Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012

iMaseno University JournalVOLUME 1 DECEMBER 2012Special Issue on Atieno-Odhiambo: Proceedings of the Conference Held at MasenoUniversity on 14-15, July 2011i

MASENO UNIVERSITY JOURNALMaseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Editorial BoardiEditor in Chief:Professor P. Okinda Owuor, Department of Chemistry, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333 Maseno,Code 40105, Kenya. Email: okindaowuor@maseno.ac.ke.Sub-Editors in Chief:Professor Collins Ouma, Department of Biomedical Sciences and Technology, Maseno University,P.O. Box 333 Maseno,Code 40105, Kenya. Email: couma@maseno.ac.keProfessor Francis Indoshi, Department of Curriculum and Communication Technology, MasenoUniversity, Private Bag Maseno. Email: findoshi@yahoo.comSERIES A: (Humanities & Social Sciences)EditorsProf. Fredrick Wanyama, School of Development and Strategic Studies,Maseno University, Private Bag Maseno.Email: fwanyama@maseno.ac.keProf. George Mark Onyango, School of Environment and Earth Sciences,Maseno University, Private Bag Maseno.Email: georgemarkonyango@maseno.ac.keDr. Susan M. Kilonzo,Dr. Leah Onyango,International Advisory Editorial BoardProf. Ezra Chitando,Department of Religion and Philosophy,Maseno University, Private Bag Maseno.Email: mbusupa@yahoo.comSchool of Environment and Earth Sciences,Maseno University, Private Bag Maseno.Email: lonyango@maseno.ac.keDepartment of Religious Studies, University ofZimbamwe, W.C.C. Consultant on the EcumenicalHIV/AIDS Initiative in Africa.Email Chitsa21@yahoo.comProf. Dismas A. Masolo, Humanities, Department of Philosophy, University ofLouisville, Louisville, Kentucky.Email Da.masolo@louisville.edui

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012iiDr. Sandya Gihar,Advanced Institute of Management, (Chaudhary CharaSingh University, Meerit), NH-35, Delhi-Hapur Bye PassRoad, Ghaziabad, India.Email: drsandhya05@gmail.comProf. Shem O. Wandiga, Department of Chemistry, University of Nairobi, P.O.Box 30197 - 00100 GPO, Nairobi Kenya.Email: sowandiga@iconnect.co.keProf. Tim May,Co-Director, Centre for Sustainable Urban and RegionalFutures (SURF), University of Salford, Manchester,U.K. Email: T.May@salford.ac.uk;ii

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012iiiMASENO UNIVERSITY JOURNALCopyright ©2012Maseno UniversityPrivate Bag, Maseno 40105KenyaMaseno University Journal is an academic channel for dissemination of scientific, social andtechnological knowledge internationally. To achieve this objective, the journal publishes originalresearch and/or review articles both in the Humanities & Social Sciences, and Natural & AppliedSciences. Such articles should engage current debates in the respective disciplines and clearly show acontribution to the existing knowledge.The submitted articles will be subjected to rigorous peer-review and decisions on their publication willbe made by the editors of the journal, following reviewers’ advice. Maseno University does notnecessarily agree with, nor take responsibility for information contained in articles submitted by thecontributors.The journal shall not be reproduced in part or whole without the permission of the Vice Chancellor,Maseno University.Notes and guides to authors can be obtained from the Maseno University website or at the back ofthis issue of the journal every year, but authors are encouraged to read recent issues of the journal.ISSN 2075-7654iii

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012vThe Home as a Text: A critical examination of spatio-temporal symbolism in Luo context ...... 146Jack O. Ogembo and Catherine Muhoma ............................................................................... 146The Production of Knowledge in, of, and about Africa: The works of Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo – Keynote Address ................................................................................... 156Bethwel A. Ogot .................................................................................................................... 156An analysis of the Late Professor Atieno-Odhiambo’s Historical Discourses as a Corpus forLexicography of the African Linguistics ...................................................................... 177Benard Odoyo Okal ............................................................................................................... 177From Round Huts to Square Houses: Spatial Planning in Luo Culture ................................ 186George M. Onyango .............................................................................................................. 186Nationalism in Kenya: Weakening the Ties that Bind ..................................................... 207Peter Wanyande .................................................................................................................... 207v

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20122brought about certain consequences, positive ornegative. It could also mean that one recognizesand pledges that it is his or her role to makesomething happen or prevent it from happening.Thus one could argue that to think about theidea of responsibility is to invoke the notion offree will and freedom of action.The broad idea of responsibility alsoinvolves raising questions about liability, oraccepting failure on behalf of a company orgroup which one has been selected to lead. Inmany cases people dismiss responsibility in thelast case as a form of political maneuvering, buttaking responsibility for a disaster or majorfailure of operation falls within the broadunderstanding of the notion of responsibility. Butwe must probe further to know what if there areany, is the criteria for assuming or assigningresponsibility to someone or an organization.According to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza“someone who is genuinely morally responsiblemust satisfy certain ‘subjective conditions’: hemust see himself as morally responsible in orderto be morally responsible”(Fischer and Ravizza.,1998; Fischer and Ravizza., 2000). In manycases one accepts that there are morallyresponsible for something because they have nochoice. For instance, if an individual is elected tolead and failure occurs during their time inoffice, then people expect the elected official toassume responsibility for the things that havegone wrong. Sometimes this criterion is difficultfor some ordinary individuals, who may fear thatwas such a rule be generalized, acceptingresponsibility could also lead to criminal liability.In many cases, people expect that state leaders orpolitical actors assume responsibility for broadlydefined failures, or unexpected outcomes whichcould not be predicted or which could not beanticipated and when the leaders acted in goodfaith or in carrying out their constitutionalduties. In general, individuals, more than electedofficials, tend to be hesitant, fearing as we havesuggested that they may also be charged withlegal liability.Scholars often link responsibility tomoral virtue. The Greek philosophers used theterms moral virtue to refer to excellences thatwould enable individuals to function well in thepolis (Alasdair, 1984). These excellences includedprudence, temperance, fortitude, justice,2magnificence, magnanimity, patience,friendship, and modesty. During the Romantimes, many of these were seen as traits that astrong individual should have and hence theword virtue emerged as a description. Duringthe Middle Ages, Saint Thomas Aquinas, adisciple of Aristotle not only discussed theexcellences which had been developed by theGreeks and the Romans, but also articulatedwhat he called theological virtues which includedfaith, hope, and charity as well as other virtueslike prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.It is no surprise that in his appeal forcontemporary society to revive virtues,MacIntyre has singled out his appreciation of thevirtues at the time of Saint Thomas and theearlier perspective by Saint Augustine.I have come to appreciate the distinctionsmade by J. R. Lucas who has argued that theword responsible might just be the best Englishrendition of the phrase Aristotle used phronimos.Lucas says the term today is used to refer to whathe describes as “all-around reasonableness andreliability, not confined to any particular topicand entering into the most other desirablequalities of character”(Lucas, 1993). Today it is aterm that is associated with a number of actionsthat includes listening, responding, and assumingcertain postures and practices that relate to otherpeople. Since an individual or a group respondsto a situation, Lucas and other moralphilosophers have argued that one could assignor accept responsibility or accept blame for thesituation if a number of things are considered.For example, what were the alternatives theindividual had in responding to a situation?Could the individual have done otherwise? Dosethe position of the individual demonstratethoughtfulness of reasonableness.There are several views on when toassign responsibility. Aristotle claimed thatquestions of responsibility are always prior tothat of freedom (Aristotle and Ostwald, 1962).However, when we encounter a situation today,we do not always stop to ask if someone actedfreely. Our assumption in many situations is thatsomeone acted because he or she felt that was theright thing to do and the actor had the freedomto make that decision. In other words, theindividual was not compelled to take the specificaction. People generally think of responsibility

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20123and freedom of action when things go wrong orthings do not go as intended. However if wereflect on the idea of responsibility, it seemsreasonable to suggest that questions aboutresponsible actions and assumption ofresponsibility should be prior to actions becausethose concerns could provide the framework onwhich to reflect on the moral freedom of choiceavailable to the actor.But an Aristotelian approach mightsuggest that responsibility could also bedetermined in light of whether there weremitigating circumstances that could makeobservers think differently about the action forwhich one is claiming or not claimingresponsibility. J.L. Mackie offers anotherperspective through what he calls the “straightrule of responsibility,” which makes an agentresponsible only for intentional actions (Mackie,1977). Mackie has worked out his thoughtscarefully grounds his position in a largerdescription of intentional systems, whichinvolves a context where behavior is explainableand predictable in light of the beliefs, desires,hopes, fears, intentions, perceptions, andexpectations of a group. It is a combination ofthese various things that makes it easy to assignintention and hence responsibility to a particularaction. This does not solve the problem becausewe must still ask whys is that people who are notdirectly responsible for an action can be blamedfor it or charged in court for it.Here is an example I used at thepresentation at the Thabo Mbeki Institute(Bongmba, 2012). Those who might considerthe Mackie rule could also consider the severityof a proposed action or the failure to carry out acertain action. For example, if I planned to callJames and chat on the phone and forgot to makethe phone call because I was shopping, I mightbe forgiven. However, if I intended to call Jim ata certain time to give him information he neededto take to a meeting and I failed to call him andsomething went wrong at the meeting, I have anobligation to accept responsibility for failing tomake that telephone call. In this way one stillconsiders intentions and purpose even if onedoes not hold some one responsibility in allcases, everything is not so important (Baier,1991; Held, 2001).3Collective ResponsibilityThe idea of collective responsibility islooked at a little differently. We often seedecisions by people to assume collectiveresponsibility when companies acceptresponsibility like British Petroleum has done forthe massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.Therefore groups, corporations, and even statesought to accept responsibility and accept blamefor their actions when those actions affect peopleand the environment in a negative way. Outsidequestions that deal with corporate responsibility,collective responsibility is often raised in thecontext of political and civil strife. In the Africancontext the question of collective responsibilityhas been raised but not always addressedadequately in gruesome events like the Genocidein Rwanda and the post election violence inKenya (Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestovic eds,1996). This is also called collective guilt.The idea of collective guilt is rejected bysome scholars. For example Thomas Cushmanand Stjepan G. Mestrovic have rejectedcollective responsibility that has been attributedto Serbian intellectuals and H.D. Lewis hasrejected group responsibility; describing it as “thebarbarous notion of collective or groupresponsibility” which lets individuals get awaywith their responsibility. While Lewis forinstance reminds us of the need to consider theactions of individuals in cases of mass action likepost election violence or in extreme cases likegenocide where specific individuals have acted tofoster and promote negative actions, I think thatto completely do away with collectiveresponsibility would make it difficult for politicalcommunities and the international community todeal with such things like Holocaust, theRwandan Genocide, and apartheid, although weknow that certain individuals played a key role inconceptualizing, planning, and carrying out thesehorrible crimes. They acted not only in their ownname, but in light of the responsibilities whichthey had at the time as leaders of their state oremployees, security officers, and members of thepolice or armed forces that were expected(compelled) to carry out the decisions of theauthorities (Smith, 1998).It is therefore important to rethinkcollective responsibility because African historyhas been marred by violence initiated by the

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20124colonial project and continued in thepostneocolonial state. While violence remainscomplex, African states can no longer explainthe plight of its people by mainly blaming thecolonial project. In other words, the question ofresponsibility for the success or failure of thestate no longer is a foregone conclusion. It isclear to many observers of the African scene thatthe debates of the late 1980s and 1990s includedthe question of responsibility. While one cannotlook at events in Africa in isolation fromdestabilizing global forces such as slavery,colonialism, and neocolonialism, it is alsoevident to some scholars that one can no longerblame colonial abuses alone for the slow progressand the growing poverty and violence on theAfrican continent. Africans and their leadersparticularly are responsible for much of theviolence that is taking place in Africa today. It isthis necessary to think of collective responsibilityin the context of Africa.My intention here is not to claim thatAfrican states have not made any progresstowards economic and social development. Tomake such a claim would ignore much of theprogress that has been recorded even after the socalled movement towards democracy of the late1980s and the early 1990s. The end of thecolonial era was itself a miraculous achievement.The struggle to build nation states in aninternational and later global context wheresome of the new countries were not prepared toface the challenges, started off successfully inmany countries. However, we must admit thatsomething went wrong and any discussion aboutresponsibility is an attempt to sort out who is toblame for the things that have caused a lot ofpain on the continent. It is therefore the case thatif we raise the question of collectiveresponsibility, we do so to ask who should beblamed for the poverty, conflicts, wars and theatrocities that have been caused in the executionof those wars. Africa has seen or lived through itsshare of major crisis such as the Rwandangenocide, the extension of the Rwandan conflictinto Eastern Congo which resulted in the deathof many people, the war in Darfur, the wars inSierra Leon and Liberia. One major event of the20 th Century that we can certainly ask who isresponsible, or extend blame is the HIV andAIDS crisis. The failure by African leaders toaddress the HIV AIDS crisis as soon as it wasknown as a major global epidemic, places theresponsibility for what has happened on theAfrican leaders. The irresponsible rejectionprotective devices like condoms by religiousleaders also implicate the religious leaders andyes, they should accept responsibility for failureon this score.I also think that when violations ofinternational law have occurred as they have inthe Rwandan genocide, the Darfur genocide, andthe wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it isimportant to examine the situation, identifythose who are responsible for the crisis and itsexecution, and hold them accountable. Thiswould mean asking an entire government or stateto assume moral responsibility for the things thathave happened. The idea here is that groups quagroups and not individual members can be heldresponsible. If the entire group cannot be heldresponsible their leaders should be heldresponsible. Most companies today often takeresponsibility for their products and conduct oftheir officials.The difficulty with supporting collectiveresponsibility as moral responsibility for somelies in the fact that one could easily see the causalaspect of collective responsibility, but the moralaspects of it may not always be clear as onewould expect. I think we can identify causalresponsibility which can be analyzed because wecan point to a decision that led to some activitythat harmed someone. It is more difficult todetermine that a group, rather than the peoplewho are part of that group share moralresponsibility for an action or a set of actions.The question here for some critics of the notionof collective responsibility is the question ofgroup. Can a collective cause harm in the sameway as an individual can do? Some criticswonder if the idea of group responsibilityreceives attention mainly because individualmembers of a particular group who have causedharm and injury may claim that they have actedin the interest of the group. Some would arguethat what happens in this case is merelydistributing the amoral acts of a few individualsto the group. Critics do not think so.There are those who argue thatemphasizing collective responsibility in the end4

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20125undercuts the sense of individual values thathave been developed over time.Collective responsibility does not undercutindividual values and freedoms; instead it is thedesire to honor those values that that collectiveresponsibility is emphasized as a way ofaddressing the abuse of power when leaders failto act responsibly in their capacity as leaders ofinstitutions or the states. This includes all acts ofthat violate individual and group rights andincludes the planning and execution of wars thatviolate human dignity to the extreme. Theconcept of collective responsibility makes itpossible to examine war crimes, genocide, andother acts of violence on a larger scale, especiallywhen it is committed by one group againstanother group.One important objection that has beenraised is that it is difficult to assign intent to acollective as one would do to an individualperson. Some argue that groups cannot beblameworthy like individuals; therefore assigningcollective responsibility to a group is tantamountto making members of the group guilty byassociation. Some scholars in the twentiethcentury question the viability of the notion ofcollective responsibility because it overturnsindividualism. In his classic work, Economy andSociety, Max Weber rejected the notion ofcollective responsibility because groups do notact with the same intention that individuals do(Weber, 1914). According to this view, Weber,maintained that it is individuals who determineactions and act intentionally and it easierassigning blame on actions of individuals than agroup. H.D. Lewis has argued forcefully thatcollective responsibility is a barbarous thoughtbecause it is the individual alone who has moralresponsibility (Lewis, 1948). The idea here is thatif we assign collective responsibility, we end upcriminalizing individuals who do not bear moralresponsibility but who become culpable onlybecause they belong to a particular group. Againwhat is central here is intentionality and whetherone could and should assign it to a collective asone would assign intentionality to a single actoror a few actors. Therefore scholars who rejectcollective responsibility maintain that it is onlyindividuals who act with intention and not anenter community (Narveson, 2002).5Scholars who support collectiveresponsibility argue that individuals and groupscould be held responsible because both havepsychological responses and as such oftenrespond to suggestions from others to participatein activities that could implicate individuals aswell as members of a group. Deborah Tollefsenhas argued that groups often also respond toevents with emotions of anger, anddisappointment that individual and groups havenot acted in a moral manner (Tollefson, 2006).This is an important point to underscore becauseif we examine recent actions and violence indifferent places in Africa such as the recent postelection violence in Côte d’Ivoire, and the onethat erupted in Kenya, the actors demonstratedmoral outrage against the manipulation of theelections; actions which they thought was wrong.Such actions do give many clues as to whoshould be assigned responsibility. In suchactions, it is possible to see group intentions.Imagine a pattern which goes something likethis. At the end of the elections, each side hopesthat their candidate would be elected. Many ofthem, who expect that outcome, often follow thedetails. But if at the end something happens, theyare bound to examine what has transpired inorder to file a protest. But the problem in postelectionviolence is that many people are oftenpushed, as it were, to act violently. If they all actviolently as a group, it is likely that theleadership incites the group to act that way. Ifthat is the case, it is a good case to assigncollective responsibility to the leaders and thegroup.Some supporters of collectiveresponsibility assume that a group has the samemind (Sosa, 2009). Margaret Gilbert has arguedthat there is something like shared intentions andcan be attributed to a group. This seems to occurin post-election violence. Many times suchaction requires very careful coordination fromthe leaders, or people who stand to gain the mostfrom such group action, but it is possible to get acrowd to think in a similar way, especially theyare taught to see that their opponents want tomake things difficult for them. What we see insuch a situation is the perception by members ofa group that they are under siege, or somethinghas been stolen from them and it is their right toact as a group to recover what has been taken

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20126away from them. They perceive that the onlyway to respond to this is to engage in the struggleas a group. While each individual has a mind ofhis or her own, it is the case that when theyperceive that they have been threatened, theymight also think that it would be to theiradvantage to act as a group. Under suchcircumstances, the group assumes moral agencyin a manner that we could say an individualtakes moral responsibility. Larry May has arguedthat when such a collective approach is taken,what is at work is a “pre-reflective intention”which precedes further deeper consideration ofthe issues by members of a group (May, 1987;May, 2006). The intentions that emerge fromsuch actions certainly reflect group intentions.Since 1994, scholars, Human RightsGroups have discussed the Rwandan Genocidein detail, as well as the extension of the conflictto Eastern Congo. Those familiar with thehistory of the genocide know that colonials andChristian missionaries demonstrated a preferencefor the Tutsi people who were in the minority. Atthe time of independence, the Tutsis occupiedmany of the responsible positions in the countrywhile the Hutu who were the majority ethnicgroup felt they have been discriminated againstand marginalized. Ethnic feelings were soimportant that the government created identitycards which spelled out one’s ethnic group. Inthe post independent era, ethnic violence wouldbreak out several times. Later on politicaldisagreements led to the creation of theRwandan Patriotic Force which began fightingagainst the government in Kigali. Thegovernment of President Habariyamana reachedan agreement with the RPF, but on his returnfrom an important discussion on theimplementation of the peace accords, his planewas shot down and this triggered the ethnicfighting in which the Hutu majority who hadcarried a campaign against the Tutsi set out toeliminate members of the Tutsi group. The deathof the President just hastened the well laid outplan by Hutu leaders to exterminate the Tutsis.In preparation for that, they had compiled a listof Tutsis that would be killed and orderedweapons that would be used in carrying out thekillings. The Hutus also carried out a systematiccampaign on the radio, educating Hutus to killTutsis and Tutsi sympathizers.6In order to further demonstrate how thenature of collective responsibility may work, twoimportant aspects of this Genocide must bementioned. The first case is the fact that for 100days, the international community did not dovery much to stop the killings. Second, theUnited Nations Peace Keeping forces stationedin Kigali were recalled. As soon as they left thecountry, the full killing machine of the Hutuextremist was unleashed and after about 100days, hundreds of thousands of people werekilled in one most gruesome acts of violence ofthe 20 th century. The international communitythen decided there was enough grounds to assignresponsibility; those who perpetrated thismassive killing. The international communityhas meticulously hunted those individuals downand brought before the international Court thatwas set up in Arusha Tanzania. Since thenumber of people implicated in the promotion orabating of the genocide was so large and theArusha courts could not handle all of them,Rwandans set up the Gacaca Courts, atraditional court which held public hearings inthe local communities and worked through therecognition of the crime, and promotions ofreconciliation.Some would argue that there is strongevidence for assigning collective responsibility tosome members of the Hutu community.Members of that community planned the killingsand persuaded their followers to believe the Tutsiwere their enemies who should be eliminated forthe good of the Hutu community. In the process,the leaders who instigated the genocide came upwith appalling ideas such as raping and killing ofTutsi women because killing a woman meantthat she would no longer give birth to Tutsichildren. Even the clergy as we know from theaccount of the genocide were involved. They didnot protect people who had gone to church orchildren who were in boarding school. Theyallowed the killers to come on sacred ground tocarry out their acts of violence.The question here for opponents ofcollective responsibility would be, why do wehave to think of blaming whole communitieswhen we could identify the perpetrators ofwrongful actions and punish them for theircrimes. Some would prefer that rather thanpursue group responsibility, individuals in a

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20127community and bring them to justice because itis not the case that every member of thecommunity often participates in activities thatcause great harm to others. Thos who supportcollective guilt argue that the leaders acted onbehalf of their community.The second thing on collectiveresponsibility that we need to rethink regardingthe Rwandan genocide is whether theinternational community itself had anyresponsibility or could also share in collectiveguilt. If blameworthiness is related to a moralposition and it can be demonstrated thatmembers of international organizations knewwhat could happen if they left Rwanda and wentahead and recommended that the peace keepingforces should be withdrawn from the volatilesituation. Given what we know today, it is alsopossible to demonstrate that the internationalcommunity could have taken another action. Byfailing to act, or by withdrawing the peacekeeping forces, the international community,through the United Nations made it possible forthe genocide to take place. I think it is possibleand we should raise the question of collectiveresponsibility on this account. The documentary,‘Sometimes in April’, dramatizes the crisis in amanner that helps us think of internationalcomplicity by showing the events in Rwanda,then panning back to what the makers of the filmwant to portray as active meetings at the UnitedStates Department to deal with the crises. If thedocumentary is correct, then the team metalmost daily but did not take any concrete actionto stop the killing. Towards the end, a frustratedState department official expressed herdisappointment that they could not do anythingto stop the killings, but one of the militaryleaders, simply said, the United States had nochoice but remain neutral. He added, that it wasRwandans killing Rwandans and in the nearfuture, the US president would apologize to theworld and say that we will never allow such athing to happen again, and that will be the end ofit. This is what happened and it was not only theleader of the United States but other worldleaders did a similar thing.But let us take a look briefly at theinternational community again, especially therole of the United Nations which ordered itspeace keepers out of Rwanda. One could say that7the security situation in the country haddeteriorated so badly that there was nothing theycould do. One could also argue that if theyremained in the country many of them couldhave been killed or caught in a civil war in whichthey could not do anything even to protect theirown lives. Yet is also clear or at least there issome evidence that the United Nations knewthat the situation in Rwanda had degeneratedand that if all foreigners left the country, it wouldsimply make it possible for an embolden Hutuextremist community to carry on what theirleaders had planned, eliminate the Tutsis. Thefact that the leaders of the United Nations knewthis would happen and went ahead and pulledout the peace keeping forces out of Rwandaconstitutes not only a lapse of judgment but aconcrete action with moral implications that callsopens the door for all to assign collective blamehere because the international communitythrough the United Nations failed to remain andprovide an important buffer zone, and let it beknown that the Hutus could not carry on thekillings because the whole world would bewatching.Speaking ten years after the genocide, theformer UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, saidthat he “could and should have done more tostop the genocide in Rwanda”(BBC News,2011). The former UN chief reportedly said “Theinternational community is guilty of sins ofomission.” Why did Annan take this step intrying to come clean? He was the head of the UNpeacekeeping forces. Under his watch, thepeacekeeping forces left Rwanda, and the Hutussystematically eliminated about 800, 000 people.The former UN Chief went on to say: “I believedat the time that I was doing my best.” Onealmost wants to ask the question, how he couldbelieve that he was doing his best when thehistory of ethnic violence in Rwanda was wellknown! He further admitted that “theinternational community failed Rwanda and thatmust leave us always with a sense of bitterregret.” For the sake of argument, one could askwhat the international community could havedone if the Hutu were so bent in eliminating theTutsi. Annan himself says that the UN couldhave provided reinforcements. When he becameSecretary General it dawned on him that therewas more he could have done to rally support for

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20128the mission in Rwanda. What happened inRwanda was more than a lapse of judgment onpart of UN leaders like Kofi Annan. It wasneglect of responsibility that contributed to acatastrophic outcome. It was not only Annanconfessing but the United Nations SecurityCouncil also apologized in April 2000 andaccepted responsibility for failing to prevent orstop the genocide.Some Rwandans blamed the UN forfailing to protect them. The BBC reportmentioned what we learned of the mass aspectsof the killing. About 4000 Tutsis sought shelterclose to Belgian troops thinking that they wouldbe safe because they were within the proximity ofBelgian keeping forces. But they were not givenany protection. The Canadian commander,Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, stated atthe same conference where Annan spoke that theinternational community was not ready to helpthe Rwandans. In a statement which reflectswhat one could say were misplaced priorities ofthe international community which had orderedhim and his troops out of Rwanda, he argued: “Istill believe that if an organization decided towipe out the 320 mountain gorillas there wouldbe still more of a reaction by the internationalcommunity to curtail or to stop that than therewould be still today in attempting to protectthousands of human beings being slaughtered inthe same country." This is not an anti animalstatement, but a reflection of the choices wecould make today in the face of mountinghuman crisis.If we go back to the concept of groupmorality on which the idea of groupresponsibility is based, one could raise manyquestions. For example, should the UN systemhave been indicted? Should Kofi Annan himselfhave been made to answer for his lack ofresponsibility? The answer to this questiondepends on a number of things which certainlyrequires that we determine if Annan or hiscolleagues at the UN knew what would happenand if their attitude was intentional. Here theevidence of intentionality might be questioned bysome. However, some would argue that giventhe volatile situation that had been building up inRwanda since independence, it should have beenclear that pulling out the peacekeeping forceswould unleash a rash of killings. The next8question here would be, could the internationalcourt have prosecuted the UN, the SecurityCouncil, or Kofi Annan and the generals on theground? Some would say that could not happeneven if some people wanted such prosecutionsbecause the international community wouldhave been prosecuting itself. Which leaves thequestion, should leaders like Annan have beenheld responsible? Some would argue that hemade the best decision based on the informationhe had at the time. He did not intend to doanything that would lead to the slaughter of over800,000 people. Even if one makes the case thathe still was negligent and has accepted as much,the counter argument would be, to prosecute himwould in effect be prosecuting the UN itself.As one thinks of this the question, it isobvious that nothing happened to the individualswho were charged with protecting the people andpreventing a war. Why would they be heldaccountable? This is where some would say asthe ones who were responsible, it was their dutyto provide the Security Council and the UN thenecessary information to ask for an increase ofpeacekeeping forces rather than leave Rwanda.There was neglect on part of those leaders, butthe UN itself turned around and gave Annan thetop job at the United Nations. Holding himaccountable would have been applying verytough rigorous standards of moral responsibilityto him. Some would say it is precisely because ofthe magnitude of the neglect that such stringentmoral responsibility should have been expected.Therefore UN leaders should have beenprosecuted as the Hutu leaders who wereprosecuted. Since the International communitydefined genocide and set in place conventionsgoverning the declaration of genocide and stepsto be taken when genocide has occurred, onewould have thought that the UN was in a goodposition to know what to do in the case ofRwanda. Although African countries were notmembers of the UN when those conventions andthe International Declaration of Human Rightswere declared, they subscribed to theseconventions, thus granting the UN jurisdictionon such issues in the African context. Thereforeit would have made sense to hold UN officialsaccountable as a matter of fairness.Global conventions recognize and treatpeople as a group and a good example is the

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20129United Nations concerns for indigenous groups.These groups are increasingly being seen not asabstract entities, but people with rights that arearticulated and often violated. In this case aprominent individual was held responsible forthe crimes that were committed. There are casesin which individuals of members of a certaincommunity may also escape being countered aspart of the guilty party. These happen becauseeven when ethnic cleansing or genocide wascarefully planned and executed in Rwanda, allmembers of the political community do not carrythe same responsibility for the crime. For manypeople the notion of collective guilt is acceptableespecially in the case of Rwanda where certainmembers of the Hutu community engineered the1994 genocide (Mamdani, 2001). We do knowthat not all Hutus were responsible and many ofthem went out of their way to protect Tutsis.However, the national scope of the genocide doshow convincingly that group guilt is reasonablewhen a large segment or its leaders plan actionsand order their followers to carry it out, thatcommunity should be held responsible forcollective guilt. Wole Soyinka has called thehunting down and killing of the Tutsis inRwanda a collectivized crime (Soyinka, 1998).However, it would be a mistake to think that thenotion of collective guilt erases or exoneratesindividuals who have played a key role in thoseevents. In seeking justice crimes againsthumanity, charges have been brought againstleaders like Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ElieNdayambaje, Alphonse Nteziryayo, SylvainNsabimana, and Joseph Kanyabashi, all ofRwanda, have now been convicted of their rolesin the Rwandan genocide.Responsibility, Freedom and the OtherResponsibility has a relationship tofreedom as I indicated at the beginning. The ideahere is that when we claim that someone isresponsible, we mean that the individual as a freemoral agent, answers by his or her own will fortheir thoughts and actions towards other people.In the main, that is the least we can claim aboutindividual or even collective responsibility. Thequestion here is what if an action takes place in acontext where the individual is not free or isconstrained by circumstances to take actions9which he or she would not have taken like in thecase of actions taken under a dictatorial regimelike apartheid South Africa? While we will notpursue that argument here, it is clear that in sucha situation, the notion of collective responsibilitymight overshadow personal responsibilitybecause it can be shown that people acted incertain ways not out of the exercise of theirfreedom but because they were compelled to act.It is clear then that responsibility is related tofreedom, but under some circumstances, one’sresponsibility can be limited by that individual’sfreedom, an idea that is not only intriguing, butraises important moral dilemmas.The work of Emmanuel Levinas hasbrought a different perspective on the idea ofresponsibility. In ‘Otherwise than Being’, Levinasargues that responsibility is not limited to thetype of deficiencies others suggest. The idea ofresponsibility in Levinas outstrips everylimitation one could place on it and thereforeLevinas brings a different perspective toresponsibility by arguing that one is alwaysresponsible to the other and such responsibilityextends beyond the freedom of the subject(Levinas and Levinas., 1981a). The issue here isnot that one does not have a choice to make, butthe view that one is responsible to the other andcannot allow his or her freedom infringe on thoseresponsibilities because one is infinitelyresponsible for the other in the sense in whichLevinas talks about the relationship to the other.In other words, based on an ethics of the facewhich Levinas has articulated, one is alwaysresponsible and answerable to the otherregardless of the conditions under which youractions take place. Levinas describes thatresponsibility as an obsession which he calls “aresponsibility of the ego for what the ego has notwished, that is for the others”(Levinas andLevinas., 1981b).In this relationship Levinas emphasizesthe freedom of the other which calls intoquestion the plans of the subject. In calling intoquestion, the domination of the subject, Levinasinsists that the powers and the demands of theother who is encountered in the face-to-facerelationship surpass those of the subject. It is ameeting that is filled with contradiction becausethe subject who assumes that he or sheunderstands the other does not understand the

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201210other. Thus the subject who encounters the otheris summoned to responsibility even if the subjectsmight want to use his or her freedom differently.This summons to responsibility according toLevinas significantly changes the debate becauseit invites a new understanding of truth whichmust start when the subject realizes that he orshe does not understand the other. Theontological view and understanding which turnsthe other into an object to be grasped, held, andcontrolled emphasizes the freedom of the subjectat the expense of the other. Levinas in verytelling language argues that the use of knowledgeand understanding to present truth as a graspimplies “knowledge would involve thesuppression of the other by the grasp and by thehold, or by the vision that grasps before thegrasp”(Levinas, 1969a). This eliminates thefreedom of the other. However, despite thisontological egoism, Levinas argues that theother’s face preempts such a grasp and praxis ofdomination as the other also grasps the subject.But this is a different grasp because this graspstops the subject from carrying out itsdehumanizing projects; displaces, andoverthrows the subject’s view of truth.The question then is what is truth?Levinas argues that truth from this perspective isto stand in the face of other and have that otherreject your imperial projects of domination. Theother simply does not tell you that she has adifferent view of what you are doing, but actuallymakes a demand on the subject and Levinas callsthat demand an “appeal to me [which] istruth”(Levinas, 1969b). In this transaction, truthis not a comprehension that is worked out indialogue between the other and the subject, but isalready that relationship. In other words, beingin relationship is truth itself. Levinas calls it amodality of relations between the subject and theother (Levinas, 1969c). Robert Manning hasargued that “truth as a modality of thisrelationship means that truth is inseparable fromthe just relationship between people and, thus,from ethics or morality, or justice”(Manning,1993). Levinas himself is insistent that truth isnot control “but rather to encounter the otherwithout allergy, that is in justice”(Levinas,1969d).What we have here is a claim that to bein the presence of the other, and relate to the10other opens one to truth and truth which is anopportunity to be in the presence of the other onthe terms of the other and not on the basis ofone’s propositions and knowledge. It is to openone’s self to the demands of justice before theother. To be open to the demands of justice inthe presence of the other is to be open to acceptresponsibility for the other. This has implicationsfor our understanding of individual and oneshould add collective responsibility in theAfrican context.Africa stands at a significant crossroadsand it is clear to all that Africa needs to moveforward, and to do that, African leaders need toassume responsibility not only as theirconstitutional obligations, but as a matter offreedom, the freedom of the other(s), who arecitizens. In recent years, Nobel EconomistAmartya Sen has argued that development is notmerely building new infrastructure, but creatingthe conditions for members of our politicalcommunities to experience freedom. Thisfreedom is significantly different from the onearticulated by rulers and those who havegoverned the postneocolonial state during thelast half of the century. If we pursuedevelopment as freedom, it will be clear thatchange goes beyond infrastructural changebecause it is an activity that should respond invery definite ways to who were are as people.Such a view of the other and community opensspaces for individuals to define themselves andfind ways of shaping their communities in newand responsible ways. The great accomplishmentof Sen in ‘Development as Freedom’, is hisinsistence that we cannot define or understanddevelopment and change merely as thepossession of wealth (utilitarians), or merely asthe processes we have used to achieve what wehave (libertarians), but development comes whenwe have acted responsibly and nurtured thecapabilities of people which according to Senconstitutes substantive human freedoms whichwould then allow people in a politicalcommunity to focus on important things thatmatter to people.If we look at political practice in Africawe will discover that many of the areas of humanfreedom which Sen discusses are lacking.Freedom in Sen’s work involves politicalfreedom, economic freedom, opportunities for

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201211members of the political community to excel,socio-political transparency, and creating a socialand political climate that is secure. All thesethings could contribute to the experience ofjustice which Sen defines as the creation ofcapabilities. It is not easy to give complete orsettled answers on these questions because onehas to weigh them in light of the politics of theday and the behavior of the markets, butcapabilities is a useful tool because it offersdifferent ways of understanding poverty, and theother disparity that exists in society such as thegender divide. Developing capabilities requiresthe establishment of strong democraticgovernance where political rights exist. “Politicalrights, including freedom of expression anddiscussion, are not only pivotal in inducingsocial responses to economic needs, they are alsocentral to the conceptualization of economicneeds themselves”(Sen, 2000). When Sendiscusses political rights he is not talking of it inabstraction because he has addressed the rightsof women in development. As part of his overallargument, it is not merely providing women withgoods or money, but paying attention to thewellbeing of women. This is done bystrengthening their capabilities and agency.What is very appealing in the work of Sen is theidea that while he champions democratic idealsand the development of human capabilities, he isopen to fresh ideas on these things. He drawsexamples from India to demonstrate how theWest does not have a monopoly on organizing afunctioning political community. We live at atime when pluralism in all respects must providethe resources and ideas that have to work with toachieve our goals and not ground economicsuccess in a democratic society by selfish valuesalone.Sen like Levinas brings together justice,freedom, and responsibility. What we have inSen is an argument which calls the humancommunity to the reality that we have aresponsibility to see “development as anintegrated process of expansion of substantivefreedoms that connect with one another”(Sen,2000). We may not be happy with this viewbecause those of us who have championed neoliberal ideas as necessary perspective oneconomic development, but Sen has brought tothe conversation ideas that are similar to whatwe have seen in Levinas. Levinas has formulatedhis ideas in response to the long ontologicaljourney of the western, and we should add thepostneocolonial leader as subject. Those threeideas point to a new truth which according toLevinas is the face of the other who stands beforethe subject. That face is not an object. We havedeveloped certain characterization of the other:She is a widow, orphan, wife, concubine,prostitute, member of the opposition party,uneducated, gay, lesbian, AIDS victim, etc. Theface, before which we stand, resists thesecategorizations and calls on us to see the humanface that is in front of us. This face itself is aresistance, the on-going anti colonial and antiimperial project that has been ever beenlaunched. It is a face that calls us to our corevalues. It is a face that reminds us of ourcollective responsibility as the path towardsfreedom.Un-concluding WordThis reflection is written in honor of mysenior colleague Professor Elisha StephenAtieno-Odhiambo whose interdisciplinarythinking moved Africanists to ask local questionsin a global context in a different way. One areaof interest that was always imbedded in his workbut never made explicit was the ethical andmoral implications of our knowledge, power,and place in society. One could argue that inaddition to their declared intention of exploring asociology, politics, and risks of knowledge,Odhiambo and his co-author, David Cohen gaveus an opportunity to reflect on responsibility,may be not in the broad sense as I have tried tosketch it, but left imprints there for one to thinkof individual as well as collective responsibilityeven in a narrow sense of the local community inKenya or the outworking of political rivalry onthe National stage in Kenya.In ‘Burying SM’ (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992), one could argue thatOdhiambo and Cohen addressed not only thedrama of an individual family, and that of anethnic group, but the legal responsibility whichmany African elites ought to assume to ensurethat after their departure, the funeral and burialrites would go smoothly and because he or shemade provisions for all involved to respect the11

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201212will of his surviving spouse, and also madeprovisions for the local traditions. However, onewonders if in taking care of the legal aspects ofhis departure could have solved everything,given that his survivors claimed spousal andsocial responsibility in their respective claims andchoices. The very fact that they mapped out thedrama and included the different voices indicatesthat the idea of personal and social responsibilityis complex and calls for constant negotiation. Inthe death of one individual, the society sawmanifested the multiple debates on gender,kinship, succession, and the extent ofjurisprudence over personal marital matters andcultural claims of the extended family. Assigningpraise and blame here is very difficult becausewhat is involved would be the idea that someoneshould accept responsibility for the aftermath ofSM’s death. Cohen and Odhiambo do notengage in that kind of speculation, but the readercould infer these questions from following thecarefully crafted narrative that gives voice toordinary citizens who themselves would like tosee someone accept blame or take responsibility.If ‘Burying SM’ only hints at the idea ofresponsibility, ‘The Risk of Knowledge’ (Cohen andAtieno-Odhiambo, 2004) perhaps opens, all thesame, an undefined window into the question ofresponsibility. One could argue that the idea ofresponsibility even as a moral category is all overthe book beginning with the expensive trip theKenyan President and his entourage undertaketo Washington DC on a rented Concorde jet atthe Kenyan tax payers’ expense. The largeentourage was made up of ministers and civilservants. This was a political miscalculation thatleads to the fact that President George HerbertW. Bush ignored the visiting Kenyan President,Daniel Arap Moi and preferred to pay attentionto the astute Foreign Minister, the HonorableRobert Ouko, thus giving the impression that theForeign Minister had willfully upstaged theKenyan President and humiliated his boss. Thissuspicion was the beginning of Robert Ouko’sdownfall, so much so that when he died, manysuspected that his enemies might have beenresponsible for his death.Odhiambo and Cohen wrote as socialscientist and had no intention of casting blame,or claiming that they knew who was behind thedeath of the Honorable Foreign Minister. Yet intheir critical analysis, one wonders if they alsomake the reader want to ask the question, who isresponsible? They do not answer that question,but I suspect that if they were to step out of theirunique style of narrative which gave voice to thepublic, they might say responsibility lies in thevary story of the postcolonial state in whichmany a political dispute was settled by eventswhich we cannot adequately account for. I donot intend to pursue these questions here, butclose with this suspense to invite furtherreflection on the idea of collective responsibilityas I have explored in this essay that I havewritten to honor the memory of Professor ElishaStephen Atieno-Odhiambo, my colleague andfriend, in the hope that we can reflect on theimportance of collective responsibility in thepostneocolonial states in Africa.ReferencesAlasdair, M. (1984) After Virtue: A Study inMoral Theory. Notre Dame, IN, NotreDame University Press.Aristotle and Ostwald, M. (1962) Nicomacheanethics. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis,.Baier, A. (1991) A Naturalist View o Persons.Presidential Address. Proceedings of theAmerican Philosophical Association 65.BBC News. (2011). BBC accessed June 9, 2011.Bongmba, E., K. . (2012) Responsibility andgovernance presented at the ThaboMbeki Institute for Leadership inJohannesburg, South Africa on 11October 2012, forthcoming in Investingin Thought Leaderships for Africa’sRenewal, edited by Kwandiwe Knodlo,2012.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1992) Burying SM - The Politics ofKnowledge and the Sociology of Powerin Africa. London: James Currey Ltd.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2004) The Risks of Knowledge:Investigations into the Death of the Hon.Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya,1990. Athens, OH, Ohio UniversityPress, and Nairobi, East AfricanEducational Publishers Ltd.12

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201213Cushman, T. and Stjepan G. Mestovic eds.(1996) The Time we knew: WesternResponses to Genocide in Bosnia. NewYork: New York University Press.Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza., M. (1998)Responsibility and Control. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza., M. (2000) Replies.Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 61, 467-480.Held, V. (2001) Group Responsibility for EthnicConflict. The Journal of Ethics 6, 157-178.Kallen, H.M. (1942) Responsibility. Ethics 52,350-376.Levinas, E. (1969a) Totality and Infinity: AnEssay on Exteriority, trans. AlphonsoLingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.: DuquesneUniversity Press, 302.Levinas, E. (1969b) Totality and Infinity: AnEssay on Exteriority, trans. AlphonsoLingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.: DuquesneUniversity Press, 291.Levinas, E. (1969c) Totality and Infinity: AnEssay on Exteriority, trans. AlphonsoLingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.: DuquesneUniversity Press, 210.Levinas, E. (1969d) Totality and Infinity: AnEssay on Exteriority, trans. AlphonsoLingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.: DuquesneUniversity Press, 303.Levinas, E. and Levinas, E. (1981a) Otherwisethan Being, or Beyond Essence, Trans.Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.:Duquesne University Press, 122.Levinas, E. and Levinas, E. (1981b) Otherwisethan Being, or Beyond Essence, Trans.Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, Pa.:Duquesne University Press, 114.Lewis, H.D. (1948) Collective Responsibility.Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 24, 3-18.Lucas, J.R. (1993) Responsibility. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 11.Mackie, J.L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right orWrong. Harmondsworth, 208.Mamdani, M. (2001) When Victims becomeKillers: Colonialism, Nativism, and theGenocide in Rwanda. Princeton:Princeton University Press.Manning, R.J.S. (1993) Interpreting Otherwisethan Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas’sEthics as First Philosophy. Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 117.May, L. (1987) The Morality of Groups. NotreDame: University of Notre Dame Press.May, L. (2006) State Aggression, CollectiveLiability, and Individual Mens Rea.Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXX,309-324.Narveson, J. (2002) Collective Responsibility.Journal of Ethics 6, 179-198.Sen, A. (2000) Development as Freedom. NewYork: Anchor books.Smiley, M. (2010) From Moral Agency toCollective Wrongs: Re-thinkingCollective Moral Responsibility. Journalof Law and Policy (Special issue oncollective responsibility) 19.Smiley, M. (2011) Collective Responsibility. TheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,ed. Edward N. Zalta.Smith, P. (1998) Liberalism and AffirmativeObligations. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 222.Sosa, D. (2009) What is it Like to be a Group?Social Philosophy and Policy 26, 212-226.Soyinka, W. (1998) Hearts of Darkness. TheNew York Times Review of Books(October 4, 1998), 11.Tollefson, D. (2006) The Rationality ofCollective Guilt. Midwest Studies inPhilosophy XXX, 222-239.Weber, M. (1914) Economy and Society 1.13

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201214Kenya’s Elections Law dangles the Prospect of Recall even as it Renders itEssentialy UnworkableCarey Francis OnyangoFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, PO Box 333, Maseno, Kenya.E-mail: cfonyango@yahoo.com______________________________________________________________________________Abstract:The Constitution of Kenya granted the right to recall legislators. In stipulatingthe grounds and procedures thereto, The Elections Act 2011 (Republic ofKenya, 2011) only “...dangles the prospect of recall…even as it renders itessentially unworkable”(Johnston, 2009). The grounds for recall are faithful toChapter Six of the Constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010, 51-54). That thegrounds must be confirmed by the High Court makes the Act evade thecriticism of recall as a political tool for targeting marginal seats (Coleman,2011). However, the signature requirements for a recall petition, conditionsfor the recall election, and the resulting special election create aninsurmountable hurdle. The Act thus contravenes the constitutional provisionof direct exercise of sovereignty.Key words: Kenya, Elections Law, Unworkable______________________________________________________________________________I. THE GROUNDS FOR RECALL1. Grounds; Faithfull to Chapter Six of theConstitutionArticle 104 of Chapter Eight (The Legislature) ofthe new Constitution of Kenya (Republic ofKenya, 2010, p. 69) give the electorate the rightto recall members of Parliament, both from theSenate and the National Assembly. Parliamentwas in the transitional and consequentialprovisions (Ibid., 190) tasked to enact legislationproviding both the grounds and procedure, andthis came in the provisions of Part IV, “Recall ofa Member of Parliament”, of The Elections Act2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011).Article 75 (“Conduct of State Officers”) ofChapter Six of the Constitution (Leadership andIntegrity) had already hinted (Republic ofKenya, 2010, pp. 52-53) at some grounds thathave been included in the provisions of TheElections Act 2011. Article 75 states that StateOfficers, in this regard Members of Parliament,who contravene the following provisions ofArticles 75, 76, 77, and 78 Constitution shall besubject to disciplinary procedures, includingthose resulting in dismissal or removal fromoffice:(a) Avoidance of conflict of interest betweenpersonal interests and public or officialduties;(b) Avoiding compromising any public ofofficial interest in favour of a personalinterest;(c) Avoiding demeaning the office held;(d) Delivering to the State a gift or donationreceived on a public or official occasionand which is not subject to exemption byan Act or Parliament;(e) Not maintaining a bank account outsideKenya unless under exemption providedunder an Act of Parliament;(f) Not seeking or accepting a personalbenefit or loan in circumstances thatcompromise the integrity of the officer;(g) A full time State Officer not participatingin any other gainful employment;14

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201215(h) Not holding dual citizenship unless onehas been made a citizen of anothercountry by laws of that country withoutthe ability to opt out.The Elections Act 2011(Republic of Kenya, 2011) inits Section 45 (Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 629)on the other hand specifies two grounds forrecall. First, that a Member of Parliament maybe recalled if found to have violated theprovisions of Chapter Six of the Constitution.Those provisions as specified in Articles 75, 76,77, and 78 of the Constitution are the 8numerated above. Article 73 of the Constitution(Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 51) has elaboratedthe grounds as follows;(a) State officers are to exercise theirauthority in a manner consistent with thepurposes and objects of the Constitution;(b) State Officers are to demonstrate respectfor the people;(c) They should promote public confidencein the integrity of the office;(d) They are to be elected in free and fairelections;(e) They must exercise objectivity andimpartiality in decision making, and inensuring that decisions are not influencedby nepotism, favouritism, and otherimproper motives of corrupt practices(f) They are to provide service based onhonesty in the execution of public duties;(g) They are to declare any personal interestthat may conflict with public duties; II.They have to demonstrate accountabilityto the public for decisions and actions;(h) They must demonstrate discipline andcommitment in service of the people.The Second ground specified for recall by TheElections Act 2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011, p.629) is if a Member of Parliament is found tohave mismanaged public resources.2. Due Process Required to Confirm Groundsfor RecallSection 45 of the act, specifies that the recall canonly be initiated if the grounds so specified areconfirmed through a judgement of the HighCourt. In that way, and by being faithful toChapter Six of the Constitution (Republic ofKenya, 2010, pp. 51-54) in providing for thegrounds for recall, the Act has evaded one of thecriticisms of recall, i.e. it can be used as apolitical tool by organised campaigns to targetmarginal seats (Coleman, 2011). With that it isunnecessary to put insurmountable hurdles in theconditions for circulation of the recall petition, inthe recall election, and subsequent specialelection in the manner that the Act then proceedsto do.3. Comparison of Grounds of Recall fromOther JurisdictionsOne needs to take note of the fact that in somerecall jurisdictions, especially in the most USstates, any registered voter can begin a recallcampaign for any reason. This is something theKenyan law has avoided. Often, the reasons inthe US states are political. The 2011 recall effortsin Wisconsin provide a good example forpolitically-motivated recalls (Legislatures, 2011),that the Kenyan Act has gone out of its way toavoid. Out of the 19 that have recall provisions,only the 8 listed in Table 1 below require specificreasons for recall.Again in most of those 19 US states confirmationof whatever grounds for recall by due process isnot even a requirement.II.SOME PRELIMINARYCONDITIONS FOR FILING ANDINITIATING OF RECALLPETITIONSThe Elections Act 2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011,p. 630) Section 45 (5) is clearly unconstitutionalwhen it provides that a recall petition shall not befiled against a Member of Parliament more thanonce during the term of that member ofParliament. This provision would only makesense in the case of avoidance of double jeopardywhere the High Court has in a previous instanceruled against the confirmation of the very same15

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201216charge. It would not make sense if the member ofParliament has engaged in a differentcontravention of the provisions specified in thegrounds, or if the High Court had confirmed thevery same charge and the recall petition had forsome reason not exhausted its process.The Section 45 (6) of The Elections Act 2011(Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 630) is also clearlyunconstitutional when it stipulates that someonewho unsuccessfully contested an election underthe Act shall not directly or indirectly be eligibleto initiate a recall petition. This is discriminatoryto persons who have unsuccessfully contestedelections. Article 104 of the Constitution(Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 69), as shouldindeed be, has endowed the right of recall on theelectorate as such.III. CONDITIONS FOR CIRCULATING ARECALL PETITIONSome of the conditions specified for circulatingthe petition are clearly problematic.1. The Petitioner Must have BeenRegistered as a Voter in the RespectiveElection:Section 46 (1) of The Elections Act 2011(Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 630) provides that apetition can only be filed by one who isregistered as a voter in the respective jurisdiction.What is however problematic is an additionalrequirement that the petitioner must have been aregistered voter in the election in respect ofwhich the recall is sought. Again, Article 104 ofthe Constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p.69), as should indeed be, has endowed the rightof recall on the electorate as such.2. Signature Requirements:The signature requirements as provided inSection 46(2, 3, and 4) of The Elections Act 2011(Republic of Kenya, 2011, p. 631) are toostringent, and needlessly so. This is because ashas been argued in Section I above, first thegrounds specified by the Act for recall are nonpoliticaland involve the violation of Chapter Sixof the Constitution or mismanagement of publicresources. Secondly the violations of the groundshave to be confirmed by a judgement renderedby the High Court.The Act states that the petition must beaccompanied by the signatures of voters in therespective jurisdiction making at least 30% of itsregistered voters. Further to that, the 30% figuremust have a spread of at least 15% of registeredvoters in at least half of the number of wards ineither the respective county (in the case of aSenate seat) or the respective constituency (in thecase of a National Assembly seat). Additionally,the 30 % figure must have a spread in terms ofrepresenting “the diversity of people in thecounty or constituency as may be the case”.These signature requirements are extremelydemanding. The 30% sum of registered voters ina jurisdiction is already demanding enough evenbefore it is saddled with the two additionalrequirements for ward and diversity spread. Thesituation is even worsened by the requirementthat the petitioner has to collect and submit thesignatures to the Independent Electoral andBoundaries Commission within 30 days.Perhaps a picture of how demanding thoserequirements are can be gleaned fromcomparisons with provisions from otherjurisdictions.(a). British Columbia, Canada: The signaturerequirements for recall of a member of theLegislative Assembly are very demanding. Thepetitioner has 60 days to collect signatures frommore than 40 per cent of the voters who wereregistered to vote in the Member’s electoraldistrict in the last election. However, unlike inthere are no set grounds with the petitioner onlyrequired to provide a statement of why thelegislator should be recalled. One maynevertheless have to agree that the politicalevents that led to the adoption of the recall in theCanadian Province resulted in “a law thatdangles the prospect of recall …even as it renders[it] essentially unworkable” (Johnston, 2009),and the same could be said of Kenya.16

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201217(a). Ecuador: The request for recall must bebacked by a number accounting for only no lessthan 10% of the persons registered in thecorresponding voter registration list. In the caseof the President of the Republic, backing by anumber accounting for no less than 15% of thepersons registered in the electoral registration list(Ecuador, 2011). There are no otherrequirements.(b). Federated States of Micronesia, Chuuk,Pohnpei, and Yap: Article IX, Section 5, of theConstitution(Federated States of Micronesia,2011a) provides that; (a) a petition for recall ofthe Governor or Lieutenant Governor may beinitiated by a majority of all mayors in the Stateof Chuuk, or by registered voters equal innumber to at least 15 % of those who voted inthe last general election for Governor andLieutenant Governor;(b) a petition for recall of a Senator or aRepresentative may be initiated by a majority ofall mayors in the applicable Representativedistrict or Senatorial Region, or by registeredvoters from such district or region equal innumber to at least 20% of those who voted in thelast general election in such district or region.(c). Federated States of Micronesia, Kosrae:Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution(Federated States of Micronesia, 2011b) providesthat the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, ajustice of the State Court, or a Senator may beremoved from office by recall initiated by apetition, and be signed by at least 25% of thepersons qualified to vote for the office occupiedby the official, except that recall of a justice ofthe State Court requires the same number ofsignatures as a statewide elective office.(d) Germany: The constitutions of some statesgive the electorate the right to recall entirelegislatures.(i) In Baden-Wuerttemberg that can be initiatedthrough a petition signed by 200, 000.00registered voters, as per part II Article 43 of theconstitution (Baden–Wuerttemberg., 1953). Thepopulation of that state is in the range of around10, 000, 000.00 (European Social Fund, nd) sothat the number of signatures required makes upjust about 2.5% of the population.(ii) Bavaria: In Bavaria, the constitution in TitleII, Article 18 (2) (Bayern, 1946), provides for arecall of the entire legislature in a referendum ifpetitioned by 1, 000, 000.00 registered voters.The population of Bavaria now stands atapproximately 12, 443,893 (Government of theState of Bavaria, 2011). The required number ofsignatures is thus below 10% of the totalpopulation. About 84.5% of the population isabove 15 years of age, meaning that most ofthem are of voting age hence increasingpossibilities for the availability of potentialpetitioners.(iii) Berlin: According to the constitution of thecity-state of Berlin, Article 63, a recall of thecomplete legislature can be initiated by 20% ofthe registered electors (International Institute forDemocracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008, p.116). During a political crisis in January 1981 theChristian Democratic opposition started acitizens’ initiative to recall the legislature. Withina few days, 300,000 signatures – more than thequorum required – had been collected. In March,the parliament decided to call an early election inMay 1981, without waiting for the referendumvote. Since the goal of the initiative had beenreached the petition was withdrawn.(iii) Brandenburg: Article 76(1) of theconstitution (State of Brandenburg, 1992)provides for the recall of the entire legislaturethrough an initiative that has to be signed by atleast 150, 000.00 registered voters. Thepopulation of Brandenburg is about 2, 500,000.00 (Government of the State ofBrandenburg, circa 2004, p. 3), and thus therequired signatories is just above 5% of thepopulation.(iv) Bremen: Article 70 of the constitution(FreeHanse City of Bremen 1947) provides for aninitiation of recall of the entire legislaturethrough a petition signed by at one fifth ofregistered voters, i.e. about 20%.17

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201218(e). Kiribati: This presents another case of aquite high figure of signatures required for filinga recall petition. Chapter V, Section 59 (1) of theConstitution (Republic of Kiribati, 2007)provides that subject to the provisions ofsubsections (6) and (7) of the section, if theSpeaker receives a petition calling for theremoval of an elected member of the Maneaba niMaungatabu (legislature) signed by a majority ofthe persons who were registered as electors, atthe time of the last election of that member, inthe electoral district from which that memberwas last elected, he shall send the petitionforthwith to the Electoral Commission.(f). Liechtenstein: Article 48 of the Constitutionprovides that the entire legislature may berecalled if up to 1,500 Liechtenstein citizenseligible to vote or four municipalities, by meansof resolutions of their municipal assemblies,demand a popular vote on the dissolution(Liechtenstein, 2009). The population ofLiechtenstein was in July 2011 estimated atabout 35, 236 (Index Mundi, 2011). Thus thesum of 1500 eligible voters required to sign apetition to recall the legislature is less than 5% ofthe entire population at least. Those of votingage were estimated to make up about 84% of thepopulation, i.e. a figure of about 29, 571. So thesum of 1500 eligible voters is just about 5% of thepopulation of eligible voters. Of course one musttake into account the fact that it would not be toobig a problem to organize an election for 35, 000,so that the recall of the entire legislatures shouldnot be that much of a big deal.(g). Nigeria: This appears to be on the sameprohibitive side as in the Kenyan case. Articles69 and 110 of the Constitution of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 1999(Law, 2009) provide thatrecall petitions for either members of theNational Assembly of the Senate has to be signedby more than one-half of the persons registeredto vote in that member's constituency allegingtheir loss of confidence in that member.(h). Palau: Article IX, Section 17 of theConstitution(Constitution of the Republic ofPalau, 1981) provides that the people may recalla member of the Olbiil Era Kelulau (legislature)18if initiated by a petition signed by not less than25% of the number of persons who voted in themost recent election for that member of theOlbiil Era Kelulau.(i). The US: In the 19 states that have recallprovisions, as listed in Table 2 below, thesignature requirements are also more or less as inthe other jurisdictions based on a formula,generally, a percentage of the vote in the lastelection for the office in question, although somestates base the formula on the number of eligiblevoters or other variants. The signaturerequirements, as one can see from Table 2, are:25% in nine states; 25% for state wide offices and35% for other offices in Washington; one-third(1/3) in Louisiana; and 40 % in Kansas.California's requirements are 12% for state wideoffices and 20 % for state senators and appellatejudges(Constitution of the State of California,1879). Georgia requires 15% for state wideoffices, and 30% for all others. Idaho requires20% for all offices. Montana has the lowestnumber of required signatures, i.e. 10% for statewide officials and 15% for state district officessuch as legislative districts.A look at the percentages in Table 2 indicatesthat the average percentage of signaturesrequired for state wide officials (governors, statelegislators, and other state officials) in the 19states, is about 22.7%. One arrives at thataverage percentage by adding the percentagesprovided for each state in regard to state wideoffices and then dividing it by 19. In the case ofCalifornia one has to get the average percentagebetween the 12% for some state wide offices andthe 20% for other state wide offices like senatorsand appellate judges. In Louisiana one has to getthe average percentage between the 33.3% forjurisdictions with over 1000 voters and the 40%for those with over 1000 voters.Only in the cases of California and Illinois arethere additional requirements relating to spreadof the percentage of signatures needed, and theseare hardly as prohibitive as in the Kenyan case.In California the 12% needed for state wideoffices (other than senators and appellate andtrial judges, and members of the Board ofEqualization) has only to include 1% from each

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201219of only 5 out of a total 58 counties. The 2010census (California Department of Finance 2011)put the population of California at 37 million,almost the entire population of Kenya. TheCalifornia petitioner has 160 days (more than IV. 5months) circulation time, whereas the Kenyanone has 30 days (only 1 month). In Illinoissignatures needed are of at least 15% of the votescast for governor in the preceding generalelection in each of each of at least only 25 out ofa total of 102 counties. This is the onlyrequirement and is not saddled with another onesuch as 30% of signatures of electors in Illinois asan addition to the 15% of signatures needed fromeach of 25 counties. The Illinois petitioner has150 days (5 months) circulation time.Only in 4 out the 19 states with recallprovisions are there signature requirements ofmore than 25%. In Georgia, signatures of 30%of eligible voters for office at time of last electionare needed for non-state wide offices. This hasnot been saddled with a spread or any otherrequirement. The Georgia petitioner has 90 dayscirculation time (3 months). In Kansas,signatures of electors equivalent to 40% of thevotes cast in the last election for the official beingrecalled are needed for all offices. This is theonly requirement and has not been saddled witha spread or any other requirement. The Kansaspetitioner has 90 days circulation time (3months). In Louisiana, signatures of 33.3 %eligible voters is needed for recall in jurisdictionswith over 1000 eligible voters and signatures of40% of eligible voters in jurisdictions of less than1000 eligible voters. There is no additionalrequirement and the petitioner has 90 days (3months). In Washington, signatures of anequivalent of 35% of the votes cast in the lastelection for the official being recalled are neededin the case of non- state wide offices. There is noadditional requirement, and the petitioner has180 days (6 months) circulation time.(j). Venezuela: Article 72 of the Constitutionprovides that all magistrates and other officesfilled by popular vote are subject to revocation. Anumber of voters constituting at least 20% of thevoters registered in the pertinent circumscriptionmay extend a petition for the calling of areferendum to revoke such official's mandate19(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2011). Thereare no additional signature requirements.IV. THE RECALL ELECTION AND THERESULTING SPECIAL ELECTION1. Is A Simple Majority Decision Neededin the Recall Election? Or Must Therebe a Mandate of at 50% of RegisteredVoters?If the circulation conditions in The Election Act2011 (Republic of Kenya, 2011) have createdquite an insurmountable hurdle, then theconditions for the recall election and theresulting special election are equally forbidding ifnot confusing. Section 47 (5) states that a recallelection shall be decided by a simple majority ofvoters voting in the recall election. Section 48 onthe other hand states that a recall election shallbe valid if the number of voters who concur inthe recall election is at least 50% of the totalnumber of registered voters in the respectivejurisdiction (county or constituency).Three things arise here: Lack of clarity, anapparent contradiction, or a condition thatwould be very difficult to meet in a Kenyan byelection.(a) Lack of Clarity: First it is unclear whetherSection 48 applies to the recall election ofSection 47 (1-6) which is like a referendum onwhether or not to recall the legislator, or whetherit applies to the resulting special election ofSection 47 (6-7) which is subsequent to the recallelection returning a verdict in favour of a recall.(b) An Apparent Contradiction or at Least aParadox: Secondly If Section 48 applies to therecall election, then it would be a contradiction,since a condition of a simple majority of thevoters voting either way in the recall election as adeciding factor (Section 47, 5) is not one and thesame thing as requiring that the recall be validonly if at least 50% of the total number ofregistered voters decide in favour. Section 48refers only to the recall election rather than to the

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201220subsequent special election referred to in Section47 (6-7).(c) A Near Impossible Hurdle to Surmount in aKenyan Special Election: Let us assume, giventhe lack of clarity, that Section 48 applies to boththe preceding recall election and the specialelection dependent on the former returningverdict in favour of recall. A validity condition ofat least 50% of the total number of registeredvoter voting in favour either in the recall or in thespecial election is very difficult to achieve in aKenyan special election, leave alone a validitycondition of at least 50% of those voting decidingin favour. This can be gleaned from results ofrecent parliamentary special elections within theyears 2009-2011, and even the constitutionalreferendum of 2010:(i) At the referendum, Kenya had12,616,627 registered voters. Votes castboth in favour and against the then draftconstitution, were 9, 106, 285. The voterturnout was 72.18% (Kenya, 2010).(ii) Parliamentary Special Elections in 2011:On the 23 rd of May 2011 IkolomaniConstituency then had 35,434 registeredvoters. Votes cast were 24, 592, making avoter turnout of 69.4%. This was quite ahigh figure by Kenyan special electionvoter turnout percentages (Kenya,2011a). On the 18 th of August 2011Kamukunji Constituency had 128, 526registered voters. Votes cast were 40,474making a voter turnout of 31.49% in anurban constituency where voting shouldordinarily be relatively easier. Thecombined average turnout percentage forthese two by-elections in 2011 was50.44% (Kenya, 2011b).number of 22,027 registered voters(Kenya, 2011f). Votes cast were 16, 084,making a turnout of 73.02%. MakadaraConstituency had 124,493 registeredvoters, 50,187 votes were cast, and theturnout was 40% (Kenya, 2011d).Kirinyaga Central Constituency had56,595 registered voters, out of 38,702voted, and the turnout was 68%. Theaverage turnout for 2010 was 49.82%(Kenya, 2011c).(iv) Parliamentary Special Elections in 2009:Matuga Constituency had 41, 719registered voters with 32,895 voting,making a turnout of 77.6% (Kenya,2009b). Shinyalu had 40,950, and 25, 277votes were cast, making a turnout of61.73% (Kenya, 2009c) . Bomachoge had51,515 registered voters with 35,785voting, and making a turnout of 69%(Kenya, 2009a).(v)Combined Average Voter Turnout inParliamentary Special Elections in 2009,2010, and 2011. The average turnout for2009, at 69.44%, was much higher thanthose of 2010 and 2011. The combinedaverage turnout for by-elections in thosethree years is 56.56%. It is difficult withsuch an average percentage of voterturnout to see how a recall election or arecall special election could attain avalidity condition of at least 50% of thetotal number of registered voters votingin favour, leave alone a voter turnout ofat least 50% of the total number ofregistered voters. Out of 9 specialelections 4 had voter turnouts of below50%.(iii) Parliamentary Special Elections in 2010: V. CONCLUSIONOn the 20 th of September StareheConstituency had 135,576 registeredvoters. Votes cast totalled 56,205, makinga voter turnout of 41.46 % (Kenya,2011e). Wajir South was quite interestingfor a rural and quite vast constituency inThe Constitution of Kenya (Republic of Kenya,2010, p. 69) did not grant the right to recalllegislators in vain. As a matter of fact that rightwas grounded in the express Statement in Article1 (2) that the people may exercise their sovereignan arid part of the country. It had a total power either directly or through their20

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201221democratically elected representatives (Republicof Kenya, 2010, p. 13). Parliament has vitiatedthose provisions by creating a recall “law thatdangles the prospect of recall…even as it rendersit essentially unworkable” (Johnston, 2009).The grounds specified for recall have beenfaithful to the requisites for the conduct of stateofficers of Chapter Six of the Constitution.Besides, those grounds have to be confirmedthrough due process by the High Court. Here theAct has evaded one of the criticisms of recall, i.e.it can be used as a political tool by organisedcampaigns to target marginal seats (Coleman,2011).However, the conditions for circulating a recallpetition, especially the signature requirements,seem to have created an insurmountable hurdle,as can be gleaned from comparisons with otherjurisdictions with recall provision. That this neednot be the case can be argued on consideration ofthe fact that grounds for recall have to beconfirmed by due process. Equally, theConstitution in Article 75 (a) and (b) alreadyprovides (Republic of Kenya, 2010) for dismissalor removal of office as possible disciplinarygrounds for contravention of most of thosegrounds.The conditions for the recall election and theresulting special election, i.e. that there has to bea voter a mandate of at least 50% of registeredvoters concurring with the recall is forbidding.Since the Elections Act in this regard appears to bein direct contravention of the expressconstitutional provision of direct exercise ofsovereignty of which the recall expresslyconstitutionally provided for is an instance, it canbe challenged on constitutional and othergrounds.21

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201222Table 1: Grounds for Recall in 8 US StatesGrounds for RecallAlaska: Lack of fitness, incompetence, neglect of duties or corruption (AS §15.45.510)Georgia: Act of malfeasance or misconduct while in office; violation of oath of office; failure toperform duties prescribed by law; will fully misused, converted, or misappropriated, withoutauthority, public property or public funds entrusted to or associated with the elective office to whichthe official has been elected or appointed. Discretionary performance of a lawful act or a prescribedduty shall not constitute a ground for recall of an elected public official. (Ga. Code §21-4-3(7) and21-4-4(c)).Kansas: Conviction for a felony, misconduct in office, incompetence, or failure to perform dutiesprescribed by law. No recall submitted to the voters shall be held void because of the insufficiency ofthe grounds, application, or petition by which the submission was procured. (KS Stat. §25-4301).Minnesota: Serious malfeasance or nonfeasance during the term of office in the performance of theduties of the office or conviction during the term of office of a serious crime (Const. Art. VIII §6).Montana: Physical or mental lack of fitness, incompetence, violation of oath of office, officialmisconduct, conviction of certain felony offenses (enumerated in Title 45). No person may berecalled for performing a mandatory duty of the office he holds or for not performing any act that, ifperformed, would subject him to prosecution for official misconduct. (Mont. Code §2-16-603).Rhode Island: Authorized in the case of a general officer who has been indicted or informed againstfor a felony, convicted of a misdemeanour, or against whom a finding of probable cause of violationof the code of ethics has been made by the ethics commission (Const. Art. IV §1).Virginia: Neglect of duty, misuse of office, or incompetence in the performance of duties when thatneglect of duty, misuse of office, or incompetence in the performance of duties has a materialadverse effect upon the conduct of the office, or upon conviction of a drug-related misdemeanour ora misdemeanour involving a "hate crime" (§24.2-233).22

