comparative assessment of decentralization in africa: ethiopia desk ...

figure continues to increase. Intended to range in population size from 100,000 to 120,000, it isclear that woredas fall outside this range (see Tegegne, 2007).Regional states in Ethiopia have considerable constitutional protections. The most unique ofthese is the aforementioned provision (of Article 39), which guarantees Ethiopia’s regions a rightto secede, albeit upon completion of a substantial political process that includes supermajoritiesin regional legislative action and a subsequent referendum, followed by approval from the upperchamber of the national legislature known as the House of Federation (HF). The Constitutioncreated the HF to represent the regional states. It has limited power in many areas of lawmaking,relative to the lower House of Parliament, but substantial power in shaping revenue distributionsfor decentralized governance. Finally, the Constitution also instituted a reserve power clause thatensured residual powers for the regional states. There is thus a significant vertical division ofauthority between the center and the regions, as will be further elaborated in our discussion of―Authority‖ and ―Autonomy‖ below.Woredas (or districts) are also well ensconced in ordinary law and are on solid institutionalfooting, though they were not established by the federal Constitution itself. Rather, each regionalstate has passed its own constitution with provisions for the woredas, which were givensubstantial powers nationwide with the District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP)beginning in 2001.We may thus say that the decentralization of formal political authority in Ethiopia isconsiderable. However, to preview the argument on intermediate objectives, we may also saythere are significant limitations in the degree of autonomy, accountability, and capacity that maybe found at subnational levels. It is precisely in the formal balance of power between levels ofgovernment that Ethiopia has advanced farthest; we will have cause to elaborate on thesignificant limitations to decentralization in greater detail in Section 2.1.4 HISTORY OF DECENTRALIZATIONThe stated rationale for regional decentralization in Ethiopia—a rationale that will beproblematized in Section 3 (―Political Economy‖)—was to split with the centralized governanceof the Derg regime, and to accommodate Ethiopia’s nationalities. Decentralization began inEthiopia in the years after 1991, as the Derg collapsed in the face of armed challenges from thecombined forces of the EPRDF, led by two opposition movements that first took root in thenortheastern part of the country among Eritrean and Tigrayan peoples: the EPLF and TPLF.With Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1995–present) at its head, the TPLF became the leadingorganization in regime transition, in the drafting of the new Constitution, and in the EPRDFcoalition government that followed. Meanwhile, under Isiaias Afwerki, the EPLF foundedmodern Eritrea, splitting off from Ethiopia in 1993. For more on the timeline of decentralization,see Appendix 2.Initially, the TPLF sought regional decentralization as a means to ―hold together‖ the peoples ofEthiopia. While the TPLF led the EPRDF, the opposition to the Derg also drew support from ahost of other nationalities, including the Oromo and the Somali. Accommodating thesemovements and peoples seemed the first step in state reconstruction. However, the EPRDFquickly developed top-down patterns of governance—led by the TPLF—that pushed in thedirection of more centralized federation (cf. Keller, 2002). TPLF leaders in the coalition4 ETHIOPIA DESK STUDY