Chapter 1

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MARITIME DOCTRINE IN CONTEXT1The Type 42 destroyer HMS SHEFFIELD, damaged by an Exocet missileduring the Falkland Islands conflict, 4 May 1982SurpriseSurprise, often an important part of effective offensive action, wasimpossible to achieve in strategic terms. The enemy knew exactly whatwe hoped to do. At the tactical level, a degree of surprise was achievedin almost every area, usually preceded by substantial deception.Deception was used during the approach to the area (18th-30th April)to convince the Argentineans that we were coming straight in to theStanley area for landing on May 1st/2nd. This was successful, drawingout the Argentinean navy and, less successfully their air force for twodays, to attack us. It did much to defeat the Argentinean navy andconvince us that the Sea Harrier was an effective interceptor after all.After that and before the landing, deception was used in ChoiseulSound to make it look as if we might land there. Deception was also11
BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE / THIRD EDITIONused in all air operations from the carriers to disguise the Battle Group’sposition. Surprise was achieved in the main landing itself in San CarlosWater, in the Pebble Island raid (where the airstrip was virtuallyundefended), and in most land force attacks.Concentration of ForceThis was kept constantly in mind but was extremely difficult to achieveduring the passage South as units were detached for other operationsthroughout the approach phase (HMS BRILLIANT Group, OpPARAQUAT). Thereafter it was kept constantly in mind despite the clearneed to split forces at the landing phase.Economy of EffortThis was always a battle requiring the maximum economy of effort. Thebattle hung in the balance throughout, whatever it may have seemed athome. Assets were invariably in short supply. For example, we startedwith only some 24 fixed-wing interceptors, over half of which had onlya day intercept capability. One only was lost to enemy action and five toaccidents. Reinforcement by limited RAF GR3 assets was critical to takethe ground attack load off the Sea Harrier force remaining. Time andweather were against us. Re-supply routes were long. We only had twoaircraft carriers in fleet service - during war operations, both wererequired ‘up front’ with no reserve. As an indication of the ‘economy ofeffort’, on about 12th June, the Battle Group had only one of sevenchannels of Sea Dart fire serviceable, no ASW Sea Kings in the role(some were sent inshore to assist land forces, the rest were doing whatlittle they could to act as surface search and AEW), and the followingevening, of four DD/FF requested for night operations in support of landforces, only two could get in and one of those had a shaft locked.‘Paucity’ was more the word than ‘economy’.12
Page 1 and 2: HMS OCEAN, with Support Helicopters
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Chapter 1

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