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201223Table 2: Signature Requirements for Circulating a Recall Petition in US StatesAlaskaArizonaCaliforniaColoradoGeorgiaSignature RequirementsCirculation Time25% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled Not specified25% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled 120 daysFor state wide officers: 12% of the votes cast in the last election for the 160 daysofficial being recalled, 1% from each of 5 counties.State Senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board ofEqualization, judges of courts of appeal: 20% of the votes cast in thelast election for the official being recalled25% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled 60 daysFor state wide officers: 15% of eligible voters for office at time of last 90 dayselection, 1/5 from each congressional district.Others: 30% of eligible voters for office at time of last electionIdaho 20% of eligible voters for office at time of last election 60 daysIllinois 15% of the votes cast for governor in the preceding general election 150 daysfrom each of at least 25 counties. Also required are the signatures fromat least 20 members of the House of Representatives and 10 membersof the Senate, with no more than half the signatures of members ofeach chamber from the same political party.Kansas 40% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled 90 daysLouisiana If over 1,000 eligible voters: 33.3% of eligible voters for office at time 180 daysof last election.If fewer than 1,000 eligible voters:40% of eligible voters for office at time of last electionMichigan 25% of total votes cast for position at last election 90 daysMinnesota 25% of total votes cast for position at last election 90 daysMontana For state wide officers: 10% of eligible voters for office at time of last 3 monthselectionFor district officers: 15% of eligible voters for office at time of lastelectionNevada 25% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled 60 daysNew Jersey 25% of the registered voters in the electoral district of the official Governor or U.S.sought to be recalledSenator: 320 daysAll others: 160 daysNorth Dakota 25% of the votes cast in the last election for the official being recalled Not specifiedOregon 15% of total votes cast in officer's district for all candidates for 90 daysgovernor in the last electionRhode Island 15% of total votes cast for said office in last general election 90 daysWashingtonFor state wide officers:25% of the votes cast in the last election for theofficial being recalledOthers:35% of the votes cast in the last election for the official beingrecalledState wide officers: 270daysOthers: 180 daysWisconsin 25% of total votes cast for the office of governor at the last electionwithin the same district or territory of that officer being recalledSource: National Conference of State Legislatures, 201160 days23

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201224ReferencesBaden–Wuerttemberg., V.D.L. (1953)Verfassung Des Landes Baden –Wuerttemberg, Vom 11 November 1953(State of Baden Wuerttemberg, 1953).Bayern, F.S.o. (1946) Gesetz- undVerordnungsblatt für den FreistaatBayern 1946 Nr. 23 vom 8.Dezember1946. Verfassung DesFreistates Bayern, Vom 2 Dezember1946, in Kraft Getreten am 8 Dezember1946. Munich: Gesetz- undVerordnungsblatt für den FreistaatBayern.Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. (2011)Constitution of the Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela, 2011).California Department of Finance (2011) Census2010. In: C.D.o. Finance (Ed). CaliforniaState Data Center, Sacramento CA.Coleman, C. (2011) Recall Elections. London:Library of the House of Commons.Constitution of the Republic of Palau. (1981)Constitution of the Republic of Palau,1981 (World Intellectual PropertyOrganisation, 2011). In.Constitution of the State of California. (1879)Constitution of the State of California,1879 (State of California, 2011). In.Ecuador, C.o. (2011) Constitution of Ecuador of2008. George Town University, EdmundA. Walsh School of Foreign Service,Center for Latin American Studies.Federated States of Micronesia, S.o.C., . .(2011a) Constitution of the State ofChuuk, 2005. Weno: Legal InformationSystem of the Federated States ofMicronesia.Federated States of Micronesia, S.o.K., . .(2011b) Constitution of the State ofKosrae, 2005. Tofol: Legal InformationSystem of the Federated States ofMicronesia.Free Hanse City of Bremen (1947) VerfassungDer Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vom 21Oktober 1947. Bremen: BremerGesetzblatt 1947 S. 251ff.Index Mundi. (2011) LiechtensteinDemographics Profile, 2011.Johnston, R. (2009) A Piece of DemocraticWindow Dressing. Sydney MorningHerald, 30th December.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2009a) Bomachoge By-Election Results. Nairobi: InterimIndependent Electoral Commission ofKenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2009b) Matuga By-Elections.Nairobi: Interim Independent ElectoralCommission of Kenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2009c) Shinyalu By-ElectionResults. Nairobi: Interim IndependentElectoral Commission of Kenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2010) Comprehensive IIECFinal 2010 Referendum Results. InterimIndependent Electoral Commission ofKenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011a) Ikolomani FinalResults May 23rd 2011. Nairobi: InterimIndependent Electoral Commission ofKenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011b) Kamukunji By-Election Results. Nairobi: InterimIndependent Electoral Commission ofKenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011c) Kirinyaga By-ElectionResults. Nairobi: Interim IndependentElectoral Commission of Kenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011d) Makadara By-ElectionResults. Nairobi: Interim IndependentElectoral Commission of Kenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011e) Starehe Results.Nairobi: Interim Independent ElectoralCommission of Kenya.Kenya, I.I.E.C.o. (2011f) Wajir South Results.Nairobi: Interim Independent ElectoralCommission of Kenya.Law, I.C.f.N. (2009) Constitution of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 1999. Abuja andLagos: International Centre for NigerianLaw.Legislatures, N.C.o.S. (2011) NationalConference of State Legislatures. Const.Art. II §8Liechtenstein, P.o. (2009) Constitution of thePrincipality of Liechtenstein.Republic of Kenya. (2010) The Constitution ofKenya, 2010. Nairobi: GovernmentPrinter.24

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201225Republic of Kenya. (2011) Elections Act, 2011.Nairobi: Government Printer.Republic of Kiribati. (2007) Constitution ofKiribati, 1979.State of Brandenburg. (1992) Verfassung DesLandes Brandenburg, vom 20 August1992 Gesetz- und VerordnungblattBrandenburg 1992 Teil I. S. 298 ff.Potsdam: Gesetz- und VerordnungblattBrandenburg.25

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201226Learning from a Friend: Everyday Intelligence and the Constitution of RepublicDavid William CohenProfessor Emeritus of Anthropology and History, Ann Arbor, MI USA, E-mail: dwcohen@umich.eduABSTRACTThe late Professor E. S. Atieno Odhiambo evolved a way of understanding the world throughengaging the actions and expression of everyday life. He eloquently and amply demonstrated that thediscourses among acquaintances and friends, through ordinary and extraordinary associations in theeveryday, are essential to the constitution of republics.Key words: Intelligence, Constitution, Learning________________________________________________________________________The late Professor E. S. Atieno Odhiamboevolved a way of understanding the worldthrough engaging the actions and expression ofeveryday life. He eloquently and amplydemonstrated that the discourses amongacquaintances and friends, through ordinary andextraordinary associations in the everyday, areessential to the constitution of republics.Jane and family, Prof. Masolo, Prof. Ogot, DeanFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Prof. SussyGumo, and staff of Maseno. . .thank you foryour invitation to be here for this conference. Iam so pleased to be able to be back with youthese days after so many years away, and sadthat I cannot share this visit with my dearcolleague Atieno.I begin with an echoing the observations of manydear colleagues of the late Professor AtienoOdhiambo, that he had a unique attraction to theimpromptu.Some twenty years ago at the African StudiesAssociation annual meeting in the USA, from apodium such as this, with me and Atieno sideby-side,Atieno asked—indeed, insisted that—every person who had been in Kenya in 1985 or1986 (among some two or three hundred in theroom) speak to what she or he thought was goingon in the SM Otieno burial saga--“what the casewas really about and how the story should betold!” It was remarkable how many people in theroom had been in Kenya during that time andremembered some part or another of the story.One of them even narrated waking up from acoma in hospital in Nairobi and hearing nursestalking of the case.The book we eventually produced, Burying SM(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992)--thesecond of the three books we wrote togetherbetween 1984 and 2004--was a text describing anincredible debate. For Atieno, debate andcritique, informed by philosophical reflectionand knowledge of the everyday, was an essentialpiece of living in the world. But his world, theworld he encouraged in everything he did, couldnot be segmented into scholarly and publicdomains. If we listened, ordinary lives and theeveryday were thick with ideas, critique, debate,imagination, and knowing.I recall that Atieno was both serious about andskeptical of virtually every claim and assertionmade by all those involved in the SM Otienosaga, including SM’s widow Wambui WaiyakiOtieno. Therefore, it was not quite predictable,but it should have been, that Atieno would agreeto draft the “Foreword” to Mau Mau’sDaughter: A Life History (Otieno, 1988),Wambui’s provocative account of her life and of26

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201227the burial saga. His goal was not to assert thecorrectness of one side or another but rather tomake sure that publics would be able to readWambui in her own terms rather than from whatpeople said and wrote about her. As he workedthrough rough drafts of her manuscript, Atienosurely saw that Wambui’s life—as she was tryingto tell it--reflected all the complexities andunpredictable fates of ordinary people, a matatutout, a migrant laborer, a housemaid, a gravedigger, a kiosk owner, a member of the bar, achild, and, yes, a foot-soldier in the nationaliststruggle. . .all figures passing through the socalled“SM saga”. These people were not“intellectuals” in unusual places but ordinarypeople experiencing and contributing toeveryday life. These people-- to whose activities,speech, and writings Atieno was so attentive--are the critical casts of competent anthropology,solid history, and outstanding fiction, and I takenote here especially of the beautiful writings ofGrace Ogot and Ngugi wa Thiong’o, to whichAtieno and I found our respective ways fromquite different trajectories.Atieno Odhiambo was an inspired scholar, onewhose achievements placed him in the highestechelon of historians of Africa. Yet Atieno nevernavigated away from his oneness with theordinary. His work was extraordinary . . .andyet characteristically so attentive to the ordinary,to the things which are all too familiar andhardly accounted. . .to the individuals, thepeople, who render lives possible but are hardlyseen. . .to the language and thought of peoplewhose writings and speech sustain the lives ofcommunities, publics, societies, and nations. . .tothe spaces of life such as the “republic of thetaxi” in which everyday intelligence is craftedand exchanged.My earliest memory of Atieno dates back toDecember 1973 at the great hall of theOrganization of African Unity in Addis Ababa inwhich the International Congress of Africanists.Professor Bethwell Allan Ogot was chairing thissession. I was presenting a paper on pre-colonialLuo history. Atieno was one of seven or eightlecturers and graduate students from Nairobisitting just above and behind my shoulder. Afterthe session wrapped, Atieno was the first toengage me. In a Congress in which there was anoverhanging tension regarding Africanization ofthe academy and the questionable place of thescholar from outside, Atieno welcomed mycontribution, through an engagement with theideas and arguments of the paper. And I feltwelcomed, as a scholar and colleague. We were,in a certain sense, kin, Atieno having beensupervised to a PhD in History at Nairobi byProfessor Ogot; in turn, Ogot and I were fellowstudents who had a few years earlier completedPhDs under the supervision of Roland Oliver atSOAS, University of London. In another way,Atieno and I worked in different landscapes: Iwas formed in the study of pre-colonial easternAfrican history; Atieno was just establishinghimself as a fresh and influential voice in thestudy of the colonial period. There was much tolearn from one other. Atieno’s work on thedeeper political and social contours of Kenya’ssettler colony drew him to recognize how oldorders and strongly held ideas and practicescould engage and shape new economic andpolitical forces and conditions. He wasconcerned with the partiality of Africanhistoriography focussing on studies ofcolonialism, nationalism, and decolonizationwhich had to take account of the real untidinessof historical development; that scholars mustrecognize the strangeness and consequentfailures of compartmentalized knowledgeproduced in universities with research programsordered in and divided among disciplines.Atieno’s first two books, ‘The Paradox ofCollaboration and Other Essays (Atieno-Odhiambo,1974)’ and ‘Siasa: Politics and Nationalism in EastAfrica, 1905-1939 (Atieno Odhiambo, 1981)’27

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201228reflected the possibilities of a new historicalliterature formed through the exercise ofquestions, approaches, and theory from multiplesites and engaged with diverse literatures. If aunified Kenyan history could be synthesized, itrequired more than an assemblage of pieces andregions. It would be constituted in therecognition of the salience of difference andcontest—especially over class, wealth, access toresources, power--as much as the commonalityof experience and affinity. Here, Atieno’s deepand extraordinary knowledge of, engagementwith, Oginga Odinga and the works of his life—signalled early in Atieno’s early publications onthe Luo thrift and trading corporation(LUTATCO)--moved understanding andmeaning away from the easier stuff of labels andcategories towards a search for that newhistorical literature that transforms the meaningsand purposes of political economy, historicalsociology, comparative politics, and historicalanthropology. His early writing on Mau Mauwas about the movement for sure, but also aboutthe implications of “Mau Mau historiography”amid a search for some kind of unified history ofKenya or of decolonization. This was a metahistoricalquestion unfamiliar to many workingthe furrows of recovering East Africa’s past inthe 1970s, though it was certainly the subject ofsteamy debates in junior/senior common roomsat the University of Nairobi. Later, Atienowould join with John Lonsdale in a dedicatedengagement with scholarship on Mau Mau--MauMau and Nationhood. And, when the momentcame to honor the father of modern Kenyanhistoriography, Professor Ogot, it was Atieno towhom everyone looked at, as the one to pull offthis tribute, as he did in the collected volumehonoring Ogot that Atieno edited: AfricanHistorians and African Voices (Atieno-Odhiambo,2001).We found common ground in the intriguingintersections of layered historical studies :"Ayany, Malo, and Ogot: Historians in Searchof a Luo Nation," Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines,(Ayany et al., 1987). And we found commonground in the discoveries of histories that seemeda bit more complicated than the resident truthsand histories that shifted the focus of historicalinterpretation and representation. The essentialargument of my 1973 Congress paper—that theNilotic Luo speaking migrants of the 16 th or 17 thcenturies comprised not one cultural andhistorical formation but at least two distinctivesets of footprints (Jok’Owiny and Jok’Omolo)--found its way into our first conversations butthen also into the first chapter of our first coauthoredbook, Siaya: The Historical Anthropologyof an African Landscape (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989). In our work together on thatbook, Atieno and I found ourselves in productiveconversations regarding the possibilities ofbridging the differences in orientation thatdistinguished pre-colonial African histories fromthose focusing on the colonial period. In thoseconversations, some of which were in Baltimoreand Washington during Atieno’s visitingprofessor appointment at Johns Hopkins in 1985-86, where I was a member of the History faculty.These conversations continued through thick andthin across some twenty years, and throughseveral published papers and two more books.One of those conversations took place in a smallairplane terminal in Tennessee where, as wespoke with each other, we saw a plane crashupon landing.There was a question that seemed too common.How did we work this collaboration, writetogether, co-author, across different formation,different locations of our work, differentexperiences of living in the world? I have alwayssensed in these queries the anticipation of ananswer: Cohen, in the US, provides the gesturesto scholarly literatures and philosophicaldomains; Atieno, in Kenya, provides theempirical stuff. But this presumption was wrong!28

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201229Despite Atieno’s rich and poetic sense of thecomplexities of the lived world of Kenyans,Atieno was generous in giving me space to workthrough what I understood was going on “on theground” when I drew on my own field researchin Uganda and Kenya or on my zest for closereading of court records, narrative accounts, andnewspapers. Atieno’s strongest contributionswere always in surprising reaches into worldliteratures, fiction, poetry, drama, music,philosophy, and biography. During times of ourmost intense work on Risks of Knowledge (Cohenand Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004), and well afterAtieno had harnessed his hands to a computerkeyboard, he would send me two or threereferential fragments a day, occasionally severalin an hour’s burst. Atieno was able to introduceinto our work remarkably salient ideas engagingwith Marx, Hobsbawm, Thompson, Mudimbe,and Garcia Marquez—who else among my closecolleagues could quote from Gibbon, Paz, theOld Testament and the New, and Richard II, viaShakespeare?-- but he was also able to bring intoplay the word-games and songs of Kenyanchildren. In 1985-86, at Johns Hopkins, Atienowas a visiting professor who not only taughtstudents working in different fields of history butalso a visitor who turned up and participated inan extraordinary array of seminars andconferences across the university. The JohnsHopkins métier was the robust discussion ofpapers read in advance and Atieno alwaysseemed the one in the room to have read thepaper most carefully and the one most preparedto introduce ideas from unexpected regions oflife. His interventions could be most productive;he never, however, required the discussion toturn in his direction. More, he came to thediscussion and contributed to it uniquely andquietly.Atieno certainly valued the open quality of theHopkins seminar. Once, in early October 1985,we travelled together with Rhys Isaac to acollege in the south-western corner of Virginia togive a few papers and classes for the faculty andstudents there. Atieno remarked the strongdistinction between the Hopkins style of seminarin which people work together on a paperaround a table and the architectures ofclassrooms and instruction at that Virginiacollege in which chairs and tables were bolted tothe floors in lecture room style and the studentswere riveted to a learning environment that didnot encourage open discussion. Curiously,importantly, the paper Rhys Isaac gave at thecollege that day was a compression of a longerargument that the Jeffersonian-Madisonianprinciples of freedom of worship came not out ofan exquisite philosophical library, or somesingular pre-constitutional theory, but rather outof the efforts to engage, to acknowledge, therough and tumble struggles of Baptists, throughpetitions and otherwise, to find security in acolony, Virginia, whose religious and politicallife was ordered by the Established Church.Here, again, it was a history of a formativedebate among people of all walks of life that wasproducing a free republic. When Atieno reachedRice and organized seminars and workshopsthere, he encouraged and expected conversation,participation, from around the room, bringingeveryone into the discussion and debate, givingeveryone occasion to speak. In the Riceworkshops, Atieno’s approach was not onlyencouraging an open seminar style, à la Hopkins;he was also cultivating common conversationscholars from Africa and the U.S, and amongscholars from multiple disciplines (includingoccasionally from outside the academy). I hadthe good fortune to be present at a few of theseRice events, and I recall thinking of them as theacademic instantiation of the idea of “therepublic of the taxi,” a construction that Atienolaunched into our common work. In oneworkshop at least, he sung as verse his ownconcluding remarks, astonishing us with both his29

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201230erudition and his playfulness, not to speak of hisbeautiful voice.Atieno certainly knew, and surely experiencedbodily, the differences between the free republicsof ideas and debate that he could uncover ineveryday life, as well as those he could himselffoster, and those arenas of repression andlimitation that so affected his teaching andwriting career in Kenya from the early 1970sthrough to his departure for Rice in the late1980s. Where some of my colleagues in my fieldmight be hard to find in their offices, Atieno wasalways there listening to students and lecturers,responding to questions, sharing his own libraryof published and unpublished work, at leastwhen he did not have to go in hiding during thepurge-like times when Kenyan securityattempted to control free speech and expressionand freedom of organization on the Nairobicampus and beyond. Atieno was close to anumber of Kenyan intellectuals and academics—students and faculty—who found themselves introuble and detention. Atieno and his universitycolleagues were experienced McCarthy-ismKenya style. Atieno was certainly threatenedwith arrest—“man, you have been warned!”--and he was arrested and detained, and tortured,across an extended period in 1986. I know thatAtieno took incredible risks in associatinghimself with colleagues in trouble. I wish I couldsay that about more of his colleagues in thosedark days who showed none of the same couragewhen some of us working outside Kenya tried toassist with Atieno’s release in 1986. The futureand authoritative biographies of figures such asNgugi wa Thiong’o and Raila Odinga will surelynote the devoted support, at his own great risk,that Atieno gave to these individuals when theKenyan state turned on them. I knew notenough, or perhaps too much, regarding Atieno’sengagements in the early 1980s, but I sense thatfuture histories of Kenya will have to attend tothese years, will have to give space to theseactivities, as constitutive of the greaterdemocracy that Kenyans have sought in recentelection. There are gap years in my knowledgeof Atieno’s career. While doing fieldwork inSiaya between early 1979 and 1981, I visitedLiganua on several occasions, bringing fish, rice,bread, tea, and sugar to Atieno’s mother, thoughI never did catch sight of him. I know that therewere many strands to his life that I knew little of,and I do not comment here on the “republic” ofhis household in Houston, which I visited severaltimes, treasuring the warmth of his family, andthe richness of the intellectual lives that theyenjoyed in that house (or home).In Risks of Knowledge (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004), we worked through theproductions of knowledge developing around thedisappearance and death Kenya’s Minister ofForeign Affairs and International Cooperation,Robert Ouko, February 1990. We marked thesignificance—and anticipated the long-runningimportance of—the openness of the questions ofwho killed Ouko and how and why. We did not,emphatically, try to solve the question of “whodunnit”; rather we attempted to grasp andinterpret the specificities in play as knowledgeunfolded or was constructed around the forensicefforts of detectives, commissions, and others tosort through the evidence to reach—and notreach—answers to the question of who killedOuko and knowledge of Ouko and his demisewas elaborated as publics themselves siftedthrough the public records for meaning and foranswers. We did not go “to the field” to achievea privileged understanding of the various routesto knowledge but rather drew upon, and directedattention towards, the extraordinary public recorddeveloping out of the many investigations. Attimes, this work felt extremely risky, at least tome, because I could see that our intention, ourapproach, could be misunderstood as the next, andmaybe better, investigation of the crimesthemselves.30

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201231I worried for Atieno through this project offourteen years, if not also for myself, for I feltthat many paths that Atieno had himself taken inhis own now suddenly too short life were pathsthat overlapped with the generation of Ouko.For too many years, they had their loyaltiesquestioned by those in power in the country thatthey loved. They saw the breakage of ideas andideals of a Kenya republic by those entrusted toassure the delivery of a better Kenya to the nextgenerations. They saw that their own personalsafety lay in the difficult spaces between homeand exile. They knew that a greater countrywould only grow in those very ordinary spaceswhere speech, writing, and debate find andcreate energy, but only so if they would findprotection. They never gave up trying to make itso.I have titled my paper “Learning from a Friend.”I use the expression in three ways: first, ourfriend Atieno was uncommonly learned, always alearner, and so comfortable in sharing his thought,his learning, his experience with others; second,in its suggestion of the importance of friendship inthe movement of knowledge across different fieldsof interest and attention; and third, that so muchof my own understanding of the world, my ownlearning, evolved within our intensecollaborations across more than two decades.I can’t replace Atieno, it takes many of us tomake just a rough accounting of his life, amapping of his intellectual itineraries. Thediscussion here is not only about Atieno ormyself, or our relationship (about which I feel soprivileged), and it is not only about learning andknowledge in all their varieties; it is also aboutthe ways in which Atieno evolved a way ofunderstanding the world through the actions andexpression of everyday life. . .that the discoursesamong acquaintances and friends, throughordinary and extraordinary associations in theeveryday, are essential to the constitution ofrepublics.ReferencesAtieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1974) The Paradox ofcollaboration and other Essays. Nairobi:East African Literature Bureau.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2001) AfricanHistorians and African Voices. EssaysPresented to Professor Bethwell AllanOgot, Basel, Switzerland P. SchlettweinPublishingAtieno Odhiambo, E.S. (1981) Siasa: politics andnationalism in E.A., 1905-1939. KenyaLiterature Bureau.Ayany, Malo and Ogot. (1987) Historians inSearch of a Luo Nation. E. S. AtienoOdhiambo, David William CohenCahiers d'études africaines 27, 269-286.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.London: James Currey, 1989.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1992) Burrying S. M.: The Politics ofKnowledge and the Sociology of Powerin Africa. Portsmouth, NH, HeinemannEducational Books, and London, JamesCurrey Ltd.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(2004) The Risks of Knowledge:Investigations into the Death of the Hon.Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya,1990. Athens, OH, Ohio UniversityPress, and Nairobi, East AfricanEducational Publishers Ltd.Otieno, W.W. (1988) Mau Mau Daughter: ALife History. Boulder, CO: LynneRienner Publishers.31

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201232Historical Manifestation of Ethnocentrism and its Challenges TodayBishop Dr. Kasomo DanielFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno, Kenya,E-mail: dkasomocounselling@yahoo.com_____________________________________________________________________AbstractIn this article we have begun by defining ethnocentrism. According toanthropologists, the concept combines the belief that one’s own culture is superior toother cultures, with the practice of judging other cultures by the standards of one’sown culture. Sociologists and social-psychologists extend the term to group attitudesshown by religious, economic, racial, caste and class group within a larger socialorder. Ethnocentrism is also defined as a feeling that one’s own group has a mode ofliving, values and patterns of adaptation that are superior to other groups. This leadsto a generalized contempt of members of other groups. In conclusion, this paper pointout that in its extreme form, ethnocentrism may lead to violent cultural conflicts andethnic cleansing. This is followed by possible solutions to challenges raised in thepaper.Key words: Cleansing, Ethnology, Ethnicity, Ethnocentricism, GenocideIntroductionI have divided this paper into four main parts.Part one presents the clarification of terms. Thisis followed by part two which gives the historicalmanifestations of Ethnocentrism. Part Threeprovides an overview of Ethnic conflicts inSpecific African Countries. Summary,conclusion and proposals come in part four.Part OneClarification of TermsDifferent scholars have given their understandingof the term ethnocentrism. According toanthropologists, the concept combines the beliefthat one’s own culture is superior to othercultures, with the practice of judging othercultures by the standards of one’s own culture(Den Van, 1970). Ethnocentrism is also definedas a feeling that one’s own group has a mode ofliving, values and patterns of adaptation that aresuperior to other groups (Haviland, 1993).Ethnology is the scientific study of the origin andfunctioning of humans and their cultures. It is amajor branch of cultural anthropology.Ethnocentrism is a human universalphenomenon. It is believed by some scholars tobe as old as the human race (Kasomo, 2010b).This stand is justified thus “right from childhood,we learn what is good, moral, civilized andnormal according to our culture (Horton andHunt, 1968).” As a human universal reality,ethnocentrism is said to be more pronounced inmodern nations than in pre-literate “tribes”.Developed CountriesThe researcher has observed that people indeveloped countries of Europe and America tendto despise other nations and their customsterming them as queer and foolish, just becausethey are different from their own. The “westernchurch’ has not been spared from prejudices andbiases about African religion as revealed bymissionaries attitudes (Hiebert, 1997). It isbelieved that enthnocentrism is a major cause ofproblems between the western industrializedportion of the world and the developing nations.Ethnicity and the related concept of culturalidentity are essentially ambivalent concepts; theymay assume a positive as well as a negative32

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201233connotation (Kuria, 1998). However, thenegative aspects appear to be overemphasized inthe societies. It is for this reason that this papermay appear to overemphasize the negativeconnotations and their effects and manifestationof ethnocentrism.Major Sources of Ethnic ConflictsAn ethnic conflict is connected with land issues,resources, struggle for power and leadership oreducation, the former is genocide on a large scale(Aquilar, 1998). Ethnic cleansing is the worlds’horrifying manifestation of ethnocentrism.Genocide is, in fact, killing members of onepeople or simply imposing measures that presenttheir growth in population. It is the annihilationof a people or part of it. Genocide’s killings areplanned, intended and carried out systematicallyusing any weapon, be it crude or sophisticated.Theories of ethnocentrismScholars still speculate on the origin ofethnocentrism as no single theory can claim tohave the whole truth. When one considers theancient biblical story of the Egyptian Pharaohwho ordered the killing of all Hebrew males; the1990 - 91 Gulf war, recent development inRwanda, Burundi, Yugoslavia, Libya, Egypt andthe former Soviet Union and needless to mentionKenya, in a series of after-election violence/landclashes, it is evident that ethnocentrism is auniversal phenomenon.Constructivist’s TheoryThis is a school of thought that considersethnocentrism as a social construction. Thus,they hold that ethnicity can be constructed.Pschological/Primordialism TheoryThis is presented as the most conservative of thethree theories. It tends to over-stress theprimordial ties and makes them unquestionableor ineffable. Thus, the givenness that stems frombeing born into a particular religious community,speaking a particular language and followingcertain social practices (Freud, 1947). Thiscognition’s of blood, speech, customs, are seen tohave an ineffable and at times over-poweringcoerciveness in themselves. This theory furtherstates that the primordial ties lead to a creationof a natural community. Naturally, such ties arestronger and older than the modern nation-state.The elements are passed from generation togeneration forming a sort of historical continuity.Structural Theoryethnocentrism is generally held not to be a fact ofhuman nature “but a result of particularconditions.” ethnocentrism is caused (Mafeje,1971).Part TwoEthnocentrismHistorical ManifestationsClassifications of peoples have been ideologicallycreated, in which other peoples’ right to life wasdenied them simply because they were lookedupon as different. Therefore, cases of ethniccleansing and genocide emerge from situationsthat support the attitude of “US” and “Them”.They have this, yet we don’t, they worshipdifferently from us, they are a danger to oursecurity, they speak a different language from us,they want to seize power from us, they havekilled our own, they have more wealth than us,they have taken our land, among others. Theseare some of the reasons given for ethnic killingsand cleansings.Although Africa has, of late, experienced someof the worst consequences of ethnocentrism, itshould be noted that the problem is universal. InAfrica, the problem has had a long history. Inother words, the current manifestations ofethnocentrism are based on the origins of variousethnic groupings, preferences, attitudes, politics,colonialism, evangelization of Africa and otherpowerful external pressures, such as neocolonialismwith its economic and socialimplications. With time, certain stereotypebehaviours have been formed, consequentlyleading to the present realities facing Africa. TheRwandan and Burundi Genocides of 1994, and1992, 1997 and 2007 ethnic conflicts in Kenyahave not only shaken the continent of Africa toits basic foundations, but also the whole world.33

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201234The symbolic visit by the secretary general of theUN, Dr. Kofi Annan, to Rwanda in 1998 and inKenya in 2008 indicated the level ofinternational awareness and credit that has beenachieved.Ethnicity in itself does not connote a negativeattitude. On the contrary, ethnicity indicates agift of God which makes us different for ourmutual enrichment. It is God who makes each ofus as what we are. Ethnicity gives us our socialand cultural identity as well as our security. Theindividuals find their roots and values in theirethnic groups. One should not apologize forbelonging to a particular ethnic community.Since Africans are deeply religious, we shoulddiscuss and theologize within the ecclesial andhistorical experience of violence in Africa (Bujo,1986). I believe that if we have to address thephenomenon of ethnocentrism in a systematicmanner, it is proper to give it a historicalapproach.Historical development of ethnocentrismIn IsraelThe book of Exodus Chapter one tells us that aPharaoh who did not know Joseph ascended tothe Egyptian throne. He gave orders that all thenew born babies of the Hapiru (Hebrews) bekilled at birth. Here is an example of a genocidebased on demographic fear. The Pharaoh said,“Behold, the people of Israel are too - many andtoo mighty for us”. The able men were turnedinto slaves. This incident is usually attributed to“Pharaoh Rameses II who ruled from Ca 1298 -1232 BCE, (Kihumbi, 1985). This move by thePharaoh was in fact an incitement of his peopleto commit genocide against the Jews.When ethnocentric feeling gets both legal andreligious backings, it can lead to senseless ethniccleansing and genocide as the Israelite historyshows. From 1914 to 1918, the First World Warwas fought and millions of people died.EuropeThe worst manifestation of ethnocentrism inEurope was realized under Hitler of Germany.During the Second World War (1939-1945), over6 million Jews perished in the Nazi34concentration camps. Hitler was out to ensurethe survival of the pure Nazi race with blue eyes,special hair, intelligence, special height and evenwith special shape of the nose. The Jews did notqualify, hence the extermination policy. Aroundthis time, the ethnic clashes in Greece between1944-1949 left 160,000 people dead. The Russo-Hungarian war of the same period left 10,000people dead (Van de Goor, 1996).Ethnic tensions and clashesIn the Middle EastEthnic clashes and even genocide’s in Asia aremainly due to land problems, crave forautonomy and religious differences. The conflictsbetween the Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese andother Arab states, have been mainly over landsince 1947 and time of Moses in the Bible.The conflict between Kuwait and Iraq in 1990leading to the Gulf War in 1991 is anotherevidence of ethnic clash over land. SaddamHussein has never abandoned his claim thatKuwait is the 8th Province of Iraq.Ethnic tensionsIn East AsiaIn the 1940s and 50s, the Chinese attacked anddestroyed many Buddhist Monasteries in Tibet.They have also tried to destroy the Buddhistculture (Mc Laren, 1995).Ethnic tensions and clashesIn Latin AmericaConflicts in Latin America are mainly political innature. They involve the masses rising up againsttheir governments or a group of elite’s organizingthemselves to challenge the regimes. The peopleof Latin America are reacting against harshmilitary governments, corruption by politiciansand bad economic policies. This has been donewith heavy human losses. The 1960 and 70 sawguerrilla movements in El Salvador, Guatemala,Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, CostaRica, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile.Some of these countries carried out ethniccleansing under the pretext of fighting againstcommunism during the cold war periods (Storey,

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012351996). This was the excuse General AgustoPinochet used to kill thousands of oppositionactivists. There were also clashes with the localIndian population. This has been the case inGuatemala. The colonial authorities did notrecognize the right of Indians. New governmentshave not addressed, sufficiently the Indianproblem. One can even say that political rulers inthe developing countries, like those in LatinAmerica form themselves into a special(privileged) political “ethnic” group against theirown people. This isolation leads to conflicts withuntold human costs.Part ThreeEthnocentrism in Africa pre-colonial AfricaIn pre-colonial Africa, there were numerousnation-to-nation conflicts. The colonial powerscalled them tribal or ethnic conflicts.African ethnicity has been explained byanthropologists, colonial administrators andmissionaries as “tribalism” and the groupsconsisting it as “tribes” (Sanneh, 1984). It isimportant to note that many of the so called“tribes” did not exist before the colonialconquest (Magesa, 1998). Many of the peoples ofAfrica have no word for tribe. There were onlywords for nation, clan and lineage. In traditionalAfrica set up therefore, there could only havebeen nation-to-nation conflicts, inter-clan orfamily feuds within a lineage.Although Africa has problems peculiar only tothe continent, it is also true that many of thereasons for ethnic tensions and conflicts we haveseen so far, can be found in that continent. Themost common causes were migrations due todrought, war, diseases or need for greenerpastures for the animal keepers. This wascommon among the Oromo-Galla, Nilotic andthe Bantu’s. Land expansion also often led toconflicts in pre-colonial Africa. The peoples wholived along the Coast often clashed due to slavetrade introduced by the Arab Muslims. Kidnapof family members by a neighbouring clan led toclashes with losses of lives. This was true in WestAfrica and along the East African Coast. It isimportant to note that feuds between variousAfrican peoples were ended as soon as possiblewith a treaty or a covenant, by which the twoparties promised to maintain peace.However, the wronged party was given acompensation which acted as restitution. Intraditional Africa, the political leader was also areligious person (Magesa, 1998).Societies laid no firm distinction betweenreligious and political life, between church andstate. The religious, political, cultural,administrator and military institutions all dovetailedand overlapped and were distinguishedonly by the ceremonies that accompanied theirauthority.The dual responsibility checked the politicalexcesses in pre-colonial Africa. If a leader failedto live up to the - expectations, he was simplyremoved from power without bloodshed andreplaced by the next leader in line (Mugane,1999).Colonial Africa“In the middle of the 19th century, it wasthought that the people living outside of Europeor North America, as it were, lived a previousstage of the development of mankind” (Hanns,1993). If you wanted to study a people who stilllived close to the origin of the humankind, to theapes, or to the cave people, one of the best placesto visit was Africa. African was termed asprimitive and dark continent. A hotel in Nairobi,Kenya during colonial times was labelled ‘Dogsand Africans not allowed’.Some African communities during missionaries’evangelisation were given conditional baptismbecause the Europeans could not ascertain if theywere human beings since they were too black.Conditional baptism goes like “If you are ahuman being, I baptise you in the name…” Theearliest anthropologists, who preceded thecolonial masters, came out to prove that theircultures were superior.Since this is what the colonial masters did, it isnot a wonder that they had no regard for thepeople of Africa. As such, they were notconsulted on important decisions.35

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201236At the Berlin conference of 1885, Africa wasdivided between the European powers of the daywithout the consent of the local people.Boundaries were drawn hastily, leaving a part ofthe same people in one country and a part inanother. By this Berlin Accord, Europe plantedseeds of discord in Africa, (Kyeyune, (ed)1997).Post -independent AfricaThere is no doubt today that ethnic conflict isafflicting many African countries’ instability andthat violence is the order of the day. “Asaffirmed by recent horrors in Rwanda, Burundi,Somalia and elsewhere, Africa is ethnically aconflict-ridden continent. In some countries, theconflicts have been so severe that a state nolonger exists, or if it does, it is extremely weak.Such is the situation in Somalia and SierraLeone today. This untruly brands Africa as acontinent that can only produce babies andpoverty.Conflicts for religious reasons have been realisedin Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Algeria andNigeria. The mainly Muslim Hausa North andthe Ibos in the south have had serious religiousconflicts. Although the conflict in the Sudanshould not be reduced to a mere religiousconflict, religious differences between theChristian South and the Muslim North plays abig role in this conflict that has cost millions oflives. Thanks be to God Southern Sudan since itis currently an independent country.Colonial powers came in and created “Tribes”and ignorantly put traditional enemies under oneroof (Ott, 1998). For example, the Buganda andthe Banyore were traditional enemies groupedtogether. The other tribes of Uganda take itsname from the Kingdom of Buganda. The otherKingdoms must accept that they are Ugandans.The best example is the case of Rwanda andBurundi. Each country has a population ofHutus, Tutsi and who for along time wereconstantly at each other’s threat, but today it hassubsided. In Sierra Leone the Creoles(descendants of America slaves) were groupedwith the Mende and the Temne people.Kenya is no exception either. The Luo have toaccept that they belong to a country called36Kenya, when the majority of them have not evenseen Mt Kirinyaga. There are Teso in Kenya andin Uganda, Sabaot in Uganda and Kenya,Bukusu (Bagishu) in Kenya and Uganda, Somaliin Kenya and Somalia, the Maasai in Tanzaniaand Kenya and the Luo in Kenya, Tanzania andUganda. We must note that the colonial policyof divide and rule heightened ethnic animositiessuppressed only by the colonial presence. Some“tribes” were seen to be good cooks andwatchmen, while others were good shamba boys.Only a few selected and trusted people couldserve in clerical capacities. At Independence,there were these disparities. Some people foundthemselves disadvantaged because of the rolesthey had been assigned by the colonial power.Churches also followed the government strategyof divide and rule. Certain areas were for theAnglican (Kikuyu) Luhya & Luo. The Methodisttook Meru while the AIC were given Ukambani& Kalenjin land. Kikuyu and Chuka acceptedPresbyterian Church. The Luo and the Kisiiwere identified with SDA. Islam remained forthe Costal peoples. The Catholic had a bit hereand a bit there. Today things are changing.Another problem in Africa is illiteracy. It is saidthat if you want to hind your money put inside abook no a few Africans will discover it. Theleaders easily resort to ethnic feelings to gaincheap support. This is easy because a strongsince of nationalism and statehood has not yetbeen achieved. The gap between the people andtheir leaders who were largely trained in Europeand America widened at Independence (Storey,1996).They were more educated than the soldiers whothey appointed to ensure security. Soon, theAfrican armies began to see the leaders as closerto the former colonial masters than to them.What followed were coup de ta that has led Africainto serious problems.So the founders of African states like KwameNkurumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe ofNigeria, Milton Obote of Uganda, Ago stinghoNeto of Angola, Patrice Lumumba of Congo(later Zaire and now Democratic Republic ofCongo) were all overthrown. The people

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201237preferred the semi-illiterate soldiers who spokeand thought like them, so Marcia Nguema,Amin Dada, Bokassa, Samuel K. Doe, Mobutuand other soldiers were born. These soldiers gotstrong support from their ethnic groups.The cold war period created a lot of problems forAfrica. The countries that were aligned to theSoviet Union such as Angola, Mozambique,Ethiopia, and Somalia were ported as enemies ofpro-American countries such as Uganda, Kenya,Nigeria, and Zaire. In the 1970s, when Somaliaand Ethiopia fought over the Ogden region, theSoviet Union secretly supplied each side witharm! The warring clans on the border of the twocountries carried out what was close to genocide.Many of the new African leaders are accused ofnepotism and ethnic favouritism (Adeyemo, ed1993). Of course, when a ruler favours membersof his family and ethnic group, it does not meanthat all their people have been favoured,unfortunately, this is what the general publicthinks is the case. In Africa, the presidency is nota symbol of unity, but one of a favour to onesgroup.This is why in Kenya, the President is a symbolof ‘eating’. The Kikuyu ‘ate’ during the Kenyattaera and are now ‘eating’ under Kibaki era. TheKalenjins ‘ate’ under Moi’s era. Each of theother tribes are trying to be as close as possible tothe presidency.In the meantime, the other Kenyan ethnic groupswill prepare their appetites as they move closerand closer. It is this perception that led to the“ethnic” clashes. The Kalenjin leaders convincedtheir people that it was Moi who was undersiege. If he was removed from power, then theKalenjin were not going to continue eating.Many people got killed by people who werenowhere near the “Moi Meal”, while those whowere actually doing the eating were safe withtheir families at home.Some African leaders have been known to armtheir own peoples to ensure that they areprotected in times of turmoil (Bate, 1994).President Juvenal Habryarimana is known tohave armed the Interwar before the genocide in37Rwanda. Obote of Uganda had armed hisNilotic Northerners and disarmed the SouthernBantus. This caused a lot of dissatisfaction. TheMoi government is said to have armed theKalenjin warriors with bows, arrows from Koreaand with guns. Such countries have seen seriousethnic confrontations.The latest reason for ethnic animosities in Africais the introduction of multiparty system.Africa can be seen as a pathological continentsuffering from:Pathology of backwardness;Pathology of EconomicFragmentation;Pathology of Maldistribution ofNatural Resources.Pathology of BackwardnessAfrica as a continent has always been seen as thecontinent that lacks creativity. It cannot produceanything of its own but many babies andpoverty.Pathology of Economic FragmentationAfrican continent can be seen as small blocks.Each country has its own economic policy. It issurvival for the fittest. We have therefore noeconomic strength. We have to keep on askingfor aid since it cannot stand on its own. Andunless Africa becomes an organised continent,Africa will continue to suffer to the glory of thewest. Africa has to move away from a beggingcondition.Pathology of Maldistribution of Natural ResourcesAfrica can be seen as a single group of richpeople living in ivory towers while the massesare sinking in the ocean. Unless we get rid ofthese billionaires through fair and free equitabledistribution of natural resources and create ademocratic system, then Africa will continuesuffering. Unfortunately, each class tries as muchas possible to bar others from rising to their class.These are sinful structures not only in the secularworld but also in the Church. Unless we evokeour ancient traditional heritage like the spirit ofgenerosity, hospitality, communitarianism

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201238among others, Africa will continue beggingendlessly.Part FourSummary, Conclusion and ProposalsSummaryIn this paper, we have shown that the usage ofterms such as ethnic, ethnicity, ethnocentrism,“tribe” and nation have not been strict and veryoften misleading. The paper has also shown thatethnicity is God’s gift to us, and thatethnocentrism is the deification of ethnicity.Ethnic belongings do not cause the so calledethnic clashes.The destruction of all i.e. social mechanisms,rules, institutions and the reduction of socialdifferences, groups and classes to the one andonly difference of ethnic belonging are the actualcauses of these conflicts, and the confusing term“ethnic” conflicts is suitable to conceal all theseunderlying causes.Real causes of conflicts are usually political,economies, religious, cultural, linguistic andsocial in nature (SECAM, 1997).It has been clearly stated, that ethnocentrism isas old as humanity, and that it is a worldwideproblem (Chinchen, 1997). As much as it is truethat the Africa continent seems to be in constantturmoil, it would not only be myopic, but alsotoo unfair to suggest that the problem is largelyan African one. Recent developments inYugoslavia and former Soviet Union States andEast Asia, are a glaring example.The colonial mentality was that Africans wereinherently “tribal” and that they should never bedetribalized (Wakano, 1985). In that way, thepeople could never gang up against the colonialauthorities. So the African peoples had to bebounded and hounded into units called districtsand provinces which were created along triballines.But again, to reduce all Africa’s turmoil’s to itscolonial past would be dishonest on our part.Many independent African States still keep thecolonial legacy. Divide and rule tactic worksvery well for them.Kenya is the best example in the whole of Africa.Her leaders have perfected the colonial art ofdividing people along their ethnic backgrounds(Kasomo, 2010a). Practically, all the newdistricts are created for specific groups of peoplewho are judged to be pro-government. In Kenya,the Bantu-speaking people tend to form theirown political parties with their Nib- speakingcounterparts forming their own. Kenyaparliamentary and civic elections are increasinglydetermined by ethnic influence. This has led to acall by many of Kenyan politicians for thepossibility of “Majimboism” (a federal form ofgovernment) (Kuria, 1998).All over Africa, therefore the so called minority“tribe” or ethnic groups coalesce into regionalpower blocks. This is an attempt to ensure thattheir interests take precedence over nationalaffairs. They do this in order to oppose theleadership by major “tribes” (Mugane, 1999).To reduce African problems entirely to, the socalled, “multi-ethnic nature” is to miss the point(West, 1984). This work has traced Africa’spresent conflicts to hastily drawn boundaries bythe colonial powers. They divided the people.This is why the newly independent AfricanStates have not been able to create therequirements of assimilative or integrativenationhood. Furthermore, our governments havefailed to convince their populations that theyshare a common culture and a common goal.38Some countries like Zambia have tried to reducethe problem by making Chichewe and Bembalanguages the ‘Lingua Franca’ (Middleton, 1997).However, those whose languages are left out feelthey are not considered important.We have also presented the fact that Africa’slatest experiment with multipartysm does notseem to have any promising prospects. Themistake is in the fact that they are formed alongethnic lines, and therefore not broad-based. Inspiteof everything else, it is important toappreciate the fact that many people in Africatoday can with the coming of pluralism, criticize

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201239their governments without much fear as was thecase a few years back.In order to make African peoples cohesive, a lotof good will has to be done in the area ofsocialization. Africa must play politics,economies, provide an education and acceptreligious faiths that give room for other people tobe themselves (Kasomo, 2010b). Many Africanstates, as we have seen, are suffering seriousconflicts in the name of religiousfundamentalism. Algeria and Sudan have beenbleeding profusely on this account. Tolerancemust be treasured and not a thing to be detested.Finally, Africa should take consolation in thefact that, those Western countries and America,which are relatively peaceful today, have hadshocking history of violence worse than whatAfrica is experiencing currently. This is not tosuggest that we should sit back and let thingshappen.Possible Solutions to Global Ethnic Conflicts1. The UN peace-keepers should never bereduced to sitting ducks. It should beconstantly alert and a strong force.2. Create an effective collectiveInternational Security System that willact as deterrence against the persecutorsof different ethnic groups. Those whokilled and maimed others should bearrested and tried anywhere in the world.3. The ideology of revolution as a means toproblem solutions should be seen andunderstood as suicidal. It is not onlyfatalistic, but also refusals to givedialogue a chance.4. There is need to establish a programmeof Popular Global Education forDevelopment and Transformation” ineach country. Stop grouping people interms of “Us” and “Them”.5. Religion and politics should not beseparated. There is generally no specific“political” structure that is distinct fromthe social and religious structures ofsociety. The same person usuallyoccupies both positions.”6. Stress the African value of communalownership and African socialism(Ujamaa) and Ubuntu Philosophy.7. Resort to the Elder Tradition. This doesnot mean consulting only the old in thevillage. African elders today includepoliticians, economists, scholars,diplomats, church leaders, members ofNGOs and elders in the village.8. Promote the Traditional value ofpeaceful dialogue and ConflictResolution. Having brought the elderstogether, they must, in the spirit of theTraditional African value of a commonconsensus, sit down to talk.9. We do not need expensive conferencehalls or hotel rooms. We can use naturalshades or village huts away from themodem worries and hurries of life.10. Bank on the African ability to forgiveand forget painful experiences fast. ForAfrican Traditional Moral and ethicalsystem an offence once forgiven is neverrecalled.11. The practice of restitution for wrongsdone to others should be explored.12. The church in Africa should thereforepromote a theology that promotes life. Infact, the focus of African religion is life.This is why killing is one of the worstcrimes. Theology of liberation appears tobe the relevant one for the bleedingcontinent.13. The solutions to ethnic tensionsexploding into ethnic cleansing andgenocide must be found by architecturesthemselves.14. No one has had a choice on where to beborn. As such, one does not have toapologize for belonging to this or thatethnic group.15. We need to recognize the value ofuniversities as a forum to promotereconciliation, justice and peace, and tofight ethnic divisions.16. Ethnic difference should never causeethnic conflicts, genocides or ethniccleansing. On the contrary ethnicityshould be viewed as a gift of God meantfor mutual enrichment.39

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 20124017. Encourage the African people to bemissionaries to themselves.ReferencesAdeyemo, T. (ed 1993) Christian Mind in AChanging Africa. Nairobi: AEAM.Aquilar, I.M. (1998) The Rwanda Genocide.Eldoret. Gaba Publication.Bate, S. (1994) Inculturation: . The LocalChurch Emerges in Missionalia - August1994 22.Bujo, B. (1986) African Theology in its SocialContext. Nairobi: St. Paul Pub.Chinchen, D. (1997) The Return of the Fourth“R” to Education: Relationships inMissiology. An International ReviewVol. XXV.Den Van, P.G. (1970) Race and Ethnicity Essaysin Comparative Sociology. New York:Orbis Booka.Freud, S. (1947) On War, Sex and Neurosis.N:Y: Arts & Science Press.Hanns, E. (1993) "Political Musician". HavilanNew York: Orbis Books.Haviland, W. (1993) Cultural Anthoropology.Fort Worth.: Harrout Brace College.Hiebert, P.G. (1997) Gospel and Culture. TheWCC Project in Missiology: AnInternational Review Vol XXV.Horton, B.P. and Hunt, L.C. (1968) Sociology.New York: McGraw Hill BooksCompany.Kasomo, D. (2010a) Challenges toEvangelisation in Africa Today: AfricanIndependent Churches. Berlin: LambertAcademic Publishing.Kasomo, D. (2010b) Ethnocentrism a challengeto Evangelization in the world:Meaningand Implications to Religion. Berlin:Lambert Academic Publishing, 90.Kihumbi, T. (1985) The African Civilization(Utamaduni wa kia Africa). Nairobi :Kenya Literature Bureau.Kuria, K. (1998) Land Clashes. Kenya DailyNation News Paper, Saturday,November, 28.Nairobi:Nation MediaGroup.Kyeyune, D. ((ed)1997) New Trends for theEmpowerment of the People. Nairobi:Paulines.Mafeje, A. (1971) The Ideology of Tribalism.Journal of Modern African Studies 9,253-261.Magesa, L. (1998) African Religion, The MoralTradition of Abundant Life. Nairobi:Paulines Africa.Mc Laren, P. (1995) Critical Pedagogy andPredatory Culture. London: Routledge.Middleton, J. (1997) Black Africa. Nairobi:Macmillan Publishers.Mugane, P.A. (1999). Kenya Daily NationMonday, January, 18th.Ott, M. (1998) Tradition, Modernity and theFuture of African Theology. Journal ofHumanities, 56-76.Sanneh, L. (1984) Christian Mission in thePluralist Milieu: The African Experiencein Missiology. An International Review -Edinburg: Edinburg University Press 11,421 - 433.SECAM, B. (1997) Message to the Churches ofthe Great Lakes Region and the Rest ofAfrica. Nairobi, 7823-34.Storey, J. (1996) Cultural Studies and the studyof popular culture: Theories andmethods. Edinburg: Edinburg UniversityPress.Van de Goor, L. (1996) Between Developmentand Destruction, an Enquiry into thecauses of Conflicts in Post IndependentState. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.Wakano, K. (1985) Coups d’état, Revolutionsand Power Struggles in Post-Independence Africa. London: England,United Kingdom.West, C.C. (1984) Culture, Power and Ideologyin Third World Theologies InMissiology. An International ReviewXII.40

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201241Ethnicity: The Legacy of Kenyan Politics from Colonial to Post-colonial EraFelix Ngunzo KioliFaculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Maseno University PO Box 333, Maseno, Kenya.E-mail:felixngunzo@yahoo.comAbstractThis paper was presented at the symposium held in honor of the late E.S.Atieno-Odhiambo on 14-15 July 2011 in Maseno University. Ethnicity and its implicationswas a key area of concern espoused by the late Atieno Odhiambo. Indeed, ethnicdivisions as manifested in political participation before and after independence sufficeto explain the ethnicization of politics in Kenya. The roots to ethnicity and ethnicmobilization in politics can be traced to the colonial Kenya, and transcended to theperiod after independence. Kenya realized independence in 1963 from Britain andsubsequently became a post-colonial African property when Jomo Kenyatta tookpower as first president. Kenyatta perpetuated ethnicity in the political arena byperceiving Kenya as a personal property. This remains a fervent legacy of hisadministration. Data abounds on how Kenyatta secured the state for his primaryconstituency - the “Mount Kenya” interests for fifteen years. The entry of Daniel ArapMoi as president in 1978 up to 2002 aggravated the ethnicization of politics andinstitutions in Kenya. His philosophy of following 'Nyayo za Mzee' heightenedregionalism and political participation in terms of ethnic consciousness. The repeal ofsection 2A in Kenyan Constitution in 1991 which allowed multi-party democracyappears to have exacerbated ethnic mobilization and participation in party politics.Exit Moi and enter President Mwai Kibaki in the year 2002 and the revival andemergence of reinvigorated 'Mt. Kenya Mafia' and the entrenchment of ethnicpolitical fragmentation and involvement has been intriguing. Consequently, ethnicityhas become the legacy of Kenya’s politics.Key words: Ethnicity, Legacy, Kenya, Politics, Post-colonial Era________________________________________________________________________IntroductionEthnicity is quite a pervasive social process inKenya. There is abundant data to the realizationthat it permeates every sector of the society. Ithas become a social process since itsdocumentation vindicates it as very continuous,quite rooted and its tenets are not indicative of aculmination (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996) hadobserved that ethnicity was an issue whichKenyans could not afford to ignore and, sixteenyears later, it has become a critical malady whichis so embedded in the social organization of thepeople. It persists at the heart of most architectsof authority and power in Kenya. Indeed, Kenyais a prisoner of an ethnic stalemate whichsubsequently has fervent ramifications forpolitical organization, democracy and stability.41

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201242Ethnicity is a concept which appeared inanthropological writings in the 1960s after therealization of the distortion of meaning andsubjectivity in the usage of terms race and tribe.(Jenkins, 1997) observes that by the 1960s, thenotion of “the tribe” was beginning to bereplaced by perhaps less embarrassing concept,“ethnic group”. The event which most clearlymarked the paradigm shift within the socialanthropology from the study of tribal society tosocial constructionist model of ethnic groups wasthe publication of Barth’s work “Ethnic Groupsand Boundaries” in 1969. The word tribe as usedby ethnographers in the 19 th and early 20 thcenturies denoted primitivity, backwardness andnon-Western. This was particularly in describingAfrican and other cultures whose social andcultural organization was diametrical to theEuropeans. It was thus Eurocentric. Similarly,the word race, associated with Count JosephArthur de Gobeneau (1816-82), proposed theexistence of three races; White (Caucasian),black (Negroid) and yellow (Mongoloid).Giddens (Giddens, 2006) observes that deGobineau was of the view that the white racepossesses superior intelligence, morality and willpower in comparison to the other races.According to (Barth, 1996), the word “race” and“tribe” provided anthropologists (some of whomwere sympathizers of colonialists) with groundsto classify human beings in terms of developed,civilized and vice versa. Indeed, this perspectivecan be said to have justified social evolution. In anutshell then, both terms “race” and “tribe” wereperceived to be value laden, lacked the academicneutrality (objectivity) and hence, the wordethnic. Contemporary Sociologists andAnthropologists favour the word ethnic to raceand tribe because it is a concept that iscompletely, not academically and sociallycontested and adheres to the notion of culturalrelativism as propagated by the anthropologist(Boas, 1922).Nature of EthnicityThe word ethnicity first appeared in the OxfordEnglish dictionary in 1972, and is attributed tothe American Sociologist David Reisman in1953. He used it to refer to a shared (cultural)and perceived (psychological) group identity(Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). Further, withinthe American scholarship, the increasing use of“ethnicity” concept was part of a long term andgradual shift of analytical framework from“race” to “tribe” to “ethnicity” (Wolf, 1994).Anthropologist Fredrick Barth (Barth, 1996)played a key role in establishing the currentanthropological understanding of ethnicity byassociating the term with the conscious identitywhich individuals acquire for being members of agroup. Clifford Geertz elegantly defined ethnicityas the “world of personal identity, collectivelyratified and publicly expressed” and “sociallyratified personal identity” (Geertz, 1973).Ethnicity can thus refer to a group identity,expressed behaviourally (by individuals orgroup) that emanates from membership to anethnic group. Thus membership is either throughascription or achieved. It is ascriptive by virtue ofbeing born in to a group, thus one acquires itautomatically. This view is corroborated by(Eriksen, 1993); (Assefa, 1996) & (Rupesinghe,1996). Further, ethnicity is achieved when one isinducted into it as a member of a group or, is as aresult of the desire to belong, that is, the free willof the individual.British anthropologist Wallman (Wallman, 1979)encapsulates the concept of ethnicity by arguingthat it entails the differences through whichhuman beings identify themselves as differentfrom others. He demonstrates ethnicity as beingdefined by cultural differences and the identitythat emanates from it. Eriksen (Eriksen, 1993)also emphasizes on the idea of culturaldistinctiveness between groups/individuals and42

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201243the concomitant identity that defines each group,in understanding ethnicity. Further, Giddens(Giddens, 2006) avers that ethnicity is thecultural practices and outlooks of a givencommunity of people that set them apart fromothers. Members of ethnic groups see themselvesas culturally distinct from other groups in asociety, and are seen by those other groups to beso in return.The aforesaid factor is reinforced by Nyukuri(Nyukuri, 1997) who pointed out that ethnicityis an inclusive concept that defines groupings onthe basis of indicators such as colour,appearance, language, race, religion, commonprimordialism and ancestry, height complexity,body structure, relationships and physicalsettlement. It is a common feature in culturallydiversified societies in the globe, includingKenya.In the endeavor to understand the nature ofethnicity, it is important to note that ethnicityand ethnic consciousness is a product of socioculturalorientation. This view is corroborated byHobsbawn and Ranger (Hobsbawn and Ranger,1983), Ogot (Ogot, 1996), Handelman(Handelman, 1977) and Giddens (Giddens,2006). The view of ethnicity being as a result ofcultural orientation is predicated on theperspective that as a behavioral pattern, it can belearned, shared, transmitted and transformed ashuman beings interact with each other. Ethnicityis acquired as one gets inducted to become amember of society. In this sense then,behaviourism which is a set of principles definingthe learning process in understanding humanbehavior can be applicable to the study ofethnicity. According to Bartol (Bartol, 1999),behaviourism “officially’’ began in 1913 with thepublication of a land mark paper by JohnB.Watson (1878-1958),”Psychology as theBehaviourist Views It”. Other grandstandingarchitects of behaviourism include Ivan Pavlov, aRussian Scientist (1849-1936); and B.F. Skinner,an American (1904-2009), and their theories(Classical Conditioning and OperantConditioning), respectively, emphasize sociallearning as critical in understandingdevelopmental behaviour, which can includeethnicity. They also believe that environmentalor external stimuli are the primary-if not the soledeterminantsof all behaviour, both human andanimal (Bartol, 1999). A synonym of sociallearning as applied by sociologists is the conceptsocialization, while anthropologists use theequivalent, enculturation. Giddens (Giddens,2006) emphasizes that there is nothing innateabout ethnicity; it is purely social phenomenonthat is produced and reproduced over time.Through socialization, children assimilate thelifestyles, norms and beliefs of theircommunities.Jenkins (Jenkins, 1997) further observes thatethnicity is variable and manipulable, notdefinitely fixed or unchanging. This viewemphasizes on the dynamic nature of ethnicityand the capacity of the human being tomanipulate and socially construct ethnicity eitherfor personal aggrandizement or to be in tandemwith other changes in the socio-cultural arena.For instance, (Smith, 1993) points out thatconditions of modernity give rise to ethnicity andmake such identity a powerful symbol ofmeaning and worth. Indeed, present day ethnicconsciousness has a scope and intensity that didnot exist earlier. In the current politicalconfiguration especially in Kenya, the sense ofidentity offered by ethnicity is quite evocativeand has the power necessary for politicalmobilization. Additionally, Jenkins (Jenkins,1997) points out that apart from the manipulablenature of ethnicity, ecological issues areparticularly influential in determining ethnicidentity, in as much as competition for economicriches plays an important role in the generationof ethnicity.43

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201244In line with above argument, Robert Merton’stheory of Social Structure and Anomie comes inhandy to understand nature of ethnicity. Histheory leans heavily on the work of EmileDurkheim, one of the founders of sociology.Durkheim (Durkheim, 1893) used the termanomie to refer to a state of normlessness or lackof social regulation in modern society as onecondition that promotes social disorganization.Merton (Merton, 1938) applied thisDurkheimian approach to the condition ofmodern societies.Merton argued that modern society evinces thismeans- ends disjuncture by strongly emphasizingon success goals, which is not matched by anequally strong emphasis on socially approvedmeans. Everyone is socialized to aspire towardhigh achievement and success. Competitivenessand success are glorified by public authorities,taught in the schools, glamorized in the media,and encouraged by the values that are passedalong from generation to generation. Worth isjudged by material and monetary success. Alkersand Sellers (Akers and Sellers, 2009) argue thatthis success is supposed to be achievedlegitimately (through education ,hard work,economic endeavor and social normsregulation).However, Merton perceived modernvalues to be more concerned with acquiringsuccess, getting ahead and money at any cost,than with the right and proper ways to do so.When success goals are over emphasized, thenorms governing their achievement getweakened, producing what Durkheim conceivedof as Anomie. In the modern society includingKenya, individuals are prone to do what theycan to achieve success, even if it means breakingthe law. Thus, ethnic mobilization for success,political survival and personal aggrandizementbecomes the norm.44Trajectory of Ethnicity In Kenyan PoliticsNyukuri (Nyukuri, 1997) observes that, Britishcolonial imperialists invented ethnicity inKenya’s socio-political participation. Indeed,before the colonialists penetrated into theterritories of Africans, the notion of borders wasnot of concern. The author points out that in thenineteenth century, the area that became“Kenya” was stateless, groups complementedeach other and there was no central power thatcould arrange groups in hierarchical relations. Ithas also been documented that people ofdifferent cultural backgrounds interacted in totaldevoid of ethnic conscience, while culturallimitations couched in stereotypes, prejudicesand bigotry were totally non existence. Were(Were, 1967) and Ogot (Ogot, 1996) argue thatthere were no water tight ethnic categoriesbetween cultural groups in Kenya beforecolonialism, while Muriuki (Muriuki, 1974)demonstrates how various cultural groups inEastern, Central and Rift Valley provinces inKenya had intimate relations with each other intotal disregard to ethnicity by the 18 th and 19 thcenturies. This scenario changed after the EastAfrican region was declared a protectorate in1895.As a strategy to annihilate, control and subjugatethe Africans, the colonialists established bordersconfigured in line with language, and thissatiated their Eurocentric desire to create“tribes”. Ogot (Ogot, 1996) observes that infurthering the policy of a gradual extension ofBritish influence outwards from establishedcolonial stations and forts, the new rulersestablished internal borders and districtboundaries that were supposed to coincide with“tribal” and linguistic units. Their efforts werevitiated by the definition of ethnic groups as“tribes”, a concept that was racist and ahistorical

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201245in the sense that it regarded the variousnationality groups as being static, exclusive andhomogeneous. In this sense then, Ogot observesthat the concept of a” tribe” was therefore anintellectual abstraction, a mental invention of thecolonialists which was intended to convey orportray the picture of a people withoutgovernment, without culture and withouthistory, in order to justify colonialism. Borders(physical) were enacted to freeze movement andinteraction, and in order to avoid contaminationfrom neighboring, but culturally andlinguistically different peoples. Fines andcorporal punishment were imposed to determovement from one locality to another while;Africans were to be governed in their ownlanguage units. As a consequence, “tribal”uniqueness was very well formulated, whilestrategies for inter-tribal tension and conflictswere well enacted. The strategy here was todivide and rule, in cahoots with colonialsympathizers (local chiefs and tribal headmen).The process of balkanization of Kenyan Africangroups into tribal enclaves as strategized by theBritish colonialists succeeded and by 1920,indicators of ethnic consciousness among theAfricans came in to the fore. Ethnic orientedpressure groups started cropping up and indeed,the struggle for independence involvement byKenyans was inevitably ethicized. This assertionis exemplified by regional groups agitating forrecognition and independence namely KikuyuCentral Association (KCA) and the “PinyOwacho” in Luo land in the 1920s. Later on,KCA transformed into Kenya African Union(KAU) in 1944. After the state of emergency wasdeclared in Kenya in 1952, Africans wereadvised to go back to their ethnic regions. Thisstrategy ensured they were confined to theirregions of origin and invented their own “tribal”pressure groups to safeguard their interests andwelfareNdege (Ndege, 1996) observes that theemergence of such associations as the NairobiDistrict African Congress, the MombassaAfrican Democratic Union, the UkambaniMembers Association(UMA),the LuhyaUnion(LU), the Kisii Highlands AbagusiiAssociation, the Taita Democratic Union,theKalenjin Political Alliance (KPA),the YoungKavirondo Association(YKA),in that order is amanifestation of how barely a decade toindependence, the colonial state was stilldetermined in localizing (ethnicicing) Africanpolitics. In 1957, the colonial governmentlegalized the creation of parties by locals butsuch parties were to be confined to their owndistricts as opposed to national operationsthroughout Kenya. When later national partieswere allowed, the Kenya African NationalUnion (KANU) was the first to be formed in1960 in circumstances that made it the naturalheir to the Kenya African Union (KAU). KANUemerged as a party to cater for interests of thelarger ethnic groups (Kikuyu and Luo), whileKenya African Democratic Union (KADU) wasestablished for the concern of the so called“small tribes”. Behind these political groupings,the ethnic conscience was quite prominent. Lateron, KADU was absorbed into KANU after theindependence of Kenya. Technically, Kenyabecame a defacto one party state, main ideabeing to perpetuate ethnic interests. Remember,Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) hadtransformed to Kenya African Union (KAU),and later evolved to become KANU.Moreover, the emergence of the Mau Maumovement in Kenya after the Second WorldWar (1946) had become synonymous with theKikuyu fraternity, and this has had its futurepolitical ramifications to Kenya. Indeed, it hasbeen argued how the Kikuyu community inKenya has for a long time viewed the country astheir possession premised on the notion that theirkith and kin fought for independence.45

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201246Moreover, the colonial administrations divideand rule practice tended to foster ethnicdivisiveness as it favored some ethnic groupsexcluding others. For instance, some areasbenefited from introduction of infrastructure,cash crops, urban and trading centers andmissionary schools in total disregard of otherregions. The Kikuyu and Luo communitiesappeared more favored in this policy – givingthem resources and opportunities that weredenied others. Consequently, seeds of ethnicity,ethnic inimical relations, hatred and belligerencebecame eminent by the time of independence.Political Participation Since Independence In KenyaAt the dawn of independence, African leadersascended to governmental structures armed withthe Western Constitution and ill-trainedmanpower to soldier on and make provisions forthe enlarged nation-state, now encompassingdiverse ethnic groups with variegated interests.Nyukuri (Nyukuri, 1997) points out that as if thiswas not enough, Kenya, like most other Africancountries, inherited from the colonialists scarcenational resources, inadequate infrastructure,inadequate human resource capacity, inadequatecapital, inadequate education and healthfacilities, among others. The scramble for thescarce national resources and facilities intensifiedand ethnicity became the main vehicle throughwhich the dominance and preservation of poweras well as resources could be achieved. Theauthor contents that leadership (i.e. ruling elites)in post colonial Kenya has often relied heavilyon ethnicity to remain in leadership positions orsettle a dispute with their perceived enemies.Indeed, Kenya gained independence from Britishrule in 1963, and since then to date, successivegovernments have demonstrated that ethnicityinvariably remains a fervent tool for resource andpolitical mobilization .Certainly, the seeds ofethnic divisions germinating during colonial rulegot anchored and perfected in the independentKenya during Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moiand presently, Mwai Kibaki’s rule. In criticalanalysis of Kenyan nascent democracy, onecannot fail to notice the ethnic manipulation andtolerance for survival, while the ethnicity passionand sentiments attached to political leadershipand participation of the country sinceindependence intrigue all and sundry.Kenyatta for instance, abhorred competitivepolitics and that’s why he strategized very fast todismantle KADU immediately afterindependence, and KPU pioneered by JaramogiOginga Odinga in 1966. He set the stage bypersonalizing politics in Kenya, placed his henchmen (Kikuyu) in strategic governmentalinstitutions and subsequently, entrenched andperpetuated the kikuyu hegemony. AtienoOdhiambo asserts that,“After Kenya became apost colonial Africanproperty, Kenyatta tookover political power.Having captured the state,Kenyatta fell back to hislife long and primaryagenda, tending to theneeds of his basiccommunity, the Agikuyu.This he succeeded in doingvery effectively in thefifteen years of hispresidency. At the end of1978, it could legitimatelybe stated that his was astory of spectacular successfor his primaryconstituency, the Agikuyu.He had secured the statefor them, the governmentand vast homeland in theRift Valley and along the46

