Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in ... - Cornwallis Group

194 THE CORNWALLIS GROUP XII: ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-AGENCY SUPPORTmujahidin commanders were appointed in 14 districts and 4 provinces as governors(Giustozzi, 173). The first non-PDPA Prime Minister since 1978 was appointed in 1988(Giustozzi, 163).Despite the failure to achieve a compromise with the opposition parties, successes wereregistered in accommodating the tribal leaders and mujahidin commanders. This wasaccomplished through offering concessions for more local autonomy and material support. Infact, those willing to cooperate with the government were offered what amounted to effectiveself-rule. The controversial reforms were first amended to the point of being irrelevant andlater completely abandoned. Former mujahidin were allowed to enroll in the militias andgiven large salaries and landholdings. These two developments signaled to many mujahidincommanders and tribal leaders that the government had corrected its mistakes and hadrecognized the limits of its authority. From the point of view of the mujahidin and the tribalchiefs, it simply paid better than the cooperation with the opposition parties. From thepopulation’s point of view, changing sides to the government was not surrender but rather areturn of the power and the autonomy to the tribe (Giustozzi, 173).As a result of National Reconciliation, by 1989, 70-80% of mujahidin commanders hadceased military operations against the government. By the end of the war, 25% of all nongovernmentarmed units had signed “reconciliation” agreements while 40% had ceasefireagreements with the government. It is estimated that only 12% of the mujahidin rejected anydeals (Guistozzi, 188-189). As already mentioned earlier, the number of governmentcontrolledvillages almost doubled in the period 1986-1989 (Graph 16).The National Reconciliation was in general lines very similar to the “pacification” policypreviously pursued. The difference was that while the latter was deemed an auxiliary to themain thrust of sovietization, the former was now was considered the main policy of receivinglegitimacy.140,000120,000100,00080,00060,00040,00020,000-114,000120,000125,00082,00042,00060,00045,0006,000 6,913 11,5331986 1987 1988 1989Mujahideen going over to the governmentMujahidin in discussions with governmentMujahidin signed ceasefire agreementsGraph 16: National Reconciliation Process, 1986-89 (based on data from: Guistozzi,282).