MEGAPROJECT Project Environment

THE MEGAPROJECT PORTFOLIOEdited byProf Naomi Brookes and Sarah KingAll rights, including translation are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission being obtainedISBN 978-0-9576805-0-0© University of Leeds, 2013

ForewordMegaprojects, sometimes known as major projects or complex projects and services, are extremely large-scale investmentprojects typically costing over €1 billion. Megaprojects include, oil and gas extraction and processing projects and transportinfrastructural projects and even cultural events such as the Olympics. Megaprojects are united by their extreme complexityand by a long record of very poor delivery. Their inability to be designed appropriately and delivered on time and to budgethas profound implications not only for the construction organisations delivering them but also for the client organisationscommissioning them which are often governments spending public money.The portfolio of cases brought together in this book have been provided by members of the MEGAPROJECT COST Action.This is a trans-European research network dedicated to improving the design and delivery of megaprojects. The cases havebeen complied using a standard template to make it much easier to facilitate cross-case learning. The authors of individualcases are given at the start of each section and are very happy to be contacted if more information is required.The MEGAPROJECT Action is now using these cases to draw out cross-sector lessons on how megaproject deliveryperformance can be improved and is using highly innovative approaches to spot patterns of performance. We hope that thewider research community will also be able to make good use of the rich empirical evidence contained in thisMEGAPROJECT Portfolio!Professor Naomi BrookesMEGAPROJECT COST Action ChairThis production of this portfolio has been generously supported by the COSTframework for European Cooperation in Science and Technology

SECTION 1Cross Sector Case Studies

1.1 HIGH TECHNOLOGY PARK, SOFIABasic Project InformationCase compiled by: Milen BaltovContact details: mbaltov@bfu.bgProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)Design and Development of High-Technology Park SofiaRepublic of Bulgaria, SofiaTo provide increased investment opportunities and favourable science and business environmentin order to maximise direct foreign and domestic investments in high tech sectors and fostereconomic development as part of Bulgaria‘s preparations for implementing EU cohesion policyupon accession.To improve the research, technology and innovation infrastructure, and establish efficientconditions for attracting new high tech products, processes and services, thus increasing theeconomic development potential.420 mil EURFirst phase performed – land design and prefeasibility studyAfter changes in the OP Competitiveness this phase will be repeated50 mil EUR from the EU funds – the Operative programme Competitiveness of the BulgarianEconomy; 130 mil EUR as assets from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 20 mil EUR in form ofdesign and regulations by the Sofia municipality and some 220 mil EUR expected by the high techcompanies to enter the park in the form of the equipment and know-how to provide15 hectares of already performing as production and experimental activities plot in Sofia and some3-4 additional appr .5 hectares plots in other cities in Bulgaria5

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (Internal)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)InternalSupply-Side Client Ministry of Economy, Energy and ToursimFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersOP ―Competitiveness‖, Sofia Municipality, BourgasMunicipality, Private sectorEuropean structural fund and national governmentPotential investors in high tech parksClient’s OwnersOther internal supply-sidecategories(please specify)Demand Side Principal ContractorMunicipalities , Research and private sectorCategory Case-StudyMunicipality of Sofia, Bulgarian Academy of SciencesFirst Tier ContractorsSecond Tier ConsultantsProfessional Services ProvidersOther internal supply-sidecategories(please specify)CategoryCase-Study6

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (External)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)ExternalPublicRegulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Municipalitiy of Sofia, Municipality of Bourgas etc.Ministry of Economy, Energy and TourismCategoryBulgarian SME AgencyInvest Bulgaria AgencyBulgarian Academy of SciencesCase-studyPrivate Local residentsPopulation, industrial innovative and high tech companies which areactive in the region , local scientific and educational institutionsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)CategoryCase-study7

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand Structure5 Key experts in the following fields: Business Planning and Management, Marketing, Civil construction orArchitecture, Finance, Business ManagementSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Project Management Software □Lessons Learnt Transfers Stakeholder Involvement Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Relationship Management Tools Project Knowledge Management Tools Team Building Tools Competency framework Other Tools and Techniques or More Information8

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesHR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration ManagementProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) Not Present □ No Information □Elaboration of mature technical documentation for the investment projects; Timely preparation of theservices tender dossiers; Delays in appointing the management teams and instability of management staff;Inability of municipal authorities to cover the running costs of the industrial zones; Worsening of the localeconomic environment and/or competitive position of the industrial zones with regard to other investmentopportunities.Present (describe below) Not Present □ No Information □Training needs assessment;Development and organisation of a management training programme for the key staff at each technologicalpark; Identification of the legal entity models;Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) Not Present □ No Information □SWOT analyses of more than 5 sites for technological park development;Identification of the main activities for high technology infrastructure improvement and development ofR&D infrastructure; Set up of a comprehensive database for technological park site locations.Present (describe below) Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Quality management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Communications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) Not Present □ No Information □Organisation of information days, promotional events, press conferences, etc.; publication of aninformational web-site on the services offered by the industrial zones; Elaboration of standardpresentations (for fairs) and a marketing plan with annual implementation programme for the industrialzones promotion.9

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder or Stakeholder GroupingMinistry of Economy, Energy and TourismOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsPreparation of a programme for developing technological parks in BulgariaLocal authorities, NGOs, private entitiesInvestigation and development of management models for technological parksLocal authorities, NGOs, private entitiesElaboration of business plans and marketing strategies for the technological parksLocal authorities (district and municipal)Improvement of capacity at local level for promoting and attracting R&D investmentsLocal authorities, academic institutes anduniversitiesDistrict AdministrationsTraining and appointment of competent operational teamsIdentification of sites for further infrastructural developmentBulgarian Investment AgencyBuilding of a data-base of investments and appropriate industrial, research andbusiness locations10

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectNational strategy for science investigations,Investment Promotion Act, National Strategy for Investment Promotion,Law on Spatial Planning, Law on Environmental Protection, Law on State Property, Law on MunicipalProperty, Law on local taxesDraft Innovation LawPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectGoals of the high tech and industrial development, conformity with existing policies of the governmentrelated with the examined region;Engagements of the terrestrial regulation at national and regional level focusing also on the potential smartspecialization in some economic sectorsAiming to improve the competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy according the Governmental strategyvision 2020SustainabilityComments on the relationship ofthe project to issues ofsustainabilityThe technological parks investments and promotion: support economic restructuring in regions with loweradaptability to the competitiveness of Bulgarian economy, dynamic market conditions; provide positivesocial and demographic effects in long-term perspective by creating new attractive jobs, accessing to ahigher level of technology and reducing the disparities in the economic development of regions; enforce therenovation of existing R&D infrastructure and/or creation of appropriate new one; attract further researchand high tech investments with perspective to higher value added production and services.11

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIMEIX-XII,2009I-IV,2010V-VIII,2010IX-XII,2010I-IV,2011V-VIII,2011IX-XII,2011I-IV,2012V-VIII,2012IX-XII,2012M1 -4 M 5-8 M 9-12 M 13-16 M 17-20 M 21-24 M 25-28 M 29-32 M 33-36 M 37 - 40Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersTask 1 Site Management and stakeholders identification – month 4 to 35Events and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementInterim reportsevery 6 monthsMonthly Progress reports – from 1 to 36Inception report– month 1 to 2Final report –month 40Events and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceTask 1 SWOT analyses, Preparation of the technical documentation (detailed design, feasibilityTask 2 Remedialstudy, IRR/ ERR, EIA) – month 4 to 32Actions Identification -month 1 to 3Events and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentTask 3 Database, Marketing and Promotion Strategy – month 33- 4012

1.2 INDUSTRIAL ZONES DEVELOPMENT, BULGARIABasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeCase compiled by: Milen BaltovContact details: mbaltov@bfu.bgIndustrial Zones DevelopmentRepublic of BulgariaTo provide increased investment opportunities and favourable business environment in order tomaximise direct foreign and domestic investments and foster economic development as part ofBulgaria‘s preparations for implementing EU cohesion policy upon accession.ScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status (i.e.. initiation,planning, construction, operation,dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)To improve the infrastructure of industrial zones, business parks and locations and establishefficient conditions for attracting new investments, thus increasing the economic developmentpotential.1 200 mil EURAll the 25 single zones under the project have passed feasibility studies and design of the land andinfrastructure. 10 of them are with invested money for infrastructure and started accumulation of thebusiness units investments for direct production sites.Consisting of two packages of EU funds air – 30 mil for design under Phare programme and 100mil for infrastructure under the Operational Programme Regional Development and another 120 milEUR as infrastructure investments by the State company Industrial zones, 400 mil EUR the value ofthe assets (allocated by the municipalities, the state and in few cases by companies). 700 mil EURare the indicated investments in business establishments inside only in the already establishedzones.Activities are to be implemented in approximately40-50 industrial areas identified within thethe 28 districts on the territory of Bulgaria.13

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalPublicStakeholder Category Case-StudyRegulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Private Local residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsMinistry of economy, tourismand energy25 municipalitiesMinistry of agriculture forlands with changed purposesMinistry of Regional Development and Public WorksInvestment Policy Directorate (Ministry of Economy and Energy)Ministry of FinanceCategoryBulgarian SME AgencyInvest Bulgaria AgencyNational Association of the Municipalities inthe Republic of BulgariaCase-studyPopulation, industrial companies which are active in the region ,local educational institutionsIn the cases when agriculture land is to be transferred toindustrialIn most cases the land is already with industrial purposesOnly in single cases as most of the zones are to cover sectorsthat are not pollutingNoneNoneComments (e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)15

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementAt the Ministry – 4 experts; At the municipalities total of 50 experts; At the State company IndustrialZones – 3.For the Management Consultant 5 Key experts in the following fields: Business Planning andManagement, Marketing, Civil construction or Architecture, Finance, Business Management and 40additional short term expertsFor the design consultants 7 key experts and more than 130 short term consultantsProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches Project Management Software □Lessons Learnt Transfers Stakeholder Involvement Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Team Building Tools □Competency framework Other Tools and Techniques or More Information16

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timeOriginal Targets and changes to targetsBy 2010 in 60% of the zones 30% of the plots tobe bought or rented by investorsAll the previous (total 7) free trade zones to befast growing industrial parks by 2011Actual Achievements Against TargetsLess than 20% of the plots in some 40% of thezones are occupied at the beginning of 2012None of the previous (total 7) free trade zones isfunctioning on full scale and most of them stillgenerate only trade facilities revenues18

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder or Stakeholder GroupingMinistry of Regional Development and Public Works;Ministry of Economy, Energy and TourismOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsPreparation of a programme for developing industrial zones in BulgariaLocal authorities, NGOs, private entitiesInvestigation and development of management models for industrial zonesLocal authorities, NGOs, private entitiesElaboration of business plans and marketing strategies for the industrial zonesLocal authorities (district and municipal)Improvement of capacity at local level for promoting and attracting investmentsLocal authorities, academic institutes and universitiesTraining and appointment of competent operational teamsDistrict AdministrationsBulgarian Investment AgencyIdentification of sites for further infrastructural developmentBuilding of a data-base of investments and appropriate industrial and businesslocations19

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectInvestment Promotion Act, National Strategy for Investment Promotion,Law on Spatial Planning, Law on Environmental Protection, Law on State Property, Law on MunicipalProperty, Law on local taxesDraft Law on Industrial ZonesPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectGoals of the industrial development, conformity with existing policies of the government relatedwith the examined region;Engagements of the terrestrial regulation at national and regional level focusing also on thepotential specialization in some economic sectorsAiming to improve the investment environment, the Bulgarian Parliament has adopted anInvestment Promotion Act in April 2004. This Act ensures equal treatment of foreign and domesticinvestors and provides for both investment incentives and integrated administrative services inshorter terms20

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and (Phase project) Activities TimelineIX-XII,2007I-IV,2008V-VIII,2008IX-XII,2008I-IV,2009V-VIII,2009IX-XII,2009I-IV,2010V-VIII,2010IX-XII,2010M1 -4 M 5-8 M 9-12 M 13-16 M 17-20 M 21-24 M 25-28 M 29-32 M 33-36 M 37 - 40TIMEEvents and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersTask 4 Site Management Training Programme – month 4 to 37Events and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementInception report– month 1 to 2Interim reportsevery 6 monthsMonthly Progress reports – from 1 to 36Draft final report – month 33-35Final report –month 36 to 37Events and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceTask 1 SWOT analyses, Preparation of the technical documentation (detailed design, feasibilityTask 2 Remedialstudy, IRR/ ERR, EIA) – month 4 to 32Actions Identification -month 1 to 3Events and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentTask 3 Database, Marketing and Promotion Strategy – month 4- 3521

1.3 MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICECase compiled by: Corrado lo StortoContact details: corrado.lostorto@unina.itBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeContractualFrameworkMOSE project (Modulo Sperimentale Elettromeccanico – in English, Experimental Electromechanical Module)City of Venice Lagoon, ItalyTo protect the city of Venice from floodsThe project is an integrated defence system consisting of rows of mobile gates able to isolate the Venetianlagoon from the Adriatic Sea when the tide reaches above an established level (110 cm) and up to amaximum of 3 m.The project is managed by a concessionaire – the Consorzio Venezia Nuova (in English, The ConsortiumNew Venice) – in trust of the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport, Venice Water Authority. The CVN isdelegated by the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport (previously named Ministry of Public Works) todesign and execute the works to regulate tidal floods in accordance with the Special Law for Venice, L. 798/84Relevant PhysicalDimensionsA total of 78 gates divided into 4 rows installed to protect 3 inlets. Specifically: 2 rows of 21 and 20 gates atthe Lido Treporti and San Nicolò inlet respectively, the widest connected by an artificial island; 1 row of 19gates at the Malamocco inlet; and 1 row of 18 gates at the Chioggia inlet. Length of the single gate is 20m.Total number of people working in the construction of the system is 3,000. Estimated number of peopleworking to manage the system is between 120 and 15022

MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICE23

MOSE FLOOD PROTECTION, VENICE24

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyComments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Supply-SideClientConsorzio Venezia Nuova (CVN)Equity joint venture Consortium specifically formed for this project.CVN is responsible for studying, monitoring, planning,experimenting and implementing measures delegated to the Stateto safeguard Venice and the lagoon on behalf of the Ministry forInfrastructure and Transport in accordance with the Special Law forVenice (Law n. 798/84)FinanciersPublic funds from Italian Government , European Investment Bank,and European CommissionSponsorsClient’sCustomersn/aThe Italian Government through the Ministry for Infrastructure andTransport – the Venice Water AuthorityThe Venice Water Authority is the local department of the Ministryfor Infrastructure and Transport with direct and primaryresponsibility for the safeguard, security and hydraulic protection ofa large area falling within a number of North Italy regions (Veneto,Friuli and Trentino Alto Adige)Client’s OwnersAt the start of the project: Impregilo (39.4%), Consorzio Italvenezia(Società italiana per Condotte d‘acqua, Astaldi and Mantelli) (18.5%),Grandi Lavori Fincosit-Mazzi (18.5%), San Marco – ConsorzioCostruttori Veneti (Co.Ed.Mar, Cantieri Costruzioni Cemento,Grassetto Lavori, Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani,Intercantieri Vittadello, Sacaim, Cir, Consorzio Rialto, ConsorzioLepanto) (13.875%), Consorzio Veneto Cooperativo (2.775%), Saipem(2.5%), Società italiana per Condotte d‘acqua (2.5%), SocietàConsortile Venezia Lavori (Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani)(1.85%), Consorzio Grandi Restauri Veneziani (0.1%)Other internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)CategoryPublic ResearchInstitutionCase-StudyThe CNR (National Research Council) in 1980launched a public contest to collect ideas forVenice safeguard26

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 2Demand Side(this case has alarge number ofmain andsub-contractors.Here a sample ofthem is reported)StakeholderCategoryPrincipalContractorsCase-StudyThetis SpA was in charge of the study and research activity in the marine engineeringfield in the concept stage of the projectCordioli Costruzioni Metalliche SpA was selected through a public tender tomanufacture the first 23 retracting oscillating buoyancy flap gates and the metalliccaissons to be placed in the Lido-Treporti inlet. Each caisson has the followingdimensions: weight 300 tons, height 20m, thickness 3.60m.Nuovi Cantieri di Chioggia SpAConsorzio Maccaferri per il Progetto Venezia (Maccaferri Venice Project Consortium) –Adanti SpA, Officine Maccaferri Group and Sarti SpA. The consortium has developed asystem for the production of a Ballasted Filter Mattress (BFM), a filter layer that wouldguarantee the hydraulic performance required, heavy enough to keep the filter incontact with the sea bed at all times and in all sea conditions.FIP SpA was selected to design and manufacture the special large hinges to rotategates. The company took out a patent for the design of this model of hinge. The totalnumber of hinges assembled in the MOSE is156. The hinge is considered a criticalcomponent of the system and the Committee ―No MOSE‖ required major assurancesrelated to reliability of this component.Comments (e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills, influenceon project)This company was acquired by the ConsorzioVenezia Nuova few years ago. According to arecent decision of the Consorzio Venezia NuovaBoard, Thetis will change its mission , focusing onlyon the MOSE facilities maintenanceFirst TierContractorsProfessionalServicesProvidersSocietà Consortile MOSE Treporti (construction), Ing. E. Mantovani (second tier,construction), Trentin Consulting srl (first tier, professional services), etc.Joint venture C. Lotti & Associati SpA and Thetis SpAThis joint venture is responsible for: a) worksmanagement, b) support and control for worksrealization, material quality control, c) works costmanagementPRINCIPIA was entrusted by the Municipality of Venice the task to test the reliabilityand the feasibility of the hinge.27

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 1StakeholderCategoryPublic RegulatoryAgenciesCase-StudyISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) wasidentified as an independent institution (according to the EuropeanCommission note # 13085, 15.07.2008). In particular, ISPRA validates andcontrol the environmental monitoring activities, evaluate environmental datareleased, check if environmental targets are met.European Commission. In April 1999, the European Parliament issued theResolution on the crisis situation in Venice. Calling on the ItalianGovernment to decide by the end of the year on proceeding to the finaldesign phase of the project. In December 2005, after the claim of someenvironmental movements, the European Commission started theinfringement procedure relative to the lagoon habitat pollution, because theEC Environmental DG retained that the Italian Government had not plannedeffective mitigation measures to preserve wild birds migration and habitat.In 2008, the Venice Water Authority informed the EC Environment DGabout the mitigation measures adopted, thus making available financialresources from the European Investment Banking (circa 750,000 euro)TAR (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) and Consiglio di Stato. In total 9legal petitions have been lodged with the TAR and Consiglio di Stato, allrelated to environmental issues. All claims have been rejected.Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)The EC was favourable to project.Favourable to project. Decision made on July 14, 2000was particularly important. On the grounds of breaches ofprocedure and substance, the Regional AdministrativeTribunal for the Veneto (TAR) issued a ruling annullingthe Dec. 1998 decree of negative environmental impact ofthe Ministry of the Environment . The appeals against thedecree had been made by the Veneto Region, ASCOMand fish farming companies. TAR also rejected all theappeals made against the MOSE system by a number ofbodies including WWF, Italia Nostra, and ProvincialAuthorities. On Dec. 20, 2004 the Sixth Division of theJudicial State Council (Consiglio di Stato) has turneddown all the appeals filed by the Province, WWF andItalia Nostra against the Veneto Regional Tribunalsentence of May 22, 2004.28

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 2StakeholderCategoryPublic LocalGovernmentCase-StudyLocal Authority of Venice (Municipality of Venice)Local Authority of Chioggia (Municipality of Chioggia)Regione Veneto (Regional Administration of Veneto).The Provincial Authority of VeniceComments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)Favourable to project., but some concern about the construction of the facilities.On Feb 22, 1999 the Venice Local Authority expressed its opinion on thedesign, passing an extremely complex resolution inviting the Mayor to call for―…the continuation of design work at the lagoon inlets‖. That happened afterthe judgment of negative environmental compatibility of the design expressedby the Ministry of the Environment EIA Commission.The operations necessary to the construction of the prefabricated concretecaissons that will be implanted on the reinforced seabed are presumed to bedetrimental to the construction site (the Pellestrina inlet)Favourable to project. On Feb. 3, 1999, in a specific vote, the Chioggia LocalAuthority expressed its opinion, considering it ―indispensable for the defenceprocess to continue in its entirety […] including defence against exceptionalhigh waters‖ and delegating the Mayor to call for ―…the continuation of designwork at the lagoon inlets‖Favourable to project. On Sept. 18, 1998 the full Veneto Regional TechnicalCommission approved the design29

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 3StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyComments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)PublicNationalGovernmentThe Ministry of the EnvironmentNot favourable to the project design when it was released. OnDec. 10, 1998 the Ministry of Environment EIA Commissionexpressed a negative opinion as regards the environmentalcompatibility of the design. Thus, on Dec. 24, 1998 theMinistry of the Environment together with the Ministry ofCultural Heritage expressed ―…as the situation stands atpresent, a judgement of negative environmental compatibility―, adding, however, that ―the design could be reviewed…‖The Ministry of the Cultural HeritageFavourable to project. On Dec. 10, 1998 the Ministry ofCultural Heritage Central Office for the Environment andLandscape expressed a positive opinion as regards the designfor mobile barriers, with certain provisions.The Ministry of Public Works/The Ministry of Infrastructure andTransport was the promoter of the MOSE project.The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the so called―Comitatone‖) of all measures for the safeguard of Venice. It is thebody for policy, coordination and control of the objectives establishedby the special legislation (see Art. 4 of Law no. 798/84). ThisCommittee was made up of representatives of the competentauthorities and institutions (Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport,Environment and Territorial Protection, Cultural Heritage andActivities, University Education and Scientific Research), theChairman of the Water Authority, the Chairman of the VenetoRegional Authority, the mayors of Venice and Chioggia and Treporti-Cavallino Local Authority and two representatives of the other localauthorities along the lagoon boundary). It is chaired by the Presidentof the Council of Ministers. The secretary of the Committee is thePresident of the Venice Water Authority.30

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 4PublicStakeholderCategoryOther internalsupply-sidecategories (pleasespecify)Case-StudyCategoryUniversity andresearch institutionsCase-studyCORILA (Consorzio di Istituti Universitari e Enti di ricerca). TheConsortium was entrusted to monitor environmental impacts ofconstruction operations in the construction siteComments (e.g. maturity,previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence onproject)IndependentexpertsCommission of international experts. To produce theEnvironmental Impact Assessment of the design for mobilebarriers, the water Authority and its concessionary called on thecollaboration of, among others, a panel of professors from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. This panel of expertsfollowed the progress of studies and validated the results.Private Local Landowners n/aEnvironmentalistsWWF, Italia Nostra, some minor environmental movementsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther ExternalPrivatestakeholders(please specify)n/aUNESCOCategoryCase studyTouristsSome political movementsASCOM (association of Venetian Traders and Shopkeepers), fishfarming companies31

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis 1External StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence on projectImpact of Projecton ExternalStakeholderWWF, Italia Nostra, and some minorenvironmental movementsNot favourable Attempt to stop project progress. Extension of decision-making time No impactEuropean Commission, UNESCO Very favourable Stimulated project progress.Some change required as to the construction site management totake into account environmental issues.None identifiedLocal Authority of VeniceAs the project life-cycle has a longtime extension, the likelihood to havechanges in the political administrationof a body is great. It happened thatin the stage of the MOSE projectconceptualisation as a system ofmobile barriers it was well acceptedand supported by the localadministration. But, in late 2006, afterthe change of the political council ofthe City of Venice, the new politicaladministration opposed the MOSEsystem, asking for the evaluation of anumber of solutions indicated asalternatives.The Council of Ministers of the Italian Government, after taking intoexam the requests from the local authorities and the resultspresented in a report on project progress and the opinions of majorstakeholders (Ministry of the Environment, the Higher Council ofPublic Works, Venice Water Authority , Ministry of Cultural Heritage,Venice Port Authority, etc.), retained that no new elements haveemerged requiring the original project to be modified. However theCommittee for Policy , Coordination and Control unanimouslyapproved the agenda presented by the Venice Local Authorityconfirming the need to guarantee the continuation of extraordinarymaintenance work in the lagoon towns and cities, dredging ofcanals, raising of public paved areas and pollution abatement in thelagoon through re-financing of the Special Law for Venice. Inaddition, the following were guaranteed: scrupulous monitoring ofthe effects of all measures being implemented in the lagoon,updating of the morphological plan and rapid availability of all datarelating to the activities underway to safeguard the provincial capitalof Veneto.None identifiedLocal Authority of ChioggiaSee comment aboveThe Provincial Authority of VeniceSee comment aboveRegional Administration of VenetoFavourable32

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis 2External Stakeholder External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project External Stakeholder’s Influence on project Impact of Projecton ExternalStakeholderThe Ministry of theEnvironmentNot favourable in the first stage of development.Required further efforts and mitigation measuresThe Committee for Policy, Coordination and Controlconsidered various opinions expressed during theextraordinary EIA of the design for mobile barriers at thelagoon inlets. In a Resolution, the Committee unanimouslydelegated the water Authority to undertake directly whenresponsible, or to coordinate with others when needed aseries of interrelated in-depth studies to be completed byDec. 31, 1999. The Committee also called for the rapidsetting up of a specific Planning Office in collaboration withthe competent administrations in the hopes that this officecould be set up in time to enable it to participate in thereview of the general Plan of Interventions.None identifiedThe Ministry of CulturalHeritageFavourableThe Ministry of PublicWorks/The Ministry ofInfrastructure and TransportVery favourable. On Feb. 26, 1999 a general meeting ofthe Higher Council of Public Works expressed itsopinion on the EIS of the mobile barriers design,unanimously reconfirming its favourable opinion on thedesign solution. The Higher Council is of the opinion―…that, on the basis of technical and scientificknowledge and the extensive studies completed and inthe light of the reconfirmed indissolubility of thesafeguarding measures, it can be stated that the onlyway to defend the City of Venice from high waters isby regulating the lagoon inlets by means of a system ofmobile gates; and that there are no therefore noimpediments to developing the final design of thissystem, partly in order to introduce the improvementsand innovations deriving from the development ofscience and technology during the last six years‖Stimulated progress of project.None identifiedThe Committee for Policy,Coordination and ControlVery favourable Stimulated progress of project. None identified33

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size & StructureContractor Project Team Size andStructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementMajor role of Consorzio Venezia Nuova in the project management. CVN is a private body, a concessionaryentrusted with the task of coordination activities (feasibility study, EIS, executive design, public procurement, worksmanagement monitoring, etc.), that acts for the public interest. It interfaces the granting Administration and theexecutors of the safeguard measures (designers, consultant for special studies and experimentation, companiescarrying out works). CVN consists of large private Italian companies, consortia, cooperatives, and local firms.CVN was delegated by the Ministry of Public Works to design and execute the works to regulate tidal floods on thebasis of Law no. 798/84 (Agreement no. 6479/85).Project Tools and TechniquesOther Tools and Techniques or More InformationThe collection of special laws and decrees (> 26) that have been issued by the Italian Parliament and by the Veneto Regional Administration provided theoperational and funding framework that enabled the progress of project.Art. 4 of Law no. 798 of Nov. 29, 1984 set up the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control of all measures for the safeguard of Venice, the so-called―Comitatone‖, made up of representatives of the competent local and national authorities and institutions (Ministries of Infrastructure and Transport,Environment and Territorial Protection, Cultural Heritage and Activities, University Education and Scientific Research, the Chairman of the Water Authority, theChairman of the Veneto Regional Authority, the mayors of Venice and Chioggia and Treporti-Cavallino Local Authority and two representatives of the otherlocal authorities along the lagoon boundary) and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The secretary of the Committee is the President of theVenice Water Authority. The Comitatone is the body for policy, coordination and control of the objectives established by the special legislation issued forVenice and the lagoon.The control system also included crossed audits and verifications implemented at different levels by a number of bodies: a) the High Council of Public Works(Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport), the Venice Water Authority Technical Committee (The Venice Water Authority), the Venice Water Authority Panel ofExperts (The Venice Water Authority Safeguarding Dept.), and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova. The Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Cultural Heritageand the Veneto Regional Administration have a role in the EIS implementation.Programme Agreements are also an important operational tool that was introduced by Law no. 139/92 into safeguarding procedures. In the case of strictlyinterconnected measures involving a number of different authorities and institutions, the programme agreement enabled the identification of a joint action plan,integrating the measures to be carried out by the single different bodies and, if necessary, appointing a single implementing body. Irrespective of theimplementing body, responsibility for achieving the individual objectives remains with the legally responsible institution. It is assumed that coordinated andunitary implementation of the various measures within a programme agreement might improve operational efficiency, optimise implementation times, reducecosts and mitigate social costs. Thirteen agreements have been signed.According to Art. 3 of Law 139/92, funds to implement works aimed at regulating tidal floods may be assigned after the audit and verification of an acceptableprogress of other interventions (measures aimed at slowing down degradation of the morphological structures caused by subsidence, eustasism and erosionresulting from wave motion and wash, etc.) by the Comitatone.34

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) X Not Present □ No Information □•Detailed and extensive investigation to identify effective solutions to solve the problem of high water•Implementation of agreements among several bodies to improve coordination and procedural efficiency•Involvement of international, independent experts to implement and validate EIS resultsHR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration ManagementProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Public tenderPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X35

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating totimeOriginal Targets and changes to targets- the conceptualisation and the study in search for feasible solutionsthat lead to the project began in 1975- executive design approved and start of the works and theconstruction site in 2003- completion of works estimated at the end of 2010Actual Achievements Against Targets- estimated completion of works at the end of 2015(completion time was 2012 in 2008)- test of the gates placed in the Treporti inlet in 2013Performance relating tocostPerformance related tospecification-planned cost of 2,3 billion €-planned annual operating cost from 5 million € to 9 million €- no. 4 mobile barriers being constructed at the lagoon inlets (2 at theLido inlet, 1 at Malamocco and 1 at Chioggia)- no. 78 the total number of gates- no. 1 lock for large shipping at the Malamocco inlet enabling portactivities to continue when the gates are in operation- no. 3 small locks (2 at Chioggia and 1 at Lido-Treporti) to allow thetransit of fishing boats and other smaller vessels when the gates arein operation- 3 m the maximum tide which the gates can withstand- 60 cm the increase in sea level the MOSE System has beendesigned to cope with- 9,850 m of rock-fill to complete the visible structures such as thesmall craft harbours, jetty reinforcement and breakwaters- 4,590 m of vertical wall required to complete the visible structuresuch as locks and ―abutments‖ for the row of gates- 597,000 squared metres of bed protection and underwater structuresrequired for completion-estimated cost to complete 4,678 billion € (5,5 billionaccording to not official estimations)-estimated annual operating cost from 12 million € to18 million € (30 million € according to not officialestimations) (including maintenance)- no. 0 gates completed and placed- 63% of the work already completed- 3,000 people currently directly or indirectly employed- 9,000 m of rock-fill already completed- 4,100 m of vertical wall already completed- 398,700 square metres of bed protection andunderwater structures already completed36

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these Aims Achievement of these AimsUNESCO, EC To preserve cultural heritage in Venice and natural habitat in the Venice lagoon As the project has not yet been completedand infrastructure is not operating, thestakeholder aim s are not achievedNational and localGovernmentsVenice residents,tourists,shopkeepersTo safeguard Venice, i.e. to guarantee the complete defence of all built-up areas inthe lagoon from high waters of all levels, including extreme events, the arrest andreversal of deterioration processes of the lagoon basin, in the same timeguaranteeing port activity, water quality, and the safeguarding of lagoon morphologyTo solve the problem of high waters that has afflicted Venice and other towns andvillages in the lagoon since ancient timesAs the project has not yet been completedand infrastructure is not operating, thestakeholder aim s are not achievedAs the project has not yet been completedand infrastructure is not operating, thestakeholder aim s are not achieved37

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on theprojectThe legal and regulatory framework that is not strictly related to the project is:- Law 349/86: Introduction of the Ministry of Environment and norms related to the environmental damage . This law introduced theprocedure to carry on the environmental impact study and the list of infrastructure works needing EIS-Law 443/2001 – Legge Obiettivo: Delegation to the Government for strategic infrastructure and productive settlements and otherinterventions for the re-launching of productive activitiesMajor legislative milestones:-Law 171/73: ―The safeguarding of Venice and its lagoon is a matter of pre-eminent national interest‖-Law 404/75: Protocol for publishing the international call for tender-competition for preservation of the hydrogeological equilibrium inthe Venice lagoon and the reduction of high waters in historic centres-Vote no. 209 of 1982: Positive judgement by the Higher Council of Public Works to General feasibility Plan (the so called ―Progettone‖)covering all the measures necessary to ―preserve the hydrogeological balance of the lagoon and mitigate high waters in the historic cityand town centers‖-Law 798/84: Identification of a single body which takes responsibility for all activities (studies, experimentation, plans, and activities)associated with physical defence and restoration of environmental balance. This law represents the legal basis for the delegation ofthese activities to the Consorzio Venezia Nuova through private negotiations exempted from normal procedures-Convention no. 6479/85: on the basis of Law 798/84, CVN is delegated by Ministry of Public Works to design and execute the works toregulate tidal floods-Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Decree of August 1, 1985: Declaration of considerable public interest concerning the ecosystem of theVenice lagoon situated in the local authority areas of Venice, Jesolo, Musile di Piave, Quarto d‘Altino, Mira, Campagna Lupia, Chioggiaand Codevigo-Regional Law – Veneto Region 27/1990: Regulations for the execution of the responsibilities assigned to the Region by Law 798/84(this is only a selection of laws, decrees, and decree laws)Economic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentSpecific Economic Events impacting on the projectPolitical EnvironmentLate 2000 recessions and scarcity of funds.None identifiedPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Events impacting on theprojectThe last conservative government had a particular interest for the realization of large infrastructure investments.Any change occurred in the political government alliances and structure, both at the national and local level.38

19841982DESIGN & PROCUREMENT1981197519731966TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS & ALTERNATIVE EVALUATIONTIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTNovember 4. Catastrophic sea storm measuring 194cm on the Punta della Salute tide gauge. Venice andother towns and villages in the lagoon are completelysubmerged under a meter of water. Incalculabledamage. There is a clear awareness that the survivalof the city will never again be certain unless action istaken to defend it.The Special Law n. 171 declares the problem ofVenice to be "of priority national interest" andidentifies the physical unity and continuity of thelagoon.International competition-call for tender issued by the Ministry of Public Works for the design andconstruction of high water defenses. Five groups of companies take part. The tender is not awarded, butfive projects are used as a basis to draw up the so-called "Progettone".The "Progettone", the first feasibility study and preliminary design to protect Venice from high water, isdrawn up and presented.The "Progettone" is approved, with specific requirements, by the Higher Council of Public Works.Law No 798 of 29 November redefines the general objectives of the measures for the safeguarding ofVenice. Art. 4 sets up the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control of all measures, the so-called"Comitatone", made up of representatives of the competent local and national authorities and institutionsand chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers.39

1995199419931992DESIGN & PROCUREMENT19901989TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTNovember 17. The new conceptual design of the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets to protect Venicefrom high water is presented and then approved as part of a general plan of interventions to safeguardVenice.The conceptual design of mobile is approved by the Higher Council of Public Works.July. The preliminary design for the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets is completed.November. The preliminary design for the mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets is approved by the WaterAuthority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.A Committee of Experts from leading international engineering companies appointed by ConsorzioVenezia Nuova, the Concessionary of the Venice Water Authority, give a positive opinion on thepreliminary design.October 18. The preliminary design is approved by the Higher Council of Public Works.July 4. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (the "Comitatone"), considering the requests of Venice LocalAuthority, pass a resolution calling for the preliminary design for the mobile barriers to be submitted to an EnvironmentalImpact Assessment (EIA), delegating the Water Authority (as the body proposing the plan) the task of producing anEnvironmental Impact Study (EIS) and establishing a schedule. But the uniqueness of the Venice case also led to theadoption of an "extraordinary" EIA procedure. The Committee, in fact, decided to flank the Ministry of the Environment EIACommission by a Panel of international experts. Members of the Panel are: Prof. Philippe Bourdeau (coordinator) IGEATUniversité Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, Belgio; Prof. Jean-Marie Martin, Environment Institute, Joint Research Centre,European Commission Ispra, Italia ; Prof. Chang C. Mei, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA; Prof.Ignazio Musu, Facoltà di Economia, Università di Ca‘ Foscari, Venezia, Italia; Prof. Pier Vellinga, Institute for EnvironmentalStudies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Olanda.40

200120001999DESIGN & PROCUREMENT1998TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTJuly 7. The Panel of international experts consign its Report to the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister ofPublic Works and the Minister of the Environment. In its conclusions, the document states that the project is effective, doesnot cause large scale impacts and has minimal and mitigable influence on the local scale. It also states that "the system ofmobile barriers" integrated with local defences, "responds adequately to current problems, while leaving options for the futureopen". At the end of the Report, the Commission of experts indicated a number of specific provisions and additions.July 21. The commission of five international experts expresses a favourable opinion.September 18. The Veneto Region Technical Commission expresses a favourable opinion on the design.December 10. The Directorate General of the Ministry of Culture expresses a favourable opinion with certain reserves. On thesame day the Ministry of the Environment Environmental Impact Assessment Commission expresses a negative opinion onthe design.December 24. The Minister of the Environment together with the Minister of the Cultural Heritage, considering the position ofthe Ministry of the Environment EIA Commission, expressed, "as the situation stands at present, a judgment of negativeenvironmental compatibility", adding, however, that "the design could be reviewed..."February 3. In a specific Vote, the Chioggia Local Authority expresses its opinion, considering it "indispensable for thedefence process to continue in its entirety [...] including defence against exceptional high waters" and delegating the Mayorto call for "...the continuation of design work at the lagoon inlets".February. The Venice Local Authority expresses its opinion on the design, inviting the Mayor to call for "the continuation ofdesign work for mobile barriers at the lagoon Inlets".February 26. A general meeting of the Higher Council of Public Works expressed its opinion on the EIS of the mobilebarriers, unanimously reconfirming its favourable opinion on the design solution.March 8. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) considered the various opinions expressedduring the extraordinary EIA of the design for mobile barriers at the lagoon inlets. In a Resolution, the Committeeunanimously delegated the Water Authority to undertake directly when responsible, or to coordinate with others whenneeded a series of interrelated in-depth studies to be completed by December 31.July 12. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) considers the results of the development workcarried out and, in light of differences of opinion between the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of the Environment,refers the decision regarding continuation of design work to the Council of Ministers.July 14. On the grounds of breaches of procedure and substance, the Regional Administrative Tribunal for the Veneto (TAR)issued a ruling annulling the December 1998 decree of negative environmental impact of the Minister of the Environment inagreement with the Minister of the Cultural Heritage.March 15. Meeting at Palazzo Chigi, in Rome, the Council of Ministers concludes the EIA procedure. Its Resolution calls forwork to begin on the definitive final design of the mobile high water protection barriers at the inlets. Specific provisions andadditions are also required, as the "dissipative capacity of the lagoon inlets channels to be increased".December 6. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control (Comitatone) expresses the opinion that design of the Mosesystem should go ahead and that at the same time "measures aimed at increasing the dissipative capacity of the lagoon inletchannels should be developed".41