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201247Coast. He had putcommerce in their hands”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996).Data abounds to the realization of how peoplefrom Central Kenya controlled major financiallending bodies after independence, Industrial andCommercial Development Corporation (ICDC),African Finance Corporation (AFC), KenyaCommercial Bank (KCB), National Bank ofKenya (NBK), inter alia with the aim ofempowering “their” people financially andultimately, control the political dispensation.Donald Rothchild (Rothchild, 1969) in his paper,“Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya” states that “thestatistics on ICDC loans up to April 1966 showthat Kikuyus’ received 64 percent of theindustrial loans and 44 percent of thecommercial loans” Further the top managementof Kenya Commercial Bank, National Bank ofKenya and the Industrial and CommercialDevelopment Corporation(ICDC) were registersof managers from one ethnic group and theirallies from Eastern province.Moreover, as a strategy to perpetuate CentralKenya into the political, economic and socialsphere of the country, the Kikuyu andcommunities surrounding them saw the efficacyof ethnicity and ultimately created the incredibleAgikuyu, Embu, Ameru Association (GEMA).GEMA evolved into a powerful land buying andpolitical entity in the 1970s and had a highinfluence in the socio-economic and politicalempowerment of its members. The fall outbetween Oginga Odinga and Kenyatta in 1966was grounded on the injustice and controls theCentral province elite was subjecting Kenyans to.This fall out set the pace for the politicalalienation of the Luo community. KenyaPeoples Union (KPU), the vehicle which OgingaOdinga clung to for political survival wasproscribed in 1969 and opposition politicscriminalized. Atieno Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996) argues that withcriminalization of competitive politics, the“ideology of order” moved to centre stage.Proscription of party politics gave room to thegrowth of Government supported tribalassociations headed by “tribal kingpins” whoacted as the leadership elites and avenue forcontrol of ethnic groups. Tribal associationspermeated almost all public institutions. AtienoOdhiambo states that the democratic pillarbecame an orphan in Kenya, and ethnic interestssuperseded nationalism.Kenyatta presided over Kenya as a one partysystem – and coincidentally this happened to bethe trend all over the African continent duringthe 1960s and 1970s (Tordoff, 1997). Kenya’sone party system was under KANU andclientelism shaped and colored Kenyan politicswith Kenyatta himself as patron. Politicalalliance and patronage became increasinglyimportant and politicians relied on ethniclinkages and network for support. Manysupposedly apolitical bodies were politicizedsuch as “trade unions, universities, co-operativesocieties, women organizations, police, army”,inter alia (Tordoff, 1997). In a similar version,provincial administration (provincialcommissioners, district commissioners andchiefs), majority of whom also had strongCentral province connections executed andcontrolled party policies and ultimatelydetermined political dispensation. From 1963-1978 Kenya was synonymous with Kenyatta andhis constituency (Agikuyu) in controlling sociopoliticaland economic affairs of the country. Asan illustration, during Kenyatta’s twilight yearsof leadership, certain Kikuyu elites endeavoredto change the constitution (1976), with the mainaim of blocking Daniel Arap Moi from takingover power, and in place install “one of theirown”. This endeavor never bore fruit and afterthe demise of Kenyatta in August 1978, Daniel47

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201248Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, assumed the leadership ofthe country.Daniel arap Moi’s Era (1978-2002)President Daniel Torotich Arap Moi (August1978 – 30 th December 2002) presided over aKenya inundated with politics of patronage andclientelism (ethnicity), deception and hypocrisy,politics of anxiety and subservience. In the initialstages, his clarion call of following “Nyayo zaMzee” translated to imply following thefootsteps of Kenyatta, by implication meantsubscribing to the ideologies and philosophy ofleadership of Kenyatta. This he did “very well”for he appeared to loathe competitive politics(multi party democracy) as Kenyatta did. Atieno– Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996) arguesthat throughout 1970s into 1990, discussingpossibilities of democracy was anathema.Furthermore, every means at the disposal of hisruling party KANU was used to derail theformation and registration of opposition partiesincluding detention without trial, the brutality ofprovincial administration and the police, theregistrar of societies, courts of law and KANUyouth wingers. Through these machinations anddeliberately, Kenya became a dejure one partysystem in 1982 after a failed military coup whoseinstigation had some sense of ethnicdiscontentment in the running of the country.As a strategy to entrench himself and his cliqueof leaders, and out of sheer paranoia, Moi starteddismantling the Kenyatta Empire. Simatei(Simatei, 1996) points out that Moi embarked ondekikuyunization of the civil service includingstrategic state institutions (parastatals, security,diplomatic circles, learning institutions, etc) in tothe Kalenjinization of the same. It has beenargued jokingly how one would find people ofthe same ethnic group turning their locallanguage into the office language of someparastatals, like posts and telecommunication,among others. Kalenjinization of key institutionswas compounded with empowering ethnicchieftains (kingpins), hand-picked by Moihimself to champion his interests at local (ethnic)level and to perpetuate subservience. Such tribalkingpins wielding a lot of power among theirethnics suffice; Mulu Mutisya in Ukambaniregion; Shariff Nassir at the Coast, KariukiChotara and Joseph Kamotho in CentralProvince, Joseph Lotodo in North Rift Valleyand the likes of Ezekiel Berngetuny in UasinGishu, William ole Ntimama among theMaasai, Wycliff Mudavadi among the Abaluhya,among others. Paradoxically, after coming intopower in 1978, Moi had disbanded all tribalcaucuses formed during Kenyatta’s timeincluding GEMA, but in turn, he endeavored touse ethnic chieftains to entrench himself.Through Moi and his tribal henchmen, intra andextra ethnic dissent was confronted with extrajudicial repercussions. To cite Koigi WaWamwere (Wamwere, 2008), how would oneexplain the demise of dissenters like BishopAlexander Muge, Jean Marie Saroney, RobertOuko, and the incarceration of KennethMatiba, Charles Rubia, Raila Odinga, Koigi WaWamwere, inter alia.Indeed, the balkanization of African regions into“tribal units” as happened during colonial timeswas highly rekindled in Moi’s era. Ethnicdictatorship and in turn ethnicizing Governmentand politics in Kenya pervaded in the entire 24years of Moi’s rule. Wamwere (Wamwere, 2008)broaches the idea of ethnic dictators whohandpicked leaders (if not themselves),manipulated elections, created fear (anxiety) anddespondency at the expense of democracy.In the 1990s, there was an agitation todemocratize the African continent – which wasmore intense in former British colonies. Moi andhis ruling elite eventually succumbed to both48

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201249domestic and international pressure. This led tothe repeal of section 2(A) of the KenyanConstitution that allowed creation of pluraldemocracy in 1991. Fascinatingly, the emergingopposition parties by 1992 (Ford Kenya, FordAsili, Kenya National Congress, DemocraticParty), and other smaller ones failed to forge aunified platform to challenge Moi’s ruling party,KANU. It is important to note that ethnicparochialism (among leaders), and an ethnicallydriven population was a leading factor. Mindyou, most of these leaders had grown andnurtured their leadership skills under Kenyattaand Moi. Throup and Horby (Throup andHornsby, 1998) offer three main arguments toexplain failure to unite by the emerging partiesand their presidential aspirants. First, Kenyanvoters had always rewarded politicians whocould guarantee “maendeleo” (literally,development, but usually understood aspatronage of state resources). The second factorwas that in the minds of voters and politiciansalike, ethnic calculations had always outweighedany ideological consideration, and lastly, theeuphoria of pluralism created unrealisticexpectations of change in the era of multipartycompetition.The voting pattern for the presidential candidatesin 1992 suffices to demonstrate ethnicization ofpolitical participation in Kenya. President Moihad managed to consolidate Kalenjin votestogether with those of smaller ethnic groups toemerge the winner. Kenneth Matiba and MwaiKibaki shared all Kikuyu votes, while OgingaOdinga’s bulwark for his votes was from LuoNyanza. Prior to the election of 1992, ethnictensions had been very high with tribal clashes inthe Rift valley and Western Kenya, instigated todrive away non – indigenous people.The second multiparty election in December1997 presented a myriad of political parties (27)to compete against KANU. Indeed, theproliferation of these parties confirmedsentiments by Bratton and Van de Walle(Bratton and Van-de-Walle, 1997) that“democratization in Kenya has resulted inreaffirmation of ethnic identities with politicalparties emerging along ethno regional criteriarather than ideological ones”. Each aspiringpolitician was under the illusion that they couldmarshal their ethnic group behind them totrounce Moi and KANU. This costed theopposition candidates the presidency. Oncemore, Moi trounced them (Moi 40.64% ; MwaiKibaki 31.49%; Raila Odinga 11.06%, MichaelWamalwa 8.40% and Charity Ngilu 7.81%.Ideally, their combined votes would have led to awin, but factionalism driven by ethnicchauvinism and fixation was their undoing. Justas in 1992, prior to the 1997 elections, there hadbeen tribal clashes at Coast province to eject outnon – Coastal people (especially the Luo) fromSouth Coast, while after the election, ethnicgroups clashed again in the Rift Valley.The period between 1998 -2002 experienced anera of political realignment and strategizing withthe main desire to succeed Daniel Arap Moi –who according to the constitution was noteligible to vie. These realignments and politicalmanoeuvres were couched in ethnic calculation.National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) frontedby Mwai Kibaki’s (DP), Social DemocraticParty(SDP) by Charity Ngilu and FORD Kenyaby Michael Wamalwa- all aspired to embracethe Kikuyu, Akamba and Abaluhya and toconfront KANU (read Kalenjin) which hadfound a political alignment for convenience withNational Development Party (NDP) fronted byRaila Amollo Odinga (read Luo). Moi and Railawere later to fall out when Moi anointed UhuruKenyatta as his heir. Together with otherformidable forces from KANU (George Saitoti,Stephen Kalonzo and Moody Awori), Railajoined forces with NAK prior to election of 2002and formed National Rainbow Coalition49

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201250(NARC). Ethnic calculation and patronageappeared the dominant factor when RailaOdinga pronounced “Kibaki Tosha” in 2002 at arally in Uhuru Park, Nairobi. Kibaki became thesole opposition candidate to square it out withUhuru Kenyatta, heir apparent to Moi. Throughethnic balance, Kibaki came to power inDecember 30 th, 2002.Mwai Kibaki`s Era (2002 –to date)Kibaki ascended to power in an ambience ofhope, fortitude and emancipation from ethnicity.Indeed, the diverse representation of key regionalfigures in his government in the beginning gaverise to the possibility that ethnic factor in politicscould dissipate in Kenya. To the chagrin anddisillusionment of many, Kibaki graduallystarted reviving the politics of patronage andwhat Kiai and Muite (Kiai and Muite, 2009)term as politics of ethnic “entitlement”. Todemonstrate that he was not for change, Kibakireneged on a Memorandum of Understanding hehad signed with key figures that spearheaded hiscampaign, which prominently had been led byRaila Amolo Odinga. Secondly, in criticalGovernment positions and appointments, Kibakiretained some of the bureaucrats or remnantswho had presided over Moi’s system. No wonderit had to be argued later that “we had done awaywith Moi but Moism persisted in Kibaki’s”Government. Thirdly, in his so called “Kitchencabinet”, Kenya witnessed the revival of theenigmatic “Mount Kenya Mafia” – whichrekindled memories of Kenyatta leadership (readGEMA). The implication of Kibaki surroundinghimself with his ethnic henchmen was theappointment of one ethnic group and its “closerelatives” to crucial positions in the civil service.Once more, the tradition of ethnic fixation inrunning the affairs of the country and politics ofexclusion took root.The Kenyan leadership of 2003 which had givenhope and fortitude to its citizenry after manyyears of misrule, ethnicity and despondencyturned into a farce. By the year 2004, Kibaki hadstarted facing a revolt from prominent figures inhis government who had played a key role in hiscampaigns for presidency. Consequently, totalfallout was quite imminent in the beginning of2005. Apart from their grievances in affairs ofrunning the country, the opposition by Kibakiand his inner circle to a comprehensiveconstitution review aggravated discord withinthe revolting group in the cabinet. Oneremembers assertions associated with a Kibakikey cabinet minister and ally who in 2005 hadsaid that there was no need to review theconstitution since “we had removed” Moi frompower.The emerging animosity culminated into twoextreme antagonistic groups towards constitutionmaking, and by extension, demonstrated thepolitical trajectory in the country. As Kenyaapproached a national constitution referendumtowards end of 2005, the disintegration of(National Rain ball Coalition) NARCGovernment was quite imminent and inevitable.The two protagonists, that is, “Banana” groupspearheaded by the president himself and thoseagainst comprehensive constitutional change waspitied against the pro-change, the “Orange”team. Indeed, ethnic passions and sentimentspervaded the campaigns of either to adopt piecemeal constitutional change or comprehensive.Central Kenya appeared to be pitied against therest of the country – and the end resultsconfirmed it.The referendum was won by the Orange team –rightly reaffirming people’s discontentment withthe centre. Kibaki sacked the “renegade”members of his cabinet (those in the Orangeteam) – most of whom had been very critical tohis presidency. Thereafter, as Kenya approached50

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201251legislative and presidential elections in 2007,ethnicity took a centre stage as politiciansstrategized for the elections. The Orange teamportrayed themselves as nationalists, but it wasvery clear that ethnic mobilization andparticipation was paramount. Indeed, theOrange team appeared to sail comfortably withinNyanza (Luo), Western (Abaluhya) and RiftValley (Kalenjin). The population of theseregions was behind their leaders, namely RailaOdinga, Musalia Mudavadi and William Ruto,respectively. On the other hand, the Bananateam had its bulwark of following in Centralprovince (Kikuyu) and Eastern (Embu andMeru), significantly.Prior to elections in 2007, Kenya projected itselfas a very politically ethicized society, more thanever before. The politicians and the mass mediaplayed a very key role in elevating Kenya toethnic politics. Interestingly, the religiousfraternity with its diversity also demonstrated apenchant of discrimination and favoritism inpolitical affiliation and party participation.Moreover, ethnic hate speeches, reminiscent ofthe period preceding general elections in 1992and 1997 put the country at risk. Much of it wasbeset with reckless and derogatory commentsthat undermined national unity. Statements like,“tutatoa madoadoa kati kati yetu” translated tomean we shall do away with those different fromus – attributed to a politician from the RiftValley, Kenya, were not different from the onesassociated with a Maasai politician in 1991, whochampioned for “making the Kikuyu in Maasailand lie low like an antelope”. Kenya was alsotreated to “politics of circumcision” and“Majimboism” or federalism which to many,meant ejecting out those who never belonged tocertain regions. These among many otherspeeches and outbursts that embody on ethnicanimosity associated with Kenyan politiciansilluminated the political arena.The results of the legislative and presidentialelections of December 2007 strongly pityingMwai Kibaki against Raila Odinga clearlyvindicated Kenya as highly ethnicized politically.Kibaki’s potent electoral zones were Eastern andCentral province. Indeed, in Central province(Kikuyu), Kibaki’s vote was up to the lastperson. The same scenario was indicative ofRaila’s votes, especially in Luo Nyanza and inother regions (Rift Valley- Kalenjin) and Western(Abaluhya), where emerging ethnic chieftainsnamely William Ruto and Musalia Mudavadi,respectively, played a key role towards hiscampaign. The intrigues of ethnic politics werealso exemplified in Ukambani region whereKalonzo Musyoka carried the day in presidentialvotes with his ODM-K political flagship.Mwai Kibaki was pronounced the winner of thepresidential elections in the year 2007 amidintense protestations from his competitors. Theaftermath of these protests were the post –election violence in January and February 2008which epitomized deep, inbuilt and passionethnic hatred between certain ethnic groups inKenya.The international community intervened torestore “normalcy” in Kenya, which culminatedin the formation of a Grand CoalitionGovernment between president Kibaki and RailaOdinga as the prime minister. Intriguingly,ethnicity appeared to play a key role toward theformation of this coalition government. With theinclusion of Kalonzo Musyoka in thegovernment, each party appeared to championfor the interests of its ethnic group as well asrewarding their kinsmen and women. There havebeen squabbles in the four year coalitiongovernment, relating to appointments to the civilservice as well as allocation of nationalresources. There is also an emerging trend inpolitics as politicians start strategizing for theelections of 2012. Political alliances based on51

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201252ethnic strengths have started emerging aspoliticians’ position themselves for the forthcoming elections. In 2011 talk had been rifewithin the Kibaki circle of the Musyoka-Kenyatta-Ruto axis, geared toward bringing thethree of the big five – Kikuyu, Kamba andKalenjin (KKK) with them to offset thechallenge by Mr. Raila Odinga and his allies.This was transformed in to G7 toward end of2011 and appears to gain momentum in 2012. Itincludes the three politicians and their closeallies whose conscription into the group isthrough ethnic calculations. The confirmation ofthe post election cases by International CriminalCourt (ICC) for the four suspects in February2012 appears to heighten ethnic passions. Ascenario is playing where by politicians projectRaila Amolo Odinga as the culprit whileWilliam Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta are thevictims. The two politicians project the case asan ethnic trial and their machinations appear tobear significance amongst their communities.Interestingly, the current Vice President StephenKalonzo Musyoka who comes from an ethnicgroup (Akamba people) whose numbers aresmaller compared to Ruto and Uhuru is reportedto have mischievously teamed up with the two intheir national “prayer” campaigns in the hope ofbeing endorsed by the suspects who commandhuge support from the Kalenjin and Kikuyuvoting blocks. This is a clear indication thatethnic alliances triumph ideology in Kenyanpolitics.Critical consequence of ethnic alignments for2012 general elections in Kenya is the emergenceof ethnic spokes men, women and elders,reminiscent of Arap Moi’s era. According toKituyi (Kituyi, 2011)),the media is awash withstories of politicians seeking to be crowned tribalspokesmen or inventing the office of tribal eldersand seeking it to read the tribal oracle for theirgroups .Mr.chirau Makwere insists he is the elderspokesman of all Coastal Miji Kenda people,Raila Odinga is projected the kingpin of the LuoPeople, Uhuru Kenyatta for the Kikuyu, WilliamRuto for the Kalenjin people, Kalonzo Musyokaand Charity Ngilu appear to spoil for each otherfor the Akamba people supremacy. Kituyifurther observes that in Western Kenya,Mr.Wycliffe Oparanya, Musalia Mudavadi andMoses Wetangula declare that a “Luhya Councilof Elders” is consulting on who should be thetribal candidate for president. Thesedevelopments reflect the ethnic politicalconfiguration of the Kenyan society.Moreover, as politicians in the currentGovernment get implicated in corruption, theyappear to find recourse from their ethnic groups.This was demonstrated in the recent maizescandals (William Ruto, Minister forAgriculture), as well as in the noted errors in2008/2009 supplementary budget which hadbeen inflated into billions of Kenyan shillings(Uhuru Kenyatta, Minister for Finance). Thesame scenario was replayed with the ethnicsupport Haroun Ringera received afterreappointment by the president to head KenyaAnti-Corruption Commission and the eventualcensure by parliament. Equally, the sacking ofKioko Mangeli as head of Kenya Bureau ofStandards drew similar ethnic overtones fromAkamba politicians. Amongst the Kalenjin, theagitation by members of the community to retainProfessor Mengich as the chief executive ofEldoret Moi University Referral Hospitalnotwithstanding the expiry of his tenure wasquite intriguing. Similarly, recent appointment ofMr.Keriako Tobiko to the Directorship of PublicProsecution whipped a lot of ethnic overtones,threats and protests from the Maasai community;in spite the glaring accusations on hisprofessionalimproprieties.Recently,March,2012,Kenyanswitnessed ethnic intrigues play in parliamentwhen the legislators from Central provincemarshalled support from their like minded from52

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201253the Rift valley to salvage the Central Bank ofKenya Governor Njuguna Ndung’u from beingedged out of the institution in spite themismanagement which has led to thedepreciation of the Kenyan currency. Moneyalso “changed hands”. It has become a norm forpoliticians and technocrats to retreat back totheir ethnic groups to solicit for support in theguise of being targeted by their “politicalenemies”. Moreover, the current trend ofpolitical calculations and alignment inanticipation for the 2012 general election,coupled with strategy of retreat for ethnicsupport and recourse in times of threat to one’sposition as well as the ethnic sentiments,passions and emotions aroused by the ICCconfirmation of post election violence cases are aclear manifestation of the future politicaldispensation in Kenya.Implications of Ethnicity in KenyaThe aforesaid discourse of the ethnicity trajectoryplays like a jinx in Kenyan socio-politicalconfiguration. The ethnic disparities aggravatedduring and after independence have had severesocio-cultural, economic and physicalramifications to the Kenyan society. First andforemost, it has become quite difficulty and anuphill task to build a national culture orcharacter. Kenyans consciously first belong to atribe before identifying with their country. This ismanifested in their socio-political and religiousorganizations and affiliations as well as in theirmother tongues. This dividedness whichmilitates against nationalism is further exhibitedand exemplified in the mental entrenchment ofethnic stereotypes and prejudices amongstKenya’s ethnic groups. Ethnic stereotypes andprejudices are not conducive for amicablecoexistence between groups. The assertions that“Kikuyus are thieves”, “Luos are proud”,“Luhyas are good watchmen and cooks”,“Kambas are weak and cowards”, “Kisiis aretemperamental”, “Kalenjins are war mongers”,amongst others have been detrimental toKenya’s unity and cohesiveness. Politicians havesystematically used the prevailing stereotypesand prejudices to breed hatred and suspicionbetween groups culminating in ethnic rivalries,belligerence and conflicts. Indeed, the ethnicconflict experienced in Kenya sinceindependence, to the most recent post electionviolence in 2008 suffice to demonstrate thatethnicity is the jinx of Kenyan politics.Kenya has witnessed politically and ethnicallyinstigated conflicts before and after everypresidential and general election held in 1992,1997, 2002 and 2007, especially in WesternKenya, the Rift valley and Coast region. Forinstance, before the multi-party elections in 1992,tribal clashes flared up in the rift valleyculminating into the killing of around 2000people and displacement of thousands of others(Tordoff, 1997). The main victims were theKikuyu community. Similar ethnic strife andtension replayed again before the 1997 elections,this time in the South Coast. Those targeted wereethnic groups from upcountry, that is, “Watokabara”. Lives were lost and a lot of propertytorched down. The aftermath of this conflict wasalso felt in the decline in the tourism industry inKenya which apparently had happened to be themain source of public revenue around that time.The climax of ethnic conflict in Kenya waswitnessed after the disputed presidential electionsof 2007. The ethnic jinx played itself in a verywanton manner. The Kikuyu and Luocommunities bore the brunt of this conflict. Inthe Rift valley and Western Kenya, the Kikuyucommunity and their economic empire werehighly decimated. In retaliation, a section of theKikuyu “warriors” blockaded a section ofNairobi –Nakuru highway and its environs in53

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201254Naivasha and physically targeted Luo people forphysical assault. Luo men were humiliated withforceful physical circumcision, torching of theirhouses and killings. Same scenarios of conflictbetween the two protagonists were experiencedin certain estates in Nairobi (Kibera,Kawangware, Kariobangi, Dandora).The postelectionviolence in 2008 led to the phenomenonof Internally Displaced persons (IDPS) of almostone million people, around 1,500 people losttheir lives, thousands of women and young girlswere raped while property worth billions ofshillings were destroyed. Therecent,February,2012 inter ethnic conflictbetween the Luo community and the Kalenjinalong the border of Rift Valley and Nyanzaprovinces are a clear sign that such tensions are along way to dissipate. In this conflict, over 1000people were displaced; hundreds of acres ofsugarcane were torched as well as several houses.Intriguingly, political instigation appears as adominating factor. Indeed, politicians were quickto point fingers at their rivals accusing them ofattempting to divide the communities alongethnic lines for their personal political gains.Ethnicity in Kenya has bred “tribalism” andnepotism in the employment sector. Patronage injob employment was strongly entrenched duringKenyatta’s presidency while Moi and Kibakiperfected it. It is evident that those in powercrave to employ those from their ethnic groups inthe institutions they preside. The Kenya of thethree subsequent presidents since independencehas seen some government institutions such asuniversities, colleges, parastatals, ministries,security agencies and even private companiesbeing the domain of certain ethnic groups. Thiskind of scenario has infested and inundated theKenyan socio-political and economicenvironment with the culture of impunity,corruption and subservience.The regimes of Kenyatta and Moi were highlyidentified with initiating selective and lope-sideddevelopment. Indeed, Kenya is an examplewhere resources have systematically beenallocated according to proximity to power andethnic alliance. During Kenyatta’s era, CentralKenya and its environs was the hub of goodinfrastructure, schools and hospitals. When Moitook over, there was a drastic shift of thedevelopment machinery to the Rift Valley andother well politically connected areas. Moi waspopularly known for the slogan “Siasa mbaya,Maisha mbaya” translated to mean those outsideKANU and not royal to him would be alienatedfrom sharing the national cake. It was during histime when it was joked of how tarmacked roadsin the Rift valley were being used for dryingharvests (Maize and beans) and for livestock toidle, while the rest of Kenya, especially areasperceived to harbour political enemies were inpoor and unkempt infrastructure. Thus Moi`smodus operandi was ethnic manipulation that setthe stage for control of public resources withoutconsideration to the whole society.As Kenya geared up for a new constitution in2010, ethnic sentiments appeared to pervade theongoing debate to adopt the harmonized draft.The rival Party of National Unity (PNU) andOrange Democratic Movement (ODM)groupings in the coalition government developedpressure groups that took positions that reflectedselfish and ethnic pattern. PNU was opposed tothe creation of a post of a Prime Minister withexecutive powers for they thought it would dilutepresident Kabaki’s power and authority. ODMon the other hand supported transfer of executivepowers to the Prime Minister - under illusionthat the proposal bestowed power on PrimeMinister Raila Odinga. Although the adagonisticparties later on agreed on presidential system ofgovernance, their earlier intentions demonstrateda dangerous scenario since the political leadersand their hench men and women in54

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201255constitutional debate did not realize that theconstitution was not about Mr. Kibaki and Mr.Raila. This amounted to the promotion ofmediocrity, dogmatic and parochial observanceto matters of national importance, which isengendered by ethnicity.ConclusionThe malady of ethnicity in defining politics hasbeen quite pervasive before and afterindependence in Kenya. Ethnicity has becomethe Achilles heel upon which any politicaldispensation has been grounded on, especiallyafter independence. This kind of scenario hassystematically played a dangerous and harmfulmanifestation for the country. Indeed, Kenya hasfor a long time been subjected to guideddemocracy, that is, a democracy that borders onauthoritarianism and the perpetuation of theinterests of the minority. For Kenya to divorceitself from ethnicity there must be the desire toenact a government which has the interests of thenation and the entire diversity at heart, devoid of“tribal” under linings and sentiments. This callsfor what Pinkney (Pinkney, 1993) callsconsociational democracy. The word is used todescribe how a culturally diverse country likeKenya can ensure that all significant groups areincorporated in Government without alienationof “others”. The system recognizes society asconsisting of these distinctive groups, based onlanguage, race or religious autonomy of oneanother and the state. Indeed, the object ofconsociational democracy is to seek consensusbetween the different groups through a politicalprocess that brings all leaders into agovernmental process, through carefully tailoredforms of proportional representation offederalism and devolution of power or, byspecifically reserving offices of state for membersof the different groups. Moreover, there is needfor a legislation to guard Kenyans againstpoliticians who whip ethnic emotions forpolitical survival and aggrandizement. Presentlyin Kenya, the National Cohesion and IntegrationCommission (NCIC) established through an actof parliament in 2008 is gaining ground in theendeavour to contain ethnicity. The law must bevery clear, with severe penalties and fines forthose who violate and whip ethnicity for politicalsurvival. Lastly, Kenya requires an elaboratecivic education targeting its citizens withinformation on the repercussions of ethnicity.Such information should also emphasize onbuilding a national culture.ReferencesAkers, R.L. and Sellers, C.S. (2009)Criminological Theories. New York:Oxford University Press.Assefa, H. (1996) Ethnic conflict in the Horn ofAfrica. K. Rupesinghe and V. A. Tishkov(Eds.), Ethnicity and Power in thecontemporary world: Tokyo; The UnitedNations University, 32-51.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1996) Reconditioningthe terms of fact. Ethnicity, nationalityand democracy as political vectors. B.Ogot (ed.), Ethnicity Nationalism andDemocracy in Africa, Kisumu: Instituteof Research and postgraduate studies,Maseno University, 74-84.Barth, F. (1996) Ethnic Groups and boundaries:The social organization of culturedifference. Oslo: UniversitetforLaget.Bartol, C.R. (1999) Criminal Behaviour:Apsychological Approach. NewJersey:Prentice Hall.Boas, F. (1922) The limitations of thecomparative method in Anthropology.Science 4, 901-908.Bratton, M. and Van-de-Walle, N. (1997)Democratic Experiments in Africa:Regime Transitions in ComparativePerspective. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.Durkheim, E. (1893) The Division of Labour inSociety. New York:Free Press ofGlencoe.55

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201256Eriksen, T.H. (1993) Ethnicity and Nationalism:Anthropological Perspectives. London:Pluto Press.Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures.New York: Basic Books.Giddens, A. (2006) Sociology. 5th Edition.Cambridge: Polity Press.Glazer, N. and Moynihan, D. (1975) Ethnicity:Theory and Experience. Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press.Handelman, D. (1977) "The organization ofethnicity". Ethnic Groups 1, 187-200.Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T.T. (1983) TheInvention of Tradition. CambridgeUniversity Press.Jenkins, R. (1997) Rethinking Ethnicity:Arguments and Exploration. London:Sage Publications.Kiai, M. and Muite, P. (2009) Ethnic entitlementdoes not bode well for our Country andcommunities. Daily Nation April, 17th,4.Kituyi, M. (2011) Time is Up for Tribal SpokesMen and Ethnic Candidates. DailyNation, November,13, 19.Merton, R. (1938) Social structure of anomie.American Sociological Review 3, 672-682.Muriuki, G. (1974) A History of the Kikuyu,1500-1800. Nairobi: Oxford UniversityPress.Ndege, G.O. (1996) Ethnicity, nationalism andthe shaky foundation of politicalmultipartysm in Kenya. B. Ogot, B. (ed.),Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracyin Africa: Kisumu. Institute of Researchand Post Graduate studies, MasenoUniversity,Kenya, 65-73.Nyukuri, B.K. (1997) The Impact of Past andPotential Ethnic Conflicts on KenyansStability and Development. A PaperPrepared for USAID Conference onConflict Resolution in the Greater Hornof Africa, June, 1997.Ogot, B.A. (1996) Ethnicity, nationalism anddemocracy - a kind of historiography. B.Ogot (ed.), Ethnicity, Nationalism andDemocracy in Africa. Kisumu: IRPS,Maseno University.Kenya, 16-25.Pinkney, R. (1993) Democracy in the ThirdWorld. Buckingham: Open UniversityPress.Rothchild, D. (1969) Ethnic inequalities inKenya. Journal of Modern Studies 7.Rupesinghe, K. (1996) Governance and conflictresolution in multi-ethnic societies.K.Rupesinghe and V. Tishkov (eds.),Ethnicity and Power in theContemporaryWorld. Tokyo: The United NationsUniversity, 10-31.Simatei, P.T. (1996) Ethnicity and otherness inKenya cultures. B. Ogot (ed.), Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy in Africa.Kisumu: IRPS, MasenoUniversity.Kenya, 51-55.Smith, J. (1993) The Ethnic Origin of Nations.London: Oxford University Press.Throup, D. and Hornsby, C. (1998) Multi PartyPolitics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and MoiStates and the Triumph of the System inthe 1992 Election. Oxford: JamesCurrey.Tordoff, W. (1997) Government and Politics inAfrica. Bloomington: Indiana press.Wallman, S. (1979) Introduction: The scope ofethnicity. S. Wallman (ed.), Ethnicity atWork. London: Macmillan.Wamwere, K. (2008) Towards Genocide inKenya: the Curse of Negative Ethnicity.Nairobi: Mvule Africa.Were, G.S. (1967) A History of the Abaluhya ofWestern Kenya, C.1500-1930. Nairobi:East African Publishing house.Wolf, E.R. (1994) Perilous ideas: race, cultureand people. Current Anthropology 35, 1-2.56

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201257Knowledge, History and People: Communitarian Threads in the Thought andWorks of E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo: Remembering E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo andConceptualizing the Mau Mau OathMickie Mwanzia KosterDepartment of Political Science and History, University of Texas at Tyler, 3900 University Blvd. Tyler, Texas75799 United States,E-mail: mkoster@uttyler.edu______________________________________________________________________________AbstractThis study responds to a question posed by the late Dr. E.S Atieno Odhiambo in his2007 Mau Mau historiography seminar at Rice University on the significance ofoathing in the Mau Mau movement. This response critically examines oathingpractices of Mau Mau fighters during Kenya’s revolutionary war against British ruleand hegemonic dominance of the colonial state from 1952-1960. All Mau Mauinitiates took dangerous and secret oaths in order to join the Mau Mau movement.The oaths were rooted in old beliefs, traditions, and knowledge radicalized during thewar. The work done on this topic over the last several years has been conductedremembering the complexity and contradictory nature of Kenyan history keenlystressed and articulated by Dr. E.S Atieno Odhiambo. Thus, the study treats theentanglements and varied interpretations of the Mau Mau oath by exploring the innerstructures, meaning, and symbolism of the experience. The paper argues that theMau Mau oath was not only central to the unity of the Mau Mau movement, but itwas also a complex and dynamic system offering a powerful window into the social,cultural, and political moment in Kenya. This study concludes exploring new researchand work on Mau Mau oath continuities in Kenya to understand how the practice ofMau Mau oathing has found new forms of expression to fight social, political, andeconomic inequalities in Kenya today. Powerful traditions of the past do not vanish,but find new ways to re-emerge in the present.Keywords: E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, Mau Mau, Oath, Kenya, Ceremony, Model, Symbol_________________________________________________________________________IntroductionOn Tuesday, January 9, 2007, I anxiouslywalked into Dr. E.S. Atieno Odhiambo’s 589Mau Mau Historiography Seminar at RiceUniversity located in Houston, Texas in theUnited States. As a doctoral student at the time,I selected Rice University for the opportunity towork with the renowned professor; he was one ofonly a few historians in the United States thatcould provide me the complicated and entangledversion of Kenyan, African, and AfricanDiasporic history. On that day in class, Dr. E.S.Atieno Odhiambo passed out his 12-pagesyllabus that included 5 background readingbooks, 25 required reading books, 53 additionalbooks labeled under “other”, and 50 articles.Both the syllabus and the class were one of akind. Reflecting back, this class was a pivotalmoment in shaping my outlook and work onMau Mau. The syllabus became invaluable tomy understanding of Mau Mau and ensuingresearch. I am often asked how I decided on thetopic of oathing in my research. Interestingly, itwas during this Mau Mau historiography classthat I was first confronted with the question ofthe significance and role of oathing in themaking of the Mau Mau movement. For ourfinal paper assignments, Dr. E.S. AtienoOdhiambo listed a handful of essay questions,57

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201258with one examining the relationship betweenoathing and Mau Mau. Although I was not ableto address the significance of oathing in themovement in 2007, I have spent the last severalyears wrestling with the intricacies of this topic.When working on this topic, I always conductmy analysis thinking of Dr. E.S. AtienoOdhiambo’s notions of “complexity” and“contradiction” in Kenyan history.Oathing is an old and new practice of justice andorder. It occupies this position because it is asystem that straddles the past, but addresses themodern needs and moments of the present inmodified forms. We can best see this throughthe use of oaths during Mau Mau, a war againstthe hegemonic British rule and domination inKenya from 1952 to 1960. The Mau Mau warresulted in the end of British rule and colonialismin Kenya. British authorities were in the darkabout Mau Mau’s development because the heartof the movement was secret ceremonial oathsthat all Mau Mau initiates had to take. Oathsserved as the center of the insurgent groups’allegiance and unity. Over time fabricatedwritings and notions about these secret, obscure,bestial oaths became available. The oath was andstill is the focal point of fascination and mystery,yet very little is known about it because of thesecrecy and because of a failure to treat it as thecenter object for analysis. Despite over fiftyyears of sustained scholarship, writing, andinterest in Mau Mau, scholars have onlynarrowly defined oathing or analyzed it only as abackdrop to a larger narrative. In the process,scholars miss the opportunity to thoroughly treatthe dynamic nature and structural components ofoathing.I spent a great deal of time attempting tocommunicate the oathing system that surfacedfrom my research. My breakthrough finallyoccurred when one of my advisors, ProfessorElias Bongmba at Rice University, suggested Icreate my own model and not limit my ritualconceptualizations to existing theories. Thisopened new possibilities, but I needed thetechnology and methodology to support myanalysis. Although this study only focuses onone modeled interpretation of oathing, it doeshope to offer a new Mau Mau conversation.58The Model MethodologyIn order to understand the Mau Mau oath, Iapproached the topic by attempting to first centermy analysis on the Mau Mau oath object whiledesigning all of the other structures andrelationships around it based on what I viewedas a single instance of the oathing moment. Thisapproach provides a center to a dynamic process.Part of the difficulty in communicatingcomplicated systems, such as oathing, is limitedtools for analysis. Currently, historians arerestricted in the ability to present findingsbecause of this limitation, especially for complexhistorical analysis. Surprisingly, this has notsurfaced as a field issue, but part of the problemis that history is often treated narrowly alongfixed categories, missing the varied interactionsand changes that complicate history making.This treatment of the Mau Mau oath shows howoathing worked together dynamically with otherobjects and relationships. It reveals the truecomplexity of the oath experience. I used thesoftware tool, Dezign, to manage the modelobjects, descriptions, rules, and connections. Awide variety of graphical design tools could havebeen used; however, this tool was the mosteffective for the limited functionality of themodel. The tool offers flexible visualrepresentations of information that are easilymaneuvered to understand the intricacy of theexisting structures and its connections.The different objects can be reused in differentpresentations or diagrams, and detailedinformation can be captured on the object thatmay contain rules, definitions, historical details,and other useful data about the object. Thissoftware is normally used by developers ofsystems to communicate data designs, but forthis analysis of the Mau Mau oath, it fits since ittoo, is a complicated system.The model consists of objects, lines, anddescriptions. Each object is represented as arectangular shape, and it can have attributes that

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201259describe the object. The attributes (in bold) arekey to identifying the object. In other words,they are dominant and important characteristicsof the object. The objects relate to each otherthrough relationship lines. These lines, however,present a limitation in the model’s visualrepresentation. They are unable to clearly showsome of the relationship rules because they areembedded in the tool, but the application ofcolor in the diagram has worked to visuallyrepresent new objects and relationships. Withthis background, we can now turn to the MauMau oath model as a solution to understandingthis dynamic system.The Mau Mau oath was a dynamic, elaborate,and sophisticated system of relationships, rules,and structures. Through the depiction of thecreated “Mau Mau Oath Model”, represented asFigure 1.0, this section aims to walk through thecomplexity of the oathing by examining therelationship between the oath and other oathingrelated variables within the scope of thisresearch. Unfortunately, this model is not able tocapture every nuance of the oathing experience,but it is designed in a manner that will allow acareful treatment and analysis of the key objectsrepresented. The objective of the model is to helpconstruct and frame the complex oathingstructures in order to analyze the Mau Mauoath. 1The model also included relationships to newobjects: colonial criminalization and oathingpurification. 2 These objects represent complexsocial and political changes that will be treatedseparately in subsequent studies. 3 The focus hereis on the examination of objects 2.0-2.5 sincethey provide insight into the core meaning,structure, and interpretation of the Mau Mauoath. 4Mau Mau oathing was distinct from oaths priorto 1950 because it often involved multiple oathsrelated to the movement. Object 2.5 representsthe type of Mau Mau oath taken. All participantsunderwent at a minimum the basic oath calledthe first Mau Mau oath. The Mau Mau oathwas a tailored oath of resistance designed as anAfrican response to colonial economic, social,and political injustices. The oath was a blend ofthe past with the urgency of the present; itencompassed truth, secrecy, and unity. The firstoath was vital as it was created “to guarantee theallegiance of its members…it demanded strictsecrecy as well as total commitment…”(Barnettand Karari, 1966) It was also referred to as the“muma wa uigoano” or the oath of the secretmovement because of the danger and violencerequired challenging British authority. (Clough,1998) The first Mau Mau Oath was primarily anoath of truth and an oath of unity (Matingo,The Mau Mau Oath Model as depicted showsthat each Mau Mau oath was a function ofseveral components that all provided a uniqueMau Mau oath occurrence which is displayedmostly through the required relationships to theobjects (2.0-2.5) that make up each oathingexperience. In other words, a Mau Mau oathexperience was dependent on relationships todifferent oathing statements, symbols, locationdetails, time details, and the nature. It alsoshows that there were new optional relationshipsto objects (3.0-3.2) created during Mau Mau thatincluded oathing to women and to the young.1 Another characteristic of the model is that it has beendesigned to provide the best structure for future researchanalysis on the topic.592 In traditional society, these relationships with oathingdid not exist; however, the Mau Mau period forged theserelationship changes. Colonial criminalization was newbecause in traditional society, oathing was not viewed asa criminal activity; it actually worked alongside thejudicial systems. Similarly, purification was not used inoathing but was a new relationship based on how theoath changed in nature. These objects are outside of thescope of this particular study but are treated in a separatearticle.3 However, the object “young” as a full blown categoryfor analysis is not treated in detail for this particularstudy, but the new oathing relationship to this group isimportant to current research efforts on this topic.4 On the model the references of FK or PK are indicatorsused to track how the object may be uniquely identified.The technical detail of this is not pertinent to this studyand useful only in how we conceptualize a uniqueoccurrence of an othing experience or event.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201260December 2008; Malei, February 2009; Maveke,December 2008; Musuo, February 2009; Mulwa,January, 2009).The oath of truth was based on traditionaloathing beliefs around the guilt or innocence ofinvolved parties.The Mau Mau Oath Model60

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201261The Oath TypeThe additional oath types varied in number andnature (Maveke, December 2008). For example,secondary literature points to specific warrioroaths called batuni and muma wa ngero (theoath for killing)(Clough, 1998) that were noted inKikuyu oathing practices as a second Mau Mauoath type. These second Mau Mau oaths weredone after the unity oath but before oathers wentto the forest to fight. The second oath wasdescribed as oathing based on extremeconditions. These oaths were designed toprepare the select group of fighters to face deathand centered on loyalty while vowing to helpeach other during the fighting. These oathingceremonies included many more taboos, contactwith excrements, and more sexual connectionsbetween the participants or objects (Wamweya,1971; Mathu, 1974; Clough, 1998; Musuo,February 2009). As a consequence, they shapedthe oathing process by embracing taboos andcultural sexual violations that were never a partof tradition (Musuo, February 2009). These actswere misunderstood by many British colonialofficers and referred as a return to tribalism andsavagery, but the reality was that sexual offensesin the society were carefully watched andfrowned upon by African society. The purposeof the warrior dimension of the oath was tostrengthen group loyalty and allegiance whilefighting. Very few Mau Mau participants tookmore than four oaths. The additional oaths wereusually conducted to promote the first or tostrengthen a particular aspect of upcoming MauMau activities. But the model structure as itstands was designed to show that thesesubsequent oaths were just as complicated andmeaningful as the first Mau Mau.The Oath DateThe Mau Mau oath was also unique based onthe time/date of the oath. This object isrepresented by the entity oathing time stamp(object 2.0) to represent the actual date and timeof the oathing activity. The date as a separatecategory provides visibility to specific events thatmay have impacted the oathing activities andneeds. The distinction shows that for every oath,there was a specific time in which the oathingoccurred. Although out of scope for this61particular study, a more rigorous analysis ofchronological oathing activities based on datecould provide an interesting oathing historicalnarrative in order to trace how oathingaccommodated the needs of the Mau Maumovement. The peak of the Mau Maumovement was between 1948 and 1954. Theoath changed during the time period of MauMau in response to the needs and conditions ofthe war. For example, during the later years ofthe movement there were more secondaryoathings, based on the needs of the movement,and the oathing practices grew more intensecompared to the previous years (Kershaw, 1997).The Oath LocationSimilarly, the Mau Mau oath was distinct basedon the oathing location. On the model, this isrepresented by the object, oathing location(entity 2.1) that shows the physical place of theoathing ceremony. For example, oaths tookplace in urban or rural settings and wereconducted in very specific places. The location isalso aimed to capture the oathing locales linkedto districts and sub-locations. This is importantbecause for a variety of reasons like secrecy thedifferent oaths did not necessarily occur in thesame place. One interview account reveals animportant dynamic aspect of Mau Mau oathing;he states, “It [the oath] could be given anywhere,anytime”(Musuo, February 2009). Thisinformation also helps to define the oathexperience.Oathing locations were important for otherreasons. The sites could carry symbolic meaning.For example, oathing ceremonies in the forestpossessed a certain level of intensity and mysterythat was different from the oathing ceremonies inhouses or in rooms. The forest location containsembedded symbolism as the place of the dead,unknown spirits, and obscurity. The forest isoften viewed as a place where evil spirits dwell;as a result, individuals avoid it or enter withcaution to avoid the possibility of spiritpossession (Ngomlokojo, 1985). For Mau Mauparticipants, the forest represented a place thatwas beyond contact by Europeans and othersbecause of the fear and myths associated with the

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201262forest. 5 Thus, the forests were a sacred refugespace.However, this space also symbolized a place ofisolation, a place of the unknown, danger, evil,and a place of mystical power. In one Kenyanfield interview account, the oathing location wasreferred to as “a secret place set aside to givepeople the oath to be one thing”(Kakie, February2009). In another account, the forest wasreferenced as a common location for Mau Mauoathing ceremonies (Malei, February 2009). TheMau Mau movement is still remembered by itsassociation and attachment with the forest. Evenin recent conversations on the topic, there aremyths that Mau Mau participants still live andhide there. 6 Historically, forests were theprimary locations for traditional initiation andhunting ceremonies. Oathing ceremonies in thissetting took on a different experience because ofits closeness to the natural and spiritual world.However, it is important to note that based oninterview accounts, if the oath was held in adetention camp or house, there was a higherprobability that interviewees would state that thelocation was not symbolic. This differs from therespondents that oathed in the forest.The Oath RolesAll Mau Mau participants played, at aminimum, one role which is shown by object2.2., Oathing Roles. In most ceremonies thereare distinguishable roles; the oath taker, the oathadministrator, and the guard (Musuo, February2009; Mulwa, January, 2009). The oath taker isthe dominant character of the ceremony,responsible for repeating dictated words,statements, gestures, and acts. In pre-colonialoathing practices, women and the young weretypically excluded from the oathing practices.However, as the model shows new relationshipswere forged as a result of the critical Mau Maumovement and societal needs (which includedyoung men and women). These changes took ona profound meaning for Kenyans and wereembedded in much larger social changes inKenya.The oath taker followed the instructions of theoathing administrator who orchestrated all of theoathing activities and ceremony (Archives) andwas typically an old or mature man (Malei,February 2009). There may have been one ormultiple individuals that took on thisresponsibility. The administrator was very keenon the meanings, purpose, and oathing process;he or she aimed to successfully transition theoath taker into being a full Mau Mau fighter whopledged to fight colonial injustice. This leadercustomized the oathing process based on thematerials, artifacts, and resources available at thetime. There was not one standard oath processbecause the administrator decided on the vows,the gestures and symbolic acts to follow, theduration of activities, and all of the otheractivities.5 In some societies in Kenya, the forest was the placethat the dead were thrown, thus people were hesitant togo into certain areas of the forest. I have heard thesestories in my family also.6 I found this also to be the case with my Kenyanhusband and family who claim that Mau Mauparticipants still live in the forests. I clearly remembermy mother’s statement that, “if you go there, you maysee them; they think the war is still happening”. Thediscussion continued with a description of how theylooked. What is revealing is that these new oral accountson the topic continue to develop and have a place inmodern Kenya. This note is here to also suggest the needfor more research on the contemporary myths of MauMau and how they continue to be imagined and reimagined.62The other important role was the guard or theescort guard. This “guarding” role wasimportant and new in Mau Mau oathingactivities because of the secrecy and danger fromthe colonial police and African loyalists. If anoather refused to oath at any point during theoath process, this individual would be killed byone of the guards, who served as protection forall involved in the oathing ceremony whichcolonial laws proscribed as illegal. 7 The guardwas also responsible for finding food andnourishment for all participants. The7 This criminalization aspect of the Mau Mau oath is thesubject of one aspect of my previous work.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201263acknowledgement and understanding of thedifferent roles and participants is important inunderstanding the dynamics of the oathingprocess.The Oath SymbolIn order to analyze and describe the essence ofthe Mau Mau oath, this section focuses onsymbolism used in the ceremony. Symbols are acrucial component in the experience becausethey express the objectives and values of theceremony (Draper, 2000). Mau Mau oathingsymbols are represented in the model as 2.3Oathing Symbol and 2.3.a Oathing SymbolType. The model structure is designed to showthat for each oathing event there could be zero tomany different symbols represented. 8 The twoobjects together capture the multiple symbols,types of symbols, and symbolic meaning. 9 VictorTurner defines a symbol as “a thing regarded bygeneral consent as naturally typifying orrepresenting or recalling something by possessionof analogous qualities or by association in fact orthought” (Turner 1967).Turner discusses two types of symbols, dominantand instrumental, which are examined as theyrelate to the Mau Mau Oathing Model. Thereare several dominant symbols incorporated in thepractice that are important in conveying theoverall meaning and purpose of the experience.For this analysis, dominant symbols may beviewed as objects like blood, sex/taboo acts,ng’ondu mixture, and war weapons. For Turner,dominant symbols are consistent, autonomous,and constant as they can appear throughout theceremony or only in specific phases. Thedominant symbols for the Mau Mau oath“represent not beings but non-empirical powersof kinds of efficacy” (Turner, 1967).Instrumental symbols can be analyzed in widercontexts and include numbers and banana8 However, in all of the oathing rituals analyzed duringthis research, ritual symbols were present in theceremony.9 The symbolic structures and properties change torespond to social processes and environmentalalterations.63leaves. Instrumental symbols are interrelated andalso connected to the overall goal of theceremony” (Turner, 1967). The Mau Maumodel aims to show that all oath instances wereassociated with zero to many symbols - eachcould represent a particular type and have aspecific meaning. To understand this in moredetail, six symbols and their use have beenselected for discussion.Blood SymbolismThe application of blood in the Mau Mau oathwas a common symbolic gesture and took ondifferent meanings and interpretations that werevery specific to the entire oathing experience.The blood presented in the ceremony representedlife and death. Oathing participants entered intoa new life as they underwent a rebirthing orinitiation process represented in the use of blood.The relationships to death are seen on theindividual and movement level. On theindividual level, death was connected to the preoathedstate of the person. 10 Death was alsoassociated with the individual in the form of acurse for breaking oathing vowels and revealingthe secrets of Mau Mau.On the Mau Mau organization level, blood wassymbolic of the eventual death of the Mau Maumovement resulting in the birth of a new Kenyannation with the stolen lands being restored(Larson, 1972). It is important to note that thisdominant symbol had meaning in variousphases. For example, during the vow phase, thepresence of blood referred to death connected tobreaking the oath. In later phases of theceremony, eating bloody meat representedrenewal, purification, and life.In many pre-colonial African societies, bloodwas the unifier in relationships with others. Itwas used to unite individuals together as bloodbrothersbased on a sworn brotherhoodestablished through sucking the blood from eachpartner to create a new bond (Lindblom, 1920).10 The old individual dies and no longer exists. Thisconcept is similar to the traditional initiation of youngmen and women.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201264New brotherhood relationships outside of theethnic group were also permissible through themutual exchange of blood. However, in this casethe blood of the different partner was applied togoat meat and eaten. In both cases the oathswearing process associated with this unity waspowerful. The combination of the blood and theoath allowed for the invoking of a power which,if broken, could lead to death. Lindblom stressesthis power in saying that, “the ceremony has thesame effect as an oath sworn over a strong kipituand the breaking of such an oath brings with itdeath”(Lindblom, 1920).Sex SymbolismAfrican traditional law is very clear on sexualoffenses and taboos. Although traditionallythere was tolerance for sex before marriagethrough youth night dances, sexuality wasgenerally a very private and regulated sphere.Public sexual intimacy was uncommon andfrowned on by society. The code of sexualconduct in the household was often regulatedduring particular times of the day, aroundceremonies, births, initiations, marriages, and soon (Dundas, 1921). With this in mind, it isimportant to properly place and understand theapplication of sexual acts in the Mau Mau oath.Why was the oath transformed to engage inoffensive sexual activity that was clearly breakingfrom traditional values and beliefs? Theapplication of these acts was symbolic becausethey became unified acts of shame, disgrace,dirtiness, and dishonor that provided apsychological shock, madness, disgust, andmystery around the entire movement. It isimportant to note that they were unified inparticipating in this experience because it boundthem together and remained a memorable andsecret moment.It is difficult to describe the ceremonial practicesthat involved sexual acts between participants,partly because of the level of secrecy and thebond of the oath. The reality is that there aresome things that we will never know thatoccurred; therefore, we can only pull togetherscattered pieces. Ceremonies in different parts ofAfrica involved the practice of copulation; andthese acts were not new to some of thesetraditional ceremonies (Ngomlokojo, 1985).64During Mau Mau, there were references tonudity, beating, and sexual gestures with objectswhile taking the oath (archives, ; Clough, 1998;Musuo, February 2009). For example, in onerecorded statement, an oather explains, “Theytold us to take off our clothes at the beginning ofthis oath and later we were beaten”(Archives,1954). Sexual abuse and beating often worktogether in forms of humiliation and bodilydegradation. Most of these sexual acts were donewhile saying vows that the oath would kill ordestroy if broken. These acts were symbolicbecause of the vile nature of the acts that helpedmake the experience for participants more unitedand secretive because they would not want todiscuss these acts and acknowledge the repulsionof the behavior (Barnett and Karari, 1966).Nudity was also an important aspect of the oathsymbolically for the same reasons above, assome participants mentioned the need to removeall clothes during the ceremony to invoke all ofthe mentioned feelings and emotions associatedwith sexual disobedience.Ng’ondu SymbolismNg’ondu was used in Kenya for purifying andcleansing. This mixture was embraced duringMau Mau oathing ceremonies for the samepurposes. During the healing phase, the ng’onduwas symbolic of the actual act of purifying andunifiying and served as medicine for healing. Itwas a combination of herbs, oils, and sometimesanimal parts (Lindblom, 1920). One Mau Mauoath taker involved in this process commentedthat after eating the meat, “We becameone”(Musuo, February 2009). The act of eatingthe ng’ondu together created a bond between allparticipants.Weapon SymbolismWarrior artifacts in the form of a sword, spear, orshield were also dominant symbols in Mau Mauoathing. These instruments were used in theceremony as a means of contacting the spiritsassociated with the victim (Lindblom, 1920;Matingo, December 2008). The weapons weresymbolic of the Mau Mau struggle and wereoften used during the swearing process indicatingthat they symbolized a gateway to the spiritual

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201265world and power so that their utterances couldbe heard spiritually. One participant stated that,“I was given a sword, to rise up vertically andvow by it, that I will heed to the Mau Maulaws”(Kakie, February 2009). These artifacts alsosymbolized the fighting and violence that wouldbe necessary in the Mau Mau struggle.Number SymbolismNumbers are very important in Africanceremonial practices. In many Mau Mauoathing ceremonies, the number seven wasfrequently used to perform particular acts. Thenumber seven was symbolic because it wasbelieved to invoke the act done; therefore sevenrepresented power. For example, in a recordedcourt testimony, one witness described theapplication of seven in her statement about theforced oathing ceremony in saying, “We wereobliged to go through the arch seven times and tobite a substance of a nature I could notrecognize”(Archives, 1954). The use of thisnumber was not coincidental but symbolic, andit was dependent on the specific associatedactions. Lindblom documented the magictradition of carrying out actions a specificnumber of times when performing acts(Lindblom, 1920). He stated, “The idea that thenumber seven has a special importance is, ofcourse, very widespread…it is the mostprominent of all the numbers” (Lindblom 1921).In many of the oathing descriptions, specific actswere repeated seven times. For example,accounts included descriptions of oathingparticipants: going through the banana leafarches seven times; waving swords seven timeswhile oathing, stirring pots seven times, andlicking the sticks while taking the oath in order toenforce the power of the oath, and drinkingblood seven times (archives). By repeating theseactions seven times, the oath administrators wereinvoking the symbolic “magic” or power ofnumbers. Some accounts of traditional kithituinvoked the use of seven such as using sevenstones while taking the oath. Lindblom states“…in taking the oath on the kipitu 7 stones areplaced by the side of it; on these stands the manwho swears and they probably help to a certainextent to make the breaking of the oathbaneful”(pp307). Lindblom also references in his65work that the number seven was used duringprayers and sacrifices when the Kenyans wantedsomething positive Lindblom (Lindblom, 1920).Therefore, the number seven was symbolic ofanother power source to enforce the dangerousnature and consequences for breaking theoathing statements. The number seven wasfound both as a good and evil number leading togood or bad repercussions Lindblom (1921).Banana Leaf SymbolismThe banana leaves were also an instrumentalsymbol in oathing and remain sacred in differentcultures. Banana trees can create large andluscious leaves and are readily available. This ispart of the reason for its use in oathing practices.In the case of Mau Mau oathing ceremonies theleaves were used to form an arch symbolic of agate in which participants went throughrepresenting their spiritual transformation. Thephysical movement through the banana archrepresented the spiritual newness of theindividual. The application of the banana leavesoften involved walking through the arch seventimes giving it added meaning which is why it isviewed as an instrumental symbol type.The list covered in this Oath Symbol Typesection represents some of the symbols that wereused in different Mau Mau oathing ceremonies;this is far from being a complete list. As a result,the model has been designed to treat this as aseparate object because the symbols were notfixed. It is questionable if a complete list is evenpossible based on the dynamic nature of oathingceremonies. After all oathing administrators hadflexibility in the symbols they used. They weretrusted to make sure the initiates were acceptedinto Mau Mau. Therefore, they used whateverthey needed to invoke the spirits, and theyfollowed the guidance of the higher power indetermining what to use and what it was torepresent. They also used what was available atthe particular oathing time.The symbol types presented are displayed anddescribed as examples of the complexity,impromptu nature, and cleverness of theceremonial acts and embedded gestures in orderto create a performance that would impactparticipants. The symbols were powerful because

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201266of their cultural and historical group association.For example, holding a sword and moving itover the head seven times while uttering oathingstatements was an act that was designed toinvoke the power of the oath (Archives). Thecollection of symbols was assembled for eachparticular oath instance to create a Mau Mauoath experience that would unify, strengthen,create secrecy, and prepare participants for war.The Oath StatementsFinally the Mau Mau oath model analysisincludes the necessity for all oathing ceremoniesto have oathing statements, vows, andutterances. 11 Therefore, the model depicts thatfor every Mau Mau oath, there is an associatedrelationship between the oath and the oathingstatements, object 2.4. The collection of oathingstatements includes short phrases, words,affirmations, and even songs that were used tomove Mau Mau participants into full Mau Maumembers. Oathing could consist of manydifferent oathing statements. The vocalutterances of words, language, and actions werea key component of the oathing ceremony. Thekithitu oath or spirits heard the words spoken bythe oather.administrator again had flexibility in selectingthe sequence, the accents, and the words as hewas guided spiritually to know what wouldinvoke the oath. One of the most importantaspects of oathing statements was that they werebeing heard by the Supreme Being who waswitness to the statements. Therefore, the failureto abide by the statements meant severepunishment.The best way to illustrate the variety of differentoathing statements is through actual examples.Some oathing statements focused more on thepunishments for breaking the oath in achievingMau Mau unity. For example, consider thefollowing oathing statement from one oather,J.M Wambua:“I will not reveal any secrets toany government officials. If I do, Ishould die. I will never reportMau Mau to the government. If Ido, I should die. I will never takeaway the property of an African.If I do, I should die”(Wambua,February 2009).There was not one set oath statement that allMau Mau participants vowed. Generally thestatements were different based on all of theconditions that went into the Mau Mau oathexperience. Some oathing statements were brief;some were much longer, some included chantsand singing, while others did not. Despite thevariability of statements, there werecommonalities. However, all oaths did appear tohave consistency in the meaning and purpose ofthe oathing statements - the unification andliberation of Kenyan.Oathing administrators knew the core elementsneeded in the statements to ensure unity, secrecy,and allegiance to Mau Mau. However, the oath11 To date, I have not been able to find any cases of anoathing ceremony conducted without the application ofoathing statements or words because the oath, bydefinition, is spoken.66Other statements were more concise but alsofollowed the theme of freedom. According toMutituni interviewee, J.M. Malei, born in1936,the Mau Mau oath meant “setting ourselves freefrom colonialism.” His oathing statements were,“I will not reveal the oath. If I do so, I should bekilled. I will help other members of Mau Mauwhen hungry or in need. If I do not, I should bekilled.” (Malei, February 2009) He alsomentioned oathing Mau Mau songs that wereimportant statements. The following is adocumented song in Kikuyu (translatedafterwards in English):“Nitamukethia inyonthe asyarina arata. Na tusyokerie nagato.Tondu niatuotehisye Kukorotwiamwe. Tukethania na kikeno.Wiathi, wiathi, wiathi, mbururiwa kirinyag. Mbururi wa kikeno,Wikamba no Kikuyu, Kenya nimbururi wa and uairu.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201267Tuturasha na kwowo nakuthamio. Na mutikatikakuterera wiathi, Kenya nimbururi wa andu airu. Kenyattaila wekire kwoko thankdukuni yakura ndamuthaitha no Kenyawoire”(Malei, February 2009).English version: “We have greetedall of you parents and friends. Letus thank the Lord, because he hasmade us to be together to greeteach other happily.Independence, independence,independence, the land ofKirinyaga, land of happiness ofKambas and Kikuyu. Kenya is aland of the Blacks. WhenKenyatta put his hand in theballot box, he saved Kenya“(Malei, February 2009).The songs as statements offered group unity inthe struggle. In this case, the statements showedthe importance and value of the Kenyan landand the need for independence. Also, in January2009, 87-year old, P. Musuo remembered hisoathing statements and the punishment ofbreaking the oathing principles as:“If I am a Mau Mau and I have afellow Mau Mau hungry and Ifail to give him some money tobuy food or buy it for him, theoath should kill me. If my familyhas food and my colleague has nomore and I let them sleep hungry,the oath is to kill me. If I haveextra clothing and you have none,and I fail to share with you, theoath must kill me”(Musuo,February 2009).His statements are revealing because the oathwas central to the basics of existence. Hiscomment on providing food speaks to thesurvival and desperation felt by many of theAfricans during this period. The oath was amatter of life and death; it was a movement ofsurvival. The oath was ultimately responsible forenforcing the unity and togetherness necessaryfor Kenyan liberation. When questioned whatthe oath meant, P. Musuo responded that itmeant “to be united to rule ourselves”(Musuo,February 2009).Other oathing statements were much longer andspoke about specific roles of the participants. Forexample, some oaths were directed at warriorsand designed to strengthen group loyalty andallegiance while fighting. One of the best writtentestimonies on this topic is from the account ofKarari Njama which provides an example of thelanguage and associated warrior principles:(1) I have today become asoldier of Gikuyu and Mumbiand I will from now onwardsfight the real fight for the landand freedom of our country tillwe get it or till my last drop ofblood. Today I have set my firststep (steeping over the first lineof the goat’s small intestine) as awarrior and I will never retreat:May this soil and all itsproducts be a curse upon me!(2) If ever I am called toaccompany a raid or bring inthe head of an enemy, I shallobey and never give lameexcuses. And if I refuse: Maythis soil and all its productscurse upon me!(3) I will never spy or inform onmy people, and if ever sent tospy on our enemies I will alwaysreport the truth. And if I fail inthis: May this soil and all itsproducts curse upon me!(4) I will never reveal a raid orcrime committed to any personwho has not taken the NgeroOath (Oath of Violence orCrime) and will steal firearmswherever possible. And if I everreveal our secrets or fail to use orturn over to our warriors any67

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201268firearms I acquire: May this soiland all its products curse uponme!(5) I will never leave a memberin difficulty without trying tohelp him. And if I everabandon a member in trouble:May this soil and all itsproducts be a curse upon me!(6) I will obey the orders of myleaders at all times without anyarguments or complaint andwill never fail to give them anymoney or goods taken in a raidand will never hide any pillagesor take them for myself. And IfI fail in these things: May thissoil and all its products curseupon me!(7) I will never sell land to anywhite man. And if I sell: Maythis soil and all its product be acurse upon me!(Clough, 1998).Many varied practices were associated withNjama’s statements. For example, hisdescriptions included practices such as droppingsoil into a gourd after testimonies; inserting hispenis into a hole in a goat while biting the goatwhen stating, “May the thenge kill me;” andswinging artifacts like the sword, knife, andneedle over his body seven times while theoathing administrator condemned him to deathfor violations (Barnett and Karari, 1966). Thisstatement is revealing as it covers the warriorexpectations, oath breaking curse, unity, and theimportance of the soil in the struggle. Theassociated object symbols and gestures also showhow these things all move together in one accordin the seriousness of oath making.One of the most beneficial aspects of thearchived documents is the detailed informationprovided. For example, in one courtroom drama,M. Ndibo recorded his Mau Mau oathingprocess and statements about an oathingceremony on October 27, 1953:“I took off my clothes. They thentied goats flesh and grass round mywrists I was given a dish to hold. Iwas then told to go through acircular thing 7 times – it was anarch with ends stuck into ground. Idid so. Then I was told to stand infront of [the] arch and the Accusedgave me a piece of meat. I had topush it over my left shoulder. As Iwas doing this Masika [the accusedoath administrator] told me – as Icame across a Europeans property Ishould take it. If I am called duringthe night by that group I should goout. That I should get ammunition(Archives).In this same case another testifier, Nzango s/oMuinde also gave his oathing statements as:“If I am called out at night by theMau Mau, even if it is to killEuropeans, Government servantor Chiefs, I must go; if I do not goI must die. If I am called out todo damage to the property ofEuropeans, Government Servantsof Chiefs I must do it or I mustdie. If I hear of any member ofMau Mau who is in trouble withthe Government I must help himor I will be killed. I must not paymoney when I go to Church as themoney is not for God but forEuropeans. If I tell the secret ofMau Mau oath to anyone, I willbe killed” (Archives).It is important to note that the statements weregiven on the same day by the same oathadministrator showing how the statements canvary for each individual oather. What isinteresting is that the individuals that came forthto testify about the oath in some ways revealedthat they did not fear the curse of the oath forrevealing its secrets. What is important is thatfor all statements given, there was associatedmeaning.68

