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Patient Safety and the "Just Culture"

Patient Safety and the "Just Culture"

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<strong>Patient</strong> <strong>Safety</strong><strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>“<strong>Just</strong> Culture”David Marx, JDPresident, Outcome Engineering, LLC2007Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Agenda• What is <strong>Just</strong> Culture?• The <strong>Safety</strong> Task• The <strong>Just</strong> Culture Model• Statewide InitiativesCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.What is a “<strong>Just</strong> Culture?”


An Introduction to <strong>Just</strong> CultureThe single greatest impediment toerror prevention in <strong>the</strong> medical industry is“that we punish people formaking mistakes.”Dr. Lucian LeapeProfessor, Harvard School of Public HealthTestimony before Congress onHealth Care Quality ImprovementCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


An Introduction to <strong>Just</strong> Culture“There are activities in which <strong>the</strong> degree ofprofessional skill which must be required is sohigh, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> potential consequences of <strong>the</strong>smallest departure from that high st<strong>and</strong>ard areso serious, that one failure to perform inaccordance with those st<strong>and</strong>ards is enough tojustify dismissal.”Lord DenningEnglish JudgeCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


An Introduction to <strong>Just</strong> Culture“People make errors, which lead to accidents.Accidents lead to deaths. The st<strong>and</strong>ard solutionis to blame <strong>the</strong> people involved. If we find outwho made <strong>the</strong> errors <strong>and</strong> punish <strong>the</strong>m, we solve<strong>the</strong> problem, right? Wrong. The problem isseldom <strong>the</strong> fault of an individual; it is <strong>the</strong> fault of<strong>the</strong> system. Change <strong>the</strong> people without changing<strong>the</strong> system <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems will continue.”Don NormanAuthor, <strong>the</strong> Design of Everyday ThingsCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


An Introduction to <strong>Just</strong> Culture“…No person may operate an aircraftin a careless or reckless mannerso as to endanger<strong>the</strong> life or property of ano<strong>the</strong>r.”Federal Aviation Regulations§ 91.13 Careless or Reckless OperationCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


An Introduction to <strong>Just</strong> Culture“As far as I am concerned, when I say “careless” I am not talkingabout any kind of “reckless” operation of an aircraft, but simply<strong>the</strong> most basic form of simple human error or omission that <strong>the</strong>Board has used in <strong>the</strong>se cases in its definition of“carelessness.” In o<strong>the</strong>r words, a simple absence of <strong>the</strong> duecare required under <strong>the</strong> circumstances, that is, a simple act ofomission, or simply“ordinary negligence,” a human mistake.”National Transportation <strong>Safety</strong> BoardAdministrative Law JudgeEngen v. Chambers <strong>and</strong> LangfordCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


The Problem StatementWhat system ofaccountability bestsupports systemsafety?SupportofSystem<strong>Safety</strong>As applied to:• Providers• Managers• Healthcare Institutions• RegulatorsBlame-FreeCulturePunitiveCultureCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.The <strong>Safety</strong> Task


Managing System ReliabilityDesign forSystem Reliability…100%SystemFailureSystem ReliabilitySuccessfulOperation• Human factors design toreduce <strong>the</strong> rate of error• Barriers to prevent failure• Recovery to capturefailures before <strong>the</strong>ybecome critical• Redundancy to limit <strong>the</strong>effects of failure0%PoorGoodFactors Affecting System Performance… knowing that systems will never be perfectCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Managing Human ReliabilityDesign forHuman Reliability…100%HumanErrorHuman Reliability• Information• Equipment/Tools• Design/Configuration• Job/Task• Qualifications/Skills• Perception of Risk• Individual Factors• Environment/Facilities• Organizational Environment• Supervision• Communication0%PoorSuccessfulOperationFactors Affecting Human PerformanceGood… knowing humans will never be perfectCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.The <strong>Just</strong> Culture Model


A Model that Focuses on Three Duties balancedagainst Organizational <strong>and</strong> Individual Values• The Three Duties– The duty to avoid causingunjustified risk or harm– The duty to produce anoutcome– The duty to follow aprocedural rule• Organizational <strong>and</strong>Individual Values– <strong>Safety</strong>– Cost– Effectiveness– Equity– Dignity– etcCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