20042003DESIGN & PROCUREMENT20022001TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTDecember 18. The Venice Water Authority instructs its concessionary, the Consorzio Venezia Nuova, to draw up a plan ofactivities resulting from the Comitatone resolution of 6 December 2001.February 22. The programme is presented and approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the HigherCouncil of Public Works.September 30. The Consorzio Venezia Nuova consigns the final design for the whole Mose system, with adaptation of thedesign for mobile barriers and introduction of the complementary structures and and the navigation lock at the Malamoccoinlet.November 4. The Environmental Impact Assessment Commission of the Veneto Region approves the design for thecomplementary breakwaters at the Malamocco and Chioggia inlets and the design for the navigation lock at the Malamoccoinlet; the design for the breakwater at the Lido inlet will be re-examined after being reviewed on the basis of givenobservations.November 8. The final design of the Mose system is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of theHigher Council of Public Works.November 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the first tranche of the Mose systemamounting to € 450 million.February 25. Meeting in Rome, the Comitatone postpones conclusion of the decision-making process until the 3 Aprilmeeting, allowing the local authorities of Venice and Chioggia more time to present their opinions on the final design for theMose system.April 3. A unanimous resolution of the Comitatone give the go-ahead to executive design work and construction of the Mosesystem, at the same time taking on board specific requests from Venice and Chioggia Local Authorities. These requests donot, in fact, interfere with the structure of the system as defined in the final design and do not therefore represent a constraintto its implementation.April 15. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the final design for the complementary breakwater at theChioggia inlet.June 6. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the "Plan of studies, designs and measures following thedecisions taken during the 3 April 2003 session of the Committee as per Art. 4 of Law no. 798/84".October 17. The Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works, approves setting upof a series of trial areas at the Lido inlet to verify the operational systems designed to consolidate the seabed near the rowsof gates.January 20. The Safeguarding Commission expresses a favourable opinion on the final project of the Mose system.January 30. The Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works, approves the designfor: the construction of the refuge haven at Lido – Treporti; the reinforcement of the Lido south jetty; the construction of thenavigation lock at the Malamocco inlet and the refuge haven at the Chioggia inlet.February 13. The Plan Office is set up. Setting up of the Office was agreed on 6 December 2001 by the Comitatone. Thetasks of the Plan Office is to harmonise the plans of the individual authorities (State, Regional, Local) responsible for thesafeguarding activities and optimise the resources.42

2005DESIGN & PROCUREMENT2004TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTFebruary 27. The final design for the work to construct the navigation lock at the Chioggia inlet is approved by the WaterAuthority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.May 22. The Veneto Regional Tribunal rejects all the appeals made against the Mose system by a number of bodiesincluding the WWF, Italia Nostra and Venice Local and Provincial Authorities.June 7. The provincial secretaries of the Italian trade unions C.G.I.L., C.I.S.L. and U.I.L. and the Consorzio Venezia Nuovasign a Framework Agreement covering work already underway or planned for the near future as part of construction of themobile barriers at the inlets.June 22. The final design for the first phase of the protection of the sea bed along the San Nicolò channel, at the Lido inlet,is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works.July 19. The final design for the first phase of the works for the reinforcement of the Forte San Pietro area, at theMalamocco inlet, is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of PublicWorks.September 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the second tranche of the Mosesystem amounting to € 709 million.November 4. The Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control meets in Rome. The agenda includes the progress ofwork, in particular on the Mose system, the "eleven points" requested by Venice Local Authority and the one pointrequested by Chioggia Local Authority. Transfer of a contribution for Venice, Chioggia and Cavallino Treporti localauthorities from funds financed by the CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) (arts. 80 L. 289/2002and 23-quater D.L. 355/2003 conv. L. 47/2004).December 20. The Sixth Division of the Judicial State Council has turned down all the appeals filed by the Province, VeniceLocal Authority and a number of associations including the WWF and Italia Nostra against the Mose system and theVeneto Regional Tribunal sentence of 22 May 2004.January 28. the Regional Environmental Impact Assessment concluded with a favourable opinion on the environmentalcompatibility of the project to set up sites at the Malamocco and Chioggia inlets to prefabricate the caissons for the mobilegates and abutments.April 29. In accordance with the Framework Agreement between the provincial secretaries of the Italian trade unionsC.G.I.L., C.I.S.L. and U.I.L. and the Consorzio Venezia Nuova signed in 2004, a round table is set up with the participation ofrepresentatives of the trade unions and the consortium and procedures are established for communicating between theindividual groups of companies operating at the three lagoon inlets. The parties jointly agree to meet with the local authoritiesto discuss the matter of accommodating the workforce employed in construction of the barriers.May 20. The final design for the preparation of two new parallel cable pipelines across the inlet channel at the Chioggia inlet,is approved by the Water Authority Technical Committee, a branch of the Higher Council of Public Works. The cablepipelines are being constructed using the remote controlled horizontal boring technique.43

20062005TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTJune 20. The Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, Pietro Lunardi, visited the work sites where construction of the tidalregulation barriers at the lagoon inlets is underway. The Minister, together with the President of the Veneto Region GiancarloGalan, Deputy Mayor of Venice Michele Vianello and President of the Venice Water Authority Maria Giovanna Piva inspectedthe work sites at the Lido, Malamocco and Chioggia inlets. He then went to the Arsenale where he met representatives of localinstitutions and visited the dry docks in the historic dockyards of the Serenissima. During the meeting, the President of theVenice Water Authority put forward a proposal to set aside part of the north area of the Venice Arsenale for management andmaintenance of the Mose system.July 21. The Water Authority Technical Committee approves the final design for the following projects: at the Lido inlet,designs for preparation of the work site at the south San Nicolò abutment (construction of wharfs for vessels to comealongside, a logistics area in support of site activities and a temporary platform for storing materials, etc) and the secondphase of work to construct the intermediate island between the rows of gates (creation of a navigational channel to the rear ofthe island to connect San Nicolò and Treporti when the inlets are closed and filling of the nucleus of the island with dredgedmaterial); at the Malamocco inlet, designs for the navigation lock (civil engineering work for the door housing structures on thesea and lagoon sides and for the guide structures) and preparation of the work site at the north abutment (construction of atemporary platform for storing and selecting materials, wharfs for vessels to come alongside, a logistics area in support of siteactivities, etc); at the Chioggia inlet, designs for construction of the north abutment (civil engineering for the wharf and hardstanding linking the barrier abutment and lock embankments) and construction of the lagoon side basin of the refuge haven(construction of the breakwater on the channel side of the harbour, the inner bank of the north side of the harbour, dredging ofthe inner basin, etc).September 28. A meeting of the Committee for Policy, Coordination and Control took place in Rome. The Commiteecoordinates the activities to safeguard Venice and its lagoon. The Committee, chaired by the President of the Council ofMinisters Silvio Berlusconi, decided to continue the realization of the Mose system. The progress of the requests expressed bythe Municipalities of Venice and Chioggia (11 points) has been verified, and the technical controls will be considered by thePlan Office. Furthermore, the financing of contributions to the State, Region and Municipalities has been requested.March 29. The CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming) finances the third installment of the Mose systemto regulate tidal floods amounting to 380 million euro.July 20. A meeting of the Committee Coordination and Control (Comitatone) for the safeguarding of Venice and the lagoon,chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers Romano Prodi, took place in Rome.The Comitatone decided to enlarge the composition of the Committee to the Province of Venice and the Municipality ofCavallino-Treporti. Besides, it confirmed the commitment to carry on the financing of the Mose system by the Cipe, and, at thesame time, to re-establish the financing of the Special Law for the other safeguarding measures. The possibility of transfer 50million euro from 380 deliberated by the Cipe on March 20, 2006, to the others measures foreseen in the Special Law, hasbeen discussed.With regard to the Mose system, the Committee decided to verify the proposals that the Municipality of Venice will arrive at thePresidency of the Council of Ministers before July 31, 2006. The DICA (the Administration of the Presidency of the Council ofMinisters Department) will prepare the proceedings for the next meeting of the Committee. Until that date, the realization ofwork at the lagoon inlets, will follow the foreseen programming.CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION 1744

2010200820072006TIMEMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineEVENTS IN THE PROJECTEVENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTNovember 10. The Council of Ministers approves, by a majority of votes, the report on the Mose system drawn up by theMinister for Infrastructure Antonio Di Pietro.November 22. A meeting of the Committe of Coordination and Control for the safeguarding of Venice and the lagoon, chairedby the President of the Council of Ministers Romano Prodi, took place in Rome. With regard to the defence of Venice from thehigh water (Mose), which is under realization since 2003, the Committee decided to complete the Mose system work and themorphological measures connected, giving assurance of financing, and complying with engagement and programme definedby the agreement between the State and the concessionary Consorzio Venezia Nuova.August 3. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) financed 243 million of euro for the Mose work.January 31. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) financed 400 million of euro for the Mosework.December 18. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) approved the financing of 800 million ofeuro.CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION 17November 18. The CIPE (Interministerial Commitee for Economic Programming) approved the financing of 230 million of euro.45

REFERENCES• 1-http://www.consorziovenezianuova.com/corporate.htm• 2-http://mediateca.consorziovenezianuova.com/• 3-http://www.magisacque.it/ilmav.htm• 4-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Documenti/uk/Accordi.htm• 5-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Leggi/uk/decreti%20legge.htm• 6-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Leggi/uk/leggi.htm• 7-http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp• 8-http://www.salve.it/uk/soggetti/soggetti.htm• 9-http://www.salve.it/uk/soluzioni/acque/mose_avanzamento.htm• 10-http://www.salve.it/uk/soluzioni/acque/mose_studi.htm• 11-N. Doni and R. Signorelli, ―Le Tecniche di Project management applicate al progetto Venezia‖, available inhttp://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp• 12-M. Gentilomo and G. Cecconi, ―Flood protection system designed for Venice‖, available in http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp• 13- P.A. Moro, ―Profilo del Consorzio Venezia Nuova‖, available in http://www.salve.it/banchedati/Letteratura/uk/Risultati.asp• 14- http://www.marinadiliogrando.eu/mose_sistem.html• 15- http://www.salvemose.it/?area=2&menu=3&page=53• 16- http://www.calcolostrutture.net/il-mose.html• 17- Lucia Vergano, Georg Umgiesser and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, ―An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of the MOSE Barriers on Venice Port Activities‖,Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Ca' Foscari University of Venice, 2010, http://www.bepress.com/feem/paper407• 18-‖CASE HISTORY: MO.S.E. PROJECT, VENICE, ITALY‖, Ref: UK-IT/CH/EP027 — Rev:01, July 08, available in www.maccaferri.co.uk• 19-http://www2.comune.venezia.it/mose-doc-prg/• 20-A. Vitucci, “La visita nei cantieri del Mose: cassoni alti come grattacieli‖, April 2011, available in http://nuovavenezia.gelocal.it/cronaca/2011/04/29/news/lavisita-nei-cantieri-del-mose• 21-http://www.drytech.ch/new/svbreferenzegenio06.php?lang=en• 22-G. Dallaporta, ―Il MOSE: un progetto che nasce dal CNR‖, http://www.fi.cnr.it/r&f/n12/dallaporta.htm• 23-http://www.ilvelino.it/articolo.php?idArticolo=1434671• 24-http://www.italiamiga.com.br/noticias/artigos/prima_pietra_per_il_mose.htm• 25-http://www.maccaferri.co.uk/PAGES00648.html• 26-E. Della Frattina, ―Mose, l‘eterno incompiuto che costa molto e serve a poco‖, http://www.patrimoniosos.it/rsol.php?op=getarticle&id=85118• 27-http://www.cooperativasanmartino.it/pagina.aspx?ID=2101• 28-http://www.edilportale.com/news/2003/04/aziende/mose-impregilo-in-consorzio-venezia-nuova_3738_5.html• 29-Consorzio Venezia Nuova and Magistrato alle Acque, ―Nuovi interventi per la salvaguardia di Venezia: studio di impatto ambientale, sintesi non tecnica‖, 2004.46

1.4 RACIBORZ RESERVOIR, SILESIACase compiled by: .Anna Maksymiuk-Dziuban and Kazimierz BanasikContact details: anna.maksymiuk@hydroprojekt.com.pl and kazimierz_banasik@sggw.plBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status (i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework (e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc)Relevant Physical Dimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)Flood protection project in Poland; ―Raciborz Reservoir‖On the Odra River in Silesia Province, southern PolandRacibórz Dolny flood control reservoir (polder) shall improve the flood control conditionsof the town of Racibórz and the Oder river valley (including the towns of Kędzierzyn Koźleand Opole) and shall decrease flood hazard for the areas below (including the towns ofBrzeg, Oława and Wrocław). The Racibórz Dolny flood control reservoir will enable thereduction of flood waves through the combined overflow and bottom outlets structure. Theeffect of reducing flood waves by the reservoir will be significant and felt throughout theCentral Odra. Reduction will affect only the flood waves with peaks higher than permittedflow rate of Q = 1,210 m3/s, determined in the environmental impact report for the sectionof the Odra below Racibórz.Object No. 1 Head dam with appurtenant structures.Object No. 2 Left side dam with appurtenant structures.Object No. 3 Right side dam with appurtenant structures.Object No. 4 Reservoir operating back-up facilities.Object No. 5 Reservoir bowl.1.337 bilion PLN (i.e. ca 330 000 000 Euro)In the process of obtaining building permits2% of total project valueThe total length of dirt dams will be 21.8 km. Max. dam height will be 11.10 m. Watervolume with max. level will be 185.0 mln m3. Water surface area with max. level will be24.5 km247

InternalMEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)StakeholderCategorySupply-Side ClientFinanciersSponsorsClient's CustomersClient's OwnersCase-StudyRegional Water Management Authority in GliwiceState budget, World BankThis information is at the clientThis information is at the clientThis information is at the clientOther internal CategoryCase-Studysupply- sidecategories(please specify)Demand Side Principal Contractor Design Hydroprojekt, contractor not yetComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)First Tier Contractors Not yetSecond TierConsultantsNot yetProfessionalServices ProvidersNot yetOther internalsupply- sidecategories (pleasespecify)CategoryCase-Study48

ExternalMEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Public Regulatory AgenciesThis information is at the clientLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentThis information is at the clientThis information is at the clientOther internal supply-side Categorycategories (pleasespecify)Private Local residentsThis information is at the clientLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)This information is at the clientThis information is at the clientThis information is at the clientThis information is at the clientCategoryCase-studyCase study49

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectThe project was designed on the basis of a environmental decision issued by the Regional Director ofEnvironmental Protection in Katowice, Katowice, 7 September 2010The environmental decisionPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectFlooding in 1997 and 201050

1.5 VIENNA HOSPITAL NORTHCase compiled by: Roland Gareis and Claudia WeningerContact details: roland.gareis@wu.ac.at and claudia.weninger@wu.ac.atBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeContractual FrameworkVienna Hospital NorthVienna, AustriaEstablishment of a new central hospital in ViennaPlanning and establishing the hospital including the buildings, the organisation, the services, theprocesses, the ICT infrastructure, etc.Vienna Hospital Association establishes the new hospital. Funding by the Vienna HospitalAssociation, municipality of Vienna and the EURelevant PhysicalDimensionsPlot size: 111.579 m²Building area: 51.452 m²Gross floor area: 214.910 m²Healing Garden (Park): 46.709 m²Building height/top edge height of the attic of the nursing wing: 38,10 mBed capacity: rd. 800Construction costs: about 850 million €51

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments (e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)Supply-Side Client/Investor Vienna Hospital AssociationFinanciersVienna Hospital Association (3) , municipality of Vienna, EUSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supply-sidecategories ( pleasespecify)Demand Side Principal ContractorsPatients (and their families)CategoryUsersConstruction companiesArchitects, plannersConsultantsCase-StudyFuture employeesFirst Tier Contractors NA Will cooperation in different serviceareasNAProfessional ServicesProvidersOther internal supply-sidecategories (please specify)NA52

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationStakeholder CategoryCase-StudyComments (e.g. maturity, previous experiencesof stakeholders, skills, influence on project)PublicRegulatory AgenciesLicensing authority,municipality of ViennaMA 15, MA 40, MA 37 etc.High inspection effortLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Private Local residentsLocal LandownersMunicipality of ViennaAustria governmentCategoryOther hospitalsCase-studySemmelweis, Gersthof, Hietzing,Otto-Wagner, FloridsdorfInhabitants of the 21 district of ViennaGet new services or are closedEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)None apparent - offshoreNone apparent – offshoren/aCategorySocial organisationCase-studyRed noses53

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsHospitalSemmel-weisHospitalGersthofOwns100%ViennaDanubeHospitalOwns100%Gives financialsupportContractsinvestments ..Municipalityof ViennaAustrianRailwayOperatorViennaPublicTransportVHA… Vienna HospitalAssociationEUHospitalHietzingVHAGives financialsupportHospitalOtto-WagnerIntegrated inplanningDifferentreligiousassociationsGives licenses to..Otherlicenseagencies(AGES)HospitalFloridsdorfFutureemployeesArchitectOtherVAMEDPORRContractsWith …ConsultantsSubcontractorSocialAssociationsContractsWith …Key:Name ofActorDescription ofrelationship- Project Actor- ProjectRelationship54

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementProject Team of the Vienna Hospital Association: about 20 peopleArchitects, planners and consultantsConstruction companiesProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Stakeholder Involvement □ √Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Management Software □ √Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Lessons Learnt Transfers □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More Information55

Project ProcessesRisk Management Processes 29HR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration ManagementProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information xPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Green Procurement 5Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X56

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timePerformance relating to costPerformance related to specificationOriginal Targets and changes to targetsThe project started in 2007. The hospital will startoperations in 2015.OkActual Achievements Against TargetsNo delayAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these Aims Achievement of these AimsMunicipality of Vienna Ok Stronger involvement in project teamVienna Hospital AssociationOk57

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)The Vienna Hospital Association is responsible for all public hospitals in Vienna. It is a public organisation andstrongly connected to the municipality of Vienna. The VHA invests 2 million € per year in Viennese hospitals. Theorganisation is also responsible for medicine and administrative staff but also for patients. The VHA is veryinterested in sustainable development and developed the sustainability charter for the hospital north.The hospital north is party founded by the European investment bank. Thus the project has to consider sustainabledevelopment parts e.g. co² emission.Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on the projectThe sustainability charter was developed from the VHA in cooperation with the municipality of Vienna. In Viennadifferent regulations e.g. green procurement exist. The projects needs to consider all local regulations.The VHA reports to the municipality of Vienna.Economic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentSpecific Economic Events impacting on the projectNone identifiedPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Events impacting on the projectAs the hospital north is a public hospital all political parties are very interested in theproject.None Identified58

EVENTS IN THEENVIRONMENTEVENTS IN THE PROJECTMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME2007Startconceptualizing2008Sustainability charterdeveloped2009Conceptualising & PlanningArchitecturalcompetitionfinishedFinancial agreementbetween VHA andEuropean investmentbankContract (ground)signed2010201120122013Implementation20142015CommissioningPart 1Site preparationParticipationworkshopsperformedRough planningfinishedGreen PublicProcurementaward winnerDetailed planningfinishedImplementationstartedInfo centre onsiteestablished59

REFERENCES1. Vienna Hospital Association – Hospital North: http://www.wienkav.at/kav/khn-pm/ZeigeText.asp?ID=391872. Sustainablity Charter: http://www.wienkav.at/kav/khn-pm/ZeigeText.asp?ID=391893. Vienna Hospital Association http://www.wienkav.at/kav/4. Red-noses organization http://www.rednoses.eu/5. GPP case study http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/case_en.htm

SECTION 2Energy Case Studies

2.1 ANDASOL SOLAR POWER STATIONBasic Project InformationCase compiled by: Giorgio Locatelli and Mauro ManciniContact details: glocatelli@lincoln.ac.ukProject TitleLocationCSP Andasol Solar Power Station (Concentrating Solar Power CSP)Andalusia, in the southern of Spain. The site of the facility is on the plateau Guadix in the province of Granada. Its name isa combination of Andalusia and Sol (Sun in Spanish). Andasol is placed at 1100 m of altitude. This ground level and thesemi-arid climate allows to achieving one of the best solar direct irradiance resources in Spain. The site has exceptionallyhigh annual direct of 2200 kWh/m² per year.62

Basic Project InformationPurpose Deploy two CSP plant. Each plant has a gross electricity output of 50 MWe and produces around 175GWh per year. Each plant saves some 150.000 tonnes of CO2 per year when compared with a modernhard coal-fired power plant. The plants together provide electricity for approximately three thousandpeople in southern Spain. They also contribute to Spain's peak electricity demand during summercaused by the energy consumption of air-conditioning unitsScopeTotal Project ValueProject StatusContractual FrameworkDesign , procurement, Realization and connection to the electric grid of two concentrated solar powerplants. The CSP plants consist of three main parts: solar field with parabolic trough, storage tanks andpower generation.300 M€ each one (600 M€ total)OperationsEPC contract Lump Sum Turn Key63

Basic Project InformationRelevant Physical DimensionsIn each plant there are more than 600 parabolic trough collectors, distributed over a total surface area of about two square kilometres, eachof which measures 150 metres in length and 5,7 metres in width. These mirrors have a total surface area in excess of 500.000 squaremetres.The full thermal reservoir of heat allows to run the turbine for about 7,5 hours at full-load after sunset. (DLR, 2012). According to(EstelaSolar, 2012) each solar field with its parabolic trough has an average efficiency during the time in transforming the solar radiation tosteam of 43%. According to (EIB, 2007) the plants have been designed for auxiliary firing with natural gas, which can be used as a back-upand will account for up to 15% of the electricity generated, as permitted under the applicable Spanish legislation. The Andasol plants sharetogether the natural gas and water infrastructure. The Andasol plants together employ about 80 people as clerks, maintenance personnel,thermal central technicians and operators64

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)StakeholderCategoryCompanyCommentsInternal - Demand SideClientFinanciersAndasol-1 CentralTermosolar Uno SA andAndasol-2 CentralTermosolar Dos SA.European Investment Bank(EIB), EuropeanCommission, BNP Paribas,Sabadell Bank Group,WestLB and Dexia.These Spanish companies created specifically to own and manage the plants. (Power Technology, 2012).These four banks have shared the risk of this new energy project (BNEF, 2006). The European Investment Bank(EIB) granted 60 million euro loan for each plant (EIB, 2006). Andasol 1 has been financed by the EuropeanCommission with a grant of 5 million euro. (EC, 2007). The plants received the 80% of their financing for therealization through borrowed capital by banks. (Solar Millennium, 2008/2009).Sponsors Solar Millennium Group. Solar Millennium is a German company in the sector of solar thermal power plants. The group covers all businesssectors along the value chain from project development and financing to engineering and EPC contract of theplants. It also holds stakes in the power plants companies. (Solar Millennium, 2012). In the year 2009/2010 the totalrevenues of the group was 73,2 million euro. In 2010 Solar Millennium Group had about 300 employees. (SolarMillennium, 2009/2010).ACS Cobra, a subsidiary ofACS GroupSolar Millennium, that was trying to develop the project, didn‘t have the financial capacity to realize the plants andtechnical credibility with the Spanish authorities to create the proper legal framework. (ACS Cobra, 2010). So in2003 Solar Millennium, agreeing by contract, convinced ACS Cobra to invest and play a crucial role in theconstruction process and the realization of the two power plants. (CESI, 2005).ACS Cobra is a subsidiary of the ACS group. Actividades de Construcción y Servicios, S.A. (ACS) is a Spanishcompany dedicated to civil and engineering construction, all types services and telecommunications. The group hasa global presence, including developed countries in America and Europe and underdeveloped countries like India,Brazil and China.. Listed on the stock exchange of Madrid, the company's shares form part of the IBEX 35 stockmarket index. The group employs 138.500 people. The significant shareholders of ACS Group are: CorporacionFinanciera Alba SA 18,3%, Corporacion Financiera Alcor SA 13,9%, Inversiones Vesan SA 12,5%, IberostarHoteles y Apartamentos SL 5,6%, Southeastern Asset Management 6,47%. The remaining of the shares, about43%, is floating. There is not the presence of the Spanish State between the shareholders.Client’sCustomersEndesa. Endesa purchases electricity from Andasol 1 and 2 power plants (Solar Millennium, 2008).Endesa is the Spain‘s largest utility. In Spain it generates, transports, distributes and supplies electricity, in nineautonomous regions, to 11,8 million customers. Since the first quarter of 2009 Endesa is part of the Enel group.(Endesa, 2012). With the electricity produced in this plant Endesa supplies approximately 300.000 people insouthern Spain (Power Technology, 2012).65

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 2(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)StakeholderCategoryCompanyCommentsInternal - Demand SideClient’sOwnersPrincipalContractor100% by ACS Cobra The companies of Andasol 1 e 2 at the beginning was owned by ACS Cobra Group (75%) and Solar Millennium (25%).(Power Technology, 2012).In July 2009, immediately after the realization of the two plants, all the stakes in the power plants companies of SolarMillennium were sold to ACS Cobra. (Solar Millennium, 2008/2009).ACS Cobra and SenerGroupACS Cobra and Sener Group set up two joint-ventures with 80% of stake of ACS Cobra and 20% of Sener. The jointventuresset up were UTE CT Andasol-1 and UTE CT Andasol-2.Sener Group, a Spanish company, develops engineering projects, production and construction activities and systemsintegration. (Sener, 2012). Sener developed the basic engineering (the FEED) and then the detailed engineering for theplants. For the realization of the plants the EPC contracts were Lump Sum Turn Key. (Sener, 2009). These companies,UTE CT Andasol 1 and 2, were set up only to come to an end the realization of the plants.First TierContractorsFlagsol, a technologysubsidiary of SolarMillennium.It provided the engineering, planning, basic and detailed design, construction supervision and the control system for thesolar field of the two plants. (Solar Millennium, 2008).Flagsol for the design of the solar field, has ever had any previous experience in the design of this kind of plants, beingthe first CSP plant realized in Europe. (Power Technology, 2012).SenerIt provided the engineering, basic and detailed design for the conventional power generation section (steam turbine,electrical generator, condenser, boiler, feed-water heaters) (Solar Millennium, 2008) and the molten salt storage system(Solar thermal group , 2010) of the two power plants.Being of course the plants provided of a conventional steam cycle Sener has had previous experience in the design ofthis part (Sener, 2012). Sener has ever had any previous experience in the design of molten salt storage system forCSP plant, being the plant the first realized with this kind of system and technology (Power Technology, 2012).ACS CobraThe Spanish company, being a construction company, was primarily responsible for the construction work (civil andmechanical) in the two construction sites. (Solar Millennium, 2008).Being of course the plants provided of a conventional steam cycle ACS Cobra has had previous experience in therealization of this part (Grupo ACS, 2012). ACS Cobra has ever had any previous experience in the realization of theother two parts that compose the plant, solar field and storage system, being the first CSP plant in Europe and the firstrealized with the molten salt storage system (Power Technology, 2012).66

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 3(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)StakeholderCategoryCompanyCommentsSecond TierConsultantsSchott Solarand Solel SolarSystemsThey manufactured and supplied the absorption pipes for the two plants. (Power Info, 2012).Flabeg Group It manufactured and supplied the parabolic mirrors for the two plants. (Power Info, 2012).ABBIt provided instrumentation and control systems for thermal storage tanks. It provided also instrumentation and electricalequipment (transformers, switchgear, circuit breakers) for connection to the high voltage grid of the two power plants. (ABB,2009).SiemensIt manufactured, at the manufacturing site of Finspang in Sweden, and supplied the turbines SST-700 and the generatorsSGen-100A-2P (Siemens, 2011). It provided also the instrumentation and control systems for the power block (DLR, 2009).Sodes Grupo It manufactured the boilers of the steam cycle of the plants (Sodes, 2012).Foster WheelerIt provided the feed-water heaters of the plants. These heaters are used to heat the feed-water using turbine steamextractions to increase the thermal cycle efficiency and to help the Steam Generation System. (Foster Wheeler, 2012).67

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)StakeholderCategoryNameCommentsExternalPublicRegulatoryAgenciesRed Eléctrica de Espana (REE).Red Eléctrica is the manager of the transmission grid of the Spanishelectricity system. It ensures the continuity of the electricity supply,maintaining the constant balance between generation and consumptionin Spain. (REE, 2012).LocalGovernmentProvince of GranadaIt issued the declaration of public utility for Andasol 1 (Vlex, 2006) andAndasol 2 (BOE, 2006).NationalGovernmentMinistry of Industry, Ministry of theEnvironment.The Ministry of Industry issued the authorization to realize the Andasol 1(Vlex, 2006) and Andasol 2 (BOE, 2006). The Ministry of theEnvironment issued the environmental impact assessment for Andasol 1(Junta de Andalucia, 2005) and Andasol 2 (BOE, 2006).Private Local residents People resident near the plants. No protests have been reported, being the plants environmentallyfriendly.The Andasol plants together employ about 80 people as clerks,maintenance personnel, thermal central technicians and operators.(Grupo ACS, 2012).LocalLandownersEnvironmentalistsFarmers, represented by theirassociation UPA-Andalucia (Union ofsmall farmers).Environmental groups.Procedure of compulsory expropriation for public utility.There have been protests, demonstrations and strikes. (UPA, 2008).No protests have been reported, being the plants environmentallyfriendly.Greenpeace praised the coming into operation of Andasol defining theelectricity produced ―climate-friendly‖ (Greenpeace, 2012).68

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsInstitutional andprivate investors.FloatingOwnSolar MillenniumAGACS CobraOwns100%ACS GroupOwntInstitutional andprivate investors.FloatingSponsorOwns andSponsorBNP Paribas, SabadellBank, WestLB , Dexia,European Investment Bank,European CommissionFinanciersAndasol-1 Central Termosolar Uno SAAndasol-2 Central Termosolar Dos SASellelectricityEndesaPrincipalContractorsUTE CT Andasol 1UTE CT Andasol 2(ACS Cobra 80%, Sener 20%)Engineering and DesignConstruction workEngineering and DesignSolar Field:Flagsol, a subsidiary ofSolar MillenniumACS CobraStorage system and Powerblock:Sener GrupoSupplierSupplierSupplierSupplierSupplierAbsorber pipes:Schott Solar and SolelSolar SystemsParabolic mirrors:Flabeg GroupStorage control system,equipments for theconnection to the grid:ABBTurbines, Generatorsand power blockcontrol system:SiemensFeed-water heaters:Foster WheelerBoilers:Sodes Grupo69

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)SpanishgovernmentIt was favourable at therealization of the firsts CSPplants in Europe in itsterritory.The various ministriesissued all the authorizationof competence. TheSpanish government withthe real decrees 2002 and2004 gave a regulatoryframework regulating theusage of this sector andwith the incentives allowedthe realization of theplants. (Real Decreto,2004) and (Real Decreto,2002).Initiation and PlanningLocal landownersThe CSP plants need largeland around the powerfacility to put the solarcollectors. The landownersof course didn‘t want to losetheir cultivated lands (UPA,2008) and in additiondenounced the taking awayof the water, used in theplants, necessary forirrigation of the land (Ideal,2006).There was negotiation withAndasol anddemonstrations to obtain asatisfactory compensationfor their lost lands. (UPA,2008).They were expropriatedof their lands to realizethe plants and share theuse of the water with theplants. (UPA, 2008).Initiation and Planning70

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformancePerformance relating totimeOriginal Targets and changes to targetsInto 2004 Milenio Solar had scheduled the construction start of the first plantAndasol 1 at the beginning of 2005 so immediately after the take-over ofstakes of the two power plants companies by ACS Cobra. So the coming online of this plant should have to be in the first quarter of 2007. The work ofthe second plant should have to start some month after the startconstruction of Andasol 1. (Warmdebate, 2004). The constrain of the RoyalDecree of 2004, which limits the use of the natural gas, has forceddesigners to modify the project and to utilize a thermal energy storagesystem. This caused a delay of the realization start. When ACS Cobrapurchased at the beginning of 2005 most of the shares of the two powerplants companies the work didn‘t start immediately but it triggered amodification of the whole management of the contract. The project has sosuffered a significant delay due to permit this process. (EC, 2006). Therewas a delay of about one year and half.The next year in May 2006 and December 2006, when there were thefinancial closures of the plants, it has been possible to know the date of therealization end of the two plants. According to the work scheduling Andasol1 had to be connected to the grid and to come on line at the end of 2008while Andasol 2 had to be connected to the grid and come on line in mid2009. As explain before this two milestone was respected and Andasol 1(Photofileit, 2012) and Andasol 2 (Solar Millennium, 2007/2008) came online on schedule. So the realization work of the two plants didn‘t report anydelay.Actual Achievements Against TargetsYears OfestimationConnection to thegrid2004 Andasol 1:1°quarter 2007Andasol 2:3°quarter 20072006 Andasol 1:4° quarter 2008Andasol 2:2°quarter 2009RespetedNoYEsPerformance relating tocostIt hasn‘t been possible reported any variation of the cost during thedevelopment of the mega project because the stakeholders involved didn‘trelease any information about the cost estimated before the financialclosure. However it has been possible to compare the cost of each CSPplant of Andasol with the other CSP plant realized in the same period inSpain. The investment of each Andasol plant has been in line with the otherplants and any relevant cost difference has been reported.Performance related toachievingspecificationThe Scope respected71

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder orStakeholder GroupingOriginal Aims of Project Involvement andChanges to these AimsAchievement of these AimsACS GroupSolar MillenniumACS decided to enter into the new market of theconcentrated solar thermal power to positioningitself as one of the main players in all this sectorsand to increase the revenues and profit.To realize the first CSP plants with its parabolictrough technology.To hold its position between the leaders of thissector investing in research and development (costreduction and greater efficiency of the solar field)for the next plants.ACS has now completed the first set of plants with totalcapacity of 350 MW (EstelaSolar, 2012). ACS Group is aworldwide leader in the development of thermal solarplants with thermal storage devices (Grupo ACS, 2012).It realized other CSP plants with the parabolic troughtechnology but in 2011 because of the crisis of this sectorand the Chinese firms concurrence it went bankrupt.(DailyE, 2011).Sener GroupSener decided to enter into the new market of theconcentrated solar power plants to learn the knowhowand to positioning itself as one of the mainEPC players in this sector.The fulfilling experience with Andasol‘s plants gaveSener the opportunity to undertake other similar projects,winning 15 contracts in only six years. (Sener, 2012).72

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)The companies before to make investment decisions had to wait a regulatory framework regulating the usage of this area. Theprojects, being a new technology and for the first time applied on large plants in Spain and Europe, were carried out conformingto the directives of the law in order to obtain the necessary incentives.According to (Envent, 2009) Spain was the first country to introduce a feed in tariff for the energy generated by CSP technologythrough the Royal Decree n. 841 in 2002. This Royal Decree and the following defined the regulatory framework for the gettingof the incentives so they have influenced the design choices of the project.Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on theprojectAccording to (World future council, 2004) the regulation in special scheme for the electric energy produced by renewablesource was ratified in Spain for the first time in the Royal Decree n. 2818 in 1998 after the Electric Power Act 54/1997 thatintroduced the liberalisation of the electric sector in Spain. This Decree set up a special scheme, economically different fromthe ordinary scheme, and regulated the requirements and procedures able to recourse to the special scheme. This decree didnot provide any division between the subcategory of photovoltaic and the CSP technology in the group that use as primaryenergy the sun.According to (Real Decreto, 2002) the plants to receive the incentives has to be with maximum size of 50 MW. For this reasonthe two Andasol power plants and all the CSP plant in Spain are projected and realized with size of 50 MW.According to (Real Decreto, 2004) two years later in 2004 was issued a new the Royal Decree. It has been imposed a limit,beyond to have a maximum size of 50 MW as defined in the previous Real Decreto, on the use of the natural gas or propane tothe plants to receive the incentives. These facilities may use auxiliary equipment who consume natural gas or propane only tomaintain the temperature of the accumulator of heat. The consumption of this fuel in annual calculation must be less than 12%of production of electricity and only during periods of interruption of the production of electric energy if the plants sell electricitywith the option of fixed tariff for the entire scheduling. This percentage increases up to 15%, without temporal limitation, if theplants sell electricity in open bidding market, that is through negotiation.According to (CESI, 2005) this regulation is valid for the first 200 MW of CSP plants but because of the high number of requestof permitting come at the Ministries this limit was increased to 500 MW in 2005. The constraint of this decree, which limits theusage of natural gas, has forced designers to replace the auxiliary gas boiler present in the U.S. CSP plants, with a thermalenergy storage system that allows the usage of the facility beyond the hours of sunshine. The solar field has been oversized tocharge the hot tank during the day. This heat is used during the cloudy days or during the evening or night. Because of thegreat heat capacity, the storage has been realized ​with the technique of the two tanks molten salt.This full thermal reservoir of heat allows to run the turbine for about 7,5 hours at full-load after sunset. (DLR, 2012).73

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentPolitical EnvironmentPolitical ProjectEnvironmentAccording to (EuroMetrex, 2009) the project was supported by the European Commission because of these reasons:(1) It is a first-of-its-kind and utility-scale demonstration of the solar thermal technology, parabolic trough of the typeEuroTrough (developed in community projects) and thermal storage, developments.(2) The European Commission pushes for the realization in Europe of power plants that use renewable source toreduce the CO 2emission for the next years in agreement with the climate-energy package.This kind of projects has been strongly desired by the Spanish government. They are projects for the generation ofelectricity by renewable sources, the sun, and they have been realized also in other parts of south of Spain. Sothe project did not find any bureaucratic difficulty or problem to be realized. The most important authorizationswere the environmental impact assessment issued by the Spanish‘s Ministry of the Environment and thepermission for the construction of the plants issued by the Spanish‘s Ministry of Industry, all obtained between2004 and 2006.Specific PoliticalEvents impactingon the projectBoth the national government of Aznar (1996 – 2004) and Zapatero (2004 – 2011) supported the usage of renewableenergy as well as the local governments.The regulation in special scheme for the electric energy produced by renewable source was ratified in Spain for thefirst time in the Royal Decree n. 2818 in 1998 after the Electric Power Act 54/1997 that introduced the liberalisation ofthe electric sector in Spain. This Decree set up a special scheme, economically different from the ordinary scheme, and regulated therequirements and procedures able to recourse to the special scheme. This decree did not provide any divisionbetween the subcategory of photovoltaic and the CSP technology in the group that use as primary energy the sun.According to (Real Decreto, 2002) the plants to receive the incentives has to be with maximum size of 50 MW. Forthis reason the two Andasol power plants and all the CSP plant in Spain are projected and realized with size of 50MW.According to (Real Decreto, 2004) two years later in 2004 was issued a new the Royal Decree. It has been imposeda limit, beyond to have a maximum size of 50 MW as defined in the previous Real Decreto, on the use of the naturalgas or propane to the plants to receive the incentives. These facilities may use auxiliary equipment who consumenatural gas or propane only to maintain the temperature of the accumulator of heat.74

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentBecause of their bad technological efficiency and their high costs, CSP plants are still not competitiveenough on the energetic market of the technology and need a framework of regulations that providespecific support to encourage their development.According to (Envent, 2009) in several states have been created mechanisms to encourage thedevelopment of this technology mainly in the form of feed in tariff and investment tax credits.Specific Economic Eventsimpacting on the projectAccording to (Envent, 2009) Spain was the first country to introduce a feed in tariff for the energygenerated by CSP technology through the Royal Decree n. 841 in 2002. The feed in tariff corresponds tomarket price + premium.According to (Real Decreto, 2002) this decree introduced a feed in tariff of 0,12 euro/kWh.According to (Titano, 2011) in the Royal Decree of 2004 the feed in tariff was increased. For the option offixed tariff it was provided 0,216 euro/kWh for the first 25 years from the coming into operation and then0,17 euro/kWh for the remaining period. According to (World future council, 2004) for the option of sell inopen bidding market the premium was 0,187 euro/kWh plus the market price.According to (Real Decreto, 2007) in 2007 was issued the Royal Decree that actually regulates the feedin tariff. In this Royal Decree the feed in tariff was increased. For the option of fixed tariff, where the griddemand is not considered, it was provided 0,269 euro/kWh for the first 25 years from the coming intooperation. For the remaining period was provided 0,215 euro/kWh. The tariffs grows at an annual rateequal to the inflation rate decreased by 0,5%. For the option of sell in open bidding market, where thegrid demand is required and a fixed quantity of electricity is required, was fixed the lower limit = 0,25404euro/kWh, the upper limit = 0,344 euro/kWh and the reference premium = 0,254 euro/kWh for the first 25years and for the remaining period 0,203 euro/kWh.75

