Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in ... - Cornwallis Group

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MINKOV AND SMOLYNEC: 3-D SOVIET STYLE 189Efforts to expand the public sector in agriculture failed. The land reforms introduced in1978 antagonized farmers and landlords and limited state control of the sector. The firstreform – canceling agricultural loans – did not eliminate the farmer’s need for credit. Thesecond reform was an imposition of ceilings on land ownership and the distribution of theexcess land to small owners or landless peasants. It too was met various practical difficulties,such as scarcity of cultivable land overall, lack of information on ownership, lack ofcompensation for the expropriated land and the sanctity of ownership in Islamic law. Thegrandiose plans to create thousands of cooperatives also could not be fulfilled. In 1982 theirnumber stood at 1,217 and only grew to 1,274 in 1984. The creation of new farms declinedsharply in 1986, and again after 1988 (Giustozzi, 294). In 1989, cooperatives only generated1% of all agricultural produce (Giustizzi, 169).The most serious damage to the agricultural sector, however, was the Red Army’sdecision to destroy the mujahidin economy as part of its counterinsurgency strategy.Although military operations by the Red Army to prevent the mujahidin from relying on thecountryside as an economic and supply base were successful (Rubin, 1995, 180-181), asalready mentioned, they also led to hundreds of thousands of casualties, the emigration of 5million people to Pakistan and Iran as refugees, the emigration of additional 2 million tourban centers, and the destruction of 20% of the rural villages. As a result of this destruction,the abandonment of farms and the loss of labour, by 1983 the production and yields ofagricultural products declined significantly (Farr and Gul, 67). Livestock decreased betweenone to two thirds (Rubin, 1995, 227) (Graph 12).40%35%36%30%30%% Farmers25%20%15%10%13%12%24%20%12%5%0%0%1978 1980 1985 1986 1987Reported by Farmers in AfghanistanReported by Farmers who left AfghanistanGraph 12: Farmers Reporting Destruction of Irrigation by the Soviet Army (based ondata from: Rubin, 1995, 228).Faced with a deteriorating agricultural sector and an antagonized rural population, theregime gradually softened its land reform policies. After 1989, all efforts at land reformswere officially abandoned and a guarantee of land ownership was built into the constitution(Giustozzi, 169). With the decrease of major military operations after 1985, it is believed thatthe agricultural sector was able to rebound, however no data exists to demonstrate this. Itshould be noted that by that time, the rural economy no longer provided the economic base tothe resistance. This role was assumed by the foreign aid supplied by the US and Saudi Arabiaand distributed through Pakistan. This aid made the insurgency independent of the localeconomy (Rubin (1995), 181, 231-232).
190 THE CORNWALLIS GROUP XII: ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORTThe decreased agricultural output, combined with the inability of the government to exertcontrol over the rural economy as a whole, reflected on the state’s capacity to feed itsprimarily urban population. While prior to 1978, Afghanistan produced enough wheat andother foodstuff’s production, in the 1980s it relied mostly on imports of wheat from theUSSR and occasionally India. The wheat imports increased from 74,000 tons in 1982 toabout 250,000 tons in 1985. Government efforts to buy wheat locally only contributedaround 40,000 tons per year until 1987, when as a result of the national reconciliation processand, perhaps, a rebounding agricultural economy, the amount of domestically purchasedwheat increased to 140,000 tons and 150,000 tons in 1988 (Graph 13).300,000250,000200,000150,000100,00050,00001982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988From USSRFrom domestic sourcesGraph 13: Afghan Wheat Supply, 1982-88 (based on data from: Giustozzi, 223).100%90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%The April Revolution33%28%37%34%64%61%87%59%72%57%Sovietinvasion1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 198271%68%Exports to USSRImports from USSRGraph 14: Afghan Trade with the USSR (based on data from: Noorzoy, 164).The other vector of Afghan economic policy development during the 1980s – to increasebilateral trade with the Soviet Union – was also consistently followed. Exports to USSRinvolved agricultural products and resources such as gas and copper. Imports consistedprimarily of manufactured products and military equipment. Combined with the number ofjoint venture projects, the rate of Soviet-Afghan trade increase reflects the economic
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