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201269The oathing statement meaning can be describedon different levels. In several interviews,participants were questioned about the generalmeaning of oathing compared to ethnic specificreasons for the oath (Berman and John, 1992).The results revealed that there were generalmeanings associated with the oath: to endcolonial rule, to liberate people, to self rule, togain freedom, to unite, to gain back land, and toseek independence (Malei, February 2009;Kakie, February 2009; Musuo, February 2009;Wambua, February 2009; Mulwa, January,2009). However, for some ethnicities the oathalso meant to retrieve their livestock andproperty, to receive equal wages, to restore theirstolen land, to expel the Europeans from Kenya,and to end European beatings (Malei, February2009; Kakie, February 2009; Musuo, February2009; Wambua, February 2009; Mulwa,January, 2009). The statements show only slightdifferences in meaning.The general and ethnic specific meaningspresented show that there were common themes,and the Mau Mau movement was powerfulenough through the oath experience that itunited many Kenyans under one Mau Maumovement creating the foundation for Kenyannationalism (Berman and John, 1992). Ingeneral, the meaning beyond the oathingstatements was variable and dynamic, and insome ways the meaning may only really beinterpreted by considering the entire oathingexperience together. This includes thecombination of all elements of the oathcomponents because all of these things workedtogether as a system.ConclusionMany African ceremonies were situatedin very specific conditions that varied accordingto the participants, location, resources available,time, specific social conditions, and values at themoment of the ceremony. This was undoubtedlythe case for the Mau Mau oath. This oath was adynamic and sophisticated system ofrelationships, rules, and structures. From thisstudy, we have seen ways in which it wascustomized, providing tailored oathingstatements, symbolic gestures, oath participants,69oath types, and a specific oath location for a trulyunique oathing experience. The process wascomplicated even more by: the inclusion ofwomen and young members of the society inceremonies (both are groups that were previouslyexcluded from political oathing practices intraditional society); colonial criminalization thatincreased the need for secrecy; and oathingpurification/cleansing that allowed for the reentryof some Mau Mau oathers in the villages.There were layers of variables, structures, andrelationships that went into the making of theoath and the making of the Mau Mau movementthat reveal the multifaceted and dynamic natureof the ceremony.Oathing was central to the Mau Mau movement.What is most intriguing about oath analysis isthat despite numerous variables, it was thesimilarity in values, beliefs, objectives, andprinciples associated with the conflict thatcreated uniformity in the oathing experience.This speaks a great deal about the spirit of themovement that went beyond the participants.We cannot deny the participation of variousethnic groups that joined the Kikuyu to fight andthe inclusion of groups like women and theyoung. From their perspective, a commonenemy stole African land and freedom, makingMau Mau a symbol of African unity. Theunifying goal was to fight for Kenyan freedom,which started with taking the Mau Mau oath. 12Mau Mau is still evolving. After more than 60years, new information is surfacing confirmingor shifting knowledge and remembrances (News,April 6, 2011; News, May 11, 2009). With therecent release of thousands of files from theBritish government on Mau Mau, new versionsand conversations are undoubtedly expected(News, April 6, 2011; News, May 11, 2009).However, through the Mau Mau oath, it ispossible to discern much more about the processand structure of the movement, providing newways to conceptualize existing and futureinformation on the topic. Like all unresolved12 However, the term “freedom” is still being questionedin modern Kenya.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201270histories, Mau Mau and their arcane oaths willcontinue to occupy the attention of scholars –not surprising given the varied number of“truths”.ReferencesArchives, K.N. CC 36/54 Rex vs. Masika S/ONyanze. KNA MLA 1/791.Archives, K.N. CC 103/54 Rex vs. RuebenMbwika, p. 2. KNA MLA 1/986, 2.archives, K.N. CC 204/55 Rex vs. Kabibya p. 2example of nakedness during oathingceremony. KNA MLA 11/93.Archives, K.N. Testimony of Masau Ndibo,KNA MLA 1/791 – CC 36/54 Rex vs.Masika S/O Nyanze. KNA MLA 1/791– CC 36/54, 1.Archives, K.N. Testimony of William NzangoS/O Muinde, Third Class MagistrateCourt at Machakos, case 60, 1953KNA MLA 1/791, 1.Archives, K.N. (1954) Testimony of KasinaNguku, Case file 127 notes, KNA MLA1/1007-CC 127/1954. Rex vs. HarunWaau Mutisya, Philip Nthekani Mwo,and Sounsza Kandu, 5. KNA MLA1/1007-CC 127/1954.Barnett, D.L. and Karari, N. (1966) Mau Maufrom Within: Autobiography andAnalysis of Kenya’s Peasant Revolt.Dublin, Ireland: MacGibbon and Kee.Berman, B. and John, L. (1992) UnhappyValley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa,Books One and Two. Oxford: JamesCurry.Clough, M.S. (1998) Mau Mau Memoirs:History, Memory and Politics. Boulder:Lynne Rienner Publishers.Draper, J.A. (2000) Ritual Process and RitualSymbol. in ‘Didache’ 7-10,” VigiliaeChristianea 54, 200.Dundas, C. (1921) Native Laws of Some BantuTribes of East Africa. Journal of theRoyal Anthropological Institute of GreatBritain and Ireland (January-June, 1921)244-248.Kakie, S. (February 2009) Interviewed by M.Musyimi. Tape recording and notes.Mutituni.Kershaw, G. (1997) Mau Mau from Below.Ohio: Ohio University Press 1997, 318.Larson, M.T. (1972) A Mau Mau oath-takingceremony administered by GeneralBlood performed on February 2, 1956.Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,University of North Carolina - ChapelHill.Lindblom, G. (1920) The Akamba in British EastAfrica: an Ethnological Monograph. In:Uppsala: Appelbergs BoktryckeriAktiebolag.Malei, J.M. ( February 2009) Interviewed by M.Musyimi. Tape recording and notes.Mutituni.Mathu, M. (1974) The Urban Guerrilla.Richmond, B.C.: LSM InformationCenter.Matingo, A.N.M. ( December 2008) Interviewedby M. Musyimi. Tape recording, notes,and video. Kikumbulyu.Maveke, S.S. (December 2008) Interviewed byM. Musyimi. Tape recording and notes.Kikumbulyu.Mulwa, K. (January, 2009) Interviewed by M.Musyimi. Tape recording and notes.Mutituni.Musuo, P. (February 2009) Interviewed by M.Musyimi. Tape recording and notes.Mutituni.News, B. (May 11, 2009) Kenya Mau MauVeterens to Sue UK.News, B.O.-l. (April 6, 2011) Kenyan Mau MauUprising Documents Released. AccessedSeptember 9, 2011.Ngomlokojo, J.J. (1985) Rituals of ReligiousWorship Among the Traditional Alur.Gulu, Uganda.Turner, V. (1967) The Forest Of Symbols.Ithaca, London: Cornell UniversityPress.Wambua, J.M. (February 2009) Interviewed andTranslated by M. Musyimi. Taperecording and notes. Mutituni.Wamweya, J. (1971) Freedom Fighter. Nairobi:East African Pub. House.70

71Living on the Edge: Rustling, Raids and Banditry in Kenya’s North-EasternFrontierGordon Obote MagagaFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno, Kenya.E-mail: magagadon@yahoo.comJacob Adipo OgaloFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno, Kenya.E-mail: adipoogalo@gmail.com________________________________________________________________________Abstract Banditry is one of the biggest security challenges currently facing Kenya and EastAfrican sub-region. The practice is creating great concerns and has resulted into loss of human lives,stealing livestock, destruction of property and dislocation of populations. The thrust of the currentpaper is rustling and banditry as a contribution to a state of violence and lawlessness which in turncreates insecurity and threatens lives of the residents. The availability of weapons in the hands ofbandits has not only contributed in fueling instability, lawlessness and conflict, but also pose athreat to sustainable development. This paper posits that the study of the phenomenon must be donein tandem with the geopolitical issues that wrap together poverty, political instability and lawlessness.The state, finding itself caught up in the whole issue, is unable to provide effective control leaving theperpetrators to have a field day. The scenario is given impetus by the fact that bandits havetransformed their operations through increased sophistication, have become more militarized anddestructive. The rapture of the vice is traceable through colonialism and post-colonial period. Inconclusions, reflection measures are recommended for the government to eradicate the problem.Key words: Rustling, Raids, Banditry, Kenya, North-Eastern FrontierIntroductionOn December 12, 1996 at Doldol in East Africa,eight armed gangsters fired shots and for twentyminutes the bandits looted shops at will afterhaving scared away residents. According to anominated Member of Parliament from the areaand a former Minister of State, parts of LiakipiaDistrict were degenerating into a bandit areawith cattle rustlers gunning down helplessvillagers (Umar, 1997a). Within the samemonth, it was reported that a Pokot-led cattlerustling expedition shot down a police helicopterin Suguta Valley killing the Samburu DistrictCommisioner, Mr. Henry Nyandoro and tenother senior security personnel who were onofficial mission monitoring the banditmovements. Fifteen thousand herds of cattlewere reportedly stolen in the raid (Standard,1996). Elsewhere, the national circulation, theDaily Nation, raised alarm over the exodus ofessential staff, among them teachers and doctorsfrom Malindi in an editorial piece on October 19,1996 titled “End the Insecurity in the frontierareas”.“…..school children in this part ofthe country will not go throughsyllabi and yet they have to competewith their counterparts elsewhere.How about the sick? They willcontinue to suffer. We are confidentthat it is not only us that feel thatinsecurity in Kenya must beparamount and that the governmentmust invest a lot more in it” (DailyNation, 1996).On July 8, 2011 Kenya Television Network newsat one o’clock was broadcasting a celebration of71

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201272three years of relative peace by residents ofLaikipia since the Kanampiu massacre of 1997where thirty four people were killed. Recently,on Monday, July 12, 2011, the StandardNewspaper on its national page titled “Rustlersleave trail of death and destruction” reported thatmore than one hundred armed raiders fromSamburu North attacked villagers in Sarima areain Marsabit and in Isiolo killing seven villagers,left scores injured and drove away hundreds ofcamels, goats and sheep. It also reported that ina span of three weeks, those killed in the countynumbered over hundred (Standard, 2011).The foregoing are living testimonies of thepresence of bandit and rustling problems inKenya. In the 1980s and 1990s, the problem hadacquired a sophisticated form. In virtually all theremote areas the authorities had continuouslythreatened harsh security measures to wipe outthe banditry, pouring in all manner of armedforces. In response bandits appear to adopt aresilience becoming more violent, acquiringheavier and more sophisticated weapons andupdating their warfare skills.The fact that the vice presents a matter of graveconcern in modern Kenya cannot be gain said.A cursory survey reveals that in the pasttraditional practice of rustling or banditry amongthe pastoral communities was a cultural practicesanctioned and controlled by the elders. It arosefrom the need to have more livestock, thetraditional measure of wealth in pastoralsocieties. Over time, and more recently,however, rustling has assumed a deadly plot toenrich well connected individuals who sell offthe thousands of stock in large urban markets.The commercial forces have created a new formof raiding devoid of restraint and inspiredmaximizing one’s own crude materialgain(Anderson, 2005). Aided by unscrupulouspoliticians and businessmen, the raiders are ableto sell stolen cattle rapidly and then use themoney to pay for new recruits and new weapons.These individuals take advantage of inter-clantensions to rustle stock from the opponent clanthus raising tension and propaganda between theclans. The crippling large scale livestock lootinghas been accompanied with negativeramifications namely; loss of lives, arson,destruction of property, rape and such relatedproblems.The thrust of this paper is to examine the newtrends and dynamics that have emergedfollowing commercialization of rustling and thebearing it manifests on the lives of the localpopulations resident on pastoral regions. Theterms rustling, banditry and raids are usedinterchangeably since they are not just closelyrelated but also intertwined. The north-westfrontier which includes areas occupied by thePokot, Turkana, Marakwet and Samburu istaken as the point of focus for this paper. Thepoint of departure for the paper is summed upthus; rustling and banditry in north-westernfrontier of Kenya has contributed to a state ofviolence and lawlessness thus creating insecurityand threatening the lives of the residents.Critical questions that may be asked are; why hasthe government of Kenya been unable to onceand for all stamp out the problem and whatreally explains its ability to self-perpetuate? Whoare the forces behind the mayhem?Historical Background: Legacy of ColonialismNorth West Kenya has remained predominantlypastoralist in orientation like many other regionsin Kenya. Her economic disparity with otherparts of Kenya is discernible; poor infrastructure,poor roads in vast areas, inadequate anddispersed health facilities, poortelecommunication services, bad schools and noelectricity, to mention but a few. The regionseems to be so neglected that one hardlyidentifies government’s presence in the remotevillages. It is of little wonder to hear a nativeTurkana for instance speak about “going toKenya” meaning a visit to the nearest town, forexample, Kitale situated several hundred ofkilometers away.The day to day life of the inhabitants of thisregion is in reality a tale of constant interactionwith poverty and insecurity. Insecurity appearsin multiple forms; the incessant conflict withneighbours over land, water and pasture, fear offamine and starvation, fear of destruction and72

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201273loss of life. In other words, the majorities ofpeople in this region are destitute, poor and lacksthe means of empowerment.Although banditry in north-west Kenya cannotbe said to a direct byproduct of Britishcolonialism, it is important to note, however,that the British divided Kenya into three regions.The first was the developed white highlands.The second was the less developed native lands,which was also providing a source of cheaplabour. Lastly, was the frontier or closed districtwhere permits were required for those intendingto travel out to the emerging cities. In their questto curve out the white highlands, the British tooksome of the most arable lands of the Pokot andother parts of the Rift Valley. The Pokots wereherded to the drier parts where their livelihooddepended on pastoralism. Other sections in theRift Valley suffered similar experiences. TheBritish administration did not do much to redressthe conditions of those dispossessed. The Pokotand their neighbours henceforth became exposedto conditions of hardships as they came face toface with colonialism. The spread of rustlingwithin this period must therefore be understoodto have been resorted to as a coping mechanismby those dispossessed and marginalized. Ocanhas aptly said, as access to land shrunk andpopulation of animals and people increases inrestricted areas, it strains on the availableresources an the natural response has been toresort to cattle raiding (Ocan, 1992).theory. Five hundred and fifty young Turkanamen were recruited, trained, armed and deployedat Lokitaung where the 25 th (East African)Brigade was garrisoned. In recognition of theirmilitary ethos and courage, the Turkana formedthe vanguard and flunk scouts for upsetting anyambushes organized by regular Italian troopsand Italian armed Merille and Donyiro tribes ofEthiopia. The legacy inherited from colonialismwas an area with disproportionately highnumbers of veterans of colonial wars whose sonsand daughters had been accustomed to seeing aloaded rifle in the homestead and listening togripping narratives of war (Nene, 1999). Thislegacy inculcated upon the Turkana a propensityfor aggression and the raids or banditry carriedout thereafter must have their meaning andexplanation from this background.Moreover, during the colonial period, the area’spotential in agriculture and livestockdevelopment was underexploited while Turkanaand Pokot ethnic communities were sociallyisolated from the mainstream Kenyan societyexcept when used to perform traditional dancesfor entertaining tourists and visiting governmentofficials. So right from the advent of colonialrule the Turkana and the Pokot tribes retained adevastating means of conducting organizedviolence while economic and political isolationof their geographical region during colonizationand after provided them with the motive andopportunity (Nene, 1999).The Turkana resisted the imposition of colonialrule upon them for a period spanning twenty-fiveyears (1895–1925). Following their defeat in1925, the British official policy towards theTurkana was very inimical and disruptive(Odegi-Awuondo, 1992). Many raids carried outby the Turkana during this period were basicallyto counteract British raids upon them. TheTurkana in turn raided their neighbours whomthey perceived to be loyal to the British. Suchraids were also a way of restocking their stocklost through British expeditions. With the WorldWar II looming, Britain preferred a policyrecruiting from “Martial Races” to build up hertroops to be used in attacking the Italians inAbyssinia. The Turkana, given their long historyof resisting the British fitted the “martial races”73The official policy of the colonial state wasskewed towards developing settler agriculture.Peasant production and pastoralism played asecond fiddle. Frantic efforts were made todiscourage the two sectors. One such effort wasdemarcation of tribal reserves which apart fromappropriating fertile lands for white settlementsalso created borders. The borders limited freeaccess to grazing land and water, hence creatingsocial conflict among pastoralists. The bordersalso hindered movements of people and livestockthat affected the pastoralists’ mode of life. Otherimpediments to pastoralism brought about undercolonialism were imposition of market taxes,quarantine laws, destocking campaigns, allaimed at depastoralising the communities. Theonset of the 19 th century witnessed the steady

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201274transformation within the modes of the Turkanaand the Pokot as they adopted transhumance.The adoption of transhumance came withaccompanying problems namely, rise ofhostilities among various groups competing overgrazing grounds. Moreover the loss of animalsduring droughts provided justification for raidingto restock the herds.Northern Kenya was a closed district during thecolonial period and was administered by militaryofficers. This had negative effects on the social,economic and political developments of thepastoral communities. Whenever there occurreda raid, the government would send punitiveexpeditions against the suspect groups. Manyhuman casualties resulted from such expeditionsbesides loss of livestock through confiscation bythe authorities. Measures taken by theadministration on Africans solicited equalmeasure of resentment against colonial rule.Since livestock keeping remained the mainstayfor the pastoralists, it was prudent that theyprotect their livestock from wild animals andhuman thieves. It was necessary therefore forthem to be armed. The British perceived them tobe warlike and hence a threat to colonialauthority. The administration used thisperception as a justification to put a close watchover the Turkana and the Pokot. Perceivingthem as war-like was a way of creating an enemyimage and using it as an ideological justificationfor counter aggression (Markakis, 1993). Themyth that nomadic communities are traditionallywarlike and aggressive seems to have gainedinternational currency among a section ofextreme anthropologists who have studied therole of stock rustling, territorial expansion,ritualized and actual war in pastoral community.They claim that it is through war withneighbours that certain clans gain their identityand sense of being (Nene, 1999). An easilyobservable characteristic of pastoral people is theway they casually but proudly carry offensiveweapons around. It is easy to assume that theunusual cultural phenomenon that concernexternal experts-pastoral warrior clan systems,age grade systems, pride of war traditionalraiding, are the main reason for the slow burnwars, banditry and breakdown of state law and74order and have been characteristic of Africa’sarid areas. If this is the case, the only way tosolve the insecurity problem is to thoroughlychange the pastoralist cultures and discardingtraditional ways!! (Nene, 1999). It was in thislight that government officials and their Africancollaborators believed that the only way to dealwith cattle rustling was to use brute force(Osamba, 2000a).Post-colonial State PoliciesDuring the post independence period, thegovernment of Kenya replicated the colonialstrategy in dealing with frequent cattle rustlingactivities. The application of force however,failed. This owes to the fact that raiders tendedto acquire more sophisticated weapons and newforms of organization and coordination makingthem to become the defacto administrators onthe northern frontier. Presently, after forty eightyears of independence, pastoralists in Kenya findthemselves faced with a three pronged strugglefor survival. First is the bitter localized conflictover resources between poor pastoralist groups.Second is the wider and complex national levelconflict with state authorities, voracious localelite and expanding populations of peasantcultivators. Lastly is the struggle for meaningfuldevelopment cognizant and respectful of socialand ecological realities of arid regions. All thesethree struggles are related and makes the life of apastoralist a bitter and often a no-win battle inwhich the main focus has been debilitating andfierce struggle between pastoral groups (Umar,1997b). The Kenyan state seems indifferent ormerely incapable of doing anything in the face ofthese struggles. The state has failed to fullyintegrate the pastoralists in Kenya’s moderneconomy leaving them to continue beingengaged in increasing and unending conflictsthat has made certain areas no-go banditterritory.As early as the 1970s, the Turkana incollaboration with elements in government,employed sophisticated raiding methods usingheavy guns, military tracks for transport andlarge scale network of smuggling extending up to

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201275Sudan (Markakis, 1993). During the 1980s and1990s, spates of infectious violence existed alongthe Kenyan border with Uganda and Sudan.Sporadic bandit activities epitomized the level ofpolitical dissatisfaction and security brewingacross the international frontier. The borders ofKenya are porous and are being shared withcountries that have experienced war overdecades. Political ambition in these countrieshas overtaken common sense, resulting intoviolent changes of government and the release ofmore tools of violence into society. Moreover,poor and corrupt policing of these borders hasfacilitated the influx of large quantities of armsinto Kenya. Individuals have been able toacquire weapons for overt criminal purposes.Bandits and traffickers have found easy entrywithin the porous borders particularly rebelmovements in Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda havebenefited from this state of affairs. Law in thesemarginalized regions is not adequately enforcedleaving the people with the option of armingthemselves for personal, communal, clan orlarger family defense requirements.It is important to note that finding itself unable toprovide the needed security, the postindependenceKenyan government has overtly orcovertly opted to arm groups in frontier districts.This policy has sent unambiguous signals tocommunities that they should take care of theirown security and it has thus solidified the beliefthat the government itself is unable to take careof this basic need (Kiflemariam, 2002). Theperiphery of Kenya and Sudan is not onlyneglected administratively but it is alsounimportant that the precise delineation of theKenyan-Sudan-Ethiopia trijunction point knownas the Ilemi Triangle is still pending.Consequently, the area extending into thetriangle due South into Kenya’s Turkana andPokot district, has become a battleground fornomadic tribes of no specific nationality. Due tolack of government control, each tribe has itsown armies of heavily armed bandits known asthe Ngoroko. They compete for the latesttechnology in arms, which, thanks to the volatilesituation in the neighbouring countries havefound their way from north and north easternregions of Uganda. Here changes in governmentbetween the Obote regime to Museveni has given75a window to soldiers to flee with weapons whicheventually find their way into Kenya.The easy access to arms in this region makes lifelivable for the bandits yet at the same time, itcauses serious stress and insecurity to otherinhabitants. Because the firearms are cheap toacquire, banditry thrives in endemic poverty thatsprings from the neglect by the existing statestructure of Kenya, Uganda, Sudan andEthiopia, where geographical distance from eachcountry’s capital literally translates into distancefrom consideration of the people’s economicadvancement and security (Nene, 1999). Giventhe harsh physical terrain that induces thesenomads to compete over scarce resources ofwater and pasture and the absence of authority,violence becomes an inexorable culture.Although it is primarily an aspect of survival,banditry escalates with high magnitude ofdevastation because the arms that make it thriveare readily present in the region. Banditry hasnot only robbed people of their materialpossessions but also their national identity.Many Turkana populations, like their other farflung counterparts, do not feel they are Kenyansor live in Kenya. To them Turkana is Turkanaand Kenya is Kenya.The ready availability of sophisticated weaponsamongst pastoralists has transformed thedynamics of rustling in varying degrees. Raidinghas evolved into military operation applyingconventional war tactics. The Samburu casewhere a District Commissioner and seniorgovernment security officials were killed is clearillustration of this transformation in banditry.Yet battles of similar magnitude are notuncommon but are regularly fought between theTurkana, Pokot and Samburu just as theyhappen in the horn between the pastoralistgroups there. The victims of such conflicts areusually young men, women, and children whoare brutally murdered. Harvests have been seton fire, shops looted, huts and stores burntdown, livestock stolen and above all women andyoung girls raped. Of critical importance is thegovernment’s lack of action on the root cause ofthe conflict, namely resources, but instead it hasresorted to illegal highhanded and thoroughlyinhuman ways of “disciplining” pastoral

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201276offenders (Umar, 1997b). Apart from issuingstern warnings and threats, the government hascontinued to send large numbers of armedsecurity men, some in military helicopters tobombard the suspected bandit hideouts (Osamba,2000a). In other instances, the securitypersonnel have randomly rounded and picked upsuspects for questioning and in the processsubjecting them to a lot of torture.An illustration of the foregoing found expressionin 1997 where Turkana leaders including anAssistant Minister said the military operation inthe area involving the use of helicopter gunships,tanks, bomber aircraft and infantry to flush outbandits was victimizing innocent villagersincluding women, children and men. Theyappealed to the state to intervene against theexcessive force visited upon innocent villagers.They claimed that the military operations andthe spate of inter-tribal killings that led to itsmounting may result into the elimination ofTurkana as a community. They urged thegovernment to come up with a clear policy of thesecurity issue in Turkana as the District “wassurrounded by hostile tribes”(Umar, 1997b).Similar operations had been undertakenelsewhere in the north among Garissainhabitants where local population includingMembers of Parliament, councilors, civilservants of Somali origin were herded to GarissaCounty grounds and made to squat in the sun forthree days under the watch of security forces.But perhaps the most indiscriminate of all suchoperation was committed in 1984 amongst theWagalla known infamously as the “WagallaMassacre” and whose investigation has beenreinstituted twenty seven years since it happened.On this February day, following the shootingdead of four Ajuran clan members in Wajir, thegovernment decided the Digodia clan was theaggressors, and punitive military operation wasmounted against them. All male Digodia wererounded up in Wajir and taken to a disusedairport at Wagalla. For three days they wereherded without water or food, and heavilysurrounded by armed police and army personnel.On the fourth day of their incarceration,overcome by hunger and thirst, a section of the76crowd made for the perimeter fence. Thesecurity forces opened fire killing four hundredpeople (Umar, 1997b). Much as these incidencesmay appear like some kind of fiction story or afairy tale, they are indeed the true representationof how a government can be cruel and insensitiveto the problems of its citizenry. The state in allmanners of speaking has become predatory andas pointed out by Salih, “the state is reduced toan arena of competing interests and politicalobjectives inconsistent either with its role as themain monopolizer of the use of force or the solearbiter of divergent ethnic and regional interests”(Salih, 1993).The government in its intervention policy hasstood accused of being selective anddiscriminatory, arbitrarily taking sides in localconflict. The government is guilty of practicingopen favouritism towards some tribes allowingsome to acquire guns like AK-47 rifles in thepretext of arming home guards while disarmingothers. In 1996, the government directed armedforces to Turkana to punish them fortransgressing in Samburu and Pokot despite thefact that large numbers of the “Turkana had beenor were being slaughtered by the favouredSamburu and Pokot groups”. Such policy leadsto bitterness among the disfavoured group whousually attack the favoured group to avengeattacks against them. In 1997, the Meru claimedthat the Turkana of Isiolo had taken cattle fromthem. Again the government led its forces toTurkana manyattas, rounded up livestock andhanded them over to the Meru. Although theTurkana were alarmed, the action taken by thegovernment, show its inconsistency and itsbiasness when cultivator communities clash withpastoralists. It reveals that different laws applywhen dealing with different communities. TheMeru cannot be punished because they hail froma region where the law requires that anindividual appears in court before his property isforcibly taken away.During the last three decades, particularlybeginning with the 1980’s, a new dimension incattle rustling emerged. Organized militia groupsemerged and permeated the Turkana and Pokotregions. They recruited a large number of youthswho were taken through vigorous military

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201277training under the supervision of ex-militarymen. They were thereafter sent on raidingexpeditions which they judiciously executedthereby turning the whole practice into aprofitable venture. Although there were manycasualties resulting from the raids, the need forprofit outweighed such casualties. This newwave of banditry became associated withwealthy individuals who finance and sponsor themobilization of marginalized youths whowillingly join hoping to better their positions insociety by escaping from poverty. Theappropriation of violence by the youth hasbrought societal dislocation and impacted ontraditional hierarchy where gerontocratic role ofelders in moderating societal affairs have beenoverlooked, ignored and disobeyed.Apart from the wealthy individuals who areassociated with new forms of banditry, there arealso some politicians who have joined thepractice as a way of settling political scores.Their aim is to make political statements to thegovernment of the day. Pokot leaders forinstance felt let down and given a raw deal inMoi’s government of which they had been keyand staunch supporters. Although they werepart of KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai,Turkana and Samburu) ruling elites, there was agrowing disquiet and disenchantment withintheir circles that they did not gain muchcompared to other Kalenjin ethnic groups withinKAMATUSA conglomeration. They felt thatthe government only favoured the Tugen-Keiyoaxis in the distribution of political and economicresources (Osamba, 2000b). The Pokot also feltcheated by the government over fertile lands inTrans Nzoia which historically belonged to thembefore they were converted into white highlands.After independence the people who bought landin Trans Nzoia from the European settlers werenon-Pokot. In the subsequent years thegovernment undertook the subdivision of statefarms within the district but allocated land onlyto favoured individuals, the Tugen and theKeiyo, leaving out a majority of the Pokot. ThePokot leaders have thus felt the need to re-assertthemselves and lay historical claim to the fertilelands in Trans Nzoia. The infamous landclashes in this region during the 1990’s find vividexplanation.77The advent of multiparty politics in Kenya in the1990’s was accompanied by conflicts whichdichotomized Kenyans into two parallel camps;those supporting the status quo (government)and those for reforms. The government had forlong resisted multipartysm claiming it will bringdivisions and conflicts as Kenyan society wasstill not cohesive enough. With the 1992 electionperiod approaching, the ruling elite realized thatall was not well with them as the support wasturning more to the opposition. To scuttle this,the government instigated tribal classesostensibly to deny the opposition victory. Thecalculation was to unleash fear and scatterpotential voters from their voting bases especiallyin opposition strongholds. Those behind thisplan had recruited and gave special training toKalenjin youths who were later released tovarious parts of the country to create mayhem(Report, 1992). After elections (1992), which theincumbent government won, these warriorsbecame uncontrollable. The government hadmerely used them as a means to achieve politicalend but did not care about them thereafter.These youths began a new form of banditry andcattle rustling never before seen in north westernKenya region. In February 1998 after generalelections the previous year, bandits from Pokotlaunched the bloodiest raids ever seen in theliving memory of their Marakwet neighbours. Itclaimed several lives and displacement ofthousands of population. Homes, farms andstores were torched, women were raped andthousands of livestock were stolen (Nation,1998). The government stood accused ofcomplicity by the Marakwet leadership.As usual, government response in dealing withthe conflict was to send a battalion of militarymen heavily armed with powerful weaponsincluding helicopter gunships. The mission washowever, frustrated. The bandits who hadmastered the rugged terrain of North WesternKenya outwitted the government forces. Thebandits also seemed to be well-trained andcoordinated in their operations. They hadbecome brutal and ruthless often times theyorganized and extended their activities intoneighbouring counties thereby inviting similarcounter attacks whose impacts would even be

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201278heavier. Just recently, the Merille from Ethiopiaattacked the Turkana, killed people and stoletheir animals besides pushing them beyond theboundaries of Kenya and Ethiopia. Adiplomatic solution is yet to be found over thisproblem. On July 11, 2011 it was reported onNational Radio that a group of Turkana militiasattacked South Horr and unleashed mayhem inthe region. The activities of bandits have madelife to be desolate causing dislocation in society.Many have been turned to become refuges as aresult. Life for the residents in bandit-hit areas isprecarious. On one hand there is the banditmenace, while on the other hand are securityforces who normally vent their anger on civilianswhom they accuse of colluding and hiding thebandits. Those suspected to be working withgovernment forces are always subjected to fullwrath of the bandits and because of these, localshave formed a tendency to run away from thereach of both.Way ForwardDuring the pre-colonial period, there were clearmethods employed to control war and peace.During the war, elders from different clanswould keep the option of peacemaking alive,partly through lively communication with rivalclan elders. Reciprocal grazing rights, mutualassistance during times of drought and exchangeof livestock, wives and sons were methods usedto carry on relationships with rival clans. Peacebetween the clans was celebrated ritually throughsymbolic meals, sharing and involvement ofreligious leaders.Whereas colonialism broke down thesetraditional methods, African governments atindependence relegated them further. It isimportant today for the government to thinkabout re-instituting these traditional and culturalinstitutions that would help regulate communitybehaviour. The gerontocratic authority shouldbe given more recognition and support by thegovernment so that they play the role of intertribalarbiters. Clan homeguards are deemedmore effective in stamping out localized interclanbanditry through proactive dialogue withinthe community as opposed to applying coercivemethods using regular troops.At another level, eradication of banditry couldstart with a dedicated in-depth study of theproblem itself. Physical environment, weatherconstraints and inexplicable epidemics have beencontributive factors to the phenomena.Lawlessness can be eradicated if the governmentembarks on a serious economic developmentparticularly in livestock industry. This could bedone through provision of water in boreholesand dams, introduction of cattle insurance tocushion the pastoralists from livestock losses andintroduction of group ranches that would controlseasonal movements as a way of arrestingconflicts related to pasture among many others.There is need to create and deploy specializedregional task forces under the auspices of theEast African Community to specialize more oncounter banditry in the region. Currently, theexisting organization is built on the premise thatregional integration is more feasible in theeconomic field, which is a delusion unlesssecurity and political stability can be given equalmeasures of importance.To stem out banditry requires one to identify andwin the cooperation of the victims of banditrywho would be used to provide vital humanintelligence. Time and patience may be requiredto inculcate trust among the victims and toconvince them of the government’sunconditional commitment to their security andsustainable development. The high-handedapproach adopted by the government in dealingwith banditry must be given up completely if theconfidence of the people is to be won.ConclusionThis paper has attempted to provide an analysisof problem of rustling and banditry in NorthWest Kenyan Region. Ecological factors havebeen identified as having a debilitating effect onpastoral economy thus making lawlessness analternative means of livelihood. The legacy ofthe colonial state had been seen as a contributorto rustling phenomena. Colonialism strained theeconomic relations of the pastoralists, an78

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201279appropriation in parts of North West Kenya,dispossessed the Pokots and limited their accessto land and brought strains on the availableresources. This naturally forces the people toresort to other means of obtaining livelihood.During the colonial period, not much attentionwas given to north western region. Governmentpolicy became inimical to pastoralism whichover the years remained unexploited. Insteadmeasures taken were aimed at de-pastoralizingthe region; imposition of market taxes,quarantine laws, destocking campaigns andpunitive expedition exhibiting high-handedness,all attracted equal measure of hatred frompastoralists. Pushed against the wall, theAfricans had no choice but to turn to banditry asa way of survival.The post-colonial state in Kenya has tended toignore and neglect the welfare of the pastoralistsin terms of development and distribution ofpolitical and economic resources. A moreproactive and interactive approach need to bedeveloped by policy makers. This approachshould go a long way to integrating thepastoralists within the nexus of Kenya’s moderneconomy. This method must be seen as the onlyavenue through which debilitating effects ofbanditry can be slowed and eventuallyeradicated. Whereas surveillance must beexercised by the government, it shouldnonetheless desist from archaic forms ofmanaging rustling namely, it must desist fromapplying high-handedness in wrestling banditry.This only hardens the bandits and exacerbatesthe vice.The institutional of violence and the resultantinsecurity have contributed to widespreadpoverty, hunger and destitutions in the region.The paper therefore argues that under thebackground, the gun has become the tool ofopportunity for the militia and the youth. Thepaper ends with a way forward recommendingthat socio-economic and political instability beaddressed. In addition, the root causes ofbanditry as well as the formation of regionalmechanisms for pro-active resolution of tensionsarising from the phenomena need to be pursued.ReferencesAnderson, D. (2005) Histories of the Hanged:Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and theEnd of Empire. London: Weidenfeld andNelson.Daily Nation. (1996). In: Daily Nation, October19, 1996.Kiflemariam, G. (2002) Understanding theDemand for Small Arms in the Horn ofAfrica. Njoroge Mbugua “Small Armsand Light Weapons in Kenya”, 39.Markakis, J. (1993) Conflict and the Decline ofPastoralism in the Horn of Africa.London Macmillan, 193.Nation, D. (1998). Daily Nation, February 13, .Nene, M. (1999) Contemporary Banditry in theHorn of Africa: Causes, History andPolitical Implications. Nordic Journal ofAfrican Studies 8, 97.Ocan, C.M. (1992) Pastoral Crisis in North-Eastern Uganda: The ChangingSignificance of Raids. Working PaperNo. 2, Kampala, CBR Publishers, 9.Odegi-Awuondo, C. (1992) Life in the Balance:Ecological Sociology of TurkanaNomads. Nairobi ACT Press, 4.Osamba, J.O. (2000a) The Sociology ofInsecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditryin North-Western Kenya. AJCR 1, 17-18.Osamba, J.O. (2000b) The Sociology ofInsecurity: Cattle Rustling and Banditryin North-Western Kenya. AfricanJournal in Conflict Resolution 2, 26.Report, T.K.P.C. (1992). The KilikuParliamentary Committee Report –KenyaSalih, M.A. (1993) Agro-Pastoralism: AnUnderestimated Regional FoodProduction System. Eastern Africa SocialScience Review (EASSR) IX, 23 - 37.Standard, T.D.N.a.t.E.A. (1996). The DailyNation and the East African StandardDecember 28 – 31, 1996.Standard, T.E.A. (2011). The East AfricanStandard, Monday July 12, 2011.Umar, A. (1997a) Resource Utilization, Conflictand Insecurity in Pastoral Areas ofKenya. Kenya Pastoral Forum 1997, 6.79

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201280Umar, A. (1997b) Resource Utilization, Conflictand Insecurity in Pastoral Areas ofKenya. Kenya Pastoral Forum, 18- 19.80

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201281For an African Communitarian Philosophy of History: Remembering E. S. Atieno-OdhiamboSussy Gumo-KurgatFaculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Maseno University, PO Box 333, Maseno, Kenya. E-mail:suguku@yahoo.comDismas A. MasoloDepartment of Philosophy, University of Louisville, USA. Email: dismas.masolo@loiusville.eduAbstractThe two decades of the 1980s and 1990s saw the collapse of the idea and structures of state as anatural development of history. The crisis and eventual rupture in the systems of political power thatdefined the political conquests and dominations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – Sovietand colonial state empires in particular – gave way to new and more liberal views of human societieseverywhere as communities that evolve from discursive interactions, negotiations, and choices ofconvenient and workable accommodations in their respective experiences and expressive cultures.We argue in this paper that such a distinction, namely between the naturalist and communitarianviews of history and societies, is what significantly informs the work of the noted and erstwhileKenyan historian, E. S. (Elisha Stephen) Atieno-Odhiambo, thus placing him among the notedpresent-day social theorists and best known African critics of European modernity generally, and ofcolonial knowledge in particular, in its application to the understanding of African history and sociopoliticalformations. But while being cautious of possible colonially derived misuses or abuses of theidea of communities as imagined, Atieno-Odhiambo persistently pushed the view that in order tosustain itself, the neocolonial state was unhelpably mired in self-destructing forms of authoritarianismby suppressing the processes of self-constitution of the communities within it. As African scholarsgrappled with the idea of state and the search for paths to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s,community-state relations became an apt topic for social theorists, and Atieno-Odhiambo was one ofthe leading voices in that scholarly quest.Key words: African, Communitarian Philosophy, History, E. S. Atieno-OdhiamboIntroductionWhat follows here below are testimonies ofKenyan scholars to the vibrant academic careerof the late renowned Kenyan historian, Elisha-Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo, all resulting from aninternational workshop held over two days in hishonour and memory at Maseno University,Kenya, on July 14 and 15, 2011. The essaysreflect the span of the late Atieno-Odhiambo’simpact on the international academiccommunity, across disciplinary and geographicalboundaries, and the influence he had on thosewho interacted with him. The authors of theseessays were either his teachers, schoolmates,colleagues, or students at one time during hislife, and several of them knew him in more thanone of those relational categories. They narratestories of interactions that almost invariablystarted first as teacher-student encounters anddeveloped into scholarly engagements and,frequently, collaborations.Beyond the strict academic circles of scholars,many Kenyans are most likely to rememberAtieno-Odhiambo on two broad fronts, althoughthose fronts were made possible and driven bythe same zeal and vision that lay at the center ofhis academic career. We will explain that drive alittle later. The fronts were, first, his authorship81

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201282and education of Kenyan youth at both theprimary and secondary levels of school, and two,his community service as a public intellectualwho wrote on issues generated by and in populardiscourse on current affairs. Not only haveAtieno-Odhiambo’s books been authoritativetextbooks of History and Civics at all school andcollege levels, his opinion on social and politicalissues are perennially respected and influential.In the conventionally strict scholarly circles, asProfessor Ogot magisterially and chronologicallyoutlines in his own essay included here, Atieno,as we all fondly called him, tackled every issueimaginable during his relatively short butimmensely rich academic career.Shifts in guild history: Atieno on AfricanhistoriographyProfessor Ogot provides a brief yetcomprehensive intellectual biography of Atienothat will be hard to match. He was Atieno’steacher, having first noticed his exceptionalintellectual gifts while acting as an externalexaminer at Makerere University andsubsequently guiding him to his doctoral degreeat the University of Nairobi. This Masterapprenticerelationship is underlined by Atieno’s2001 book, African Historians and African voices(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2001) a collection of essaysedited by him as a celebratory tribute to adeserving teacher at his seventieth birthday.Central to Atieno’s intellectual quest, bothwithin history itself, and across disciplinesgenerally, was how knowledge was created.Relentlessly weary of and opposed to the ideathat only those in positions of leadership createknowledge or make history, Atieno spent his lifeoutlining, an understanding of the world fromthe base of the pyramid, or, as others would putit, from-bottom-up. Positions of leadership, if wemay so call institutional roles for lack of a betterterm, may be privileged in respect to enablingthose who occupy them to manipulate availableknowledge, but they do not, and should never beseen to include cognitive advantages for thosewho occupy them. Sadly, however, occupants ofpositions of power, both in academia as well asin the world of conventional politics, falsely82equate occupation of those positions tounfettered or unquestionable authority in thecreation of knowledge. Yet, Atieno firmlybelieved, academicians do not create knowledge,nor, more particularly, do historians alone tellhow history ought to be understood ashistorically significant.So, who creates knowledge? Or, morespecifically, who makes history? And whoseword, whose opinion, should matter in thewriting of history? Inadvertently, and perhapsnot so happily for African theoreticians of historyfor that matter, recent changes in attitudestoward knowledge-creation, toward change, andthe relation between them, have returned toHegel to uncover from his theory of history theidea that its nuts and bolts are to be found in theaspirations of the people, in the choices thatdefine and direct their daily lives, and in thecollective spirit that gives their daily choices asense of right by virtue of belonging to a groupsystem. There is, in other words, nothingseparately called “history” other than in theabstract. The reality of human experience ismade up of the many decisions individuals andgroups make in their moral conduct, in theirsocial decisions such as when and to whom toget married, and how to get it done. Realities oflife also show themselves in when people maketheir decisions that it is the right time to start thetilling, planting, weeding, and harvest seasonsand to participate in the other events in-between.Obviously, festivals as well as all otherceremonies that describe a full life-cycle for anyand every group are how life is lived. In theolden days of the search for settlements,expeditions were part of this humanly rich trainof events, all in search of what reason dictated tobe part of the human quest. Hegel’s myopic(non-global), racist, and simply skewed view ofhow these endeavors were unevenly manifestedin different global regions notwithstanding,it isnow widely accepted that the “making theworld” – that is, creating the knowledge on thebasis of which humans persistently shape and reshapetheir worlds – is a collective endeavor thatgoes on all the time in every reasonable person’swake life, at least most of the time that theyexercise their agency. The making of history isnot a preserve of the scholar of history.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201283Foreshadowing what would become a widelyknown and used phrase, thanks to Fred Cooper’sfamous title, “peasants as intellectuals”, Atienodirected his attention to the aspirations of theordinary folks from the early days of hisacademic career, embracing the strings of theradical turn in African scholarship at the timethat it was important to see things differentlyfrom how Western scholarship had charted theknowledge of Africa.Indeed, if African freedom was for the benefit ofthe masses rather than of the elite, then theaspirations of the masses could neither beignored nor be trampled. Rather, they had to beincorporated into the writing of the histories ofthe new nations, a significant shift from thecolonial approach to whom colonized nativeswere not agents in the making of history. Spurredby a broadened Hegelian vision, it was uponthem, the colonizers, to plant the sparks ofdialectical motion – known in pragmatic terms asprogress and development – in the heart of theinert (non-historical) realm of darkness. No-oneneeds to be reminded that in its structure andform, the history of the colonized people wascolonial history of which the colonized were notpart. Radical post-independence scholarshipsought to revert this situation by embarking on adifferent kind of social research. There were twooptions for doing research or, more generally, forpracticing intellectual life: the first was to doresearch that carried out the mandates of thegovernment by seeking to install descriptiveconceptual and empirical frameworks that fitgovernment programs. Although appearing to beuseful in the sense of being responsive to the“needs” of the nation, this approach had pitfalls.While appearing to be nationalistic, it fails – thenand now – to question the social order andideology on which government projects andpolicies are based. Thus, due to its alliance withthe tradition class, its framework is both narrowand apologetic. It lacks the autonomy thatscholarship requires as it degenerates fast into therole of handmaiden of the political order of theday. In return, the practitioners of this approachbecome advisors or consultants to thegovernment as they mediate – in their roles aslocal or local informers – between the donororganizations and governments that sponsor83their research. Many folks will remember theyears of such organizations as Canada’s IDRC,United States of America’s USAID, Germany’sDAD, and other similar research organizationsas they dominated the funding and oversight forresearch activities in the global South. Theydefined and directed development patterns onbehalf of their donor governments back home.Based on the above, Atieno loathed thisapproach and always thought of its practitionersas technocrats rather than scholars orintellectuals, and thought of their work as aperpetuation of the colonial idea of history andstate from the viewpoint of the ruling class. Thesecond option was to do research that questionedthe kind of social order assumed in the goals ofpublic policy and programs. He would often askof such government documents: whose public,and whose goals are assumed in government orresearch development agenda? It does not takemuch head-scratching to see that the latterapproach would question the extent to whichAfrica’s new governments would separatethemselves from the colonial order andobjectives. Although it is equally – if not more –committed to the goal of nation-building, thislatter approach placed freedom and autonomy atthe center of their understanding of development,hence its proponents were inevitably seen bynewly-installed political leaders to be “radical”and anti-government in its opposition to theperpetuation of the colonial project in which themasses were marginalized and muffled.Atieno’s point of departure was within theradical social perspective which, at the time, wasinformed, at least in part, by a new and criticalgeneration of social theory, itself informed bywhat its chief proponents identified as limitationsof the conventional Marxist critiques of socialstructures historically effected by capitalistmodes of production incorporated in colonialstructures and operations. In its anti-and-postcolonialrepresentations, this new radical pushwas ingrained in the works and thought ofFrantz Fanon (Fanon, 1965; Fanon, 1967a;Fanon, 1967b; Fanon and Philcox, 2004; Fanon,2008), especially in its embrace of the peasantryas the critical mass of the anti-colonialmovement. Such connections can be only

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201284incidental, but it is also the case that youngAfrican intellectuals were the main and crucialavenue in the popularization of Fanon in theearly post-independence years, that is in thesixties and seventies. In Atieno’s thought andworks we see not only the critique of Kantiansolipsism and its replacement with a dialecticalprocess in which knowledge is both function andtool of humanity’s self-reflection in respect toends by which the practical competence andidentities of its members are measured. We alsosee a sharp critique of new African political andeconomic elite, as well as the huge majority ofthe pioneer intellectual elite trained and madecomfortable within the colonial structures,including the academy.In considering the emerging worldview of thenew and radical intellectual à la Fanon, one that,in the reversal of things into a new order, nowembraces the experiences of ordinary people,people of both genders, those people that Fanonsaid colonialism had discarded as “les damnés dela terre”, the wretched of the earth, the undertrodden, who later were equally marginalized bytheir compromised compatriot intellectuals asinconsequential to value-creation, especially thecreation of knowledge. To the contrary, what wegenerally refer to as world is indeed aconstellation of cultural communities defined bytheir respective traditions. Such communities areunderstandable only as self-reflective systems orforms of life that comprise their ownauthoritative reasons for the beliefs and actionsby which the competence of members acting asagents are judged. In this sense, everycommunity is a slice of what Hegel referred to as“absolute spirit”, that is, a human communityreflecting on its essential self-identity andtherefore on the ultimate ends of life in which thepractice of culture is a form of communalreflection on the principles governing human life.As the self-consciousness of a community, everynormative belief, and the cultural practices builtupon them, including rituals of all kinds, are thebearers of what each community regards asnormatively authoritative for that community.As in Fanon, the reversal of the colonialstructures and its remnants in the morality of thelocal petit bourgeois meant reclaiming theagency – the Caribbean philosopher CharlesMills would say “regaining their status of‘person’, once denied by colonialism andreplaced with the status of ‘sub personhood’ asthe antithesis of the colonizer’s Herrenvolk statusand values (Mills, 1997; Mills, 1998) – of and forthe formerly colonized people, all of them, menand women alike. For once, Africans couldbecome their own subjects again.For Atieno, understanding the past and presentof every community lay in knowing what itssingle most basic absolute principle governinghuman life was, such that all other beliefs andpractices found their warrant or ground in it. Inpure Hegelian terms, accepting some irony inmaking such a reference, knowledge of suchabsolute principle is what opens up knowledge ofthe “spirit of the community” because it makespossible an understanding of the object in serviceof which social practices acquire meaning andpurpose. The crucial point, in the best scenario,is, then, that the life of a nation issues out of, oris the function, of such a principle, and theknowledge of it, as it gets both translated andreconciled into the life of a nation rather thanonly of the many cultural communities whoseaspirations they unveil. That would be the ideal.Often, however, it is not. Fanon talks of thecontradictions the newly independent states findthemselves mired in, namely how to register,even vindicate, the anti-imperialist “love of one’sown”, knowing well that this homestead is inmany ways a house of oppression anddiscrimination, repression and exclusion. Afterfighting colonialism to make it possible for themany ethnicities and communities of our nationsto express themselves freely and with pride, halfheartednationalists have made ethnicities andethnic identities political and moral burdens.Like Immanuel Wallerstein would later say ofSékou Touré, the liberator had quickly becomeLeviathan to his people, stretching the extent ofoppression from where the colonial oppressorhad left the job (Wallerstein, 1962). In the light ofthese contradictions, one may ask, for example,what picture of identity emerges in one’s mindwhen the word “Kenya” is uttered. It is not anunderstatement to claim that the pursuit of ourmultiple identities presents the dilemma of84

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201285critical political and cultural discourse in thecolonies and neocolonies of the world system.or as of such far lesser value that theirdomination in any way would be warranted.The key question, then, is: does nationalism havean “essence” for itself, a form of life that givesone an identity as a citizen of a specific nation asdistinct from another? What are such essences,and how do people embody and manifest them?Issues like this may seem abstract, but not whenwe think of nations as eco-claims that are onlyartificially imagined spaces on the expansive andunmarked earth. Hence there must be somethingelse that drives our senses of national differencesfrom those we regard to not belong. The problemwith nationalism is that it strikes us as an entitywhose entity transcends the concreteness of ouremotional attachment to names and other typesof imagination, as something we can make toobjectively include some people while excludingothers.Atieno believed that the modern state lacked theHegelian principle. Why? Because it was theproduct of European imperial imagination.While the pre-modern African “nations” had it,the modern and colonially-produced state lacksit, which is why it was negated so quickly by thepull of the ethnic nation. By interrogating theorigin and nature of nationalism in Africa, andthe Kenyan nation in particular, Atieno drew onsome of the leading twentieth-century socialtheories of nations and communities as imaginedidentities whose realities were the function ofideological movements and propaganda as madeevident in Eastern and Central Europe in thepost-WWII period (Benedict, 1983; Chetterjee,1993). But Atieno was weary of somemisapplications of this fashionable “postmodern”idea of communities as imagined orconstructed, because it bears the dangers ofbelittling the histories and experiences of realpeople whose cultural beliefs and practices, andwhose freedoms have been the subject matter ofscholars and concerns of freedom fighterseverywhere across the globe. Above all, theliberal underpinnings of theorizing communitiesas imagined betrays possible sympathy with thediscourses of power whose sovereignty overridesthe rights of those who can be dominated ordismissed altogether as either absent, inexistent,85In Africa we have lived with the historicalconsequences of being mere imaginations in theminds of others since, according to Atieno, theHomeric fantasization about Greek gods flyingto Africa to feast with Ethiopians, or as we havedone with European occupiers since ChancellorBismark’s Berlin West Africa Conference of1884-1885, as well as with the influence of theVictorian social anthropological project. At thesame time, on purely historical and linguisticevidence as fact, Atieno could not have deniedthat collective, and by pragmatic implication alsoindividual choices of identities, especially social,cultural and political ones, historically have beenmechanisms for scrambling and re-drawing themaps of social and cultural practices in service ofresponse to the necessities of political survival.This is part of what oral sources of history aremost useful for revealing. Professor Ogot,himself one of the pioneers in the incorporationand formalization of oral narratives as crediblesources of history, has eloquently alluded to thisin respect to Atieno and the segment of KaRuothclan in his paper as he tried to show thecomplexity of Atieno’s social genesis as isrevealed by the names in that sub-clan. Whilereferring to Atieno’s multiethnic heredity, he wasmaking a significant point about the fluidity andindeterminacy of everyone’s identity as functionsof constantly changing narratives. Indeed everytime one asserts their socio-cultural or nationalidentity they are performing a political act(Vansina, 1961; Vansina, 1985; Vansina, 1990;Vansina, 1994b; Vansina, 1994a; Vansina, 2004).We have learned from Cohen and Atieno(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004) that ethnohistory,and oral histories generally, carry greatresponsibility, especially when their narrators areaware of preserving them against a moredominant force that may want them suppressedor annihilated altogether, or, put slightlydifferently, oral preservation of knowledge inpresent societies faces challenges of differentpolitical magnitudes. In some cases, it faces thecompetition of the official archivaldocumentation that steadfastly sides with thepolitical powers of the time. In a related way,custodians of oral knowledge generally, and of

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201286historical knowledge particularly, face constantthreats from those in positions of political powerand influence who view them as adversaries byvirtue of their witness to the truths of politicalintrigues and dirty games. While the bestexample of the uneasy relations betweencustodians of oral history on the one hand andthe crafters of distorted official narrativesremains the standoff between the Government ofKenya and the household staff of Hon. RobertOuko in 1990, we can broaden the map toinclude the vast numbers of similar householdstaff in other politicians’ homes everywhere inthe world. When the “politically wrong”versions of oral history are too threatening to theestablishment, they are eliminated altogether, asin the mysterious death of thirty-eight individualsrelated to Ouko’s household, or to the eventsaround his death, like the mysterious herdsboywho never lived to tell his story about thelocation of Ouko’s charred body in the bushes ofGot Alila. Indeed, outsiders’ knowledge is thebiggest anathema to organized crime.To what end, one may ask, are we invoking allthese ideas anyway? Atieno frequently posedand critically discussed such matters bothformally in his papers and informally in hisperennial conversational probes. He did so withone goal: to determine whether, and how orwhy, to borrow words from Partha Chatterjee’stitles, some fragments of the new nations wereprivileged over others such as to warrant claimsto favorable differential treatment at state andgovernment levels. It was not infrequent towitness Atieno challenge his discussants toexpress or declare their preferred order ofallegiance, namely whether they thought of theirrespective ethnic communities bore moresignificant synchrony with the new idea ofnation than others did. To what extent was anygiven number of indigenous communitiesviewable as more naturally interfacing with orevolving into new nations than others? By posingthese questions, and pursuing theoreticalexplanations or basis of Africa’s political crises,Atieno aimed at subtle critiques of both colonialcreatures and their continued complicity inspurring Africa’s politics of disintegration in thepost-colonial period. Equally unrelenting, then,was Atieno’s penchant for challenging British86historians for taking over and extending theirdisciplinary practice from where their compatriotsocial anthropologists had left, namely socialorganization and social change. In other words,the search for a coherent nationalist narrative hasproduced multiple readings and emphases of theevents that led to the emergence of Kenya as anation. This search starts with a perspective thatsees Kenya as a White man’s conquest, thusfocusing on the opposition between the settlersand Africans. This was prior to the criticalMarxist analyses that, by focusing on theexploitative relations between colonial economicinterests on the one hand, and the unrewardedlocal labor on the other, influenced the shift inhistoriographical endeavors to the role of localcommunities as resisters of colonial capitalism.The result was a focus on the roles played bylocal communities in their resistance againstBritish rule.Similarly, as local historians descended ondescribing activities of various communitiesduring the colonial period with the aim ofwriting them into the nationalist framework, aschool of British historians have been busy attrying to wrestle the Kenyan nationalistdiscourse from other communities to locate itsquarely in central Kenya and equating the MauMau movement with Kenya’s independence asits sine qua non driver. They describe themovement itself as an event that can beunderstood solely in its relation to the worldviewof the Kikuyu people, their religious and moralideals. In other words, they forestall thepossibility of inventing a Kenyan nationalistnarrative. It was Atieno’s contention, however,that whether or not this attempt to ethnicizeKenya’s independence holds, the lesson one getsfrom it is that “nationalism [is not] is aprerequisite ideology for the construction of afuture nation-state”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).Furthermore, Atieno argued, the Mau Maubasedhistoriography overlooks the complexity ofresistance generally, and that of central Kenya inparticular. In his counter-position, Atieno arguedthat “in African communities there obtained aparadox of collaboration and resistance; thatwithin the textures of African societies theresisters of today would be the collaborators oftomorrow, thus creating ‘the paradox of

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201287collaboration”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1974). Evenas it tries to whip up visions of a nationalisthistory by focusing on the initiatives of localcommunities, the approach of British historianstends to be too narrow for the need to see localevents as local variations or specific illustrationsof general social theories and patterns affectingsocial structures and change everywhere elsearound the globe. As oral narratives becamemore widely accepted as legitimate sources ofhistory, the experiences – languages, religiousbeliefs, and modes of subsistence – of ordinarypeople and communities became key to historicalresearch and knowledge.If not exactly in relation to how we narrate themaking of our nation, focus on Mau Mau signalsa significant shift in mapping knowledgeproduction. Together with the legitimation oforal methods, and with the critical Marxist socialtheory, reading history through the conscience ofthe masses puts the production of knowledge andhistory in the consciousness and actions ofordinary folks by countering the old perceptionthat knowledge belongs to the social and politicalelite. In its place this alternative approachproposes to excavate knowledge from thenarratives of lived experiences of workers andpeasants, sharecroppers, women and the family,the arts, from music, and other aspects ofeveryday deliberations and struggles of ordinaryfolks. Recognition of ordinary folks as creators ofknowledge by which they order their experiencehad started and taken roots in the sixties andseventies with the study of the peasantry as amodel that integrates thick description andhistorical change like Steven Feireman wouldexemplify later in his noted study of peasants inTanzania (Feierman, 1990; Gutkind andWaterman, ed 1977). This approach isinteresting in at least one sense – namely that itidentifies the peasant as an agent in his/her ownworld, disconnected from the state whosedemands he/she works to satisfy. His/herjudgments and decisions are free of theconstraints of state and capital. Rather, peasantsinhabit that space in which they live their ownlives where they determine for themselves whatcounts as an authoritative reason for them to act.87Focusing on the experiences of peasants, or ofordinary folks more generally by tapping intooral accounts meant, for historians, philosophers,and anthropologists alike, that ideas that informand explain systems of value, whether these arein the political arena, or for organizing the normsfor private conduct in the moral world, stemfrom conceptions of power, personhood, andagency, and about how human beings ininteraction with one another produce effects onthe world (Karp and Masolo, 2000). Hence, iffocusing on ordinary folks by means of the oralmethod makes it possible for historians to writehistories of communities into national histories.It also provides a huge challenge to find theunifying conceptions of reality, including thoseof persons and selves as moral and politicalagents, that makes it possible to critique theperformance of the nation-state under a commonpolity. In this sense, the ethno-structural view ofthe nation-state mimics similar structures of theregional groups based on the constituting clansand their competing oral narratives. Thisapproach that maps regional histories inopposition to state ones exemplifies a similarproblem constantly faced by Africanphilosophers regarding the possibility ofconstructing common continent-widephilosophical positions in contrast to theethnically or regionally-informed conceptualschemes as separate cultural spheres (Gyekye,1987; Appiah, 1992; Wiredu, 1996; Gyekye,1997). Together, and in their quasi-concurrentmulti-disciplinary eruption, these texts give thevoice back to indigenous keepers of knowledge,whether they are court historians in the royalsystems or clan elders in the so-called statelesssocieties, or heads of family in the many Africansocial systems. These texts mark a significantshift from the image of indigenous intellectualsas native intellectuals – in both contemporaryprofessional and the informal senses as capturedby Feierman – whose value lay in feeding thecolonial narrative in which their appearance wasmerely incidental. In the new paradigms, theynot only reclaim their voices, they also assert thelegitimacy of their own historiography as analternative to that of the state, an alternativeparadigm which, according to Atieno, “that iscloser to the people’s experiences with history inthe longue duree than the western historical

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201288practice and which throws up challenges for thestudent of comparative history...”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002) Consequently, Atieno argues,the “nationhood” of communities like the Luo inEast Africa or Mande in West Africa, or theBanyamwezi in central Tanganyika, Zulu orTswana in South Africa, all existed long beforethe incursions of the colonial state or itspostcolonial heir. Thus the histories of the olderand indigenous nations can be writtenunproblematically side-by-side with the historiesof the colonially constructed nations. Atieno’sproposal is, then, that these regional histories areseparate from, and should not be mistaken for,histories of colonially constituted states.History and histories: the state withoutnationhoodSo what did Atieno envisage as an Africanphilosopher of history? Or, to put the matterslightly differently, now that we have beenwalked through the different models of writingAfricans’ histories, can we identify what makesevery theoretical trajectory as crucial as theother, or as bearing autonomous concepts ofhuman destiny and purpose that can only be seenin the normative articulation of such values inmost spheres of human experience that aredeemed to enable the attainment of such humandestiny and purpose? Like his grand teacherBethwell Allan Ogot, Atieno’s guild history, orthe trace of different approaches to writingAfrican history, unmistakably asserts the needfor a clear departure from writing Africanhistory, let alone explaining it, from foreignstandpoints, a stance, he tells us, the Master hadbeen worried about since the seventies as part ofhis pioneering influence on the adoption of oralnarratives and memories as legitimate sources ofAfrican history (Vansina, 1990; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). There is some irony here thatis worth mentioning. While historians believedthat oral histories harbored the values ofautochthony of knowledge, philosophers,African and their Western trainers alike, loathedthe oral tradition as indicative only of what hascome to be known as ethnophilosophy, a schoolof thought and body of texts written mainly sincethe WWII under the influence of PlacideTempels (Tempels, 1969). The critics of this88school, led by the Beninois philosopher PaulinHountondji(Hountondji, 1983), regard the termethnophilosophy specifically, and oral textsgenerally as they relate to the claim of thepresence of philosophy in African oral traditions,with scorn and derogation. The late Kenyanphilosopher Odera Oruka(Odera Oruka, 1991),as well as Barry Hallen and his co-author the lateJohn O. Sodipo of Nigeria (Hallen and Sodipo,1997) believed differently and have shown howgood and sometimes pretty sophisticatedphilosophical ideas can be teased out of oraltraditions. Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, andKwame Anthony Appiah (Wiredu, 1980;Gyekye, 1987; Appiah, 1992; Wiredu, 1996), allGhanaian-born and leading Africanphilosophers, have indicated, perhaps in theclearest fashion close to what the historiansmentioned here were saying for their discipline,that sources of knowledge in African cannotignore the oral tradition, after all philosophers,and any scholars who produce formallypresented knowledge in the academic senseground themselves in the language of the peopleas well as in the language of professionalthinkers.It is evident that Atieno, like Ogot, was a specialkind of historian. Both he and his former teacherreveled in taking on complex philosophicalissues in search of theoretical threads thatjustified, or at least explained, historical choicesand paths of communities, as well as thedifferent political practices and structures.Driven by a search for reason as the ground forsocial and cultural systems, he took noideological sides as he spared no one in hiscriticism of the rationally unacceptable, just as hedefended all victims of injustice in the samemeasure. Such was the basis of his incessantcritique of the unjustified politics of exclusion. Incarrying out such examination of society, helooked at both what people took to be theessence of nationhood, and how people, ascitizens of such formations, took themselves tobe related to the said-essence of nationhood suchthat it would give them justifiable unequalinterest claims in exclusion of others.To put his concerns in proper perspective, it wasnever the case for him that the emergence of

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201289nations had suddenly rendered histories ofcommunities irrelevant. Rather, in order tocounter such European texts whose aim wasdeliberately to help establish Westernsovereignty over Africa by describing it as a terranullius (nobody’s land) as one finds in thefifteenth century Papal Bull or a terra obscura(dark continent) and as one reads in Hegel’sLectures on the Philosophy of World History. AnAfrican historiography must take into account allsources as may be gathered about kingdoms asthey have been written and kept by Africanwriters, or as can be recouped from the oraltraditions which memorize and re-tell the clannarratives of those people once called “stateless”by the British social anthropologists MeyerFortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (Fortes andEvans-Pritchard, 1970). Contrary to the empty ordark continent of the European text, there was,again in Atieno’s words, “The other Africa, theactually existing Africa of theAfricans...”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). Thehistory of this Africa dating back to the MiddleAges was well recorded in the works of scholarsusing both written and oral sources. When wewere inviting people to participate in theconference out of which these papers were born,many of Atieno’s former colleagues intimatedthat there was hardly a subject Atieno was not atease in discussing whether good or bad.Definitely they did not imply any negatives fortheir remarks. Besides indicating theinterdisciplinary nature of Atieno’s intellectualvocation, these colleagues probably also meantsomething deeper regarding Atieno’s broadinterests across many disciplinary fields in thehumanistic and social sciences. Again, Atienowas a theoretician or philosopher of history and,by derivation, a historian of social movements, areason why most aspects of human experienceand social events found a place within his broadand deep intellectual interest as we believed ourcolleagues implied. Hence his driving concerncould be put as follows, in his own words:Recent thinking on the philosophy ofhistory has delineated its basic concernsas being, firstly, the nature ofhistoriographical knowledge, andsecondly, the metaphysical assumptions89of historiography...The seemingly weakstatus of the sub-discipline... belies theinterdisciplinary diffusion of articles andbooks across the disciplines of history,philosophy, law, political science, andsociology. This diffusion is particularlymarked in the field of African studies...,and may indeed beguile the scholar intothe false recognition of the absence of anAfrican philosophy of history. And yet aproper reading of the Africanist foundersof African historiography should soondisabuse us of this erroneous posture,given their early concerns with ancientEgypt as the plenum of all history andthe foundation of all blackcivilization...[and with other concernsthat premise an understanding of Africanhistory upon the realities of Africanpeople’s experiences over the millennia].Can African historians recapture thishistorical space and reintroduce anAfrican philosophy of history thatemphasizes African autonomy?”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002).Although it draws him dangerously closer to theHegelian instrumental view of reason orknowledge and its nexus to history, for Atieno,history ought to be understood as a process bywhich each community, through the activerealization in the thoughts and actions of theirindividual members, articulates and practicesthose culturally defined activities that enablethem to meet their needs as their interaction withthe environment of their abode. It further allowsthem to design and execute, as well as thenormative principles that regulate their socialrelations according to their view of a good life.Such norms are important whether they areabout activities for subsistence, or the norms thatdefine propriety of dress in different occasionsand circumstances, or about how to accomplishritual obligations toward the dead, or what itmeans for a claim to property to be justified, or,as in the domain of the arts, even what it meansto an accomplished singer or dancer or a skilledsuitor. All such norms need to come from thepeople themselves, as they are the symbols oftheir “sense” of the world. History, then, must beseen as the view that studies the presence of these

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201290categories of values at any given time, and how,as they are formalized into the specific idioms ofevery locality, they cause both differences andsimilarities of African communities as we knowthem. But also, and due precisely to theirgrounding in time and specific social realities,they get to be transformed by future generationswhose different times and circumstances imposesuch changes. It would appear, then, that what iscrucial is that however and whenever changebecomes imperative, both goals andimplementable specifics reflect the well-beingand aspirations of African populations, the sameway the push for democratic practice has beenhinting throughout the continent.In lieu of a conclusion, it is appropriate thatsomething is said about why we introduced theidea of communitarianism in characterizingAtieno’s thought. Recent in its claim of aprominent position in the articulation of themeasure for judging propriety of private conductand public policy in respect to their ends, thecommunitarian mind-set arose recently incontemporary political and moral thought,notably in the lexicon of such political leadersand thinkers like Mwalimu Nyerere. Nyerere’spolitical slogan was “African socialism”, a termthat meant so many different things to differentusers. However, one thing remained constantand clear in Nyerere’s thought: namely hisopposition to the liberal economic and socialworldviews of Modern Europe – and theircolonial transfer to the African scene – in whichthe wellbeing of the individual was thecenterpiece of human worth, endeavors, whereall resources were to be directed at the protectionand promotion of the rights and wellbeing of theindividual. Western history as it was taught tous, in the growth of both institutions and thoughttraditions, have placed the individual at thecenter of ends. The resurgence of liberal thoughtin the West since the early 1970s has engendereda response from thinkers who, despite theabsence of a unifying common theoreticalprinciple, have been referred to ascommunitarians. While accepting some aspectsof the liberals’ views regarding the rights of theindividual, they have countered with the viewthat the protection of the individual cannot bedone without regard to the conditions that have90produced inequality to people by virtue of theirbelonging to groups, or that people live incommunities, and therefore their wellbeingcannot be considered in isolation from thecommunal wellbeing in general.Communitarians argue that liberalismoveremphasizes the rights and liberties ofindividuals at the expense of the general welfareof the community which cannot be achievedwhen individuals possess unhindered rights toattain whatever they want and can. John Rawls,the American philosopher who is also the mostfamous and best read recent defender ofliberalism (Rawls, 1972; Rawls and Kelly, 2001),argues that individuals must enjoy their rights solong as their doing so does not cause others tobecome poorer than would be the case in theiruse of their capacities. In other words, everyonehas the right to attain those means by which tocompete fairly in an open society, and that solong as there is no deliberate hindrance ofanyone to attain such means, individuals shouldbe free to what they want and can do under thelaw. Because Rawls was an American, his theoryof justice, put simply as I have stated, has beenthe focal point of great critical debate. Hisposition defends the individual as theunencumbered self, which, in the eyes of critics(Alasdair, 1984; Michael, 1987; Alasdair, 1988;Charles, 1989; Masolo, 2010), suggests anatomically conceptualized and thereforeanarchistic society, while, in fact, individuals arethemselves made by their societies and aredependent on the communities that “make”them. Hence, an idea of fairness that ignores thisindebtedness cannot be correct.Nevertheless, the above is probably not exactlythe idea of community that Atieno stood for. Notthat he rejected it, we just don’t know headdressed it in the terms in which it appeared inWestern social and moral theory. Yet, becausewe are dealing with conceptualizing howindividuals relate to their communities, andabout what they owe each other in the mutuallylimiting relationship, his thought generally, andabout the making of history in particular,resonates with a stance that can be attributed tohim. As we have traced above, his idea ofcommunity resonates with a definition that castsit as a cultural unit whose members claim shared