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 1Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectstakeholdersEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectmanagementEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectperformance23.12.1998 In 1999 31.05.2002 02.08.2002 Sep-03 12.03.2004 30.09.2004 19.01.2005 Beginning 2005 In 2005Milenio Solarwas set up bySolar Milleniumto carry out thedevelopmentand thenegotiationsrequired for thepower plantrealization.(SolarMillennium,2007/2008).ACS Cobra,agreeing bycontract withSolarMillennium,committed toplay a crucialrole in therealization of theAndasol plants.(CESI, 2005).Issued of theenvironmentalimpactassessment forthe two powerplants. (Junta deAndalucia, 2005)and(BOE, 2006).Issued of theauthorization torealize the powerplants, Andasol1 (Vlex, 2006)and Andasol 2(BOE, 2006).The two powerplantscompanies,Andasol-1CentralTermosolar UnoSA andAndasol-2CentralTermosolar DosSA werecreated. Theyare the ownersof the two plants.(SolarMillennium,2008).Solar Millennium,as agreed in2003, sold the75% stake ofboth plantscompanies toACS Cobra andheld theremaining 25%.(SolarMillennium,2008).Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectenvironmentIssued of theRoyal Decree thatset up specialscheme for theelectricityproduced byrenewable source.The EU ratifiedthe KyotoProtocol.Issued of theRoyal Decreeabout theregulation of theCSP plant.Issued of theRoyal Decreeabout theregulation of theCSP plant.76

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectstakeholdersEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectmanagementEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectperformanceEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectenvironmentIn 2005 30.01.2006 Spring 2006 31.05.2006 Jun-06 03.11.2006 Dec-06 Dec-06 Feb-07 26.05.2007 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Sep-09Senerdevelopedthe basicengineering (theFEED) andthen thedetailedengineering for theplants.Declarationof publicutility forthe plantAndasol 1.End ofProcedure ofcompulsoryexpropriation forAndasol 1.Thecompanyhas signedthefinancingcontractswith thebanks andthe EPCcontractwith theprincipalcontractorforAndasol 1.Start of theconstructionwork of CSPplantAndasol 1Declarationof publicutility forthe plantAndasol 2.End ofProcedure ofcompulsoryexpropriation forAndasol 2.Thecompanyhas signedthefinancingcontractswith thebanks andthe EPCcontractwith theprincipalcontractorfor Andasol2. (SolarMillennium,2006/2007).Start of theconstructionwork of theCSP plantAndasol 2Issued ofthe RoyalDecreeabout theregulationof the CSPplant.Andasol 1wascompletedIt wasconnectedto the gridand itbegan theoperationstart-upAndasol 1, afterthe operationstart-up and thecommissioningphase, startedthe commercialoperationAndasol 2wascompleted. It wasconnectedto the gridand itbegan theoperationstart-upAll thestakes inthe plantscompaniesof SolarMillenniumwere soldto ACSCobra.Andasol 2, afterthe operationstart-upand thecommissioningphase, startedthe commercialoperation.77

MEGAPROJECT Bottom-line (including LNG regasification)The development of these two megaprojects has many points in common.• In the concept phase a company deals with the national government. Such companies aim to obtain all the authorizations necessary torealize the project.• Before obtaining all the authorisations the sponsor companies, that these two cases analysed, did not have enough financial resources,agreed with other companies, willing to share the risks, to take part in the realization of the projects.• The companies that manage and own the terminal and the sub-power plants were set up at the end of the bureaucratic procedures.• These ad hoc-companies include as major shareholders the large companies that took part in the realization of the project and as minorshareholders the sponsors which initiated the project. After their creation these new ad hoc-companies are able to face the large financialeffort having as shareholders these large companies and their financial resources.The international situation, the laws enacted by the national governments and their political behaviour have been fundamental for the realrealization of the work for these two kind of mega projects in the energy sector.78

2.2 ANHOLT OFFSHORE WIND FARMCase compiled by: .Prof L-F Pau, Copenhagen Business School © DONG, L-F Pau, and References (2012)Contact Details: lpau@nypost.dkBasic Project InformationProject TitleAnholt offshore Wind FarmLocationBetween Djursland and Island of AnholtPurpose Produce 4,5 % of Denmark's electrical power ( 400 MW or consumption of approx. 400 000households)ScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)DONG Energy had acquired the license for utilizing the wind power for 25 years and is toconstruct and operate the offshore wind farmThe total investment in preliminary investigations, design and construction of the offshore windfarm as well as an operation centre amounts to DKK 10 billion (1, 32 Billion Euros) ; life cyclecosts for concession duration are about 2,3 Billion EurosConstructionFixed price by DONG Energy88 km2 area within a total area of 144 km2 ; wind farm approx. 20 km long and 5 km wide with111 wind turbines; nearest wind turbine from Grenaa is 20 km away; seabed and windconditions (W-SW) determined the location; rotor diameters 120 m; sea depth 15-19 m79

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalSupply-Side ClientStakeholder Category Case-StudyFinanciersAnholt Offshore Wind FarmDONG has received a 240 MEuro loan from Nordic Investment Bank, and additionalcredits.A consortium consisting of Pension Danmark and PKA has entered into an agreementwith DONG Energy on purchasing on 25/3/2011 50 per cent of Anholt Offshore WindFarm for approximately DKK 6 million. However, DONG Energy is still responsible forthe construction of the wind farm and in charge of the operation of the wind farm .Pension Danmark and PKA will pay the purchase price in four installments beginning atthe end of 2011, with the last installment due at the end of 2013. The installmentsrepresent 14, 30, 31 and 25 per cent respectively of the purchase price. DONG Energycommits to constructing the Anholt offshore wind farm at a fixed price and by a fixeddate. On 1 April 2014, Pension Danmark and PKA will take over responsibility foroperation and earnings in proportion to their respective interests. Until that date,production will primarily accrue to DONG Energy.DONG Energy has signed a 15-year contract with Pension Danmark and PKA onoperation and planned maintenance of the farm.Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)SponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersAnholt Offshore Wind Farm sells power to end power customers, via a power gridcompany, and power supply utilities (some of which are shareholders of DONG Energy)Anholt Offshore Wind Farm is jointly owned by DONG Energy (50%), Pension Danmark(30%) and PKA (20%). DONG Energy owners : Danish State (76,49 %), SEAS-NVEHolding AS (10, 88 %), SYD Energi AS (6,95 %), Others (5,68 %)Other internal supplysidecategories(please specify)CategoryCase-Study80

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification (II)(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalStakeholderCategoryDemand Side Principal ContractorFirst TierContractorsCase-StudyDONG Energy is responsible for the construction and operation of theoffshore wind farm.Siemens Wind Power (Brande, Aalborg) (wind turbines) : 111 windturbines @ 3,6 MW ; rotor diameter 120 mThe Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk, is responsiblefor establishing an offshore substation, the export cable to shore and theconnection to the main high-voltage power grid on landMT Hoejgaard AS (Soeborg) for the foundations; NEXANS Deutschland(Monchengladbach, DE) for array cables; Siemens AS ( Ballerup) forelectrical substation equipmentComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Second TierConsultantsProfessionalServices ProvidersOther internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)A2SEA (Fredericia) Wind turbine installation vessels ; Ballast NedamEquipment services (Nieuwegein, NL) for foundation installation vessel;Visser & Smit Marine (Sliedrecht, NL) for installation of array cables ;GEO (Kgs. Lyngby) for geotechnical investigations ; Hvide SandesSkibsbyggeri (Hvide Sande) for two service vesselsCategory Case-Study The intense installation period will involveDONG Energy has chosen to use the Port of Grenaa employees with very different qualifications. Thisduring the construction phase but also for the following includes trained workmen and electricians,maintenance of the offshore wind farm. Once the Anholt engineers, vessel crews, divers, QHSEOffshore Wind Farm is in operation, the wind farm will be employees who all have to ensure efficient andmonitored, serviced and maintained from the base in the safe installation of the wind farm, but alsoPort of Grenaa where DONG Energy will set up an employees will be needed for servicing of theoperations organization with about 50 people.installation activities81

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 1(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Public Regulatory Agencies Energistyrelsen (Energy regulator),Miljoestyrelsen (Environmental regulator),European CommissionLocal GovernmentNorddjurs Municipality, Grenaa harbour : 1) DONG bought oldCustoms house April 2011 as project office; 2) rebuild of two coldstores into support building built before April 2012 by AalsrodeToemrerfirmaExtensive experience with prior wind farmsNational Government Danish Government High attention to wind energyOther internal supplysidecategories ( pleasespecify)CategoryCase-study82

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification 2(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)ExternalPrivate Local residentsLocal LandownersAnholt island: a new sea cable will link the wind farm to the island and an replace the dieselgenerated power supplying the island nowDanish State (national seawaters)EnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsDONG Energy has asked external special advisers from the National Environmental ResearchInstitute and the international consulting and research organization DHI to carry out surveys ofboth the spring and autumn migration in 2011 before commencing the construction of the offshorewind farm.In general, the surveys will be identical to the EIA surveys of migrating birds made in 2009 and willinclude bird observations by means of radar on both Djursland and the island of Anholt, visualobservations and surveys from airplane.Climate partnerships: A number of DONG Energy's climate partners contribute to the constructionof Anholt Offshore Wind Farm. Each partner contributes to the project by pledging to buyrenewable energy produced by the offshore wind farm. The basic idea behind a climatepartnership is that DONG Energy helps companies or organisations to make energy savings. Partof the financial gain is then used for expediting a new renewable energy project in Denmark bypledging to buy parts of the power production generated by a renewable energy plant.No relevant involvementOther ExternalPrivate stakeholders(please specify)CategoryNetwork of support to SME‘s (orders received by those 100 MDKK) : DJURSWind Power: was established based on a local initiative shortly after theFolketing decided to construct the wind farm, and as overall player DONG Energyhas contributed to supporting the network between DJURS Wind Power and thesuppliers during the entire process. Today, DJURS Wind Power offers support toall players through one common point of contact to all the member companies inthe network.Case study83

Fishermen’s assnMiljoestyrelsenParlamentEnergistyrelsenEuropeanCommissionDanishNatureagencyMEGAPROJECTStakeholderRelationshipMapsDONGEnergyAnholtislandSiemensWindPowerMTHoejgaardNexans DEProfessional services(boats, etc)GrenaaHarbour,NorddjursEnerginet.dkGrenaa-AnholdtFerryPensionDanmarkClimatepartnershipsANHOLTOffshoreWind FarmLocal supportandmaintenanceservicesPKAPowerutilities(SEAS, etc)DJURSWindPowerKey:Nameof ActorDescription ofrelationship- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractual projectrelationshipPowerconsumer84

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis 1ExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction,operation,dismantling)Grenaa-Anholtferry (244 PAX)Anholt Offshore Wind Farm isconstructed right betweenGrenaa and the island ofAnholt. So far, the Anholt ferryhas used a direct routebetween Grenaa and the islandof Anholt; however, for safetyreasons, it will be necessary toredirect the ferry route south ofthe wind farm.Raised concerns in 2009In order for the ferry to continue operatingaccording to schedule, it has been necessary toincrease speed and thus use extra fuel. Anagreement has been signed with the ferrycompany Grenaa-Anholt Færgefart tocompensate for the extra fuel costs which theconstruction of Anholt Offshore Wind Farm hasinflicted on the ferry company.The agreement will be effective during the entirelifetime of the wind farm, and compensation willbe paid annually. This ensures that travelerscan get to Anholt as usual.OperationDanishFishermen‘sAssociationRaised concerns in 2009DONG Energy has signed an agreement withthe Danish Fishermen's Association oncompensation for loss of earnings from fishingin connection with the construction of AnholtOffshore Wind Farm. The working area will becordoned off for unauthorized persons duringthe construction, and there will be no fishing inthe area.Construction, Operation,DismantlingOn completion of the wind farm in 2013, netfishing will be resumed, whereas trawling willstill be prohibited in the area. The agreement oncompensation will be effective during the entirelifetime of the wind farm.85

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis 2ExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternalStakeholder’sInfluence onprojectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project of GreatestInterest(initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Danish NatureAgencyThe geotechnical surveysperformed in connection with theenvironmental impactassessments pointed to thepresence 5000 stones (up to 30tons) on the seabed. DONGEnergy's subsequent detailedseabed surveys have documenteda considerable number of largestones in large parts of theseabed. Stones which have to beremoved for construction technicalreasons before commencing theconstruction of the offshore windfarm.Raised concerns in 2009Danish Nature Agency has approvedin 2011 the plans for establishingapproximately 28 artificial reefs withinthe 88km2 wind farm area. Theartificial reefs are placed where theywill create no nuisance for theconstruction process.The stones will be re-laid, creatingvarious cavitation structures resultingin a biological gain. The wind farmwill thus contribute to ensuringoptimum breeding and livingconditions for animals and plantsspecially attached to reefs (hard soilflora and fauna).Initiation, ConstructionVestas ASVestas and DONG Energy haveentered into cooperation on testing ofVistas' newV164-7.0 MW offshore wind turbineat DONG Energy's demonstrationsite in thewaters off Frederikshavn. Vestas willbe supplying a V164-7.0 MW turbine,whichis a dedicated offshore wind turbinedesigned specifically for the harshconditions at seaFuture: Wind turbine evolutionDanish MarineSeveral 400 kg sea mines weredetected in the area and had to beexploded by Navy Seals in 2010Problem solvingInitiation86

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureAnholt Offshore Wind farm : a Board ( 7 members), 5 coordinators and a secretariatDONG Project manager Claus Bøjle Møller ; approx. 60 people for operational tasks ; 5 personsinvolved in HR, PR and liaison at headquartersSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementEach of the 23 main sub-contractors have own project management; total employed staff 1000 persons;permanent difficulties in recruiting some expert skillsProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Project Management Software XLessons Learnt Transfers XStakeholder Involvement XBuilding Information Modelling (BIM) □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Team Building Tools □Competency framework XOther Tools and Techniques or More InformationHydrographics, Seabed mapping, Geotechnical probing and analysis, Aerodynamics coupled to weather models, Fish migrationtools, Bird migration models , 3D Visualisation tools (landscape, buildings) , Competence build up workshops, etc.87

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesNormal best practices, subject to inspections and random checks by EnergistyrelsenEnvironmental impact processes-An environmental management system; including e.g., minimization of the risk of chemical and oil spills, will beimplemented in the construction and operation phases. Measures which are not directly connected to the windfarm include e.g., devices for scaring sea mammals away during pile driving of the foundation piles and markingof the working area in order to minimize the risk of ship collisions during the construction phase.-The Danish transmission system operator, Energinet.dk, was assigned the responsibility of carrying out thepreliminary studies and preparing the EIA for the project. The EIA comprises the offshore wind farm includingarray cables up to the substation connection. The statement must address: pile driving and noise affecting fish,forceful fish migration effects, bird habitat, disturbances of seabed, visual impact, bird collisionsThe complete statement and related technical background reports can be obtained from Energinet.dk or can bedownloaded from the Danish Energy Agency‘s website at www.ens.dkHR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration Management ProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCentralized expert skills HR management at DONG , Siemens Wind Power and NEXANSAs the pre-qualification databases Sellihca/Achilles (which is pre-notified in TED on a yearly basis by Achilles)will often be used for procurements in the Anholt project. DONG Energy encourages potential suppliers toregister in this pre-qualification database. When using the pre-qualification database there will normally be nocall for tenders via TED. Because of DONG Energy's ownership, we have the opportunity to waive theobligation to call for tenders by procuring via SKI-contractsNot present , except at Siemens Wind PowerNot presentVery detailed time management by a coordinated systems across partners (smart business network)Decentralized to each partner , all working on fixed priceCentral with DONG Energy, decentralized by each main sub-contractorCommunications ManagementProcessesDONG Energy , unless news vetted by it and distributed by partners88

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets and changes totargetsPerformance relating to timeAnholt to be commissioned by the end of 2013(concession granted Summer 2010) ―an unofficialworld record from starting to plan to installingmonopiles‖, The Danish developer sees Anholt asa test of how far it has got in terms of applying itsgrowing know-how in offshore projects andstreamlining installation, given the tight time frameset out in its concession from the DanishgovernmentActual Achievements Against TargetsMonopiles are already being installed by Ballast Nedam‘s Svanen and thetransition pieces by the heavy-lift vessel Jumbo Javelin since Feb 2012 (1 stmonopile put in 31/12/2011 18 months after formal concession) . A2SEA‘sSea Power will install the Siemens 3.6MW turbines for four to five monthsfrom September 2012 , and Sea Worker will install turbines from December2012 for four months. A2SEA‘s flagship Sea Installer, currently beingcommissioned in China, will arrive at the site at the beginning of February2013 — when Sea Power has carried out about 50 installations — and workthere for a further two months.Performance relating to costFixed cost 1) An analysis of April 2011 prepared by the auditing and consultancycompany Deloitte on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energyindicates the possibility of reducing prices for the construction and operationof future offshore wind farms.The analysis also concludes that the high transfer price for the construction ofAnholt Offshore Wind Farm is caused by the fact that the tender conditionsdid not offer the tenderers sufficient flexibility. An example of this is the shorttime frame and the strict penalties.In addition, the invitation to tender coincided with a period in which theproduction of wind turbines and foundations could not keep up with theincreasing demand for offshore wind farms, primarily from Germany and theUnited Kingdom.2) Main sub-contractor MT Hoejgaard (Civil engineering Div.) has in 2011incurred big losses and high volume growth, with future related risks onproject and itself; same for AH Industries (wind mill towers and nacelles)Performance related toachieving specificationThe wind farm site has areas with very difficultseabed conditions, which at best will entail extrainstallation costs, but it could also mean that someof the proposed wind turbine locations have to beabandoned89

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder or StakeholderGroupingEnergitnet.dk (Power grid)Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to theseAimsPower grid elements to be financed and installed by this party. The transformerplatform will increase voltage from 33 to 220 kV for transporting the alternatingcurrent power 25 kilometers (16 mi) to land through a single 3-conductor cable(diameter 26 cm/10 in) and a further 56 km (35 mi) to Trige (near Aarhus) where a400 kV main power hub can distribute the powerAchievement of these AimsParlament and DONG BoardThe governance scandal which emerged in March 2012 around ex-CEO AndersEldrup (dismissed) may eventually affect the project, as he wanted to double windfarm investments and change the business model ; future projects may be moreaffected than this one though as large pension fund ATP withdraws for now itscommitments90

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectAs a utilities company DONG Energy must abide by the Utilities Directive: ―Directive 2004/17/EC of theEuropean Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures ofentities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors‖ in its procurement.DONG Energy will procure within established framework agreements. If no relevant framework agreementexists for a specific purchase, DONG Energy will procure by Contract Notices published in the OfficialJournal of the European Communities (TED). DONG Energy also publishes its Contract Award Notices inTED-During construction of the offshore wind farm, considerations will be made to the potential adverseenvironmental impacts identified in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in order to minimize theseas much as possible within the technical, financial and time-related framework of the project. This alsoapplies to the planning of activities in the construction phase-As of 1 November 2011, the naval authorities have formally approved the area around Anholt OffshoreWind Farm to be a 'restricted area at sea'. This means that as of 1 November 2011, navigation, anchoring,fishing, diving and works at the seabed, which are not related to the construction of the wind farm, areprohibited. All mariners have been notified of the restriction area through 'Efterretninger for Søfarende'(Notice to mariners), EfS 40/1100 2011Political EnvironmentPolitical Project Environment Danish government has set a goal of 30% renewable energy in 2020Specific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectIn February 2008, the Danish government and a number of the parties of the Folketinget reached consensuson the Danish energy policy for the period of 2008-2011. As a consequence of the energy political agreementand the following ‘Offshore wind farm action plan 2008‘, the parties behind the energy agreement decidedthat an offshore wind farm should be erected in the waters between the island of Anholt and Djursland.91

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic ProjectEnvironment-DONG Energy is ensured a fixed payment of 105.1 ore/kWh (without price adjustments) for the first20TWh (20,000,000,000kWh), which corresponds to approx. 12 years – depending on the wind. Afterthat period, the generated power is sold on market terms without any subsidies. As part of the tenderconditions, the wind farm must supply the first power by the end of 2012, and the complete wind farmmust be in operation by the end of 2013. Non-compliance of these dates is subject to penalties whichmay amount to DKK 1 billion in total.-Therefore, the entire wind firm must be in operation within three and a half years at the latest fromaward of the license and consent to carry out preliminary investigations in the wind farm area.-DONG Energy bears all economic risks in connection with the construction and operation of theoffshore wind farm, e.g. the price of wind turbines and foundations, uncertainty about the bearingcapacity of the seabed, and adverse weather conditions, which makes the work in the area difficult.Furthermore, the actual wind conditions in the period are naturally uncertain.-Third party assessment : In connection with the award of license to DONG Energy, Ernst & Youngprepared a third party assessment on behalf of the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy of DONGEnergy's tender price of DKK 105.1 ore/kWh. The assessment concluded: "We conclude that a fairtender price for the first 20TWh is within the following interval: Anholt Offshore Wind Farm 99.3-118.4ore/kWh , The analysis shows that DONG Energy's tender price of 105.1ore/kWh for the first20TWh is considered a fair market price given the present market situation and tender conditions.―Specific Economic Eventsimpacting on the project-The Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy invited tenders for Anholt Offshore Wind Farm on 30 April2009, and on 2 July 2010, the Danish Energy Agency announced that DONG Energy had beenawarded the license for construction and operation of the Anholt Offshore Wind Farm-The Danish Energy Agency 28/11/2011 approved Pension Danmark and PKA as partners in theconcession agreement on construction and operation of the Anholt Offshore Wind Farm agreed in 2010between DONG Energy and the Danish Energy Agency.92

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIMEFeb 2008 Dec 2009 Dec 2010 Dec 2011 Dec 2012 Dec 2013Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersEvents and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceEvents and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentConsensusinParlamenton energypolicyJune 2010:award ofconstructionproject to DONGGeotechnical,environmentalworksMarch 2011:PKA andPensionDKinvestmentsStartconstructionworksFirstcommercialpowerMarch 2012: The stonefisher vessels have almostrelocated the approximately5,000 stones, which wereblocking the 111 windturbine positions and thecable routes. Therelocation of the stones hasresulted in theestablishment of 30 new,artificial reefs – all locatedinside the wind farm area.Furthermore, the laying ofstone pillows at a total of42 wind turbine positions isexpected to be completedat the beginning of March2012. The stone pillowprevents erosion aroundthe foundation pile andmust be laid before drivingthe monopile into theseabed.EndconstructionEntire windfarm must becommissionedby theend of 2013.Otherwisedelays willresult in areduced tariffincome and apenalty if allturbines are notconnected tothe grid by 31December2013 atthe latest.93

ADDITIONAL DATA SOURCES• http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/Pages/index.aspx• http://www.windandwater.dk/3-references.html• http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/wind/article299960.ece?WT.mc_id=rechargenews_rss• http://www.ens.dk/da- DK / UndergrundOgForsyning/VedvarendeEnergi/Vindkraft/Havvindmoeller/Aktuelle_havmoelleprojekter/Udbudaf400MWmellemDjurslandogAnholt/Sider/Forside.asp• Environmental assessment reports prior to concession : http://www.ens.dk/da-DK/UndergrundOgForsyning/VedvarendeEnergi/Vindkraft/Havvindmoeller/Miljoepaavirkninger/Miljoeundersøgelser%20for%20specifikke%20projekter/Sider/Forside.aspx• http://www.business.dk/green/dong-skandale-kan-skade-vindeventyr• Aarsrapport 2011, MT Hoejgaard94

REFERENCES1. "Djursland Anholt"4C Offshore Limited. http://www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/djursland-anholt-denmark-dk13.html. Retrieved 2010-06-23.2. Siemens - Offshore wind power projects3. Anholt offshore wind farm (in Danish) Danish Energy Agency Accessed: 27 November 2010.4. Backwell, Ben (May 1, 2009). "Denmark launches Anholt offshore wind farm tender"http://www.rechargenews.com/business_area/finance/article177404.ece. Retrieved 2010-06-23.5. "Anholt - tender of 400MW" Danish Energy Agency. http://www.ens.dk/en-US/supply/Renewable-energy/WindPower/offshore-Wind-Power/anholt_tender/Sider/Forside.aspx Retrieved 2010-06-23.6. Bjartnes, Anders (June 22, 2010). "Dong gets green light for 400MW Anholt despite high prices"http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/wind/article218455.ece. Retrieved 2010-06-23.7. van Loon, Jeremy (June 22, 2010). "Siemens Wins 111 Offshore Wind-Turbine Order in Denmark From Dong Energy" Bloomberg L.P.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-22/siemens-wins-111-offshore-wind-turbine-order-in-denmark-from-dong-energy.html. Retrieved2010-06-23.8. Hanne, Windemuller. Anholt Offshore Wind Farm will be the largest in Denmark Danish Energy Agency, 2 July 2010. Accessed: 27November 2010.9. Kvarts, Thomas. About the seacable (in Danish) Energinet.dk. Accessed: 27 November 2010.10. Kvarts, Thomas. About the landcable (in Danish) Energinet.dk. Accessed: 27 November 2010.11. Damgaard, Poul. About the transformator platform (in Danish) Energinet.dk, 20 August 2010. Retrieved: 24 October 2010.12. Gaardestrup, Rikke Bille. Connection of offshore wind farm Anholt Energinet.dk 30 November 2009. Retrieved: 24 October 2010.13. "PensionDanmark and PKA to become co-owners of Denmark's largest offshore wind« . DONG Energy. 28 March 2011.http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/News/anholt_nyheder/News/Pages/PensionDanmarkandPKAtobecomecoownersofDenmark%27slargestoffshorewindfarm.aspx.Retrieved 2011-03-30.14. Pedersen, Lars Dalsgård. DONG sells half of Anholt wind farm. Energy Supply, 28 March 2011. Accessed: 10 December 2011.15. Anholt Offshore Wind Farm Newsletter, January 2012. DONG Energy. January 2012.http://www.dongenergy.com/anholt/EN/News/anholt_nyheder/News/Pages/AnholtOffshoreWindFarm-Newsletter-January2012.aspx.Retrieved 16 January 2012.16. "Today we start construction of Anholt Offshore Wind Farm(Press release) ". DONG Energy. 13 January 2012.http://www.dongenergy.com/EN/Media/Newsroom/News/Pages/Today-westartconstructionofAnholtOffshoreWindFarm.aspx. Retrieved 16January 2012.Retrieved from "http://mediawiki.dp.teoma.com/wiki/Anholt_Offshore_Wind_Farm"95

2.3 FLAMMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTBasic Project InformationCase compiled by: Giorgio Locatelli and Mauro ManciniContact details: glocatelli@lincoln.ac.ukProject TitleLocationFLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (FL3)Flamanville, Cotentin Peninsula- Manche, FrancePurposeScopeContractual FrameworkTo build the First EPR Reactor in France. To incorporate the Lessons Learnt from the other EPR(Olkiluoto 3) and demonstrate the constructability of this reactorTo build the EPR reactor, the ancillary services and connect it to the electrical gridEDF is owner and Architect Engineer. It award contracts to other partner (Areva, Alstom, Bouygues…)Relevant PhysicalDimensions1650 MWe – 4500 MWth. When the project reaches its peak, more than 3000 employees will be workingon the site - 15 000 000 hours96

FLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTNuclear IslandConventional Island97

FLAMANVILLE 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT98

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1InternalStakeholderCategoryCase-StudySupply-Side Client EDF (Électricité de France) 87.5% - Enel 12.5%FinanciersDemand Side PrincipalContractorFlamanville 3 is being financed from the corporate resources of theEDF and ENEL.EDF is owner and Architectural engineer: Managing the project (quality, schedule, costs, risks, interfaces…) Fronting the French Nuclear Safety Authority (Responsible of theNuclear License) Deciding how contracts are to be shared out, placing and thenmanaging them Defining technical reference of the plant (general specificationsfor equipment, for buildings, for the general operation…) Optimizing the ownership cost by including feedback from Frenchnuclear fleet in the design and operation Controlling suppliers‘ detailed studies and equipmentmanufacturing quality Controlling on-site construction and commissioning testsCommentsFirst TierContractorsAlstomTurbine IslandIt is a large French multinational conglomerate. The company hasbeen awarded of a contract of 350 million Euros for all engineering,procurement, construction and commissioning of the completeturbine islandFirst time on EPR,Experience in theprevious nuclearprogramBOUYGUES Civil WorkFrench construction company is. In April 2006, Bouygues acquiredthe French government‘s 21% stake in Alstom. At 30 June 2011,Bouygues owned 30.74% of Alstom. (Bouygues, 2011).Second time onEPR, No Experiencein the previousnuclear program99

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 2StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyCommentsInternalDemand SideFirst TierContractorsArevaNuclear IslandAREVA SA is a French industrial group owned for more than 90%by the French State (including the shares owned by the CEA). It isdivided into three main divisions which cover all the aspects ofgenerating electricity with nuclear technology. Areva NP is one ofthese divisions.AREVA NP: Is the architect engineering, reactors vendor and maincontractor for the nuclear island.Second time onEPR, Experiencein the previousnuclear programSecond TierConsultantsContract management for Flamanville 31. 150 main contracts2. The 20 biggest lots represent about 80 % of the constructionbudget3. Contracts for both equipment supply and erection on site4. Competition for all the lots except for NSSS5. At the end of 2009, more than 95 % of contracts were signed100

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationExternalStakeholderCategoryPublic RegulatoryAgenciesLocal GovernmentNationalGovernmentEnvironmentalistASN(Autorité deSûretéNucléaire)Case StudyASN (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire) is the French authority responsible forensuring nuclear safety and radiation protection, in order to protect workers,the public and the environment from risks associated with nuclear activities.The Local Government has been involved mainly in the ―debat publique‖The government controls directly the Authority (ASN), the buyer/utility (EDF), and the mostimportant contractor (AREVA). It owns the CEA and the 85% of EDF shares. Moreover,many other important contractors are French, among them: Alstom and Bouygues. France,as stated by President Sarkozy, aims at becoming a leading exporter of atomic energy.(The World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in France, 2011)Greenpeace and other environmental group fight against this project. They tried severaltimes to stop the project. In the 2011 EDF was fined 1.5 million euros (£1.3mn) for hiring aprivate agency run by a former member of the French secret services to hack thecomputers of the former head of campaigns for Greenpeace France, Yannick Jadot, in2006. (The Telegraph, 2011)CommentsIt has a long experience in managing theoperations but 15 years has passedsince it supervised the last constructionThe French Government is the entitywho owned the two most importantplayers (CEA and EDF) and it was theone who decided to start with the nuclearprogram since 1973.101

Stakeholder Relationship MapsFRENCHSTATEControlANS(autority)OwnsOwnsRegulatesCEAEDF(Owner 87,5%, ArchitectEngineering)ENEL(Owner 12,5%)OwnsOwns+ContractContractOwnsOwnsAREVA SAFlamanville 3ProjectOwnsAREVA NP(Nuclear Island)ALSTOM(ConventionalIsland)Owns30%BOUYGUES(Civil Works)102

Budget management103

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderAttitude tothis ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence on projectImpactRegulatoryAgenciesIndependentASN gives its technical option on the acceptability of any civil nuclear installation. Thebasic regulatory functions ascribed to it are: Licensing (assesses the licensingapplication and make a decision in terms of technical acceptability), Inspecting(likewise in other countries the regulatory body has the full power to inspect thenuclear site, the manufacturing facilities or any other relevant site even withoutnotification), Regulating and Enforcing actions (using the license as vehicle, e.g.suspension of license, or emitting civil sanctions.High, ANS existbeside the projectsince it has tocontrol the otherFrench reactorsLocalGovernmentSupportiveHigh. The local governments have the following powers: first they give their opinionwhen a nuclear site is selected close to them. Second they are involved into the publicinquiry as stakeholder (the public inquiry complains all ―department‖ that areoverlapped by the circle area centered on the nuclear sit and having radios equal tofive kilometres plus every ―communes‖ included into the ―department‖ ). Furthermore aperson appointed by every local governments (―department‖ and ―communes‖) isappointed to the local information committee (having the function of disseminateinformation in the vicinity of the site).Every minor authorization concerning the localgovernment decision-making (for example during the licensing process) pass throughthe local information committee.Medium. The FL3project receive alot of attentionfrom the mediaand this create apressure on thepolitics104

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence onprojectImpact of Project on External StakeholderNationalGovernmentSupportive Very High. Owns the major stakeholders Medium. The FL3 project receive a lot ofattention from the media and this create apressure on the politicsLocal Resident Supportive Medium/Low. They receive a lot of moneyand incentives to accept the projectEnvironmentalists Against Low. Beside some advertising campaignand demonstrative actions there is notmore that they can doMedium. It create job positions and providesfounds to the local community. There are notdirect externalities on the localMedium. To stop the construction of nuclearreactors is one of the big ultimate goal ofmany environmentalists like Greenpeace105

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timePerformance relating to costPerformance related to achievingspecificationOriginal Targets and changes to targetsEDF started in 2006 to build the reactor atFlamanville. Fl3 was expected to be connected in2012. In July 2011 the new official forecast secommercial operations in 2016 (EDF, 2011)Fl3 was expected to cost approx. 3.3 billion Euro(2005) In July 2012 the new official forecasts are:6 billion euros,Actual Achievements Against TargetsThe project is 4 years behind scheduleThere is 2.7 billion of Euro of extra cost (81% ofproject value)The authority reported several time that thequality was below what is required in the nuclearindustry106

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightStakeholder orStakeholder GroupingAREVA / EDFEnvironmental group/GreenpeaceOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsThere were 3 main aims for this projecta) To show that the EPR, after the bad experience in Olkiluoto(OL3), can be built at a lower cost and the lessons from OL3have been learnedb) To learn other lessons for the other EPR projectc) To provide a New reactor to substitute the aging FrenchReactorsTo disturb the construction and possibly to stop the projectAchievement of these Aimsa) It seems that only few lessonsfrom OL3 have been implementedin this projectb) The performance in the Chinesereactors seems to confirm thatsome lessons have been learnedc) This reactor will substitute theaging French ReactorsSome disturb actions but the project isstill going and the majority of thepopulation support itBouygues To apply the lessons from OL3 and to gain experience It seems going according to the planAlstom To enter the EPR project delivery chain, to gain experience It seems going according to the plan107

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on the projectThe legal and regulatory framework is characterized to be "prescriptive based", shared into many legal fonts. Asresult the framework is mostly rigid and complex. The highest level of prescriptiveness and complexity is reachedat regulatory level. A peculiar feature of the legal system is the division between three main quasi-independentlegal bodies associated to three typologies of nuclear installation: Basic Nuclear Installation (FL3 belongs to thiscategory), Installations classified for environmental protection purposes and Defence related installation.The regulatory functions applied to all French Reactors are characterized to be highly crafted on a specific familyof reactors (N4). Since the French reactor standard has been replicated over decades the specific licensingdecision-making safety criteria were standardized on the same reactor. These criteria mostly complain withdeterministic safety criteria (indeed also the probabilistic one has being also crafted on the specific reactordesign).The changing of reactor standard has posed a regulatory and licensing challenge to the regulatory body becauseof the lack of practice in assessing different reactor technologies (differently to other oversee regulatoryinstitutions). At the same time, the developing organizations were not sufficiently experienced with this newreactor design. Finally the linkage between oversee regulatory bodies (WENRA Western European NuclearRegulators' Association) contributed to the discover some safety weakness affecting the EPR (for example thelack in separating the control system with respect the safety one is in conflict with the defence in depth concept:this problem were also reported by the Finnish regulatory body and British one, respectively STUK and HSE).Political EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectThe political environment was highly supportive. The French president N. Sarkozy is one of the mostimportant supporters of this project.The Fukushima accident pointed out several lessons for the nuclear Industry. Among the other EDF maystudy the development of mobile diesel generator back up units that could be moved to reactors wherepower systems and back-up generators have failed108

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic ProjectEnvironmentThe nuclear profitability is undermined by the steady low cost of natural gas (the main competitor with the CCGTplants) and the high cost of the commodities.Specific EconomicEvents impacting onthe project109

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2008Events andactivities relatingto projectstakeholders5/06 7/06 1/07 4/07 12/07 3/08 5/08 10/08 12/08NSSSorderedfromAreva NPFrenchgovernmentissuesconstructionlicenseEvents andactivities relatingto projectmanagementEDFdecides toproceedwith FL3Site workcommenced.Targetconstruction time54 months,construction cost€3.3bn excludingfinance and fuelFirstconcretepouredEvents andactivities relatingto projectperformanceASN asks EDF to improvework in several areasinvolving in particularquality control andorganization. Inspectionhad revealed severalproblems in the civilconstruction work,including errors ininstallation of steelreinforcing bar in theconcrete and"inconsistency" betweenrebar blueprints and theconcrete pouring plan.organization for preparingconcrete pouring was"insufficient,"ASN requires EDFto stop concretepouring on May 26(ban lifted June 17).Problems ‗showinsufficientdiscipline on thepart of the licenseeand insufficientprojectorganization‘.Welding anomaliesfound in one of thefour bottom piecesof the steel liner ofthe containmentbuildingASN toldAreva toimprove itsoversight offorgings afterproceduresused byItaliansubcontractorSocietà dellaFucine werefound not toconform tostandards.EDFacknowledgescost hadincreased to€4bn duemainly toinflation, andtechnical &regulatorychanges.Constructionscheduleclaimed still tobe achievableEvents andactivities relatingto projectenvironment110

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2010-201101/10 07/10 08/10 10/10 03/11 07/11Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersEvents and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementASN asks EDF to modifythe architecture of thenon-safetyinstrumentation andcontrol systemEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceUnions claim constructionis at least 2 years behindscheduleEDF confirms delay andannounces expected costsare €1.7bn over budgetLe Figaro reports afurther year delayThe new official forecastsfrom EDF are: 6 billioneuros, about 90% overbudget, and commercialoperations in 2016Events and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentFukushimaDaiichi nucleardisaster111

2.4 GREATER GABBARD OFFSHORE WIND FARMCase compiled by: Naomi BrookesContact details: n.j.brookes@leeds.ac.ukBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScope 3,5ContractualFramework 2,3,4,5Greater Gabbard Wind FarmOff-shore of Suffolk, UKTo produce electricity for the UK‘s National Grid from wind powerAll off-shire power generation and on-shore substation with connections to the National GridGreater Gabbard Offshore Winds Ltd (GGOWL) is an equity joint venture (50% Scottish and SouthernEnergy 50% RWE Innology). Fluor has a fixed price $1.8bn EPC contract for the Balance of Plant withGGWOL. (N.B. The contractual framework has changed significantly during the lifetime of the project.)Relevant Physical 140 turbines, capacity of 500MW, expected output 1750 GWh/a, 23 km from land in a depth of water of 2.4 –Dimensions 1,5 10m112

