comparative assessment of decentralization in africa: ethiopia desk ...

which competitive/pluralist politics is found at local level is an indicator of transparency andaccountability (Tegegne, Taye, Kassahun, and Meheret, 2004).In Ethiopian decentralization, we can distinguish accountability between levels of governmentand between the government and the people. At the various levels of SNG in Ethiopia, dualaccountability exists. This takes the form of ―upward accountability‖ to higher levels ofgovernment and ―downward accountability‖ to electors. Concerning the latter, the formalassertion of accountability is found in the Constitution, which ascertains that sovereignty residesin the nations, nationalities, and people of Ethiopia which is expressed through their electedrepresentatives (Article 8). Similarly, the Constitution states in Article 12 that the conduct ofaffairs of government shall be transparent, any public official is accountable for any failure inofficial duties, and in case of loss of confidence the people may recall an elected representative(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [FDRE], 1995). The Constitution therefore providesfor the fundamental legal basis for political accountabilityAll SNG have popularly elected local councils that should be accountable to the electorate.Elections are a first important mechanism that allows people to express theirsatisfaction/dissatisfaction, of course, and secret ballot voting occurs once every five years. Theelectoral system provides recourse for those disenchanted with local officials. At the regionallevel, the councils are accountable to the people, while at the woreda level the councils areaccountable to the people by whom they are elected and to the regional executive committeethrough the zonal executive committee. Such dual accountability has its own problems in that itmight relegate accountability to electors to secondary status. In case of cities and towns with noindependent councils, decisions affecting cities and towns are undertaken by woreda councilors.The managers of these cities are appointed and accountable to woreda administration (Meheret,2007). This practice brings upward accountability, which has a potential of neglectingcommunity interest.There is also a system of horizontal accountability between branches of government. Woredacouncils have standing committees to oversee sector activities. This practice is also evident at thefederal level, where the Prime Minister, as chief of the executive, and various sector ministersface the Parliament, which assesses their performance on the basis of reports. The oversightfunctions of councils, however, are compromised because of conflict of interest, as cabinetmembers in all woredas are also members of the councils (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008).At the woreda level, in addition to representative accountability, there is administrative/servicedelivery accountability (CIDA, 2005). This refers to woreda sector offices (health, agriculture,education etc.) which are headed by appointed professional civil servants. The main problemnoted here is the blurring of the distinction between the elected and appointed personnel. At theworeda level, those who run sector offices are both elected and appointed officials.Public scrutiny remains one of the most important means of ensuring accountability, but thissocial accountability is not a well-developed area in the Ethiopian decentralization schemes.Ethiopian decentralization makes no reference to civil society and there is no provision formembers of civil society to represent their constituencies in local councils or the nationalparliament (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004). The tradition of scrutinizing plans, budgets, and otherdocuments is not instituted in the decentralization drive. A recent citizen report card surveyconducted in seven regions in 21 rural woredas has shown that 87 percent of the households haveno information on woreda level government budget, 83 percent of the households have noETHIOPIA DESK STUDY 15