The Behaviors We Can Expect• Human error - inadvertent action; inadvertently doingo<strong>the</strong>r that what should have been done; slip, lapse,mistake.• At-risk behavior – behavioral choice that increasesrisk where risk is not recognized or is mistakenlybelieved to be justified.• Reckless behavior - behavioral choice to consciouslydisregard a substantial <strong>and</strong> unjustifiable risk.Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


ExampleA nurse is going to administer a medication to a baby in <strong>the</strong>neonatal ICU. The ICU has an automated dispensing system.The automated dispensing system opens a drawer with fourbins. As he has always done, he reached into <strong>the</strong> second binwhere <strong>the</strong> vial of medication is, confirms <strong>the</strong> blue cap on <strong>the</strong> vial,grabs <strong>the</strong> medication <strong>and</strong> takes it to deliver <strong>the</strong> medication. Atno time in <strong>the</strong> process did <strong>the</strong> nurse actually confirm <strong>the</strong>medication label, instead relying on <strong>the</strong> medication’s location in<strong>the</strong> dispensing system <strong>and</strong> color of <strong>the</strong> cap to confirm <strong>the</strong> correctmedication. In this case, pharmacy had dispensed <strong>the</strong> wrongdose in <strong>the</strong> dispensing system.Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Accountability for Our BehaviorsHumanErrorAt-RiskBehaviorRecklessBehaviorInadvertent action: slip, lapse,mistakeA choice: risk not recognized orbelieved justifiedConscious disregard ofunreasonable riskManage through changes in:Manage through:Manage through:ProcessesProceduresTrainingemoving incentives for At-Risk Behaviorsreating incentives forhealthy behaviorsRemedial actionPunitive actionDesignncreasing situationalawarenessEnvironmentConsole Coach PunishCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


<strong>Just</strong> Culture is about:AdverseEvents• Creating an open, fair,<strong>and</strong> just culture• Creating a learningcultureHumanErrors• Designing safe systems• Managing behavioralchoicesSystemDesignManagerial<strong>and</strong> StaffChoicesLearning Culture / <strong>Just</strong> CultureCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


It’s About a Proactive Learning Culture• It’s not seeing events asthings to be fixed• It’s seeing events asopportunities to improveour underst<strong>and</strong>ing of risk– System risk, <strong>and</strong>– Behavioral riskWhere management decisionsare based upon where our limitedresources can be applied tominimize <strong>the</strong> risk of harm,knowing our system is comprisedof sometimes faulty equipment,imperfect processes, <strong>and</strong> falliblehuman beingsCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


It’s About Reinforcing <strong>the</strong> Roles of Risk,Quality, <strong>and</strong> HR• Risk/Quality– Helping improve <strong>the</strong>effectiveness of <strong>the</strong>learning process– Providing tools to linemanagers– Helping to redesignsystems• HR– Protecting <strong>the</strong> learningculture– Helping with managerialcompetencies• Consoling• Coaching• PunishingCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


It’s About Changing Managerial Expectations• Knowing my risks– Investigating <strong>the</strong> source of errors <strong>and</strong> at-riskbehaviors– Turning events into an underst<strong>and</strong>ing of risk• Designing safe systems• Facilitating safe choices– Consoling– Coaching– PunishingCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


It’s About Changing Staff Expectations• Looking for <strong>the</strong> risks around me• Reporting errors <strong>and</strong> hazards• Helping to design safe systems• Making safe choices– Following procedure– Making choices that align with organizational values– Never signing for something that was not doneCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.Statewide Initiatives


Statewide Initiatives• A willingness of stakeholders to work toge<strong>the</strong>r– Individual providers– Healthcare organizations– Professional boards– Departments of health• One model of shared accountability– Protecting <strong>the</strong> learning culture– <strong>Safety</strong>-supportive accountabilityCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


An Algorithm to Follow• One methodthat worksacross allvalues• One methodthat works bothpre <strong>and</strong> posteventCopyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Doves <strong>and</strong> Hawks – Who are we?Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.


Thank YouDavid Marx, JDdmarx@outcome-eng.comwww.justculture.org972-618-3600Copyright 2007, Outcome Engineering, LLC. All rights reserved.

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