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationSupply-SideStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments (e.g. maturity,previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence onproject)ClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Greater Gabbard Offshore Winds Ltd (GGOWL)n/an/aNational Grid plc (through wholly owned subsidiary National Grid Energy Transmission plc) 17At the start of the project: Airtricity & Fluor.Currently: 50% Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) and 50% RWE npower RenewablesCategoryOff-shore TransmissionOwner (6,7)Case-StudyGET, (a consortium comprising Equitix, AMP Capital Investors andBalfour Beatty Capital) £315M high voltage transmission linkEquity joint venture specificallyformed for this projectOSTO AwardOrganisations ( 6,7)OFGEM (Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets) UK authorityestablished by Act of ParliamentSite-Owner UK Crown Estates 9Demand Side(NB for this casehave details for~100 contractorsand professionalservice providersonly included asample here)Principal ContractorsFirst Tier ContractorsFluor is responsible for the EPC (engineer, procure and construct) of the Balance of Plant(BOP)Siemens providing 140 3.6MW turbines (awarded by?) 8McNulty Offshore Construction of South Shields. McNulty will construct an offshore substationto be housed within a platform 25km off the Suffolk coast, connecting to an onshoresubstation at Sizewell (awarded by Siemens)Highly formalised and global PMprocesses and practices usedthroughout the organisationSubsea Protection Ltd. Concrete Fleximats (awarded by Fluor)JDR Cables providing all underwater cabling (awarded by?)Professional ServicesProvidersRamboll geotechnical surveying to GGWOL, METOC providing project control services toSSE/GGWOL, KBR providing project management consultancy service to SSE113

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationPublicStakeholderCategoryRegulatoryAgenciesCase-StudyOff-shoreTransmissionOwnerLicence todepositmaterial onseafloorLocal Government N/A - offshoreNationalGovernmentUK GovernmentPrivate Local residents N/A - offshoreLocal LandownersN/A – offshoreGET, (a consortium comprising Equitix, AMP Capital Investors and BalfourBeatty Capital) £315M high voltage transmission linkDEFRA issues licence but confers withDepartment for Transport (DfT), Ministry of Defence (MoD);CEFAS for scientific advice on fisheries, benthos, sedimentary processes,hydrodynamics and coastal processes;English Nature (EN), Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) and Joint NatureConservation Committee (JNCC) for statutory advice on species and sites ofnature conservation importance e.g. Special Protection Areas SPA), SpecialAreas of Conservation (SAC), (Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), MarineNature Reserves (MNR);DEFRA Sea Fisheries Inspectorate;Local Authority interests – for planning, amenity/leisure, environmental health;Port Authorities;The Crown Estate;Environment Agency – for water quality, migratory fish, coastal processes;Other interest groups and non-governmental organisations (NGO) e.g. NationalFederation of Fishermen‘s Organisations, Royal Yachting Association etc.Comments (e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)Environmentalists Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Favourable attitude to wind farmsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther ExternalPrivatestakeholders(please specify)None apparent - offshoreN/A - offshoreCategoryPrivate and non-human users of areasCase-studyEnglish, Dutch and Belgian long beam fishingtrawlers, Commercial Shipping, Birds, Fish,Marine MammalsTourist BoardsEnvironmental Impact Assessmentproduced by PSSC shows negligible oreven beneficiary effect on all of thesestakeholders114

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsNumerousexternalstakeholdersOFGEMConsults withScottishandSouthernEnergyRWEInnologyLicences transmissionDEFRAOwns 50%Owns 50%UKCrownEstatesLeases the sea-bedcommissionsLicences use of sea-bedGGOWL(client)Leases the sea-bedTransfers on-going transmission rightsGETConsortium(OFTO)Consultants,(e.g. Technicalservices, PR 21 )commissionsSIEMENS(turbineprovider)Contracts withContracts withFLUOR(EPCContractor)Supplies electricity toContracts withNationalGridSupplies electricity toContracts withContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsFirst tiersubcontractorsKey:Name ofActor- Project ActorContracts with2nd tiersubcontractors2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withDescription ofrelationship- ProjectRelationship115

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influenceon projectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderGreenpeace, Friends of the Earth Highly Favourable 10, 12 Ability to Lobby GovernmentOrganisationsNational Federation ofFishermen‘s OrganisationsConcerned about danger tolivelihood 11Ability to Lobby GovernmentOrganisations specifically DEFRA inresponse to application to deposititems on sea-bedTourism Boards Worried about effects of tourism 12 General ability to lobby governmentorganisationsContributes to achieving theiroverall aimsPotentially substantively harmfulMarine Flora and Fauna None identified PSCC survey identifies this asneutral or potentially beneficialRoyal Yachting AssociationNatural EnglandPort AuthoritiesConcerned about navigationalsafety and loss of cruising routes butcurrently happy with levels ofconsultation 13Concerned about damage to habitatsbut currently happy with levels ofconsultations - 14See this as a commercial opportunityto provide industrial, technical andlogistical support - 15General ability to Lobby GovernmentOrganisationsAbility to Lobby GovernmentOrganisations specifically DEFRA inwill consult with in connection with toapplication to deposit items on seabedLimited to on-shore facility supportSlightCould lead to loss of some currentareas of recreational sailingPotentially makes it more difficultfor organisation to reach itsobjectives of protecting England'snatural environmentsCould provide areas of commercialgrowth116

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementComplex picture of project team dispersed in Airtricity/SSE, RWE, Fluor and Siemens alongsideproject management consultancies and changing throughout the lifecycle of the project. Plethora ofsupply chain interactions.Project Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Stakeholder Involvement □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Management Software □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Lessons Learnt Transfers □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More InformationSSE employs a ‗Large Capital Governance Framework‘ to insure that its projects are governed, developed , approved and executed in an effective manner. Toassistin this, SSE has appointed KBR ( a leading EPC company) as a Project Management partner to help maintain the processes, systems and skills needed todeliver largecapital projects 25RWE is in the process of developing company wide approaches to project management systems and procedures 28Fluor has well-established formal project management systems and procedures. These form part of the OSR ( operating system record) that prescribes all of theOrganisations‘ processes and practices in Fluor. The OSR dictates that everyone should develop operating systems implementation plans which need to getsigned off one of which looks at Project Management. OSRs get kept up-to-date by a subject manager who is responsible globally for their development. OSR areavailable on-line and are an integral part of day-to-day operation against which people are audited.Siemens has longstanding formal imitative in project management. In 2000, it introduced the PM@Siemens initiative and in 2009 had its project managementdevelopment programme accredited by the APM.117

Project ProcessesRisk Management Processes 29Present (describe below) X Not Present □ No Information □Airtricity/SSE considered that they had undertaken significant risk mitigation actions through:•Detailed and extensive soil investigation•Extensive site specific wind data•Conservative array spacing to minimise array losses.•Independent foundation design verification•Early input from O&M group (particularly for access design)•Use of proven technology backed up by service and warranty agreement.They also considered that the joint development of the design with Fluor prior to contract award ensured that all subcontractswere fully transparent and the cost and value of wrap known and understood. They considered that the projectprogramme developed with adequate float (particularly vessels) and that the BOP wrap provided a hedge against keylarge-scale offshore risksHR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration ManagementProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □See previous statementPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X118

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timeOriginal Targets and changes to targetsOriginal targets were for first power to be generated onQ4 2009 ,42 turbines to be installed by Feb 2010 and afurther 98 by March 2011 which would also see thecompletion of the project.Changes:Oct 2010 - completion estimated at the end of 2011April 2011 – completion estimated in the summer of 2012Oct 2011 – completion estimated at the end of 2012Actual Achievements Against TargetsOct 2010 – 30 turbines installedDec 2010 – 53 turbines installedOct 2011 – 115 turbines installed and 80% cablesinstalledFirst power achieved Dec 2010Performance relating to costFixed price contract with Fluor for $1.8bn (April 2008) Q4 2010 – Fluor make provisions for losses of £340MPerformance related to specification500MW output with an average output of 1895 GWhsAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these Aims Achievement of these AimsUKGovernmentGreater Gabbard will contribute 5% of the UK's 2010 renewable energy target of 10%.This target is raised to 20% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 22Failure against 2010 target as not delivered on time. Unknownsuccess of future targetsAirtricity To develop a portfolio of projects to make it an attractive acquisition target 23 Initial market capitalisation in 1997 was €625K sold for €2.2bnto SSE and Eon in 2008.RWE Creating a diverse portfolio of energy generating resources 24 Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets generation targetsSSESiemensCreating an investment portfolio that delivers a significantly-enhanced asset base(consistent with returns greater than the cost of capital), additional fuel for energy in theform of renewables and additional cash flows and profits to support future dividendgrowth. 25Should succeed as long as Gabbard meets generation targetsFluor Profit on contract Earnings on contract considerably less than expected119

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)The UK energy market is regulated by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 26 and is responsible for the regulating monopolies in energy supply. Italso helps to secure UK‘s energy supplies by promoting competitive gas and electricity markets - and regulating them so that there is adequate investment in thenetworks, and contributing to the drive to curb climate change and other work aimed at sustainable development.Planning regulations for large projects deemed to be of national importance have been changed under the 2007 planning reform bill with a particular stance towardseasing the ability of nuclear and renewable power plant to get planning permission. The EU has no formal authority for spatial planning.The European Commission Energy Directorate has an energy strategy "Energy 2020― which identifies the energy priorities for the period up to 2020, i.e. to reduceenergy consumption, implement the internal market, develop infrastructure, improve technology, protect consumers and reinforce the external dimension of energypolicy. These goals will be achieved through a series of legislative proposals.Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on theprojectGreater Gabbard Declared a Renewable Energy Zone (REZ) (The Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2004, made under Section 84 of the EnergyAct 2004) in relation to the United Kingdom‘s rights under Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 for the economic exploitation andexploration of its exclusive economic zone under the Convention for the Production of Energy from the Water, Currents and Winds (Article 56, UNCLOS).In relation to consenting and related matters, the Energy Act has extended the Section 36 consenting regime under the Electricity Act 1989 to the REZ, enabled anavigation extinguishment declaration to be made in relation to a Section 36 consent inside territorial waters, and provided a new regime for the declaration of safetyzones inside territorial waters and the REZ. Statutory Consents required for the proposed Greater Gabbard Offshore Wind Farm project are as followsEconomic EnvironmentSection 36 Electricity Act 1989 (construction and operation of the wind turbines, offshore transformer stations and met masts;granted by DTI)Section 5 Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (installation of foundations of offshore structures, rock armouring, scourprotection etc; granted by DEFRA)Section 34 Coast Protection Act 1949 (obstruction to navigation works; granted by DEFRA)Section 36A Electricity Act 1989 (navigation extinguishment declaration; granted by DTI)Section 95 Energy Act 2004 (Safety Zones; granted by DTI)Section 57 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (planning permission for onshore sub-station and cables; granted by SuffolkCoastal District Council)Section 37 Electricity Act 1989 (overhead electric lines from sub-station to neighbouring existing 400 kV power line; granted by DTI)Economic Project Environment Late 2000 recessions (beginning December 2007)Specific Economic Events impacting on the projectPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Events impacting on the projectNone identifiedGrowing interest in ‗green‘ politics as evidenced by the election of the UK‘s first Green MP in the 2010 election.None Identified120

EVENTS IN THEENVIRONMENTEVENTS IN THE PROJECTMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME200320042005200620072008200920102011SITE IDENTIFICATION & DEVELOPMENT 17 DESIGN & PROCUREMENT 17 CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION 17Crown Estatesopen bidding forRound 2 sites foroffshore windfarmsGGOWLcreated as a JVby Fluor andAirtricityCrown Estatesawards site optionto GGOWLGGOWL signsconstructionagreement withNational GridGGOWLreceivesgenerationlicence fromOFGEMGGOWL grantedSection 36planningpermissionSSE takeoverAirtricitySSEcontracts withFluor for$1.8bn to beEPC for BOPin return Fluorsells SSE50% GGWOLfor £40MGGOWLsignsconnectionagreementwith NationalGrid 17Weldingdefects delaymonopileinstallation 20First TurbineBankruptcy ofSubocean,the cablelayingsubcontractorFirst Powergenerated 19Fluor suesGGWOL for£300M overmonopilequality 18installed 19 117 of 140SSE contractswith Siemensfor turbinesSSE sell 50%of GGWOL toRWE for£308MFluor make$340Mreduction inprofitsprovision dueto GreaterGabbardturbinesinstalled and80% cablesinstalled 19Passing of UKEnergy Actenables creation ofREZ for GreaterGabbard siteEU Directive givesUK target togenerate 15% ofenergy fromrenewables121

REFERENCES• 1- Case Study: European Offshore Wind Farms- A Survey to analyse Experiences and Lessons Learnt by Developers of Offshore Wind Farms fromwww.offshore-power.net• 2 - http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/310134/rwe-innogy/sites/wind-offshore/under-construction/the-proposal/• 3 - http://www.fluor.com/projects/Pages/ProjectInfoPage.aspx?PrjID=64• 4 - http://www.offshorewind.biz/2010/10/19/fluor-announces-that-cost-escalation-on-offshore-wind-project-will-impact-third-quarter-results-usa/• 5- http://www.sse.com/GreaterGabbard/ProjectInformation/• 6 - http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1805171/renewables-grid-competition-sparks-investor-gold-rush• 7 - http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2074046/balfour-beatty-consortium-bags-gbp317m-gabbard-grid-link• 8 - http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pr_cc/2007/09_sep/pg200709075_1463099.htm• 9 - http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/energy/offshore-wind-energy/• 10 - http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/press-releases/switch-on-for-uks-first-offshore-wind-farm• 11- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-12354185• 12 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/1261882.stm• 13 - http://www.rya.org.uk/cruising/current-issues/Pages/Round3windzonesdevelopersstartscoping.aspx• 14 - http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/about_us/news/2010/080110a.aspx• 15 - http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/20715/comment-pna-ports-getting-ready-for-offshore-wind/• 16 - GREATER GABBARD OFFSHORE WIND FARM NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY October 2005 published by PMSS• 17 - Gabbard The World’s Largest Offshore Wind Farm In Construction. Presentation to IET Dublin -December 7th2010by Séamus Mc Cabe• 18 - http://www.windpowermonthly.com/channel/environment/news/1096453/Greater-Gabbard-monopile-row-continues/• 19 - http://www.4coffshore.com/windfarms/greater-gabbard-united-kingdom-uk05.html• 20 - http://www.offshore247.com/news/art.aspx?Id=14850• 21 - http://www.3gc.co.uk/communication.php?content_id=21044• 22 - http://www.power-technology.com/projects/greatergabbardoffsho/• 23 - http://www.businessandfinance.ie/index.jsp?p=643&n=329&a=2237• 24 – http://www.theenergyevent.com/Energy11/uploads/1.Beckers.Volker.Insight.10.40.pdf• 25 – SSE ANNUAL Report 2011• 26 - http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/About%20us/Pages/AboutUsPage.aspx• 27 - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Late-2000s_recession• 28 – Meeting held to discuss this in February 2011• 29 – Presentation by Jim Smith Director Offshore Airtricity 2008• 30 - http://www.s0larpower.net/subocean-goes-bankrupt-purchased-by-technip/122

2.5 HINKLEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATIONCase compiled by: Naomi BrookesContact details: n.j.brookes@leeds.ac.ukBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeContractual Framework 1 2Hinkley PointSomerset, United KingdomTo produce electricity for the UK‘s National GridHincley Point C Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactors. All power generation and connections to the National GridNuclear New Build Holding Company Limited an equity joint venture ( 20% Centrica 80% EDF) toconstruct, operate and decommission 4 nuclear powerplants in the UK. EPCPM contract with AMEC.Nuclear Steam Supply system to be provided by AREVA.Relevant PhysicalDimensions3200MWeStatus In Planning to be completed 2020123

HINKLEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION124

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Supply Side Client Nuclear New Build Holding Company Limited (NNBHC) Equity joint venture specifically formed for this projectDemand SideFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Principal ContractorsFirst Tier ContractorsProfessional ServicesProvidersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)n/an/aNational Grid plc (through wholly owned subsidiaryNational Grid Energy Transmission plc) 1780% EDF Energy20% CentricaCategoryother procurementstakeholdersCase-StudyEDF Procurement, ParisAMEC is responsible for the architectural engineering andproject management.ARREVA is responsible for the provision of the nuclearsteam supply system.Rolls-Royce is responsible for the turbine equipment 3Kier & BAN Nuttall – earthwork construction servicesCategoryCase-StudySupply and Installation of BOP will be directlyprocured by EDF Energy (60% cost)Many still to be awarded125

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationPublicStakeholder Category Case-StudyRegulatory AgenciesOffice for Nuclear Regulation, (part of the Health andSafety Executive)Design and Quality Standard Producers(RCC & ASME)Infrastructure Planning CommissionComments (e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Responsible under Nuclear Installation Act to provide a single sitelicence for all activities relating to the site. Likely to become astatutory corporation.French RCC – M/RCC-EAmerican - ASME Section 111Responsible for granting planning applications to strategicinfrastructure project as defined by the National Policy Statement( will be changing very soon unde the new Localism Act)Environment AgencyInvolved in Generic design AssessmentPrivateLocal GovernmentOFGEMInternational Atomic Energy AuthoritySedgemoor District Council, Somerset County CouncilLicences Energy producersSet up a series of treaties and agreements to promote peacefuluse of nuclear energyNational Government Department of Energy and Climate ChangeUK government department responsible for ‗smoothing the path‘Office for Nuclear Developmentfor nuclear developmentOthersA strategic Authority set up by UK Government to be responsibleNuclear Decommissioning Authorityfor the disposal of all Nuclear WasteLocal residentsThink it will have a positive impact on the area -4 ( House pricesSedgemoor, Taunton Deane, West Somersetwill rise – 5, EDF energy community fund)Local Landowners EDF spending money on mitigation for local landowners - 7Local BusinessOrganisationsEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther ExternalPrivate stakeholders(please specify)Somerset Chamber of CommerceGreenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Stop New NuclearAlliance 6Severn Estuary Conservation groupn/aNuclear Industry AssociationURENCOUranium fuel provider partially owned by UK Government126

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsOffice ofNuclearRegulationAssists in providing nuclear site licenceEnvironmentAgencyOffice forNuclearDevelopmentProvides nuclear site licenceEDFEnergyCentricaProvides planning consentOwns 80%Owns 20%IPCContracts withNNBHC(client)Licences transmissionOFGEMSupplies electricity toContracts withFirst tier subcontractors(e.g. Kier)Contracts withARREVAContracts withRolls-Royce(turbineprovider)Contracts withContracts withAMEC(EPCPMContractor)Contracts withNationalGridKey:Nameof Actor- Project Actor2nd tiersubcontractorsFirst tiersubcontractors2nd tiersubcontractorsFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsDescription ofrelationship- ProjectRelationship127

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influenceon projectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderGreenpeace, Friends of the Earth,Stop Nuclear new Build AllianceHighly UnfavourableAbility to Lobby GovernmentOrganisations, civil disruptionOpposition to this type of project istheir raison d‘etreLocal residents and landownersConcerned about risk but alsowelcoming new jobs and potentialproperty boomvote for local government and nationalgovernmentPotentially ( and v. remotely)substantively harmful but in realitymay make significant improvementto standards of livingLocal Business Organisations ( e.g.Somerset Chamber of CommerceVery happy to see new businessopportunities but want to seethese available locallyGeneral ability to lobby government(especially local )if successful may increase growthsubstantiallyNuclear Industry Association Very favourable and supportive None identified PSCC survey identifies this asneutral or potentially beneficialURENCO Happy for new business General ability to Lobby GovernmentOrganisationsMore growthSevern Estuary Conservation Groupworried about effect ofdevelopment on habitatsAbility to Lobby GovernmentOrganisations, civil disruptioncould be beneficial if EDF providesextra funding128

Project ProcessesRisk Management Processes 29Present (describe below) X Not Present □ No Information □HR Management ProcessesProcurement Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □See previous statementIntegration Management ProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X129

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timeOriginal Targets and changes to targetsActual Achievements Against TargetsPerformance relating to costPerformance related to specificationAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder Original Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these Aims Achievement of these AimsUK GovernmentGreater Gabbard will contribute 5% of the UK's 2010 renewable energy target of 10%. This target israised to 20% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 22Failure against 2010 target as not deliveredon time. Unknown success of future targetsAirtricity To develop a portfolio of projects to make it an attractive acquisition target 23 Initial market capitalisation in 1997 was€625K sold for €2.2bn to SSE and Eon in2008.RWE Creating a diverse portfolio of energy generating resources 24 Should succeed as long as Gabbard meetsgeneration targetsSSESiemensCreating an investment portfolio that delivers a significantly-enhanced asset base (consistent withreturns greater than the cost of capital), additional fuel for energy in the form of renewables andadditional cash flows and profits to support future dividend growth. 25Should succeed as long as Gabbard meetsgeneration targetsFluor Profit on contract Earnings on contract considerably less thanexpected130

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationally andEurope wide)The UK energy market is regulated by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 26 and is responsible for the regulatingmonopolies in energy supply. It also helps to secure UK‘s energy supplies by promoting competitive gas and electricity markets - andregulating them so that there is adequate investment in the networks, and contributing to the drive to curb climate change and other workaimed at sustainable development.Planning regulations for large projects deemed to be of national importance have been changed under the 2007 planning reform bill with aparticular stance towards easing the ability of nuclear and renewable power plant to get planning permission. The EU has no formalauthority for spatial planning.The European Commission Energy Directorate has an energy strategy "Energy 2020― which identifies the energy priorities for the periodup to 2020, i.e. to reduce energy consumption, implement the internal market, develop infrastructure, improve technology, protectconsumers and reinforce the external dimension of energy policy. These goals will be achieved through a series of legislative proposals.All nuclear energy programmes take place under the auspices of the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic EnergyAuthoritySpecific Legal andRegulatory events impactingon the projectPlanning Act 2008 and Localism Act 2011Energy Act 2008Climate Change Act 2008Nuclear Installation Act 1965Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999Nuclear Generating Stations ( Security) Regulations 1996Radioactive Material(Road Transport Act) 1991Radioactive Substances Act 1993Economic EnvironmentEconomic Project Environment Late 2000 recessions (beginning December 2007)Specific Economic Events impacting on the project Financial Collapse of British Energy in 2002Political EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentGrowing interest in carbon emission reductions. EU Emissions Trading Schemes. Power plant reaching the end of its life inthe UK. Nuclear disasters ( Chernobyl, Fukushima)Specific Political Events impacting on the project2006 reversal in previous anti-nuclear energy policy by Labour government.131

EVENTS IN THEENVIRONMENTEVENTS IN THE PROJECTMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME200320042005200620072008200920102011British EnergyOwned Sitesselected by UKGovernment assuitable for moredevelopmentEDFsuccessfullyacquires forBritish Energyfor £12.5 bnEDF sells20% of BE toCentrica toform NNBEDF awardsEPCPMcontract toAMECNNB appliesforsite licencefrom HSEat HinkleyGovernmentreverses itsviewpoint onnuclear powerIntroduction ofnew planning act132

REFERENCES• 1 - http://www.edfenergy.com/about-us/about-edf-energy/our-structure/• 2 - http://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/press-news/AMEC-awarded-11-year-contract-with-EDF-for-new-UK-nuclear-powerstations.shtml• 3 - http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1517/french-and-british-to-seal-nuclear-power-deal• 4 - http://www.british-energy.com/article.php?article=418• 5 - http://www.thisissomerset.co.uk/Hinkley-Point-staff-influx-Somerset-residents/story-14304950-detail/story.html• 6 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/03/hinkley-point-protest-nuclear-power• 7 - http://hinkleypoint.edfenergyconsultation.info/newsroom-faqs/press-releases/972133

2.6 LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGOCase compiled by: Giorgio Locatelli and Mauro ManciniContact details: glocatelli@lincoln.ac.ukBasic Project InformationProject TitleLiquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal of Rovigo.Location15 Km far from the coast of Porto Levante, in the province of Rovigo, in the Adriatic sea. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).PurposeScopeContractual FrameworkRelevant PhysicalDimensionsRegassify 8 billion m 3 of gas per annum, about at the 10% of the Italian gas consumption.Realization of the gravity base structure (GBS), all the facilities placed on the top of GBS, the mooringdolphins, the off-shore and the on-shore (Porto Viro – Cavarzere – Minerbio) pipeline to connect the terminalto the national gas distribution.Two EPC contracts with Aker Kvaerner and Snamprogetti (now Saipem). About 1 billion of EuroThe GBS built with 90.000 cubic meters of concrete and 30.000 tons of steel, is long 180 m and high 47 mand the most part is under the sea level.The liquefied natural gas is stored in two LNG tanks, with capacity of 125.000 cubic meters everyone, placedinto the GBS structure.A first pipeline of 76 cm diameter and 40 km long covers 15 Km of sea floor and then carries on for 25 Kmonshore.From here the gas is carried by another pipeline (90 cm diameter and 84-km long) to a tie in point with thenational distribution network near Minerbio (BO). (Adriatic LNG, 2011).134

LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGO135

LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGOGBSStructure136

LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGOLNG CARRIER NEAR THE TERMINAL137

LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGO1)GBS structure9) Generators2) LNG vaporizers ORV 10) Maintenance building3) Boil-off gas compressors 11) Helicopter platform4) Boil-off recondenser 12) LNG unloading platform5) High-pressure pumps 13) Docking facilities6) Flare 14) Bridges7) Living quarters 15)Pipeline connection8) Electric and instrumental system138

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LNG RE-GASIFICATION PLANT, ROVIGO148

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 1StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills, influence onproject)Supply-Side Client Adriatic LNG Owner and manager of the terminal and the pipeline up to Cavarzere station.The company employs about 125 people. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).FinanciersEdison, Qatar Petroleum(QP), ExxonMobil (XOM),Italian State.InternalSponsors Edison. It obtained all the necessary authorizations for the realization of the terminal.Client’sCustomersClient’s OwnersEdison 80%, BP 12,5%,Others 8,5% (percentage ofthe gas productions).ExxonMobil 70,7%, QatarPetroleum 22%, Edison 7,3%.Edison is the holder of the right of allocation and so it has a contract ―take orpay‖ with RasGas of 25 years of duration for the utilization of the 80% of thegas processed in the terminal. (Quadrino, 2009) and (Delibera n. 91/02).The remaining 20%, available for the other gas companies, has been assignedaccording to the procedures defined by AEEG Authority. The 8,5% is processedon demand. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).QP and XOM are involved together in other joint venture of LNG terminal. South HookLNG terminal in UK, Golden Pass LNG terminal in USA. (Qatar Petroleum, 2010).Other internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)PrincipalContractorRasGasAker Kvaerner for the LNGterminal and Saipem for thepipeline.ExxonMobil and QP own also the company RasGas (ExxonMobil, 2010) that supply the80% of the LNG for the terminal. (Quadrino, 2009).Aker Kvaerner is a global oil services company that provides engineering services,technologies, product solutions for the oil and gas industry. It employs about 18500people. (Aker Solutions, 2011).Saipem is an Italian contractor in the field of infrastructure construction andmaintenance for the oil industry, with operations on five continents. It employs about30000 people. (Saipem, 2012).149

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification 2StakeholderCategoryCase-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders, skills, influence on project)Demand SideFirst TierContractorsAccionaIt built the GBS structure (Serina, 2012). It also undertook all of the ancillary installations for the basecamp, including 4500 square meters of offices and other facilities (Acciona, 2008).WhessoeIt provided, with an EPC contract, the engineering and design for LNG tanks and subcontracted theconstruction. It was responsible for the testing and commissioning of the tanks after their installationinto GBS. (Whessoe, 2010).DragadosIt constructed the top side facilities, and was responsible to their installation and hook up on the GBSstructure. (Serina, 2012).InternalIng. E. MantovaniMax Streicher andSaipemIt built the Mooring Dolphins at the Arsenale shipyard in Venice (Italia Oggi, 2008) and was involved inthe pipeline construction (Penolazzi, 2006).pipeline construction.Second TierConsultantsHyundai HeavyIndustries (HHI)It manufactured and supplied the LNG tanks in six sections. (Hyundai Heavy Industries, 2006).SiemensIt built the module of electric and instrumental system. (Serina, 2012).EmtungaIt supplied the Living quarters module. (Serina, 2012).ProfessionalServicesProvidersFagioliIt was responsible for the unload, the transport, the lifting and the positioning of the all modules andtop side facilities on the GBS structure. (Fagioli, 2011).150

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationStakeholder Category Case-Study CommentsPublic Regulatory Agencies AEEG (Autorità per l‘Energia Elettricae il gas)AEEG has the functions of regulation and controlin the sectors of the electricity and gas(determination of tariffs and the technical andeconomic conditions of access andinterconnection to the networks). (AEEG, 2012).ExternalLocal GovernmentRegione Veneto, Regione EmiliaRomagna, Provincia di Rovigo,Municipalities.Both regions approved and was favourable to theprojects.National GovernmentMinistero Sviluppo Economico,Ministero dell‘Ambiente.The Ministero dell‘Ambiente issued the VIAdecrees . The Ministero Sviluppo Economicoissued the permissions to construction.Private Environmentalists Committees environmentalistTried to stop the construction of the terminal.151

Stakeholder Relationship MapsPrivates andbanksQatar StateTransalpinadi EnergiaOwns50%EDFGruppoTassaraFloatingownsownsOwns61,3%Owns19,4%Owns10%Owns9,3%RasGasOwns30%ExxonMobilOwns70%QatarPetroleumOwns70,7% Owns22%Owns7,3%Sell80%EdisonownsownsRasLaffanLNGOthersSupplies80%Supplies20%Adriatic LNGTermi nal + Pipeline(Terminal-Cavarzere)ContractContractSell12,5%Sell8,5%BPOthersEdison StoccaggioPipeline (Cavarzere-Minerbio)ContractAker KvaernerTerminalSaipemPipelineConstructionConstructionand installationDesign andconstructionConstructionConstructionConstructionAccionaGBSDragadosTop side facilitiesWhessoeLNG tanksIng. E. MantovaniMooring Dolphinsand PipelineMax StreicherPipelineSupplierEmtungaModule of livingquartersSupplierSiemensModule ofelectric systemSupplierHyundai HeavyIndusriesLNG tanksForeign investors:• Own the plant• Supply the gas• Sell the gas152

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitude to thisProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence on projectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderRegion ofVenetoIt was favourable to the realization of theterminal and the pipeline in its territory.(Regione Veneto, 2006).In the VIA decree of 1999 for the terminal and in2003 for the pipeline it obtained that it takes greatcare of the environment and its restoration duringthe construction of the terminal and pipeline.(Decreto di VIA, 2003) and (Penolazzi, 2005).Region ofEmilia-RomagnaProvince ofRovigoIt was favourable to the realization of thepipeline in its territory. (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 2003).The Province opposed to the terminaland the pipeline trying in any way, in thecourtroom, to stop the project. (Chinaglia,2006).In the VIA decree of 2003 for the pipeline itobtained that it takes great care of theenvironment and its restoration during theconstruction of the pipeline. (Decreto di VIA,2003).It first appealed to the TAR of Lazio and thenturned to the State Council against the acts ofauthorization. It lost in both the judgements inJune 2005 and July 2006.(TAR del Lazio, 2005) and (Consiglio di Stato,2006).In February 2008 there was thesigning of the agreementbetween AdriaticLng, Consvipoand the Province of Rovigo thatput an end to the battles. Thisagreement established aenvironmental compensation forthe territory. (Consvipo, 2008).153

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitude to thisProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence onprojectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderEnvironmentalistsSince 1998 until the entry into operationof the terminal there was the opposition ofthe environmentalists and committees ofcitizens against the terminal. (Stoppa,2009).the negative effects on the environmentrisks of accidentany benefit on the employment plan andstops the process of tourismdevelopment.The committee Basso-polesano recoursedto the TAR of Lazio and then to the StateCouncil against the acts of authorization. Itlost in both the judgements in June 2005and July 2006. (TAR Veneto, 2006).In 2006, some environmental groupsincluding the Committee Basso-polesanoappealed to the TAR of Veneto against theacts of authorization and the TAR ofVeneto dismissed this appeal on October2006. (TAR Veneto, 2006).MunicipalitiesIn 2006 there was the agreementbetween Edison and the municipalities forthe environment compensations. Theoverall amount was 1,2 million euro. Themunicipalities committed to facilitate theexecution of work, releasing permits notincluded into urban conformity requiredby Edison, and to renounce to legalaction. All the municipalities expressedtheir agreement with resolution of theircouncils. (Comune di Berra, 2006).In 2006 the municipalities crossed for thesection of pipeline Cavarzere -Minerbioobtained by Edison the environmentalcompensation for the constraintsburdening in their territories. Themunicipalities of the on-shore pipelinesection of Porto Viro - Cavarzere (themunicipality of Porto Viro and Loreo) wascompensated, together with Consvipo, byAdriatic LNG after the agreement of20.02.2008. (Consvipo, 2008).154

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timeYearsComing into operationNov 2000 End 2004Nov 2003 End 2007Apr 2005 End 2008Apr 2007End 2009 (respected)Performance relating to cost• In November 2000 the managers of the then-company Edison Gas (after Edison LNG and now Adriatic LNG) stated that theinvestment was about 450 million of euro for the terminal. (Il Gazzettino - Cronache di Rovigo, 2000).• In the resolution of the CIPE of 2001 the investments was estimated in 455,98 million of euro. The next year with the second resolutionof CIPE the cost increased to 585,519 million of euro.• In the last resolution of CIPE in 2003 the cost of the terminal raised to 615,72 million of euro. (CIPE, 2001,2002,2003).• In 2004 the EPC contract awarded was of 900 millions of Dollars (ENR.com, 2008) and some months before was awarded the FEEDand the detailed design for about 70 million of Dollars (Aker Kvarner, 2004).Size increased from 4 billions to 8 billions!155

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightStakeholder orStakeholder GroupingProvince of Rovigo andEnvironmentalistRegion Veneto and Emilia-RomagnaOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsStop the project. (Chinaglia, 2006).They asked that the project was less invasive for the environment andasked for the environmental monitoring plan during and after theconstruction. (Decreto di VIA, 2003).Achievement of these AimsLost their battle at the civil court(Consiglio di Stato, 2006) theproject has been completed.Their requests was accepted.(Decreto di VIA, 2003).Aker KvaernerRealise the first offshore LNG terminal in the world to get the knowhowfor the next project in this sector.It realized the terminal.EdisonQP and ExxonMobilEnter in the new Italian market of the LNG and to have a good pricethe gas for its customers.Realize LNG terminal in the world to sold the LNG processed in theirliquefaction trains and so enter in the regasification business. Ensuresa presence in the whole LNG value chain from gas production throughliquefaction, shipping and LNG regasification. (RasGas, 2011).80% of the gas processed sold toEdison for 25 years. (Quadrino,2009).The terminal came into operation.The LNG arrive from theirliquefaction trains. (QatarPetroleum, 2010).156

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)The environmental compensations to the municipality and local authorities crossed by the two sections of pipeline waspossible because of the law of August 23, 2004 article 1 paragraph 5 (Legge, 2004). In the first part of pipeline Porto Viro -Cavarzere owned by Adriatic LNG with agreement signed in 2008 were compensated municipalities, the Park of Delta andConsvipo (Consvipo, 2008). In the second part of pipeline from Cavarzere to Minerbio owned by Edison Stoccaggio with theagreement of 2006 were compensated the remaining municipalities involved (Comune di Berra, 2006).Another law impacting on the project was the Article 27, comma 2 of 12.12.2002 n. 273 and the subsequent deliberation n.91/02 and n. 90/03 of AEEG (Autorità per l‘Energia Elettrica e il Gas) that acknowledged this law. The resolution 91/02 of theAEEG established the condition to the priority access for the new LNG terminal in Italy. This is an important decision thatallows to the companies of the sector to have rules to make investment decisions. The main rules of this resolution establishthat is allocated the priority access to the companies that fund the construction of the new terminals in Italy. To this companiesis reserved the 80% of the terminal capacity for 20 years from the start-up of the plant. The tariffs is traded with the owner ofthe plant. The tariffs must be communicated to the authority (AEEG) that publishes them. (Delibera n. 91/02).On 23.05.2000 was enacted the legislative decree n.164/2000 about the liberalization of the internal market of natural gas inItaly, crucial for the future construction of terminals by private companies. (Legge, 2000).The liberalization of the gas market began at European level by Directive 98/30, then updated and replaced by 2003/55 thatpursued the objective of creating a single European market free and competitive. In Italy, the opening to the free competitionbegan with the legislative decree 164/2000. The Italian gas market since its inception has been characterized by verticallyintegrated monopoly of ENI, with the exception of the distribution, where, although the leader was Italgas, a subsidiary of ENI,the market shares have always been very fragmented. When the decree (164/2000) opened the market to competition, he didso by focusing on Upstream chain, going to affect directly the existing monopoly. The monopoly of ENI was then hit by placinga double cap. From 01.01.2002, in fact, no company could claim a share of gas supply in Italy (production + imports) over75% of total consumption (excluding own consumption). This roof was reduced by 2% every year to get to the limit of 61% in2009 and 2010. Furthermore, no company can sell to end users more than 50%. (AmbienteDiritto, 2004) and (Legge, 2000).Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on the projectThe declaration of public utility and urgency for the pipeline Porto Viro - Cavarzere - Minerbio , with legislative decree no.190of 2002, of the works allows the realization and operation of strategic infrastructure for energy supply and all the activitiesenvisaged in the approved project. It is issued with the agreement State-Regions about the location. Local authorities provideto the necessary safeguards for the areas involved and the related range of respect. The project will then have to obtain thedecree of environmental compatibility. So the main thing is that the local authority have not the power to stop the realization ofthe project. (Legge, 2002).157

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project Environment • In Italy about 92.5% of gas consumption comes from foreign countries.• The construction of new LNG terminals is strategic choice and allows Italy to diversify its sources• Italy thus would decrease its heavy dependence on Russia.Specific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectIn January 2006 and 2009 there was the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which also affected Europe and Italy since the gasarriving from Russia passes for 80% through the Ukrainian territory to which Russia pays transit fees.Economic ProjectEnvironmentThe Comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica, CIPE, establishes the address to the national economic policyand the general guidelines for the elaboration of the national economic program.The CIPE in 2001 (resolution no. 41 of 2001) with its resolution authorized the stipulation of the program contract between theMinistero del Tesoro, and the then-company Edison Gas regarding the investment for the construction of an off-shore terminal.The incentives were calculated based on the costs of industrial investment and industrial research activities.158

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2009Events and activities relating toproject stakeholdersEvents and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceEvents and activities relating to projectenvironmentDec 1999VIA decree for the Terminal withregasification capacity of 4 billion m 3 peryear after the favorable opinion of theRegion of Veneto (Decreto di VIA, 1999).May 2000The legislative decree n.164/2000 about theliberalization of the internal market of natural gasin Italy, crucial for the future construction ofterminals by private companies. (Legge, 2000).Mar 2002The declaration of public utility for the pipelinePorto Viro - Cavarzere – Minerbio. (Penolazzi,2005).Dec 2002The law n. 273, article 27, comma 2 (Articolo 27comma 2) and the subsequent deliberation n.91/02 and n. 90/03 of AEEG (Delibera n. 91/02).Mar 2003Region Veneto (Decreto di VIA, 2003)and Region Emilia-Romagna (RegioneEmilia-Romagna, 2003) expressedfavourable opinion for the pipeline.159

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2009Oct 2003Events and activities relating toproject stakeholdersVIA decree for the Pipeline. (Decreto diVIA, 2003).Events and activities relatingto project managementEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceEvents and activities relating toproject environmentNov 2003The CIPE issued a third and last resolution.The decree established a contribution toEdison LNG for the work amounted to 66,57million of euro. (CIPE, 2001,2002,2003).Nov 2003QP and ExxonMobil agree toparticipate in the development of theTerminal with Edison. (RasGas, 2011).Summer2004Aker Kvaerner was awarded by aEPC contract for the realization ofthe terminal. (ENR.com, 2008).Jul 2004Oct 2004May 2005VIA decree for the increase of theterminal regasification capacity from 4to 8 billion m 3 per year. (Penolazzi,2005).Set up of Adriatic LNG By Edison, QPand ExxonMobil. (RasGas, 2005).In July 2004 was awardedSnamprogetti (now Saipem) for therealization of the two section ofpipeline. (Edison Stoccaggio,2012).160

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2009Events and activities relatingto project stakeholdersEvents and projectmanagementEvents and activities relating toproject performanceEvents and activities relating toproject environmentMay 2005Jun 2005Sep 2005The Province of Rovigo (TAR delLazio, 2005) and theEnvironmentalists (TAR Veneto,2006) lost the cases at the Tar ofLazio.Construction start of the terminal at the drydock of Algeciras in Spain. (Adriatic LNG,2011).Construction start of the pipeline Terminal –Cavarzere. (Penolazzi, 2006).Jan 2006Crisis between Russia and Ukraine,which also affected Europe and Italysince the gas arriving from Russia passesfor 80% through the Ukrainian territory.The European gas companies reported adrop in pressure in the pipelines of itsnational network.(Croce, 2011).Jul 2006Aug 2006The Province of Rovigo (Consiglio diStato, 2006) and theenvironmentalists (TAR Veneto,2006) lost the cases at the StateCouncil.The municipalities of the section ofpipeline Cavarzere -Minerbioobtained by Edison theenvironmental compensation.(Comune di Berra, 2006).161

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline 2006-2009Events and activities relating to projectstakeholdersEvents andprojectmanagementEvents and activities relating toproject performanceEvents and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentOct 2006Construction start of the Pipeline Cavarzere– Minerbio. (Edison Stoccaggio, 2012).Feb 2008The municipalities of the pipeline section PortoViro - Cavarzere was compensated, together withConsvipo, by Adriatic LNG. (Consvipo, 2008).Mar 2008Mar 2008May 2008Sep 2008Construction end of the terminal at the drydock of Algeciras in Spain. (Fagioli, 2011).Construction end of the pipeline Cavarzere– Minerbio. (Edison Stoccaggio, 2012).Probable construction end of the pipelineTerminal – Cavarzere.The terminal arrived in the Adriatic Sea.Then it was ballasted, connected to thepipeline and there was the installation of themooring dolphins. (Adriatic LNG, 2011).Jan 2009New Crisis between Russia andUkraine. There was a new stopflow of gas to Europe. (IlGiornale.it, 2009).Aug 2009Started the commissioning with the mooringof the first LNG carrier. (Esso, 2010).Oct 2009 Inauguration of the terminal. (Esso, 2010).162

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events• Feasibility study: 1998• Project final approval: 2003• Start of GBS construction: 2005• Module installation engineering: from beginning 2005• LNG Tanks arrival on site: December 2006• LNG Tanks installation: January – May 2007• Modules installation: July2007 – May 2008• Basin flooding: 20 th May 2008• GBS sail away: 30 th August 2008• Sailing duration: 15days• GBS in final position on Adriatic sea bed:18 th September 2008163

2.7 UNITS 3 & 4 MOCHOVCE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTCase Compiled By: Daniela Ńpirková and Koloman IvaničkaContact Details: Institute of Management, Slovak University of Technology, Bratislava, Slovak RepublicBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeCompletion of units 3 and 4 of Nuclear power plant (NPP) MochovceMochovce, Nitra self governing- region, Slovakia, EuropeMeeting of the national demand for electricity, energy security and self-sufficiency inSlovakiaThe completion of the third and fourth unit of nuclear power plant Mochovce.Total Project ValueEUR 2.775 bn estimated at November 2009, later estimation is EUR 3,7 bnProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)Completion of 3 and 4 unit of Nuclear power plant (NPP) is under constructionSlovenské elektrárne (SE) are responsible for the construction. 34% of shares of SEbelongs to Fund of National property and 66 % to ENEL Produzione SpA. ENEL is themain financier of the constructionUnits 3 and 4 in Nuclear Power Plant Mochovce are under construction.Completion of the unit 3 – 2014, unit 4 – 2015164

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationStakeholder Category Case-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)InternalSupply-Side ClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersSlovenské elektrárne, a.s.Private financing: Enel, financing the construction fromthe cash flow of Slovenské elektrárnen/aSEPS (Slovenská elektrizačná a prenosová sústava) –Slovak power grid operator34% National property fund of the Slovak Republic66% ENEL Produzione SpA. It is largest shareholdersin March 2011:Ministry of the Economy and Finance of the ItalianRepublic 31.24% of the shares,Blackrock Inc., which owns 2.74% of the shares,Natixis S.A., which 2.07% shares.Largest producer of energy in SlovakiaThe experience of large European power operatorTake over of Slovenské elektrárne by ENEL• The takeover of Slovenske elektrarne by ENEL was motivated by acquiring in-house nuclear plant construction experience, which was missing to thistransnational company. Since it was not possible to buy only nuclear power plant Mochovce, ENEL agreed to buy 66% of the Slovak utility SlovenskeElektrarne (SE) in February 2005 for € 840 m. The deal was completed in May 2006.• For this reason ENEL had also made the agreement with EDF on participation on costruction of NPP Flamanville in France. Enel hoped that this expertisewould be useful for building the first new nuclear unit in Italy, which should have started in 2013 with the perspective that 25% of Italy‘s electricity wouldcome from nuclear power by the year 2030.• The condition for takeover by ENEL of Slovak generation company, Slovenske Elektrarne was the commitment that ENEL would complete two partly-builtnuclear plants of Russian design (Mochovce 3 and 4).165

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (Internal)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)InternalDemand Side Principal ContractorFirst Tier ContractorsArchitect Engineer: Slovenske elektrarne - EnelMain Contractors:Nuclear Island:Ńkoda Jadrové strojírenství (ŃJS), Atomstrojexport, VUJE,Enseco (Evaluation of reliability and operational efficiency inthe stages of commissioning, operation anddecommissioning of sources of energy and heat. Design ofelectrical equipment), Inņinierske stavby Końice, PPA, RollsRoyceConventional Island:Enel (EPCM Contractor), Skoda Power, Brush, ZIPPMain Instrumentation and Control:Areva-SiemensVUJE (Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute), JAVYS(Nuclear and Decommissioning Company), SEPS (SlovakElectricity Transmission System)Second Tier Consultants Individual companies within Slovakia, Poland, Czech,HungaryIndividual worldwide companiesProfessional ServicesProvidersAreva-Siemens, NPPM (Nuclear power plant maintenance)166

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (External)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)ExternalPublicRegulatory AgenciesÚrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky (Nuclear RegulatoryAuthority of the Slovak Republic), URSO, MŅP (Ministry of Environment),MH (Ministry of Economy), International atomic energy authority (IAEA),Environment agency,International Atomic Energy AuthorityLocal GovernmentNitra Self - Governing Region, Levice district – Tlmače, Kalná nad Hronom,Starý Tekov, Veľký Ďur, Malé Kozmálovce, Nový TekovPositive economicimpact in regionNational GovernmentSlovakia, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, RussiaPrivateLocal residentsIndividual residents, Levice, Tlmače, Kalná nad Hronom, Starý Tekov, VeľkýĎur, Malé Kozmálovce, Nový TekovPossitive impact on thearea, unemploymentdecreaseLocal LandownersIndividual landownersThe value of propertywill increaseEnvironmentalistsGreenpeace, Environment agencyConservationistsGreenpeace, State nature conservancy (Ńtátna ochrana prírody Slovenskejrepubliky),ArchaeologistsThe Monument office of SR, Local authoritiesGreenfiield, impropableto find somethink167

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps168

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influence onprojectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderGreenpeace, Environmentagencies, Austrian governmentHighly UnfavourableAbility to lobby at governmentorganizations, civil disruption, and also toexert the pressure on banks in order toprovide the provision of credit line for theprojectOpposition to this typeof project is their raisond‘etreLocal residents and landownersConcerned about risk but alsowelcoming new jobs andpotential property boomVotes for local government and nationalgovernment-- Based on several surveysof public opinion the completion of thethird and fourth unit is supported by morethan two thirds of Slovakia's population(and more than 87% of the population inthe 10 km zone around the plantPotentially ( and v.remotely) substantivelyharmful but in reality itmay make significantimprovement tostandards of livingLocal Business OrganisationsVery happy to see newbusiness opportunities but wantto see these available locallyGeneral ability to lobby government(especially local)if successful mayincrease growthsubstantiallyLocal goverment Very favourable and supportive None identified Long term sustainabilityin region169

Nuclear power plants in SlovakiaIn 1999, nuclearreactors produced47% of Slovakia´sElectricity170

MEGAPROJECT Project ProcessesTime Management Processes Completion of NPP Mochovce - units 3 and 4Completion of the third and fourth unit of NPP Mochovce was planned in 2012 and 2013. This would bethe largest private investment in the history of the Slovak Republic. Performance of each unit will be a440 MW. Slovenské elektrárne began with the completion of units 3 and 4 by formal opening ofconstruction works on November the third, 2008. In this process the German, Italian, French, andRussian companies take part. Slovak power plants has contracted the suppliers for the completion ofthe third and fourth unit of nuclear plant Mochovce totaling 2.63 bn euros. Closed contracts representsmore than 94% of total investment. Company Termostav - Mráz, Inc. with base in Końice will alsoparticipate in completion and it will provide thermal isolation for third and 4 unit.The transfer of the reactor pressure vessel of the fourth unit of nuclear power plant was realized at thebeginning of December 2011. The pressure vessel was finally deposited into the reactor pit, where it willbe operating. This is a key component of nuclear power plant, which is located in the active zone of thereactor, the overall height is 14.1 meters and weighs over 215 tons. Pressure vessel for third unit wasmounted in 2010.Cost Management Processes The construction of NPP Mochovce was funded by state resources until 1991. By the end of 1991,about 19 billion of Czechoslovak crowns were invested into the project. In the early nineties, lack ofresources greatly influenced the construction of NPP Mochovce. The third and fourth units werereported to be only 40% and 30% complete when work was halted on them at the beginning of Nineties.The only way to continue the construction was searching for funds abroad. In September 1995, thegovernment approved a model of financing of units 1 and 2. It was agreed that the completion will becarried out within the range of the original design and the original contractors. Contracts with suppliersand credit institutions were signed in 1996 where the government agreed to take over loan guaranteesfor the completion of Units 1 and 2.171

COST MANAGEMENT PROCESSESThe reality and plans in 2008Source: Chren, J.: Lessons learned from completion of nuclear power plant EMO 3,4 Case Study. Geneva, November 24, 2010.172

MEGAPROJECT Project ProcessesCost Management ProcessesIn October 2004, the Italian national utility ENEL acquired a 66 percent stake in Slovenské elektrárne(SE) and, as part of its bid, proposed to invest nearly €2 billion in new nuclear generating capacity.In 2007 the feasibility study has been completed. The result was positive but the timescale to completeNPP Mochovce 3 and 4 slipped. By 2007, the expected completion date was 2012 when the contractsfor completion were expected to be signed in mid-2008. Obtaining finance became a problem. In 2007,a consortium of nine banks agreed to provide ENEL/SE with a €800m ‗revolving credit‘ facility overseven years. However, in 2008, under pressure from Greenpeace, three banks, ING, Banca Intesa andErste Bank, refused to allow the credit facility to be used for the completion of Mochovce, thenprojected to cost €1.7bn. ENEL/SE was forced to issue a statement that it would finance completion ofthe plants from internally generated cash.The process was further delayed in September 2008 by a Slovak government decision to requireENEL/SE complete a new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). As the consequence of the delays,some of the contractors has augmented their pricesThe European Commission also became concerned in May 2008 that the designs were not adequatelysafe. The Commission has expressed the concerns that the facility is not meeting the objectives of theEuratom Treaty," provided the utility "bring(s) the design in line with the existing best practices"including the protection against external attack. Based on such opinion, the new safety measures wereimplemented.Not long ago CWZ/JAVYS proposed to build another NPP unit at Bohunice site, expected to come onlinein 2020. As a result of that a surplus of base-load power might be available and this could forcedown the price ENEL/SE would receive for the output of NPP Mochovce 3 and 4. Such situation wouldmean the reduced profits or even losses for ENEL/SE173

MEGAPROJECT Project ProcessesCost Management Processes In Eighties the planned cost of construction of Units 3 and 4 represented EUR 1.3 bn. In 1992construction works on the completion of Units 3 and 4 were stopped. One reason was the lack offunds. The works on Units 3 and 4 were recommenced in 2007, which raised the costs to 3.4 billioneuros. At that time it was expected that the completion of Mochovce NPP - units 3 and 4 will be EUR3 bn, where the equity financing would represent EUR 2.2 bn. And EUR 500 million will come fromforeign sources. Since the financial performance of the SE at that time was positive, the equityfinancing seemed to be a good option. When ENEL took over SE the forecast completion date for thereactors was 2011-12. ENEL was expected to finalize a feasibility study in April 2007 and then to takea final decision whether or not it would invest in the units.The stress tests in post-Fukushima period and the implementation of the results has caused anotherdelays and cost overruns in the project. The following changes were added to design of NPP:• Severe accident consequence mitigation;• Seismic reinforcement;• Enhancement of plant protection to area events (flooding, fire, etc);• Plant instrumentation and control and human machine interface;• Protection from high energy pipe breaks;• Minimization of radioactive wastes.The management and verification of the design works are being performed by Slovenske elektrarnethrough a dedicated Engineering Team which consists of specialists from NPP Mochovce 3-4, NPPMochovce 1-2, NPP Bohunice and from Enel SpA. For the technical activities, Slovenske elektrarne isassisted by an international engineering consultant.In order to ensure that the revision of basic design is performed by implementing the best applicablesafety practices, SE has also set up a Safety Board, composed by 6 leading national and internationalexperts in nuclear safety, which is aimed at providing guidelines as well advice on all subjectsconcerning safety.Such a large scale changes could not have impacted the substantial raising of the cost of completionof units 3 and 4.174

MEGAPROJECT Project ProcessesQuality management ProcessesAn important part of safe operation of NPP Mochovce is also practical training of operators ofnuclear power plant, especially in dealing with transient and emergency situations in a simulator.It is a computer model that monitors the activity of NPP with a defined accuracy and in the realtime simulates the behavior of the equipment in a plant. Simulator allows to perform all workactivities during the training that can be controlled from nuclear power plant control room.Supplier of representative full-scope simulator for the 3 and 4 units at NPP Mochovce is anAmerican company GSE Power Systems. Currently, the construction works of the simulator arecomplete, titanium-zinc facade with thermo-isolation also with communication and landscaping.The supply company will be responsible for the design and engineering, procurement,manufacturing, factory testing, delivery to site, installation, startup and commissioning of acomplete hardware and software that is necessary to realize the operation of simulator of units 3and 4 of NPP Mochovce.Revision of the design after the stress tests:In order to ensure that the revision of basic design is performed by implementing the bestapplicable safety practices, SE has also set up a Safety Board, composed by 6 leading nationaland international experts in nuclear safety, which is aimed at providing guidelines as well adviceon all subjects concerning safety.Communications managementProcessesThe Slovak government organizes presentations and visits to nuclear sites.Public information material like brochures, newspapers and advertisements are widely distributedto many people for maximum effect. Public meetings and hearings are organized for each nuclearfacility, and are considered very important, in particular for the citizens of cities and villages onthe route from the Treatment Centre to the Mochovce repository. Conferences and seminarsabout nuclear issues happen once a year, and public opinion surveys showed that the populationis interested in getting more details about the repository. The authorities concluded that thetransfer of information plays an essential part in the establishment of public trust, but it is notenough. Communication between the public and representatives of the waste managementorganization is also vital for the success of the enterprise. The issue of compensation to hostcommunities can not be forgotten, and the research in many areas of risk acceptance has shownthat people are more willing to accept the risk if it is controllable.175

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets andchanges to targetsActual Achievements Against TargetsPerformance relating to time Completion of the unit 3 - 2014Completion of the unit 4 - 2015The targets will not be achieved in time because of stress testsand design changesPerformance relating to cost EUR 3 billion The expenditures for completion will be substantially overun.Some technology for completion was bought 20 years ago andhad to be conserved, guarded, and in some cases replaced,which generated the additional costs. The new post-Fukushimadesign changes will also demanf more financial sourcesPerformance related toachieving specificationThe specifications were changed many times during the last 20years in order to meet the requirements of the safety andtechnology progress. Status of completion as per the originaldesign: Civil part 70%, Mechanical part 30%, Electric and I&C1%.176

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder orStakeholder GroupingMunicipalities that are notin larger distance fromMochovce than 20 kmEmployment in regionOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsThey want to obtain the unchanged volume of compensationA major factor for the regional development: completion of the first andsecond unit of nuclear plant Mochovce, which meant influx of young people- nuclear experts - in this region, which was initially strongly agricultural.Construction of Mochovce brought about number directly or indirectlyinduced investments (e.g. new hospital in Levice, construction of new flats,as well as all related services and infrastructure). Construction of the thirdand fourth unit also means new job opportunities for people from theregion, as well as from more distant parts of Slovakia or abroad.Achievement of these AimsSo far EUR 1,71 million isgranted by SE every year177

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentPolitical EnvironmentIn 1992, all work on the third and fourth unit for lack of money stopped, and experts began topreserve equipment. At that time the third and fourth units were reported to be only 40% and 30% complete.Work started on first and second unit, however, continued albeit with interruptions. In 1995 the Slovakgovernment approved the financial model of financing of the first two units of Mochovce NPP.The first reactor become fully operational in 1998. Two years later, the second unit was put into operation.The gross output of each unit in 2008 was increased from the original 440 to 470 MW.As a condition of accession into the European Union (2004) Slovakia was forced to deactivate two reactors atthe V-1 plant in Jaslovské Bohunice. The first reactor was shut down at the end of 2006, the second on thelast day of 2008. A provision in the accession treaty allowed for reactivation in case of emergency.The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009 disrupted natural gas supplies and electricity generation. OnJanuary 10, 2009 the Slovak government decided to urgently restart the reactor shut down just daysbefore. Eventually, the reactor was not started.This is one of the most important projects, present and future. Project of the third and fourth unit of Mochovcenuclear power plant is the largest private investment in the Slovak Republic since its creation. Slovak powerplants invested in the completion of construction approximately 3 billion EUR over five years. Already about80% of contracts were signed with the Slovak and Czech companies.In addition to the pulse for economic development at present, the completion of these units will contributesignificantly to the energy security of Slovakia in the future. Already the production of one unit covers about12% of electricity consumption in Slovakia.178

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentPolitical EnvironmentNuclear energy is an important part of the energy package of Slovak Republic. The share of nuclear energyon total energy consumption is around 35 %. Nuclear power plants have significant proportion of producingthe electricity. In 2007, 55 % of electricity was generated at nuclear power plants in Slovakia. After 1998 and2000, when the first two units of the Mochovce were completed (EMO 1, 2), Slovakia has become selfsufficientin electricity production by 2006 and part of the strategic commodities exported. Change occurredafter the shutdown of unit V1 nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice (EBO V1) in 2006 and in 2008 -Slovakia has again become an importer of electricity. Such a situation motivated the Slovak republic tocomplete and launch units 3 and 4 in Mochovce (EMO 3.4), which should enable Slovakia to become againself-sufficient in electricity production. All Slovak governments since 1989, considered the nuclear energy isthe most important part of the energy package and none of them did expect to fully replace nuclear energywith other sources. Document Energy Security Strategy of Slovak Republic (ESS SR) is the currentframework document, which was approved by the Government on 15th October 2007 with the perspective to2030. One of the key information at the beginning of ESS SR refers to the fact that the EU is unable toguarantee the energy security of its members. Therefore in the competence of the Member States remainssetting energy policy and particularly the determination of the energy mix. The energy mix of EU 27 iscomposed of 14.4% nuclear energy. Particular attention government pays to the nuclear energy. "NuclearIllustrative Program" is also part of the Energy Policy for Europe - which together with the European Counciland their Action Plan on energy policy became the basis for energy policy in the short - and medium term.179

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentPolitical Environment:(support for pro-nuclear technologies)In all post-communist countries of Central Europe there is virtually no political opposition tonuclear energy. If one can speak of political parties with antinuclear orientation in thesecountries, then those are marginal formations scoring low in elections; in addition, if they gainedparliamentary seats, they did so, according to analysts, by articulating other themes. Thedominant political parties in these countries are pro-nuclear.The general attitude towards nuclear energy in the countries studied was explored byEurobarometer in 2009. Eurobarometer asked whether the share of NPPs in the production ofelectricity should change. Great support for increasing the share or maintaining it at the presentlevel was witnessed in all post-communist countries even after disaster in Fukushima.Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are dominantly pro-nuclear, whereas neither inAustria nor in Germany would find today a relevant political actor offering an alternative to themoratorium on NPP construction.Specific political events impactingon the projectRethinking construction of nuclear power plant strategy by ENEL2012 was not ideal year for ENEL. The difficulties in Italaian markets followed by difficulties inforeign markets. In December 2012 the Italian concern decided to withdraw from the project tobuild a nuclear power plant unit number 3 "Flamanville" - the first in France to block the reactorEPR. The announced to the public the reasons - the rising cost of nuclear power unit, andunfortunate post Fukushima referendum in Italy.Before the accident in Fukushima Berlusconi government was prepared to abolish theChernobyl legislative ban on nuclear power plant construction. In order to make this processlegitimate, the national italian referendum was organized. But the vote in Italy was held in June2011, against the background of the events at Fukushima. The result meant the failure for thesupporters of nuclear energy, since for the abandonment of nuclear power plants voted 94.1%who came to the polls.180

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentSpecific political eventsimpacting on the project(Austrian resentment of Slovaknuclear power plant program)Relations with AustriaFor Austria the nuclear power euphoria was typical for Sixties. They had started construction ofnuclear power plant Zwenterdorf, which was expected to be completed in 1976. But during 1975 theprotest movement was developed and half of the population was against the operation of nuclearpower plants. The referendum in 1977 has forbidden commissioning Zwenterdorf plant. The disasterat Three Miles Island in 1979 and Chernobyl catastrophe further strengthened anti-nuclear powerplant opposition in Austria. Moreover the nuclear power plant agenda enabled to join political forcesthat were against the former premier minister Bruno Kreiski.Currently support of nuclear power in Austria by the public is the lowest in the whole EU. Anti-nuclearstance is also typical for Austrian parliament and government, while Parliament is in their views moreradical, more approaching to public attitude. (Pavlikova 2011).In the section on foreign policy of Austria expressed concern over the "nuclear renaissance". Austriawill by all means protest against the presentation of nuclear energy as a safe and sustainable form ofenergy and will strongly advocate for the proliferation - and the form of a multilateral system ofcontrolling access to nuclear fuel. Austrian politicians and media promote a strict anti-nuclear policy,not only on its territory, but also in relation to other countries, especially neighbors and try to promoteanti-nuclear the concept at European Union level.Before 1989, Austria had no real possibility to influence nuclear policy of states that were behind theIron Curtain, however the situation has changed later and Austria began to oppose very strongly thedevelopment and operations of nuclear power plants in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, sincethese facilities are located not far from the Austrian borders, and in the case of serious disaster itwould be impossible to protect the Austrian citizens.181

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentSpecific political eventsimpacting on the project(Austrian resentment of Slovaknuclear power plant program)Against the completion of Mochovce Austria stood out as very active at international level – she forinstance managed to unit the allocation of credit for completion of the European Bank forReconstruction and Development (EBRD) in Nineties in 20th century. The Austrian anti-nuclearpower activists from Greenpeace and Global 2000 occupied the Slovak Embassy in Vienna in May1998 and demanded all the technical documentation for NPP Mochovce. (Böck, Drábová, 2005)The pressure from the activists was also focused on banks providing the credit for completion ofthird and forth unit of EMO Mochovce, and I some cases they succeeded in way that the banksrefused to provide the credits for completion.The 2011 crash of Fukushima plant in Japan has caused renewed growth anti-nuclear tendencies.Austria at the end of March 2012 decided to undertake the action against Czech and SlovakRepublic in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It was part of new action plan adopted byAustrian government in the document "International rethinking of nuclear power to renewableenergy and energy efficiency", which was approved on March 3, 2011 (Rehfus, 2011). Theprogram aims to promote the closure of nuclear power plants across the European Union, throughextensive campaigns and cooperation with other anti-nuclear oriented countries. For many yearsthe European authorities closely monitored the safety of the nuclear reactors in Czech and SlovakRepublics, as well as in other new European countries, which was quite fruitful approach leading tomany changes that had led to implementation of many safety measures. However European Unionhas never shared the extreme opinions of Austrian politician to the development of the nuclearpower stations. So when Vienna provincial government sued Slovakia for the completion of thirdand fourth EMO units in 2011, it did not succeed. (Viedeň neuspela..., 2011).The Slovak-Austrian controversies regarding the operation of Nuclear power plant in Mochovceare likely to continue in future, even though the safety standards were significantly augmented.Otherwise there are no real problems among both countries, which have otherwise the friendlyrelations; many Austrian companies operate in Slovakia, and the intensity of mutual advantageouseconomic relations is growing.182

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentIn times of economic recession, this investment is a huge stimulus to the national economy. It alsoindirectly involves several thousand people who provide infrastructure for the project, most of themfrom Nitra region.A recent study by BDO states that every euro invested in the completion of two units of Mochovcecreates Slovakia GNP growth of € 2.36. Nearly 10 years after completion of the first and secondunits, the region renewed its industrial infrastructure. During the seven years of completion therewere created 9,400 direct, indirect and induced jobs. During the years of operation has to be newblocks Mochovce directly employs about 960 people.Nuclear type power plants belong to low carbon technologies (and in fact, greenhouse gasemissions are running at close to zero), so the construction of two new nuclear units willsignificantly contributes the fulfillment of the commitment of Slovakia to reduce CO 2 emissions by2020. Each reactor VVER 440 will save about 3.7 million tons of CO 2 each year. Otherwise thisgreenhouse gas will flow to air from coal-fired power plants.Based on the document ESS SR, the final consumption of electricity represents about 20.7% shareof total energy consumption and until 2030 is expected to rise to 22.8%. This increase is consistentwith the expected growth of the economy, while reducing the energy consumption. In connectionwith this fact it is quite a significant factor in the expected increase in energy prices. Productioncosts of nuclear energy in comparison with coal and gas resources are less sensitive to pricechanges. This is mainly so because in the world there is a sufficient number of uranium depositsand it is possible to diversify the vendors.183183

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentFrom an economic point of view it is important to know that „that equivalent amount of heatcontained in coal is 7 to 8 times more expensive than nuclear fuel. Price of brown coal is 11 timesmore expensive than nuclear energy and price of natural gas is 20 times more expensive than thenuclear energy. The operation of nuclear power plant is therefore at least in economic terms morefavorable than production of electricity from brown coal or fossil fuels, although the initialinvestment is much higher. The strategy also keeps in mind the possibility that the price ofuranium will grow dynamically in the future and the privileged position will be given to countriesthat have this material.In this case the government of Slovak Republic does not exclude the possibility of restart of mininguranium in Jahodná localities, Huta Novoveská, Kluknava, Kálnica - Selec. With this policy is alsolinked the necessity of amending the relevant laws and strategic documents, allowing formaximum protection of the environment. Another rather significant fact is that the uranium is notimported from politically unstable countries, and it is possible to buy and maintain stocks for alonger period than in case of oil, or gas. All these factors speak in favor of using more nuclearenergy and to plan and build additional nuclear power plants from economic and political point ofview.184184

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic Environment(Fukushima accident)The challenges which nuclear safety and its governance face were highlighted in the accident at theFukushima reactors in Japan following the earthquake and the tsunami in March 2011.Fukushima accident on March 2011 was a series of equipment failures, nuclear meltdowns andreleases of radioactive materials at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, following the Tōhokuearthquake and tsunami. This event highlighted the challenges which nuclear safety and itsgovernance face. The lessons from the accident has shown that nuclear reactors must be protectedeven against accidents, which have been assessed as highly improbable. The most importantreason Fukushima accident were the faulty design, insufficient backup systems, human error,inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications.The European Union reacted on Fukushima accident by ordering the comprehensive andtransparent risk and safety assessment ("stress tests") and to propose by the end of 2011 anyimprovements that may be necessary Although based on the stress tests, national regulatorsconcluded that there are no technical reasons requiring the shutdown of any NPP in Europe,nevertheles, practically all NPPs are expected to undergo safety improvements, as hundreds oftechnical upgrade measures have been identified. These measures include additional mobileequipment to prevent or mitigate severe accidents, the installation of hardened fixed equipment,and the improvement of severe accident management, together with appropriate staff trainingmeasures. The costs of additional safety improvements were estimated to be in the range of €30million to €200 million per reactor unit in 2011.Based on the necessity of realizing stress tests, implementing additional safety measures, ENELhas substantially delayed the completion of third and fourth block of NPP, while demandingadditional EUR 800 million for the completion185185

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic Environment(New Mochovce ReactorsHeld Up by Budget Dispute)The ENEL‘s Slovenske elektrarne requested for additional funding of NPP Mochovce from Slovak budgetraised the resentment from the Slovak government. The government declined the request for the secondtime on May 28 2013 and ENEL threatened to stop the construction works. The missing agreement onraising the budget may endanger the completion of the entire project, in which Czech companies aretaking part. The costs of completion of the units 3 and 4 have increased to EUR 3.8 bn from the originallyestimated EUR 3 bn. This would endanger jobs in the construction and cause a fall of tax revenues to thestate budget, SE said. The investment in the completion of the 3rd and 4th units of Mochovce representsa significant contribution to the growth of the Slovak economy. The government would however like toforce Slovenské elektrárne to complete the project, under the threat of sanctions. The construction hasalready been delayed.Originally, the two units were to be completed in the course of last year and this year. According toavailable information, they should complete in 2014 and 2015 at the earliest. According to Enel, the delayhas been caused partly by additional measures aimed at enhancing the plant‘s safety, which ensuedfrom stress tests. Owing to the delay of the launch of the two new reactors, the state loses dividends fromSE‘s profits. The third and fourth units could collect per year, according to the planned volume ofproduction at current prices, more than EUR 300 million. Part of this amount would be through dividendscould have been received also by the state budget.Specific Economic Eventsimpacting on the projectThe new production capacity in Mochovce will become the next great stabilizing element in our energysystem and it guarantees stable and secure supply of electricity.Placing third and fourth unit of Mochovce into operation in 2014 and 2015 will replace fossil fuel burningin the Central region of Slovakia. It is expected that this would reduce the volatility of electricity prices forhouseholds and industry on the Slovak market.186186

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentFeasibility studyThe feasibility study solves essential issues related to the feasibility of the completion of the third and fourth unitproject financing and the return of funds. Appropriately specified key contributions/benefits from the investor pointof view and analyzes in detail possible risks of the project. The technical part of the study analyzed focused oncurrent conditions on the electricity market within Slovakia and in the adjacent region, the current state of the SE-MO34, the investments necessary for the completion, as well as the elementary technical and security solutions.The feasibility study expected the completion date of NPP Mochovce 3 and 4 in 12/2008 and 12/2009.Study presented by Deloitte&Touche in 2002 analyzed the completion as a project for independent powerproducer (hereinafter IPP) i.e. like the most conservative variant in terms of their financial evaluation.Based on the financial estimates and forecasts, which used wide range of tools and techniques of projectfinancing, Deloitte&Touche prepared financial model and financial forecast with below mentioned conclusions:• Company SE MO34 as IPP can be successfully designed and financed as sole project;• Company SE MO34 as IPP has sufficient cash flow, to fulfill their liabilities and cover operational costs;• Cash flow of the company as IPP provides adequate assurance in respect to the debt service obligationsincurred from the financing agreements;• In general, the company SE MO34 as IPP seems like a profit making company, whereby the return of equityseems to be significantly higher than the average level in comparable projects within Europe;• The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is calculated around 18,61% for the whole life cycle of the project/ 40 years.187187

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentFeasibility studyPositive aspects of completion: Valid building permission Utilization of constructed objects and side accommodations Compensation for the decommissioning of energy capacity till 2010 Boost for whole economy in Slovakia Utilization of experienced staff (the construction of the nuclear power station in Slovakia has started 50 yearsago and since that many experts with practical experiences have been developed) Evaluation of financial expenses Higher economic efficiency in long-term period compared to comparable resources Employment and regional development High level of usability of supplied components and equipment High level of safety after the revision of former project Optimization of completion costs, approximately EUR 1 mil./MW installedCompletion of the NPP Mochovce will have significant impact within the region: Stabilizing economy and economic growth New working opportunities, indirect impact on community development Increase of tax revenues for municipalities Housing development Use of waste heat for community Reduction of negative environmental impact and increase the efficiency and economy of the NPP Mochovceoperation Company SE EMO 3&4 as Independent power producer - IPP can be successfully designed and financed assole project, Company SE EMO 3&4 as IPP has sufficient cash flow, to fulfill their liabilities and cover operational costs, Cash flow of the company as IPP provides adequate assurance in respect to the debt service obligationsincurred from the financing agreements, In general, the company SE EMO 3&4 as IPP seems like a profit making company, whereby the return ofequity seems to be significantly higher than the average level in comparable projects within Europe, The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is calculated around 18.61% for the whole life cycle of the project/ 40 years.188188

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentSustainabilityComments on the relationshipof the project to issues ofsustainabilityCompletion of third and fourth unit of the nuclear power plant will be the largest private investment inthe history of Slovakia.Slovenské elektrárne invests EUR 3 billion by 2013 in the construction of Mochovce NPP units 3 and4.Further investments were concluded with the modernization and power up-rate of existing units inBohunice NPP (EUR 0.5 billion) and Mochovce NPP power up-rate.The Strategic Plan involves also full hydro automation and modernization of the existing hydro units,introduction of biomass in the fleet of thermal power plants (Vojany and Nováky) and development ofrenewables - mainly photovoltaic and small hydro power plants.This completion is one of three nuclear power plant currently being built in EUThird unit will be put into operation in 2014 and fourth unit in 2015Each unit with performance 440MWeNon nuclear part contractor: ENEL Ingegneria e InnovazioneContractor of control and management system: Areva-SiemesUp to 2/3 of work was carried by Slovak (local) companiesCommunication strategy of the completion is based on transparency and therefore more than 2/3 ofSlovak population and more than 87% of the population in the 10km zone around the plant supportsthe completion.Land impactNPP Mochovce covers an area of 301.99 ha, thereof built up area spread on 49.81 ha and the rest ofthe area are other sites including 22.78 ha of woods.Under operation of NPP Mochovce is also another 44.37 ha of land within 15 villages neighboring withthe NPP Mochovce whereby majority of this land is using for special purposes of the NPP. Thecompletion of NPP Mochovce -unit 3 & 4 does not create any additional land requirements.189

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentSustainabilityComments on the relationship of theproject to issues of sustainabilityThe share of electricity generatedfrom nucleus in Slovakia is 66%Nuclear energy sector remains animportant and stable part of theenergy mix for Slovakia, the EU andfurther extension of the nuclearpower generation will enable to reachthe commitment of Slovakia toreduce „greenhouse" gasesemissions by at least 20% by 2020.190

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE OF UNITS 3 & 4 OF MOCHOVCE NPP1980 Start of Site permit1987 construction Building permit – start of construction1992Halt of construction works1993 Halt of Start of preservation and protective works2000 constructionworksApproval of the NPP Mochovce 3&4Strategic preservation maintenance and protection plan by the Nuclear RegulatoryAuthority (NRA)2002 Takeover of the supplies in the property of Slovenské Elektrárne2007February 2, 2007July15, 2008August 14, 2008Continuation andplannedcompletion of theprojectRealization of feasibility studySlovenské elektrárne stakeholders announced the intention to complete theconstruction of units 3&4European Commission issues positive statement on NPP Mochovce - units 3&4NRA approved NPP Mochovce 3&4 design modifications and prolonged the buildingpermit by Dec 31,2013November 3, 2008Inauguration of the re-start of construction works2009 EIA process for NPP Mochovce 3&4 operation (public participation)June 11, 2009April 30, 2010September 5, 2010Signing of contracts with the main suppliersMinistry of Environment issues its Final Statement on the EIA ReportInstallation of unit 3 reactor pressure vessel2011Realization of stress tests of NPP Mochovce units (that were not planned) as theresult of accident NPP FukushimaMarch, 2012 Decision on delay of commissioning NPP Mochovce - units 3&42013-2014 Commissioning of NPP Mochovce - units 3&4 (the original date 2014 -2015)Source: Table elaborated based on SE, a. s., 2012191191

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIMEEvents andactivities relatingto projectstakeholders1989Change ofpoliticalsystem1993Split ofCzechoslovakia2004Call forprivatizationtender200666% of SEowned byEnel2007Multi-contract (more than 100contracts)Events andactivities relatingto projectmanagementEvents andactivities relatingto projectperformance19892007 2008 2009SE SE Europeanstakeholders commissionSigning ofChange ofannounced the issuescontracts withpoliticalintention to positivethe mainsystemcomplete the statement onsuppliersconstruction of NPP units 3,4units 3,41980 1987 1992 1993 2002 2007 2008 2014 2015Early sitepermitBuildingpermitstart ofconstructionHalt ofconstructionworksStart ofpreservationworksTakeoverof suppliesto SEpropertyFinal decisionon completionRe-start ofcompletionworksCommissioningof the NPPUnit 3Commissioningof theNPP MochovceUnit 4Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectenvironment1989Revolution1993Emergence ofSlovak state1998Elections2004Slovakia in EU2011Realization ofstress tests ofNPP Mochovceas result ofaccident NPPFukushima192

REFERENCES• 50 years of nuclear power plants in Slovakia. Published by JAVYS, a. s. and ENEL Slovenské elektrárne, a. s., 2007• Areva a Siemens dodajú systémy pre Mochovce (Areva and Siemens will supply the systems for Mochovce) 27. Siemens. April 2010. WebnovinyRetrieved on 1 July 2012, URL: http://m.webnoviny.sk/ekonomika/areva-a-siemens-dodaju-systemy-pre-moc/121881-clanok.html• Atómy na Slovensku (Atoms in Slovakia). Published by SNUS, 2006. ISBN 80-89090-17-6• Böck, H., Drábová, D.(2005) Transboundary Risks: The Temelin Case. October 2005, Retrieved on 10 July 2012, URL:http://www.csvts.cz/cns/news05/temcas05.htm• Elektrárne. Mapa (2012) Slovenské elektrárne. Retrieved on 3 July 2012, URL: http://www.seas.sk/sk/elektrarne/mapa• ENEL Annual Report 2011. Published by ENEL Slovenské elektrárne, a. s. , 2012• Fond národného majetku Slovenskej republiky. Retrieved on 1 July 2012, URL:http://www.natfund.gov.sk/index.php/sk/fnm-sr.html• Greenpeace. (2012, July 10). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:10, July 13, 2012, fromhttp://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Greenpeace&oldid=501542044• Jadro v energetickom mixe (Nucleus in the energy mix) (2010) Atómové elektrárne MOCHOVCE. Slovenské elektrárne, člen skupiny ENEL.Infocentrum Mochovce, Slovensko• Mochovce 3&4. História projektu. (History of project) (2012) Slovenské elektrárne. Retrieved on 5 July 2012, URL:http://www.seas.sk/sk/elektrarne/projekty/mochovce-3-4/mochovce34-historia• Pavlíková M.: Politika jadrovej energetiky Českej a Slovenskej republiky a jej vplyv na vzájomné vzťahy s Rakúskom. (Politics of nuclear energeticsof Czech and Slovak Republics and its influence on mutual relationships with Austria). (2011) Diplomma thesis. MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA VBRNĚ, Ekonomicko – správní fakulta. Brno• Rehfus, H. (2011) UN-Resolution «Climate Change by Radioactivity» Urgent Call for Global Action Retrieved on 10 July 2012,URL:http://solarpeace.ch/solarpeace/E/20090807_ClimateChangeByRadioactivity.htm#Austria• Savage, G. T., T. W. Nix, Whitehead and Blair, 1991. Strategies for assessing and managing organizational stakeholders. S. l. : Academy ofManagement Executive.• Siemens to quit nuclear industry. BBC News Business 18. September 2011 Retrieved on 10 July 2012, URL:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business -14963575• Správa o vplyvoch na ņivotné prostredie pre 3. a 4. blok AE Mochovce. (Report on environmental impact) Published by Slovenské elektrárne,member of ENEL group 2009• Ńtúdia hodnotenia vplyv na ņivotné prostredie pre 3. a 4. blok elektrárne Mochovce. (Study of environmental impact of Mochovce units 3 and 4)(2007) Golder Associates 2007.• The Annual report of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic 2010, The National property fund of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava,Slovakia, 2011• The History of Siemens – From Workshop to Global Player Retrieved on 1 June 2012, URL: http://www.siemens.com/about/en/history.htm• Viedeň neuspela so ņalobou proti dostavbe Mochoviec (Vienna did no suceed with the suit against the completion of Mochovce) (2011) TOPKY Sk.Retrieved on 10 July 2012, URL: http://www.topky.sk/cl/10/1287835/Vieden-neuspela-so-zalobou-proti-dostavbe-Mochoviec• Martinovský, P., Mareń, M.:Political support for nuclear power in Central Europe. Nuclear Governance, Economy and Ecology, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2012• Lessons learned from completion of nuclear power plant EMO 3,4 Case Study. Geneva, November 24, 2010. Juraj Chren, Centrel BusinessDevelopment Manager. URL:http://www.globalelectricity.org/upload/File/Projects/Geneva%20workshop%20(part%20of%20e8%20156)/07.2%20Juraj%20Chren%20-%20Enel.pdf193

SECTION 3Transport Case Studies

3.1 A2 MOTORWAY, NOWY TOMYSICase compiled by: Agnieszka ŁukasiewiczContact details: alukas@ibdim.edu.plBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeMotorway A2German/Polish border – Nowy Tomyślconnects Poland with the network of European motorwaysPart of A2 motorway from Polish/German border to one of main Polish cities – PoznańPart of Route E30 (Cork/IE – Omsk/Ru)Part of TEN-T 2nd corridorTotal Project Value 1,300 mln €Project Status(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions (e.g.height, width, volume, length)OperationFixed price104.9 km, 6 interchanges,35 passages for big and medium animals, 71 passages for small animals, protectivebarriers for bats etc.195

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating totimeOriginal Targets and changes totargetsCompletion of the unit 3 – 2014,Completion of the unit 4 - 2015Actual Achievements Against TargetsThe targets will not be achieved in time, because of stress testsand design changesPerformance relating tocostEUR 3 billionThe expenditures for completion will be substantially overun.Some technology for completion was bought 20 years ago andhad to be conserved, guarded, and in some cases replaced,which generated the additional costs. The new post-Fukushimadesign changes will also demanf more financial sourcesPerformance related toachieving specificationThe specifications were changed many times during the last 20years in order to meet the requirements of the safety andtechnology progress. Status of completion as per the originaldesign: Civil part 70%, Mechanical part 30%, Electric and I&C1%.196

A2 MOTORWAY, NOWY TOMYSI197

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)Stakeholder Category Case-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)InternalSupply-Side Client Autostrada Wielkopolska II SA concessionaire, side of PPP aggreementFinanciers Subordinated Investment (388 mln €)Commercial Loans (186 mln € BBVA S.A., Bank Pekao S.A.,BRE Bank S.A., Caja Madrid, Calyon, Deutsche Bank AG,Espirito Santo Investment, KfW IPEX-Bank GmbH, PKO BP,Societe Generale, WestLB)European Investment Bank (958 mln €)SponsorsMinister of InfrastructureClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Demand Side Principal Contractor1. Kulczyk Holding S.A2. Meridiam A2 West S a.r.l.3. Strabag AG4. KWM Investment GmbHCategoryGeneral Directorate forNational Roads andMotorwaysA2strada sp. z o.o.Case-StudyCentral road administrationauthority for issues related to thenational road systemCompany owned by Kulczyk Holding SA andStrabag AGFirst Tier Contractors Scott WilsonSecond TierAECOMConsultantsProfessional ServicesProvidersAutostrada Eksploatacja SAEngineerTraffic and Revenue Studyan operating company acting subject to anagreement with the Concessionaire,Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A.198

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)ExternalPublic Regulatory Agencies General Directorate for National Roads andMotorwaysLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Private Local residentsWielkopolska County, Lubuskie CountyMinister of InfrastrucutureMinister of the EnvironmentCategoryCase-studyLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsPrivate landownersPracownia na rzecz wszystkich istotNGO monitored all aspects of planning new route,especially influence on Natura 2000 areas andanimal migration patternsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)Adama Mickiewicza University in PoznanCategoryDrivers and passengers in generalCase-study199

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsNameofActorDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationshipKey:- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basis- Non-contractual projectrelationship200

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternalStakeholderExternalStakeholder’sAttitude to thisProjectExternalStakeholder’sInfluence onprojectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderPhase of Project of GreatestInterest(initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Ministry ofInfrastructureVery highNegotiations: Price of building 1km(9.6 m. €),Rates for users,Other conditionsInitiation, operatingGeneral Directorate forNational Roads andMotorwaysFavourable – mostlydepended ongovernment‘s decisionsHighControling role of roadadministrationAllMinistry of EnvironmentConcern about the effectson environment,especially Natura 2000areasVery highHigh requirements of environmentprotection (1/4 of the whole value ofthe project was allocated onenvironment protection)European Commission Favourable High Favourable – although sometimesdepended of governing partyUEFA Very Favourable Very high Decision about Euro 2012 in Polandand Ukraine. Acceleration ofdecision making process about theproject.Initiation, planningInitiation, planningInitiationLocal goverments Favourable Limited Improving local flow of traffic Initiation, planningPracownia na rzeczwszystkich istotWorried aboutenvironmentHighMonitoring all aspects of influencethe project had on environmentInitiation, planning, construction201

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating to timeOriginal Targets and changes totargetsThe first plan was 2006 for finalising theproject. Legal changes and long lastingnegotiations caused 5 yrs delay.Actual Achievements AgainstTargetsAfter starting the construction process itlasted 6 months less than planned.Performance relating to cost 6.1 m. per building 1 km 9.6 m. per building 1 kmPerformance related to achieving specification There wasn‘t an issue of Natura 2000areas. Need to change the wholeenvironmental protection specification.All targets concerning naturalenvironment protection were achieved,25% of the project‘s value was spent onenvironment protection.Stakeholder or StakeholderGroupingEC, Pracownia na rzecz wszystkichistot (extremely importantenvironmental issues)Original Aims of Project Involvement andChanges to these AimsThere wasn‘t an issue of Natura 2000 areas.Need to change the whole environmentalprotection specification.Achievement of these AimsAll targets concerning natural environmentprotection were achieved, 25% of the project‘svalue was spent on environment protection.202

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectNational (build law)European (environment protection law)Changing environmental regulationsThe new requirements of banks financing the project on the environment during construction and operationObligation to make a Security AuditChange of protected areas throughout the project (the creation of new and extension set)To prepare reports for the Building Design(a requirement of the European Commission and the banks financing the project)Political EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentHostile attitude to the concession agreement from one of the governing partiesSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectElectionsEconomic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentIncrease in price of building materialsSpecific Economic Eventsimpacting on the project203

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME1993 1995 2000 2004 2009 2011 2012Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersEstablishing comapnywinning concessioningcometition (2 fragments ofA2 highway)Events and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementNegotiations about firstfragment of A2 highwayRealisation of first fragmentof A2 highwayEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceNegotiations about second fragment of A2highwayRealisation of secondfragment of A2 highwayEvents and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentAdditionalInfrastructurefor launchingpre-emptive204

3.2 ATHENS RING ROADCase compiled by: Dr. Athena RomboutsosContact details: athena@aegean.grBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeContractual FrameworkRelevant PhysicalDimensionsAthens Ring RoadAthens , GreeceTo develop the inner ring and integrate a full road network for fast and safe transport in theentire Attika region, to provide connection from / to Athens International Airport , to connect thePatras – Athens and Athens – Thessaloniki highways65km MotorwayPublic-Private Partnerships (PPP‘s)65km urban motorway, 24 intercharges, 125 Overpasses/Underpasses, 38 railroad gradeseperated crossings, 12 pedestrian overpasses, 56 no of bored &cut & cover sections, 15,4 kmlength of tunnels &cut & cover sections, Length of flood protection works, 3 lanes per direction+ Emergency lane205

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationInternalSupply-SideStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments (e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)ClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Greek State (Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Civil Works)Grant, E.U , EIB loan, EIF guarantees, Commercial loans and guarantees, Contractorcompany Attiki Odos SAConcession Company Attiki Odos SAn/an/aCategorySite OwnerCase-StudyGreek StateEquity joint venture specificallyformed for this projectATTIKI ODOSCONSTRUCTION JOINTVENTUREATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.The Greek Parliamentconstruction company for the projectcompany which has undertaken the operation andmaintenanceof Attica TollwayThe Parliament has the legislative duties of the Greekstate. The concession contract and the EIA have beenratified by the parliament as Laws of the Greek state.Demand-Side Principal Contractor Concession Company Attiki Odos SA is the company has undertaken the design,construction, financing, operation and maintenance of the motorwayFirst Tier ContractorsGroup Pella (First candidate temporary contractor)Group of Companies Attiki OdosGroup CONCIF (Second candidate temporary contractor)Second Tier Consultants n/aProfessional ServicesJacobs Gibb Ltd. and SGI – Trademco were appointed as the Independent EngineerProviderswith their main duties being to supervise and monitor the works, provide certificationsof progress and quality control, approve engineering plans and approve the necessityof any additional works required outside the concessioned object .Halcrow Bank Tech. Advisor206

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder IdentificationExternalPublicStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Regulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentTraffic Police , Fire Brigade, AmbulanceThirty-three local, municipal and regional authorities in Attiki regionprovide permits, authorizations and plansthat were essential for the planning andprogress of the worksNational GovernmentOther internal supply-sidecategories ( please specify)Greek GovernmentCategoryArchaeologyCase-studyApproximately 200 specialistarchaeologists, conservators andtechnicians worked on all aspects ofthe project, in order to investigate,detect, register and promoteelements of cultural heritagePrivateLocal residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders (pleasespecify)Attica Residentsn/aThe Environmental Terms for the ESSM section of Attiki OdosThe EIA of the Immitos Western Peripheral Motorwayn/an/aCategoryActivistsCase studyI won‘t pay movement (appeared inyear 2009)207

Name ofActorDescription ofrelationship208

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps 1996ACTORT.S.AABAX S.A17.06% 8,47% 8,22%ALTEAT.S.A9,82%ETETH S.A8,58%ATTI-KAT T.S.A8,47%J&P(Hellas)S.ATEGAS.A.4,91%Greek stateConcession contractAttiki odos S.A8,47%ELLAKTOR S.A9,82%7,62%K.ISARANTOPOYLOS S.APANTEHNIKI S.A.ATTIKI ODOSCONSTRUCTION J.VProjectdeliveryAttikesDiadromesS.A0,07%8,47%TEB S.A.Key:NameofActor- ProjectActorEGISPROJECTSS.A.Description ofrelationship- ProjectRelationship209

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps 2011ELLAKTOR S.AJ.&P.AVAXS.A.GroupAKTORCONCESSIONS S.AETETHS.A.J.&P.AVAXS.A59.25%stake9.82%,stake21.00%stakeATEBANKS.AGreekStateConcession contractAttikiodos S.A9.88%stake0.04%stakeEGISPROJECTS S.Aleading80%stake20%stakeKey:Name ofActor- Project ActorATTIKI ODOSCONSTRUCTION J.VAttikesDiadromes S.ADescription ofrelationship- ProjectRelationship210

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s Influenceon projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderGreek GovernmentArchaeologyAttica ResidentsThe EIA of the ImmitosWestern Peripheral MotorwayThirty-three municipalsActivists211

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisInternal StakeholderInternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectInternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project on InternalStakeholderGreek StateConcession Company Attiki Odos SAATTIKI ODOS CONSTRUCTIONJOINT VENTUREATTIKES DIADROMES S.A.Halcrow Bank Tech. AdvisorJacobs Gibb Ltd. and SGI –Trademco212

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size & StructureContractor Project Team Size andStructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementn/a5000 employeesn/aProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches XStakeholder Involvement □Project Management Software XRelationship Management Tools □Lessons Learnt Transfers □Team Building Tools □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Knowledge Management Tools XCompetency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More Information213

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XHR Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XProcurement Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XIntegration Management ProcessesScope Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XTime Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XCost Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XQuality management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information XCommunications Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information X214

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets and changes totargetsActual Achievements Against TargetsPerformance relating to time Construction completed 2003Concession hand over 2004Performance relating to cost Original Target cost approx. 1.2bn€ Project matched the Original Target costPerformance related to achieving specification215

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectOlympics GamesPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectN/AOlympics GamesEconomic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentSpecific Economic Eventsimpacting on the projectPositiveOlympics Games216

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline217

3.3 EDINBURGH TRAM NETWORK, SCOTLANDCase compiled by: Prince BoatengContact details: pb128@hw.ac.ukBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeContractual FrameworkRelevant PhysicalDimensionsEDINBURGH TRAM NETWORK PROJECTSCOTLAND, UK- To support the local economy by improving accessibility.- To promote sustainability and reduce environmental damage caused by traffic.- To reduce traffic congestion.- To make the transport system safer and more secure.- To promote social benefits.The Tramline will be double track to:- Connect Edinburgh Airport to the City Centre- Link with development areas in North and West EdinburghThe key contracts are as follows:• Development Partnering and Operating Franchise Agreement (DPOFA);• System Design Services (SDS);• Joint Revenue Committee (JRC);• Multi Utilities Diversion Framework Agreement (MUDFA);• Infrastructure provider and maintenance (Infraco); and• Vehicle supply and maintenance (Tramco).Total length: 24 km in two phasesPhase 1a: 18.5km, is underdevelopment (Case study)Phase 1b: 5.5 km, to be developed later218

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder IdentificationInternalStakeholderCategorySupply-Side Client City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)FinanciersSponsorsCase-StudyThe strategic goal of tie and its partners is: “To successfully deliver, by 2011, a world classtram system in Edinburgh, the Capital of Scotland; safely - together - with commitment,professionalism and expertise.”Transport Scotland (TS) and City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie) and Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL)Client’s Customers UK Tram, Edinburgh TramsClient’s OwnersOther internalsupply-sidecategories ( pleasespecify)Demand Side PrincipalContractorFirst TierContractorsTransport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie), Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL), Lothian Buses (LB)CategoryTram Project Board (TPB)Council Audit Committee (PAC)MPs/ MinistersCase-StudyA formal sub-committee of TEL. Delegated authority tomonitor the delivery of the trams projectProject AuditParliamentary & political parties representativesBilfinger Berger Siemens (BBS) - Responsible for infrastructure construction (INFRACO).Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA (CAF)- Responsible for tram vehicle construction(TRAMCO).Comments (e.g.maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)Second TierConsultantsProfessionalServices ProvidersOther internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)Alfred McAlpine Infrastructure Services/Carillion-Responsible for utilities diversion workParsons Brinkerhoff/Halcrow - SDS provider to facilitate the early identification of utility diversion works,land purchase requirements and traffic regulation requirements and the completion of design drawings.Faithful & Gould: Construction cost management consultants responsible for risk managementprocedures .Hg Consulting - Independent Certifier with a duty of care to CECSteer Davies Gleave (SDG) – Assessed economic costs and benefits of the Trams project inDecember, 2007.Transdev- was appointed as the tram operator in May 2004 to assist planning of an integrated servicenetwork with TEL. Transdev was later cancelled in December 2009 as a cost saving measure.CategoryFinancial, Commercial andLegal Committee (FCL)Case-StudyFinancial management - Reporting, control, audit, risk management,insurance; and Contract management – Reporting, compliance, interfacewith delivery, claims and variations.219

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Identification (External)ExternalPublicPrivateStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Regulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supply-sidecategories (please specify)Local residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsSEPA, Scottish Water, Parliament, Planning, Road & aviationauthority, Network rail, Historic Scotland, Building StandardsCity of Edinburgh Council (CEC)Scottish GovernmentCategoryCEC councillors & officials,Case-studyCEC representativesEdinburgh residents (Randolph Crescent, Queen Street, Moray Feu, Blenheim,Shandwick, Picardy , Leith Walk, Forth Ports etc..)SEPA, Friends of the Earth Scotland; Sustainable Scotland Network; Lothian &Edinburgh Environmental Partnership; Scottish Environment Link; ScottishNatural Heritage (SNH). Scottish Executive‘s Countryside and Natural HeritageUnit (CANHU).Headland Archaeology (UK) Limited; City Council Archaeologists –Edinburgh,Glasgow University Archaeological Research Division (GUARD)Other External Privatestakeholders(please specify)CategoryB.A.A Edinburgh Airport; Henderson Global Investors (St.James Centre); Forth Ports; Edinburgh Business Forum;Essential Edinburgh; Federation of small businesses-Scotland; Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce; andrepresentatives of local communities impacted by theTrams.Case-studyKey business andother stakeholders220

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsFunding AuthorityTransport Scotland (TS)The CouncilProject Audit CommitteeThe Council/TS/Elected Member RepsExternal StakeholderGroup(Key business & otherstakeholders)Project SponsorCity of Edinburgh Council(Project director)Joint Project DeliveryGroupJoint Project ForumStrategic Direction &ControlCouncil ChairSenior responsible OfficerCouncil/Tie/TS/BB&S/CAF/Tram OperatorJointly AppointedIndependent Adjudicator(Engineering Experts)Traffic Management (CEC)ApprovalsEmploying Audit ScotlandBest value advancedpractices toolkitsDesign (Approvals/Consents/ Management)Contract VariationConstruction Progress ReportingIndependent CertifierRiskDesignConsentsProgrammeValuation/CostLand Acquisitions & compensationRemedial WorksTram Vehicle Delivery & IntegrationBB & SCAFKey:Name ofActor- Project ActorCommunicationsHealth & Safety/ The Railways & Other guidedTransport Systems Safety Regulation sCONTRACTSDescription ofrelationship- ProjectRelationship221

ORIGINAL TRAM PROJECT BOARD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURECity of EdinburghCouncilDirector of CityDevelopmentTransport ScotlandDirector of Rail DeliveryTieExecutive ChairTransport Edinburgh LtdChairChief ExecutiveTram Project BoardChaired by TEL ChairSub-CommitteeBusiness planning,integration and commercialsSub-CommitteeDesign, procurementand deliveryTEL TeamPlanning, integrationand commercialTram Project Directorand teamSource: Audit Scotland222

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderB.A.A Edinburgh Airport Positive High LowHenderson Global Investors (St. JamesCentre)Positive High HighForth Ports Positive High LowEdinburgh Business Forum Positive High HighEssential Edinburgh Positive Low HighFederation of small businesses- Scotland Positive Low HighEdinburgh Chamber of Commerce Positive High LowRepresentatives of local communitiesimpacted by the Trams.Positive Low High223

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvement3503000n/aProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing ApproachesProject Management SoftwareLessons Learnt TransfersStakeholder InvolvementRelationship Management ToolsTeam Building ToolsBuilding Information Modelling (BIM)Project Knowledge Management ToolsCompetency frameworkOther Tools and Techniques or More Information224

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesHR Management ProcessesProcurement ManagementProcessesIntegration Management ProcessesScope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ Short, medium and long term risk management strategies includingplanning engagement, and co-ordination of risks were approaches used to achieve market commitments for deliverablepackages of work and to reach financial close to commence construction activities. The risk management deliverables includethe use of Project Risk Management Plan; Assumption Register; Project Risk Register; Risk Progress Report; Project EstimateReports ; risk workshops and one-to-one meetings with those responsible for mitigating project risks.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The people strategy enshrined in the Human Resource (HR) planhas underpinned the Project Management Plan of ETP. Tram Delivery team, resources and capability are used to manage theprocess required for good project and cost control and undertake sufficient inspection of what is being delivered. This is toprovide assurance and confidence in the end product delivery and quality to ETP client and key stakeholders involved such asTEL, CEC, TS and the Scottish Government.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The procurement strategy applied to ETNP is entirely compatiblewith the approach of a staggered implementation of the project Phases. The key contracts relating specifically to the Phaseunder development are SDS, MUDFA, Infraco and Tramco. The contractual principles for each of these are the same with aspecific elements set for other phases of the project.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ To ensure effective system integration management processes,INFRACO – an implementation company was task to be responsible for construction , integration and maintenance of the tramsystem. Lothian Buses, The principal bus operator in Edinburgh which is wholly owned by the public sector would facilitate tram /bus integration and maximise the operational and service opportunities this presents.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The Scope Management Procedure has been developed to addressthe following workflows within the ETNP Workstream: Identification, Modelling & design, Approval & review of requiredi) Traffic and Pedestrian Management, ii) MUDFA, iii) INFRACO, iv) TRAMCO, v) SDS, and vi) System integration .Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ Cost estimates are fully aligned to the Master Programme & aredeveloped to detailed workstream level, enabling the effective management of costs throughout the project lifecycle. Theseproject cost estimates were and continue to be reviewed at principle points of the project .and they form the baseline againstwhich the project manages expenditurePresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ The project adopted quality management system which conforms tothe principles and requirements of BS EN ISO 9001:2000 Quality Management Systems.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □ A range of communication and media methodologies were used.(Contact database; Bespoke presentations for briefings; Exhibition and banner stands; Construction Newsletters &Tram timenewsletter – wider community; Fact Sheets and Concertinas; Tram DVD; Tram branding; Tram models and simulations; andLeaflets; One to one briefings with partners and key stakeholders; Q&As; Key Messages / statements; Key programme dates;Working action plan and Stock photography)225

MEGAPROJECT Project Performance (TIME)Planned infrastructure construction programmeYearQuarter number2007 2008 2009 2010 20112 3 41 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4Newhaven to Foot of Leith WalkFoot of Leith to St. Andrew SquareSt. Andrew Square to HaymarketHaymarket to Edinburgh ParkStationEdinburgh Park station to AirportLegend:UtilitiesRoad and TramworksOverhead line equipmentSource: Audit Scotland226

MEGAPROJECT Project Performance (TIME)Delivery against key milestonesYear 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011quarter number 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1Business Case planned 1 2 3 4Actual 1 2 3 4Design and TrafficRegulation Ordersplanned 1 2 3 4 5Actual 1 5Business CaseKey Milestones1 Approval of draft final business case by CEC2 Confirmation of INFRACO tender prices to CEC3 Approval of final business case by TPB4 Approval of final business case by CECUtilities planned 1 23 4 5Actual 1 23 4TRAMCO planned 1 2 3 4 5Actual 1 2 3 4INFRACO planned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Actual 1 2 3 45Design and TROs1 TRO process commences2 Completion of construct. dwgs - Utilities diversion3 Completion of planning drawing4 Completion of detailed design const. dwgs5 TRO process completeUtilities1 Award of Utilities diversion contract2 Completion of pre-const. Period of utilities design contract3 Commencement of utility diversion works trial site4 Commencement of utility diversion works5 Completion of utilities diversion worksTramco1 Completion of initial evaluation/negotiation of bids2 Recommendation of preferred bidder3 Award of Tramco contract4 Delivery of first tram5 Delivery of all tramsInfraco1 Return of Stage 1 bid2 Completion of evaluation/negotiation of Stage 2 bid3 Recommendation of preferred bidder4 Award of Infraco contract5 Construction of track and tram depot commences6 Depot completion7 Commencement of test running8 Delivery into revenue serviceSource: Audit Scotland227

MEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (TIME)Delivery against key milestonesBusiness CaseYearQuarter numberDesign and TrafficRegulation orderUtilitiesTram construction(Tramco)Infrastructureconstruction (Infraco)2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20113 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1Legend:PlanActualSource: Audit Scotland228

£millionMEGAPROJECT Project Performance (COST)Edinburgh tram network spend to the end of December 2010300250Budget as at May 2008Expenditure to end December 2010200150100500InfrastructureconstructionTramconstructionUtilitiesdiversionDesignProjectmanagementLand andcompensationContingency229

£millionMEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (COST)Spend by type against budget300250Actual Budget as at May 2008Expenditure to end December 2010Actual Spend to end December 2010200Projected spend to endDecember 2010 atfinancial close(May 2008)150100Total budget atfinancial close(May 2008)Actual Spend toend December2010500InfrastructureconstructionTramVehiclesUtilitiesdiversionDesignLand andcompensationProjectmanagementContingency/risk allowance230

£ MillionMEGAPROJECT Project Performance. (COST)Planned and actual expenditure profiles180160Cumulative spend to 31 March 2008Spend during 2008/2009Spend during 2009/2010Planned spend during 2010/2011Planned spend during 2011/2012140120100806040200Projected spend asat December 2007Projected spend asat May 2008Projected spend asat April 2009Projected spend asat April 2010Projected spend asat December 2010231

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder orStakeholder GroupingCommunity andBusinessProject StakeholdersProjectCommunicationMedia and ExternalRelationsOriginal Aims of Project Involvement and Changes to these AimsFacilitate communication to ensure local businesses and residents and otheraffected parties are kept fully informed of the nature and timing of the works.• Commit to a one-message approach, owned by all key partners andstakeholders;• Generate support and endorsement as required from key audiences: localresidents and businesses; commuters; political; media; travelling public;community; special interest groups and visitors to Edinburgh; and• Encourage a joined-up working approach between tie, CEC, LB and TEL.•Implement a robust public information campaign during construction, andthroughout key stages such as utilities diversion; final business caseapproval; contracts awarded for Tramco and Infraco; tram branding; final tramroute design; tram commissioning and driver training; new tram timetable andtram operation by TEL; and ensure all tie and CEC management andoperational staff are kept up to date and are fully briefed as appropriate.• Generate positive media coverage for the tram project, tie, CEC and TEL,focusing on benefits for the travelling public and wider economy;• Harness political and public support and media commentary; and• Demonstrate competence and efficiency of delivery agent, promoter andfunders.Achievement of these AimsAchievedPartially achievedPartially achievedPartially achieved232

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectETNP is governed by the following Legal and Regulatory frameworks (regionally, nationally and Europe wide)• Edinburgh Tram Acts• New Roads and Street Works Act (NRSWA)• Code of Construction Practice (Buildings, Roads, Bridges)• The Road Traffic Regulation for the tram• The Local Authorities' Traffic Orders (Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended.• Environmental Impact Assessment (Scotland) Regulations (covering: Traffic and Transport, Land Use,Geology, Soils and Contaminated Land, Landscape and Visual Impacts, Ecology and Nature Conservation,Water Quality, Cultural Heritage, Socio Economic Effects, Noise and Vibration, Air Quality) .• Environmental Impact Assessment (EU) Regulations.• Delays in obtaining temporary traffic regulation orders for construction - (Regional)• Delays in obtaining consent – (Regional and National).• Legislative/ Regulatory change -(Regional, National and Europe wide)• Insufficient powers to acquire land.Political EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentThe political project environment for ETNP varies in influence according to the number of political seats orelected members within the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) .Specific Political Eventsimpacting on the project• Political opposition;• Lack of political support;• Lack of partner support;• Political indecision.• Project termination233

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentSpecific Economic Eventsimpacting on the projectEconomic Project Environment for ETNP is based on the following economic benefits:• Reduction of travel time.• Economic efficiency.• Employment development.• Employment generation.• Residential development• Economic growth.• Incorrect project cost estimate• Incorrect project time estimate• Wage inflation• Changes in VAT• Global economic recession• Changes in taxation• Cost and delays due to utilities diversions• Changes in inflation as construction works proceed234

3.4 HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUERESCase compiled by: Rafaela Alfalla-Luque and Carmen Medina-LópezContact details: alfalla@us.es, cmedina@us.esBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeHigh-Speed Train in Spain: Madrid-Barcelona-French frontier (Figueres)SpainTo joint two main cities in Spain through high speed train. Safe, punctual and comfortable means oftransport. To improve connections with France. The last stage is currently being worked on, theBarcelona-Figueres section, which links with the Figueres-Perpignan section (which has been inservice since December 2010). 6To improve the connection between cities. Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network(TEN-T)Total Project Value Total investment of nearly 9 billion euro (Madrid-Barcelona) 6Project Status (i.e.. initiation,planning, construction, operation,dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant PhysicalDimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)Finish date (Madrid-Barcelona): 02/2008Expected finish date (Barcelona-Figueres): 2012(Expected divergence 3 years)Madrid-Barcelona: 6,611 million Euros (inaugurated on 20 February 2008Barcelona-Figueres: 4,200 million de euros [22]Line length: 664 km (Madrid-Barcelona)- 804 Km (M-B-Figueres)Operating speed: The track is designed for speeds of up to 350 km/h in nearly 86% of the route,although Renfe Operadora runs commercial services at 300 km/h.International gauge, compatible signaling system, standard electrificationMinimum 7000 m radius bends on the general trackRamps under 2.5% - Maximum 140 mm slope - Junctions suitable for 350 km/h 6235

HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUEREShttp://turismoytren.com/index.php/nuevo-mapa-de-la-alta-velocidad-en-espana/236

HSR MADRID-BARCELONA-FIGUERESADVANTAGES OF THE LINE [51]This line allows communication between the two most densely populated urban areas of Spain (Madrid andBarcelona) ​and Zaragoza and other cities such as Guadalajara, Calatayud, Lleida and Tarragona.This infrastructure also extends its benefits to other cities to connect:In Madrid, the North-Northeast corridor (LAV Valladolid), South corridor (LAV Seville and Malaga) and runnerLevante (Valencia LAV).* In Zaragoza with the high-speed and international gauge Zaragoza-Huesca* In Camp de Tarragona and the Mediterranean Corridor.* Also, thanks to the wide exchange facilities of Plasencia de Jalon, the benefits extend to La Rioja andNavarre.Another unique feature of this line is its design for mixed passenger and freight (including the Port ofBarcelona and the connection to France), which implies the possibility of establishing new services to or fromintermodal centers in France and other European countries.In addition to a significant reduction in travel times, this modern infrastructure provides a number of benefitsincluding:* Citizens have a more integrated rail infrastructure, safe and sustainable* A significant increase in capacity and regularity of rail traffic resulting from the technical specifications anddesign of the line.* Significant increase comfort by establishing optimal conditions of rolling and drawing* Increased security by incorporating advanced technologies in control systems of rail traffic* Security is enhanced by the fencing on both sides of the track and the absence of level crossings* Removing barriers and improving urban permeability and potential for development of citiesONLINE FEATURES [51]It extends over 804 kilometers from Madrid to Figueres.The layout allows traffic at speeds up to 350 km / h in almost 86% of the course, although it commerciallyexploits Renfe Operator to 300 km / h.INFRASTRUCTURE [51]The construction parameters applied were very demanding to allow the development of maximum speeds of350 kilometers per hour in commercial service and ensure the interoperability of the infrastructure accordingto EU rules:* Tread international signaling system compatible, standard electrification* Curves of minimum radius of 7000 m in the general pathway* Ramps less than 2.5%* Maximum depth 140 mm* Deviations suitable for 350 km / hThe line has by-pass in Zaragoza, Lleida and Figueres so that not to penalize travel times of non-stop trainin those cities.Furthermore, the Barcelona-Figueres section is designed for passenger traffic and also for the transport ofcertain types of goods.237

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalStakeholderCategorySupply-Side ClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’sCustomersCase-StudyRENFE OPERATOR is the national rail passenger operator and is a state-ownedcompany controlled by the ministry of public works (Ministerio de Fomento).European Union. During the period 2000-2006 co-financing was provided as follows:* By the Cohesion Fund which provided 3.3581 billion euro for the construction ofplatforms on the Madrid-Barcelona section, as well as the supply and installation oftracks on the Madrid-Vilafranca del Penedés section and power lines, signaling andcommunications on the Madrid-Lerida section.* By TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) Funds which provided funding of 70.9million euro for studies and projects as well as track-bed works on the Maçanet-Silssection. 41During the period 2007-2013 there will be co-financing:*By TEN-T funds of 10.6 million euro for the implementation of the ERTMS (EuropeanRail Traffic Management System) on the Barcelona-Figueras section.The European Investment Bank (EIB) collaborates in the funding of this project. 6The total cost of this line is €10.5 billion, with EU Cohesion Policy contributionsamounting to about €3.4 billion. 41Final customers: Tourists, professionals, passengers in general. General public(passengers), freight operatorsComments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Client’s Owners In January 1, 2005 the RENFE Railway Sector law extinguish RENFE company. Thiscompany was divided into two companies: 1) one that operates the trains called RenfeOperator, and 2) one that manages the infrastructure called ADIF (Railway InfrastructureManager). RENFE Operator is a Public Enterprise under the control of the Ministry ofDevelopment of Spain. It is heir to the legacy of RENFE (Spanish National RailwaysCompany), a company created in 1941. 8Other internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)CategoryInfrastructureAdministrator(ADIF)Case-StudyADIF is a separate state-owned organisation, is responsible fordevelopment of the high-speed lines that are under construction 4It manages (operation and maintenance) the railway infrastructure. [10, 4]238

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalDemand-SideStakeholderCategoryPrincipalContractorFirst TierContractorsCase-StudySiemens, Alsthom and CAF signed the agreement for the manufacture of the sixteen ICE-3trains to be run through the high speed line (AVE) between Madrid and Barcelona. CAF andAlstom took charge of about twenty-five percent of the manufacturing machining Siemenstrain [25]The trains are Germany's Siemens and the Spanish Talgo, signaling was awarded toAnsaldo Italian and the Spanish Cobra and assistance technique (4% of the budget,according to Renfe) to virtually all engineering firms in the country works. [26]Acciona, OHL and Sacyr have been awarded the works of the entrance to the high speedrailway line (Ave) Madrid-Barcelona in the Catalan capital [29]Dragados, Comsa y Acsa , the joint venture formed by Rubau, Copisa, FCC Construcciónand Ferrovial Agromán [32] Siemens and Talgo/Bombardier builds the train machineACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL (construction firms) build the track [12]HKL: The German multinational has been in the works of the AVE to contracting companiesleasing equipment different tonnage. It has also intervened in the emergency works carriedout between Bellvitge and Sants and repair of the tunnels [27]Comments (e.g. maturity,previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)Second TierConsultantsCurrently, Redalsa is going through the lanes and elastic fasteners for the route of the AVEMadrid-Barcelona. [28]TYPSA information studies and projects as technical assistance and supervision of works[39]ProfessionalServices ProvidersOther internal Categorysupply-sidecategories Industrial producers of railway equipment [2](please specify) Basalt suppliers: Up to five different quarries provided the basalt (Ophites ofHappy St., Stone and Derivatives SA, Quarries The Ponderosa, Quartzite ofMediterranean and Bob Arno and Sons). [26]Case-Study239

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalPublicStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Regulatory AgenciesMinistry of Environment, Ministry of DevelopmentEnvironment Agency from Madrid (Agencia de Medio Ambiente– AMA- de la Comunidad de Madrid), Agencia Catalana delAguaLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supply-sidecategories ( please specify)Madrid, Aragon and Cataluña. Municipal authorities/town councils and theCommittees for Coordination and regional Development (CCDR)Spanish government, MOPTC (Public Works, Transport and Communications),MF (Ministry of Finance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry for theenvironment)CategoryPublic landowners, Tourism board, Industry & serviceassociations, Cities with HST stationsCase-studyPrivate Local residents Local AssociationsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsPrivate landownersGreenpeace, Friends of the Earth, European Environment AgencyArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders (please specify)CategoryOther transport operatorsPress & MediaOpinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles bycompanies interested in the projectPolitical OpinionCase study240

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsNumerousexternalstakeholdersSpanishgovernmentLocaland regionalgovernmentNumerousexternalstakeholdersPassengersin general(client‘scustomers)Ministry of Environment,Ministry of DevelopmentEnvironment Agencyfrom Madrid (AMA)Agencia Catalana delAguaADIF /GIFPrivate landownersGreenpeace,Friends of the EarthOther transportoperatorsAcciona,Sacyr,OHL,Dragados,Comsa y AcsaRENFE(client)Contracts withContracts withContracts withRubau,Copisa,FCC,Ferrovial,VallehermosoAnsaldoAndCobraSIEMENS(electrificationprovider) andTalgoContracts withContracts withALSTHOM(TrainMachineProvider)TYPSAConsultantCohesionFund and theTEN-TbudgetContracts withCAFCONSTRUCCIONES YAUXILIAR DEFERROCARRILESSuppliers basalt: OphitesofHappy St., Stone andDerivatives SA, QuarriesThe Ponderosa,Quartzite ofMediterranean and BobArno and Sons asaltContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with Contracts with2nd tiersubcontractors2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withHKL andRedalsaKey:Nameof ActorDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationship- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractualbasis- Non-contractualProject relationship241

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderTourism boardEU CommissionOthers transportoperators:air transport (Iberia , …and airports), onconventional railwaysand on road transport(buses, cars and roadnetwork) 2Industry & servicesAssociationsExternal Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this ProjectHighly Favourable . The HST hasan impact on travel distribution andmodal choice. Furthermore, thehigh quality of transport cangenerate new trips offered not fromadditional modes. 11Highly Favourable . ContemplatesHST as a new form of Europeanintegration 2ExternalStakeholder’sInfluence onprojectGeneral abilityto lobbygovernmentGeneral abilityto lobbygovernmentImpact of Project on External StakeholderHigh. Contributes to achieving its overall aimsContributes to achieving its overall aimsWorried about effects Limited For air transport between Madrid and Barcelona theintroduction of the HRS reduced the airport traffic. Theroute Madrid-Barcelona was in 2007 the world's busiestpassenger air route with 971 scheduled flights per week(both directions). In order to compete with each otherRENFE has made, and Iberia will make, changes to theirfare structures, as well as changing services; Iberia plansto use smaller planes which will leave as soon as fullHighly Favourable .Commercial reasons 2Phase of Project of GreatestInterest (initiation, planning,construction, operation, dismantling)OperationInitiation, Planning, Construction& OperationOperationMedium High OperationGreenpeace, Friends ofthe Earth, Environmentagency (AMA); SpanishMinistry of Environment;Worried about effectsAbility to LobbyGovernmentInitiation, Planning, Constructionand OperationPrivate landowners Worried about the lost of the land Limited Lost of the land Constructioncities with HST stations Highly Favourable . Medium High Construction & OperationBarcelona culturalassociationsEnvironmentalorganisationsWorried about effects Limited The construction committee of Barcelona's famedSagrada Familia church lobbied for a re-routing of thetunnel - it passes within metres of the massive church'sfoundations. It also passes equally near the UNESCOrecognizedCasa Milà also designed by Antoni GaudíHighly unfavourableSubstantivelyharmfulCan limit the development of the process (presentingsuccessive complaints about negative impacts that theproject brings)Construction and OperationInitiation, Planning, Constructionand Operation242

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project TeamSize and StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementRENFESiemens, Alsthom, CAF, [25]Talgo, Ansaldo [26]Acciona,OHL, Sacyr, [29]Dragados, Comsa y Acsa , the joint venture formed by Rubau, Copisa, FCC Construcción and FerrovialAgromán [32]HKL: The German multinational has been in the works of the AVE to contracting companies leasing equipmentdifferent tonnage. It has also intervened in the emergency works carried out between Bellvitge and Sants andrepair of the tunnels [27]Redalsa is going through the lanes and elastic fasteners for the route of the AVE Madrid-Barcelona. [28]Firms of engineering, construction, manufacturing systems and trainsProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Stakeholder Involvement □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Management Software □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Lessons Learnt Transfers □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More Information:Renfe, as operator of the network, says it will be a model "completely innovative and participation in all phases of the process,the aftercare of the product― [43]especially243

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesHR Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Procurement Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Integration Management ProcessesScope Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Department of Regulation and Control Integrated traffic management: in the high-speed lines also has advancedtraffic management on the integration platform Davinci, a specified and owned by ADIF, which can integrateinformation from other systems related to rail traffic, such as the Remote Power, communications, passengerinformation systems, remote control of sensors. This is an Intelligent Transportation System that featuresincorporating the latest technologies. 45The CRC concept integrates all the systems involved in the regulation of railway traffic, responding to thedemands of high speed. Thus, from these centers are regulated simultaneously signaling, electrification,communications systems, traveler information and energy, among other things. Process integration is possiblethrough the DaVinci system, considered one of the world's most advanced in the regulation of railway traffic. Thissystem, intellectual property of ADIF, get an overview of all subsystems into which traffic management through asingle platform, which optimizes the process considerably. The CRC direct and coordinate the circulation in realtime, following a defined transportation plan, meeting the safety and punctuality rates required, and allowingimmediate response to any incidents 47Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Time Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesQuality management ProcessesCommunications Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □The main drawback of HST in corridors of low traffic density is its high cost. Infrastructure (generally notcompatible with freight transport) is more expensive than that required by conventional railways, and its use isassociated with decreasing average costs.Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □244

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets and changes to targetsPerformance relating to time Start date: 1995Estimated finish date (M-B-F): 2009Actual Achievements Against TargetsFinish date (Madrid-Barcelona): 02/2008Expected finish date (Barcelona-Figueres): 2012(Expected divergence 3 years)Performance relating to costPerformance related toachieving specificationIt is estimated that the AVE Madrid-Barcelona will cost more than six billioneuros. One Km of this line will cost7.362.398,28 euros (initial estimation). 34Seen 2002 investment was expected in theline of 7,800 million euros 34Estimated number of passengers:Renfe provides transport 6.1 millionpassengers with this service in your firstyear of operation (2008). This figure isalmost double the 3.3 million passengers in2007 and earn about three million newcustomers 35Total investment of nearly 9 billion euro (Madrid-Barcelona) 6(a divergence of 3 billion euros related to the initial estimatedcost).Annual passenger traffic and year: 7 millions (2009)There was much criticism during the construction of theMadrid-Barcelona line. A highly critical report by the consultingfirm KPMG, commissioned by ADIF (Administrador deInfraestructuras Ferroviarias) at the behest of the Ministry forPublic Works (Ministerio de Fomento) on 23 June 2004,pointed to a lack of in-depth studies and over-hasty executionof works as the most important reasons for the problems thatdogged construction of the AVE line. For example, during theconstruction of the AVE tunnel near Barcelona, a number ofnearby buildings suffered minor damage from a large sinkholethat appeared near a commuter rail station, damaging one ofits platforms.Passengers: 2,337,913 (2008); 2.651.598 (2009); 2.574.920(2010); 2.515.681 (2011) [10, 16, 12, 17]245

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder orStakeholderGroupingTourism agencyIndustrygovernmentCity of MadridCity of BarcelonaOriginal Aims of ProjectInvolvement andChanges to these AimsPassenger traffic increaseMadrid mobilityenhancementsBarcelona mobilityenhancementsAchievement of these AimsThe Madrid–Barcelona–French Frontier route is one of the most relevant land links withEurope. It channels an important flow of tourists toward the south of Spain andLevante. In addition, Catalonia and Aragon maintain significant commercial and culturalrelations with the French southern regions and its web economies are veryimportant. 24Impact urban environment of the station, step by residential, increased activity,congestion traffic, in a psychological effect for residents. increased mobility for residentsand host population, as we saw above, goes to the city in unacceptably high, for workand to take steps, leisure, etc.. with the consequent economic impact 15The challenge of a project of this type is:- assert that rail transport is the safest;- promote the use of clean transport, especially in short to medium distances 38•Increased capacity and regularity.•Significant increase comfort by establishing optimal conditions of rolling and drawing.•Increased security by incorporating advanced technologies in control systems of railtraffic.•Removing barriers and improving urban permeability and potential for development ofcities.•Citizens have a more integrated rail infrastructure, safe and sustainable, while guestsenjoy reduced journey times. 31Locals and citizens Benefits for citizens Increase the overall efficiency of the rail system.Ensuring the safety of rail transport.Improve the structuring of the territory.Promote social cohesion and sustainable development.To promote the welfare of citizens and their quality of life 31246

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectThe Plan of Infrastructure and Transport of the Spanish Government 16Nueva Ley del sector Ferroviario 39/2003 17 de noviembreREAL DECRETO 2387/2004, de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento del SectorFerroviarioOrden Ministerial FOM/898/2005 en la que se fijan las cuantías de los cánones ferroviariosOrden Ministerial FOM/233/2006 para la homologación del material rodante ferroviario [30]General Plan of Urban DevelopmentReal Decreto 1302/86 on environmental impact assessments for public works [25]Environment Agency (Agencia de Medio Ambiente-AMA): Effect on the river Manzares - deterioration of theavifauna of the area - noise barriers to mitigate the effects of the passage of the train next to residentialareas [21] [25]- The work required to correct the environmental impact of Madrid-Seville line will cost about4,000 million pesetas [23]Archaeological prospection - average cost of 20,000 pesetas per hectare [24]7Plan de Acción Regional del Transporte para el Mediterráneo (2010-2013) TYPSA leads the consortium ofconsulting companies supporting the European Commission in implementing the Regional Action Plan forTransport in the Mediterranean, acting as the main contract in the EuroMed Transport Project, the project ofregional cooperation in transport of the Union European neighbors to the south [40]Political EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the project- Urban planning measures: regulations and incentives to reduce the possible barrier effects of the railsystem; new zoning of land uses to allow the location of new economic activities and create positivesynergies- Management measures: the implementation of mobility policies to foster the coherent coordination ofinternal and external passenger flows. 16- interest to remove regional imbalances and improve communications in the countryNone Identified247

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic ProjectEnvironmentSpecific Economic Eventsimpacting on the project* Key factor of geographic integration.* Contribution to the development of several of the Spanish regions.* Strategic role in the development of a global metropolitan network in Spain.* The benefit of the Barcelona-Madrid AVE is 970 million within 40 years, and 8,990 million taking intoaccount indirect factors, such as its impact on tourism and the territory. These 8,990 million would be 10.187million if we add other intangible factors such as the country's political credibility, citizen appreciation andreputational assets [36]None identified248

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME1988 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersEvents and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementCabinetapprovalTenderMadrid-Saragossa-LeridaLerida-Camp deTarragonaTarragona-Barcelona2008Barcelona-FigueresEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceOpened the firstSpanish high speedtrain: the AVEMadrid-Sevilla (1992)Spain joined theCEE (1986)Events and activitiesrelating to projectenvironment[42]http://fcmaf.es/cronologia.htmThe Popular Partywon the election(1996)Absolute majority forthe Popular Party inlegislative elections(2000)Becomes effectiveEuropean singlecurrency (2002)Terrorist attack in Madridcaused 191 victims andover 1800 wounded (2004)The PSOE won theelections (2004)The governmentdeclared a state ofalarm, for the firsttime in democracy,the crisis of air trafficcontrollers (2010)Economic crisis249

REFERENCES1 - http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm2 - Rus G. and Inglada, V. (1997): "Cost-Benefit of the High-Speed Train in Spain". The Annals of Regional Science. Volume 31, Number 32,175-1883 - http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta_Velocidad_Espa%C3%B1ola4 - COMMISION FOR INTEGRATED TRANSPORT (2004) "Report on high-speed rail in the United Kingdom international comparisons.Appendix F. Spain | [Informe sobre la alta velocidad en inglaterra comparaciones internacionales. Apendice F. España]" Revista de ObrasPublicas 151 (3444), pp. 7-165 - Rus, G. and Nombela, G. (2005):Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable? Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. Volume41. Part I. January 2007, pp 3-23.6 -http://www.adif.es/en_US/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa.shtml7 - De La Fuente, R.S.; Antín, M.G.; Tordesillas, J.M.C.; Capdepón, F.P.; Francés, J.M.U. (2006) "Analysis of the territorial consequences of theHST (high speed train) in small cities: Ciudad Real and Puertollano | [Análisis de las consecuencias territoriales del AVE en ciudadespequeñas: Ciudad Real y Puertollano]" Estudios Geograficos (260), pp. 199-2298 - http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renfe_Operadora9 - http://www.rodiokronsa.es/images/stories/inyecciones/pdf/fichas/06_consolidacion_zona_karstica_ave.pdf10 - http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/FERROCARRILES/Estructura_ferr/11 - http://www.ub.edu/gim/albalate_bel_EA.pdf12 - http://www.europapress.es/economia/transportes-00343/noticia-economia-ave-ampl-empresas-espanolas-unen-marca-alta-velocidadespanola-entrar-eeuu-20090530142301.html13 - http://www.ferropedia.es/wiki/Tr%C3%A1ficos_corredores_Andaluc%C3%ADa_Larga_Distancia14 - http://upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/6281/11/10.pdf15 - González Yanci, Ma.P.; Aguilera Arilla, Ma.J.; Borderías Uribeondo, Ma.P.; Santos Preciado, J.M. (2005) "Changes in the cities of de highspeed line Madrid-Seville since its establishment | [Cambios en las ciudades de la línea de alta velocidad Madrid-Sevilla desde suimplantación]" Cuadernos Geograficos (36 1), pp. 527-547250

REFERENCES16 - Bellet, C., Alonso, P., Casellas, A. (2010), "Transport infraestructure and territory. The structural effects of the high-speed train in Spain",Boletin de la Asociacion de Geografos Espanoles (52), pp. 143-163+377-38317 - López, E.; Monzón, A. (2010) "Integration of sustainability issues in strategic transportation planning: A multi-criteria model for theassessment of transport infrastructure plans" Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 25 (6), pp. 440-45118 - Garmendia, M., Ureña, J.M., Coronado, J.M. (2011), "Long-distance trips in a sparsely populated region: The impact of high-speedinfrastructures", Journal of Transport Geography 19 (4), pp. 537-55119 - High-Speed Rail Give Short -Haul Air a Run for the Money in Europe, With More Flexible Travel, Greater Comfort, Lower EnvironmentalImpact20 - López, E.; Monzón, A. (2010) "Integration of sustainability issues in strategic transportation planning: A multi-criteria model for theassessment of transport infrastructure plans" Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering 25 (6), pp. 440-45121 - Ordaz, P. (1991)El hundimiento de tierras de Córdoba retrasará cuatro meses las obras del TAV. El país, 15/03/199122 - Adif. http://prensa.adif.es/ade/u08/GAP/Prensa.nsf/0/D32582D883AE053AC12573FE0043BB75/$file/LAV_Figueres2.pdf?OpenElement23 - Rus et al. (2009): Economic Analysis of High Speed Rail in Europe. BBVA Foundation (5 chapters. Some of them analysis the impact ofMadrid-Barcelona line). http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/inf_web_economic_analysis.pdf24 - Coto-Millán, P.; Inglada, V.; Rey, B. (2007) "Effects of network economies in high-speed rail: The Spanish case" Annals of RegionalScience 41 (4), pp. 911-925.25 - Expasión (2002) "Siemens firma con Alstom y CAF el acuerdo para el AVE Madrid-Barcelona" Expansión, 07/02/200226 - Carcar (2003) "Los plazos del AVE Madrid-Barcelona, un fracaso anunciado" El País, 05/03/200327 - HKL participa en la construcción del AVE en los tramos de Lleida-Tarragona-Barcelona" Interempresas 22/02/200828 - Redalsa: caminos de hierro para comunicar29 - Actualidad24h: "Acciona, OHL y Sacyr se adjudican las obras de la entrada del Ave en Barcelona por 275,7 millones―30 -http://prensa.adif.es/ade/u08/GAP/Prensa.nsf/wV007B?SearchView&Start=1&Count=20&Query=FIELD+TipoDoc+=+InformesyDoc&SearchOrder=4&251

REFERENCES31 - Línea de Alta Velocidad Madrid-Barcelona-frontera francesa Sala de Prensa Adif32 - http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/1C667F9D-E422-4CB9-86A5-39929D608D69/71015/10032903.pdf33 - Muñoz-y-Martin (2002):"El Gobierno crea una tasa para financiar el AVE de Madrid a Barcelona desde 2003" El País, 02/10/200234 - http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm35 - Madridpress (2008): 12.000 viajeros utilizan el AVE Madrid-Barcelona en su primer día36 - Preferente (2011) : "El AVE Madrid-Barcelona puede dar 250 millones anuales de beneficio a España" 30/11/201137 - Prados (1990): "Reducir el impacto ambiental del TAV entre Madrid y Barcelona costará entre 18 y 20 millones por kilómetro" El País 04/07/199038 - Inforegio: La línea de Alta Velocidad: Madrid-Barcelona-Frontera Francesa.39 - http://www.typsa.com/2_2c_ferrocarriles.html40 - http://www.typsa.com/_actualidad.html41 - http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/country2009/es_en.pdf HST Madrid-Barcelona sponsors42 - http://listas.20minutos.es/lista/cronologia-de-los-principales-acontecimientos-ocurridos-en-espana-tras-la-muerte-de-franco-1439/43 - El País (1999)-Siemens, Talgo, Adztranz y Alstom ultiman sus ofertas para el concurso de alta velocidad por 117.000 millones 22/11/9944 - RuizdelArbol (2005): "La auditoría revela que la línea AVE a Barcelona tiene graves deficiencias" Cinco Días 26/02/200545 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/circulacion/circulacion.shtml46 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/conoceradif/doc/7sistemas03.pdf47 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/ocio_y_cultura/fichas_informativas/ficha_informativa_00038.shtml48 - http://www.sener.es/EPORTAL_DOCS/GENERAL/SENERV2/DOC-cw4b4b0cc8680f0/ingenieriacivilenSENER.pdf.49 - http://www.steerdaviesgleave.com/ouroffices/madrid/proyectos-claves50 - http://www.sener.es/EPORTAL_DOCS/GENERAL/SENERV2/DOC-cw49c0b668d7a61/INNOVACION_CLAVE_ESTRATEGICA.pdf51 - http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa/madrid_barcelona_frontera_francesa.shtml52 - http://www.spainbusiness.com/icex/cma/contentTypes/common/records/mostrarDocumento/?doc=414897553 - http://fcmaf.es/Ferrocarriles/050.htm252

REFERENCESGeneral Information about High Speed Rail: institutions and reportsEuropean Commission Mobility and Transport:http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/interoperability/high_speed_en.htmTrans-European Networks (TEN)http://ec.europa.eu/ten/index_en.htmlEuropean Commission Eurostat. Glossary:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:High-speed_railEuropean Commission Eurostat. Passenger transport statistics:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Passenger_transport_statisticsEuropean Commission Eurostat. General statistics:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/main_tablesInternational Union of Railways (UIC). Rail and Sustainable Developmenthttp://www.uic.org/etf/publication/publication-detail.php?code_pub=525Spain. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). Statistics:http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t10/a106/a2000/&file=pcaxisSpain. Ministerio de Fomento. Statistics:http://www.fomento.gob.es/BE/?nivel=2&orden=07000000Spain. Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF):http://prensa.adif.es253

Basic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScope3.5 HSR VIGO - OPORTO - LISBON - MADRIDTotal Project ValueProject Status (i.e.initiation, planning,construction operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)Case compiled by: João de Abreu e Silva and Marisa PedroContact details: : joao.abreu@civil.ist.utl.pt ; marisa.pedro@ist.utl.ptThe High-Speed Project in PortugalPortugalBuilding and operation of the High Speed Rail network for Portugal consist of 5 links:• Lisbon/Madrid: to strengthen the connection between the two capitals and increase multimodality in theinternational connections• Lisbon/Oporto: to create a new rail connection between the two main cities of Portugal, and serve theintermediate region (+- 70% of GDP and +-61% population)• Aveiro/Salamanca: to link Aveiro, Viseu and Mangualde by rail to Guarda and Spain.They are included in Priority Project no.3 (―Southwest European High-speed Railway Line‖)• Oporto/Vigo: to strengthen the connections and multimodality between Oporto and Galiza (Spanish)Included in Priority Project no.19 (―High-speed Railway Interoperability in the Iberian Peninsula‖).• Évora/Faro-Huelva: the latter depending on subsequent studies to be carried outIntegrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)About 8.3 billions € (1.4 B€ Oporto/Vigo, 4.5 B€ Lisbon/Oporto, 2.2 B€ Lisbon/Madrid)Project suspendedPublic Private Partnership (PPP)• Designing, construction, financing and maintenance of the rail sub and superstructures (40 years)• Designing, installation, financing and maintenance of the signals and telecom. (20 years).• Lisbon station to be developed by REFER and Caia International Station to be developed jointly by Portugal andSpain. Other rail stations are developed by PPP.Operation: not yet totally defined•The strategic role of regulation and network management resides with the State/REFER.Lisbon/Madrid 640 km (203 km in Portugal), Oporto/Vigo 125 km (100 km in Portugal), Lisbon/Oporto 290 kmAveiro/Salamanca 170 km in Portugal, Évora/Faro-Huelva 200 km: Under study (probably postponed)254

Basic Project InformationSOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTHigh-speed network coverage56% of municipalities81% of the population87% of the GDPDevelopment in railway market shareIn 2003: 4%In 2025: 26%Socio-economic impact during constructionOn GDP: 1.7%On employment: 1.4% or a maximum of92,000 jobsSocio-economic impact during operationOn GDP: ~1.025%(With conventionalcomponent of TTT)Annual environmental savingsIn 2010: EUR 69 millionIn 2025: EUR 184 million(With conventional componentbetween Évora and Caia)Source: Annual report and accounts from RAVE (2004)Signalling andTelecommunications Systems255

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalSupply-SideStakeholder CategoryClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersCase-StudyREFER E.P.E (Formerly RAVE a subsidiary of REFER createdspecifically for the implementation of the HSR project)European Union: Structural Funds (Cohesion Fund, Trans-EuropeanTransport Networks) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).Private investment and Portuguese State funding.DGTREN (Directorate-General of Transports and Energy).Operational Cash Flow(Total investment: 8.3 Billions €)Portuguese State, EU Grants: TEN, Cohesion Fund (QREN), EUPriority Project nº16 (Sines/Madrid/Paris)General public (passengers), freight operatorsComments (e.g.maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders, skills,influence on project)Client’s OwnersPortuguese StateDemand-SidePrincipal ContractorConcessionaire ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium(Caia-Poceirão; part of the link Lisbon-Madrid)The project (PPP1) is suspendeddue to the credit crisisFirst Tier Contractors LGV-Engenharia e Construção de Linhas de Alta Velocidade, ACE Contracted by ELOSSecond Tier ContractorsProfessional ServicesProvidersOther internal supply-sidecategories (please specify)KPMG II – Consultores de Negócios S.A. (financial services) andlegal support from several companies, Epypsa, Sener andFerconsult, IN OUT GLOBAL, Steer Davies Gleave and VTM,Deloitte, CEEETA, EUROESTUDIOS-COBA, TIS.pt, Biodesign,GLOBALVIA, GRID, CONSULGAL, TYPSA, SENER, MUNICÍPIA,Terraforma, SOCINOVA, CISED, A.T.KEARNEY, CEA/UCP,FERBRITAS, GESTE Engineering, LNEC (NationalLaboratory of Civil Engineering), …CategoryCase-StudyConsultants of RAVE/ REFER256

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalStakeholder CategoryRegulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentCase-StudyIMTT (institute charged with the regulation and coordination of inland transport)Municipal authorities/town councils and the Committees for Coordination and regional Development (CCDR)Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)PublicNational GovernmentOther internal supply-sidecategories( please specify)MOPTC (Ministry of Transport), MF (Ministry of Finance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry forEnvironment)CategoryAPA (Portuguese Environmental Agency), INAG I.P. (Institute of Water), IGESPAR I.P. (TheManagement Institute of Architectural and Archaeological Heritage) Estradas de Portugal EP(Portuguese Roads Authority), APL (Lisbon Port Authority), REN S.A. (NationalTransmission Network), CP E.P.E (Portuguese Railways), IGF (General Inspectorate ofFinance), …Case-studyPrivateLocal residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)Local Associations, residents associationsnon-governmental organizations for environment (ENGOs) like Quercus, LPN and Urbe, etcCategoryUniversities and Technological CentresProfessional associations : ADFER (Portuguese Association for the Development of RailwayTransport), OE (board of engineers), CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry), AEP(Portuguese Business Association),Press & MediaCasestudyOpinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles by companies interested in the projectPolitical Opinion257

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsIn GeneralPortugueseStateREFERNumerousexternalstakeholdersIMTTTry to InfluenceregulatoryOwns60%Owns40%AEIE-AVEPContracts withADIF(Spain)MunicipalauthoritiesCP andPrivateOperatorsTry to InfluenceCooperates withCooperates withPPP1financialservicesRAVElegal supportContracts withbusinessmodelTHRconsortiumConsultants(Technicalservices)Key:Nameof Actor- Project ActorELOSconsortiumKPMG II(businessmodel)LegalConsultantsDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationship- Project relationshipwith a contractual basis- Non-contractual projectrelationship258

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsStep 1 – Studies(2002 – 2008)RAVEEnvironmentalAssessmentLicensor(APA)Minister makesdecision(Approve)Environmental EvaluationProcessConsultancyEvaluationandAssessmentPreliminary StudiesEnvironmental Impact StudiesTechnical Viability StudiesCost-Benefit StudiesPublic ConsultationReview of EA /TechnicalassessmentMarket StudiesSocio-economic StudiesONG‘sMunicipal authoritiesKey:Financial StudiesTechnical StudiesAPLLocal organizationsNameofActor- Project Actor(...)Local population(…)Description ofrelationship- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractualproject relationship259

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsStep 2 – Tendering(2006 – 2010)PPP1Portuguese StateMonitoringCommitteeRAVE /REFERELOSconsortiumlaunch of thetenderFirst tiersubcontractorsLGV - ACEJURICommitteeProposalEvaluationContracts withTechnicalsupportRAVESupport byDepartmentsof the MinistryMOPTC (Transport)MF (Finance)MA (Environment)(...)PPP1 by1. ELOS consortium2. Altavia-Alentejo3. Eurolinhas4. Cintra FerrovialFinal decision(select a PPP)ELOS consortiumKey:NameofActorDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationship2nd tiersubcontractors- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basis- Non-contractual projectrelationship260

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsStep 2 – Tendering (cont.)Financial ConsultancyFinancial services(business model)RAVE / REFERFinancial services(2007)(2005)KPMG II Consultoresde Negócios, S.AConsortiumFINANTIA Bank,DEPFA Bank andGOLDMAN SACHSOther submitted bids in the tender procedure:1. Deloitte2. Efisa BankKey:Nameof Actor- Project ActorDescription ofrelationshipbasisDescription ofrelationship- Project relationshipwith a contractual- Non-contractualproject relationship261

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsStep 2 – Tendering (cont.)Legal ConsultancyLaw FirmBARROCASSARMENTOROCHAadvisoryservices(2003)RAVE / REFERPMPreventive measures(2003-2010)Law FirmTavares e Sousa,Duarte A., Campose Carvalhinho(2007 - 2008)(2010)Law FirmJardim Sampaio,Caldas &AssociadosPPP1Lisbon/Madrid+PPP 5Oporto/Vigo+PPP 6Signalling andTelecommunicationsSystems(2007)PPP2Lisbon/Poceirão(TTT)Law FirmFlamínio Roza, PintoDuarte, Côrte Real &AssociadosPPPAcquisition ofRolling StockKey:NameofActorDescription ofrelationshipLaw FirmMiranda, Correia,Amendoeira eAssociados- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractual projectrelationship262

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsStep 3 – OperationPortugueseStateRAVE / REFEROperators(without timeline)provide serviceKey:General public(passengers)FreightOperatorsName ofActorDescription ofrelationship- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractual projectrelationship263

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal Stakeholder External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project External Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest InterestADFER (PortugueseAssociation for theDevelopment of RailwayTransport)In general there are positive opinions, even if insome cases the opinions are negative - relatedwith project viability and corridor delimitationWhen unfavorably opinion, maycause delaysin issuing the studies.Conception, Planningand designEnvironmentalorganizations(ex. LPN and Quercus)Highly unfavourable:For example: with the road component, the Tagusriver bridge will have more cars entering into thecity and it will increase environmental impacts.However, there are a few positive opinions aboutthe project, once it may bring development.Can limit the developmentof the process (whenpresenting successivecomplaints about negativeimpacts that the project brings)Conception,Planning, designingand constructionCIP(Business Confederation)See this as a commercial opportunity to provideindustrial, technical and logistical support. Canprovide the grow up of the commercial/economicareas, but on other hand there isn‘t the samedevelopment for the freight.They were important public stakeholders in thedecision processes leading to the location for thenew airport and TTT bridge.Has provided support toadvocates of different projectconfigurations. They presentedan alternative proposal toreplace the Iberian gauge by aEuropean gauge on theconventional rail network toprovide better interoperabilityfor freight. They had influencedthe alternatives of the corridordelimitation.Slight to moderate.Possible businessopportunities for someCIP MembersConception andPlanningOE(board of engineers),A little controversy among board members.It is extremely appropriateto hold a debate on this project.SlightAll PhasesAPA (PortugueseEnvironmental Agency)Positive opinion, in general. In some cases theopinion is no-positive (related to corridordelimitation).Influence of the corridordelimitation and theconfiguration of the alternativeroutes.Conception andPlanningMunicipal authoritiesSome municipalities: favourable opinion andinterested in the project. Others: unfavourableopinion regarding the corridor definition, which canproduce physic constrains within the territoryImportant to support thedevelopment of the processModerate. To promotethe economic, socialand cultural aspects ofthe cities.Planning,construction andoperation264

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject Organisation (until 2007)Client Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvement2004: REFER E.P. (RAVE 10, REFER 22, other 8) + THR (Project Manager 44)Specialists in design companies (300 workers approx.)ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium (PPP1, Caia-Poceirão)LGV-Engenharia e Construção de Linhas de Alta Velocidade, ACE(Project and construction: 1.4 billions €)Project Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Stakeholder Involvement □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Management Software □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Lessons Learned Transfers □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More InformationTrimble QUANTM Alignment Planning Solution simultaneously manages all environmental, cultural and community issues involved in planningthe corridors for the high speed rail project.Relationship Management Tools: IntranetManagement Wage: GESVEN softwareSeveral studies incorporated specifically life cycle cost approaches, and they are incorporated in the Business Model.The project leadership was internalized by RAVE (2007).The implementation of the SAP-ERP business management system, of which a functional analysis of the system already in place at REFERhad already been carried out and lead to the decision to roll it out to RAVE, and the implementation of a modern GIS (Geographic InformationSystem) application, which will serve to organise all the project‘s technical components.265

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject Organisation (after 2007)Client Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementREFER EP.E (RAVE 51, 19 from REFER)ELOS – Ligações de Alta Velocidade consortium (PPP1, Caia-Poceirão)LGV-Engenharia e Construção de Linhas de Alta Velocidade, ACE(Project and construction: 1.4 billions €)Project Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Stakeholder Involvement □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Project Management Software □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Lessons Learned Transfers □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More InformationTrimble QUANTM Alignment Planning Solution simultaneously manages all environmental, cultural and community issues involved in planningthe corridors for the high speed rail project.Relationship Management Tools: IntranetManagement Wage: GESVEN softwareSeveral studies incorporated specifically life cycle cost approaches, and they are incorporated in the Business Model.The project leadership was internalized by RAVE (2007).The implementation of the SAP-ERP business management system, of which a functional analysis of the system already in place at REFERhad already been carried out and lead to the decision to roll it out to RAVE, and the implementation of a modern GIS (Geographic InformationSystem) application, which will serve to organise all the project‘s technical components.266

Project ProcessesRisk Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □A database to record technical, financial and planning risks at the development, construction and validation phases of the project. Itwas developed first by THR (TYCO Consortium, currently BRISA / HOLLAND RAILCONSUL) that used TYMS (managementsoftware). After 2007 a different risk management business model was defined (PPP) and developed by RAVE/REFER.HR Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □The execution of the project‘s various specialities has been effected by means of external contracting in each technical area in orderto incorporate the latest technologies and benefit from the know-how acquired by contractors on similar projects.Procurement Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □Collaborative Platform to manage procurement processes and tenders. The relation with the consultants was made in a project pointof view optic and not in client/supplier perspectiveIntegration Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □―Global Integrated Management‖. i.e. The global management and co-ordination of the work carried out during all the phases and forall the links, is performed by a permanent team from THR 2004-2007. After 2007 managed internally by RAVEScope Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □RAVE publishes all relationships with third party organizations (service providers within the scope of the HSN project), in theCompany Report and Accounts.Time Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □Planning and Control Department (PCD) which cumulatively monitored project with project managers, and periodically reported to topmanagement. Tasks - critical task identification, analysis of delays and their mitigation, risk assessmentCost Management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □Database of unitary prices to allow uniformity of cost estimates. The database was built using benchmarks and incorporating pricevariation and actualizationQuality management Processes Present (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □Various activities was developed and implemented by RAVE/REFER with a view to ensuring, continuously, the effectiveimplementation of each supplier‘s Quality Management System in the preparation of the studies. The criteria used for monitoring andmeasuring this effectiveness were the requirements contractually defined for the purpose and the applicable standards in force.Communications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □ Not Present □ No Information □Various initiatives were undertaken that have already resulted in a significant increase in awareness of environmental.Public presentations of the project by members of the board of directors and senior staff took place throughout the process in differentseminars, forums and conferences in City Council and Parish Councils. Therefore, there was a continue engagement with localpopulations.Relations with the media have also been enhanced, and daily monitoring of media coverage of the high-speed project has beenundertaken.267

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightPerformance relating totimeOriginal Targets and changes to targets2003:Lisbon/Madrid - design and construction: 2006-2010. Start operations: 2010Lisbon/Oporto - design and construction: 2006-2013. Start operations: 2014Oporto/Vigo - design and construction: 2006-2009. Start operations: 20092008:Lisbon/Madrid - design and construction: 2010-2013. Start operations: 2014Lisbon/Oporto - design and construction: 2012-2015. Start operations: 2015Oporto/Vigo - design and construction: 2011-2013. Start operations: 20132010/2011: Project being reframed new calendar to be defined2012: Project suspendedActual AchievementsAgainst Targets2008: Tender for PPP12009: PPP1 Awarded2011: PPP1 Reframed2012: PPP1 SuspendedPerformance relating tocost2003: Lisbon/Madrid: 1.6 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 3.6 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 1.3 billions €2008: Lisbon/Madrid: 2.6 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 4.5 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 850 millions €(1 st . step)2010: Lisbon/Madrid: 2.3 billions €; Lisbon/Oporto: 4.65 billions €; Oporto/Vigo: 1.3 billions €2009: PPP1 Awardedprice (1,359 millions €)Performance related tospecificationDemand estimations2003: Lisbon/Madrid: 5.3 M passengers ; Lisbon/Oporto: 13.5 M passengers; Oporto/Vigo:2.1 M passengers (forecasts for 2025)2008/2010: Lisbon/Madrid: 9.4 M passengers; Lisbon/Oporto: 12.2 M passengers;Oporto/Vigo: 3.7 M passengers (forecasts for 2030)Type of trafficOporto/Vigo (1h) and Lisbon/Madrid (2h45m): Passengers and freightLisbon/Oporto (1h15m): passengersSource: Annual report and accounts from RAVE268

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder or StakeholderGroupingPortuguese State(by pressure from public opinion)CIP (Business Confederation)ADFER (Association for theDevelopment of Railway Transport)Original Aims of Project Involvement andChanges to these AimsThe location of the airport changed from Ota toAlcochete and HS also changed the routesChange from a rail bridge (TTT) to a road + railbridge (TTT).Achievement of these AimsFind the best way to access HighSpeed to the new airport of Lisbon,independently of its locationCity council of LisbonOrganizations from the north / Galiza(Atlantic axis)APL (Lisbon Port Authority)APA(Portuguese Environmental Agency)Influence of the corridor delimitation and theconfiguration of the alternative routesTimeline anticipationInfluence of the corridor delimitation and theconfiguration of the alternative routes269

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationallyand Europe wide)Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on the project2000: RAVE was created2001: AVEP (Alta Velocidade Espanha-Portugal) is a European Economic Interest Group created by Spain andPortugal to study the ―linking of Spain and Portugal by a High-speed Rail Network‖. AVEP was owned by RAVEand ADIF.Throughout process: Standards and rules from REFER and IMTT2003 - 2010: Different laws applied to Public Private Partnerships (PPP‘s).2007 - 2010: several pieces of legislation where put forward to implement preventive measures (reservation ofcorridors from incompatible land uses).2008: Public Contract Code (Código dos Contratos Públicos - CCP): Decree-Law No. 18/2008 of 29 JanuaryPolitical EnvironmentPolitical ProjectEnvironmentSpecific PoliticalEvents impacting onthe projectSince 2007/ 2008 the main opposition party (presently in Government) opposed strongly to the project. The onlyawarded PPP was reframed (possible reductions in the project configuration, eg. single track, stations postponed,project speed reduction) and now is suspended.2003: The Iberian Summit defines the 4 cross-border HSR connections2004: The links Lisbon/Oporto, Lisbon/Madrid, Aveiro/Salamanca e Oporto/Vigo were included in the 30 prioritaryprojects of TEN-T2006: The Strategic Guidelines for the Railway Sector were presented2007: change of location for the new Lisbon Airport2004 and 2009: years of elections2011: elections change of Government270

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic ProjectEnvironmentSpecificEconomic Eventsimpacting on theproject2007: The project final business model is defined• 5 PPPs for the design, construction, financing and maintenance of the rail sub and superstructures• a PPP for design, promotion, financing and maintenance of the signaling and telecommunications systems• Lisbon station to be developed directly by REFER and Caia International Station to be developed jointly byPortugal and Spain• Strategic functions concerning capacity allocation and circulation management will be handled by REFER• On an operational level, the Portuguese state will go ahead with the acquisition of the rolling stock2008: Availability of the Portuguese banks and EU Grants2009: The TEN-T approved new financial support for TTT Oriente Station (5.4 million €)2010/2011: Crisis and Troika2001-2006: European funding associated with the priority projects within the TEN-T (Trans European Networks forTransport) created by the European Commission and co-financed by DG TREN (EC Directorate-General for Energy andTransport) through the MIP (Multi-Annual Indicative Programme)2007: a regulation was published regarding the community support to be granted to the TEN-T project(2007-2013 multi-year program), with an overall value of approximately 5.3 billion € .Community financial support: 1.338 million € distributed in the following manner:• 955 million € from the Portuguese State through the National Strategic Reference Framework (QREN) for the2007-2013 timeframe (Cohesion Fund)• 383 M€ from the European Commission‘s support framework for TEN-T project:•191 M€ for the Évora/Mérida cross-border stretch.•141 M€ for the Lima/Vigo Bridge cross-border tretch•51 M€ for the Third Tagus Crossing.Sovereign debt credit crisis of 2010271

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectstakeholdersCreationof RAVECreation oftheEEIG-AVEPStudies (preliminary studies and environmental impact studies, technical viability studies, costbenefit,market studies and socio-economic, financial, and technical , … )Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectmanagementInclusion ofHSR axes inthe list ofthe30 TEN-TPriorityProjectsLocation ofthe PortoHS Station(Campanhã)Start of theEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentLocation ofthe LisbonHS Station(Oriente)Events andactivitiesrelating toprojectperformanceStart offeasibilitystudiesPortuguese/ SpanishSummit:Crossborder HSRaxes;Run timeobjetivesPortuguese /SpanishSummit:Lisbon/Madrid axis -Type of mixedtraffic andCompletiondate (2013)Portuguese /SpanishSummit:Internationalstation ontheElvas/Badajoz borderGranting of383 million €ofcommunitysupport tothe TEN-THSN ProjectPresentationof theBusinessModelBeginning oftheProcurementProcess(PPP1Poceirão/Caia)Portuguese /Spanish Summit:Location of theElvas/BadajozStationThe TEN-Tapproved newfinancialsupport forTTT-OrienteStation: 5.4million €Portugal, Spainand France wassigned anagreement tofinish the HSAxis inSouthwestEurope (P3)Signing ofthe contractagreementfor the PPP1ProjectrefurbishmentEvents andactivitiesrelating toprojectenvironmentyear ofelectionsNew Lisbonairportchange oflocationCRISISyear ofelectionsSovereigndebt creditcrisisyear ofelectionsChange ofgovernment272

REFERENCES• ADFER. (2006). O Projecto de Alta Velocidade Português, 7 th National Conference [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from:http://adfer.cp.pt/pages/congresso/Teses/A-2.pdf• Annual report and accounts from RAVE (2004 – 2010)• Meetings with RAVE / REFER• News collected in different newspapers on the Internet• RAVE / REFER. GONÇALVES, José Carlos and COELHO, Natália. (2006). Os Sistemas de Informação de Suporte aoProjecto de Alta Velocidade Ferroviária [PowerPoint slides].Retrieved from: http://tercud.ulusofona.pt/GeoForum/Ficheiros/20GeoForum.pdf• RAVE / REFER. (2008). O Projecto de Alta Velocidade Português, [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from:http://www.aiccopn.pt/upload/PPP_17_11/Carlos_Fernandes_Rave.pdf• Studies by ATKEARNEY (2003/2004). [PowerPoint slides]• http://www.refer.pt/MenuPrincipal/TransporteFerroviario/AltaVelocidade/Enquadramento.aspx273

3.6 SEVILLE - MADRIDCase compiled by: Rafaela Alfalla-Luque and Carmen Medina-LópezContact details: alfalla@us.es and cmedina@us.esBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant PhysicalDimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)High-Speed train in Spain: Seville-MadridSpainTo joint two main cities in Spain through high speed train. Safe, punctual and comfortable means oftransport. (Carried out between 1987 and 1993)To improve the connection between cities. Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)In 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693 million euros)The construction of high-speed infrastructure in Spain was carried out between 1987 and 1993. TheSpanish high speed (AVE) began in April 1992 2The Madrid-Seville AVE was initially budgeted (1988) to 262,000 million pesetas (1,575 million euros), butin 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693 million euros) (a divergence of 71%). 1 [27]Track costs are approximately 900 million pesetas (5,4 million euros) per kilometre (2,547,690,310.48€)2Line length: 471.8 km Track gauge: 1435 mmMinimum radius: Standard: 4000 m; Absolute: 3250 mElectrification: 25 kV; 50 HzOperating speed: 300 km/hMaximum incline: Standard: 12.5 ‰; Absolute: 13.25 ‰ 3274

HSR SEVILLE-MADRIDCHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE [46]Km of track (including secondary): 1011.7Distance Madrid - Seville: 471,800 metersRadius of curvature on the ground: 4,000 m. 3,200 and2,300 Exceptionally, in Sierra MorenaMaximum slope: 12.5 milMaximum depth: 150 mm.Platform Width: 13.3 m. (exceptionally 12.7m.)Viaducts (L> 50 m.) 32 (total length 8,355 m.)The two most important are, first built for the Royal Cityvariant turns out to be the longest of them all, that savesa span of 930 meters, and the second corresponding tothe crossing of the river Tagus and Guadalmez, whichspans a distance of 800 meters with a height of stacks of78 meters.Tunnels 17 (total length 16.030m.)The longer length extends along 2540 meters.Electrical substations: 14Detachment detection equipment: 208Automatic driving km (CAT or LZB): 942Gauge: UIC (1.435mm)Electrification: 25kV 50Hz AC 1 xMaximum speed: 300 km / hSignage: ASFA200 and LZB.Planned installation of ERTMSTelecommunications: Train-Ground-based digital GSM-R5 passenger stations.Madrid Puerta de Atocha, Ciudad Real, Puertollano, Córdoba and Seville (Santa Justa).Overtaking and parking stalls train (PAET): 11Trivialization posts: 12http://www.adif.es/es_ES/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_sevilla/madrid_sevilla.shtml275

HSR SEVILLE-MADRIDexisting lines of high-speed trainlines under constructionlines planned for 2020This map reflects the existing high-speed lines, lines that are running and those planned for 2020 at the date of December 2010 [45]http://www.spainbusiness.com/icex/cma/contentTypes/common/records/mostrarDocumento/?doc=4148975276

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalStakeholderCategorySupply-Side ClientFinanciersSponsorsCase-StudyRENFE is the national rail passenger operator and is a state-ownedcompany controlled by the ministry of public works (Ministerio de Fomento).Has been encouraged and financially supported by the:European Commission 5 ; co-financed by the European RegionalDevelopment Fund (ERDF) with 267.3 million euro [6]; European InvestmentBank (EIB) 6Spanish Government [5, 6, 9]Regional governments [6] ; regional development funds 4Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Client’sCustomersClient’s OwnersOther internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)Final customers: Tourists, professionals, passengers in general..55% of customers of the Madrid-Sevilla are men, 63% are between 25 and44 years of age, 72% have college degrees, 51% travel for work, 27% do sofor personal reasons, 68% are officers decision and 38% make more than atrip to the fortnight. 7 General public (passengers), freight operatorsIn January 1, 2005 the RENFE Railway Sector law extinguish RENFEcompany. This company was divided into two companies: 1) one thatoperates the trains called Renfe Operator, and 2) one that manages theinfrastructure called ADIF (Railway Infrastructure Manager). RENFEOperator is a Public Enterprise under the control of the Ministry ofDevelopment of Spain. It is heir to the legacy of RENFE (Spanish NationalRailways Company), a company created in 1941. 8 Spanish stateCategoryInfrastructureAdministrator(GIF- laterADIF)Case-StudyGIF/ADIF is a separate state-owned organisation, isresponsible for development of the high-speed lines thatare under construction 4 It manages (operation andmaintenance) the railway infrastructure. [10, 4]277

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalStakeholderCategoryDemand Side Principal ContractorCase-StudySiemens was awarded the electrification of the line high-speed [29]Alsthom Iberia (Maquinaria Terrestre y Marítima (MTM), Ateinsa andMeinfesa) builds the train machine [29]ACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL (construction firms) buildthe track [12]Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)First TierContractorsSecond TierConsultants TYPSA 41ProfessionalServices ProvidersFreyssinet: Maintenance of the viaducts hyperstatic (G-1) of the Madrid-Sevillawhich included the treatment of batteries and repair and support inside the boxgirder 40RODIO CIMENTACIONES ESPECIALES, S.A.(treats problems of the limestone under the platform of the road) [9]Other internalsupply-sidecategories(please specify)CategoryIndustrial producers of railway equipment [2]Case-Study278

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalPublicStakeholderCategoryCase-StudyRegulatory Agencies Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Development; Environment Agency from Madrid(Agencia de Medio Ambiente – AMA- de la Comunidad de Madrid)Local GovernmentNationalGovernmentOther internalsupply-sidecategories ( pleasespecify)Private Local residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther ExternalPrivate stakeholders(please specify)Andalucía; Castilla - La Mancha and Madrid. Municipal authorities/town councils and theCommittees for Coordination and Regional Development (CCDR)Spanish government, MOPTC (Public Works, Transport and Communications), MF (Ministry ofFinance and the Public Administration) and MA (Ministry for the environment)Categorypublic landowners, Tourism board Industry & serviceassociations, Cities with HST stationsLocal AssociationsPrivate landownersGreenpeace, Friends of the Earth, European Environment AgencyTaller de Investigaciones Arqueólogas S.L.CategoryOther transport operatorsUniversities and Technological CentresPress & MediaOpinion makers, placement of news and opinion articles by companiesinterested in the projectCase-studyCase studyComments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)Political Opinion279

NumerousexternalstakeholdersMEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsSpanishgovernmentLocaland regionalgovernmentNumerousexternalstakeholdersEuropean CommissionSpanish Governmentregional governmentsregional developmentfundsADIF /GIFOwns 100%RENFE(client)TYPSAMinistry of Environment;Ministry of Development;Environment Agency fromMadrid (AMA)Contracts withService providersRODIOCIMENTACIONESESPECIALES,S.A….Contracts withACS,Ferrovial,FCC, SacyrVallehermoso& OHLContracts withContracts withSIEMENS(electrificationprovider)ALSTHOM(Train MachineProvider)Passengersin general(client‘scustomers)Key:Contracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsContracts withFirst tiersubcontractorsContracts with2nd tiersubcontractorsNameofActorDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationship- Project Actor- Project relationshipwith a contractual basis- Non-contractual projectrelationship280

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternalStakeholder’sInfluence onprojectImpact of Project on ExternalStakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)Tourism board Highly Favourable .The HST has an impact ontravel distribution and modalchoice. Furthermore, the highquality of transport can generatenew trips offered not fromadditional modes. 11General ability tolobby governmentHigh. Contributes to achieving its overallaimsOperationEU Commission Highly Favourable .contemplates HST as a newform of European integration 2General ability tolobby governmentContributes to achieving its overall aimsInitiation, Planning,Construction & OperationOther transport operators:air transport (Iberia andairports), on conventionalrailways and on roadtransport (buses, cars androad network) 2Worried about effects Limited For air transport between Madrid and Sevillethe introduction of the HRS reduced ademand downshift of 50%, diminishing theload factor and flight frequency. The Sevilleairport suffered a reduction of 25% in itsuse, as Madrid-Seville represented 50% ofairport traffic. [30]OperationIndustry & servicesAssociationsHighly Favourable .Commercial reasons 2Medium High OperationGreenpeace, Friends of theEarth, Environment agency(AMA); Spanish Ministry ofEnvironment;Worried about effectsAbility to LobbyGovernmentEffect on the river Manzares - deteriorationof the avifauna of the area - noise barriers tomitigate the effects of the passage of thetrain next to residential areas [21] [25].Archaeological prospection [24]Initiation, Planning,Construction and OperationPrivate landownersWorried about the lost of thelandLimited Lost of the land Constructioncities with HST stations Highly Favourable . Medium High Construction & Operation281

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size & StructureContractor Project Team Size andStructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementRENFEEmpresa Novi, AZVIACS, Ferrovial, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL 12Firms of engineering, construction, manufacturing systems and trainsProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □Project Management Software □Lessons Learnt Transfers □Stakeholder Involvement □Building Information Modelling (BIM) □Relationship Management Tools □Project Knowledge Management Tools □Team Building Tools □Competency framework □Other Tools and Techniques or More Information282

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesHR Management ProcessesProcurement Management ProcessesIntegration Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Department of Regulation and Control Integrated traffic management: in the high-speed lines also has advancedtraffic management on the integration platform Davinci, a specified and owned by ADIF, which can integrateinformation from other systems related to rail traffic, such as the Remote Power, communications, passengerinformation systems, remote control of sensors. This is an Intelligent Transportation System that featuresincorporating the latest technologies. 42The CRC concept integrates all the systems involved in the regulation of railway traffic, responding to the demands ofhigh speed. Thus, from these centers are regulated simultaneously signaling, electrification, communicationssystems, traveler information and energy, among other things. Process integration is possible through the DaVincisystem, considered one of the world's most advanced in the regulation of railway traffic. This system, intellectualproperty of ADIF, get an overview of all subsystems into which traffic management through a single platform, whichoptimizes the process considerably. The CRC direct and coordinate the circulation in real time, following a definedtransportation plan, meeting the safety and punctuality rates required, and allowing immediate response to anyincidents 44Scope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □The main drawback of HST in corridors of low traffic density is its high cost. Infrastructure (generally not compatiblewith freight transport) is more expensive than that required by conventional railways, and its use is associated withdecreasing average costs. 2Quality management ProcessesCommunications ManagementProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Present (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □283

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets and changes to targetsActual Achievements Against TargetsPerformance relating to time Estimated project duration: 2 years Real project duration 5 years (divergence 3 years)The construction of high-speed infrastructure inSpain was carried out between 1987 and 1993.The Spanish high speed (AVE) began in April1992 2Performance relating to costPerformance related to achievingspecificationThe Madrid-Seville HST (AVE) was initiallybudgeted (1988) to 262,000 million pesetas(1,575 million euros) 1Expected number of passengers in 1997: 4,3millions (constantly increasing since 1992)[37]Renfe expected the first net benefits in1998, but finally it had the first net benefit inJune 1997 (217 millions pesetas in June 97)[37]In 1992 had cost 448,000 million pesetas (2,693million euros) (a divergence of 71%). 1The work required to correct the environmentalimpact of Madrid-Seville line cost about 4,000million pesetas (24 million euros)[23][25]Actual passengers per year:From April to December 1992 : 1.3 million travelersAVE [37]2,338,000 in 1993 133,5 millions in 1994 [37]3,8 millions in 1995 [37]4,000,000 in 1996 [37]3,804,000 in 1999 134,202,000 in 2000 134,613,000 in 2001 133,397,000 in 2005 133,677,000 in 2006 133,571,000 in 2007 133,407,730 in 2008 133,061,000 in 2010 13284

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder orStakeholderGroupingTourism boardIndustry & ServicesAssociationsCity of MadridCity of SevilleOriginal Aims of ProjectInvolvement and Changesto these AimsAchievement of these AimsPassenger traffic increase *Time savings [30]*The benefit caused by the introduction of the HSR from the point of view of theregional equilibrium is obvious, taking into account the peripheral situation ofSeville and Andalusia with respect to the centers of decisions and production of theSpanish and European economy. [31]*The AVE station plays a major attraction for populations located more than anhour drive 14MADRID mobilityenhancementsSeville mobilityenhancementsTo improve performance ofSeville*Impact urban environment of the station, step by residential, increased activity,congestion traffic, in a psychological effect for residents 15*Increased mobility for residents and host population with the consequenteconomic impact 15*HST in Seville has ―stolen― the air transport for 63% of the market.*Madrid has become a dynamic element of the outsourced economy.*It has been responsible for reshaping the city, ending the plight of urbanbottlenecks and allowing to recover degradated areas and create new areas ofexpansion [15]* 21.9 millions travelers over more than 50 million passengers transported in totalin 2002 were traveling to Seville. 13.8 million of them spent the night in the city.Travellers who do not sleep in the city have also an important impact (restaurats,urban transports, shops .......). The operation of the AVE has become thecommunity of Madrid in the second national tourism market in Seville. Theincreased accessibility of Seville has benefited the development of a greaternumber of conferences in the city. [36]285

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and RegulatoryProject Environment(regionally, nationally andEurope wide)Specific Legal andRegulatory eventsimpacting on the projectThe Plan of Infrastructure and Transport of the Spanish Government 16The European Union Treaty of Maastricht (1992) contains objectives for transport policy: security in transport, thetrains and the protection of the environmentWhite Paper on European Transport "rail infrastructure package― Directiva 2001/12/CE, Directiva 2001/13/CE,Directiva 2001/14/CE [39]General Plan of Urban DevelopmentReal Decreto 1302/86 on environmental impact assessments for public works [25]Environment Agency (Agencia de Medio Ambiente-AMA): Effects on the river Manzares - deterioration of theavifauna of the area - noise barriers to mitigate the effects of the passage of the train next to residential areas [21][25]The work required to correct the environmental impact of Madrid-Seville line will cost about 4,000 million pesetas[23]Archaeological prospection- average cost of 20,000 pesetas per hectare [24]Political EnvironmentPolitical ProjectEnvironment-Urban planning measures: regulations and incentives to reduce the possible barrier effects of the rail system;new zoning of land uses to allow the location of new economic activities and create positive synergies-Management measures: the implementation of mobility policies to foster the coherent coordination of internal andexternal passenger flows. 16-interest to remove regional imbalances and improve communications in the country-Given its importance, soon became a terrorist target. Having suffered some attacks to varying degrees (one of themost important was the attack of 11-M) [32]Specific Political Eventsimpacting on the project- 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville286

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentEconomic EnvironmentEconomic ProjectEnvironmentIn the early 1990's developed countries were affected by an economic and financial crisis affecting inflation.The effects of this crisis took longer to arrive in Spain, given the huge public spending that was done between1990 and 1992 to prepare the country for major events like the 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville (includinglarge transport infrastructure of the Madrid-Sevilla HST)-New demand which comes to constitute a new type of mobility in relation to work and university studies. Speciallyin those urban centers that are located midway on the headwaters of the corridor cities, as is the case of Córdoba,Ciudad Real and Puertollano. Increased journeys to work as a direct result of the high speed opens up newmarkets [33]Specific EconomicEvents impacting on theproject- 1992 Universal Exposition in Seville287

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities TimelineTIME1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 20002011Events and activitiesrelating to projectstakeholdersStart Seville-Madrid line―Shuttle‖ Madrid-Ciudad Real-Puertollano―Shuttle‖ Córdoba-SevilleEvents and activitiesrelating to projectmanagementEvents and activitiesrelating to projectperformanceEvents and activitiesrelating to projectenvironmentSpain joined theCEE (1986)Construction of high-speed train Seville-MadridConstruction machines and train coach(1) Sinking of land in Córdoba (20,000m3)100 million pesetas (0,6 million euros) costof repairing the damaged section [21]1Delivery machinesand train coachThe Popular Partywins the election(1996)Absolute majority forthe Popular Party inlegislative electionsBecomes effective Europeansingle currency (2002)Terrorist attack inMadrid caused 191victims and over1800 wounded(2004)(2000) The PSOE won theelections (2004)The governmentdeclared a stateof alarm, for thefirst time indemocracy, thecrisis of air trafficcontrollers (2010)288

REFERENCES1- http://www.elsoto.org/ave.htm2- Rus G. and Inglada, V. (1997): "Cost-Benefit of the High-Speed Train in Spain". The Annals of Regional Science. Volume 31, Number 32, 175-1883- http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta_Velocidad_Espa%C3%B1ola4- COMMISION FOR INTEGRATED TRANSPORT (2004) "Report on high-speed rail in the United Kingdom international comparisons. AppendixF. Spain | [Informe sobre la alta velocidad en inglaterra comparaciones internacionales. Apendice F. España]" Revista de Obras Publicas 151(3444), pp. 7-165- Rus, G. and Nombela, G. (2005):Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable? Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. Volume 41.Part I. January 2007, pp 3-23.6- http://www.adif.es/en_US/infraestructuras/lineas_de_alta_velocidad/madrid_sevilla/madrid_sevilla.shtml7- De La Fuente, R.S.; Antín, M.G.; Tordesillas, J.M.C.; Capdepón, F.P.; Francés, J.M.U. (2006) "Analysis of the territorial consequences of theHST (high speed train) in small cities: Ciudad Real and Puertollano | [Análisis de las consecuencias territoriales del AVE en ciudadespequeñas: Ciudad Real y Puertollano]" Estudios Geograficos (260), pp. 199-2298- http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renfe_Operadora9- http://www.rodiokronsa.es/images/stories/inyecciones/pdf/fichas/06_consolidacion_zona_karstica_ave.pdf10- http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/FERROCARRILES/Estructura_ferr/11- http://www.ub.edu/gim/albalate_bel_EA.pdf12- http://www.europapress.es/economia/transportes-00343/noticia-economia-ave-ampl-empresas-espanolas-unen-marca-alta-velocidadespanola-entrar-eeuu-20090530142301.html13- http://www.ferropedia.es/wiki/Tr%C3%A1ficos_corredores_Andaluc%C3%ADa_Larga_Distancia14- http://upcommons.upc.edu/pfc/bitstream/2099.1/6281/11/10.pdf15- González Yanci, Ma.P.; Aguilera Arilla, Ma.J.; Borderías Uribeondo, Ma.P.; Santos Preciado, J.M. (2005) "Changes in the cities of de highspeed line Madrid-Seville since its establishment | [Cambios en las ciudades de la línea de alta velocidad Madrid-Sevilla desde suimplantación]" Cuadernos Geograficos (36 1), pp. 527-547289

3.7 NORRA LANKEN, STOCKHOLMCase compiled by: Jonas WennströmContact details: jonas.wennstrom@vti.seBasic Project InformationProject TitleLocationPurposeScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning, construction,operation, dismantling)Contractual Framework (e.g. fixedprice, cost-plus etc.)Relevant Physical Dimensions(e.g. height, width, volume, length)Norra Länken (‖the Northern Link‖)Stockholm, Sweden. In the northern part of the city centre.The purpose of the project is to create a new link for the E20 motorway from the E4 motorway―Essingeleden‖ in the north west to Värtan in the north east. This will improve theaccessibility for Lidingö and open up for new urban developments in ―Norra Djurgårdsstaden‖.Norra Länken is also a prerequisite for the development of Hagastaden in the north westernareas. When finished, it will relieve the traffic load in the city centre [ME].The project includes the original plan of ―Norra länken‖ with a connection only betweenNorrtull-Värtan/Frescati and also an extension of the project to include the overdecking forHagastaden. The project consists of rock and concrete tunnels and traffic facilities inconnection to the tunnels.Norrtull – Värtan/Frescati: 10.5 billion SEK (~€ 1,2 billion)Hagastaden: 5.6 billion SEK (~ € 640 million)ConstructionIn total around 40 contracts. Rock tunneling work have been mostly unit price contracts (UPC)with fixed prices. The other contracts have been of DB character with UPC parts. Around20 % of the total contract value is represented by incentive programmes.The total length of the main tunnels will be 5 km of which 1 km was constructed twenty yearsago. In total there will be 11 km of road tunnels, of which 9 km is rock tunnels and 2 km isconcrete tunnels.290

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalSupply-SideStakeholderCategoryClientFinanciersCase-StudySwedish Transport Administration (STA)Norrtull – Värtan/Frescati75 %: the Swedish government via the STA.25 %: Stockholm Municipality.EU funding TEN-T subsidy: ~€ 56 million[TENTNL]Hagastaden:80 %: Stockholm Municipality.20 %: STAComments(e.g. maturity,previous experiencesof stakeholders, skills,influence on project)SponsorsEU: TEN-T subsidy, initial estimation~€56 million [TEN-T]Client’s Customers The public and the road users (however, no fees to use the tunnels)Client’s OwnersSwedish Government, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and CommunicationsDemand-SidePrincipal Contractor Design: Sweco, Grontmij, WSP, RamböllFirst TierContractorsSecond TierConsultantsBuild: Svevia, Hochtief, Bilfinger Berger, Skanska, Züblin-Pihl, PEAB,Veidekke, Oden and Bravida, Tunnelentreprenader ABConsidering the number of first tier contractors, probably plentyTunneling,installations, safetyetc.291

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalPublicStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences ofstakeholders, skills,influence on project)Regulatory AgenciesLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supply-sidecategories (please specify)• Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden• County Administrative Boards of SwedenStockholm Municipality and Solna MunicipalitySwedish GovernmentCategoryCase-studyPrivateLocal residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsIn Albano, Roslagstull, Vasastan, Östermalm, Gärdet, Hjorthagen• ―Förbundet för Ekoparken‖ is an association for the protection of the national citypark• Naturskyddsföreningen• Kungliga DjurgårdsförvaltningenArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders(please specify)No special archeological considerationsCategoryCase-study292

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps/OverviewEnvironmentalorganisationsNGOsEUMEECMinistryofFinanceSwedishgovernmentStockholmMunicipalitySwedishparliamentSupremeAdministrativeCourt ofSwedenPublicRoadusersPublic participationFinances € 56 mFinances € 800 mSTA(client)Finances € 300 mCountyAdministrativeBoards ofSwedenContracts withDesign contractsConstruction contractsSwecoRamböllWSPGrontmijPEABSkanskaSveviaHochtiefVeidekkeBilfinger-BergerZüblin-PihlBravidaTunnelentreprenad ABSub-consultantsSubcontractorsDescription ofrelationship- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractual projectrelationship293

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps/FinancingEUMinistryofFinanceSwedishgovernmentTaxpayersTEN-TExecutiveAgencyMEECStockholmMunicipalityFinances 75 % -> ~ € 860 millionFinances 25 % -> ~ € 300 million€ 56 millionSTA(client)Key:Consultantsname ofactor- Project ActorDescription ofrelationship- Project relationshipwith a contractual basisContractorsDescription ofrelationship- Non-contractual projectrelationship294

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)European UnionThe European Union isinterested to establish atrans-Europeantransport network toincrease competivenessand employment withinEurope [EUTENT].―Norra länken‖ isanticipated to improveintermodal link betweensea and land transport[TENTNL].Attitude: +EU will contributed withan estimated €56 millionor around 5 % of total,projected, cost[TENTNL].Influence: +When finished, the E20motorway will improvethe accessibility in andout of the Värtanharbour for the ferryline to/from Tallinn.Impact: (+)Initiation, planning,constructionStockholm Chamber ofCommerceHas interest in itsmember companiesinterest and regionalgrowth. Positive toimproved infrastructureto increase economicgrowth.Attitude: ++The Camber had animportant role in the ringroad package,‖Dennispaketet‖[SChamber] [Glemdal]Influence: +The tunnel will improvethe road system and isexpected to increasecommerce for themember companiesImpact: ++Initiation295

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)―Förbundet förEkoparken‖ (TheAssociation forEkoparken‖Concerned of the urbannational park,Nationalstadsparken.Attitude: --Appealed againstconstruction in 1997 and2002. Won in court 1997which halted theconstruction ten yearsand changedconstruction method.Influence: --Impact: -Initiation, planning,constructionEnvironmental Activists.Consist of severalsubgroups, including forexample ‖Socialekologiskaktion‖[Glemdal]Opposed the whole ringroad project, including―Norra länken‖.Attitude: --Several actions, coveredin national media, oncontractors duringpreparation works beforethe appeal in 1997[Glemdal]. However,probability mixedreceptions among thepublic.Influence: 0- Initiation, planning296

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)Residents nearValhallavägenThe tunnel will decreasethe traffic andconsequently lowerpollution onValhallavägen.Attitude: ++Influence: 0/+Less pollution, decreasein noise and risk fordangerous goodsaccidents will increaseproperty values.Impact: ++InitiationResidents near Hjorthagen(Djurgården-Lilla VärtansMiljöskyddsförening)Concerned about theenviromental impact inthe area (noise, particles)and generally of theNational City ParkAttitude: --Influence: 0/-The EIA projectedincreased noise andpollutans to residentsadjacent to the VärtanconnectionInitiation, planningMotormännen (associationfor automobile drivers)Positive to theconstruction of a ring roadfor Stockholm.Attitude: +LimitedInfluence: (0)When finished the tunnelwill improve the networkfor the road usersImpact: +Initiation297

MEGAPROJECT Project ManagementProject OrganisationClient Project Team Size &StructureContractor Project Team Sizeand StructureSub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvementIn 2012 on average 56 full time employees belong to ‖Stora projekt‖ (big projects) divisionProject leaders, construction leaders and supportAround 1100 people at maximum in 2010 [IJE]Around 800 people in 2012 [STAA]N/AProject Tools and TechniquesPlease √ if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknownLife-Cycle Costing Approaches □No [IJE]Project Management Software □Yes [IJE]Lessons Learnt Transfers □ Yes [IJE]Stakeholder Involvement □Yes[VV05]Relationship Management Tools □Yes [IJE]Team Building Tools □ No [IJE]Building Information Modelling (BIM) □No [IJE] Project Knowledge Management Tools □ Yes [IJE] Competency framework □ Yes [IJE]Other Tools and Techniques or More Information• In some of the design procurements , requirement of all drawings should be presented in 3D based on experiences from the―Södra länken‖ project [3DP].• Structured meetings every second month to control current achievements concerning time, cost and specification.298

Project ProcessesRisk Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, the software Exonaut Risk is used [IJE]HR Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, documentation of competency and plans for replacements [IJE]Procurement Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, the software Chaos desktop [IJE]Integration Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, current project status presentations and project specifications [IJE]Scope Management ProcessesTime Management ProcessesCost Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □No informationPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, time planning softwarePresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, Agresso invoice system [IJE]Quality management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □All contracts include quality controls and project specifications concerning quality. Employees of STAhave participated during contractors quality assessments [IJE]Communications Management ProcessesPresent (describe below) □Not Present □ No Information □Yes, a communication plan in order to manage the public and media was established. Meetings acouple of times of year with groups concerned of the national park to discuss how to minimize intrustionsetc. [IJE]299

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project RightOriginal Targets and changes to targetsActual Achievements Against TargetsPerformancerelating to timePerformancerelating to costPerformancerelated to achievingspecificationIf only the project in its current form is considered, the tunnelsbetween Norrtull and Värtan should be open for traffic in 2015[STAFAQ]. Norrtull to Tomteboda is planned for 2015 and 2017.Railway tunnel for Värtabanan in 2019 [STATN]. Procurementsof all contracts have been planned in[VV05] .Below are some of the cost estimations from different stages inthe planning process. However, it should be noted that duringthe time specifications have been changed.• 1991 – Idea study 4 billion SEK [PLU]• 2002 – Pre-study 7 billion SEK [PLU]• 2004 –Investigation 6,5 billion SEK [PLU]• 2007 – Detailed design 11 billion SEK [PLU]• 2009 – Construction 10,5 billion SEK [PLU]• ―Norra stationsområdet ― added in 2010: +5,6 billion SEK[STATN]Overdecking of the E4 motorway for the development of ―Norrastationsområdet‖ was added in 2010. Included was alsowidening of roads to add extra capacity and a tunnel forVärtabanan.In current form, no major construction delays havebeen reported. Some delays have been reportedin the early stages. However, in 2010 was theproject on, or ahead of schedule [IN10] . Abreakthrough of finishing a continuous tunnel wasaccomplished in November 2011 [IN].Procurement plans and written contracts havebeen followed mostly[STAE].Until today limited overuns reported based on the2009 cost estimation. The failed construction nearthe Bellevue park before the plans were changedafter the legislature change, have been estimatedto cost > 300 million SEK [Source needed].Shortage of labour and construction material led to15 % more expensive contracts in the earlycontracts. However, this lead to necessarysavings for later procurements.Construction restarted in August 2006. Somechanges in insulation method in order to savemoney. [SOURCE].300

MEGAPROJECT Project PerformanceAspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right ProjectStakeholder or StakeholderGrouping―Förbundet för Ekoparken‖EnvironmentalistsOriginal Aims of Project Involvement andChanges to these AimsDesired to prevent intrusions in the ‖RoyalNational City Park‖ during construction.Opposes the construction of the ring road aroundStockholm city centre.Achievement of these AimsThe halting of the project in 1997 resulted in anew plan with less intrusions in the park. STAhas constant meetings with the association.‖Södra länken‖ is completed. Construction of‖Norra Länken‖ has started and ‖FörbifartStockholm‖ is under planning.301

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)Specific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the project2009 - Change in the Environmental Code regarding temporary works in National ParksPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project Environment • 94-2006 Social democratic led government• 2006- Center-right governmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the project• Several environmental organisation actions to stop the project during planning• ‖Förnyelse i anläggningsbranschen‖ – Programme to promote innovations in the infrastructurefacility sectors. Especially the programme concerning rock works [IJE].Economic EnvironmentEconomic Project EnvironmentSpecific Economic Eventsimpacting on the project2007 -2008 – Economic boom2008 - 2009 - Sweden affected by the global recession2009 – present – Economic recovery in Sweden• During the economic boom contractors reported difficulties in finding labour. This resulted in higherthan expected bid prices [BIFörs]. During the recession the contract bids were lower [IJE]. However,instead this led to higher costs for extra works (ÄTA)302

Events inenvironmentEvents inprojectMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline60’s 1991 Aug Jan1996 1997Events before current developmentRing roaddiscussionsInitial planning & designCompletion ofKarlberg -NorrtullStart of rocktunnelconstructionProject halt20052006Design & Procure. planning2007Current developmentPreparing works2008 2009 2010ContractingExtension of projectwith‖Norrastationsområdet‖NL12 : PEABNL11 : Skanska2011Breakthrough intunnel boringTIMENL31 : ZüblinNL22 : Bilfinger-BergerNL33 : VeidekkeNL34 : VeidekkeNL35 : Hochtief & OdenNL51 : Hochtief & OdenNL41 : PEABNL62 : VeidekkeNL52 : SkanskaNL66 : TE ABNL67 : BravidaNL68 : BravidaNL69 : LäckebyPoliticalacceptanceAppeal against projectrejected, full projectlegally acceptedChange in the‖Environmental Code‖regarding temporary worksin National ParksN72 : BravidaHard to find labourEconomic recession303

Events inenvironmentEvents inprojectMEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline20122013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2025TIMEPlanned openingof Norrtull –Värtan/FrescatiPlanned peningof Hagastaden‘stunnelsConstruction ofHagastadenbeginsPlanned openingof the railwaytunnels forVärtabananPlannedconstruction startof FörbifartStockholm304

REFERENCES• [STAFAQ] Trafikverket: Frågor och svar. http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Fragor-och-svar/• [ME] Genomslaget klart - asfalteringen börjar http://www.me.se/Tidning/Branschnytt/20111/Nomvember/Genomslaget-klart---asfalteringen-borjar/• [IN] Genomslag för Norra Länken. Infrastrukturnyheter. http://www.infrastrukturnyheter.se/2011/12/genomslag-i-norra-l-nken• [3D] ‖Väg- och vattenbyggaren‖. Volume 4. 2006• [BIM] Trafikverket. Stefan Engdahl.• [VV05]. Norrtullsområdet. Vägverket. 2005.• [GA] Startklart för Norra länken, Svenska Dagbladet 6 april 2006• [BV09] Byggare kan börja gräva för Norra länken. 2009. http://www.byggvarlden.se/nyheter/byggprojekt/article87866.ece• [RA] The Road Act SFS 1971:948. http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19710948.htm• [EC] The Environmental Code 1998:808• [STATN] http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Delprojekt-i-Norra-lanken/Tomteboda--Karlberg/305

REFERENCES• [STAE] Entreprenader, tecknade kontrakt. http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Omprojektet/Entreprenader-Tecknade-kontrakt/• [STAA] http://www.trafikverket.se/Privat/Projekt/Stockholm/E20-norra-lanken/Om-projektet/• [3DP] 3D-projektering – framtiden i vägbyggnadssektorn? . Rasmus Regnstrand. Master thesis. 2011.• [IN10] Snabbt driv i Norra länken. Infrastrukturnyheter. http://www.infrastrukturnyheter.se/2010/02/snabbt-driv-i-norra-lanken• [PLU] Peter Lundman. Cost Management of Underground Infrastructure Projects. Doctoral Thesis. 2011.• [BIFörs] Brist på byggare försenar Norra länken. http://www.byggindustrin.com/nyheter/brist-pa-byggare-forsenar-norralanken__604• [EUTENT] TEN-T / Transport infrastructure. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/index_en.htm• [TENTNL] Works for construction of the road section Norra Lanken. http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-t_projects/tent_projects_by_country/sweden/2007-se-12090-p.htm• [Glemdal] Michael Glemdal. Gubben på kullen. Jönköping International Business School. PhD Disseration. 2008.306

Basic Project InformationCase compiled by: Jana Korytárová, Vít HromádkaContact details: korytarova.j@fce.vutbr.cz hromadka.v@fce.vutbr.czProject Title Big City Road Circuit Brno http://www.mestsky-okruh-brno.cz/Location3.8 VMO RING ROAD, BRNOBrno, Czech RepublicPurposeScopeTotal Project ValueProject Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,construction, operation,dismantling)Contractual Framework(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)Relevant PhysicalDimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)- protection of the town center before transport;- converting all kinds of transport outside the center with maximum environmental protection;- balanced connections between urban areas;- pacification of local roads;- diversion of long distance transit transfer (Vienna , Prague,Bratislava, Ostrava).22, 7 km1 772 mil. EURProject contents from 4 parties:N-W Sector – planning (design), construction, operationN-E Sector – planning, constructionS-E Sector – initiation, planningS-W Sector - initiationIn the operation phase is approximately 20% and next 12% in construction.The project has during its project cycle several prices, expected price in initiation phase, estimated value of theinvestor on the beginning of public procurement, next contract price and definitively price.Contract price is fixed price, but over run costs are to 20%.Difference between expected price and estimated value is 20–30% due to changes in legislation, inflation andincrease of prices of lands.N-W sector: length 5,065 km, 4 interchange, 3 tunnels (1 of them for tram);N-E sector: length 5,05 km, 7 interchange, 1 intersection, 2 tunnels, 1 flyover;S-E sector: length 8,265 km, 12 interchange, 1 tunnel, 2 flyovers;S-W sector: length 4,31 km, 4 interchange, 2 tunnels, 1 flyover;307

VMO RING ROAD, BRNO• Idea of the realization prepared since 1947.• Real realization started in 1998 and the estimated finish of all the realization activities is 2030.• Long-term priority in the road network of the Czech Republic.• Whole route of BCRCB is the best solution from aspect of– protection of environment– population's living conditions• BCCB involves many expensive technical solutions including tunnels.• From economic, transport and administrative reasons it is not possible to build the big city circuit in one stage.• The whole route of the circuit is divided into individual sections, which partial opening allows use of all parts already constructed.308

Map of BCCB 2015202120262030309

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)InternalSupply-SideStakeholder Category Case-StudyClientFinanciersSponsorsClient’s CustomersClient’s OwnersOther internal supplysidecategories(please specify)Statutary City of BrnoRoad and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (RSDCR) The Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic(RSD CR) is a national contributory organization, founded by theMinistry of Transport and Communications on January 1st,1997. The organization fulfils the following main tasks in theframework of its basic subject of activity: Management ofmotorways and roads of the 1st class including components andfacilities of these communications according to §12 and asubsequent Act No. 13/1997 Coll., concerning roads, asamended, together with related rights and obligations andrelated groundGuarantees, maintenance and repairs of motorways and roadsof the 1st Class, including components and facilities of theseroads and acquisition of further assets necessary formanagement of these assetsInhabitants of Brna, transit traffic (Wienna-Prag, Prag – Brno -Bratislava, Wienna – Brno -Ostrava )CategoryCase-StudyComments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)310

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)Stakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previousexperiences of stakeholders,skills, influence on project)Supply-Side First Tier Contractors Design officesOperator – Brněnské komunikace, a.s. ( Brno roads)Second Tier ConsultantsProfessional ServicesProvidersOther internal supply-sidecategories (please specify)Statutory City of Brno, Brněnské komunikace, a.s. –Supervision of the investor, management of roads inthe operation stageBrněnské komunikace, a.s. – Supervision of theinvestor, management of roads in the operation stageCategoryControl system into thetunnels for examplecompany Eltodo, a.sCase-Study311

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)ExternalStakeholder Category Case-Study Comments(e.g. maturity, previous experiences ofstakeholders, skills, influence on project)Public Regulatory Agencies Ministry of Transport and CommunicationsMinistry of EnvironmentLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentOther internal supplysidecategories ( pleasespecify)Private Local residentsLocal LandownersEnvironmentalistsConservationistsArchaeologistsOther External Privatestakeholders (pleasespecify)Statutory City of BrnoMinistry of Transport and CommunicationsMinistry of EnvironmentCategoryPrivate residentsPrivate LandowersCategoryCase-studyCase-study312

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship MapsName ofActorDescription ofrelationshipDescription ofrelationship313

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude AnalysisExternal StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’sAttitude to this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’sInfluence on projectImpact of Project onExternal StakeholderPhase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation, planning,construction,operation, dismantling)Ministry of Transport andCommunicationsMinistry of EnvironmentHigh requirements ofenvironmental protectionHigh investment costPlanning (design) andrealisation phaseLocal residents(Civic Association)HighSuspension of thepreparatory hearingprocedure, stop theconstruction of inprogress.Stopping and reopeningof construction reflects bythe cost overrun.Local landowner High Speculative landpurchases, which aremade possible longdiscussedprojectdocumentation in twostages - DUR, DSPPlanning, constructionphasePlanning, constructionphase314

MEGAPROJECT Project EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory EnvironmentLegal and Regulatory ProjectEnvironment (regionally,nationally and Europe wide)ACT on town and country planning and building code (Building Act);ACT on Public Contracts;Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Action Plan on Urban MobilitySpecific Legal and Regulatoryevents impacting on the projectPolitical EnvironmentPolitical Project EnvironmentSpecific Political Eventsimpacting on the projectCivic Association VMO Brno - stop discussing the project documentation, halting construction ofsuch tunnel 2 million CZK / day - objections VMO Brno civic association, which complained ofviolations of noise limits.315

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline316

REFERENCES• http://www.mestsky-okruh-brno.cz/• www.rsd.cz -The Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (ŘSD)• http://www.bkom.cz/en - Brněnské komunikace, a.s. - company is mainly engaged in, and is certified to do, the following :civilengineering projects (activities related to construction and reconstruction), and management and maintenance of roads.• http://www.brno.cz/sprava-mesta/magistrat-mesta-brna/usek-technicky/odbor-dopravy/ - Brno City Municipality/ deputy Mayor –technical / Transportation• http://www.dalnice-silnice.cz/Brno/I-42.htm• http://www.stavebnictvi3000.cz/clanky/stavba-mimourovnove-krizovatky-hlinky-v-brne/• http://www.ita-aites.cz/files/tunel/1999/2/9.html• http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husovický_tunel• Planning and realization VMO – road I/42 – prezentation ŘSD ČR, June 2010• http://brno.idnes.cz/stavba-tunelu-v-brne-se-denne-prodrazi-o-dva-miliony-korun-p36-/brno-zpravy.aspx?c=A110218_1534473_brnozpravy_kol317

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