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201291belonging exhibited by conformity to the valueswith which they live their lives and understandtheir history. This is the basis of Atieno’s claimthat there had been African nations, such as theMande, or Luo, or Ganda, or Fulani, and so on,long before the incursions of Europeanimperialism that led to the construction of thecolonial state in the model of the eighteenthcenturyEuropean definition of the nation statecarved out of the human “state of nature”. It isAtieno’s position, to the extent that we are ableto extract it out of the argument in the essay onAfrican historiography that a truly Africanhistory can be written only in such a manner thatconsiders the history of the inherited colonialstate as an imposition over local nations withtheir histories.This seemingly structuralist view – what ParthaChaterjee has described as “the nation and itsfragments in colonial and postcolonial histories”in reference to India (Chetterjee, 1993) – definesAfrica’s political orders and histories, just like inmost other colonial spaces, as made ofcommunities that co-exist side-by-side with oneanother, and with no one or more of themhaving claims to exclusive relations with, orrights over, the colonial state in itsadministration or resource allocation. On whatbasis does one judge which, among the manylocal histories and accounts of resistance againstcolonialism, best fit the nationalist narrative?Ultimately, the relegation of nationalism to thedomain of the particular histories of the colonialempires, has left their different constitutingcommunities in pursuit of dominance over thenew institutional practices of economy andpolity, therefore creating a conflictualrelationship with one another that is not helpedby countless revelations of secret deals,manipulations, and the cynical pursuit ofsectorial – that is, ethnic – as well as privateinterests (Atieno-Odhiambo and Lonsdale,2003). To be sure, Atieno has argued, largely onthe basis of both oral and archival testimonials,ethnic resistance was never homogeneous orfully united in its formations. There were theAfrican colonial army, the police and, above all,the homeguards, people who were doubledealersby appearing to side with their folks byday, but revealed the identities of the leaders of91the resistance to colonial authorities by night –forming what Atieno, in the memory of hisstudents, referred to as “the paradox ofcollaboration in the Mau Mau resistance.” Bythe 1970s, the evident failures of nationalism hadgiven way to ethnic politics. As a result,Chaterjee writes, “[t]he leaders of the Africanstruggles against colonialism and racism hadspoiled their records by becoming heads ofcorrupt, fractious, and often brutal regimes...Nothing, it would seem, was left in the legacy ofnationalism to make people in the Westernworld feel good about it”(Chatterjee, 1993;Atieno-Odhiambo, 1998).The failure of the pre-independence nationalistdrive to sustain itself in the postcolonial era bycreating a unified nationalist narrative, and itsreplacement with ethnic rivalries, suspicions,plots, and shallow alliances have continued totear Africa apart, thus preventing orundermining the sprouting of democraticinstitutions and practices. In sum, it is thecommunities that last. For historians, it wouldseem, the sensible writing of history can takeeither one of two directions: either in the form ofaccounts of communal interests vis-a-vis thestate, or accounting for the life of thecommunities as autonomous entities whoseengagements with the state in both its colonialand postcolonial forms of knowledge can bedescribed and analyzed by applying ananthropological perspective to the study ofcommunities in the two historical contexts in amanner that identifies how the knowledge by oneside regarding the other helped shape and nowhelp historians understand how recent historiesof local communities were made. Atieno haswritten, for example, the history of Britishcolonial knowledge regarding the Luo, on theone hand, and Luo perceptions of the colonialspace as they encountered and reacted to it. Thisis the subject matter of the immensely popularSiaya, which is appropriately described in thesubtitle as “the historical anthropology of anAfrican landscape”(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989). The same approach forms thebasis of the explanations and analyses of the socalled“S.M. Otieno Case”(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992). Here is the question: Withwhat legitimacy does or should colonial

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201292knowledge be ruled as superior to an indigenousepistemic canon in the jurisdiction of theiraffairs? In the idioms I have known fromelsewhere – yet in the same manner, highlightingthe same issue of the legitimacy of applyingcanons of judgement developed in onehomogeneous context to situations andexperiences foreign to it – whose justice, whichrationality? To that extent, one of the interests ofthe historian in the post-colony should be asearch for the specific careers of terms like“primitive”, “tribe”, “village”, “customary”,“backward”, and so on, as various antonyms ofthe ambiguous and now contested term“modern”. The essays contained in thiscollection speak to the many ways the lateAtieno-Odhiambo’s passion for knowledge, andhis sophistication in understanding and use ofcurrent theoretical frameworks to shed light onopaque social and political events ignited flamesof desire for knowledge in his own students andcolleagues. As we said at the top of thisintroduction, each contributor was given thefreedom to address topics of their choice as bothevidence and tribute to Atieno’s influence ontheir growth as persons, but more importantly asscholars. Two of these contributions stand out.One, by Professor Bethwell Allan Ogot, is atestimony to the close attention a teacher haspaid to the making of his own student anddisciple into a globally recognized academicgiant in his field and beyond. Professor Ogot’stestimony allows us to see how vastly read thelate Atieno was how nothing important in histime escaped his comment. Together, they havedemonstrated how human experience shouldnever be taken for granted, and how all aspectsof human experience can be accounted for ashistorically and socially produced, and therefore,when given the appropriate analysis, itselfbecomes a window for understanding historyand the culturally constructed strategies ofengagement and coping.The other stand-out contribution is that ofProfessor David William Cohen, Atieno’s longtimefriend, research collaborator and co-authorof the noted texts that have brought them suchattention among scholars as well as amongpeople who merely want to enjoy the magicalability of scholars to turn the everyday into the92subject matter of an astonishingly interesting andsophisticated analysis and explanation. Becausehe knew, loved, and immensely enjoyed hisculture, Atieno, in collaboration with ProfessorCohen, an astutely sophisticated anthropologistand historian, and much like Professor Ogot,read the everyday practice of knowledgemanifested in oral idioms and narratives and inthe practice of custom much as anthropologicalmaterial for practicing historicized analyses thatreveal the extent to which their production is partof negotiating through colonial knowledge andpractice as laid out in the epistemic orders of thenew institutional arenas. In other words, theywere codes for listening to and observing howthe Luo nation experienced British colonial ruleand sometimes also the authority of neighboringenclaves of power, like Loch Kawango.Sometimes even the seemingly isolated termslike Ka-Nanga, or its derivative, Ja-Nanga,acquire important significance when analyzed inthe context in which clothes and dressing becamepart of the history of colonialism and how it wasdomesticated. Finally, those who knew Atienowill certainly remember that his analyses oftenprovoked critical questions regarding the roughedges of these local-foreign encounters whichonly spurred further considerations of points ofseparation and accommodation. How, forexample, to reconcile or to read together theencounter between a system of power thatworked itself through a single order of authority,on the one hand, and a self-controlling systembased on a unifying moral authority of clan andlineage?This collection provides a few examples of themulti-disciplinarity of Atieno’s work andinterests. For those of us who knew and engagedin colloquia over some of these matters with himfrom time to time only when his intellectualdirection was already set can only urge others,especially those colleagues and friends who knewhim in his earlier and formative years, tocontribute ideas toward finding a way to makethe inspiration of our leading intellectuals not diewith their bodies, but to live in the intellectualgrowth of future generations. A few years priorto the onset of the infliction that finally took him,Atieno and I held regular conversations by

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201293electronic correspondence dedicated to a themethat he baptized as “Thinking your People.”That practice should never come to a halt.Rather, like a relay baton, it should pass over tosome representatives of the next generation.ReferencesAlasdair, M. (1984) After Virtue: A Study inMoral Theory. Notre Dame, IN, NotreDame University Press.Alasdair, M. (1988) Whose Justice, WhichRationality? Notre Dame, IN, NotreDame University Press.Appiah, A.K. (1992) In my father's house :Africa in the philosophy of culture.Oxford University Press, New York.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1974) The Paradox ofcollaboration and other Essays. Nairobi:East African Literature Bureau.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1998) Ethnicity andDemocracy in Kenya. Text of PublicLecture, as presented at the NebrasksUnion, University of Nebrasks- Lincoln,Lincoln, Nebraska, USA, September 25,1998.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2002) From AfricanHistoriographies to an AfricanPhilosophy of History. Falola, Toyin andC. Jennings, eds., AfricanizingKnowledge: African Studies Across theDisciplines, New Brunswick (USA) andLondon (UK), Transaction Publishers13-63.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2001) AfricanHistorians and African Voices. EssaysPresented to Professor Bethwell AllanOgot, Basel, Switzerland P. SchlettweinPublishingAtieno-Odhiambo, E.S. and Lonsdale, J. (2003)Mau Mau & Nationhood: arms,authority & narration. Nairobi, EAEP;London, James Currey; and Athens, OH,Ohio University Press.Benedict, A. (1983) Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism. London, Verso Books.93Charles, T. (1989) The Sources of the Self: TheMaking of Modern Identity. Cambridge,UK, Cambridge University Press, 1989.Chatterjee, P. (1993) The nation and itsfragments : colonial and postcolonialhistories. Princeton University Press,Princeton, N.J.Chetterjee, P. (1993) The Nation and ItsFragments: Colonial and PostcolonialHistories. Princeton, NJ, PrincetonUniversity Press.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.London: James Currey, 1989.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1992) Burrying S. M.: The Politics ofKnowledge and the Sociology of Powerin Africa. Portsmouth, NH, HeinemannEducational Books, and London, JamesCurrey Ltd.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2004) The Risks of Knowledge:Investigations into the Death of the Hon.Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya,1990. Athens, OH, Ohio UniversityPress, and Nairobi, East AfricanEducational Publishers Ltd.Fanon, F. (1965) The wretched of the earth.Grove Press, New York,.Fanon, F. (1967a) A dying colonialism. GrovePress, New York.Fanon, F. (1967b) Toward the Africanrevolution; political essays. MonthlyReview Press, New York,.Fanon, F. (2008) Black skin, white masks. GrovePress ;Distributed by Publishers Group West, NewYork [Berkeley, Calif.].Fanon, F. and Philcox, R. (2004) The wretchedof the earth/Frantz Fanon; translatedfrom the French by Richard Philcox;introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre andHomi K. Bhabha. Grove Press, NewYork.Feierman, S. (1990) Peasant Intellectuals:Anthropology and History in Tanzania.Madison, WI, The University ofWisconsin Press.Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1970)African Political Systems. Published for

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201294the International African Institute byOxford U.P., London, New York,.Gutkind, P.C.W. and Waterman, P. (ed 1977)African Social Studies: A RadicalReader. London and Nairobi,Heinemann Educational Books.Gyekye, K. (1987) An Essay on AfricanPhilosophical Thought: The AkanConceptual Scheme. Second edition,Philadelphia, Temple University Press(first edition Cambridge UniversityPress).Gyekye, K. (1997) Tradition and Modernity:Philosophical Reflections on the AfricanExperience. Oxford, UK, OxfordUniversity Press.Hallen, B. and Sodipo, J.O. (1997) Knowledge,belief, and witchcraft : analyticexperiments in African philosophy.Stanford University Press, Stanford,Calif.Hountondji, P.J. (1983) African philosophy :myth and reality. Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington.Karp, I. and Masolo, D.A. (2000) AfricanPhilosophy as Cultural Inquiry.Bloomington, IN, Indiana UniversityPress.Masolo, D.A. (2010) Self and Community in achanging World. Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington.Michael, W. (1987) Interpretations and SocialSciences. Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press.Mills, C.W. (1997) The Racial Contract Ithaca,Cornell University Press.Mills, C.W. (1998) Blackness Visible: Essays onPhilosophy and Race. Ithaca, CornellUniversity Press.Odera Oruka, H., ed. (1991) Sage Philosophy:Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debateon African Philosophy. Leiden, TheNehterlands, J. Brill Publishers, 1990,and Nairobi, ACTS, 1991.Rawls, J. (1972) A theory of justice. ClarendonPress, Oxford,.Rawls, J. and Kelly, E. (2001) Justice as fairness: a restatement. Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge, Mass.Tempels, P. (1969) Bantu Philosophy. Présenceafricaine, Paris,.Vansina, J. (1961) Oral Tradition: A Study inHistorical Method. Chicago, AldinPublishing Co.Vansina, J. (1985) Oral Tradition as HistoryMadison, WI, University of WisconsinPress.Vansina, J. (1990) Paths in the Rainforest:Toward a History of Political Traditionin Equatorial Africa Madison, WI,University of Wisconsin Press.Vansina, J. (1994a) Living With Africa.Madison: The University of WisconsinPress, 242.Vansina, J. (1994b) Living With Africa.Madison: The University of WisconsinPress, 240.Vansina, J. (2004) How Societies Are Born:Governance in West Central AfricaBefore 1600 Charlottesville, VA,University of Virginia Press.Wallerstein, I. (1962) The Political Ideology ofthe P.D.G. Présence Africaine 40, 30-41.Wiredu, K. (1980) Philosophy and an Africanculture. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York.Wiredu, K. (1996) Cultural universals andparticulars : an African perspective.Indiana University Press, Bloomington.94

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201295Youth, Destitution and Conflict: Nairobi’s Street Children, 1949- 1962Milcah Amolo AcholaDepartment of History and Archaeology, University of Nairobi, E-mail; mamolo@uonbi.ac.ke__________________________________________________________________AbstractThis paper attempts to examine destitution and some of its consequences among young people inNairobi, between 1949 and 162. The problem is set against African poverty, segregation by race and thereluctance of colonial authorities to address the problem of African urban destitution. Colonialauthorities tended to equate African unemployment and poverty in urban areas with crime andinsubordination. Most Africans were supposed to be rural and tribal not urban detribalized. Nairobi inparticular was categorized as a European town. Only Africans with proof of employment were supposedto reside in the town. The result was the enactment of a series of laws to control their immigration intoNairobi. These laws, however, did not attain their objective. African children and young people came tobe associated with crime of increasing magnitude. The extra operations at the height of the Emergency inthe mid 1950’s were aimed at tightening colonial authority and surveillance. But they provided minimalrespite. The nationalist movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s challenges. By the eve ofindependence in 1962, not only was the problem of immigration of young people unsolved: its expansionhad attained unprecedented levels.Key words: Youth, destitution, conflict, Nairobi, Street children______________________________________________________________________________IntroductionThe problem of street children in urban areas isglobal, growing and apparently uncontrollable.Some of these children and young people arediscipline or addiction cases believed to have runaway from homes and family. The majority,however, ends up homeless, without parental oradult care. A third category may be made up ofchildren and young people living with theirfamilies on the streets entirely. Family life mayalso be partial, that is to say children living onthe streets by day and going home to sleep atnight (Wikipedia).This paper is part of a larger research,encouraged by the late Prof. Atieno-Adhiambowho suggested that it was time to re-directAfrican scholarly research more and more at thevoiceless and marginalized in society. Thequestion of street children in urban Kenyasometimes also called parking boys and girls orchokora in the Nairobi dialect of Kiswahili is onewhich has been debated since colonial times andwhich continues to defy solution (Amolo-Achola, 2001). Street children are almostuniversally considered by policy makers a greatnuisance. To Nairobi’s wealthy, they areassociated with overly insistent or even rudebegging, dealing in and consumption of narcoticdrugs, child sex trade, pick pocketing, variouskinds of conning tricks, theft of car parts, verybold snatching of bags, jewellery and othervaluables and so on. Over time the criminalbehavior gained in gravity and parking boys havecome to be associated with house breaking andeven more violent crime. During the years ofEmergency homeless boys were associated withgangs which practically took control of Africanlocations and with violent crime and murder(Protectorate, 1950c). Only charitable andreligious based organizations regard them withany kindness. After it’s swearing into the officein January 2002 the Narc Government, infulfillment of one of its election campaignpromises, attempted to clear Nairobi of itsteeming populations of street children. Theobjective was to settle them in new homesprovided with basic needs such as food, clothingand to offer them education and re-habilitation.The attempts can safely be said to have failed.95

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201296It is too often imagined that the chokora problemis one of the post independence era (SOS) . Thispaper will attempt to examine the historicalantecedents of today’s problem of homeless anddestitute children and young people in Nairobifrom the end of World War II, to the eve ofindependence. For the purposes of this paper thedefinition of children and young people willfollow those laid down by the various relevantcolonial ordinances. Definitions of child werebased on age. For example, Ordinance No.XXII of 1934, titled “An Ordinance Relating toJuveniles” defined “child” as anyone under theage of fourteen. A “young person” was anyonebetween fourteen and eighteen. Ordinance No.XII of 1955 titled “An Ordinance to provide forthe Prevention of Cruelty to and Neglect ofChildren” defined a child as any person underthe age of sixteen”. Paul Ocoboc has given adetailed account of the transfer of English lawrelating to destitute or homeless juveniles to thecolonies (Nier and Ocobock, 2009). In Englishlaw generally, capitalism as a social economicculture tended to criminalize homelessness anddestitution. In the colonies, this tradition wascombined with racism and the stereotyping ofAfricans, as lazy, ignorant, essentially rural andtribal and unsuited for urban life especially in a“Europeans only” town such as Nairobi wassupposed to be. Having failed to achieve thisdistinction the town became segregated on thebasis of colour. This continued to be the caseeven after 1923 when official policy claimed thatsegregation was no longer upheld by the colonialideology.Through the empowerment of variousregulations and practices, Africans could onlyreside in what came to be known as the AfricanLocations. An exception was made whenAfricans worked in areas set aside for the otherraces and were provided with residential quartersthere. In addition to the official locations,unauthorized slums developed where largenumbers of Africans lived in temporarystructures (Olumwulla, 1986; Throup, 1957;Zwanenberg, 1972). Thus the study of streetchildren fits in with the story of growing povertyin African reserves in Kenya, and the efforts ofsome of the youth to find alternative sources oflivelihood in towns like Nairobi.96The story of urban poverty as it applied tocolonial Nairobi has been handled by manyresearchers (Olumwulla, 1986; Throup, 1957;Zwanenberg, 1972). Suffice it to say here thatduring the colonial period the lives of themajority of Africans were characterized by lowwages for those who worked, high levels ofunemployment, very overcrowdedaccommodation, poor, sometimes nonexistentsanitation and other social services, poor healthand other such indices of poverty(Amolo-Achola, 2001). Colonial authorities saw theproblem of African rural-urban migration as oneof unreason because Africans seemingly left therural areas where they could make a living on theland and went to towns to engage in crime andother undesirable side effects of “moraldegradation”, such as prostitution, juveniledelinquency, alcohol and drug abuse and begging(Amolo-Achola, 2001; Amolo Achola, 2001;Nier and Ocobock, 2009; Olumwulla, 1986;Zwanenberg, 1972).One of the earliest laws to control African life inNairobi was the aforementioned JuvenilesOrdinance of 1934. Briefly it dealt with personsunder 18 years of age found begging or receivingalms, wandering about not having a home,having no parent or guardian, having drunken,irresponsible or imprisoned parents or guardiansand such like. Other social ills frowned uponwere being destitute not being an orphan,frequenting the company of reputed thieves orprostitutes, residing in premises associated withprostitution, being persistently ill treated orneglected and the like. All these things werereasons for the seizing a child, or young person.The ordinance empowered persons authorizedby the government to bring such children beforea magistrate’s court. If not acquitted, they couldbe placed under the supervision of a probationofficer, committed to the care of a relative orother fit person, sent to an approved school,ordered to be whipped or committed to custodyin a remand home. Young person between ages14 and 18 could be committed to prison ordetention camp. Juveniles under 10 years of agecould not even be sent to an approved school.The burning question, in the end was how andwhere to obtain and maintain accommodationfor persons so arrested.

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201297An effort to remedy this problem was theenactment of Ordinance No. XXII of 1946otherwise known as “An Ordinance(Temporarily) to Provide for the Removal ofUndesirable Natives form Certain Areas”. Itaimed at the clearing of undesirable Africanimmigrants from the streets from municipalities,townships and other urban centers. Itempowered authorized persons to make aRemoval Order in respect of any “native” whocould show no evidence of a settled home,regular employment or other means of livelihoodor support within a municipality. Furthermore,there was section 178 of the Penal Code whichwas directed against, “idle and disorderlypersons,” prostitutes and anyone “wandering orplacing themselves in any public place to beg orgather alms”, or “endeavouring by exposure ofwounds or deformity to obtain or gather alms”.The burning issue of discussion came to be howto finance the accommodation and subsistence ofpersons rounded up under such laws andregulations until the removal and how suchremoval was to be paid for. Ocoboc shows howin the original English law young people soarrested could be made to work to earn enoughto pay for transport to their supposed home. Butthis was not always a practical solutionespecially in the case of children under ten yearsof age, who had not been claimed by any relativeor who had been removed from objectionableones.It is interesting to note that up to the early 1950snominated African leaders seemed to accept theview that children and young people who werehomeless and without adult care deserved to beremoved from town. In 1949, for example, acommission of enquiry was established inconsequence to a complaint voiced in theLegislative Council by Eliud Mathu. He haddemanded the repeal of Municipal Bye Laws 208and 212 which empowered the police tochallenge any African found outside thelocations between 10.00 pm and 6.00 am and todemand their business. Mathu argued that theregulations merely humiliated Africans withoutachieving their objective, namely reducing crime.As they were questioned during the sitting of thecommission Mathu, Tom Mbotela and AmbroseOfafa all accepted that it was important tocontrol Africans in Nairobi. The final report ofthe enquiry recommended that the regulations beretained. The African leaders agreed that allburglaries occurred between 10.00 and 6.00 amand were committed by African youth.Furthermore, the African leaders offered noconstructive alternatives, actually suggesting thattheir main objection was the racial over tones ofthe regulations. They would not mind the byelaws if all the other races were subjected to thesame treatment (Republic of Kenya, 1949).As the European only town it was meant to beNairobi developed into a very hierarchical towndominated by race and from the first themachinery created to run the town wascontrolled by Europeans. As late as 1959, thecity was administratively categorized as a non-African zone. Yet it had never really been sosince Africans and Asians were always in themajority, even without the figures from unofficialsettlements (Table I). It was necessary to admitsome Africans as labour and caught between theneed for this labour and the desire to keep it ascheap as possible municipal and centralgovernments were unable, often unwilling tolimit the proportions of African immigration inNairobi to only such as had “business” to be intown. From 1903, when a visitor commentedthat one could wander about the streets ofNairobi for hours and only see an occasionalnative face, the African and Asian population ofthe town grew rapidly. By 1956, the CityCouncil could actually express concern over the“uneven development”, of the town because thelocations had grown way beyond the proportionsenvisaged as right for a non African area(Protectorate, 1957a). The following tableindicates the estimated growth of population inNairobi by race, over a period of four years.97

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201298Table I: Nairobi Growth of Population by Race 1942-46Race 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946European 8,591 9,421 10,431 10,257 10,379Asian 28,530 30,829 36,517 36,517 37,191African 54,493 59,022 66,040 66,040 65,183Total 91,574 99,272 112,814 112,814 110,751Source: Report of Medical Officer of health, Nairobi, 1947.Note: these figures did not include thoseof people living in illegal settlements.In an “ideal” situation Africans employed in thetowns would have been youthful and hopefullysingle. Accommodation provided for Africanswas originally, based on this principle. Onlyfrom 1947 was it recognized that it might benecessary to provide family accommodation forNairobi’s African workers. Workers,furthermore, were expected to be largely male.Young girls and women were equated withprostitution, actual or potential. They were seenas a threat to the natural order of life in theAfrican reserves. They were believed, to beresponsible for the spread of venereal diseases aswell as the many so called “illegitimateabandoned children”. (Amolo-Achola, 2001;Amolo Achola, 2001; Republic of Kenya,1948,1954) Women were, therefore, habituallyrounded up, examined for sexually transmitteddiseases and repatriated to the reserves (Kanogo,2001). The 1936 Masters and ServantsOrdinance, allowed unmarried girls and youngwomen to be employed as servants and childminders but only on condition that the employerprovided accommodation, or on the productionof evidence that they lived with husbands legallyemployed in Nairobi. Throughout the 1940’sand early 1950s the male female ration wasbelieved to be extremely lopsided - one female toseven or eight males (Amolo-Achola, 2001;Amolo Achola, 2001; White, 1990) Such youngworkers as already had wives and children wereexpected to keep them in the reserves. Indeedmany African parents were suspicious of thecorrupting influence of towns on young childrenespecially daughters and preferred to have theirchildren raised in the reserves (Amolo-Achola,2001; Amolo Achola, 2001; White, 1990). In an“ideal” situation, therefore,there would have been very few African childrenin town. A 1949 estimate put thenumber in Nairobi at 300 (Protectorate, 1950b).Yet colonial authorities constantly complainedabout the presence and growing numbers ofunsupervised children and young people in town,crime, use of drugs, begging and disorderlybehaviour. One explanation, frequentlylamented was the position of Nairobi, almostcompletely surrounded by the Kikuyu Reserveand the impossibility of keeping Kikuyu womenand children out of the town’s boundaries(Protectorate, 1950b). By the early 1950s a strongprejudice had developed against the Kikuyu,Embu and Meru (KEM) groups, the Kikuyu inparticular being seen as having “a natural predirectionto crime”(Protectorate, 1950b; Throup,1957), and master minding the Mau Maurebellion.The administration of Africans in the Colonyand Protectorate was dealt with by centralgovernment, under the Department of Native(later African) Affairs led by the Chief Native(later African) Commissioner. For Nairobi therewas, from 1949, a Municipal Native (laterAfrican) Affairs Officer. Both the officials wereEuropeans throughout the colonial period. TheMunicipal (from 1950 City) Council also had anAfrican Affairs Committee. This committee wasmade up of Europeans and Asians until thenominations of Councilors Tom Mbotela andAmbrose Ofafa to the Council after World War98

Maseno University Journal Volume 1 201299II. Only in 1957 was an African, CouncilorMusa Amalemba allowed to chair thecommittee.The direct administration in the locations wasunder a Superintendent, aided by an AssistantSuperintendent of African Locations. Both wereEuropeans up to the end of 1956. In additionthere was a Welfare Officer and an AssistantWelfare Officer also European and alwayswomen. As the control of African Locationsveered towards anarchy from 1950 the tasksassigned to these officials became impossible forEuropeans to perform. In 1950 for example, theWelfare Officer and her assistant tendered theirresignation. This was followed by theresignations of the Superintendent of Africanlocations and the City African Affairs Officer.When the women appointed to take over asWelfare and Assistant Welfare officers declined,on second thought, to take office the decisionwas made not to advertise or fill these positionsfor a while. As David Throup has pointed outthe African locations had become a no-go-zonefor Europeans as these locations were taken overby gangs of practically uncontrollable youth. Forinstance, the African Maternity Hospital inPumwani, whose administration had alwaysbeen entirely European had to be abandoned tovery low level African staff.Municipal services targeting children werealways limited. For example, the MunicipalCouncil, in partnership with certain employers ofAfrican labour, like the East African Railwaysand Habours and the East African Posts hadoperated maternal and child welfare clinics, fromthe 1930s. The municipality’s role largelyinvolved the inspection of premises for themaintenance of minimum standards of hygieneand sanitation.In addition the Nairobi Municipal Council, from1943, slowly built up a system whereby daynurseries were provided for children of all raceson the basis of racial segregation. Ultimatelythe policy came to be for the local governmentauthority to handle pre-school children up to agesix while central government took responsibilityfor elementary and middle schools, alsosegregated on the basis of race. In addition,99Christian missions, also worked among Africansto provide schools. Sometimes they ran specialschools. For example the Salvation Armyprovided a school for blind children. There wasin addition, a Quran school.In African locations like Pumwani, ShauriMoyo, Ziwani, Kaloleni, Bahati and others, daynurseries, as well as elementary and middleschools were problematic for several reasons.Social services provided by the municipality forAfricans, such as social halls, beer halls,children’s playgrounds and football stadiums, aswell as the nurseries and schools could only becatered for from the limited funds of the NativeTrust Fund. Usually this was with the help of acontribution by the government on a £ for £basis. The European and Asian dominated CityCouncil was unwilling to spend municipalrevenue on anything to do with Africans. It wasargued that Africans in Nairobi did not pay rates,so any service for Africans was regarded ascharity and funds issued on a niggardly basis.Thus the schools were few in number and alwaysbuilt on extreme austerity lines. Often theCouncil had to waive its own buildingregulations so that schools in the locations couldbe built of temporary materials on a banda basis.They were not inviting and were, like otherservices provided for Africans, inadequate interms of staff and materials. Moreover, highlevels of poverty, even among the employedcreated a problem of destitution in the locations,and though European councilors frequentlysuggested that Africans should be made to payfor their own services, such a solution was notpractical (Protectorate, 1954). In 1954, thecolonial government was actually moved to setup a commission of enquiry on the incidence ofindigence among Africans in Nairobi. Althoughthe findings of the commission confirmed theworst expectations regarding the lives of themajority of urban Africans the question ofAfricans in Nairobi continued to be basically oneof how to control people rather than to provideservice or alleviate hardship.The implementation of the various laws tocontrol Africans in town was done largelythrough municipal bye laws. 1949 for examplesaw the promulgation of Bye Law No. 718,described as “very efficacious….. for dealing

100Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012with loafers about town”. It led to the arrest,according to official reports, of some 200 youngpersons every month (Protectorate, 1954). Butthe council continuously lamented the shortageof its staff, the slow process of the law and itsconsequent inability to expel all undesirable“natives”. From its inception it had fought along battle to obtain its own municipal policeforce but failed. Consequently, year by year theCommissioner of Police complained aboutincreasing levels of offences committed byjuveniles and young people in Nairobi. In 1947C.H Ward, then Commissioner of Police gavethe following breakdown of juvenile crimes in hisannual report.Table II: Juvenile Crime 1944 to 1947Type of crime 1944 1945 1946 1947Vagrancy ordinance 525 248 727 500Theft under sh.100/- 262 223 226 268Township Regulations 150 44 20 15Home breaking and Burglary 55 35 41 83Theft over sh. 100/- 48 21 33 39Assault on persons 9 17 7 20Theft of stock - - 24 7Escape from custody 5 8 - -Source: Annual Report of Commissioner of Police, 1945 and 1947.As the decade of the 1940s ended, however thecolonial government realized that the traditional1952). In 1952, the year that the Emergency wasdeclared crime was reported to have taken “anmethods of controlling insubordinate African abominable and murderous nature”. It wasyouth who would not stay in the reserves as they attributed to gangs of “extremely well organizedwere supposed to was becoming more and more youth, obviously under central direction”of a challenge. Scholars have described the (Protectorate, 1952). The entusiasm of specialbreakdown of order in the African reserves,particularly in central province (Throup, 1957).This has been attributed to many causesincluding increasing impoverisation of Africans,unsympathetic colonial attitudes to African“spiv” squads led to 1,588 convictions. Inaddition there were 10,845 proceedings underordinary municipal and townships regulations(Protectorate, 1953). The following year thePolice Commissioner had to admit that even thegrievances and the various coercive and “spiv” regulations were inadequate to controlfrustrating regulations and policies adopted Nairobi’s “gangs of marauding youth” and thattowards African economic problems. In the police had failed to recognize the importanceretrospect, it can be seen that a rebellion was of municipal and township bye lawsbrewing.(Protectorate, 1954).In the later half of 1950 special “spiv” squadsunder Bye Law No.718 were let loose in theAfrican Locations. This resulted in theconvictions of 480 “undesirables” under thespecial regulations and 596 under municipal bylaw. The Commissioner of Police lamented thatall this was not adequately addressing crimeprevention (Protectorate, 1951; Protectorate,1952). By 1951 there was concern over the“unfortunate prominence” of crime in the City ofNairobi and its environs, which accounted for40% of all crime in the Colony (Protectorate,In February 1953 a plan was conceived andimplemented of putting the City of Nairobi, andin particular the African areas under closerpolicing. Initially, the city was divided into fourdivisions and then grouped into pairs, eachunder a police superintendent. By the end of theyear the city was re-organized into three subdistricts,comprised of the African Locations, thenon-African residential areas and the businessdistrict. Each was further subdivided intolocations, which were placed under chiefs andheadmen assisted by the so-called “tribal” police.100

101Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Chief’s camps were established in Karen, SpringValley, Kilimani, Kileleshwa, Parklands,Muthaiga, Ruaraka, Eastleigh and thecommercial and industrial areas. All together,23 administrative posts were created and placedunder a total of 20 chiefs, 55 headmen and 210tribal police. For African locations, a DistrictCommissioner (D.C.) was appointed andtemporarily stationed at the Pumwani MemorialHall. In 1955 new offices were completed at acost of £17,000 for the use of the D.C.Despite all this, from the beginning of 1954, thelevels of crime and lawlessness were consideredto have increased so much as to necessitate thepromulgation of Operation Anvil in April. Inpart it involved a concerted effort to clearNairobi and Nakuru towns of the youth of theKEM groups. The First Battalion, RoyalInnskilling Fusiliers were assigned this task.Meanwhile, “Tribal” police were appointed fromall ethnic groups with the Akambapredominating. Most of them were exservicemenbut they had to demonstrateimpeccable loyalty and integrity. Initially theywere armed with shot guns. By the end of 1955,however, the shot guns were withdrawn and thetribal police re-armed with truncheons. The socalled emergency force was ultimately 231 strongby the end of 1955. An additional 12 were keptfor the sole purpose of escorting repatriatedKikuyu, Embu and Meru youth out of the town.At this point the government decided that theage-old demand of the City Council for its ownpolice had become a non-issue.In 1955 the first Battalion, Royal InnskillingFusiliers was awarded Freedom of the City inrecognition of their extraordinary effort in theexecution of the Anvil. A camp wasfurthermore, established at Langata to deal withAnvil detainees and to act as a transit camp forrepatriated of women and children. However, itwas closed down in April 1955 for new intakes.A Mau Mau Investigation Centre was put up inEmbakasi. In October 1955 its work wastransferred to the Police, Special Branch.Passbook Regulations were extended to includeKEM women. By 1956 the Chief African AffairsOfficers could boast that any African wanted inNairobi could be located in a matter of hours.101However, although the Anvil operations resultedin the removal of over 20,000 members of KEM,the incidence of crime continued to cause greatconcern. R.C. Catling, Commissioner of Police,made special mention of juvenile crime, in hisannual report of 1955, as follows:Juvenile crime was a major problem. Gangscomprising of children who had been separatedfrom their parents as a result of the Emergencyroamed the city up to the end of May 1955.They were responsible for theft of property fromvehicles to the value of approximately £12,000(Protectorate, 1955).It was recognized that the removal of KEMyouth merely made way for the immigration ofnon-KEM youth. By the end of 1956 the policereported that the homeless in Nairobi were nolonger speaking kikuyu. It was increasingly alsorecognized that there were a number of really“detribalized” or landless Africans who couldnot be repatriated anywhere. Camps opened toaccommodate child criminals together with otherhomeless and unclaimed children seemed tooffer only a temporary solution to the problem.Juvenile crime levels dropped from June only torise again in November and December 1955.This was because gangs of children escorted tothe city boundaries melted into the illegalsettlements on the outskirts of the town. As soonas was possible they sneaked back into the cityand the African Affairs Department continuedattributed “much of the crime in the city” tothese children (Protectorate, 1956).1955 saw the enactment of the Prevention ofCruelty to and Neglect of Children Ordinance.On the face of it, it seems as if kindness and carehad led to the enactment. The title, however wasmisleading, influenced by a UNO comention.The City Council had complained about the1934 Ordinance on the grounds that it did notmake proper provision for the appointment of“authorized persons” empowered to execute theordinance. Nor did it adequately provide for thecreation of institutions to accommodate childrenarrested or convicted under the ordinance. Thecouncil was merely expressing its age oldreluctance to having responsibility for Africanhoisted on them. The 1955 Ordinance waspartially a response to these concerns and partlyan enhancement of the anvil operations. Under

102Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the new law, 2,662 Kikuyu juveniles werehandled, 1,188 through a specially establishedJuvenile Court and 1,474 through repatriationorders meant to return them to relatives residingin the KEM reserves. In addition some 832juveniles of non-KEM origin were repatriated torelatives in the respective reserves. The initialoperation carried out in April 1955, involvedsome 2000 children all together. By end of 1955an average of twenty children a day withoutparents or guardians and with no means ofsubsistence were being picked up daily.Realization dawned, finally, that some of thesechildren were genuinely without older relativesin town or in the reserves (Protectorate, 1956).Under the so called Protection of ChildrenOrdinance, a facility, named Ujana Park wasestablished at the Lang’ata Camp by a speciallycreated Save the Children Fund Committee. Theordinance referred to destitute children variouslyas “child in need of care” and child in need ofprotection” Two Hundred juveniles werecommitted to Ujana Park under the Emergency(Welfare of Children) Regulations (Protectorate,1956). The ostensible objective of the Committeewas to ensure a more humane approach to thetreatment of confined children, away fromhardened criminals. But the atmosphere at theUjana Park remained punitive, making it merelya children’s jail.By the early months of 1956 it was possible tobegin relaxing some of the features of closeradministration of African Locations though itwas recognized that a permanent form wasnecessary. However, large numbers of juvenileimmigrants continued to enter Nairobi illegallyand destitute children continued to be blamed fora large proportion of crime in the city. Inaddition to the traditional catalogue of crimeslike house breaking, begging, pick pocketing,theft (especially of car parts), assaults and use ofdrugs, indecent attacks on young girls of all racesmade its appearance. Some 3,547 Kikuyuchildren were repatriated to their home districts,in 1956 alone. The Report on the Incidence ofIndigence among Africans in Nairobi clearlyshows the great hardships of African life in thetown. The authorities, nevertheless, stillregarded destitution in all ages as a nuisance and102the origin of crime in the city. Clearing thestreets of destitute and sending them to livesupposedly productive crime free lives in thereserves was still the main approach to solvingthe problem. This was despite the fact that theReport on the Incidence of Indigence amongAfricans in Nairobi recommended that specialhomes and institutions be established in the cityfor destitutes of all ages and that these centres bemaintained at public expense. But thisrecommendation was never implemented. TheCity Council and central government engaged inanother round of their age old struggle to shiftfinancial responsibility on each other. Thecouncil refused even to accept responsibility forappointing or nominating an “authorizedperson” responsible for making arrests andbringing “offenders” before the magistrate’scourt established in Pumwani for the purpose.For its part of the African AffairsDepartments’comment was as follows:The Prevention of Cruelty to ChildrenOrdinance passed early in the year is unsuited tothe special and almost unmanageableproportions this problem has reached(Protectorate, 1957b).Consequently, voluntary associations like theChild Welfare Society formed in 1955 andChristian missions and other religiousorganizations were encouraged to take up a largepart of the burden, with the grudging help ofgrants in aid from both the City Council andcentral government. The 1957 Annual Reportof the Commissioner of Police reported a declinein the levels of crime in the city, but he had toadmit that the situation was far from satisfactory(Protectorate, 1957a).By late 1957 partly because of the influence ofnew international humanitarianism, colonialauthorities were being forced to recognize thatthe most effective solution to the problem ofhomeless, unsupervised children without meansof support and therefore prone to criminalactivity was free education for all children in theAfrican locations. This was not a new idea.Jimmy Jeremiah had made the suggestion in1949 and had been disregarded (Protectorate,1950a). At the beginning of 1957 it was reportedthat the City Council ran 7 nursery schools forAfricans. There was furthermore, a total of 16

103Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012grants aided schools run by various christenmissions. Schools, especially new ones andextensions of old ones tended to be housed intemporary accommodation. The total enrolmentwas given as 3,694 boys and 1,452 girls. Therewere 113 teachers, 11 of them untrained. Thequality even of the trained teaching staff wasadmitted to be below standard. Too often poorlyqualified married women were posted to teach incity schools for the convenience of husbands,especially when qualified quality professionalscould not be found (Protectorate, 1957b). So theidea of free education was quietly dropped.Suggestions were then made that compulsoryeducation for African children in Nairobi mightbe planned for 1959. But the administrativeproblems envisaged were legion. It was pointedout, for example, that a proper census wasnecessary to determine the real numbers thatwould need to be catered for. The old vexedquestion of who was responsible for the largenumber of Africans in illegal settlements justoutside city borders raised its head. So also wasthe question of how to control “the influx andefflux of the African population throughout anyyear in Nairobi” (Protectorate, 1957b). It hadalways been argued that it was impossible todistinguish genuine Africans from “loafers” andthat if services in the city were instituted forAfricans in good faith, migrants from thereserves would abuse the trust and flock in totake advantage. It was also recognized that theperennial problem of seriously inadequateAfrican housing of reasonable standard wouldfirst have to be solved. Attempts made in thepast to tackle this problem had always servedmerely to reveal the enormity of the problem andfallen far short of the desired goal (Olumwulla,1986). Finally and most importantly neithercentral government nor the City Council werewilling to take the responsibility to shoulder thetotal cost, which was envisaged to be massive. Itwas thus argued that it would be necessary toimpose a special cess on the Africans and toincrease the school fees already charged(Protectorate, 1950a). Given the levels of povertyamong Africans, in Nairobi, it was reconised thatany such move would actually destroy theproject before it even started (Protectorate,1950a).103The lifting of the Emergency regulations in 1960broke the floodgates of African immigration intoNairobi. At the same time the approachingindependence made control of “undesirableAfricans” politically incorrect, as a policy. Thusthe eve of independence found the issue ofhomeless children unresolved and alarming(Amolo-Achola, 2006).In the euphoria of the immediate post colonialperiod, the first independent Kenya governmentin 1966 abolished sections 176, 177, 178 and 179of the Penal Code which criminalized wanderingabout the streets for the purpose of begging. Thegovernment also absorbed the Lady NortheyChildren’s Home, formerly a European onlyinstitution for children with special needs, andturned it into an all races home for orphaned anddisabled children. The 1969 Vagrancy Act,however, restated all of colonialism’s issues with“undesirable persons”. And the Lady NortheyChildren’s Home abandoned its grand plans fordestitute and handicapped children within thefirst decade of independence. Lack of sufficientfunds, was given as the explanation.ReferencesAmolo-Achola, M. 2001. The Public HealthOrdinance Policy of the Nairobi Municipality1945 - 62. Africans Historians and African Voices,Essays presented to Prof. Bethwell Allan Ogot by Prof.E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo(ed) 2001 P. SchlettueinPublishing, SwitzerlandAmolo-Achola, M. 2006. Youth, Povertyand Destitution in Nairobi: 1945-60Presented at a Conference on Youth: Past andPast Perspective; Organized by IFRA andBritish Institute in Eastern Africa in Nyeri,28th – 30th June 2006Amolo Achola, M. 2001. the Public HealthOrdinance Policy of the NairobiMunicipality 1945 - 62. Africans Historiansand African Voices, Essays presented to Prof.Bethwell Allan Ogot by Prof. E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo(ed) 2001 P. SchlettueinPublishing, SwitzerlandKanogo, T. 2001. The Medicalization ofMaternity in Colonial Kenya. African

104Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Historians Basel, Switzerland : P.Schlettwein, 2001Nier, A.C., and P. Ocobock. 2009. Cast Out,A history of Vagrancy and Homelessnessin Global Perspective 2000. Athens, OhioUniversity Press 2009. Also by OcobockJoyrides for childrenOlumwulla, O. 1986. A History of Housingin Nairobi: 1900 - 1960: A study ofUrban conditions and Colonial Policy.MA Thesis, Unversity of Nairobi. PassimProtectorate, K.C.a. 1950a. Annual Reportof Municipal African Affairs officer,1950.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1950b. Annual Reportsof the Commissioner of PoliceProtectorate, K.C.a. 1950c. Annual Reportsof the Commissioner of Police, 1950,1951, and others.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1951. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1952. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of PoliceProtectorate, K.C.a. 1953. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1954. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1955. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1956. Annual Reports ofthe Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1957a. Annual Reportsof the Commissioner of Police.Protectorate, K.C.a. 1957b. Report ofAfrican Affairs Department, 1957.Republic of Kenya, R. 1948,1954. Report ofCommissioner of PoliceRepublic of Kenya, R. 1949. Report of theCommission of Enquiry on Bye Laws208 and 212. In Government of KenyaPrinterNairobi.SOS. Street children in Kenya. SOS Children'sVillageThroup, D. 1957. Economic and SocialOrigins of Mau Mau. James Gurrey,London, 1957, PassimWhite, L. 1990. The Comforts of Home:Prostitution in Colonial Kenya. Universityof Chicago Prets, Chicago, LondonWikipedia. Definition of street child.Zwanenberg, R.V. 1972. History and Theoryof Urban Poverty in Nairobi; the problemof Slum Development. Journal of EasternAfrican Research and Development G.S.Were & G. M. Mutiso (eds) 2:177.104

105Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Development Ideals and Reality: Bridging the Kenya Gap Through DevolutionWinnie V. MitullahUniversity of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya. Email: mitulla@uonbi.ac.ke____________________________________________________________AbstractWondering like buffalos is M.A Ogutu’s description of the Luo migration’. Discuss.Prof. E.S.A. Atieno Odhiambo set this as a term essay topic for his 1977 first yearhistory class student. While this paper does not focus on the luo migration, it appliesboth a politico-economy and historical approach to interrogate how Kenya haspursued its development goals since independence and concludes that the term papertopic fits the history of Kenya’s development since independence. The Kenyagovernment set out three development ideals at independence: elimination ofilliteracy, poverty and disease. However, these ideals are still to be fully realized. Forover four decades, three regimes have attempted to translate these ideals with hardlyany success. The path followed by the three regimes is not different from the buffalodescription. This paper examines the major turning points the country has made toarrive at a new Constitutional dispensation which is expected to provide a foundationfor eliminating illiteracy, poverty and disease, and consequently stopping the countryfrom `wondering like a buffalo’. The paper begins by discussing the first turning pointof party politics, highlighting the independence political parties, one party state tomulti-partyism and effects on development. The second turning point is presidentialpolitics, centralization of power, marginalization of citizens and effects on themanagement of public affairs. Evidence presented shows how the executiveincrementally eroded powers of the legislature and judiciary and marginalizedcitizens. The third turning point is the struggle for the constitution and rebirth of anation through the promulgation of Kenya Constitution 2010. The Constitution ispillared on the people of Kenya, with the ideal of participatory governance embeddedin the mother statute. The statute is expected to bridge the gap between Nationalgovernment and County government - the latter is the locus of people of Kenya. Thepaper heavily relies on secondary information and development experience of theauthor, both in academic discourse and practical life as a Kenyan, who have livedthrough the four decades.Key words: Ideals, Reality, Kenya, DevolutionIntroductionDevelopment Ideals: Concept and TheoryDevelopment across the world is about people,economy and how to improve economicdevelopment for the benefit of people. Once thisthreshold is achieved countries struggle toincrease their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) inorder to compete in raising the overall livingstandard of their citizens and by implication theentire economy. Countries, led by practitionersinformed by different ideologies drawn frompractice and research have used differentapproaches to understand society and addressdevelopment challenges. Countries which drawfrom colonial history such as Kenya for decadesviewed development challenges using thedependency theory arguing that colonialdevelopment distorted the path of developmentby siphoning resources outside the country livingcitizens marginalized. This theory could not be105

106Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012sustained as decades passed, and developmentchallenges remained resulting in new theories,including socialism and its welfare tents;capitalism and its liberal, and neoliberal tenets,and the current dominant theory ofinstitutionalism, and its governance and capacitybuilding for development tenets. While bothsocialism and capitalism had many decades oftension, with countries being on preferred side ofthe divide, the collapse of the Berlin wall andfragmentation of Soviet Union reduced thenumber of those pursuing the socialist approach.For the developing countries such as Kenya thefocus shifted to institutions and governance, withcountries concentrating on building institutions,improving leadership and ensuring economicgrowth. This is the situation Kenya finds itself asit remembers one of its best scholars who did notonly write about these theories of developmentbut lived and experienced economies based onthese theories both at home and abroad.Kenya’s development has revolved aroundimproving livelihoods and reducing illiteracy,disease and poverty which has marginalizedmajority of the population. In Kenyan context,marginalization of citizens refers to a deliberateattempt to exclude the physically and mentallychallenged, religious minorities, linguistic andcultural minorities, racial minorities, women,children and youth from governance process(Oloo, 2007). Since independence politics ofmarginalization has revolved around a dualperspective, close to what Mamdani (1996) refersto as insiders and outsiders: African versusEuropeans, Asians and others, Christians versusMuslims, Hindus and other minority religions,African customary law versus written law,agriculturalists versus nomadic pastoralistcommunities, unitary versus decentralized orfederal state, the Kenyan government versus theNorthern Frontier District, citizens versus specialgroups like women and persons with disabilities,big tribes versus small tribes (Ibid). The list isendless, but the divide irrespective to type isspecific and with appropriate developmentframework can be the reduced and eventuallyclosed. The closure of such divides is whatscholars such as Prof. E.S.A Atieno-Odhiambocontributed to throughout his scholarly life. Aswe celebrate his life, it is appropriate to reflect onKenya’s development ideals during the period helived using both a politico-economy andhistorical approach.Party Politics and Development PlansUnderstanding Kenya’s development andlivelihoods of citizens requires understanding ofparty politics, in particular the dynamics of oneparty state, multi-partyism, and the recentregulation of party politics which is still to beeffectively implemented. Kenya attainedindependence in 1963 with a Constitution whichprovided for a multi- party state, with twodominant parties, the Kenya African NationalUnion (KANU) and Kenya Africa DemocraticUnion (KADU) formed government and theopposition respectively (Oyugi, 2005). TheConstitution provided for checks and balancesbetween the three arms of government and theprotection of fundamental human rights. Theconstitution further provided for a decentralizedstructure of government with each of the eightregions having its own government (Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996).The constitution provided mechanisms to checkexecutive power and safeguards to protectminority groups from majority groupdomination. However, one year afterindependence, Kenyatta made the first turningpoint, by moving quickly to consolidate hispersonal authority by creating a government ofnational unity. KANU government intimidatedand enticed KADU MPs to cross over and join106

107Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the ruling party. The KANU- KADU meagercatalyzed internal rivalry between theconservative group led by Jomo Kenyatta andradicals led by Oginga Odinga. WhereasKenyatta wanted to maintain status quo, Odingafaction advocated for fundamental changes in thesocial, economic and political fields (Oyugi,1994).Development PlansIn an effort to define the policy framework, thegovernment produced its first NationalDevelopment Plan presented to Parliament on10 th June, 1964. The main objective of the firstNational Development Plan (Republic ofKenya, 1966) was to “achieve high and growingper capital incomes, equitably distributedresources so that all Kenyans are free from want,disease and exploitation, while at the same timeensuring and guaranteeing political equality,social justice, human dignity, and equalopportunities and enhancement of nationalsavings (1964: vii). This objective was to beachieved through Africanization of industry,trade and banking (1964: x- xiii).As the KANU government rolled out theDevelopment Plan, the radicals accused KANUgovernment of betraying the pledges which theyhad made to the masses before independence.Land policy, in particular, became a major boneof contention. Apart from advocating for freeland distribution to the landless, they alsoadvocated for free education and free medicalfacilities for the people. The disagreementbetween the radicals and the Kenyattagovernment continued and went beyond land,medical and educational issues. They also calledfor the government to honor the party pledge onthe necessity of an East Africa Federation.In the meantime, the government decided thatfactional struggle over the ideology ofdevelopment should be settled. A policydocument was authored in the Ministry ofEconomic Development and later presented toParliament as Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 onAfrican Socialism and its Application to Planning inKenya (RoK, 1965). The paper had a number ofobjectives, including providing for individualfreedom, freedom from want, disease, ignorance,and exploitation, expansion of the economy withequitable sharing in its benefits and integration ofthe national economy. In response to privateownership under capitalism which was becomingcontentious with each party holding a differentview, paper pointed out that, traditional Africansociety did not exclude the private ownership ofcapital, but only required that capital be used inways “consonant with the general welfare.” Theprime need for Kenya was rapid economicgrowth which could only be secured throughlarge inflow of private foreign investment (Ibid).Given that private property must never beexpropriated without full compensation,nationalization was seen as undesirable except inspecial circumstances.The paper further noted that emergence of an“inequitable of wealth and of future classdivisions as a result of growth would beprevented by the vigorous implementation ofindigenous political economy”. Foreign firmswould be controlled so as to make themAfricanize their management and make theirshares available “to Africans who wish to buythem”. Some of the “sensitive controls” whichwould secure social justice without interferingwere specified in the document. They included,limitation on the size of individual holdings,marketing boards to be controlled in the interestsof the consumer, highly progressive taxation,including a progressive capital gains tax andinheritance tax (Ibid). This policy paper waspurely an ideological rationalization for capitalist107

108Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012development in Kenya and only committed thegovernment to “consider” those particularcontrols of which none was actually adopted. Inspite of opposition from radicals, parliamentapproved it (Gertzel, 1970). Given the numericalreduction in number of radicals in parliament, astrategy was hatched to totally remove radicalsfrom the government.In March 1966, following KANU elections thatsaw radicals lose their position in the party,Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia and OchiengOneko broke away from KANU and formed theKenya People’s Union (KPU). KPU drew itssupport from urban workers, trade unionists andstudents and advocated for socialist policies, asopposed to capitalist policies pursued by theruling party, KANU. The defection from KANUled to the 1966 little general elections, an electionwhere the radicals developed their firstmanifesto. KPU accused KANU’s AfricanSocialism as a “meaningless phrase”, and more“cloak for the practice of total capitalism”.Small-scale settlements had been brought to ahalt by huge debts; while African large farmerswere substituted for white ones (Odinga, 1967).The spirit of replacing European farms with largefarm cooperatives was long forgotten and creditfor land purchase had been withheld fromcooperatives in favour of powerful individualsclose to President Kenyatta.KPU accused KANU government for promotingthe development of a small privileged class ofAfricans. The rich were getting richer and thereverse was true for the poor. KPU proposed thatland should be taken from the remaining non-Kenyan white settlers and given free to thelandless, and that no African-owned land beexpropriated. To KPU, what the peasantswanted was “private property with social justice.But in 1969 KPU was proscribed followingdisturbance at a function held in Kisumu, puttingKenya on an autocratic path which saw anumber of constitutional provisions amended.Although party politics shrouded economicdevelopment during the first decade ofindependence, the country experienced a 6.6 percent annual economic growth.The year 1970 marked the beginning of theSecond Development Plan for 1970- 1974(Republic of Kenya, 1970) which to a largeextent was similar to the first one, except for itemphasis on accelerated rate of economic growthand achievement of economic independence.The objectives of the plan were to be realizedthrough Kenyanization of personnelprogrammes, increased trade with the rest of theworld and transformation of rural economy(1970:9). The plan raised the target rate ofgrowth for the economy from an average 6.3 percent set in the previous plan to 6.7 per cent. Interms of political development, theConstitutional amendments made Kenya a defacto state, without opposition political parties.This vacuum created space for a cabal ofpoliticians around the President. Thesepoliticians became Kenyatta’s confidants,acquired substantial political powers to theextent of influencing policy direction (Barkan,1994; Throup and Hornsby, 1998). With nopolitical party competition, the parliamentbecame a rubber stamp of the executive decision,with many Members of Parliament (MP)struggling to be close to the President whowielded massive powers.When the country became a de jure one partystate, the Presidential caucus built a kitchencabinet, leaving only civil society organizationsas the avenues for political expression. Ironicallythese organizations were ethno-regional based.The Gikuyu-Embu Meru Association (GEMA)comprised ethnic groups related to the Kikuyu,the Luo Union was formed for the Luocommunity and the Abaluhya Union wasformed for the Luhya (Oyugi, 1992). Each of the108

109Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012numerically large groups had a similar ethnopoliticalassociations formed ostensibly toarticulate socio- political and economic concernsof its membership.Apart from the political challenges based onparty politics, the country experienced economiccrunch occasioned by worldwide economicdownfall during the second decade. As a result ofglobal economic instability, the industrializedcountries experienced high inflation rate whosenet output was high imports prices to thedeveloping countries. In 1974, the governmentlaunched third National Development Plan(1974-1978). The plan set to undertake ruraldevelopment, creation of employmentopportunities, more equitable distribution ofincome, better educational opportunities, andincreased participation of the people amongothers. The Harambee spirit was embraced as avehicle for enhancing participatory developmentwith the government taking a greater role indirecting the economy. In this model, the peoplewould participate in such activities as buildingschools, setting development priorities andinitiating business and farming ventures.The end of the 1974/78 Development Plancoincided with the death of President Kenyattain 1978. By this time Kenya’s political landscapewas undemocratic. The presidential power hadno checks, the legal system under tight control ofthe executive, access to resources, both politicaland economic revolved around proximity to thePresidency (Nying’uro, 1997). Thiscentralization affected the rate of economicgrowth which dropped from 6.6 per cent to anaverage of 5.2 per cent per annum. Theanticipated target growth rate of 6.7 per cent wasnot attained, due to a number of factorsincluding Kenya’s dependent developmentideology and lack of organized opposition partieswhich prevented expression of alternativedevelopment ideas.Although the country had begun lapsing on itsdevelopment focus, President Daniel Moi tookpower and promised to follow Kenyatta’sfootstep, an adage which required thoroughinterrogation considering what Kenya wentthrough during the Moi regime. During Moi’sfirst year of presidency, KANU governmentlaunched the fourth National DevelopmentPlan (Republic of Kenya, 1979). The theme ofplan was poverty alleviation, which was basicallygetting back to the independence ideals whichhad not been achieved. The government plannedto address poverty through measures such asimprovement in government expenditures;efficient use of scarce resources; improvement inthe tax structure; encouragement of foreignprivate investment in selected sectors; priority inthe development of arid and semi- arid areas;promotion of agricultural exports and exportorientedindustrialization, dispersion ofindustrial activity and promotion of the privatesector through promotion of competition,reduction of restrictions and bottlenecks andincreased efficiency in the government sector(1979:1-21).In the face of all the above developmentstrategies, Moi was busy consolidating statepower at the expense of development. Theregime gradually became retrogressive throughparliamentary elections held in 1983. Critics andthose perceived enemies of the regime werevilified. Moi used carrots to reward loyalty andstick to punish opponents. The same tactic wasextended to all independent centers of power.Parliament became merely a rubber- stamp of thedevelopment policies crafted by powerfulindividuals in the executive, who had littleinterest in public good and the country’sdevelopment. Thus, the early 1980s wascharacterized by political and economic decayand suppression of citizens.109

110Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Economically, the period saw budget deficitsskyrocketing as the state over concentrated itsexpenditures on social welfare services, whichwere not equitably accessed across the nation.Accompanying social welfare was corruptpractices which rose sharply as a bloated civilservice and senior elected officials becamevictims of patron- client networks. Barkan notesthat “corruption on the part of Kenya’s toppolitical leader reached kleptocratic proportionsthat exacerbated government deficit.” Theeconomic decline, blamed on the state’smismanagement of the economy, accelerated theprocess of political decay as prominentpersonalities withdrew from KANU or begun tochallenge the authority of the regime. Thegovernment reacted through a series ofredistributive policies which recorded net effectof taxing farmers so as to subsidize social welfareservices and infrastructure for populationresiding in rural areas (Barkan, 1994).The structural adjustment loan extended by theWorld Bank in 1980 did not immediatelyimprove economic growth was reflected in the1982 attempted coup. The SAPs conditionalitiestargeted the overbearing role of the state inmarket and were administered in piece mealsacross various economic sectors. The Moiregime introduced the District-Focus for RuralDevelopment (DFRD) strategy in 1983, in anattempt to rationalize inequalities in resourcedistribution by channeling funds to areas ordistricts. The DFRD program was based ondevelopment committee system. The governmentestablished a hierarchy of developmentcommittees at sub- location, location, divisionand district level. The provincial monitoring andevaluation committee (PMEC) was alsoestablished to oversee the operations of the lowercommittees. This was an attempt to delegateresponsibility for planning and implementationto the development committees, particularly theDistrict Development Committee (Alila andOmosa, 1996).In 1984, the government launched fifth NationalDevelopment Plan (Republic of Kenya, 1984).The theme was mobilization of domesticresources for equitable development, economicmanagement for growth as well as agricultureand rural development. The plan acknowledgedthat the long term objectives of improving thewell- being of the people had remainedsubstantially unchanged since independence. Itcalled for strategies to mobilize and efficientlyutilize resources and encouraged publicparticipation through the district focus policy,rationalization of government in parastatals, costsharing, macroeconomics policies. Two yearslater, Moi insulated public participation byassuming the chairship of both the Public ServiceCommission (PSC) and Judicial ServiceCommission (JSC) which vetted and deployedfield officers in various districts. This basicallyinterfered with separation of powers, but sincethe institution of the Presidency had become sopowerful with almost all arms of the governmentsurging towards the institution, the jointchairship was not questioned. Meanwhile, thebudget and balance of payments deficits soared.A perusal shows that the public sectoremployment and public construction projectsgrew, however, it should be noted that they weresustained by development partners without thenation making substantive input, except resistingsuggestions by the donor community toderegulate internal grain markets and privatizepublic enterprises (Barkan, 1994): 36. During thesame year, the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 onEconomic Management of Renewed Growth (Republicof Kenya, 1986)was unveiled. It provided afoundation for SAPs with a main theme ofimproving agriculture and rural development. Itacknowledged the need to provide a vision foreconomic and utilize macroeconomic110

111Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012management framework in order to achieverenewed economic growth. The policyhighlighted the government’s firm commitmentto implementation of SAPs.The Sessional Paper set a target for economicgrowth at a rate of 5.6 per cent for GDP from1984 to 2000, with an emphasis on acceleratedemployment creation especially in the privatesector to ensure effective participation ofKenyans in economic development. It alsoprovided guidelines for provision of basic needsfor all Kenyans in order to cushion citizens fromrising unemployment. To achieve its goals thepaper proposed development of a mixedeconomy. The mixed economy was expected toencourage private sector to increase productionas opposed to direct intervention and controls.However, decline in the share of Gross NationalSaving in GDP, investment in lower productivityareas, inflation of capital goods, and highprotective barriers on import substitution wereidentified as the main challenges in the policy. Inspite of this policy paper the country’s economicperformance continued to decline with aneconomic growth of 4.1 per cent during theperiod 1980-1985 (RoK, 1999). This showed thatprogress was not being made in spite of thepolicy instruments being put in place.The development strategy outlined in SessionalPaper No. 1 of 1986 provided the basis for thetheme of the sixth National Development Plan(Republic of Kenya, 1989) focusing onparticipation for progress. The plan recognizedthat the past five plans were sectoral and projectbasedas opposed to macro-based planning(1989: xviii). The principal objective was toachieve structural adjustment which wouldjumpstart economic growth, create jobs as wellas instituting controls to ensure equitabledistribution of economic outputs. The planemphasized the need to address the potential inagriculture, the investment in environment, theefficiency of government’s use of resources.Growth was expected to come from agriculture,a revitalized industry and small scale enterprises.Other areas of focus included: export- orientedindustrialization, agriculture and tourism; costsharingin the provision of basic needs services;use of district focus of rural development toachieve regional balance in growth and in theprovision of infrastructure and basic needsservices’, integrated approach to developmentprogramming; facilitation of greater role ofprivate sector in the economy andmacroeconomic stability (1989: xx).Before the end of the sixth NationalDevelopment Plan there were major politicalchanges in Eastern Europe, the Middle East,Southern Africa and throughout the world. Thewave of democratization was rapidly sweepingaway authoritarian regimes. This externalpressure coupled with domestic pressurecompelled the government to introduce multipartyism.The introduction of multi-partydemocracy in December 1991 by deletion ofSection 2A of the Constitution was perhaps themost significant historical turning point sinceindependence. However, the opposition inKenya was not able to remove the incumbentPresident who won the 1992 elections, albeit theincumbent had began embracing changes in thecontext of prevailing democratic wave. Thedramatic political changes, in conjunction withthe reduction in the balance of paymentssupport, resulted in considerable economicuncertainty and had a dampening effect on theeconomy. Real GDP growth declined from 4.3per cent in 1990-1991 to 2.3 per cent in 1991-1992, deteriorating further to 0.5 per cent in1992- 1993 and 0.2 per cent in 1993 - 1994 (RoK,1999) as Kenya launched its Seventh NationalDevelopment Plan.The theme of the seventh NationalDevelopment Plan (Republic of Kenya, 1994)111

112Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012was Resource Mobilization for SustainableDevelopment. Its objective was restoration ofeconomic growth and maintenance ofsustainable development (1994: xxxiii). This wasto be achieved through: continuation ofstructural adjustment; introduction of shorterplanning period to enable government policy tobe reviewed more frequently and facilitate moreflexible response to changing events; promotionof private sector free from unnecessaryconstraints; stimulation of savings andinvestments, limiting direct governmentparticipation in many sectors; maintenance ofmacroeconomic stability; reduction ofdependence on donor aid; industrialization andpromotion of export sector and rationalization ofregulatory framework (1994: xxxv).The introduction of multi-partyism opened uppolitical space resulting in many oppositionpolitical parties being formed. Forum forRestoration of Democracy (FORD) was the firstmajor opposition party, followed by DemocraticParty of Kenya (DP). Other smaller parties were:the Kenya Democratic Alliance (KENDA),Kenya National Congress (KNC), the KenyaSocial Congress (KSC) and the Party forIndependent Candidates of Kenya (PICK).FORD would later split into FORD- Asili andFORD- Kenya, initiating a behavior which hasbecome the face of party politics in Kenya.The split of FORD was not based on ideologicaland policy difference but more on personalitydifferences and desire of various individuals tolead the party. Most of the political parties hadno well outlined policies and ideology to sell tothe general public as a blue print fordevelopment. More or less all parties sharedsimilar policy objectives, and only differing inapproach and emphasis. For instance, a numberof parties addressed the excessive size of localadministration and personalization of stateinstitutions. While FORD-Kenya favoureddisbanding of the Provincial Administration, DPemphasized the need to reform and improve theinstitution rather than abolition of the institution(Kanyinga, 2003).Divisions along ethnic and class interests,personal idiosyncrasies and the composition ofparty leadership drifted opposition parties apart.The politics of independent Kenya was rooted inethnicity, which was not new. There seems to beconsensus among scholars that ethnic identitiesexisted long before colonialism and subsequentlyindependence. In his paper titled “Democracyand the ideology of order in Kenya, 1988- 1986”(Atieno Odhiambo, 1988) Prof. AtienoOdhiambo argues that both the state and thepolitical class generally exploited ethnicidentities to exacerbate ethnic divisions forpolitical end. This had impact on economicdevelopment.Ethnic politics and personality differences partlyaffected the synergy in opposition parties, andpartly contributed to splitting the politicalparties. What initially appeared to be a unitedopposition to the ruling party ended up facingthe general election of 1992 as separate entities.Consequently, the opposition lost to KANU,largely due to their fragmentation and KANU’sadvantage of incumbency. KANU used publicresources to buy opposition MPs to supportgovernment agenda in parliament. In a span ofless than three years, several MPs from FORDAsili defected to KANU. The defectors arguedthat they needed to be close to the government soas to gain access to development resources fortheir constituencies (Ibid).The defeat of opposition parties in the 1992elections led to the opposition designing differentstrategies for winning political power. Theparties formed United National DemocraticParty (UNDP). Between 1994 and 1995 thealliance faced internal differences over the112

113Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012clamour for electoral and constitutional reforms.Many new parties were formed a head of the1997 elections. Some of these were off shots ofthe mainstream opposition parties. Others wereformed by individuals who disagreed with theleadership of their parties. Once again oppositionpolitical parties failed to unite ahead of 1997general elections and subsequently lost toKANU. Moi and KANU won again with 41 percent share of the votes while the oppositioncombined lost with 57 per cent.In both 1992 and 1997 general elections Chweya(Chweya, 2003) observed that althoughopposition failed to remove KANU from power,important democratic changes were registered “amulti-party system was introduced, anindependent electoral commission wasestablished, the Provincial Administration wasdeprived of responsibility to manage elections,many authoritarian laws were amended orrepealed, and the state began to respect manyhuman rights and freedoms. These changes hadbegan changing Kenya and improvingdevelopment as reflected in the economic growthof 4.6 per cent in 1995 and 4.8 per cent in 1996(Republic of Kenya, 1999).In the middle of the changes, the governmentlaunched its eight National Development Plan(Republic of Kenya, 1997) in 1997. The theme ofthe plan was rapid industrialization for sustaineddevelopment. Its objective was stabilization ofeconomic reforms to spur economic growth andreduce unemployment and poverty (1997: iii).This would be achieved through private sectorparticipation, mobilization of savings, nurturingof a responsive and efficient public sector. Theplan was preceded by the Policy FrameworkPaper (1996- 1998), Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996on Industrial Transformation to the year 2020, andSessional Paper No. 1 of 1994 on Recovery andSustainable Development to the year 2010. BothSessional Papers sought to address howsustainable economic growth and increased jobcreation would be achieved through a number ofstrategies including industrialization.The Sessional Papers equally sought to establisha market-based incentive regime in which theoverbearing hand of state in market logic wouldbe curtailed. Unfortunately, this plan wasconstrained by KANU’s defense tactics overpolitical reforms from opposition parties. KANUgovernment was determined to narrowdemocratic space. KANU directly unleashedterror to its opponents using militia groups suchas Mungiki, Jeshi la Mama, Jeshi la Mzee, Talibanand Baghdad Boys. This retrogressive approachconstricted the political and economic spaces,especially in urban areas. The militia groupsterrorized and extracted resources from thepublic with impunity, and began nurturing aculture of militia for hire, especially within urbanareas. In rural areas political violence displacedthousands of families (Asingo, 2003; Katumangaand Omosa, 2007). In some cases violence was aproduct of differences among political leadersusing militia groups with an aim of destabilisingcommunities and the entire country, largely forpersonal interest.The ninth National Development Plan (2002-2008)(Republic of Kenya, 2002) with focus onEffective Management for Sustained EconomicGrowth and Poverty Reduction had an objectiveof enhancing growth and reducing poverty. Thiswas to be achieved through participatory andconsultative approach to development anddistrict focus for rural development (RoK2002:1). The plan incorporated the objectivesspecified in two other government documents,namely, the National Poverty Eradication Plan(1995- 2015) and the Poverty Reduction StrategyPaper (2001- 2004) which stipulated policies andoperational priorities meant to achieve pro- pooreconomic growth and service delivery.113

114Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The 2002/08 plan was developed at the height ofsuccession debate and politics. Contrary toKANU party members’ imagination, Moi settledon Uhuru Kenyatta as his preferred successor.This was least expected since Uhuru was not afront runner. This resulted in a faction viewed asKANU rebel MPs led by Raila Odinga walkingout of the party and joining opposition to form aunited opposition under the umbrella party,National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) withMwai Kibaki as the presidential candidate.Campaigning on the promise to give Kenyansconstitution within 100 days in the office amongother key campaign issues, NARCoverwhelmingly trounced KANU at 2002 pollsending its four decade at the helm of power.Kibaki was sworn in the office on 30 th December2002 commencing his first term, the thirdPresident of Kenya.The NARC government took over power with alot of motivation for change. The governmentimmediately implemented a universal freeprimary education system at the beginning of itsreign in 2003. They also reviewed, and re-castedthe eighth Development Plan by formulating theEconomic Recovery for Wealth andEmployment Creation Strategy (ERS) (2003-2007). The strategy was based on improvedeconomic governance and economicempowerment of the people. The strategyfocused on policy actions including,enhancement of economic growth, strengtheningof institutions of governance, rehabilitation andexpansion of physical infrastructure as well asinvestment in the human capital of the poor. Thestrategy further stated that “government stronglybelieves that recovery is primarily the result ofimprovement in the productive sectors of theeconomy including agriculture, tourism, tradeand industry”. Under the ERS, economicrecovery began to be realized with poverty levelsreducing from 56 per cent in 2002 to 46 per centin 2006.The new regime and availability of economicstrategy triggered the government of Kenya in2005 to welcome a proposal by the NationalEconomic and Social Council (NESC) to preparea long- term vision to guide development up tothe year 2030. The vision aims at making Kenya`a globally competitive and prosperous countrywith a high quality of life by 2030.’ It aims attransforming Kenya into “a newlyindustrializing, middle income country providinga high quality of life to all its citizens in a cleanand secure environment.” The vision also aimsat creating a cohesive, equitable and just societybased on democratic principles and issue-basedpolitic grounded on Kenya’s rich and diversecultures and traditions. This long-term nationalplanning strategy is anchored on economic,social and political pillars under which flagshipprojects and other priority programmes will beimplemented. The foundations of these pillarsare macroeconomic stability, continuity ingovernance reforms, enhanced equity and wealthcreation opportunities for the poor. The visionalso provides for infrastructure, energy, science,technology and innovation, land reform, humanresources development and public sectorreforms.This review shows the various turning pointsKenya embedded regular development ofDevelopment Plans, albeit muddled in partypolitics. Over the last five decades, Kenya hasjumped from one development theme to theother, without concretely concluding any theme.The elimination of illiteracy, disease and povertywhich were framed under the philosophy ofAfrican Socialism are still to be fully achieved.Other themes have included: rural development,economic management, participatorydevelopment, resource mobilization,stabilization programmes, industrialization andpoverty reduction. Indeed, development agendahas oscillated around the demand for mixed114

115Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012economy, participation of the people and focuson the significance of private sector in economicgrowth. This notwithstanding, economic growthhas stagnated, unemployment has increased, andpoverty status has almost remained stable orincreased with the general infrastructuredevelopment also taking the status of poverty.as manifested in the nomination certificatesawarded to preferred candidates. Thedisintegration of NARC was blamed on theunwillingness by Kibaki to honour aMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) signedbetween Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) andNational Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK).Political PartiesPolitical parties play a central role in liberaldemocracy, although they continue to faceserious challenges in most African states. It isthis challenge that has influenced the EconomicCommission for Africa (ECA) to dedicate itsAfrica Governance Report 111 to acomprehensive anaylsis of political parties inAfrica. In Kenya, Following multi-partyism,there was no legal provision to guide theformation of political parties (IED,1997:179)(Democracy, 1997). Many parties werethus formed with a single motive of dislodgingKANU from power. Majority of the parties hadethnic affiliations, loosely organized and lackedideologies. Over time, leadership wranglesresulted into split of the main opposition politicalparties in the run up to 1992, 1997 generalelections. The alliance building logic has notsurvived mistrust and lack of consultationsleading to disintegration. The winning party oralliances have rewarded the party loyalists,ethnic kingpins and party financiers kickbacksfrom the constituted government.Between 1992 and July, 2008 majority of thepolitical parties drew their support from theirethnic base. Most of these parties weredominated by influential personalities whodouble up as founders and financiers. Mostparties lacked registered membership, had weakorganizational structures and were furtherweakened by rival parties. During election timeparties often did not adhere to their constitution115The Political Parties Act, 2007 which becameoperational in July, 2008, provides guidelines onparty processes, including formation andfunding. The Act established the Political PartiesFund and enjoins the Minister for Finance tomake provision for it annually. The funds areadministered by the Office of Registrar ofPolitical Parties. Section 28 - 30 of the Act limitsthe use of money for purposes compatible withdemocracy such as promoting activeparticipation by individual citizen in politicallife, covering the election expenses of thepolitical party and the broadcasting of thepolicies of political party, maintaining linksbetween party and state organs, organizing civiceducation and electoral processes, andarticulation of interest and shaping publicopinion (Republic of Kenya, 2007). In addition,the Act provides for funding of elections to besourced from membership fees, voluntarycontribution, donations, but not from foreigngovernments, governmental, nongovernmentalorganizations or proceeds from investmentswhere the party has interests. Furthermore, theAct prohibits aliens from contributing to politicalparties. The Act requires full disclosures as to thesources of funds and explicitly puts a ceiling ofKsh 5,000,000 for individual contributionsexcept for founder members.The Political Parties Act is further strengthenedby the provisions in the new Constitution thatrequire political parties to have democraticallyelected governing body. The Act prohibitsformation of political party on religious,linguistic, racial, ethnic, gender or regional basis.

116Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The current regulation of party politics isexpected to instill discipline among politicalparties in order to effectively perform their role.In relation to development, political parties indeveloped democracies perform policyformulation. The ruling party and parties outsidegovernment provide a framework fordevelopment as enshrined in party manifestos,and struggle to pursue their activities within aphilosophical stance.Presidential Politics and DevelopmentPresidential politics and centralization of powerwas a major characteristic of Kenya developmentuntil the 1990s when the wave of multi-partydemocracy, and related Structural AdjustmentProgrammes (SAPs) began sweeping the Africancontinent when minimal gains were realized.Upon the attainment of independence in 1963,Kenya adopted a parliamentary system ofgovernment. Under the independenceconstitution the executive powers were vested inthe Queen and exercised by the GovernorGeneral. The head of government was the PrimeMinister who was answerable to parliament. Thesame constitution also devolved state power tothe regional units; Kenya was a quasi- federalstate. In addition, it created a bi- cameralparliament comprising the Senate and the Houseof Representatives (Ojwang, 1990). The Senatewas mandated to cater for regional interests innational legislation while the House ofRepresentatives dealt with national policies.Between 1964 and 1970 the executive’s powerconsolidation destroyed separation of powerthrough several constitutional amendments. Thefederal structure of governance and bicamerallegislature were abolished effectivelyundermining the power, authority, economicdevelopment and curtailing popular participationin governance by the people. The consolidation116was completed by amending the constitution andmaking Kenya one-party state, resulting incentralization and personalization of politicalpower in the presidency (Wanyande, 2003).During Kenyatta’s first three years in office,seven significant constitutional amendmentswere made, making Kenyatta enjoy tremendousauthority. Most notable was the 1966, preventivedetention Act, which allowed the president todetain individuals without recourse to courts inthe interest of public security. Between 1964 and1969, the constitution was amended 11 timesdistorting and radically changing the originalindependence constitution. The various centersof power were systematically eroded and vestedin the presidency negating the concept ofseparation of powers, accountability andopenness in the management of the affairs of thestate (Odhiambo- Mbai, 2003). Under the oneparty framework, political competition waslimited creating a vacuum that enabled the rulersand the ruled to establish mutually dependentlinks through patron -client relationships.Change of regime at the death of the Presidentdid not change the trend. Moi declared that hewill follow the foot steps – `fuatanyayo’ of the latePresident, in spite of the fact that systems werecollapsing as the late President consolidatepower. As Moi assumed the Presidency in 1978,after the death of Mzee Kenyatta, he used twostrategies to consolidated power during his firstfew years in the office. He gradually reduced theinfluence of the Kikuyus in the state and createdroom for his own loyal constituency consistingpredominantly of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana,Samburu (KAMATUSA) communities. TheseCommunities became the bedrock of the regime,over time and later support was extended toinclude Abaluhya of the western province andthe Mijikenda of the Coast province (Anyang’-Nyong’o, 1989). In 1982, shortly before anaborted coup, Moi intensified his efforts to

117Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012consolidate power by passing a constitutionalamendment that outlawed political opposition.Moi’s second strategy came in the 1980s whenhe was able to enact a number of institutionaland constitutional amendments that eroded theindependence of the judiciary. Changes in theelectoral code respectively undermined the semicompetitivenature of elections. The creation ofa Kalenjin based state increased the level ofdiscontent among the Kikuyu population. Theirresponses came in the form of political protests,resulting in threat and uncertainty of politicalinstability (Ibid). In 1988 through an amendmentto section 62 of the constitution, the security oftenure for judges and the Attorney General wasremoved. These changes reflected the continuedtrend of constitutional decay and a substantialcorruption of the principles of legality andconstitutionalism (Ojwang, 1990).The over concentration of power in thepresidency continued to shape Kenya politicseven after introduction of multi-partyism asethnic based political parties competed with oneanother in a bide to capture the presidency. Oneof the consequences of the centralization ofpower in the presidency has been a widespreadperception of alienation of citizens, many ofwhom feel marginalized, neglected anddiscriminated against. Such groups includedsmaller communities such as the Nubian,Sengwer, the Ogiek, the Elmolo, the Sakweri andthe Illchamus; women, children, the youth, theaged, the disabled and religious minorities.These groups have been largely underrepresentedin public institutions due to lack of institutionalframework for safeguarding their rights. Womenin particular have faced gender-role stereotypes,male resistance to women’s participation andpolitical structures that prevent them frompolitical participation. The marginalization ofcitizens took place despite entrenchment ofprovisions to safeguard these groups in the oldConstitution. The constitutional review processwas characterized by individual minority groupspushing for certain provisions in the constitutionthat would assure them of their interest.In 2001, the Kenya government adopted theCharter for Social Integration. The Charterrecognizes the need for equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of gender, disability,children, youth, squatters, and prisoners. TheCharter enjoins the state to take affirmativeaction in respect of the past marginalization. Inthe same year the government enacted Children’sAct 2001 and later on enacted the Disability Act,2002, National Youth Policy Act, and SexualOffence Act. These reforms have been furtherconsolidated in the Kenya Constitution 2010which is a land mark to the marginalized groups(Republic of Kenya, 2010).The Struggle for Constitutional ChangeThe clamour for constitutional change wasushered by the late 1980/1990 wave ofdemocratic reforms which resulted in theintroduction of multi-partyism. In Kenya thisled to the repeal of Section 2A of theConstitution to introduce multi-party politics.Section 9 subsections (1) and (2) were introducedinto the Constitution limiting the presidentialtenure to two five- year terms in office (Maupeuet al., 2005). Although multi-partyism wasrestored, little reforms were made to grant freeand fair competitive politics. The constitutionalamendment number 6 of 1992 not only enjoinedthe winning presidential candidate to obtain thehighest number of votes but also to garner atleast 25 per cent of the vote in five of the eightprovinces (Democracy, 1997). Other minimalreforms in the nomination and electionprocedures were considered, security of tenurefor serving judges, Attorney General andController and Auditor General was restored. In117

118Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012spite of these changes, the opposition faced thegeneral election of 1992 as a divided house alongethnic affiliations and personal interests. KANUemerged victorious and Moi was sworn in tobegin his first term in the office as required by theConstitution.Dismal performance by opposition parties in thegeneral election of 1992 influenced the agitationfor electoral and constitutional reforms. Theperiod between 1993 and 1996 was marked by alove-hate relationship between civil societyorganizations and political parties. Underlyingthis ambivalent relationship was disagreementover modalities of initiating constitutionalreforms given that president Moi was serving hisfirst term in the office, under the reforms. Whileone group called for comprehensiveconstitutional reforms another group opposed tothe idea saw it necessary to initiate reformprocess once Moi was out of power (Mutua,2009).By May 1997, concerted effort had been made tounite the opposition political parties and CSOsunder the banner of National ConventionExecutive Council (NCEC). This was a majormilestone as all the actors agreed on the need toengage in civil disobedience aimed at compellingKANU government to kick start the muchawaited constitutional reforms. But oppositionpolitical parties abandon the CSOs effort andextended a hand to KANU government,resulting in the conceptualization of the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG).The IPPG agreed to implement minimumconstitutional reforms before general elections of1997. These included “the independence of theelectoral commission, repeal of a number ofrestrictive civil and political rights, includingfreedoms of association and expression, theannulment of the offence of sedition, which hadbeen used extensively for a number of years toarrest and imprison citizens who agitated forreforms” (Cottreli and Ghai, 2007).The IPPG agreed to amend the constitution todeclare Kenya a multiparty democratic state, toallow a coalition government, to expandmembership at the electoral commission withappointment done in consultation with theopposition political parties, to have thenominated members of parliament appointed inaccordance with numerical strength in theparliament (Oyugi, 2003). As part of the IPPG,the Attorney General published a bill seeking toestablish a commission to review theconstitution. Parliament enacted theConstitution of Kenya Review Commission Act,1997 establishing a commission which collectedviews from Kenyans on the proposals to amendthe constitution and submitted the same to theparliament. With no further doubts as to whetherKANU would implement the minimum reformsand provide ground for comprehensiveconstitutional review process, oppositionpolitical parties exuded confidence inparticipating in the general elections of 1997. Asprovided in the Constitution, Moi was sworn into serve his final and last term in the office andwas instrumental in the pending constitutionalreview process.In June 1998 IPPC was formed. The forum wasmandated to come up with modalities onconstitutional reforms. This culminated into astakeholders’ conference at Safari Park tobrainstorm on the norms, institutions andprocesses for the constitutional reforms (Mutua,2009). Consensus was arrived to amend theConstitution of Kenya Review Act, key amongthem making the composition of theConstitution of Kenya Review Commission(CKRC) more inclusive and allowing for publicparticipation. However this was short lived,opposition political parties and KANU failed tobalance the equation of arriving at 13 seats from118

119Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012parliamentary parties out of the proposed 25commissioners (Cottreli and Ghai, 2007).Convinced that Moi lacked political will to leadthe constitutional reform process, the CSOs andreligious organizations later on in December1999 formed the Ufungamano Initiative. TheUfungamano Initiative established a People’sCommission of Kenya (PCK) to conduct apeople driven constitutional review process andsubmit a draft constitution. Similarly, KANUand NDP established the Parliamentary SelectCommittee (PSC) on Constitutional Review togather views from Kenyans and suggest changesto the Constitution of Kenya Review Act. ThePSC’s recommendations were adopted byKANU- NDP dominated parliament andProfessor Yash Pal Ghai was appointedchairman of the CKRC. The UfungamanoInitiative on the other hand, appointed the lateDr. Ooki Ombaka as the chairman. Prof. Ghaiwas disturbed by the rift that was inevitable inthe review process.In a bid to attain legitimacy, Ghai sought toreconcile both initiates, an achievement heaccomplished in March 2001. Furtheramendments were made to the Review Actwhich saw 10 members from People’sCommission and 2 from government- sponsoredparties added to the original 15. It is important tonote that the review was conducted under the2000 Review Act as amended in 2001.Parliament ratified the Constitution of KenyaReview Act that facilitated the process ofcollecting views from Kenyans before draftingthe constitution. This constitutional reviewprocess was started by CKRC appointed by thepresident on the nomination of parliament. Itwas intended to be “independent and expertbody while reflecting the diversities of thecountry”. It was mandated to conduct civileducation to the citizenry and prepare a draftconstitution for deliberation at a NationalConstitutional Conference (NCC). The NCChad a total of 629 representatives as follow: AllMPs, 3 delegates elected from each district, 42representatives of political parties and 125representatives of religious, women’s and youthgroups, the disabled, trade unions and NGOs.NCC was supposed to debate, amend wherenecessary and endorse the draft presented byCKRC. Additionally, there was the NationalAssembly (NA) to enact changes made in thedraft constitution with assistance from the PSCon the Constitution. All the rules for adoptionand amendments were agreed upon by theCKRC and PSC. The CKRC published its reportand the draft constitution in September 2002.President Moi dissolved Parliament ahead of thescheduled inaugural meeting of the NCC on 27October 2002. This move derailed theconstitutional review process. By this timeopposition had united into a formidable forceunder the umbrella party, National RainbowCoalition (NARC) with Kibaki as thepresidential candidate. campaigned on thepromise of giving Kenyans a new constitutionwithin 100 days in the office. NARCoverwhelmingly trounced KANU in the generalelections of 2002.Kibaki was sworn in the office on 30 th December2002 commencing his first term in office. Tomany Kenyans 100 days meant that the newgovernment was expected to deliver the newconstitution before the end of April, 2003. Yet itwas on 28 th April, 2003 that the governmentactually convened the NCC at Bomas. At thispoint it is important to recall that NARCgovernment approached the conference as adivided house over the alleged failure to honourMoU between LDP and NAK. LDP felt that ithad been short changed over 50-50 powersharing basis and creation of the posts of PrimeMinister and, two deputies and deputy vicepresident. At the conference the LDP and NAK119

120Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012took sides and turned Bomas into a battle groundfor supremacy. Driven by the politicalsuccession, Mutua notes that `both factionsassumed that whichever group managed to getthe conference to adopt its positions wouldcontrol the post- Moi state.’The new and old struggles became evident,centered on the membership of the CKRC, PSCand NCC. In yet another struggle on how tocontrol the three institutions, politicalentrepreneurs sought to protect their backyardsand vested interests. The constitutional reviewprocess was weakened by class, gender,sectarian, ethnic and ideological differences. Inthe end the national conference adopted a finaldraft constitution which provided for a powerfulprime minister and relatively weak president. Aday before Bomas endorsed the draftconstitution; through an application filed earlier,the court granted an injunction barring theAttorney General from publishing the draftconstitution. And in a yet another suit, the courtdeclared Bomas process an improper body forconstitution making and prevented parliamentfrom enacting the draft constitution. The courtdid not nullify the draft constitution but orderedthat the draft be subjected to a nationalreferendum. Each side of political divide reacteddifferently to the judicial ruling and itsimplication on the political calculations. ForKibaki and his henchmen, it was a reprieve tothe leadership and an opportunity to reconsidernext move. To regain position in theparliamentary debate, Kibaki reached out tofriendly MPs in KANU, Ford People and Safinaand formed a grand coalition government with abloated cabinet (Mutua, 2009).The hopes for new constitution did not fadeaway, in a bid to implement the court rulings theparliament resuscitated the constitutional reviewprocess through the enactment of ConsensusReview Law. At this time parliament played acritical role in deciding what would be changedin the Bomas draft. Eventually, when the PSCwas constituted the government side prevailedwhen it backed Paul Muite for chairman’sposition. Changes were made in the Bomas draftand subsequently the Attorney Generalpublished the Bill. The Wako draft was subjectedto the referendum in 2005 with the contentiousissues revolving around Kadhi courts,devolution, transitional arrangements and thestructure of the executive which remainedunsolved. Those who supported the documentargued that it was the best document thatchecked the executive power, entrenched clauseson devolution, independent judiciary andsafeguarding the rights of all Kenyans.The draft Bill was rejected by a vote of 57 percent to 42 per cent. Makau observes thatPresident Kibaki’s defeat can be interpreted on anumber of factors, ‘’including his hands-off style,corruption scandals, power struggles withinNARC, a protest against perceived Kikuyuhegemony and the government’s failure toformulate an inclusive and consultativeconstitutional review process. On their part,Cottrell and Ghai contend that the failure todeliver the constitution between 200- 2005 can beattributed to the relationship between the stateand civil society. To these scholars “althoughcivil society with much popular support, wasprominent in pushing for change, when theofficial constitutional review process began, thevested interests of the government and even ofthose trusted with the review frustrated a quickoutcome, and especially any outcome that meantcurtailing the powers of government” (Cottreliand Ghai, 2007).As the Constitutional process unfolded withseveral challenges, a team of scholars haddevoted their attention to the study of ethnicityin Kenya and its influence on the country’ssocio-economic and political organization. One120

121Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012of these scholars was Prof. Atieno Odhiambowho discussed the hegemonic strategies of theKenyan leadership by juxtaposing Kenyatta(representing the Kikuyu) and Oginga Odinga(representing the Luo and by the extensionprogressive political forces in Kenya). AtienoOdhiambo highlights how political elitesinstrumentalized ethnic ideology in any politicalstruggle whose net output has been frustration ofreforms agenda and underdevelopment ingeneral.The defeat of the Wako draft did not end thestruggle for constitution change. In a renewedeffort Kibaki appointed the Committee ofEminent Persons headed by a retired diplomat toadvise the government on how to jump start theconstitutional review process. Preparations forthe next general elections were gainingmomentum and hopes for a new constitutionwere becoming dimmer. The opposition leadersresorted to calls for minimum reforms to levelthe playing field before 2007 elections. TheMuite led parliamentary committee sought toentrench the review in the constitution byproviding for a referendum, enhance theindependence of the Electoral Commission ofKenya (ECK), provide for judicial independence,entrench affirmative action in the constitution,require that the winning presidential candidategarner 50 per cent plus one of the votes cast inaddition to at least 25 per cent of the vote in atleast in five of the eight provinces, increaseparliamentary independence and authority,prohibit opposition MPs from joining thegovernment without authority of their party,holders of constitutional offices be vetted byParliament, provide for dual citizenship and setup a committee to oversee the distribution ofnational resources. Although the last threereform items were not adopted in May, 2007Kibaki dissolved the 9 th parliament before theywere enacted.The 2007 general elections whose outcome wasdisputed were hotly contested between theincumbent president Kibaki of Party of NationalUnity (PNU) and Raila of Orange DemocraticParty (ODM). Kibaki was sworn on 30 thDecember at State House effectively beginninghis second and final controversial term in theoffice as required by the constitution. Thedisputed presidential results led to politicalviolence of unprecedented magnitude. Theviolence took an ethnic dimension and almostpushed Kenya to the Rwanda’s 1984 situation,an experience that continues to affect the countryas key politicians await trial by the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC).2007 Post Election ViolenceNo sooner had the defunct ElectoralCommission of Kenya (ECK) announcedelection results than violence erupted in Nairobi,the Rift Valley, the Coast, Western and Nyanzaprovinces- regions where the opposition hadhuge support. In the Rift Valley, Western andNyanza provinces, about half a million membersof the Kikuyu ethnic community were displacedfrom their homes. Members of Kisii ethniccommunity perceived to have voted in favour ofKibaki were also targeted. Kikuyu families wereevicted mostly by Kalenjin who assumed controland some instance baptized theme with localKalenjin names to conceal their Kikuyu identity(Kanyinga, 2009).According to the Commission of Inquiry intoPost Election Violence (CIPEV) herein calledWaki Report, post- election violence had severalpatterns. First it was spontaneous and it took theform of protest in respond to the alleged riggedpresidential results. The first form of violencewas public concern on truth about election.Second pattern of violence involved state’ssecurity agents to calm protestors in ODM121

122Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012strongholds. The third form of violencepoliticians and business people allegedly to haveplanned and enlisted criminal gangs to executeviolence. This form of violence took ethnicdimension such that in Rift Valley, Kikuyu andKisii were targeted for expulsion from the region(RoK, 2008). Kikuyu and Kisii voted for Kibakiyet they were settled in the Kalenjin’s territorialsphere. Fourth pattern of violence took the formof revenge attacks organized by the Kikuyu toexpel the Kalenjin, the Luo and the Luhya fromtheir rented premises in Nairobi, Naivasha andNakuru. Finally, there was violence that took aclass connotation. Key actors were groups ofyouth financially supported by their ethnicbarons and businessmen.By the end of the crisis, no less than 350,000Kenyans had been internally displaced. Over1,100 had died, many women raped, and about3,560 suffered serious injuries. The politicalviolence halted after the signing of the NationalPeace Accord and specifically the signing of the“Agreement on the Principles of Partnership ofthe Coalition Government” on 28 February 2008under the mediation of the African Union Panelof Eminent African Personalities chaired byformer UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. Thepolitical settlement was later enacted byparliament as an amendment to the KenyanConstitution as the Constitution of Kenya(Amendment) Act 2008, and as the NationalAccord and Reconciliation Act, 2008 (Kanyingaand Okello, 2010). The National Accordestablished a framework for power sharing so asto resolve the post election violence. Theframework was based on the overall goal of theNational Accord: Achievement of sustainable peace,stability, and justice in Kenya through the rule of lawand respect for human rights. To actualize this goalthe mediation framework identified four centralagenda points.On the agenda item of the agreements was theimmediate action to stop violence and restorefundamental rights and liberties. The secondagenda was the need to install measures toaddress the humanitarian crisis, promotereconciliation, healing and restoration. The thirdagenda was on how to overcome the politicalcrisis at the moment and finally agenda fourprovided for a framework on the solution oflong-term issues including constitutional andinstitutional reforms, land reforms, poverty andinequalities, youth unemployment, nationalcohesion and transparency and accountability.The KNDR process prioritized constitutionalreview and institutional reforms. The frameworkalso established several institutionalarrangements to address various aspects of thepolitical crisis. These included: An IndependentReview Commission on the General Electionsheld in Kenya on December 27, 2007 (IREC), aCommission of Inquiry into the Post- ElectionViolence (CIPEV) and establishment of a Truth,Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)to address matters incidental to the settlement.TJRC was mandated to inquire into humanrights violations, including those committed bythe state, groups or individuals. Anotherinstitution created was National Cohesion andIntegration Commission (NCIC) to respond tothe post election and forestall lasting peace,sustainable development and harmonious coexistenceamong Kenyans.In tandem with Agenda item four andrecommendations from IREC, the ElectoralCommission of Kenya was disbanded andInterim Independent Electoral Commission(IIEC) and Interim Independent BoundariesReview Commission (IIBRC). The IIEC was setup with the aim of reforming the electoralprocess and to restore people’s confidence in thecountry’s electoral system while IIBRC wasmandated to recommend to parliament on thedelimitation of constituencies and local authorityelectoral units and the optimal number of122

123Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012constituencies on the basis of equality of votes.In terms of performance, TJRC lost its credibilityover the leadership row, NCIC has tried to curbhate speech mongers and conducted advocacy onnational cohesion. IIEC has conducted severalby elections, instituted a new voters registers andcarried out a successful referendum while IIBRCon its part has recommended creation of addition80 constituencies. The mediation processprovided a window of opportunity forjumpstarting constitutional review process thatgave birth to Kenya Constitution 2010 on the 4 thAugust 2010.Rebirth of a NationWith the return of multipartyism in 1992, thelong journey to new constitution began when theopposition political parties and civil societyorganizations (CSOs) advocated forconstitutional reforms. Essentially this aimed attrimming the power of executive in relations tojudiciary and legislature. A window ofopportunity for comprehensive constitutionalreview was presented following the signing ofNational Accord in February, 2008. On August4, 2010, Kenyans went to a referendum andvoted to adopt a new Constitution to replace onethat had been negotiated at independence fromthe British in 1963, and over the years wasmutilated through amendments to suit theexecutive and those surrounding the office. TheKenya Constitution 2010 establishes theframework for the restoration of constitutionaldemocracy in Kenya. It provides for inclusivecitizenship through the new devolved system ofgovernment, reduced presidential powers andseparations of powers between the three arms ofthe government. Articles 6 and Chapter eleven ofthe Constitution provides provisions fordevolved government.The devolution of power debate preceded theexistence of independence Kenya, dating back tothe constitutional talks at the LancasterConference. At independence, Kenya was aconstitutionally devolved state. Significant powerwas devolved to regions and entrenched in theConstitution. Regions enjoyed certain tax andfinancial power and had both legislative andexecutive authorities. Regional governmentdealing with the National government weredeeply entrenched in the Constitution andKenyans had a right to live and settle anywherein the country; discrimation was expresslyprohibited. This local brand of devolution waspopularly referred to as majimbo, a form of semifederalism(Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996). Devolutionwas subsequently abolished through persistentconstitutional amendment, between 1964 and1969, to create a unitary state.During the course of the constitutional reviewdebate in Kenya, opinion was unanimous thatthere was need for decentralization of the powersof government. However, the socio- economicand political history, and the current events atvarious constitutional moments made theconsensus on the mode of decentralization ofpower difficult. In a culmination of more than 20years of constitutional debate, and a delicatenegotiation of the Draft Constitution, theConstitution 2010 was promulgated on 27 thAugust 2010.The new Constitution, under Article 6 and 176,establish a system of devolved governmentconsisting of county government. Article 174 ofthe constitution of Kenya 2010 provides objectsof the devolved government: Promotion ofdemocratic and accountable exercise of power.This would ensure accountability of thegovernment and its officials. Previouslyappointment of leaders at district and provinciallevel was done by the central government. Thecounty government will be given the opporunity123

124Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012to appoint its own leaders and manage its ownaffairs with minmal monitoring.Devolved government seeks to foster nationalunity by recognising diversity. The purpose ofthis is to bring Kenya together in nationalcohesion and appreciation of a common nationalculture. Kenyan hospitality may just be anexample of this kind of common nationalculture. This is expected to make residents ofcounties feel belonging with opportunities tocontribute to local development. The provisiongives powers of self-governance to the peopleand enhances the participation of the people inthe exercise of the powers of the state and inmaking decisions affecting them. Provisions suchas the requirement that Assemblies whether atCounty or National level have to conduct theirbusinesses in an open manner are intended tofacilitate participation by the public in thelegislature and other public affairs (Article 196(1)). This is portrayed in several articlesthroughout the Constitution including thePreamble, Chapter Four; Bill of Rights, ChapterTen among others.It equally provides for protection and promotionof the interests and rights of minorities andmarginalised communities. Voices andarticulation of the interests of relatively smallcommunitites such as the Elmollo,Ogiek,Nubian, Sengwer, Sakweri and Illchamus areprovided for at county government level. Article177(c) provides for the number of members ofmarginalized groups, including persons withdisabilities and the youth as prescribed by an Actof Parliament. It takes into account marginalisedcommunities which previuosly had not beenrecognised.Devolved system of governemnt further providesfor promotion of social and economicdevelopment and the provision of easilyaccessible services throughout Kenya. Everycounty will have some resource base in line withthe functions provided by the Constitution, andis expected to ensure equitable sharing ofnational and local resources. For every fiancialyear, the equitable share of the revenue raisednationally that is allocated to county governemntshall be not less than fifteen per cent of allrevenue collected by the national governement.In addition, an equalization fund geared towardsbringing up counties that are underdevelopedcompared to others is provided. This willempower and boost deelopment in countieswhich had previously performed poorly due toseveral factors including marginalisation.Overall the deolved system is expected tofacilitate the decentralisation of state organs,their functions and services, from the capital tothe counties and ensure the principle of furtherdecentralization. This implies that the functionsby the county governments will be cascadeddownwards to enhance efficiency and effectiveservice delivery. The sub-counties and wardsoffices will improve service delivery by engaginglocal people through participatory governanceembedded in county law through coordination,planning and management. The system willfurther enhance checks and balances and theseparation of powers; improve accountability atthe local level since each country shall have itsown executive, legislature, and civil services. Thelocal legislature will ensure check and balance atthe county level, with officials being accountableto the local people, their own county executiveand legislature. However, the countygovernments will not have judicial powers,although the county assembly will make lawsrelated to counties in line with the Constitution.Pertaining to the relationship between nationaland county government it is germane tounderscore the fact that the devolution providesfor shared governance in which the emphasis ona unitary state does not quite bring out the124

125Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012unique governance system that Kenya hasadopted. The relationship between the nationalgovernment and county government is informedby the notion of “cooperative government”according to which each level of government issupposed to respect the other level in aconsultative and supportive manner. Article 189(a) provides for the establishment of jointcommittees to give effect to relationship. So farlaws informed by the work of a Task Force onDevolved Government have been enacted whileothers are awaiting enactment to operationalizethis unique governance model. One of the lawsprovides for intergovernmental relations,including establishment of forums which ensurecooperative and consultative governance.In considering Constitutional Commisions andIndependent Offices, the primary conecrn is howto manage the establishment of thesecommissions and offices and ensure that theirfunctions are fulfilled. Most of these commisionsand commitees have been formed including, theCommision on the Implemenation of theConstitution (CIC), Commision on RevenueAllocation (CRA) Judicial Service Commision(JSC) Constitutional Implementation OversightCommittee (CIOC), Kenya National HumanRights and Equality Commision, IndependnetElectoral and Boundaries Commision. TheNational Land Commission, Salaries andRemuneration Commission and National PoliceService Commision are yet to be constituted. Theappointment of commissions and constitutionaloffices has attarcated public interest and debate.This is a clear indication of Kenyans begining toengage with public issues as provided in theConstitution. The manner in which public turneddown president’s nominees for the Chief Justice,Director of Public Presecution annd AttorneyGeneral arguing that that was unconstitutionalare a clear demonstration of this engagement.ConclusionKenya has gone through various phases ofdevelopment and governenace and the newConstitution is a paradigm shift from centralizedto devolved governmnet. A critical examinationof the provisions of devolution reveal that theprovision could remain ideals unless there isdemocratic culture in the body politics. Theobjectives of devolution provide a basis forevaluating the performance and behaviour ofthose who will be charged with implementationof the new constitution. The operationalizationof the new design is already grappling with issuesrelating to inter-governmental relations at thelocal level, in particular how to handle theProvincial Administration during the transitionperiod; management of finances; design of publicservices at the county level in a manner that willattract and retain skilled staff, how to harmonizethe working relationship between the countygovernment and central governmentdepratments/services. Although some of theseissues already have legal provisions to governtheir management; the fact that there is notransition authority as recommended by the TaskForce on Development Government to act onbehalf of the counties, is a major gap. Putting theauthority in place will provide a mechanism formanaging the challenges challenges whichduring initial period of implementation. Thisstage does not only require policy makers andpractitioners, but great thinkers and researchersto support the process. The process should belaced with the current realities of Kenya andAfrica as argued by Prof. Atieno Odhiambo, ascholar and a nationalist who will be greatlymissed as Kenya implement devolution, with anultimate goal of bridging the gap between idealsand realities.125

126Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012ReferencesAlila, P. and Omosa, M. (1996) RuralDevelopment Policies in Kenya. inNg’ethe, N and Owino, W FromSessional Paper No.10 to Structuraladjustment Towards Indigenizing thePolicy Debate .Nairobi: Institute ofPolicy Analysis and Research(IPAR)Sessional PaperAnyang’-Nyong’o, P. (1989) State and Society inKenya: The Disintegration of theNationalist Colaition and Rise ofPresidential Authority in Kenya, 1963-78. African Affairs 88, 229-251.Asingo, P. (2003) The Political Economy ofTransition in Kenya. Oyugi, W.Wanyande, P., Mbai, C. The Politics ofTransition in Kenya From KANU ToNARC, Heinrich Boll Foundation:NairobiAtieno Odhiambo, E.S. (1988) Democacry andthe ideology of order in Kenya, 1986-1988. Walter O. Oyugi, E.S Atieno-Odhiambo, Michael Chege & AfrifaGitonga (1988) Democartic Theory andPractice in Africa, HeinemannEducational Publishers, PortmouthBarkan, J. (1994) Beyond Capitalism VisSocialism in Kenya & Tanzania. EastAfrican Educational Publisher: Nairobi.Chweya, L. (2003) Resources and PoliticalTransition. Wanyande, P., Omosa, M.,Chweya, L. Governance and TransitionPolitics in Kenya. University of NairobiPress: Nairobi.Cottreli, J. and Ghai, Y. (2007) ConstitutionMaking and Democratization in Kenya(2000-2005). Democratization 14, 1-25.Democracy, I.f.E.i. (1997) National ElectionsData Book, Kenya: 1963- 1997. IED:Nairobi.Gertzel, C. (1970) Government and Politics ofIndependent Kenya 1963-1968.Heinemann Education Books.Kanyinga, K. (2009) The Legacy of the WhiteHighlands: Land rights, ethnicity and thePost- 2007 election violence in Kenya.Journal of Contemporary African Studies27, 325-344.126Kanyinga, K. and Okello, D. (2010) Tensionsand Reversals in Democratic: The Kenya2007 General Elections. Society forInternational Development and Institutesfor Development Studies, University ofNairobi.Katumanga, M. and Omosa, M. (2007)Leadership and Governance in Kenya.Wanyande, P Omosa, M & Chweya, L.Governance and Transition Politics inKenya .University of Nairobi Press.Maupeu, H., Katumanga, M. and Mitullah,W.V. (2005) The Moi SuccessionElections. Transafrica Press: NairobiMutua, M. (2009) Kenya’s Quest forDemocracy: Taming Leviathan.Fountain Publisher: Kampala.Nying’uro, P. (1997) The External Sources ofKenya’s Democratization ProcessJournal of Political Science 25.Odhiambo- Mbai, C. (2003) The Rise and Fall ofthe Autocratic State in Kenya. Oyugi,W., Wanyande, P., OdhiamboMbai (eds)The Politics of Transition in Kenya:From KANU to NARC. Heinrich BollFoundation: Nairobi.Odhiambo-Mbai, C. (1996) The Nature ofPublic-Making in Kenya: 1993-1996.Ng’ethe, N., Owino, W. From SessionalPaper No.10 to Structural adjustmentTowards Indigenizing the Policy Debate.Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis andResearch (IPAR) 10.Odinga, O. (1967) Not Yet Uhuru. HeinemannEducational Books, London.Ojwang, J.B. (1990) Constitutional Developmentin Kenya: Institutional Adaptation andSocial Change Acts Press: Nairobi.Oloo, A. (2007) Minority Rights and TransitionPolitics. Wanyande, P. Omosa, M.Ludeki, C. (eds) Governance andTransition Politics in Kenya. Universityof Nairobi: Nairobi.Oyugi, W.O. (1994) The Uneasy Alliance: PartyState Relations in Kenya. Walter Oyugi(ed) Politics and Administration in EastAfrica. East African EducationalPublisher Ltd: Nairobi.Oyugi, W.O. (2003) The Politics of Transition inKenya, 1992- 2003: DemocraticConsolidation or Deconsolidation.

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128Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The Al Qaida, the Al Shabaab and the Future of the Somalis in East AfricaWilliam R. Ochieng’Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno. E-mail:Jethron A. AkallahFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno. E-mail:ayumbajetty@yahoo.com_____________________________________________________________________________AbstractInternational terrorism has been a major issue that has pre-occupied governments and the entirehumanity for the last over one decade. Osama bin Laden became a household name after theSeptember 11 bombing of the Twin Towers and Pentagon in the US. Some key questions thereforearise; who was Osama bin Laden? What did he stand for? Does his death constitute the end ofterrorism? With him having made in-roads in East Africa and established Al-Qaeda cells along theEast African coast therefore, it is of interest to ask what the future of Somalia, a country ravaged byan endless internal war is. This paper attempts to bring to light some of the issues that informedOsama bin Laden’s struggle against the American and Western European hegemony and proposesfor the full engagement of the Somali state by the East African states as they seek to integrate so as toattain socio-economic and political stability in the region. A weaker fragile Somali state is a threat tothe entire region. The paper gives a perfunctory rendition of the truth behind Al Qaeda and theirIntrusion in East Africa and a brief history of the failed Somali State and the future of the Somalis inEast Africa.Key words: Al qaida, Al Shabaab, Somalis, East Africa___________________________________________________________________________Osama bin Laden and the Struggle for the ArabFreedomIntroductionAt the exact moment when the Al Qaeda hit theTwin Towers in New York with their hijackedpassenger planes, on the eleventh of Septemberthe year 2001, I was attending a conference inLondon. A few minutes later a rather panicstrickenEnglishman dashed into the conferencehall to relay to us the news that Osama binLaden’s boys had destroyed some huge buildingsin New York, and that they were headed forWashington.Each one of us at the conference was perplexed.What were the boys up to? What point were theymaking? “And who is this Osama you are talkingabout?” I asked the Englishman. “Well, he issome blood-thirsty terrorist from some place inthe Middle East. His plan is to conquer the worldfor Islam,” he said. As he spoke my mind keptclicking back to the 1950s in Kenya, when theBritish used to refer to Jomo Kenyatta as: “thered-eyed terrorist” and also as: “the leader untodarkness and death.” And wasn’t NelsonMandela also called a terrorist by the Apartheidracists of South Africa? Might this Osama be asimilar prominent nationalist, but this time in theMiddle East?Osama bin Laden: His Ideas, Struggle andDeathBut those same ideas returned to me in force onthe 1 st May, 2011, when Barack Obama’s boystracked Osama bin Laden to his hideout inPakistan, and shot him dead. When his deathwas announced there was joy all over theWestern world. To the Anglo Saxons all overEurope and the New World, Osama was thequixotic serpent. His carnagial policy of murderand destruction, to liberate the Arab world fromthe Western exploitation and arrogance, shockedthe so-called “civilized world.” And for strangereasons even China joined in exuberance.128

129Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Osama had not been scared by the new hi-techWestern weaponry. His “gangsters” usedprimitive grenades to cause fear anddespondency. Indeed, over the last one decadethe rather frugal and haughty Americans havespent billions of dollars in their wars against theOsama-led pan Arab nationalists.According to President Barack Obama, Osamawas a terrorist who was responsible for themurder of thousands of innocent men, womenand children. Thus America had exacted justiceby murdering him. To some extent what Obamawas saying was true, if you believe that Osamawas responsible for the infamous bombing in1998 of the American Embassies in Nairobi andDar es Salaam, the 9/11 bombing of the twinWorld Trade Towers in New York, the 2002bombing of the Kikambala Paradise Hotel inMombasa and several such other acts of brutalityin Europe and Asia.Nevertheless, very few writers, as they talkedabout Osama, ever paid attention to what hestood for, or about the ideology of the Al Qaeda.Indeed, the mission of terror might not end soonfollowing Osama’s death, because the West, andin particular the United States, are outrightlyperfunctory and racist about what the Arabs arecrusading against.The term “terrorist” which is used again andagain against Osama and his team by itself doesnot make complete sense. One can only be aterrorist for a cause; and the so-called Al Qaedaterrorists are those who terrorize the Westernimperialists for their freedom. The Mau Mau ofKenya were not just terrorists, as the Britishcalled them. They were Kenyan nationalists whoterrorized the British for the freedom ofKenyans. So, when the Americans call the AlQaeda terrorists they should make a point ofcompleting the sentence, by telling us that theyare being terrorized by the Al Qaeda for thefreedom of the Arab world.To Osama bin Laden and his team, Americahad, over the years emasculated the Arab world.The Americans had brought under their controlall the ruling Arab dynasties and emirs. TheAmericans, and Europeans, had twofundamental interests in the Arab world.Foremost was the exploitation of the oil wealthand second, was the use of the Arab and otherAsiatic territories as buffer against the spread of129Soviet and Chinese communist influences andinterests. Indeed, the Americans controlled andexploited the Arab oil wealth, and determinedArab investments in trillions of dollars, most ofwhich went to the United States. When theArabs sell oil to the Americans the oil moneydoes not go back to Arabia, it is kept inAmerican banks and investments in New York,Los Angeles, Chicago and San Fransisco – so theAl Qaeda claim. While the Arabs should be thewealthiest community on earth, because of theiroil, the general Arab population is poor andunemployed. The noises from the 2011 SpringRevolution in North Africa and the Arab worldare a test to this.The western world, besides, despises the Arabculture and religion. By ingeniouslyemasculating the Arab world the Americanshave stopped indigenous growth anddevelopment in the Arab world. For many yearsthe Arabs have accused Europe, as much as theU.S., for protecting Middle Eastern despots.Recently, following some anti-Europeansentiments during the Spring Revolution, someEuropean statesmen have begun to understandthe folly of their former Arabian delusions.According to Stefan Fule, a EuropeanCommissioner for Enlargement and EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy; “We must begin to showhumility about the past. Too many of us fell preyto assumption that authoritarian regime were aguarantee for stability in the region” (TimeMagazine, 2011).Thus, years of cozy relations with the Arabdespots undermined the West’s claims to bechampioning democracy, as the West’sreputation amongst the Arabs got tainted due totheir ties with the old regime. For the Arabs tochange and develop “the Yankees must go first,”according to the Al Qaeda and to unite the Arabsin their gargantuan struggle for freedom Islammust play the role of the unifier. ProfessorEdward W. Said, the late Palestinian scholar,through his writings including his masterpieceOrientalism (1978) properly captures thereservations of the Arab world towards the West.There are also other violent extremists in theMiddle East, specifically in Afghanistan andPakistan, apart from the Al Qaeda, who arerunning their own sectorial and religious wars –groups like the Teleban, Salafi, Shia and Moslem

130Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Brotherhood, who in fact are much stronger,smarter, bigger and more elusive than the AlQaida, and who are equally opposed to theWest. People who come from outside find itdifficult to differentiate these “holy warriors whohate non-Muslims.” Listen to the creed of theMoslem Brotherhood:-Allah is our objectThe Prophet is our leaderQuran is our lawJihad is our wayDying in the name of AllahIs our highest goal.Note, however, that it is not our aim in thisdiscourse to stray into the activities of all thesesects. Be that as it may, unlike the formerAmerican presidents who translated the pan-Arab uneasiness as the work of religiousfundamentalists, President Obama understoodthe Arab psyche pretty well; and that is why hewas at first hesitant to join the NATO gang-hoagainst Gadaffi in Libya. Those who translatethe Al Qaeda mission purely in religious termsare terribly misguided. The pan-Arab nationalistssimply want the West out of the Arab territories.Why, then, are the Al Qaeda causing a lot oftrouble in East Africa? True, in their strugglewith the United States other people, includingTanzanians, Kenyans and Ugandans, havesuffered. But that is the nature of nationaliststruggles. When the British were fighting theGermans during the so-called First and SecondWorld Wars thousands of innocent Africans andArabs were killed. We should, thus, not look atthe Al Qaeda operations as unusual. EastAfricans are targets because of their linkage withthe United States.In our case, the Al Qaeda have got one of theirstrongest bases in Somalia, next door; a basewhich they have used effectively to harass theAmericans and Israelis all over Eastern Africa, abase which has led to much bloodshed in EastAfrica. In the next section of this paper I want totalk a little about the history of the failed state ofSomalia and how the Al Qaeda have infiltrated itfor their own purpose, and how Somalia mightbe redeemed in the future.The Somali State130Amongst those who saluted Osama’s death, assoon as President Obama announced it, wereKenya’s top leadership: President Mwai Kibakiand the Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Accordingto both of them the killing of Osama was a formof justice for the victims of terror attacks,planned and financed by bin Laden. They had ontheir minds the bombing of the U.S. embassy inNairobi in 1998, the Kikambala killings in 2002and the problems Kenya was facing at theSomalia border from the Al Shabaab. The AlShabaab is the Al Qaeda influenced and fundedpolitical group in Somalia who preach extremeIslam and have vowed to topple the Americanfunded Somalia government. “We shall neverdivert from the path of Sheikh Osama bin Ladenand we shall continue the jihad till we taste thedeath our brother Osama faced, or achievevictory, and rule the whole world,” said the AlShabaab from Mogadishu, following Osama’smurder (The Star, 2011).Whenever discussion on the history and tragedyof the Somali people is conducted, there arethose who take the view that the Somalis areArabs who came to the Horn of Africa long timeago, and are not Africans. This is a fallacy,propagated by the dedicated preachers of racism.There is no convincing evidence that the Somaliscame from Arabia. Their antiquity goes deepinto the cultures of Africa’s earliest Stone Agefolk. It was from this ancient African socialstratum that the scattered Barbers of NorthAfrica and the Somalis emerged; as well as theBeja, Agaaw, Sidama, the Oromo and the Wayto of Ethiopia. Based originally at the Horn ofAfrica, most of this population was pastoralist.Over the ages migrants of neighbouring Arabiatrickled in, across the Red Sea, and settledamongst them, bringing along their Arabictraditions. The Somali section of this populationlater turned their attention southwards, along theIndian Ocean, until they reached the Juba River.During the classical period Somalia was knownas Punt, but the Phoenicians called it “The Landof Incense.”Throughout the early periods, until the British,Italians and French began to scramble for theSomali territory the inhabitants of Somaliaroamed freely along the ocean and into theinterior of their country, with their herds ofcamels and goats, secure in their own territory,

131Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012until 1854 when the celebrated British explorerSir Richard Burton, crossed Somalia, drawingmaps for trade and general geographicalinformation. In the years following Burton’sexploration Somalia was rapidly drawn into thetheatre of colonial competition involving theBritish, French and Italians, but at partitionEthiopia also chipped in, cutting for itself a largechunk of Somali territory, as did the British,French and Italians.For the British and the French, Somalia wasimportant as a base for safeguarding theirinterests in the Indian Ocean. But they didvirtually nothing for the Somali people. Apartfrom exporting meat from the Somali livestockand fish from the Somali fishermen, both theBritish and the French left very little behind – interms of education, agriculture or infrastructure.The Italians, on their part, hoped to build a truecolony which would serve the mother-countryboth as a source of primary goods and as aconvenient receptacle for some of Italy’s surpluspopulation, but these dreams gradually pesteredaway. To Somalis, colonialism was a fraudulenthurricane, which was soon forgotten.Unlike most African territories which arrived atindependence loaded with competing tribes,Somalia was different. The Somalis possessed acommon language and a common culture basedon Islam and pastoralism. But beneath theirpassionate nationalism lay a labyrinth of clanfamiliesand sub-clans extending down to closelyknit lineage segments and family groups. Thisfragmentation soon became a hindrance tonational cohesion; more so when afterindependence it was realized that the personnelleft in charge of the state had very low educationand no previous experience in administration toproperly manage the cohesion and developmentof the far-flung Republic. Their early wars forGreater Somalia against Kenya and Ethiopiaquickly impoverished their exchequer, in acountry which lacked adequate resources forregional or international trade.To manage their wars the Somalis needed strongexternal support, which they eventually flukedfrom the Soviet Union, which agreed to establishfor them an army of 10,000 men, together with asmall air force, but the Soviets did not supportthe Somali Government’s plan and dream for aGreater Somalia. In 1969 General Mohammed131Saied Barre carried out a military coup andproclaimed Somalia a Marxist state, embarkedon a nationalization campaign and accepted alarge number of Soviet advisers in governmentministries and in the military.But the Soviets soon realized how poor thecountry was and that they were being misused inlocalized wars by a government which really hadno resources or good reasons for wars. In 1978when Barre asked for more Russian arms andsupport he was turned down. Barre’s responsewas to tear up the Somali’s Treaty of Friendshipand Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Heexpelled all the Russians from Somalia andturned to the West for help. Italy, a formercolonial power in Somalia, came forward andcontributed one billion dollars, while the UnitedStates reluctantly contributed $800 million, but itdid not take long before Western support driedup.Without any foreign support Somalia began todisintegrate, fragmenting into what MartinMeredith calls a “patchwork of rival fiefdomscontrolled by clan chiefs, all armed to the hilt”(The Star, 2011). By 1990 Saied Barre’s controlin Somalia hardly reached outside Mogadishu.In January 1991 Barre and his remnant armywere driven out of Mogadishu by GeneralMuhammed Farah Aideed’s militia, Barrefleeing southwards into Kenya, loaded downwith gold bars, foreign currency and lootplundered from Western embassies (Meredith,2006). Since 1991, Somalia has been a battlefieldof contending clans and warlords. Into thisferment later emerged the radical political classthat influenced and financed by the Al Qaeda –the Al Shabaab. Indeed, over the last few yearsmany Al Qaeda fighters who have been fleeingfrom the “scotched earth” in Afghanistan,Pakistan, Yemen and Iraq have found a home inSomalia. Amongst these are Fazul AbdullahMohammed (from the Comoros) who was killedin June in Mogadishu, Sheikh Mohamed AbuFaid (from Saudi Arabia), Abu Suleiman al-Banadiri (a Somali of Yemeni descent), and AbuMusa Mombasa (from Pakistan). All these, andothers, have been grafted on to the Al Shabaabmovement, administration and training. Theyhave kept Kenya and Ethiopia at tenter-hooks, asthey recruit gullible East African youths intotheir militia (The East African, 2011).

132Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012DiscussionUnlike the clan-based warlord militias that cameinto being after 1991, the Al Shabaab is a terriblyfeared nationalist group, wired by Islam,pursuing the earlier Greater Somalia policy, butfundamentally imbued with the anti-Western AlQaeda philosophy. East African intelligenceforces say they foiled many of its attacks, but inJuly 2012 the Al Shabaab managed to explodetwo deadly bombs in Kampala, Uganda’scapital, when football fans were watching theWorld Cup on a television. Nearly 70 peoplewere killed, and hundreds injured. Thoughclaimed by the Al Shabaab in Somalia, theKampala attacks were carried out by its cell thatis based in Tanzania.In Kenya, there is constant recruitment of youthsat the Coast through Lamu, to join the AlShabaab forces in Somalia. The Al Qaeda cellsin East Africa are based in Eritrea and Sudan.Outside East Africa the Al Qaeda are scattered inEgypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, but theSomalia branch, the Al Shabaab, are regarded asthe most dangerous, “because of its lack ofdiscipline (Time Magazine, 2011). In this regardKenya has served as the centerpiece of theAmerican Counter-terrorism strategy in EasternAfrica, evidenced by the fact that since 2006 ithas received 78 per cent of the money theAmerican Government has spent in Djibouti,Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to boostEast Africa’s capacity to fight the Al Qaida.With Osama bin Laden’s death no one can tellhow long Al Qaida phenomenon will last, butgiven that its branches were active in the last fiveyears when Osama had lost central control, themovement might roll on for several decades.Besides, there is the revenge factor. As RudyGiuliani, the former New York City mayor hasput it: “People are human. When you take awaytheir loved one in a brutal way … you want tosee vengeance, you want to see retaliation. Thoseare the raw human emotions (Sunday Nation,2011). But even if the future of the Al Qaeda issealed by Osama’s death, the historic GreaterSomalia dream must be dealt with. Despite thefact that the Somalia is already split into fourmini-states, a truce can still be arranged by theAfrican Union to federate them and, throughnegotiation, possibly to admit them into the EastAfrican Community. Thus contained theirponderous world view, their vision and theirfuture will be linked to the world view of theirEast African neighbours and, hopefully, theirdomestic wars will end.ConclusionThe Somalis seem to be a nationality sufferingfrom abandonment and loneliness along theIndian Ocean, with Kenya and Ethiopia blockingher rear. In our minds, we see the Somalis as agreat African people. For centuries they werevery successful pastoralists, fishermen andmaritime traders. They appear frequently in precolonialIndian Ocean and classical almanacs.Those Somalis who live in Kenya have greatlyimpressed us by their soberness, their devotion tocommerce and their scant involvement in crimes.Unless East Africans positively help the Somalisto integrate into the wider African milieu, fordecades to come, the Somalis will remain anintolerable hump on our backs.ReferencesTime Magazine, Vol. 177, No. 20/2011, p.11The Star, a daily Kenya Newspaper, Monday,May 9, 2011, p. 19.Meredith, M., The State of Africa: A History ofFifty Years of Independence, Free Press,London 2006, p. 465 – 468.The East African, May 9 – 15, 2011, p. 6-7.Sunday Nation, Nairobi, June 12, 2011, p.8.132

133Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The Body as a Figurative Code in Luo Popular Culture, Vernacular Literature, andSystems of ThoughtBenjamin M. O. OdhojiKenyatta University, P.O. Box 43844, Nairobi, Kenya. E-mail: odhoji@yahoo.com________________________________________________________________________Abstract Popular culture is commonly viewed as a process of producing meanings fromsocial experience as well as the way such meanings are expressed by respectivegroups of people in their daily lives. Popular culture (as opposed to "high culture")may be viewed as folk culture favoured by many people. This notion of popularculture encompasses a people's systems of thought and also embraces the culturalmeanings that are woven into their language. The premise of my argument is thataccording to Luo popular culture, oral literature, and systems of thought, and thehuman body is deployed as a figurative code for modes of thought, feelings, andcharacteristics that do not coincide with English idiom. The Luo people'sconception of "self" and "person-hood" is therefore, quite different from Westernsystems of thought.Key words: Luo culture, Vernacular Literature, Systems of Thought________________________________________________________________________IntroductionPopular culture is commonly viewed as a processof producing meanings from social experience aswell as the way such meanings are expressed byrespective groups of people in their daily lives.Popular culture (as opposed to "high culture")may be viewed as folk culture that is favored bymany people. This notion of popular cultureencompasses a people's systems of thought andalso embraces the cultural meanings that arewoven into their language.Popular culture may also be conceptualized, interms of Antonio Gramsci's concept of"hegemony," as a site of struggle over themeanings of social experience. This positionviews popular culture as a site of strugglebetween the forces of resistance of subordinategroups and the forces of incorporation ofhegemonic groups in society. In this regard,popular culture emerges as a culture of conflictthat constructs oppositional meanings underconditions of social subordination.Whatever definition is employed, popular cultureis always contrasted to something else. Thenotion of "otherness" is always present. But whathappens when this "otherness" consists ofoppositional cultural meanings of a group ofpeople framed and "marginalized" as subordinateby the ideology of a hegemonic foreign politicalpower? What kinds of meanings are producedwhen popular notions and texts (sources out ofwhich they produce meanings) of such asubordinate group are encoded into the "masternarrative" of the dominant group? What kinds ofconceptual problems and negotiations come intoplay when creative artists of such a subordinategroup are caught between the need to capture thecodes of their popular culture and the need to beunderstood by an audience outside their culturaland lingual contexts? These are some of theissues I wish to explore by examining andanalyzing popular notions and representations ofthe body of the Luo people of Kenya.I should hasten to observe that the Luo people,like all other Kenyan ethnic groups, endured thesubordinating norms of British colonialdomination. It is therefore, in the wider sense ofpolitical domination and ideologicalsubordination that I consider Luo systems of133

134Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012thought and representations as forms of popularculture, at least, from the hegemonic westerncultural/political point of view. Such anapproach broadens our appreciation of popularculture as a culture of conflict not only withinconditions of social subordination but alsowithin the conditions of political/ideologicaldomination as well. There is a close relationshipbetween popular culture and ideology. However,while popular culture often aims at producingmeanings of social experience that are relevant toeveryday life, ideological forms are oftenassociated with and implicated in some form ofpolitical domination.The premise of my argument is that according toLuo popular culture and systems of thought, thehuman body is deployed as a figurative code formodes of thought, feelings, and characteristicsthat do not coincide with English idiom. Dho-Luo (Luo language) "compels its speakers tointegrate the moral and physical attributes ofpersons together within the matrix of the humanbody" (Lienhardt, 1985). The Luo people, likethe Tallensi of Ghana (La Fontaine, 1985), theDinka of Sudan (Lienhardt, 1985) and theOromo of Ethiopia (Jackson and Ivan, 1990),seem to link human physiology and psychology.The body as a unit emerges as a narrative textand "enjoys a very special place as a literaryobject in Luo oral art" (Amuka, 1991). Luoconception of "self" and "person-hood" istherefore, quite different from the westernsystems of thought. For example, according tomainstream western epistemology, "there hasnever existed a human being who has not beenaware, not only of his body, but also at the sametime of his individuality, both spiritual andphysical" (Mauss, 1985). However, as I willargue and elaborate later, among the Luo people,when an individual is under the influence of"juogi" spirit possession, self-consciousness istemporarily suspended and the individualpossessed has no subjective experience of thepossession.Cultural-linguistic codesSince it is often on the basis of the languagesthey speak that people define themselves and theworld in which they live, language is quite134central to the process of transmitting culturalmeanings of popular culture. It is in the realm oflanguage that the struggle between the forces ofincorporation and resistance over meanings ismost profoundly contested. Learning a people'sworld-view and how they represent theirthoughts in rhetorical and symbolic codesinvolve more than learning the grammatical rulesof their language. It involves learning thepeople's shared institutionalized uses of languageand language-like sign systems including thecultural-linguistic codes or generic forms derivedfrom the practice of living communication.While the grammatical forms remain stable andcompulsory for interlocutors, the generic formstend to belong to the domain of popular cultureand "are much more flexible, plastic and free"(Bakhtin, 1986). It is precisely due to theirflexibility and plasticity that these generic formsof rhetoric and representation often resisttranslation into other languages. Speech genresbelong to the domain of popular culture. Theytend to vary in terms of the language used, themoral judgments made and the subject positionsof respective interlocutors.During the British colonial rule, some Luoliterary writers deployed popular vernacularspeech codes as rhetorical modes to satirize thesubordinating aspects of the colonial ideology.Others engaged the English language in a kind of"guerrilla warfare." They appropriated it butinvested it with "untranslatable" generic conceptsand codes derived from the domain of popularculture. In both cases, the writers oftensucceeded in articulating subtle opposition toand resistance against the dominant "masternarrative." Let me illustrate this point byrecounting the full text of a popular short story,“Dhaw e kind Karan gi Jawir range” (Strifebetween a clerk and a painter) written byShadrack Malo. Here is my literal translation:“At a certain school, there were two employees,a painter and a store-manager who managed theschool's storeroom. Although the two livedtogether under one roof, they detested each otherthat they even had separate hearths. Both werebachelors. One day, the two had a quarrel andexchanged bitter words on their way until theyarrived at their place of work. The source of theirdifference was that the store-manager suspected

135Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the painter of stealing some paint since the paintwas depleting fast incommensurate with theamount of painting done. When the painterheard about the store-manager’s suspicions fromother people, he approached him in order toverify the validity of the allegations. The storemanagerinquired whether he also admitted thathe was indeed a thief. When the painter heardthat question, he began to shout vehemently. Hewas accusing the store-manager of slander, “Okinyal ketho nyinga kamano, ng’at matin tinni”(You should not destroy my name like that, yousmall person). Presently, their employer, a whiteman, overheard the commotion and summonedthem to his office. He inquired about theirdifferences. The painter belched out hiscomplaint: “Bwana, ng’at matin tinni, keth iyerach” ("Bwana, this small person, the bile of hisstomach is bad"). However, the white man, whoalso spoke the Luo language, could notcomprehend such expression. Hence, hesuggested that he provide the store-manager witha sick-sheet so that he (store-manager) could goand consult with a doctor about his badbile. However, the store-manager declined,insisting that he was not ill. The painter alsoconfirmed that the store-manager indeed was notill but only “the bile of his stomach was bad”(Keth iye ema rach). Now, the white man couldnot understand their complaint and so hedismissed them to resume their respective dutywarning them to cease quarreling forthwith sincenone was ill and that their quarrels werebaseless” (Malo).The breakdown in communication is quiteevident. Why should the two Luo workers on theone hand and their employer on the other fail tounderstand each other when they speak the samelanguage? How do we interpret or understandthe apparent referential aberration, "the bile ofhis stomach is bad?" The narrative demonstratesthe extent to which Malo deploys codes of thehuman body both as a mode of thought and as arhetorical strategy for satirizing the excesses andinsensitivity of British colonial rule.Speech GenresThe narrative demonstrates the extent to whichspeech genres are dependent upon both the135practices of living communication andgrammatical systems of language. The whiteman comprehends “keth iye rach” (the bile of hisstomach is bad) in the literal referential sense.Whereas he correctly comprehends the stockepithet at the level of mimesis, both the storekeeper(clerk) and the painter comprehend it infigurative terms. Riffatere explains that suchstock epithets are “regulated by tradition, by ahistorically definable esthetic system; that samesystem dictates the words’ interrelationships(especially their perception as signs of values)”.Not only does Malo demonstrate thedisplacement and distortion of the stock epithetat the mimesis level, he also shows itsappropriate deployment within Dho-Luosemiotic grid as well. In this way, he subtlysatirizes the white man's limited comprehensionof the local people's narrative environment.Narrative environment basically refers to theway people of a linguistic community talk toeach other. The writer has also demonstrated theconsequent disillusionment of the subordinatedpeople under colonial domination.When the painter and the store-manager insistthat the latter is not sick but only "the bile of hisstomach is bad," they are quite comprehensibleto each other. Clearly their “semantic field” isderived from Luo popular culture and dependentupon the culture-bearer's point of view. Thewhite man’s comprehension of the stock phraseis based on his competent fluency in Dho-Luoand knowledge of its grammar. The twoemployees on the one hand and the white manon the other regard their respective semanticfields as accurate, sensible and appropriate. Anyother meanings beyond the structural plane aresenseless or "mere noise making" as the whiteman soon observes. The failure incommunication is therefore caused by theinterpretation of a popular Dho-Luo genericmode of speech.Bakhtin draws a distinction between forms oflanguage and utterances or speech genres. Heargues that these genres are quite diverse sincethey differ depending on the situation, socialposition and personal interrelationships of theinterlocutors. Bakhtin further observes that, "aspeaker is given not only mandatory forms of the

136Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012national language (lexical composition andgrammatical structure) but also forms ofutterances that are mandatory". Unlike theutterance, he argues, the sentence as a unit oflanguage "lacks the capability of determining thedirectly active responsive position of thespeaker. Only after becoming a completeutterance does the individual sentence acquirethis capability”. Consequently, any sentence,being a signifying unit of language iscomprehensible, that is, "we understand itslanguage meaning, its possible role in anutterance. But in no way can we assume aresponsive position with respect to thisindividual sentence unless we know that withthis sentence the speaker has said everything hewishes to say "(Bakhtin, 1986). In other words,the sentence must reflect extra-verbal reality(situation or code) hence, becoming anutterance. The utterance is dependent upon boththe preceding and subsequent links in the chainof speech communion.Utterances, ultimately, reflect specific spheres ofcommunication. Hence, according to the painterand the store-manager in Malo's story, "keth iyerach" (the bile of his stomach is bad) hasnormative significance as comprehended withinthe context of Luo popular culture. As individualspeakers of the language, they have not createdsuch normative values. The generic codes aregiven as typical popular utterances. Significantly,people neither speak in individual words norindividual sentences but in utterances. The formsof language and the typical forms of utterances"enter our experience and our consciousnesstogether, and in close connection with oneanother" (Bakhtin, 1986). Hence, to learn tospeak also implies to learn to constructutterances. According to Luo popular thought,the expression, "keth iye rach" (the bile of hisstomach is bad), does not refer to a person'sphysical ailment. It implies that a person ismalicious. Before exploring such figurative codesof the body in detail, I would like to brieflyexamine some popular Luo notions andunderstanding of self-identity.Self and personThe Luo notion of “self” and “other” appears asa social structure whereby the structure is fairlyconsistent with normative pattern of personalresponsibilities and social loyalties. Significantly,the individual's corporeal body emerges as ametaphor for selfhood in terms of "chuny"(heart), "wich" (head) and "ich" (stomach).However, since each individual is born into adescent group or clan, the Luo people alsoconceptualize self-identity in terms of collectiveidentity. "Juogi" (ancestral or spiritual) namessymbolize this "collectivity" since the peopleregards ancestors as reincarnated in newbornindividuals. Towards this end, the individual’sself-awareness could come under the influence ofancestral spirits particularly in spirit possessionswhereby the self temporarily loses his/heragency. Since ancestral spirit names reflect thecollectivity of the clan, each individual has a"collective alter ego." The Luo notions ofidentity and representation can shed light onAfrican people’s systems of thought.It is instructive to point out that many scholarshave written about African ideas of the self thatrightly emphasize the importance of a person’sgroup and status (the public self). However, thisemphasis "can deflect interest” from the Africanconcern that also regards individuals’ selves interms of their awareness of their unique identities(Lienhardt, 1985). The "self" in the Africanworld-view and particularly within the Luocognition, is labile. It is both private (marked byrespective individual’s self-awareness of his/herunique identity), and public (marked by society’sconfirmation of that identity as of socialsignificance) (La Fontaine, 1985). On the onehand, the metaphysical and epistemologicalanalysis of the "self" as the "conscious possessionof experience” is a crucial criterion of identity(Rorty, 1977). On the other hand, analysis of the"self" also closely links it to the notion of“person”- a “unified center of choice and action,the unit of legal and theological responsibility”(Rorty, 1977). In this respect, the “ego-centric”(experiential) and “socio-centric” (cultural and136

137Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012ethical) notions of selfhood and personhood arenot in opposition but subsist on one another.Ontological symbols of selfhoodAs I have observed, the Luo people deploy thephysical human body as a metaphor for modesof thought. There are three significant sets of"ontological" symbols that, invariably, constituteselfhood: “chuny” (heart or liver), “wich” (head)and “ich” (stomach).HeartDho-Luo unlike English makes a lexicaldistinction between the physical and moralcontent of “chuny” (heart). “Chuny” refers to thephysical organ, the liver, but it is also “the site ofthe intellect and ethical emotions and wisdom ofa person” (Ocholla-Ayayo, 1976). For example,when a person says, “Ahero chamo chuny” (Ilike to eat the liver), he or she refers to thephysical organ and deploys "chuny" without anysuggestions of moral or mental condition. On theother hand, when one says, “Chunye ler”(practically, “his or her heart or liver is clean")one refers to the moral idea of kindness. Theexpression, “Dhano jakwadh chunye” (A personis the shepherd of his or her heart) refers to anindividual as a private entity. The Luo therefore,deploy the "heart," as do the Yaka of Zaire, as“the seat of intuition, comprehension andgrowing innerness” (Devisch, 1990). Otherrelated popular expressions include, “Chunyeariyo” (he or she has two hearts). This means theperson is undecided. “Chunye chuok” (he or shehas a short heart) refers to a quarrelsome person.“Chunye gondalo” (his or her heart iscalculating) means he or she is in deep thought.“Chunye gwa-gwa” (his or her heart is hoarse)means he or she is apprehensive.Luo literary writers, such as Malo, often deploythese metaphors of the body in their works forvarious effects. Apparently, when one casts themetaphors into a "foreign language" such asEnglish, by way of translation, they lose theircontextual and aesthetic values. Such genericcodes could best be understood as “ideologems”that express hidden judgments. Theysimultaneously indicate the subject (denotation)and evaluate it (connotation). Their “contextualpotential is included in their meaning, which isstable and pre-supposes a definite attitude of thespeaker to the signified object”(Epstein,1995). For example, in his novel, Otieno Achach(Otieno, the Misguided), Alloo Konjra refers tothe mental attributes of “chuny” when he writesthat “E kor yo, chunye ne pod thagore kodmirima . . . . To ahinya, chunye nosingore manawang’o od ja-sike cha mana ei odhiambono”(“On the way, his heart was struggling withanger. . . . But even more, his heart was bent onsetting the house of that enemy of his on fire”).The literal translation does not even come closeto capturing the full impact of theexpression. When describing Otieno’s regret,Alloo explains, “Chuny Otieno koro neneong’awore mokalo” (The heart of Otieno wasextremely suspended).In her novel, Miaha (Ogot, 1983), Grace Ogotalso refers to “chuny” in figurative senses whenshe explains, “To kara wach ma nene WereOchak owacho kaka ngerano nene ochwanyochuny Lwak” (However, that remark that WereOchak meant as a joke struck the heart of Lwak).This implies that Lwak became angry. However,the heart is deployed differently by Leo OderaOmolo in his short story, “Ng’at Mane KiaSomo” (Omolo, 1967) (The Man who Could notRead). He states that “Kata kamano nene ok enkod chuny mar nywomo nyako mokia somo”(However, he did not have the heart for weddinga bride who could not read) (Kia Somo 21). Theheart is deployed in this instance to meanreluctance. In other words, the man wasreluctant to marry the girl. The spiritual heart ofa human being, as Ocholla-Ayayo observes, is"situated somewhere beneath the end of thecentral cartilage, a spot believed to be occupiedby the physical heart, adundo". "Chuny" is alsodeployed as the pivotal center in suchexpressions as “chuny nam” (the heart of thelake) and “oboke mayom mag chuny yien”(tender leaves at the heart of trees) (Lansdown,1969).HeadSelf-hood is not only defined in terms of “chuny”but also in terms of “wich” (head). The world of“chuny” and “wich” are closely related.However, as Ocholla-Ayayo points out,137

138Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012“sometimes it would appear as if the heart does alot of work for the brain, since decision and greatthoughts are the works of heart and not thebrain”.“Wich” (head) is associated with knowledge,memory, perception and skill. The popular Luosaying, “Wich e dhano” (The head is theperson), means that presence of mind defines aperson. The head endows the individual personwith self-perception. Hence, the Luo cautionaryremark, “Nene okuny dhano to owe biero” (Wasthe human being buried instead of the afterbirth),draws aparallel between a living, conscious person and a"dead" organ discarded at birth. The saying isoften deployed in circumstances when somebodyhas made serious errors of judgment. Ogot delvesdeeper into her character's consciousness whenshe writes, “To gimoro nene osige ni kik onyisNyawir paro ma nene thageno. Nyawir nenewiye ringo matek” (But something cautionedhim not to tell Nyawir whatever was troublinghim. Nyawir had a head that raced very fast)(Miaha 111). To have a “head that races fast” inLuo popular discourse implies to be imprudent.However, the English lexicon, being relativelyabstract, cannot fully capture the concreteexpressive metaphor of Dho-Luo.The head is responsible when a person has beenmisled. In his novel, Otieno Achach, Alloocomments that “Kinde mathoth Otieno noyudowach ni min dware, to dhakono nowilo wiyechuth” (On many occasions, Otieno wasinformed that his mother summoned him, butthat woman completely twisted his head). Inother words, he procrastinated having fallen tothe enchantments of the woman. Whereas theexpression, “wiye obiro marach” (his or her headhas become bad) refers to a mental state ofinsanity, “wiye otimo pi” (his or her headcontains water) refers to a stupid person. In hisshort story, Omolo comments about thestubbornness of a character in his story, “Ng’atmenene oromo gi makolwer” (The person whoencountered the un-primed). He writes, “WuonAgulu kaka pile nene en jago-no ma wiye tek ento nene ok owinj weche jotelogi” (The son ofAgulu, as usual, was a person with a hard head,he never heeded the words of these138overseers). To have a “hard head” in Luopopular thought means to be obstinate. In fact,even the lexeme, “makolwer,” is a motivatedsign that is both descriptive and evaluative. It'sEnglish equivalent “the un-primed” onlycaptures its descriptive but not evaluative values.Significantly, “Wuon Agulu,” at the referentiallevel, translates as “father of Agulu” but whentrans-coded into the process of meta-lingualsemiosis, it shifts the borders of semantic field tomean “son of Agulu.” In another short story,Omolo narrates, “Luoro kende gi wich kuotnotamo Ojwang’ dhi waro dhoge dala gi Akech”(“Fear alone and a swollen head preventedOjwang' from going to reclaim his head of cattlefrom the homestead of Akech) (Kia Somo 23). Inother words, Ojwang’ was embarrassed.StomachAccording to Luo systems of thought, "ich"(stomach) is a metaphor for transgressive andanti-social feelings. “Ich” (stomach) is “like theblack box of perturbed and anti-social feelings”(Devisch, 1990). Anger, selfishness, and greedare all located within the stomach. Ocholla-Ayayo aptly explains that the “function of thestomach, according to the Luo, goes beyond thatof digesting food alone”. A telling example ofthis deployment in a literary text is when Alloodescribes a character's anger. He explains, “Iyenene owang’ ahinya ka noneno ka chotnenidhialo wuoth ei pacho ka” (His stomach wasextremely aflame on seeing his lover treadingabout within this compound). In other words, hebecame very angry. Related examples includethe expression, “Iye kwar” (He or she has a redstomach) that refers to selfishness. “Iye lit” (Heor she has a sore stomach) refers to a stingyperson. “Iye bor” (he or she has a long stomach)refers to a greedy person.It is along similar lines that we should interpret"keth iye rach" (the bile of his stomach is bad) inMalo’s short story. When the painter accuses thestore-manager, “Bwana, ng’at matin tinni, kethiye rach” (Bwana, this small person, the bile ofhis stomach is bad), he evokes an organ of thestomach that is associated with bitterness. Thelexical choices in the story convey the tensionsabout social status and re-enforce the narrative'saesthetic flavor. “Bwana” is a loan word from

139Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Kiswahili that, in the context of the story, isdeployed as a title of honor. It is a title of respectthat conveys the respect the painter has for theirwhite employer. However, to refer to somebodyas "ng'at matin tinni" in Dho-Luo vernaculardiscourse communicates an attitude of disrespectand detestation. In Luo popular thought, theexpression is loaded with stereotypicalconnotations meant to belittle the social andmoral standing of the addressee. The painterpresumably knows the proper name of hishousemate but chooses to refer to himstereotypically as a foreigner thereby seeking toerase his mate’s social status. "Ng'ato"(somebody), as in the expression, "ng'at matintinni," erases one's identity. It also denies anderases a person's network of affective relationsand casts him or her among strangers. Indeed, itis "synonymous with the stranger, an alien,possibly even an enemy" (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989). An individual is not onlyperceived in terms of personal identity but also interms of social identity.The concept of “juogi” and social identityNaming systems within the context of personaland socio-cultural identity identifies anddescribes a person directly but also in terms ofculturally defined aspects. As I have argued, theLuo popular culture tends to regard selfhood interms of "chuny" (heart), "wich" (head) and "ich"(stomach). When a person has died, the Luopeople refer to the state as "chunye ochot"(figuratively, his or her heart has snapped)."Chuny" is regarded as the vital force that"snaps" from the physical body at the time ofdeath. According to Luo systems of thought,when "chuny" has snapped or left the physicalbody, it becomes "tipo" (shadow). The unanimatedphysical body, which is soon buried, isreferred to as "ringre" (body withoutconsciousness). Ongong'a notes that in observinghow the Luo people "treat a dead man's bodyand how they speak about him afterwards, onewould have no occasion for doubt that theybelieve there is a part of man that survives deathand one that goes to the grave". "Tipo" (thespiritual entity of a person) survives the deadbody and joins the constellation of ancestralspirits collectively referred to as "juogi." Juogi or139Jok is "the force behind every being, the essencethat makes a being what it is" (Ongong’a, 1983).In Luo popular thought, growth to adulthoodthat starts with the physical birth and namingceremony through puberty and marriage ends inthe death of the physical body but notextinction. Death is merely a process thatremoves a person gradually from the present to afuture identified with the ancestralperiod. Ongong'a aptly explains how the Luopeople view death:It is a gateway, a bridge, a line of demarcationwhich divides the world of human beings and theworld of spirits. . . . Each time it occurs, it breaksthe normal course of life and shakes the moralfoundations of society to such an extent thatreligious rites must be performed to neutralize itseffects and bring the society back to normal.Such popular beliefs in personal immortality areevident in many Luo funeral rites. For instance,the Luo traditional patriarchal culture requiresthat when a young un-married woman dies, herbody must be buried outside the fenced hedge ofher parents' homestead. This must be observedlest her spirit "returns" to haunt her female agemateswithin the compound. Dho-Luo saying,"Ng'a motho neno" (A dead person seeseverything), is a tautological statement thatemphasizes personal immortality.I mentioned at the beginning of this discussionthat some Luo literary writers, writing inEnglish, sometimes engage the language in akind of "guerrilla warfare." This refers toinstances when they figuratively appropriate anddeploy untranslatable codes of body in theirworks. For example, Ogot makes references topopular Luo beliefs about the dead when shedescribes a scene in her short story, The GreenLeaves. She explains, "Omoro raised his voice,‘Let not the enemy die in your hands. His spiritwould rest upon our village. Let him give up theghost when we have returned to our huts'. To"give up the ghost" refers to the process whenseparation occurs between the "tipo" and"ringre." Such representations convey the deepseatedpopular Luo cosmological belief thatdeath does not end life but is merely a change ofa person's level of existence. Non-Luo readers of

140Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Ogot's narrative would, most probably, fail tocomprehend such generic codes although thewriter writes in English.Anyumba acknowledges that "juogi" spiritsplayed a very important part in the life of Luopeople and that once a person died he or sheentered another abode of mysteriousexistence. The spirit of the dead was notexpected to be visible to the naked eye hence, ifsuch a spirit appeared to a living person as"naked or with wildly grown hair or as a corpse,it was invariably a 'jachien'" (Anyumba, 1954) oras Ocholla-Ayayo observes, a malevolent "eviljuogi". Anyumba identifies two types of "juogi"spirits: "yamo" (the unknown spirits) thatmanifest themselves in body rashes, swellingsand chest discomfort and "the known spirits" orspirits of dead relatives. The "known spirits"manifest themselves in spirit-possessions andwhoever is under such possession becomes wild,trembles and wildly jabbers (dhum) or speak intongues. In this respect, an individualtemporarily loses his or her self-agency andawareness and submits to vital forces beyond therealm of self-consciousness. In Luo popularthought, spirit possession (juogi) isconceptualized not in terms of a supreme god butas Ocholla-Ayayo explains, traceable to thedeparted ancestors in the "underworld".Personal identity and "juogi" namesOne significant representation of the individualperson is personal name. Ocholla-Ayayo pointsout that according to Luo popular culture, "anindividual did not hold his personal identity withthe physical body alone. Personal identity wastraced through characters, personal spirits andsocial identity of parents. The clan identity wastraced through the clan founder". Personalidentity is therefore, not conceptualized as aprivate center of narrative gravity as in mostWestern modes of thought but in terms of "anetwork of affective relations with brother, uncle,grand-father, in-law. . . . The individual's identityis crucial in terms of the structuring ofcommunication, civility and co-operation"(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989)140I have mentioned that personal identity is alsotraced in terms of personal spirits(juogi). Personal immortality is enhanced byfriends and relatives of the deceased throughcertain symbolic communions and rites includingnaming newly born babies after deadpeople. Such names are collectively referred to as"nyinge juogi" (spirit names). "Juogi" names arenot arbitrarily assigned. In Luo popular thought,when an ancestor wants a child to be namedafter him or her, the child will cry incessantly,refusing food and sleep, until the name of thedead ancestor is invoked (Kawango, 1995). Thename could be revealed in a dream or throughdivination by seers (jolek) or fortune-tellers(jobilo). According to Adhiambo-Oduol, thevalue attached to the exact naming "was the needto give the particular child protection byinvoking the real name of the deceased person:such a child would be protected by the spirit ofthe person it is named after. The name wasreferred to as ‘nying juogi' - spiritual name".However, children named after departedrelatives had other names based on events ortimes of birth. Such names were preferred in dayto-dayinteractions unlike "juogi" names thatwere held in high esteem (Adhiambo-Oduol andJacqueline, 1997).According to Luo popular beliefs, there is nofixed maximum number of names given to aparticular child. It is instructive therefore, tostress Ocholla-Ayayo's observation that to a"great extent, Luo names are based on theprinciple of the sun's position during the day andits corresponding positions by night". Suchnames are not "juogi" names although some ofthem could become "juogi" names. Juogi namesof departed relatives are given to newly bornchildren only if the deceased bore children of hisor her own. Juogi names are sometimes givendomestic and pet animals in order to invokeparticular spirits and endow the animal sonamed with characteristics of the respectivedeparted person. "Juogi" is also called uponduring the launching of a fishing vessel orboat. As Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo explain,"there is the rebirth of the ‘jok,' the controllingspirit force, after whom the boat has beennamed; there is an appeal to the jok and to thespirits of the lake to accept the boat as worthy".

141Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Juogi names are particularly treasured among theLuo. They locate respective individuals’ identityin a given genealogy and symbolically identifythem within family and clan networks. Ocholla-Ayayo observes that among the Luo people, notonly was the name a part of a person's being asthe soul and the body but also "a man's name asan essential part of him, so that the blotting outof the name of an individual was synonymouswith his destruction". "Rito nying" (namepreservation) is a crucial obligation for theindividual. Conversely, "ketho nying" (namedestruction) or talking ill of someone is anunforgivable offense. In Malo's short story, it istherefore, no wonder that the painter complainsbitterly, "Ok inyal ketho nyinga kamano, ng'atmatin tinni" (You should not destroy my namelike that, you small man). Ocholla-Ayayo alsostates:Being as a value is related to many otherconcepts such as individual growth, protection ofpersonal being, and includes those related to selfindividualization,and self-actualization. This isclear when a person's name is questioned, whenhis honor and prestige or dignity, whichrepresent his being, are polluted or contaminatedby non-valued actions or language symbolizingthem. It is in this respect that the painter inMalo's story feels that his actual being, hischaracter, his name, has been “polluted.”Due to the normative significance of utterances,translation of Luo figurative body's coding intoWestern languages often leads to a loss of theirreferential niceties and aesthetic. I have arguedthat some Luo writers writing in English at timestake for granted that their readers would be ableto comprehend the motivated and evaluativegeneric concepts they use. For instance, GraceOgot narrates a story about Achieng,' one ofchief Mboga's spouses, who has delivered twins(Ogot, 1988). Since the Chief desires a son, thespouse decides to abandon the female twin bythe well, where she went to draw water, andtakes home only the male twin. The mothernames her abandoned girl-child, “Apiyo.” Ogotdoes not explain the choice for this particulargeneric name. One can assume that in any case,the mother abandons her baby hence nobody141would address her by that name anyway! Anelderly woman later retrieves the abandonedbaby and takes her to her home and brings herup to maturity as a foster child. Within heradopted family space, the girl-child is named"Awiti." Once again Ogot offers no explanationfor preferring this name.I would like to argue that either Ogot took it forgranted that her non-Luo readers wouldcomprehend the normative significance of suchLuo names or she was out to play the "guerrillawar" with the English language. The non-Luoreader would certainly, miss the meta-lingualsignificance of such generic codes as "Apiyo"and "Awiti" since they are incomprehensiblebeyond Luo popular culture and systems ofthought. According to Luo cosmic principles,"Apiyo" is the name given to the first-born twinif the baby is female. The second born is named"Adongo" if female. If male, the respectivenames given are "Opiyo" and "Odongo." Awiti(female) or Owiti (male) are names given toabandoned babies by those who have retrievedthem. However, without sufficient elucidation ofthis meta-lingual code, non-Luo readers wouldcertainly not grasp the sub-textual codes. Perhapsa more complicated system of Luo social identityis the way virtue boasting names are deployed.Virtue boasting namesDavid Parkin (Parkin, 1978) explains that "therecognition among the Luo that socio-economicstatus is most easily observed and measuredthrough the achievements of an individual ratherthan a group is expressed in the concept ‘sunga'(a proud person)". However, let me point outthat "sunga" does not accurately translate as a"proud person" but simply "pride." "Pakruok"(virtue boasting) or "Chamo nyadhi" (selflaudation),as the genre is popularly known, ischaracterized by “sunga.” Virtue boasting is apopular symbolic name preservationperformance that glorifies certain normativetraits of one's own family, lineage, or clan. Forinstance, a man may boast: "An Opiyo Ochwinjookew g'Opondo Malwiny, oyieyo ma dak kodi githuon kata idagi" (I am Opiyo Ochwinjo nephewof Opondo Malwiny, the rat that shares yourliving space by force whether you like it or not).In this instance, the man identifies himself with

142Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012his maternal uncle. He regards himself as the ratwhich forces its way to reside in a hut against theowner's wishes. In other words, not only does heboast about his incredible qualities but alsolocates his individual identity within a networkof family relationships as well. In Ogot's novel,Miaha, Lwak refers to her son as "Owiny, badedongo" (Owiny, he who has big arms). This is aform of virtue boasting that expresses Lwak'sfondness for her son's kindness and generosity.Owiny may physically have quite small arms.The significance of virtue boasting names, associal identity markers, are perhaps best realizedduring traditional Luo nyatiti (lyre) popularperformances. During such live performances,members of the audience do often profuselyrecite their many praise-names and chant theirself-laudations with abandon. This is normallyregarded as "moso jathum" (saluting themusician). During such live "nyatiti"performances, the harpist or musician usuallycomposes and embellishes his songs by thepraise-names of the members of his immediateaudience. The popular Luo saying, "Thum weromana ng'ama nitie" (A song is composed only forwhoever is in attendance), indeed attests to thispractice. Apart from certain formulaicrenditions, subtle innuendoes, and pervasivecomments, "nyatiti" musical performances arecharacterized by nothing more than excessivelaudations and strings of virtue boasting namesspiced with scurrilous asides.Indexical representations of the bodyThere are also some popular indexicalrepresentations of the body that often defytranslation. These include body attire such asclothing and sandals. For instance, a person'sagency can be arrested and manipulated byanother person through certain ritualisticpractices. Let me illustrate this by referring to ascene in Alloo’s novel, Otieno Achach,(Alloo,1966). In the novel, Otieno decides to kill amalicious medicine man (jandagla). Alloowrites, "Koro paro nobirone kowacho ni‘Jaduong'ni losruokne ema adwaro gajego' nimarOtieno nong'eyo ni losruok mar ng'ato nyalonege ka losruokno okingi kata oling' e bur ogwe"(He soon resolved that ‘I want to betray this old142man using his own excrement.' This is becauseOtieno had known that a person could be killedif his own excrement was bewitched or castinside the hole of a lizard). However, securingthe excrement of the old man was not an easytask. The old man was also well versed in thepopular generic discourse of witchcraft and so heused to help himself very early in the morning ata riverbank so that the offal was washedaway. Otieno eventually succeeds in trickingOlambo, the old man, into casting lethal magicalspells on his own bodily excuviae therebycondemning himself to death. By unknowinglycasting his spells on his own excrement, Olambosucceeds in destroying his own potency, vitalityand agency. This is an apt example of popularLuo beliefs in the potency of a person asextending to his or her bodily excretions.The vital essence of a person also resides in hisor her shadow. An individual can lose his or hervitality if his or her shadow falls on anotherperson. The intruder is usually reprimanded,"We madho remba!" (Do not suck my blood!). Insuch instances, the vital essence of the subject isbelieved to be trickling and bolstering theintruder's own self-potency. Certain religiomagicospells can also be concocted with themalicious intention of robbing a person of his orher self-agency. An apt illustration from Cohenand Atieno-Odhiambo may shed light on this:One day in 1957, in Ugenya, Miruka Jalam wasbeating a girl who was wailing loudly for help. . .. When the owner of the ‘dala' intervened,Miruka shouted back that she had ‘tied'(bewitched) him and that she had refused to cooperatein removing the spell. Peace was notrestored until Miruka had found the cause underhis pillow: three ears of still-green star grass.In other words, the girl had used the star grass torender her lover temporarily sexually inactive.This is therefore, one instance where anindividual has lost his potency due to someritualistic machinations on his body. Such secretcodes belong to the domain of Luo popularculture and systems of thought.Significantly, among the Luo people, when aperson has drowned in the river or lake so thathis or her body cannot be retrieved for burial, anaspect of the dead person's clothing is

143Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012symbolically, taken as his or her representationand accorded full burial rites. In case nothing ofthe bodily margins is found, then a special fruit,"yago" (sausage-fruit), is appropriatedsymbolically as his or her body and consequentlyaccorded full funeral rites as befitting his or herstatus within the community. All these types ofsymbolization of the body are deemedappropriate purification and pacification of adeparted person's spirit. They are meant to avertpossible "chien" (ghostly vengeance).Iconic representations of the bodyThere are instances when representations of thehuman body's actual representations are visiblyaltered in a manner quite inconsistent withverisimilitude. The body's coding in the popularLuo board game of "ajua" is an example of thisform of representation. Such representations canonly have meaning when understood within thepopular Luo notions of person-hood. The humanbody is distorted in such a way that ridicules orsubverts any approximation towards reality. Insuch instances, the body is "appropriated as asemiotically charged magnet of social andaesthetic forces" (Ogembo, 2005). The "ajua''board-game resembles the game of chess. The"ajua" wooden board (wer) has eight adjacentdepressions (udi) in which small pebbles (alsocalled "ajua") are dropped and removed in theprocess of the game. Examined closely, "ajuareveals sophisticated artistry in which imitationof what is real and what is unreal becomesapparent. It imitates human physiology. But acloser look reveals detailed deformitiesdestroying the realism in it" (Ogembo, 2005).Each of the depressions is named according toorgans or parts of the human body. There aresixteen depressions in total, eight on either sideof the board. Symbolically, the eight depressionsrepresent two human beings lying flat downadjacent to each other but facing oppositedirections. It is as if one's head faces the directionof the other's toes. However, the body partsappear deformed in a way that conveys a senseof de-familiarization. For example, from the foot(tielo), the next depression is the buttocks (pier).This is followed by the thigh (bam), the eye(wang'), the waist (nungo), the chest (kor), the143neck (ng'ut), and finally the head (wich) in thatorder."Ajua" is a complex game that represents whatOgembo refers to as "the syntactical coordinationof symbols or syntagm". The signsand symbols are not stagnant but their meaningsaccrue from their dynamic movement. Ogemboexplains:And when the symbols move, they change theiraesthetic significance. For this reason, a player orspectator cannot appreciate the game unless helearns to see the signs and symbols as anetwork. The movement of one sign willtransform the next and in turn the third or moreand a player who is unable to keep track of thechanges in syntax will be paralysed as he wouldmost likely be caught contravening the rules.The game of "ajua" is also loaded with lewdimages and symbolism that defy adequatetranslation. Curiously, the depressions havedifferent "fertility" values that must be contestedin order for one player to emerge the winner. Forinstance, the eye (wang') is the most infertiledepression while the buttocks (pier) the mosthighly productive. As Ogembo infers, "since'pier' may also mean the female reproductiveorgans in Dho-Luo, it is not a wonder that it isthe most prolific as far as reproduction in ajuagoes". During "ajua" game, players are at libertyto deploy lewd and sarcastic remarks. Forinstance, one often hears such sexuallysuggestive expressions as "chuowo thuon"(spearing with the cock) and "turo tielo"("breaking the leg"). The latter expressionfiguratively, means also "to impregnate." Otherlewd expressions include "soko wang'" (pokingthe eyes) and "nindo e bam" (lying on thethighs). The sexually explicit verbal discourse ispopularly viewed and accepted as part and parcelof any “ajua” performance. This type ofdistortion or rupture of the body communicatesthe Luo people's attempts to come to terms withthe human body both as a contingent and sacredtext. It is an example of the rhetoric ofrepresentation whereby the Luo people attemptto influence or re-create the corporeal body bytemporarily challenging its physical form. Thebody is deployed as a hypogrammatic derivation.Such figurative and symbolic representations of

144Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the body are instances of generic coding thatbelong to the realm of Luo popular culture.ConclusionIn this paper, I have attempted to shed somelight on popular Luo notions and symbolicrepresentations of the human body. I haveargued that according to Luo systems of thought,the human body is appropriated as a hypogram.The body's coding is deployed in representingpersonal and social identities. The physical bodyas an entity is both private and public. It is thelocus of individual self-awareness and identitybut this personal identity is also conceptualizedin terms of socio-cultural identity. I have pointedout that within the Luo cognition and popularliterary expression the moral and physicalattributes of an individual person are integratedtogether within the matrix of the human bodyand by extension, also within spiritual names,items of clothing, and other symbolicrepresentations of the body. By makingreferences to the popular Luo board game of"ajua," I have illustrated how the Luo people,sometimes, not only conceptualize the body as asymbolic code but also represent it in the termsof semantic indirection. According to Luopopular thought, the physical human body is notonly deployed as a metaphor for modes ofthought. The body's figurative coding are alsodeployed in popular virtue boasting and by Luoliterary writers. The body's coding and itssymbolic representation belong to the domain ofLuo popular culture. They invariably, lose theirsignificance and aesthetic values when cast in"foreign" referential realms.ReferencesAdhiambo-Oduol and Jacqueline, H. (1997)Culture Dimension of InterpretiveStrategies: A Linguistic Study of DholuoProverbs and Sayings Contesting SocialDeath: Essays on Gender and Culture.Eds. Wanjiku M. Kabira et al. Nairobi:KOLA, 1997 19-28.Alloo, C.K. (1966) Otieno Achach. Nairobi:EAPH, 1966.Amuka, P. (1991) An Oral Reading of theWritten: The Example of Masira Ki144Ndaki. British Council Seminar. Eldoret-Kenya Sep. 1991.Anyumba, H.O. (1954) Spirit Possession amongthe Luo of Central Nyanza. Kampala:Arts Research Prize. Makerere U.Bakhtin, M.M. (1986) Speech Genres and OtherLate Essays. Trans. Vern W. McGee.Eds. Caryl Emerson and MichaelHolquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.London: James Currey, 1989.Devisch, R. (1990) The Human Body as aVehicle for Emotions among the Yaka ofZaire. Personhood and Agency: TheExperience of Self and the Other inAfrican Cultures. Eds. Michael Jacksonand Ivan Karp. Uppsala Studies inCultural Anthropology 14, 115-133.Epstein, M.N. (1995) After the Future: TheParadoxes of Postmodernism andContemporary Russian Culture. Trans.Anesa Miller-Pogacar. Amherst:Massachusetts UP.Jackson, M. and Ivan, K. (1990) Introduction.Personhood and Agency: TheExperience of Self and Other in AfricanCultures. Eds. Michael Jackson and IvanKarp. Uppsala Studies in CulturalAnthropology 14, 15-30.Kawango, E.A. (1995) Ethnomedical Remediesand Therapies in Maternal and ChildHealth among the Rural Luo. TraditionalMedicine in Africa. Eds. Isaac Sindiga, etal. Nairobi: EAEP, 80-93.La Fontaine, J.S. (1985) Person and Individual:Some Anthropological Reflections.Category of the Person: Anthropology,Philosophy, History. Eds. MichaelCarrithers, et al. Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 123-140.Lansdown, G.N. (1969) Gi Momiyo SibuorRuto Gi Sigende Le moko mag Afrika.London: Macmillan Press Ltd.Lienhardt, G. (1985) Self: public, private: SomeAfrican Representations. The Categoryof the Person. Eds. Michael Carrithers, etal. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 141-155.Malo, S.S.L.M.C.K.L.P., n.d.. Dhaw e kindKaran gi Jawir Range. Sigend Luo

145Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Maduogo Chuny. Kisumu: LakePublishers, n.d., 1-2.Mauss, M. (1985) A Category of the HumanMind: The Notion of Person; the Notionof Self. Category of the Person:Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Eds.Michael Carrithers et al. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 1985Mboya, Paul. Luo Kitgi Gi Timbegi. KenduBay: African Herald Publishing House,1965, 1- 25.Ocholla-Ayayo, A.B.C. (1976) TraditionalIdeology and Ethics among the SouthernLuo. Uppsala: The ScandinavianInstitute of African Studies.Ogembo, J.O. (2005) Art in Ethno-medicine: ACase Study of Juogi. Mysticism Amongthe Luo People in South Nyanza Districtof Western Kenya. PhD Thesis ofUniversity of Cape Town, Published inAmerican Science Commons.Ogot, G. (1983) Miaha. Nairobi: Heinemann.Ogot, G. (1988) The Bamboo Hut. In: LandWithout Thunder. 1968. Nairobi:Heinemann, 1988, p. 27-37.Omolo, L.O. (1967) Ng’at Mane Kia Somo. In:Wasomuru Sigana Mamit: Luo readerBook One.1967. Kisumu: LakePublishers, n.d, p. 21-23.Ongong’a, J.J. (1983) Life and Death: AChristian/Luo Dialogue. Eldoret: GABAPublications, 1983.Parkin, D. (1978) The Cultural Definition ofPolitical Response: Lineal DestinyAmong the Luo. London: AcademicPress.Rorty, A.O. (1977) Identities of Persons. inPersonal Identity Ed. John Perry(University of California Press).145

146Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The Home as a Text: A critical examination of spatio-temporal symbolism in LuocontextJack O. OgemboFaculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Maseno University, PO Box 333 Maseno, Kenya.E-mail: jakogembo@yahoo.co.ukCatherine MuhomaFaculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Maseno University, PO Box 333 Maseno, Kenya.Email: cathymuhoma@gmail.com______________________________________________________________________________AbstractThis article examines the Luo world view, in so far as it manifests meaningfrom the spaces in the home and its environs. The analysis is within thecontext of time and order that dictate human activities chronologically. Timeis construed to be a product of seasons, and upon which the solar systemimpacts heavily on characters as they perform on the platform known as thehome. The time also superimposes itself on the people both in its cyclical andlinear perspectives. Meanings attached to certain symbols and rituals arehighlighted and their attendant associations with ceremonies such planting,harvesting, wedding and burial rites discussed. We argue that though timeand space are invisible, they interact with the Luo home in a metaphoricalmanner that needs interpretation. Upon the interpretation lie etiquette, socialorder and transition. The article also exposes how the Luo use their time andspace in a manner that reveals their identity. As repositories of events, timeand space impose social order and together, they affect production andreproduction thereby determining the economic levels of the community. Tobe healthy, successful or ill is to strike a balance or imbalance between theindividual and the environment. It is argued that the Luo ethno-medicine isdependent on manipulation of these factors in so far as their attendantindigenous principles manage, harness and exploit the resources in theenvironment. The article concludes by showing how these issues underlineLuo narratives in a subtle manner that must be understood if the significanceof stories is to be grasped.Key words: Home, Luo, Spatio-temporal symbolism______________________________________________________________________________IntroductionThe Luo are an ethnic group that lives on theshores of Lake Victoria in East Africa. They arepart of a larger ethnolinguistically connectedpeople that dwell in an area including southernSudan, northern and eastern Uganda, westernKenya, and northern Tanzania. Their ancestorsmigrated from the Southern Sudan and arrived inwhat is now called Kenya in the 15 th Century orthereabouts. They are basically fishermen byinclination, but for the declining catches, theyhave lately taken to farming and keeping ofcattle. The history of the people indicates thatthey followed River Nile because of their interestin fishing. Since they have interacted with wateras the source of their mainstay, their culturalpractices revolve greatly around the water in itsmany forms. It forms the basis for their ritualsand ethno-medicine. Water is a traditionalmedicine, however, if not handled well in linewith traditional taboos that guard its usage, itcan cause illnesses that Western medicine cannotmanage to deal with. Like other ethnic groups,the Luo culture has learnt a lot from their146

147Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012neighbours, like the Luhya, the Abagusi andKalenjin around them. For this matter, someshared customs have evolved in the area. Thatnotwithstanding, the Luo remain a distinctcommunity because of the way they cherishsome of their ‘outdated’ traditions that strangersabhor. This has earned them severecondemnation from sections of the populacewho do not understands nor appreciate thesetraditions. This article offers a tiny windowthrough which some of the complex issuesaround meanings of home and the attendantsymbolisms can be interpreted or monitored.The world as we know it today faces seriouschallenges because of environmentalmismanagement. According to Agnatava(Agnatava, 2010), pollution has been afflictingmankind from the time people started using fire.However, with the advent of the industrialrevolution in the 19 th Century, pollution becameworse. Though technological improvement hasmade it possible to strike oil offshore andonshore and extract it with maximum efficiency,they have been unable to devise methods ofcleaning its undesirable side effects likedischarges emitted into the atmosphere, frequentspillage of oil into the seas and residues on land.Mining for instance, has its adversities.Agnatava goes on to say that industrializationcreated a capitalist culture that entailed divisionof labour and efficient consumption of resources.The population has grown in leaps and bounds,thereby outstripping food supply. The attempt tocope with it through industrialization has createdfaster urbanization, which in turn, has stressedthe earth by demanding excessive resources fromit. She concludes that the carrying capacity ofthe earth has been surpassed and furtherdemands put upon it can only yield automaticdisaster.In the light of the cited challenges, some scholarshave recommended reactivation of indigenousknowledge, skills and practices that havestabilized the society over the years. Theysuggest that this can be done by examining thebelief systems of a people. It is imperative toexamine myths, legends, rituals and world viewsbecause they are the people’s instruments ofsurvival, and construed as the source of a147community’s protection over the years(Gorjestani, 2000). On the other hand, there arescholars such as Shah (Shah, 2002), who hold acontrary opinion. Shah argues that studyingindigenous knowledge would lead to globalizingthem which amounts to theft. He says thiswould be stealing creativity and innovation fromthe people by denying them their rights. Havingconsidered the multiple and controversial voiceson the subject, this article postulates that thatthere is merit in seeking to understand folkknowledge. Hence the following sections delveinto the world view of the Luo regarding theiruse of space, time and sex in the management ofthe community’s resources.The structure of a Luo homesteadThe home is a flippant imagery that generatesmultiple meanings. There are mobile homes orhomes away from home as opposed to fixedhomes. Such homes symbolize a culturalconcept. Some belief systems view the world weinhabit, not as a destination per se, but as atransitory space where human beings are merepassengers heading for other homes, otherworlds, other destinations. Hence, Moltz(Moltz, 2008), finds the concept of homeintriguing in its multiple definitions. Tackling itfrom its synonym “abode”, Molz finds theconcept of home entailing two broad meanings.It could mean a sojourn for a temporary stay orhome where one resides for a long time, even alife time. For that matter, dualism is theterminology that makes it possible for one tothink of home as fixed and stationery, whilesimultaneously, perceiving it as a flux andtemporary. This way, the home becomes fluid,mobile, plural, and static, with all sorts ofcultural attachments and grounding.The structure of a Luo homestead is a fixedpattern whose blueprint has been passed downfrom generation to generation. It is like theconstitution upon which all other legal issues areresolved. Indeed the home is regarded as theplatform or space upon which pirits interminglewith the living, Iteyo (Iteyo, 2009). The unborn,the young and the old must interact in this spacewith the departed ancestors who are known asthe living dead Mbiti (Mbiti, 1975). However, forthe interactions to work well there must be rules

148Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012of engagement. While some people may viewdiscourse about the dead as taboo, for others it ismerely part of cultural heritage. Whatever thecase may be, according to Iteyo, the dead occupyan exalted position among the Luo. This is thereason why the dead must be buried at aparticular space in a particular position. In thisscenario, the right side reflects symbolicmaleness, authority and power, he observes. It isimperative that all the males must be buried onthe right side of the door of the homestead, if youlook towards the gate. Here the male body mustlie on its left side while the female one lies on itsright, thereby re-enacting the traditional sexualpositions that they played in life. For adults, afire known as magenga must be lit for seven daysfor a dead male, and three days in the case of afemale. This is the background against whichthe burial of S.M. Otieno, Cohen & Atieno–Odhiambo (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992)became a national debate. There were legal,cultural, social and historical questions thatrevolved around what constituted a Luohomestead and how that affected the inheritanceof the estate.The time factorWe have seen above how time and space interactwith age and sex of the dead. To grasp theimportance of all this, one needs to know theargument of Dejung (Dejung, 2003), who statesthat time and space are key to life because theyare the containers of happenings or events. Forthis reason, he believes that time imposes socialorder and space carries symbolic meanings.According to this opinion, all social facts orevents are located in particular physical places,thereby being in particular social processes. TheLuo home space and performance on it shouldbe seen against this philosophy. This is howtheir past, present, and future conception ofspace and its structure should be understood. Ittakes a keen observer to interpret the spatialpositions of houses by the manner in which theyhave been built. In the Luo homesteadprototype, the parents must pitch their house atthe top of the space, and then the boys put uptheir huts, left and right, according to their orderof birth cascading down towards the gate.The oula water factorIn almost flat terrains, in which it would be hardfor anyone to tell which side of the landscape ishigher, the Luo would only need to watch thestorm water. Its flow will dictate who builds ahouse where and this rule becomes enforced bytaboo kwer practice. The bigger picture isdetermined by the location of water body like alake, river or pan that collects water. The rule ofthe thumb is that a Luo homestead must be setfacing the direction of such water bodies. Theoldest couple settles at the highest altitude of thelandscape, and then younger generations spreadthemselves in phases downhill in order of theirages, so that the youngest couples occupy thelowest part of the landscape. This is why it isarguable that the planning of how to use landresources is taken care of to a great extent for theLuo by the water, which in turn is controlled bythe hills or mountains and skies. It is not left tochance to decide who will settle where as theusage of the land surface is culturallypredetermined. Supposing the left side of thefarm is rocky or marshy, the son born in theorder to inherit it cannot make a claim for achange of settlement. It would be a taboo for himto move above his senior brothers.Atieno Odhiambo, (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1973)participates in questions of what constitutes gooddevelopment plans for Africans. Somerecommend capitalism, others talk aboutMarxism and later on African Socialism. ToAtieno Odhiambo it is the responsibility of thestate to plan for development because it controlsthe resources and levies taxes and rents byimposing rules and regulations with the objectiveof making the society happy. In a Luo state,planning the development in the environmentwould have been left to oula water principle tosort out. Together with the left-right patternprinciple, there would have not been controversyon what should be done where by who and inwhich order.Left-right pattern, and of doors and gatesThe point of reference here is the home of theoldest couple. Back to individual home space, itought to be noted that the sons are supposed toput up their huts in an alternating right-left148

149Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012pattern starting with the oldest son at the top andthe youngest at the bottom of the home space. Aperson familiar with culture will figure out byhimself which house belongs to who. The homestructural design is legible to those who areculturally literate. The same rules apply topolygamist families. Different wives takepositions in an alternating right-left pattern inorder of seniority where junior ones comeslowest and nearer the gates. This can be ‘read’too. All these things may seem unimportant, butthey help the Luo find their bearings andnavigate their movements in life and on earth.Having studied the Luo settlements in detail,Abonyo (Abonyo, 2005) reaches a similarconclusion. She notes that there is often anunderlying cultural value attached to creation ofcultural spaces. It is these spaces that definecommunities and give them idiosyncraticidentities. From the cradle to the grave, the Luouse the spaces in the home in a manner thatidentifies them as Luos. We have seen theskeleton outlay of the homestead. Beneath theconspicuous basic spatial layouts of the home,according to Abonyo, there are signs that definetheir ethnicity.For illustration, she gives the example of thegates and doors. They have both hiddensymbolic meanings which the communitycherishes. The sons in laws cannot use the backgate known as rot. This is a small entrance at theback of the home used by those who may beinsiders or intimate to the family. Probably, thisrestriction was meant to keep privacy from thosewho do not belong, like the in laws, were not touse this gate. For the main gate, however, it isused by all in life, but in death, the practicechanges. When a man or his wives die outsidethe home, their bodies would be brought inthrough the main gate. In Abonyo’s opinion, thisis because they are considered permanentresidents of the home. Anyone else like thechildren, sons or daughters in law are to bebrought in through a temporary opening calledrot made in the fence. It is again arguable thatthis is symbolically indicating that the diseaseddid not thrive to move out to his or her ownhomestead.Both the gate and the door are symbols oftransition and privacy. The door is a sign of entryas it is everywhere. However, like the gate, it isalso a sign beyond which certain individualswithin or without the family cannot go at givenmoments. For example, it is a taboo foradolescent sons and daughters to go past thedoor to their mothers’ hut. It is the sacredness ofthe sleeping space that keeps them off. Abonyoobserves that in the event that the sons anddaughters came to their mothers hut for a meal,they would be served at the door. If the motherwould be away, she would ensure the food is leftfor the youth at some special space above thedoor, where it can be accessed without steppinginto the hut.The gates and doors have been noted to be pointsand symbols of transition. They are markers ofinsiders versus outsiders. For the Luo, Ogembo(Ogembo, 2005), they are delicate spaces thatcan be manipulated ethno-medically to causeillness or heal a sick patient. Indeed they areguarded strictly because they are the points ofexposure at which ones enemy can depositharmful charms to ones detriment.The right is inherently associated with strengthand good luck while the left is regarded weakand a sign of bad omen. The Luo figurativelyrefer to the left side as ‘bat kor ka jachien’ meaningthe side of the devil. It is this weak sideassociated with evil that typifies the women folk.In case children, against all discouragement,persist on being left-handed, the Luo wouldorganize certain rituals to cleanse them. Onbecoming adults, when due to establish theirown homes, certain rituals must be done inadvance for the left handed men according toAbonyo. When all sons have moved to theirhomes and the parents have aged and died, aLuo home is considered dead and the settlementcycle begins all over again. Birth, Death andSpace are all intertwined amongst the Luo tomaleness or femaleness of the subject. At birth,the placenta (biero) of a baby girl is buried on theleft hand side of the door of the mother’s hut.Later, when she dies, she is buried to the left ofthe door too, although not on the same spot. Forthe boy child, they do the exact opposite. It ispossible for an observer to know the gender of149

150Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the dead by simply looking at the grave site.When a young marriageable girl dies beforefinding a husband, she would be buried outsidethe fence of the home. The same applies topeople who have committed suicide. The spaceoutside would be making a statement to the restthat what the dead person has done isunacceptable. This is supposed to have somedeterrent effect on society especially on the peersfacing similar pressures.OsuriOn the roof of every hut in a Luo homestead is aone metre stick pitched at the appex of thecircular conical roof. It is a very importantsymbol in the home. It pierces through brokenpots and sits directly above the centre of the hut.That space below it is sacred. It is where beer potis mounted with chairs around it for old men tohave their drink. It is also the point at which themedicine-man would administer his herbs tothose who are ill, if there is a sick person in thefamily. In case the man of this house dies, theosuri stick, which some people think is a phallicsymbol, is removed to reflect his demise. Anyonepassing by, if literate in the culture of the people,would know for sure that the man is dead. Assoon as the woman or widow is remarried orinherited, as it is known here, a new Osuri stickis fixed on top of the roof. This symbolizes thepresence of the new man. That osuri is like aflag. It signifies authority, which is bestowed onthe man because this is a patriarchal community.The Luo tie a lot of significance also to theconcept of left or right spaces. These are deicticterms that must be determined by the position ofthe speaker. For the Luo point of departure atwhich people perceive ‘leftness’ or ‘rightness’ isthe door of the first wife’s hut. It matches wellwith the gate too. The two points complementone another and they decide how the spaces inthe home or farm or village will be distributed,used or occupied. Abonyo says the system ofplacing activities and artifacts left and right stemsfrom the cultural beliefs in the differences infunction and strength between two opposingwings. This concept is applied in the life of aLuo from the cradle to grave.Gates and doors as markers of transitionThe gate and door are markers of territorialitykeeping those inside from the outsiders. Theyare points of strategic defenses. In terms oftaboos and procreation, these are key points tobe guarded jealously for the Luo. Lots of rites ofpassage are conducted in these places becausethey symbolize transition and becoming. On thedoors and gates, one might find symbols ofcompetition, rivalry and interfamily feuds. Atharvest time, leaves of the new crops are hangedon the gate to ward off witchcraft and toannounce the good news about the harvest.Traditional medicine men also put markers ontheir gates for the public to discern.Space as instrument of self-definitionIn de Silva’s opinion (De Silva, 2007), theconcept of space and place are well recognizedand accepted in recent architectural theories andpractices though definitions vary according todifferent interpretations. He thinks that theconcept of space basically relates to man and hisenvironment in terms of man’s experiences. Thisposition however is confronted by modernconcepts of the infinite and boundless space inthe Cartesian sense. Technology has madeexploration of our environment beyond anylimits. The Luo, of course, did not go that faralthough they had the concept of polo heaven.Their oral narratives go only that far and that isthe limit of their traditional spatial imagination.We understand that even in the Western worldview, space remains an ambivalent mediumconstructed between human beings andenvironment in the sense of physical andpsychological manner. In a way, the spacesaround one, helps to define him. As he exploresthis space he also reflects an undertaking of selfdiscovery.For that reason, we understandourselves in terms of our stories. The stories areset in and on an environment. In the mind ofMorris (Morris, 2007), stories help peoplereconstruct or reconstitute physical settings andmake them permanent when actually they arefluid and evolve from minute to minute. If we donot use narrative space concept to createstability, the environment would simply meltaway. The presence of the audience to thenarrator makes it possible to hold still the150

151Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012environment which has passed. To the Luo, thehome symbolism is the chief device of holdingthe environment still and therefore managinginteractions between man and the space aroundhim.Beyond the fiction world, real issues like the onesraised by human rights activist find it hard toundo the Luo traditions on land allocation bysurface principle of left-right. Nash (Nash, 2009)argues that human rights disrupt the normsusually taken for granted. They revolve arounduniversal justice. Globalization that the world isgoing through raises hard questions about howresources can be allocated across the board in ajust manner. However, the sharedunderstanding of justice would vary fromcommunity to community. To the Luo, thespatial distribution of land will follow the waterflow and order of left-right pattern. If there wereany land dispute between brothers, the elderswould strictly look at the oula concept togetherwith left right-left patterns to resolve it. Justice isdetermined by the order and gender in whichyou were born. The women are not consideredhere because they are ogwange wild cats thatmarry away from the homestead. This is whatNash calls cultural politics. The space symbolsare deeply rooted in the Luo heritage, but thesecould be contested in a struggle to change things.Sex as a method of enforcing social orderThe Luo have been derided as people whose liferotates around sex. This has made some peopleborn in the community become too shy toidentify with this cultural practice. Before thebride is taken to bed, the bridegrooms’ parentsmust have sex themselves and send a signal tothe young couple in a symbolic language, butwhich must be culturally very clear. For plantingnew crops, the order of sex starts with the oldestcouple in the hierarchy to the youngest ones. Nocouple could plant new seeds, withoutundertaking a sexual ceremonial ritual the nightbefore. When putting up a new homestead ormoving into a new house, the Luo must have sexto complete the process. All these are mademandatory obligations that must be observed.Defying such taboos would invite the chronicand stubborn chira disease into the family. This151is a dreaded illness, whose symptoms are likethose of HIV and AIDS infections. For a longtime, the Luo used to confuse the former for thelatter sickness. What is common between thetwo is that they are diseases revolving aroundsocial ethics. The ethics decide what is regardedas normal and therefore considered acceptablesexual practices. Leighpigg and Rivkifish(Leighpigg and Rivkinfish, 2005) argue that sexis very important in development. Populationcontrol and management, disease prevention,maternal health promotion and child health carepractices, which internationally depend on sexculture. This influences planning andreproduction, which in turn, affect physicaldevelopment of the land.Gosine (Gosine, 2009) agrees and observesfurther that when sex and sexuality are left out ofinternational development agenda, it cannotreach optimum levels. He says that sexualproclivities of those on development sites havecaused anxieties of the people and driven andshaped projects of international development.The Luo seem to have taken care of this need byintegrating their sex and sexuality todevelopment. This is also injected into theirhealth management. To them staying healthy is afunction of good sex practices in an orderlymanner as we have discussed above. When lifeis infected by illnesses, it might just mean thatsomeone has not played his part correctly in thesex chain and order. The remedy is to re-enactthe whole play, having adjusted the part thatwent wrong.This world view is getting support from the mostunlikely quarters. Dossey (Dossey, 1982) arguesthat the world cannot be understood entirely onthe basis of modern physics in which the body isperceived as a clock-work of mechanism, inwhich illness is caused by breakdown of parts.Having been an internal medical physician for along time, Dr. Dossey recommends thatmedicine needs regular updating probably byinfusing indigenous knowledge. On this basis wecan question the theories that have governed ourapplication of medicine. He wonders whetherthe brain is nothing more than a hologram inwhich every part contains a whole. That couldexplain why ordinary people have been able toraise or lower their blood pressure at will, or

152Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012control heart-rate and body temperature. Themajor question arising out of this phenomenon iswhat part consciousness plays in themanagement of health and illness. He disputesour obsession with the idea that time is a flowingentity. Like the Luo, he introduces the new timepattern which is not linear but circular orcyclical. Upon this understanding, he brings inthe idea of time sickness which he talks about asa new medical concept. It is seen as a possiblecause and the greatest killer of all heart diseases.He presents remarkable medical data showingthat by changing their view of time, people havebeen able to positively affect the cause ofdiseases.considered weak and of less value. Such peopleare considered ‘jooko’ meaning outsiders. Heargues that those whose placentas are buriedwithin their respective homesteads are seen tobelong and understood to be upright anddependable. He concludes that ‘biero’ in thehome then becomes part of the constitution ofboundaries between those born and raised onfamiliar grounds and those unrecognized orcoming from outside the lands of familiar people.Like the fence, one can see that biero, placenta,and its burial site, is a marker of the Luo identity.The birth place and death place are indicators ofLuo identity in terms of the burial sites of thebodies concerned.The fence of the homeThe Luo home is normally fenced using aeuphorbia. This is a boundary marker indicatingtransitory point that separates the insiders fromoutsiders. The fence indicates territorialitybeyond which intrusion would not be tolerated.If need be, force will be used to evict theuninvited. Normally, the fence would take acircular shape and pattern. The fence alsosymbolically binds the family together. Thoseinside must adhere to certain cultural norms, ifthey want to stay healthy. The outsiders do nothave to go by these rules. If anyone falls illwithin the home compound, a medicine manwould be engaged to examine the space to see ifsomeone contravened the space and time taboos.The healing remedy is normally a remanipulationof the space in the understandingthat the reconfiguration would bring life. Thefence is a point at which witchcraft and is carriedout. It is also the point in which anti-witchcraftcharms are planted. The space outside the fenceis regarded ‘unclean’. That is why those who diein an acceptable manner are buried outside thefence. Indeed it is a marker of where the homebegins and ends. When a story is told of acharacter going into or out of a home, it is thefence that determines at what point the characteris in or out.To Atieno Odhiambo (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989), the boundary of the home isfurther indicated by the ‘biero’ or placentaprinciple. This is a theory where people whoseplacentas were buried outside the home are152The cycles of sex and timeThe Luo say ‘piny agonda’ meaning the world isround. This underscores the idea that timemoves in a cyclical pattern. The Luo symbolsand rituals and sex patterns reflects time as acycle. Even in this complex cycle, there islinearity and order. This is the basis upon whichthe planting of new crops, harvesting andploughing are all preceded by chronologicallyorganized sex starting from the oldest couples tothe youngest. If the population complies with thepattern, there is health, but if deviation isbrought into play, the community would beafflicted by illness. The spatiotemporal sexpattern of the Luo emanates from the fact thatman can abstract. This is why van Huyssteen(Van Huysteen, 2006) states that only man canbrood about what did not happen and ponderabout what it would be like if we did not exist. Ifthe Luo fall sick, they try to figure out whatmight have not happened in the right way. Thatway, they invent stories about what might nothave happened well and then use the stories toorganize their lives.The Luo stories like Lwanda Magere, SimbiNyaima, Gor Mahia, Ogutu & Roscoe (Ogutu andRoscoe, 1974) and so on are set in homesteads.All of these stories are crafted around somethingthat went wrong in the homestead and how thecharacters went about fixing it or how they madeerrors in the quest to correct them. It isunderstood that the houses in these stories wherethe characters live were built to fit the blueprint

153Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012given above. The stories are told to listeners whoare assumed to have the home design, pattern ororientation in mind. The home of mikayi,nyachira, simba and abila are all fixed. Thenarratives revolve around these houses and theirpositions are already fixed in the mind of boththe teller and the listener. Spaces of thehomestead ‘speak’ to the narratives insymbolism, infusing or injecting meaning intothe stories in a silent manner. In the Luothinking, spaces are planned by oula meaningstorm water and chira disease. As water flowsand finds its own level, it distributes Luopopulation across the surface of the earth. Chirais the illness that afflicts people who defy settlingtheir homes according to the oula dictates. Thetemporal order is observed in sex, which takes afixed pattern in the community. In turn thepattern is controlled by major seasonalphenomena like the planting seasons that aredetermined by the rainy periods. In effect, it isthe solar systems that affect weather, which inturn would influence sex patterns. The celestialrhythms affect Luo life in this way by invokingorder or meta-order into society.The story of Othin-Othin and space metaphorThe Luo tell the story of Othin-Othin rabbit orhare that wanted to go to seek a wife in heaven.He dared the space around him and naturallimitations to dream of a bride from above. Notknowing how to reach the heavens, heapproached different animals for help to no avail.After a lot of search, he came to a spider, whoagreed to help. On the appointed day, the spiderwove a line web from the earth to heaven. Theyused it to climb up to the place. They were threetogether with a frog. On approaching the home,Othin-Othin warned them that when they wouldbe served, they should listen very carefully. If thehosts said, “Send these things, food, chairs oranything else to oche meaning sons in law,whatever would be brought would all be left forOthin-Othin alone. However, if they said sendthe same to welo visitors, then they would allshare whatever it was.” It turned out that thechairs were brought for oche and Othin-Othinclaimed all the chairs and tried to sit on all ofthem: two for his legs, two for his hands and twofor his buttocks. The spider and the frog sat onthe floor. When the hosts brought food, Othin-Othin was quick to enquire, “Is the food for ocheor welo?” They replied for oche. Othin-Othin ateall the food and left his friends hungry. At night,the two conspired and returned to earth using theweb, then cut it. On waking up the followingday, Othin-Othin discovered that he had nomeans of coming back to earth. He jumped fromheaven only to have a hard and dry landing thatturned him into obambla dry fish.The story goes on but the bit given above will dofor our discussion. The Luo etiquette demandsthat those going on a marriage errand must bethree, and not more or less. The pattern wassupposed to identify the actual suitor by thespace position he occupied. He was to be in themiddle. The ‘’mothers” in law would know himwithout asking his name directly. Othin Othindefied this cultural requirement and occupied allthe seats, thereby throwing heredity andtraditions out of balance. It ended in a fiasco. Healso became very greedy and individualistic byseeking to occupy all the chairs when he onlyneeded one. It is the greed that drove him to seeka wife outside the known territories of the earth.He is punished for over-reaching theenvironment by going overboard and disturbingthe balance of nature with very adverseconsequences. He abused the environment bygoing too far to reward his ego. The home wherethey went in heaven was understood to havetaken a Luo format, with mother in laws’ houseelevated above. Its door must have faced the gatenext to which there were several huts calledsimba for the boys. This would be the venuewhere the suitors would be welcomed as theyawait the formal negotiation later in the motherin laws house. All the chairs and food would bebrought down from the mother in laws’ house tothe simba huts. The Luo listener will understandthe cultural beliefs regarding the spaces, fences,gates and doors. Though this message is loadedwith what Leland & Viotti (Leland and Viotti,2009) call inter-subjectivity, meaning levels atwhich the narrator interacts with the narrateeand that in which the subjects within the storyinteract among themselves, the essence of theLuo ethics remain clear. In this story, the153

154Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012narrator has used a figurative structure to mapthe World and show ones’ place in it. The mans’place in it is the home. Realizing the role ofnarratives in giving meaning to the environment,Tally, (Tally, 2008) draws a parallel to mapping.The stories organize data into recognizablepatterns which, even if we know them to befiction merely representing space and place, helpthe listener make sense of the world. The Worldof Othin Othin is mapped or cartographed localterritory, the earth, which he can exploit freelyand outer space, heaven, which is a spaceforbidden by traditions. The result of defyingtradition is that he became homeless fittingneither in heaven nor on earth.Lowe (Lowe, 2004) sums up such a scenarioarguing that the internal structure of a story iscaptured in what he calls narrative space thatmay code information about structure ofrelationships between players. When the OthinOthins are united, they can conquer theenvironment because the relationship is good.Later on we see a spatial structure whose matrixreflect differentials and spheres of power. Thesitting arrangements are configured to reflectthat. The animals in the story ventured beyondtheir spatial limits, the earth, to the place wherethey would be vulnerable. They have to contendwith the consequences.Planning the EnvironmentThe Luo environment and landscape is plannedby cultural traditions that cannot be changed.Even the exploitation of the resources is not donein a haphazard way or random manner. It isdone in an orderly way organized by water flowand sex patterns that are remotely controlled bythe weather and seasons. This way, the Luowould not overexploit his environmentalresources because cultural demands wouldinvoke regular punctuations in between to makehim pause as he waits for his turn. Today, thepeople have become so individualized because ofwesternization and urbanization. This hasunleashed the people from traditions and it haspushed the people to become perfect consumerswho think of nobody else but themselves. This iswhy the resources are abused instead of beingused.The stories, folktales, proverbs and songs wereall used to uphold the ethics of using landscapeand other resources according to traditions.There would be characters crippled because theybuilt their houses above their parents or becausethey ate green maize ahead of their seniorbrothers. When one brought a new wife knownas miaha home, he would have to wait for hismother to come back, if she had travelled faraway, so that the parents would have their sexbefore the young man sleeps with his wife. Toensure this, the elders would keep the young ladyout of his reach by ensuring that she sleeps in agrandmothers’ house away from the bridegroom.The world space is continuously changing. Forpeople to organize their lives well on it, theyneed a theoretical framework to grasp and fix it.This is a principle that Smith, Harre andLangenbov (Smith et al., 1995) call ‘partitioning’.It is a process by which the environment is heldstill by the observer in order to make the objectsof interest perceivable. It is a construct thatholds the environment stable for human action.They say that the purpose of partitioning is tocreate figural relations which are constant underconstant transformation of the figure. This makesspace a predictable phenomenon on whichnarratives can be based because it spells out howspace is organized to contain experience. Forthe Luo, that figure, is the home together with itsstructure and History.ConclusionWe have seen how the Luo mindset responds totime, space and sex in manipulating hisenvironment and exploiting it. There is merit inthese traditional provisions because they limitedindividualistic and competitive exploitation ofthe resources that would be more ruthless andabusive than otherwise. The whole objective ofextracting materials from the environment was tomake use of it and not to hoard it or accumulateit as is the capitalistic practice that ensues today.Whereas the taboos that were passed on fromgeneration to generation through folk narrativesmay not have been sensible, they were efficientin enforcing and sustaining public order, which isa prerequisite for development. The World viewof the Luo was governed by predestinedpositions in life to some extent. Indeed, it is154

155Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012debatable whether this was good or bad. Itseems the Luo did not benefit from the privilegeof having free choice in a random manner. Hewas born to fit in a strait jacket of labyrinthinepattern of a homestead. He gained the resultantorder, but lost his freedom of choice in matters ofsex, space and time. This has culminated inperpetual debates about determinism versusrandomness and freedom of choice in matters ofdevelopment of a Luo. To date, that argumenthas not been resolved.ReferencesAbonyo, D.A. (2005) Cultural Aspects ofHousing: A Case Study of the Luo inKisumu Town in Kenya. NairobiUniversity, Kenya.Agnatava, I. (2010) Tropical Rain ForestAnimals. Environmental Pollution: ItsSources and Effects.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1973) Stand Points. Ed.C. Wanjala, E. A. L. B, Nairobi.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.London: James Currey, 1989.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1992) Burying S. M.: The Politics ofKnowledge and the Sociology of Powerin Africa. Portsmouth, NH, HeinemannEducational Books, and London, JamesCurrey Ltd.De Silva, W. (2007) Built-Environment. SrilankaJournal 07.Dejung, K. (2003) International OrganizationalNetwork Culture. WashingtonUniversity Press.Dossey, L. (1982) Space, Time and Medicine.Shambhala Publications. Boston,Massachusetts.Gorjestani, N. (2000) Indigenous Knowledge forDevelopment: Opportunities andChallenges. UNCTAD, Geneva.Gosine, A. (2009) Development. PalgraveMacmillan Journal.Iteyo, C. (2009) Thought and Practice. A Journalof the Philosophical Association ofKenya. Nairobi, Kenya 1, 147-159.Leighpigg, S. and Rivkinfish, M. (2005) Sex inDevelopment. Ed. Adams Vincanne.Duke University Press, USA.Leland, M. and Viotti, E. (2009) TheEmbodiment of Intersubjectivity,Otherness and Absence in SignedLanguage Narratives. University of SaoPaulo, Brazil.Lowe, N.J. (2004) The Classical Plot and theInvention of Western Narrative. CUP,UK.Mbiti, J.S. (1975) African Traditional Religion.Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.Moltz, J.G. (2008) Space and Culture. SagePress, USA.Morris, C. (2007) The Creation of NarrativeWorlds in Physical Space. Internet[morristhesis].Nash, K. (2009) The Cultural Politics of HumanRights. CUP, UK.Ogembo, J.O. (2005) Art in Ethno-medicine: ACase Study of Juogi. Mysticism Amongthe Luo People in South Nyanza Districtof Western Kenya. PhD Thesis ofUniversity of Cape Town, Published inAmerican Science Commons.Ogutu, O. and Roscoe, A. (1974) Keep MyWords. E.A.E.P, Nairobi.Shah, A. (2002) Food Patents-StealingIndigenous Knowledge.Smith, J.A., Harre, R. and Langebov, L. (1995)Rethinking Methods in Psychology. SagePublications, University of Michigan.Tally, R.T. (2008) Literary Cartography: Space,Representation, and Narrative. TexasState University, USA.Van H. (2006) Human Uniqueness andSymbolization. Ferdmans Publishing Co.UK.155

156Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The Production of Knowledge in, of, and about Africa: The works of ElishaStephen Atieno-Odhiambo – Keynote AddressBethwel A. OgotFaculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maseno University, P.O. Box 333, Maseno, Kenya______________________________________________________________________AbstractThis article is a critical historiography of Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo’s historical thoughtsovertime. It explores the historical themes of his discourses. It begins with an appraisal of Atienosimmense contribution among the second generation of historians whose core task was to engage inextending the temporal and special scales of African history as well as the production andconsumption of the new historical knowledge. Some of his works addressed in the article include:The place of African peasants in nationalism and intellectual progress; The historical making of theLuo nation within the Kenyan nation; Challenges of African historiography; The question ofinteraction between Africans and Europeans; The role of Africans in the decolonization process; TheMau Mau debate in Kenya; Class formation and its relations to ethnicity in Kenya; Africa religionand The question of the spirit and destiny of Luo nationalism.Key words: Knowledge, Africa, Keynote Address________________________________________________________________________IntroductionElisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo (1946-2009)was my Ph.D student between 1970 and 1973 inthe Department of History, University ofNairobi, having obtained a First Class degree inHistory from Makerere University. He thenbecame a colleague in the Department, andsubsequently, a fellow intellectual until his deathin 2009. He belongs to the second generation ofAfrican professional historians who emerged inthe late 1970s and 1980s. The first generationwho included, among others, Cheikh Anta Diop,Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Adu Boahen, Jacob Ajayi andB.A. Ogot, had in the 1950s and 1960s laid thefoundations of African history. Their intellectualand ideological mission was to rehabilitate theAfricans past and to reclaim the dignity ofAfrican peoples. Under their intellectualleadership, the development of African historywas in the hands of African historians andAfrican history departments. Theirdetermination to establish the authenticity andautonomy of African history culminated in thepublication of UNESCO General History of Africawhich has been translated into fifteen languages.By the time the second generation came intobeing, no one any longer seriously questionedthat Africans had their own history or histories.The challenge now facing the youngergeneration of African historians was to extendthe temporal and special scales of these histories,their methodological and global histories, as wellas to expand the production and consumption ofthe new historical knowledge, to disseminate itto policy-makers and the public masses hungryfor liberating ideologies and identities. In thisendeavour, they were variously influenced byMarxist, feminist, ecological, and postcolonialand postmodernist perspectives. In most cases,their research focus gradually shifted from thelonger perspective of African history tocontemporary history (the colonial andpostcolonial eras). Some of the problems cryingout for urgent investigations included a study ofcolonialism in the context of state/societyrelations: social relations and class formation;the Western education and elite formation;political economy and exploitation; formation ofethnicities; gender relations; the values of the oldthat are recoverable in pursuit of nationalbuilding and identity. Secondly, there was the156

157Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012problem of decolonization and nationalism: theemergence of the neocolonial state; the presenceor lack of nationalism to sustain the new nation;who had the legitimacy and credibility togovern? Can Africa create a “civic identity” inplace of an ethnic? Thirdly, there was the crisisof economic production – income inequality; thegap between the rich and the poor. Finally, therewas the issue of the African state and theinternational system. African historians had tobe vigilant against Eurocentric conceptions ofhistory and categories of analysis and alsovigorously produce reconstructions of historythat recentre African history by deepening andglobalizing it in its temporal and spatial scope.Atieno-Odhiambo rose to these challenges, andsoon emerged as an original, brilliant, versatileand productive thinker, who vigorouslyinterrogated the historical assumptions andintellectual pretentions of African and non-African historians. His works were quoted inmany international journals and academicbooks, and his presence was sought and valuedin international fora where scholars,professionals and policy-makers met to deliberateon the historicity and humanism of Africa.Atieno-Odhiambo’s involvement with theproduction of knowledge in, of and about Africawas anchored in two primary sources: theacademy and his peasant roots. In a paper heread at the Second International Conference ofthe Association of Third World Studies (KenyaChapter) held at Egerton University between 17 thand 19 th September, 2001, he wrote:“Over the past three decades orso I have been engaged indeciphering the two templatesaround which the production ofknowledge about Africa has beentaking place: first within theacademy, which is my mainhabitus, and secondly, among thepeasants, the people amongwhom I was born and raised. Ihave increasingly becomeengaged with peasantintellectuals, these movers andshakers of meaning in thecountryside, and brokers of bothacademic cultures and the157republic of popular discourse tothe rural populace. It is thepeasant intellectuals who likewisenormatively process howauthoritative and authorialknowledge ought to be handledat grassroots level”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2003).Even the long period of exile in North Americafrom August 1988 to 2009 failed to extricate himfrom his peasant roots. This in itself was aremarkable achievement.The disappointment with the results of politicalindependence from the mid-1960s led to radicalpessimism captured by the title of OgingaOdinga’s book Not Yet Uhuru (Odinga, 1967).This radical pessimism was marked by a shift infocus from the African elites to the study ofpeasants and workers as the real wagers of theanti-colonialist struggles. Beginning with aninterest in the historical origins of the Kenyapeasantry in the Kenyan social formation at thebeginning of the twentieth century whichresulted in the publication of “The Rise and Fallof the Kenya Peasant, 1888-1922,”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1972; Atieno-Odhiambo, 1972).Atieno moved on to study the movement ofideas among the Liganua peasants where he wasborn (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1976). In his Makerereundergraduate dissertation on the Luo Thrift andTrading Corporation, which he later revised forpublication, he demonstrated how culturalidioms had been harnessed by Oginga Odinga inorder to achieve sustainable development frombelow among the Luo in the years after theSecond World War. The study of independencemovements in Africa had concentrated on theelites and it was high time the historians reexaminedthe exact nature of the relationshipsbetween these elites and the people they claim tohave led, the “masses”. The study ofnationalism in Africa, therefore, must not endwith the elites, Atieno stated. The work must beextended to the people they led. When the elitesclaim they were ‘popular”, what was the exactnature of this popularity? Who were theypopular with? And what was the nature of“populism” in Africa? (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1975).

158Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Atieno-Odhiambo, with his co-author DavidWilliam Cohen, produced their famous triologywhich started with Siaya in 1989 which containstheir original formulation of “the problem ofknowledge”, as they explored the multiple andunfinished contours, then elaborated in BuryingSM (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992) inwhich they discussed the politics of knowledgeand the sociology of power and was concluded intheir discussion in the Risks of Knowledge (1990).In all the three works, the authors applied thepostmodern method of providing“deconstructive” accounts which play off againstone another a number of contesting voices,interests and perspective so as to expose thecomplexity of social issues involved, but thatthemselves refuse to choose “correct”interpretation.In Siaya (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989c)(which has several landscapes: Boro in Siayadistrict, Kaloleni in Nairobi, southern Uganda,and the sugar belt in western Kenya) the authorsexplore two major themes: (i) the making of theLuo nation within the Kenya nation, and (ii) thedefinition of the core values of this new nation.They conclude that while the British were busycreating ‘tribes’ the leading Luo proto-elites, atseveral levels and in multiple contexts, werecreating the Luo nation. “The outcome, a senseof a Luo nation within a nation, was not simply,or directly, the product of the rehearsals ofprevious stages of identity formation……….This broad identity was sculpted by real people,in real time, articulating particular and secularinterests as well as global ones”(Cohen andAtieno-Odhiambo, 1989b). The Luo nation hasbeen built over time by actual actors in a processof dispute and contest, they conclude.The recurrent reaffirmation of the ‘Luo way oflife’ and the Luo homeland in the Luo protoelites’discussions eventually defined the corevalues of this new society, which by 1940, werewidely shared in Luo-speaking communitiesbroadly across Kenya. These core valuesresonated through the football clubs (Luo Union,Gor Mahia, Kisumu Hotstars) the clanassociations, and the Luo Union branches. Atypical Luo man – Jaluo Asili – was identifies byhis adherence to these core values. A typicalLuo man, for example, had to maintain a goodhome (dala) in the countryside, as a place to be athome and to be buried, and as a concreteacknowledgment of links to the past. Thepowers of Luo women are discussed. Manymanage rural households and estates as aconsequence of the fathers migrating to Uganda;and they have an important role in medicaltherapy and psychotherapy as well as ineducation of the girl-child. There is alsodiscussion of women and marriage: what is thenorm and what is the practice.The two sources – the oral and the colonialarchive – were thus being used complementarilyin writing the new social histories of Africa. Thisnew strategy propelled the historiography on“The African Voice” – as exemplified by thehistorical anthropology of peasant discourse inSiaya. Historical explanation was pushed in newand refreshing directions, situating twentiethcentury Africans as participants in the terrain ofcreation, contestation and occupation as theysought to exercise some choice and control overtheir location, identity and security.In their second book in the triology, Burying SM(Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992), theauthors drew attention to the power that wasassociated with the ideas and theories of theordinary as against ethnological, legal andphilosophical expertise. It is the story of a burialdispute following the death of a prominent Luolawyer, S.M. Otieno who died at NairobiHospital on Saturday, December 20, 1986. ALuo spokesman, a philosopher, a medicine man,assorted kinsmen and kinswomen witnesses, anda seventy-six – year old grave digger, were calledto explain, under oath, what it meant to be aLuo. Otieno’s death had ignited a family andlegal feud which lasted 154 days. The burial casehad to decide whether a modern African can becompelled, in death, to comply with customarylaw, which he rejected while alive?Silvanus Melea Otieno, born into the UmiraKager clan in Nyalgunga in Alego, had marriedVirginia Edith Wambui, a Kikuyu aged 26, in1963. They lived in the luxurious Langata158

159Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Suburb of Nairobi and owned a six acre farm onUpper Matasia on Ngong Hills where he keptgoats. A year before his death, Wambui, herchildren, and a dozen friends, claimed thatOtieno had intimated to them that he wished tobe buried on his Ngong farm since to be buriedin Luoland “is to throw me away.”But after his death, his brother, Joash Ochieng’Ougo, and Omolo Siranga, the spokesman forthe Umira Kager clan, demanded his body,insisting that once a prominent Luo died, hisbody had to be buried in his village. After all theclan owned the body.The Umira Kager clan hired a lawyer, RichardOtieno Kwach, later Justice Kwach. Wambuihad a grave dug at their home in Upper Matasia.The clan dug one at Nyalgunga, Otieno’s ruralhome. Both parties arranged funeral on thesame day; but court injunctions saw both burialscancelled. The courtroom battle then followed,which dragged on for five months.Lawyer John Khaminwa, an expert in familyand criminal law represented Wambui. JudgeFrank Shields on 5 January 1987, ruled inWambui’s favour, rejecting Kwach’s argumentthat Otieno was a Luo and therefore subject tothe customs and laws of his Luo community.Shield argued that Otieno was a metropolitanand a cosmopolitant, and such a person cannotbe subject to African customer law.Kwach appealed to the Court of Appeal, and on12 January, the Court of Appeal panel set asideShield’s ruling, and ordered a full trial of thedispute in the High Court, where a three judgepanel headed by Justice Samuel E.O. Bosireoverturned Mr. Justice Shield’s ruling.Cohen and Odhiambo argue that theHigh Court itself was a Court on Trial.“From the end of Decemberthrough May, the question ofwho would bury the body ofS.M. Otieno, and where theburial would be, produced animmense public debate in Kenya– within the courts in the streets,159in clubs and bars, and inscholarly seminars – concerningthe risks and liabilities of‘intermarriage between tribes; thenature of the body as materialproperty; the appropriateauthority of ‘custom’ and‘tradition’; the relative standingof statutory, customary, andcommon law; the meaning andbonds of intimacy betweenhusband and wife; the worth andlegitimacy of ‘modern’ socialpractice; the rights of womenwithin marriage, as widows andbefore the law; the meaning ofdeath and the purposes ofinternment; the idea of ‘home’ asthe only appropriate site of burialfor a Luo individual; the tenacyof Luo identity; notions of the‘backwardness of the Luo in a‘modern Kenya’; and the form ofLuo participation in nationallife…… And - whatever SM’sintentions – the case elaborateditself as a laboratory for the studyof the production of history andthe sociology of power incontemporary Africa” (Cohenand Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992).Mr. Justice Bosire delivered his 32 – page verdicton Friday, February 13, 1987. He ruled thatjustification for judicial interference in ethnicburial disputes was “only if they are repugnant tojustice and morality.” He found nothingrepugnant with Luo burial customs.Angered by the High Court ruling, Wambuicalled a press conference at her Langataresidence and thundered:“We have parted bitterly and he(Ochieng) should forget that hisbrother ever had a wife known asWambui Otieno. I have goneback to Kikuyuland”(Review,1987b).

160Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Omolo Siranga, the clan’s spokesman, washorrified, though not surprised. The Luobelieved that whatever you do, a Kikuyu wifewill always leave the husband, taking thechildren with her. He said that we have evenmarried white women, but we have never seenanything like this before (Review, 1987a).Wambui appealed to the Court of Appeal,Kenya’s highest court at the time, but afteranother two-and-a- half months, the judges ruledthat S.M. Otieno’s “urban lifestyle” did notexempt him from Luo customs. S.M. Otienowas finally buried by Court Order at Nyalgungain Siaya, on 23 May 1987.In July 2003, Wambui Otieno rose to nationalprominence after her controversial civil marriageto stonemason Peter Mbugua, 42 years herjunior. Eight years later, they solemnized theirunion at St. Andrew’s Church in Nairobi.The book raises problem of objectivity andsilences in the production of knowledge. Thereis a distinction between what the courts see asappropriate, relevant and correct facts andarguments, and what the litigants see asappropriate, relevant and correct. Court recordsalready have silences in them. Secondly, inconstructing a narrative, the authors selectcertain facts and silence others. In the book, theconscious and unconscious silences of facts aremore evident from the witnesses who used oralhistory to argue their cases in court. RichardKwach and all those who defended Luotraditions selected those facts that supported theirposition. The defense did the same. Certainfacts were privileged and others silenced in orderto meet certain goals.For example, nobody referred to the fact thatWambui Otieno was the grand-daughter ofWaiyaki wa Hinga, who was buried alive by theBritish in an unknown grave at Kibwezi. TheKikuyu believed that until Waiyaki’s grave isdiscovered and a proper burial conducted, therewill be no peace and stability in Kikuyuland.Wambui should therefore not have found itdifficult to understand the meaning of death andthe purposes of internment.Secondly, Wambui as a bride arrived with fourchildren, three of them by another man fromNyanza who had rejected his children. In Siaya,Cohen and Odhiambo had discussed thelaunching of a boat as a bride into the Lake inUyoma. The qualities of a bride portrayed inthat ceremony were lacking in Wambui. To theLuo, Otieno was merely practicing informalwife-inheritance. That is why Alego people didnot attend the wedding.Thirdly, in accordance with the Luo core valuesdiscussed in Siaya, the children of a Luo fatherare culturally Luos, irrespective of where themother comes from. Otieno’s children aretherefore Luo.So when Otieno and Wambui advice theirchildren not to have any contact with the Luobecause they are barbaric, they are committingan abomination. Moreover, Otieno himselfdisowned the Luo, stating to his wife that hisclan is going to start with her. He had no housein Nyalgunga, and hence could not connect withthe past. In Luo parlance, Otieno ne Olal – hewas living outside the Luo universe.The fourth important silence was that both JudgeShields and lawyer Khanminwa are married toKikuyu ladies, and at a time when the wholecase was being interpreted in terms of ethnicrivalry between the Luo and the Kikuyu, such asilence was surely significant.The two themes that keep coming up in BuryingSM are power and the production of knowledge.Professor Odera Oruka is introduced by Kwachas a renowned scholar who had a B.Sc. degreefrom Sweden and had authored many articlesand books on African customs and traditions andChairman of the Department of Philosophy formany years. How could Wambui and herlawyer challenge evidence from such a learnedscholar, Kwach was telling the court.But Khaminwa argued that Oruka’s evidencewas subject to scrutiny like any other evidencepresented before his. So who had the right torelate Luo history? What is a scholar who hadobtained much of his information from the160

161Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012elders, or the elders who preserved Luotraditions in their different narratives? Did ruraland urban Kenyans have the same authority overthe production of knowledge about Kenya’spast? All these questions force us to thinkcritically about the ways in which historiansproduce historical knowledge and how thatknowledge is perceived by different institutionssuch as courts of law and universities. BuryingSM is, indeed, a very rich source for thehistorian.The last book in the Cohen/Odhiambo triologyis The Risks of Knowledge (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 2001b), which is an investigationinto the death of John Robert Ouko in Kenya in1990. He was the fourth prominent name on thepolitical assassination ledger in Kenya, startingwith the murder of Pinto in 1965, followed bythe assassination of Mboya on July 5, 1969, andlater Josiah Mwangi Kariuki on March 2, 1975.The authors claim that in the case of Karuiki andlater that of Ouko, knowledge itself was movedto centre stage. It was now evident that therewere dangers not only for those who could pushthe President and his circle too far but also forthose who would seek to produce explanationand establish truth.Robert Ouko’s body was found on February 16,1990 on Got Alila a few kilometers from hisKoru home in Nyando District. The body wasin a mutilated and smouldering state. But theauthors argue that we should use Ouko’smutilated body as a text. The inquiries over andinto it, animated and enabled and also shapedand constrained a new social and politicalreckoning; new forms of consciousness; and newforms of critique and self-critique.The elaborated readings of dead bodies as texts,on which diverse and elaborate meanings couldbe inscribed, had produced major works inEastern Europe, South America, the UnitedStates and South Africa, in which dead bodieswere being used in political and cultural debates.In such debates, the capacity of the dead body tocarry surplus and contested meanings has beennoted. Such contests, they observed, have beencontests over the control of knowledge, the161management of information and intelligence,and the constitution of memory”(Cohen andAtieno-Odhiambo, 2001a). Cohen andOdhiambo were thus pioneering such studies inKenya.But in this work, they are not answering thequestion “who killed Ouko?” That questionshould be left to the courts. Here there areconcerned with the social history of knowledgeproduction: how people came to know; how theyused what they knew or claimed to know ininterested or strategic ways, and how these usesof knowledge and claims to knowledge markedinvestigations, inquiries, proceedings, and thenation. Their interest in this work is in theprocesses involved in the constitution ofknowledge, how individuals and bodies come to“know” and how certain knowledge has gainedauthority.Towards this end, the authors engage inelaborate, sophisticated and controversialdiscussion on African historiography. Theycontend that knowledge production within andabout Africa has long been subject to extremeeconomies which have pressed for direct, simple,and whole answers and accounts. They thenbemoan the fact that there are only a limited setof recurrent interpretative frameworks within theacademic and non-academic literatures appliedin the economy of knowledge production withinand about Africa. They then ask questionswhich have engaged the attention of Africanscholars for some time now: How has a limitedset of interpretative frameworks continued tomaintain a presence discursively andtheoretically in the interpretation andrepresentation of complex processes and eventson the continent, a presence that traces back tothe era of the slave trade? And how have theserecurrent interpretative frameworks shapedknowledge and knowledge processes withinAfrica and on the African past? And finally,how might observers and scholars of Africa beable to free their (our) writing from thesepowerful frameworks.The authors’ struggle to sustain attention to awider array of processes surrounding the death ofOuko, they assert, is also a struggle for a more

162Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012complex rendering of Africa’s past/s andpresents/s. There is a purposeful tension herebetween the quest for murderer/s and the questfor knowledge of Africa. And Africa must beunderstood in its specificity, and not only in itsgenerality, they conclude.In this process, the authors inform us that theordinary, with its worth and power, is a resilientmotif in their triology. In Burying SM, forexample, they drew attention to the power thatwas associated with the ideas and theories of theordinary as against ethnological, legal, andphilosophical expertise. In the case of the Oukosaga, it was the observations of his cook andhousemaid, Selina Ndalo Were, about a whitecar, that were to be at the centre of the Oukodrama, as authoties and publics sought tointerpret her evidence. Again it was a cook,William Wako Nangabo, in the house ofPermanent Secretary for Internal Security,Hezekia Oyugi, who revealed to the SunguhParliamentary Committee on March 25, 2004,that from the service hatch between a kitchenand a dining room, he overheard a conversationamong some of Kenya’s most powerful figures(Oyugi, President Moi, Nicholas Biwott andNakuru District Commissioner Jonah Onguka),unfolding a plot to remove Ouko from his farmand then eliminate him.The authors tell us that that the shift they arerecommending is a shift from social history ofoppression to a social history of knowledge,interpretation, and representation. It marks ashift from redistribution to recognition, the twoessential elements of justice, one resting ineconomic equity and the other in culturalrecognition.In the case of the Ouko murder, we see the waysin which sections of his attentions in life toquestions of economic change, economicopportunity, and development, were turnedaway in death from the politics of redistributiontoward a politics of recognition, aroundquestions of rights and multiparty democracy. InOuko’s last hours of life, the papers that he wasseen to be digesting and assembling on his bedwere about the corrosion of Kenya’s economy,its development programmes, its relations with162international financial institutions, the openingsstill available to salvage the developmentprogramme he was shepherding through thecabinet, and the unseemly wealth of Kenya’smost powerful leaders. But in death, thosepapers were seized from Ouko’s bedroom, andthe work of recovery was not so much about thedetails about those papers but rather aboutdiscovering the names and interests of those whoevidently took Ouko away from his farm to hisdeath. The state was now viewed through themutilated corpse rather than through thereconstruction of those papers.Turning now to individual works of Atieno-Odhiambo, he wrote extensively on theinterrelated themes of colonialism,decolonization and nationalism. The debate oncolonial conquest and its meaning for thedifferent African countries had turned into a“growth industry” in the post- 1960s. But mostauthors who had written on this theme ignoredAfrican agency in their attempts to establishreasons for change in colonial administration.Atieno-Odhiambo addressed the question ofthe interaction between Africans andEuropeans in great detail. Using Kenya as hiscase study, he demonstrated in Siasa (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1981b) that Africans were notpassive objects of colonial rule who wereunable to influence their fate or respondrationally to new situations. Hence, the idea ofEuropean initiative and African response didnot hold.Decolonization has also been the subject ofmany scholars. The withdrawal of theimperialists from their former colonies wasviewed in terms of the triumph of nationalismover imperialism. Two schools of thought existon the causality of decolonization in Africa.There are those who see it as a voluntarydecision by Europeans to give Africancommunities what was rightfully theirs (land andnatural resources). Others conceivedecolonization as an obvious solution, sayingthat Europeans deprived the African continent ofits resources and only pulled out when theyrealized that their profit was dwindling. Atieno,however, provide a nuanced and sophistical

163Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012analysis and arrived at a more critical solution.He, for example, held the view thatdecolonization entailed the push and pull ofevents, episodes, and idea, with the forces andlogic of African nationalism dictating theinitiative (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995).concerns, his awareness and knowledge of ruralKenya was limited to those areas where theAgikuyu lived, and which he stormed in the1946-52 period. He portrays Kenyatta as a hitchhikerin the nationalist band wagon of Mboyaand Odinga:In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalism engulfedother identities within territorial states – we wereall nationalists. It even eclipsed the transnationalsentiments of Pan-Africanism. But by the 1990s,nationalism was fighting for its dear life asinternecine wars triggered by ethnic sensibilitiesmade devastating depredations against it. Pan-Africanism, once hallowed for its capacity tounite Africans across the continent has beenunable to neutralize the force of ethnicity.The ethical and practical foundations of thenationalist project were questioned by Atieno-Odhiambo, in view of the centrifugal forcesconfronting it. According to Odhiambo, Africannation states were conceived in the fertile mindsof a tiny section of the western educated Africanelite and given impetus by anti-colonial and antiracistsentiments.Colonialism gave rise to the“territorial state”; but the cultural and politicalfoundations of the new nations in African are notonly ephemeral but also precarious andvulnerable to the seemingly more enduringethnic nationalism. The latter thrives on interethnicexploitation and competition for resourcesand contestation for state power. The postcolonialpolitical elite, according to Odhiambo,have not only served the course of ethnicnationalism but also used it to subvert thenationalist project (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996b).In Kenya, Odhiambo held Kikuyu nationalismresponsible for the liquidation of Kenyannationalism, which was couched in terms ofnationhood by Tom Mboya or of communalequity by Odinga in the 1960s (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996c). In discussing Kikuyunationalism and Kenyatta vis-à-vis thenationalist project in Kenya, Odhiambo says thatKenyatta was not a man of Pan-Kenyan vision inthe mould of either Odinga or Mboya but was allalong dedicated to his people, the Kikuyu.While he was prepared to use “Kenya as a stageon which to play his essentially Gikuyu163“On his release from prison in1961 Kenyatta found thenationalist project full-blown.Oginga Odinga had set him up asthe African leader in theLegislative Council on June 24,1958, and subsequently TomMboya carved him his publicpolitical space in the succeedingtwo years. Kenyatta did not haveto spell the content of his Kenyannationalism. But he was veryspecific about its purpose:nationalism was meant to enableKenya seize (nyakua)independence. Having capturedthe state Kenyatta fell back to hislifelong and primary agenda:tending to the needs of his basiccommunity the Agikuyu. This hesucceeded in doing veryeffectively in the fifteen years ofhis presidency. At the end of1978, it could legitimately bestated that his was a story ofspectacular success for hisprimary constituency, theAgikuyu. He had secured thestate for them. He had giventhem a government to run. Hehad secured for them a vasthomeland in the Rift Valley andalong the Kenyan Coast. He hadput commerce in their hands, inappropriate alliance with theAsian and European bourgeoisie.And had underwritten theirsecurity by manning the police,military, intelligence andbrutalizing apparatuses like theGeneral Service Unit (GSU) with‘no-nonsense’ Gikuyu toughs likeBen Gethi”(Atieno Odhimabo,1992).

164Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Furthermore, many historians who have studiedAfrican nationalism, and African resistanceagainst colonialism in Kenya, have generallylinked their studies with the historiography of theMau Mau rebellion, seen as a specifically CentralKenyan phenomenon. Some have claimed thatonly Mau Mau fighters were freedom fighters,and therefore their people are entitled to matundaya uhuru. This kind argument negates whatshould have been the objective of Kenyannationalism: national integration. Thetendency has been to condemn any scholar whoexpresses a more complex and contraryviewpoint as a Kikuyu – hater who wants tominimize the centrality of Mau Mau to Kenya’sdecolonization (Maina-wa-Kinyatti, 1977).The historiography of Mau Mau has gonethrough at least five consequences: (i) thenationalist phase; (ii) the Revolution Betrayedphase; (iii) the Post World War II crisis of therural households; (iv) the Mau Mau as Discourse(which is identified with the contributions ofOdhiambo); and (v) and most recently a return toMau Mau as history in the book edited byAtieno-Odhiambo and Lonsdale, Mau Mau andNationhood (Atieno-Odhiambo and Lonsdale,2003) Atieno-Odhiambo participated vigorouslyin this Mau Mau debate starting with his paperon “Who were Mau Mau” (Atieno-Odhiambo,1978), followed by “Who were the Mau Mau(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1981c), “The internationalPress and Mau Mau” (Atieno-Odhiambo,1981a), “Kenyatta and Mau Mau” (1991), “TheProduction of History in Kenya: The Mau MauDebate” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1991) andculminating in the book, Mau Mau andNationhood, (Atieno-Odhiambo and Lonsdale,2003) he co-edited with Lonsdale. In all hiscontributions, Odhiambo pleaded for a moreinclusive historiography on Mau Mau andnationalism. But as Lonsdale’s work on themoral economy of Mau Mau has shown, thepower of Mau Mau as a historical event wentwith deep cultural and symbolic meanings for theKikuyu themselves. The work gives it ethnic andhistorical specificity; and totally overthrows thepossibility of re-inventing a Kenya nationalistnarrative.(Lonsdale, 1992) The Mau Maunarrative has other powers manifested throughthe many public debates in the public arenas. AsAtieno Odhimabo has argued, it has been a tropefor critiques of the postcolonial state from below(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1992). These concerns withinternal problematiques do not considernationalism to be a pre-requisite ideology for theconstruction of a future nation – state (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1999). Instead, the Mau Maustruggle has become a key plank of Kenyahistoriography, providing both the rationale forthe justness of the African cause in the struggleand the yardstick by which to judge thepostcolonial dispensation.Another topic which attracted the sharp pen andpiercing mind of Atieno-Odhiambo was classformation especially as it related to ethnicity. Inhis paper titled “Hegemonic Enterprises andInstrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity andDemocracy in Kenya”, (Atieno-Odhiambo,2002a), for example, he compares thedevelopment of class-formation in Kikuyu andLuo societies during the post-colonial period.The independence bargain had included a landresettlement deal, not only for the squatters andformer landless Gikuyu in rural reserves, but toKenya’s ‘big men’ in Kenyatta’s Cabinet, in thecivil service and in the armed forces. Thedifferential access to land saw the small peoplesettled on the Yeoman, Smallholder, NewSmallholder, Million-acre, Haraka, Harambe,Shirika and other land- buying Schemes in theformer highland in such places as Ol Kalou andWanjohi Valley. They were followed by theNgwataniro Mutukanio land – buying companiesin the Rift Valley in the 1970s. The ‘big’ peopleacquired intact the estates of former settlers(Wasserman, 1984). Class formation, as part ofBritish decolonization policy for Kenya, gainedaccelerated momentum after independence.The new inheritors and successors to the Britishsettlers assumed their squirearchy of the vastestates stretching from Laikipia to Endebes, andfrom Mau Summit to Konza. They includedPresident Kenyatta and his Gicheha farm inNakuru; his brother James Muigai with threefarms including the 2,000 acre Muirui farm in164

165Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Kiambu, a second “Survey” farm in Kiambu,and a third 1,000 acre farm at Rongai nearNakuru, and Njonjo acquired a carnation flowerfarm in Limuru.The educated rural graduates of PriamryTeachers’ Colleges in Kikuyuland sung theTexan Jimmy Reeves song over and over,instead of the National Anthems.“This world is not my own,I am just a passing though.If heaven is not my home,Then Lord, what shall I do?”At the bottom of the class pyramid were theGikuyu propertyless, the have-nots. Theirnumbers swelled steadily. The KenyattaGovernment condemned them as lazy peoplewho wanted free things, and were regarded asdangerous to the good government of Kenya.They referred to themselves as Matigari, theremnants of Mau Mau bullets. In Ngungi waThiongo’s novel (1989) Matigari is a resurrectionof their spirit (Ngungi wa Thiongo, 1989). Theirfavourite potent brew was Karara, and theirfavourite cigarette was ‘King Stork’ – kanyoni.In contrast, and living in Western Kenya, werethe as yet undifferentiated Luo peasantry,renowned by their African and Europeandetractors alike for their Epicurean hedoism andno thought for tomorrow.At independence the Luo were reputed to haveno emergent proletariat and “no mysticalattachment to the land – merely a desire to besure of a place to live and some food to eat afterone’s working days are over, or when one issacked.” Likewise, it was argued of the Luo,“For the labour migrant, the land is primarily aplace where he leaves his family, and which isthe anchor of his security when he returns,frequently after many years. During his absencehe is anxious primarily to maintain his rights toland and is often slow to accept changes such asland consolidation and registration which, in hisview, may jeopardize these rights.” These“reluctant and benighted Luo of 1965 weredancing to the tune of “Celestina Juma” by the165guitarist Ajwang’ Ogara of K’ Auma inKarachuonyo.“Ayee, jaherana Celestina -Ayee, my sweetheart CelestinaLando nyar Ugenya -The tawny one from UgenyaHerana Celestina -Sweetheart CelestinaLando nyar Ugenya -The brown one from UgenyaHerana Celestina -Sweetheart CelestinaBrua mor yande indikona -You wrote me a letterKanyisoa ni pod isomo Uganda -Informing me you were still studying inUgandaKanyisao ni pod isomo Uganda -Informing me you were still studying inUgandaLando nyar Ugenya -The brown one from UgenyaHerana Celestina -The sweetheart CelestinaLand nyar Ugenya -The brown one from UgenyaAdundo morm ne wamor yor Jinja -Shortly for happiness we were happynear Jinja,Adundo morm ne wamor yor Jinja -Shortly for happiness we were happynear Jinja,Lando nyar Ugenya -Brown one from UgenyaHerana Celestina -Sweetheart Celestina.Their educated Primary school teachers,graduates of Siriba and Ngiya Teacher’s College,tuned in further afield to Siera Leon where oneRoger boomed out the loss of his sweetheart in“My Lovely Elizabeth”.“I am deeply worried at heartCause the girl I love so wellMy fried has snatched from meNow I scarcely know what to doSo I bend my head and cryFor my sweet Elizabeth!Some people say there are many girls

166Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012That are running crazy after meBut I don’t care for what they sayFor my sweet Elizabeth!Say, Elizabeth where did you go?Come back to your boy RogieYour lucky boy rogieDon’t you ever listen to what they sayCome back to your Rogie boy!Atieno-Odhiambo point is that the nation underKenyatta was drifting in different classdirections, with the Kikuyu national elitebecoming English country gentlemen, while the‘reluctant’ Luo were yet to join the mainstreamof history as beneficiaries of what Cohen andAtieno in Siaya calls the Kenyatta bequest tothem as landowners in the western Kenya sugarbelt (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989a). Buteven here, Peter Anyang Nyong’o has drawn ourattention to the ossification of small and poorpeasants, and the failure in the development of amiddle peasantry in the sugar belt (AnyangNyong’o, 1981).Religion was another topic on which Atieno-Odhiambo wrote extensively. Starting with hisundergraduate essay on the launching of fishingboats in Uyoma in 1967, which alerted him tothe possibility of the imbrication of manyuniverses of may histories of many cultures, inthe neighbourhood of Nam Lolwe (LakeVictoria) (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1970b) he followedit with another undergraduate paper on LegionMaria – A study in the Dynamics of separation”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1970a). The works of ChristEhret since the early 1970s, he says, concretizedand consolidated his earlier feelings aboutregional rather than ethnic universes; and thehistorical researches of David Cohen opened theinterlacustrine neighbourhood to much wideraccess in terms of time and space. From themid- 1970s, he says, it became possible to thinkof a process of continuous habitation, changinglinguistic and ethnic identities, continuallyreconstituting political boundaries, and acondensing of ideas: about existence, aboutpresence, about entity. And this is what heattempted to do in “Towards a History ofAfrican Traditions Religion: A West KenyaCase”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1977). Then came hisessay on the deconstruction and reconstructionof the Luo universe, which was a critique of myarticle on the Concept of Jok, which I published in1961. He concluded that the organizingprinciple about the order of things in the Luouniverse is not jok or juogi but piny (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2001).But perhaps the most significant contribution byAtieno-Odhiambo to the subject of religion was apaper he wrote for an international conferenceon African Traditional Religion in Switzerlandto which both he and I were invited. Thequestion the organizers of the conference askedpaper writers to consider was “whether AfricanIndigenous Religion can provide a basis for theprocess of societal Reconstruction taking place(however incremental) in different Africansocieties today.” Atieno wrote on “The AfricanCrisis and the Politics of African TraditionalReligion.” He asked whether the religion whichsustained our forebears for centuries has anyrelevance today. In other words, we mustinquire into the future viability of AfricanTraditional Religion. In answering thisfundamental question, he asked Africans not tobe mesmerized by the last two millennia ofAfrican Christianity, nor with the past fourteencenturies of African Islam, but to interrogate theindigenous cultural heritage of the past fivemillennia, so as to get rid of the culturalanamnesis that has become typical of our times.He laments the fact that the spiritual legacy ofthe High Culture of ancient Egypt has scarcelybecome a part of our cultural recollection. It isan object of fascination, but we do not reallycomprehend it. And yet, sources of greatantiquity and variety are at our disposal. In thecase of the modern African this written heritageremains a mere beckoning distant mirror, in spiteof the urgings from Cheikh Anta Diop toappropriate this Egyptian legacy as our ownheritage. This hesitancy in turn informs ourincompleteness when it comes to thefundamental questions of African origins,African cultures, African religions Africanontologies, African cosmologies, and Africaneschatology. He contends in this paper that wemust not just describe, but explain why Africans166

167Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012may indeed be notoriously religious. But wemust surely start from somewhere. Thatsomewhere, he concludes, is Egypt.Five millennia of history in Africa has been oftenglossed over in the process of privileging ourAfrican Christian and Islamic heritages. ButAfrican Christianity and African Islam did notfind tabula rasa in Africa; rather the people hadtheir own philosophies that were reflected intheir religions. Unfortunately, scholars havetended to study aspects of African religion ratherthan religions as a whole.It is now generally accepted that the ancientEgyptians were African. Hence the question toask is: why privilege this ancient Egyptianheritage?First, because the antiquity of this heritage,stretching back five millennia and preceding theAristotelian African Christian and Islamicheritages by such a wide chronological distancethat we may not confuse what came prior towhat else. Secondly, this archive from antiquityleads us to the conclusion that what we havebeen studying since Mbitis’s invention of thisdiscipline over thirty years ago at Makerere:namely, African Religions and Philosophyembracing the study of African ideas of God,African Worldviews, African cosmologies,African belief systems, African folklore, mythsand legends, African Ways of thought, AfricanReligions and Resistance to Colonialism – arebut fragments of this ancient archive.He ends the paper by giving of examples of how,despite the African crisis, people are successfullycoming to terms with their African Religiousheritage, and putting it to good use. For over acentury of simultaneous contact with missionaryChristianity and modern Islam, Africans haveinsisted on cultivating their own spiritual space,giving due recognition to the indigenousreligious heritage. Modern life does not excludethis particular part of African spirituality. Theancestors are not outdated, nor out of touch withcurrent developments and the challenges anddemands of modern living. They are a livingpart of life – they know about laptops andBMW’s.167Atieno-Odhiambo published many widerangingarticles on ethnicity: “The Agrarianquestion, ethnicity and politics in Kenya, 1955-1993” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1994),“Reconditioning the terms of fact: Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy in Kenya” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1996b), and “Historicing the DeepPast in Western Kenya” (Atieno-Odhiambo,2002b), among others. In all these articles headvocated a two –prong approach to thephenomenon of ethnicity. First, study when andhow ethnic groups and ethnicity emerged inAfrica. Secondly, Analysise your own roots todiscover who you are. In his chapter in HistoricalStudies and Social Change in Western Kenya, a bookof essays in Memory of Professor Gideon Were,edited by William Ochieng’, titled “Historicingthe Deep Past in Western Kenya”, he appliedthis approach. The specific claims of ourcommon linguistic habitat have been elaboratedupon by Christopher Ehret in his magnum opus,An African Classical Age (Ehret, 1998). Ehreturges us to think back to deep time: the periodbetween 1000 BC and 1500 A.D: when we weeinitially one (1000 BC to 800 A.D.), then becamedifferentiated into environmental and social units(800 A.D. to 1500 A.D.), before becomingpeople familiarly known in our region as ethnicgroups and clans (1500 A.D to the present).Ehret is thus challenging scholars to movebeyond the received categories of clan, caste,tribe, back to deep time. Likewise, the sinews ofancient social history in the region in the periodbetween 100 B.C and 1500, and the continuingvalue of ancient histories for today’s Great Lakespeoples of eastern Africa, have been laid bare byDavid Schoenbrun, who argues in his excellentbook, A Green Place, A Good Place, thus:“A history of how these socialsystems emerged, of how peoplenegotiated their continuity andinfluenced the course of theirdevelopment, offer valuablestores of cultural capital forcontemporary struggles overmoral order and the ways inwhich material circumstance

168Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012should be made to reflect thatorder”(Scheonbrum, 1998).Other scholars, have suggested that theinhabitants of the interlacutrine of East Africahave commingled for a millennium within theregion, creating systems of production, exchangeand redistribution that were predicated on localidentities rather than specific “Bantu” or“Nilotic” language, culture and ethniccommunities, let alone pristine “tribes” withtheir discreet and mutually exclusiveprimogenital histories (Ogot, 1983; Ogot, 1984).that we are all mongrels. This should lead to amove sober discussion on ethnicity and tofruitful results.The interrelated topics of philosophy of historyand historiography were major concerns ofAtieno-Odhiambo, especially as they related toAfrican history. The two key issues to beaddressed were the authenticity and autonomy ofAfrican history. The first issue had largely beenestablished by the first generation of Africanhistorians, as discussed above. The second stillwaited to be theorized.With this historical background, Atieno-Odhiambo then turns to his genealogy andshows that he is the proud heir to this regionaldeep past. He traces his geneology to 1416 A.D.He was born in 1946 of a Luo father and aMwirecheya woman from Marama in Buluyia,who was sister to Professor Gideon Saulo Were.His father (Were’s) Ogwamor had a Luo fatherand a Luyia mother, Drusila nyar Ochieng’ fromthe Abafofoyo clan among the Abamarachi. Thename Ogwamor itself is clearly of Itesotderivation, a variation of Obwangor. The Itesoincursion into northwestern Buluyia andnorthern Luoland constitutes one of the majormigration and settlement themes in thenineteenth century of Western Kenya. In Alegothey ended up constituting the Kalkada clan,where their most illustrious representatives in thetwentieth century have been Senior Chief PeterOsowo, his brother the nationalist AmbrosoOfafa, after whom the estates of Ofafa Kunguni,Ofafa Maringo, Ofafa Jerusalem and OfafaJericho in Nairobi are named, and OfafaMemorial Hall in Kisumu.As we go back into Atieno-Odhiambo’s descentline, we discover Maasai elements (todayrepresented by the Kanying’we clan in Alego),we identify the Kintu cluster of the Bantuspeakers, the Owiny cluster of Luo speakers,Jokaruoth who was to produce Barrack Obamaand President Barrack Obama Junior of NorthAmerican Diaspora, and many other Bantu andSouthern Nilotic elements. The genealogicalexcursion is simply a confirmation of whatscholars have discovered about our ethnicity –168The quest for an African philosophy of Historyhad continued to concern three generation ofAfrican historians. In 1965, T.O. Ranger wrotethat there was the need “to examine whetherAfrican history was sufficiently African; whetherit had developed the methods and modelsappropriate to its own needs or had dependedupon making use of method and modelsdeveloped elsewhere; whether its main themes ofdiscourse had arisen out of the dynamics ofAfrican development or had been imposedbecause of their over-riding significance in thehistoriography of other continents (Ranger,1968).These questions were raised but not answered;and by the beginning of the 1990s, they werebecoming an embarrassment to Africanhistorians. Jan Vansina, a Belgian historian, anda colleague of mine on the InternationalScientific Committee that wrote UNESCOGeneral History of Africa and who was a memberof a strong team of scholars working under thedynamic leadership of Prof. Philip Curtin thathad established an influential department ofHistory at Wisconsin University U.S.A. TheDepartment produced many African scholarswith Ph.D. in History. He decided to beprovocative. He stated that African history waslargely written for an academic audience outsideAfrica rather than for the Africans living in thecontinent. Moreover, African historiographywas still dominated by outsiders some fourdecades after independence. He lamented:

169Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012“This is a continuing anomaly.In all other major parts of theworld, and that includes themajor parts of the so-called Thirdworld areas, the writing ofhistory, academic booksincluded, has primarily beenconducted in the area itself, in thelanguage of the area. But intropical Africa the writing of theacademic history was organizedby outsiders’, and ever since, theepicenters of this activity haveremained outside Africa, despiteall efforts to alter the situation. Itis a crucialanomaly…………………Outsiders initiated Africanhistory here. They created theuniversity departments withinwhich African historians laterworked, and they ‘trained’ themhow to write academic history.The Pioneers wrote for anoutside audience which sharedtheir world views and socialpractice, not for an audience inAfrica itself, except for Africanhistorians of Africa and a fewothers who had absorbed Euro-American academic culture.When African scholars began totake their destinies in their ownhands, they unwittinglycontinued to write their majorworks to a large extent for thesame academic audience ratherthan for their own naturalpopulations………… While theseauthors attacked imperial historyand promoted national history,they continued to write inEnglish or French, thus limitingaccess of their local audiences.Implicitly they still looked forapproval of their works in Europeor North America as a guaranteeof its high technicalstandard”(Vansina, 1994a).Vansina then concluded:169“However difficult to achieve,authors, insiders and outsidersalike, must strive to reach‘natural’ audiences and thus endthis anomaly in Africanhistoriography”(Vansina, 1994b).What a time-bomb! Who, among the Africanscholars, was going to hold the lion’s tail? Whowas going to spearhead future direction in theshaping of the discipline?A decade earlier John Fage, a doyen of Africanhistory had raised the same question in veryarrogant terms:“In the last analysis, it does needto be asked whether Europeanconcepts of history are suitablefor the understanding of Africanhistory. It is possible, indeed, tobelieve that the idea of history aswe have come to know it inmodern Europe was not oneapplicable to precolonial Africanhistory ……….. For the momentwe have very little Africanhistory written by Africans whoare untainted by Europeanconceptions and significances oftheir own past”(Fage John,1993).It was surprising that such a statement wascoming from the person who founded the historydepartment at Legon University in Ghana, wholater joined Roland Oliver at the School ofOriental and African Studies, University ofLondon to develop the Department of Historywhere I did my Ph.D. The two later founded theJournal of African History and edited the CambridgeHistory of Africa. Why was he now sodisillusioned?It is worth noting that the foreign scholars whohad pioneered the teaching of, and research in,African history in Africa, Europe and America,and who had made names and fortunes forthemselves in the “growth industry” that was

170Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012African history at the time, were now, inretirement, claiming that they had all alongparticipated in some kind of intellectual fraud.Their African products, with Ph.D in Africanhistory, were now being seen as intellectualcollaborators in the gargantuan act of betrayal ofthe peoples of Tropical Africa. A newgeneration of African historians was badlyneeded to reclaim the intellectual ground thatwas being lost.of historical reconstruction which differentiatesAfricans historical writing most clearly fromparallel writing in South Asia and Europe.Thirdly, we need to take cognizance of themanner and context in which this question hasbeen raised at all. He concludes his examinationof the different answers provided by Africanscholars with a quotation from the novelist AyiKwei Armah, which provides a prescriptiveagenda.At a meeting of the Association of AfricanHistorians, sponsored by CODESRIA, inBamako in 1994, Atieno responded to the abovecomment by Professor Fage:“Has time come to question theunitary acceptance of thehegemonic episteme which positsthat the discipline of historyuniquely belongs to Westerncivilization? Alternatively canAfricans articulate an Africangnosis that stands independentlyof these western traditions in ourstudy of African history? NeedAfrican episteme be intelligible tothe West? Need the study andpractice of history be tied to theguild of historical study at theuniversity academies? Is therestill the lingering possibility thatany one of us working within thewestern mode can have thearterial bypass surgery that maystill be the viaduct upstream tothe African reservoir ofhistory?”(Atieno-Odhiambo,1996a).In short, is autonomy of African history possible?Atieno answered this question in a long papercalled “The Usages of the African Past: AfricanHistoriographies since Independence” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2005) He stated that in order toanswer the question we need to consider theingredients of context, change, and Africanagency. First, we should do more research onthe philosophy of history of different Africancommunities. Secondly, we need to emphasizethat it is the relative dependence on oral sources170“To liberate the teaching ofHistory in Africa from colonialand neo-colonial confinement, itis necessary to break out of theconception prisons of Europeanand Western historiography.This means opening our minds asstudents and teachers to historyas a universal discipline, a studynecessarily involving allhumanity……..“We shall have to examinecritically all availablephilosophies of history, instead ofblindly accepting andpropagating the usual linearWesternevolutionaryhypotheses, from Christianity toMarxism.“Finally we need to conductpermanent in-depth studies ofworld history, placing specialemphasis on transformatorymovements, particularly thosemovements and processes that inour time have worked to turnsuch societies as China, Japan,and South Korea into modern,self-developing societies”(Armah,1995).Atieno’s excursion into African historiographiesconvinced him that African historical autonomyis certainly attainable, and doable. Thechallenge for the present generation of Africanhistorians is to undertake works of synthesisaimed at making explicit an African Philosophyof History.

171Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012One dominant thread is discernible in most ofthe works of Atieno-Odhiambo, namely, thehistory and culture of the Luo-speaking peoples.But in treating this theme, which he regards asregional as contrasted with state histories, Atienoemphasizes that the Luo chronology has itsepicenter in the cradleland of the Central Sudansometime around 1000 A.D. Successivemilestones in Luo historiography, from J.P.Crazzolara in the 1950s, Ogot in the 1960s,Cohen and Odhiambo in the 1980s, and RonAtkinson in the 1990s, all assume the constancyof the Luo world. The Luo histories aretransnational, traversing several ethnicities, statesand polities over the centuries without beingconfined to any single one of them. Hence, therewas a Luo nation and cultural sphere well beforethe incursion of the colonial state in thetwentieth century. Their sense of multiplebelongings to the various postcolonial states inthe region suggests an alternative paradigm forwriting regional rather than state histories, analternative that is closer to people’s experienceswith history in the long perspective than theWestern historical practice and which throws upchallenges for the student of ComparativeHistory. This is what Jan Vansina did in hisPaths in the Rainforest (Vansina, 1990), a clearintegration of anthropological insights intohistorical narrative that moves beyond the stateinto an understanding of local ways regardingexplanations why what we do, we do politically.During the Historical Association of KenyaConference on post-colonial Kenya: the firstfourty years, held at Lake Baringo Club, Kenyain June 2004, Atieno-Odhiambo intimated to methat he was planning to write a book on thepolitical history of the Luo, which would be aparallel volume to what I had done on theEconomic history over the past 4,000 years(Ogot, 1996). He wanted to focus on thehusbandry of power: how it has been harnessed,retained, and maintained in the Luo past; andhow it might be acquired and retained in thehurly-burly of the politics of the post-colonialAfrican state. He was taking it as axiomatic thatthere are some useful lessons to be learnt fromhistory. He requested me to organize aninternational workshop at Maseno Universitywhere major aspects of the subject could beventilated.For the workshop, he sent to me a paper whichhad two parts: a very long bibliography onpolitical history of the Luo, and a short essay onthe bibliography. He argued that as a scholar, hehad a responsibility to study society and try tocall people’s attention to things they mightwelcome looking at. His qualifications forundertaking this task were four: (i) His habitus asan academic over the past 34 years, which ledhim inexorably to reflection; (ii) his attainmentof the Socratic age of wisdom (51 years), whichentitled him, in terms of his “biological age”, tothe status of jaduong’ morwako ngaga (a sage whois qualified to wear an ear stud); (iii) his absenceand distance from local Kenyan politics over thepast sixteen years, which should ideally facilitatea certain detachment regarding a point of viewwhenever he was called upon to ng’ado rieko (giveadvice); and (iv) he had been around for longenough to acquire sufficient experience to writesuch a book.The title of the paper itself was intriguing, andcould only come out of Atieno’s fertileimagination. The full title was:“Thinking Your People, or‘Living a Kind Akuru gi Asumbi’: The Problem of Knowledge inLuo Pasts and Futures”(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004).Atieno-Odhiambo’s thesis is that the Jo-Luo ofKenya, like ancient Britons, saw colonialism asprovidential. Variously in the twentieth centurythey have described themselves as: “bornadministors”; as “government –sirkal,” especiallyduring the short stint between 1946 and 1966when both Tom Mboya and Oginga Odingawere in the Kenyatta government; as a peoplewith a homeland city, Kisumu, variously referredto by themselves as well as by their detractors as“second London”; as persona with a placement,“Odiero Ja Kisumo”. Throughout this longcentury they have entertained an ambiguity asregards the relationship between ethnicpatriotism and the territorial nationalism of171

172Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Kenya; to which they have also felt marginalizedand excluded from for most of the postindependenceperiod.At issue is the question whether a study of theLuo, and of the Nilotes generally, ought to focuson mentalities (with a concentration on selfregardingattributes as ‘the men of men’, monyjaang in Dinka, thuondi, oteka, witong, ka kara,wiluth); or whether they should concentrate onthe shifting sands of identity (with an emphasison being Jo-Luo who speak lep Luo, but which isalso cognizant of the fact of inter-Luo tensionssuch as occurred between Acholi and Lango atBarlonyo in 2004; or whether they shouldconcentrate on politics within the various statesof Sudan, Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya,Tanzania, with a focus on capturing state power.Their historiography suggests that any one ofthese loci has got its pitfalls.Like all peasant societies, all Luo societies inEastern Africa are in turmoil. They are subjectto a deep conflict between survival andcitizenship. Our experience during the twentiethcentury suggest they should, at the beginning ofthe twenty-first century, avoid tumult – mahu,between ourselves and within the widerterritorial societies we now inhabit. Thehistorical experiences of the twentieth centurysuggest that we may, in the short or long run,have to make difficult choices. This calls for are-interrogation of several things:(i)The all –consuming pursuit ofearthly wealth, which has led toindividual primitive accumulationand to the perennial refrain of“after all, who are you?”, that hasbecome the battle – cry of the havesagainst the have-nots. It is the kindof arrogance that lead to theconsumption of Bitter Money –pesa makech.(ii) The relentless pursuit of thePresidency: in Sudan, Kenya andUganda especially. Theexperiences of Milton Obote, JohnGarang, Tito Okello Lutwa, AliceLakwena, Joseph Kony, TomMboya, Oginga Odinga, Argwings-Kodhek, John Robert Ouko andHezekiah Ochuka Rabala call forsober reflection on the lessons, ifany, to be learnt from these happenstances. Some of them are:(a) Jatelo ogongo ogwari(b) Thim lich kodwa(c) Pod wan KujaWe should also ask ourselves whether ourtotemic animal imaginaries – liech (elephant),kwach (leopard), jowi (buffalo), omuga (rhino) –which are found in all Luo societies, areadequate for the task at hand. Is it enough tosing with Okot p’ Bitek:“The buffalo goes swinging his head thisway and that wayThe buffalo goes towards the hill with hishead raised high”(P’Bitek, 1972).How far does our farourite praise poem, “Jowijamuomo” enable us attain political power underthe shifting dispensations? When do wedeliberately depart from the imperially – imposedtaxonomy of the “Fighting Nuer”(Johnson,1981). In whose interest should we sustain, for awhole century, the politics of opposition anddissent?(Mueller, 1972).(iii)Dhano ipuonjo nyaka ti (Education islifelong). We must learn the limitsof the moral certainty of Luopopulism, and the pitfalls attendantto the pursuit of self – validatingtruths at the expense of the nuancesand hidden meanings that makeintelligent speech comprehensibleto the discerning, and wach awachato the populace. Atieno is awarethat this moral certainty oftenpasses as Luo Public Opinion,which has a tendency tometastasize into mob rule, andagainst which the individual mayraise her or his dissenting voiceonly at one’s own paril. But shouldwise women and men not be wary172

173Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012of unanimity among some twentymillion human beings?In short, Atieno is saying that our presentpredicament demands serious reflection. (Jo-Luonyaka yua wigi e sani). There is a need for theLuo peoples to involve themselves with a studyof the meaning of our four thousand years ofhistory, rather than concentrating on the historyof the present, with the attendant truculentdispositions towards: ok achiem nga dalu, or ihanyaango? This exercise should lead to an embrace ofthe knowledge of the great themes and processesof our evolution. What are the alternatives tothe politics of permanent struggle? At whatconjuctures do we accommodate both presumedtraitors – andhoga and thuondi in our practice ofpolitics? We know when to agree to disagree;but when do we agree to agree over contentiousissues? We must create space for toleration aswell as for daring forthrightness. If we want tosurvive, as citizens, and not merely as subjects,of the capricious states in which we are destinedto belong in the foreseeable future, we must goback to the value systems which emphasizeaccumulation of wisdom, wisdom with atrajectory “for the survival of the many, for theprofit of the few.” We must re-invent the meansby which a moral community is defined, in spiteof our often – announced differences. We mustunderstand that these means are “essentiallypolitical in nature.” That to Elisha StephenAtieno-Odhiambo, is the problem of knowledgeat present.He never lived to write this book, but the outlinecontained in this paper together with thecomprehensive bibliography he compiled shouldconstitute part of the rich intellectual legacy ofAtieno-Odhiambo. Now that the Luo have twoPresidents: Barak Hussein Obama – President ofthe most powerful country in the world, andPresident Salva Kiir – President of the youngestnation, the need for the political book planned byAtieno-Odhiambo is urgent.In conclusion let me say this: In the year 2002,Atieno-Odhiambo and Professor Toyin Falola ofthe University of Texas at Austin originated theidea of publishing, in one volume, a collection of46 of my essays. The volume span four decadesof my active scholarship, both in the academyand as a public intellectual. The volume alsoincluded critical essays on my works fromeminent scholars such as Jacob Ajayi, AliMazrui, John Lonsdale, Tiyambe Zeleza and theeditors. The essays were published under thetitle: - The Challenges of History and Leadership inAfrica (Falola and Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002) inthe Classic Authors and Texts on Africa Series,which re-represents classic African texts in orderto recover their contributions, give recognition topast accomplishments, challenge dominantparadigms, invigorate the discussion of Africa,and position the continent in the forefront ofintellectual debates and trends.But prior to this, in the year 2001 Atieno-Odhiambo edited a collection of extremely wellresearched and well – written essays byChapurukha M. Kusimba, Chris Ehret, DavidWilliam Cohen, Luise White, Tabitha Kanogo,Milca Amolo Achola and Atieno himself whichwere presented to me on my seventieth birthday.Called African Historians and African Voices(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2001), the book waspublished in Switzerland but launched atUgunja, in Ugenya among Atieno-Odhiambo’s“intellectual peasants”. These books helped todisseminate my works worldwide, and theKeynote Address I have just given is but a feebleattempt aimed at reciprocating the generousappreciation of my publications by a formerstudent, a colleague, a fellow intellectual, butabove all, an honest critic of my works. May hisworks continue to inspire young African scholarsin their struggle for a seat at the IntellectualTribunal of Intellectuals. Oriti, wuod Alego nyakawarom (Goodbye, the son of Alego till we meet.)ReferencesAnyang Nyong’o, P. (1981) The Development ofa Middle Peasantry in Nyanza. inReview of African Political Economy 20,108-124.Armah, A.K. (1995) Osiris Rising: A novel ofAfrica’s past, present and future.Popenguine, West Africa: Pev Ankh,217-218.173

174Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1972) The Rise and Fallof the Kenya Peasant, 1888-1922. EastAfrica Journal 5, 5-11.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1975) Seek Ye First theEconomic Kingdom: A History of theLuo Thrift and Trading Corporation(LUTATCO) 1945 - 1956. in B.A. Ogot(ed) Hadith 5: Economic and SocialHistory of East Africa. Nairobi: EastAfrican Literature Bureau, 218-256.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1976) The Movementof Ideas: A Case study of IntellectualResponses to Colonialism among theLiganua Peasants. B. A. Ogot, ed.History and Social change in East Africa.Proceedings of the 1974 Conference ofthe Historical Association of Kenya,Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.,165-185.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1991) The Productionof History in Kenya: The Mau MauDebate. Canadian Journal of AfricanStudies 25, 300-07.Atieno-Odhiambo. (1992) The Production ofHistory in Kenya: The Mau MauDebate. Canadian Journal of AfricanStudies 25, 300-307.Atieno-Odhiambo. (1995) On Decolonization. inB.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng’,Decolonization and Independence inKenya 1940-93. London: James Currey.Atieno-Odhiambo. (1999) Ethnicity andDemocracy in Kenya. Lincoln. NE:University of Nebraska - Lincoln.Atieno-Odhiambo E.S. (ed). (2001) AfricanHistorians and African Voices. Basel,Switzerland: P. Schlettwein Publsing.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1970a) Legion Maria:A Study in the Dynamics of Separatism.Department of Religious Studies andPhilosophy, Makerere UniversityOccasional Paper 17.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1970b) Some Aspects ofReligious Activity among the UyomaFishermen: The Rites Connected withthe Launching of a Fishing Vessel.MILA 2, 14-21.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1972) The Rise and Fallof the Kenya Peasant, 1888-1922. EastAfrica Journal 5, 5-11.174Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1977) Towards aHistory of African traditional Religion: AWest Kenya Case. The Journal ofEastern African Research andDevelopment 6, 5-17.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1978) Who were theMau Mau? No. 2, February – march,1978. African Perspectives 2, 6-7.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1981a) TheInternational Press and Mau MauHistorical Association of Kenya AnnualConference Paper.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1981b) Siasa: politicsand nationalism in E.A., 1905-1939.Kenya Literature Bureau.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1981c) Who were theMau Mau? . Historical Association ofKenya Annual Conference Paper.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1994) The agrarianquestion, ethnicity and politics in Kenya,1955-1993. Historical dimensions ofdevelopment, change and conflict in theSouth (ed). R. Van den Berg and UbeBosma. Amsterdam: Brukkerij RandstadBV.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1996a) Democracy andthe Emergent Present in Africa:Interrogating the Assumptions. AfrikaZamani, new Series 2, 27-42.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1996b) Reconditioningthe Terms of the Fact: Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy as PoliticalVectors. in B.A. Ogot (ed),. Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy in Africa.Kisumu Maseno University DesktopPublishing Unit.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1996c) Reconditioningthe Terms of the Fact: Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy as PoliticalVectors. in B.A. Ogot (ed),. Ethnicity,Nationalism and Democracy in Africa.Kisumu Maseno University DesktopPublishing Unit, 76.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2001) A World -Viewfor the Nilotes? The Luo Concept ofPiny. African Historians and AfricanVoices (ed) E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, BaselSwitzerland: P. Schletwein Publishing,57-67.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2002a) HegemonicEnterprises and Instrumentalities of

175Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy inKenya. African Studies Review 61, 223-249.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2002b) Historicising theDeep Past in Western Kenya. HistoricalStudies and Social Change in WesternKenya. William R. Ochieng’ (ed)Nairobi; East African EducationalPublishers.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2003) The CulturalDimensions of Development in Africa.Egerton Journal, July 2003 IV, 22.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2004) Think YourPeople, Or Living e kind Akuru giAsumbi: The Problem of Knowledge inLuo Pasts and Future A paper for theConference on the Political History ofthe Luo, Maseno University.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2005) Usages of theAfrican Past: African HistoriographiesSince Independence. African Researchand Documentation 96.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. and Lonsdale, J. (2003)Mau Mau & nationhood : arms,authority & narration. James Currey;EAEP, Nairobi.Atieno-Odhimabo, E.S. (1992) Tom Mboya. inHarvey Glickman (ed), Political Leadersof Contemporary Africa. Boulder Co.:Greenwood Press, 76.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989a) Siaya: Historical anthropology ofan African Landscape, 53-56, 119-128.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989b) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.Nairobi Heinemann Kenay, 35.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1989c) Siaya: The HistoricalAnthropology of an African Landscape.Nairobi Heinemann Kenay.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(1992) Burying SM - The Politics ofKnowledge and the Sociology of Powerin Africa. London: James Currey Ltd.Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(2001a) The Risks of Knowledge:Investigation into the Death of The Hon.Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya,1990, Nairobi. East African EducationalPublishers Ltd 2001, 14.175Cohen, D.W. and Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S.(2001b) The Risks of Knowledge:Investigation into the Death of The Hon.Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya,1990, Nairobi. East African EducationalPublishers Ltd.Ehret, C. (1998) An African Classical Age.Charlottesville: The University ofVirginia Press.Fage, J. (1993) Reflections on the Genesis ofAnglophone African History after WorldWar II. History in Africa 20, 15-26.Falola, T. and Atieno-Odhiambo E. S. (2002)The Challenges of History andLeadership in Africa. Trenton, N.J.08607: Africa World Press, Inc.Johnson, D. (1981) The Fighting Nuer: PrimarySources and Origins of a stereotype.Africa 51, 508-527.Lonsdale, J. (1992) The Moral Economy of theMau Mau: The Problem. Oxford: JamesCurrey in J. Lonsdale and B. Berman,Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya andAfrica, 270.Maina-wa-Kinyatti. (1977) Mau Mau: The Peakof African Nationalism in Kenya. KenyaHistorical Review 5, 287.Mueller, S.D. (1972) Political Parties in Kenya:The Politics of Opposition and Dissent,1919-1969. Ph.D. Thesis, PrincetonUniversity.Ngungi wa Thiongo. (1989) Matigari. Oxford:Heinemann.Odinga, A.O. (1967) Not yet uhuru: theautobiography of Oginga Odinga. Hilland Wang, New York.Ogot, B.A. (1983) Keynote Address: Language,Culture and Ethnicity in the PrecolonialHistory of Africa. Nilotic Studies, R.Vossen and M. Bechhaus - Gerst (eds).Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Vevlag, 23-32.Ogot, B.A. (1984) The Great Lakes Region. D.T.Niane (ed). Africa from the Twelfth tothe Seventeenth Century London:Heinemann, 498-524.Ogot, B.A. (1996) An Economic History of theJii-Speaking Peoples. Kisumu: AnyangePress.P’Bitek, O. (1972) What the Buffalo Desires.Ghala 9, 24.

176Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Ranger, T.O. (1968) Introduction. T.O. Ranger(ed) Emerging Themes in AfricanHistory. Nairobi : East AfricanPublishing House I - xii.Review, W. (1987a). Weekly Review, 20February, 1987.Review, W. (1987b). Weekly Review, 20February, 1987, 7-8.Scheonbrum, D.L. (1998) A Green Place, AGood Place: Agrarian Change, Genderand Social Identity in the Great LakesRegion to the 15th Century. Kampala:Fountain Publishers.Vansina, J. (1994a) Living With Africa.Madison: The University of WisconsinPress, 240.Vansina, J. (1994b) Living With Africa.Madison: The University of WisconsinPress, 242.Vansina, J. (1990) Paths in the Rainforest:Toward a History of Political Traditionin Equatorial Africa Madison, WI,University of Wisconsin Press.Wasserman, G. (1984) Politics ofDecolonization: Kenya Europeans andthe Land Issue 1960-1965. New York:Cambridge University Press, 1976;Christopher Leo, Land and Class inKenya. Buffalo: University of UniversityPress.176

177Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012An analysis of the Late Professor Atieno-Odhiambo’s Historical Discourses as aCorpus for Lexicography of the African LinguisticsBenard Odoyo Okalbenardodoyo@yahoo.comDepartment of Kiswahili and Other African Languages, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, MasenoUniversity, P.O. Box 333, Maseno, Kenya.______________________________________________________________________AbstractThe article focuses on the late Professor Atieno-Odhiambo’s historical discourses as an invaluablecorpus for the enrichment of African language studies. The article has analysed some of his historicalcontributions to the understanding of African language families, synchronic analysis of the nature andsemantics of lexicons of various languages (Kiswahili, Kalenjin and Dholuo) during colonial timesand after, and his contributions to the field of lexicography with special reference to Dholuo. The lateProfessor Atieno-Odhiambo was one of the great gurus in the historical discourses in the world,Africa and Kenya in particular. Though the scholar had a great passion in historical discourses as adiscipline, to some extent, he also had a strong love for the collection of lexicons of African languagesthat form a good corpus for the enrichment of African linguistics especially the field of lexicographyboth monolingual and bilingual.Key words: historical discourses, corpus for lexicography, the African linguistic___________________________________________________________________IntroductionThough all academic disciplines appear to bedifferent structurally, in nomenclature, in theirgoals and objectives, it is a clear fact that theynormally interrelate in one way or the other. Forexample, as we study activities of an ethnicgroup, the geographical experiences become veryhandy so as to locate the habitat of the group inthe globe.Likewise, as we endeavour to study the languageof any given ethnic group then the historicaldiscourses are normally looked for so as to knowthe origin of the speakers of the language, otherrelated languages and the etymology of variouslexicons used by the concerned group. On theother hand, great historians also need both thelinguistic competence and performance in orderto tailor their findings in an orderly way byembracing the standard grammar of the languagethey intend to use for communication.It is therefore imperative to note that any givendiscipline cannot survive in isolation but mustalways rely in one way or the other on otherdisciplines for the accomplishment of its variousstudies. Since most academic studies now tend tobe interdisciplinary, this article intends to analysethe contributions of the historical works of thelate Professor Atieno-Odhiambo in the study ofAfrican language families, synchronic analysis ofthe nature and semantics of the collected lexemesof some African languages in his historicaldiscourses during the colonial and post colonialtimes in Kenya, and lastly the contributions ofhis historical works towards the enrichment ofAfrican languages in the field of lexicographywith special attention to Dholuo.Contributions towards the study of Africanlanguage familiesThe African continent is regarded as thebirthplace of human race in that by the 4 thMillennium BC, the world’s oldest civilization177

178Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012seemingly had flourished in Egypt (Judge, 1993).New York Times News Service also gives a latestreport that it is postulated by Quentin D.Atkinson, a biologist at the University ofAuckland in New Zealand that languages grewfrom seed in Africa and especially southernAfrica (Daily Nation, 2011, April 23). Thoughthe African continent is regarded as both thebirthplace of human race and the humanlanguage, this same human language grew,developed and probably gave birth to the manyworld languages that are currently spread all overvarious continents.The UNESCO report of 2006 gives an estimatethat the world has about 7000 languages(Fromkin et al., 2007). Africa is reported to havealmost half of these languages between 700-3000both standard and non standard languages(Frawley, 2003). However, there are so manyAfrican languages existing together with otherworld languages witnessed and used incommunication in the African continent. Theselanguages in the African soil can be categorizedinto various families like: the Afro-Asiatic, theNilo-Saharan, the Khoisan, the Niger-Congo, theEuropean languages, the Dravidian languagesand also various pidgins, creoles, slangs andanagrams (Webb and Kembo-Sure, 2000).It is a common trend in linguistic studies thatfrom the major families of languages we can beable to move down to the studies of specificmembers with ease and accuracy. For example,in the African language studies, we can be ableto move down to specific languages in questionof various ethnic groups. But while doing this,we must remember that any study of a languagein a given environment needs historicaldiscourses.The historical discourses are very instrumental inthe language studies because any languagebelongs to an ethnic group in a specific culturalenclave and it is only through historians andtheir historical discourses that the linguists canrely so much on in order to comprehend theetymology of lexicons of the language of theethnic group. In this regard, linguists thereforenormally find the historical findings acomfortable abode for their linguistic studies soas to make informed and supportive conclusionson languages.178Many historical works of the late scholarProfessor Atieno-Odhiambo together with otherdiscourses from other great African historicalintelligentsia are invaluable contributions to thelinguistic study of the African languages in termsof the origin, nature, semantics and theirgrammatical relationships. For example,Dholuo language as one of the members of theNilo-Saharan language family is heavily enrichedby the late scholar’s works and his collaborators.Atieno-Odhiambo, Ouso and Williams (Atieno-Odhiambo et al., 1977) in their historical worktitled ‘A History of East Africa’, show very clearlythe origin, spread, language and classification ofLuo ethnic group into four minor groups as JokaJok, Joka Owiny, Joka Omollo and JokaSuba/Abasuba.The Joka Jok group settled around South ofAgoro Hills, moved again via Gulu, Soroti andMbale into Nyanza. The most famous settlementfor this group was Ramogi hills in Kadimo,Siaya district in the 16 th Century. The Joka Owinygroup moved to Kenya and had major settlementat Sigoma in Alego with the famous leaderOwiny Sigoma who was a ruthless man and ahard fighter. This group was also referred to asJokaruoth and believed to have arrived in Kenyaby the 17 th Century. The Joka Omolo group thatmigrated from Pawir in North Bunyoro,travelled through North Busoga and settled atIbanda and Bukoli. The group later movedeastwards into Kenya about the start of the 17 thCentury and includes Gem and Ugenya people.The Abasuba/Joka Suba group is considered to bea mixed one. Many of them were refugees fromBuganda and Busoga. Although on a rival thegroup was considered as a non-Luo, themembers of this group later became Luospeaking through assimilation as they mingledwith the Luos of Nyanza and settled in theSouthern part of the province and also on theoffshore islands.The historical classification of the Luo ethnicgroup is a scholarly finding that is veryinstrumental not only to the historians but also tothe linguists who are interested in dialectology(study of dialects of a language), semantics(study of the meanings of lexicons), lexicography(theory and practice of compiling dictionaries)and even the study of general historical

179Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012linguistics both synchronic and diachronicanalyses. This kind of explanation of the historyof the Luo ethnic group, classification and theirethnic language (Dholuo) is an avenue for anylinguist dealing with ethno-linguistics and evendialectological studies. The linguist will be highlymotivated to carry on with his or her studybecause of the availability of the essential data.Dialectology simply means the study of variousdialects of any given language and dialect is avariety of a language whose grammar differs insystemic ways from other varieties especially inlexical structures, phonological rules, syntacticnature and semantic considerations (Fromkin etal., 2007). There are dialects in any givenlanguage that can be categorised as regionaldialect spoken in a given region by the peopleusing the same language, social dialect and theprestige dialect spoken by people in positions ofpower.The study of Luo groups is important since wecan therefore be able to know as linguists wherethese groups inhabit in Nyanza province and ifthere are variations in lexical, phonological,semantic and syntactic aspects when speakingDholuo. The classification of the Luo groups andtheir different geographical placements inNyanza indicate the probable existence ofDholuo dialects. It has been realized that Dholuoas a language that is spoken in Kenya has fewlinguistic differences and almost negligibledialectical variations (Odaga, 1997). Forexample, Dholuo spoken in parts of Siaya(Alego, Ugenya and Gem) have slight variationsfrom what is spoken in Bondo and Kisumu.There are also slight variations in SouthernNyanza. For instance, in Alego the word cowdung is sometimes called wuoyo while in otherareas it is referred to as owuoyo. Furthermore,there are also slight differences in speechwhereby it is faster in Kisumu and Bondo than inSouthern Nyanza, Ugenya, Alego and Gem.Besides Dholuo language being studied in thiswork ‘A history of East Africa’, the work is also aclear indicator of the subdivisions of the Niloticlanguages which are important for any Africanlinguist with a passion for their in depth study.For example, there are Plains Nilotic languagesthat include Bari and the Teso-Maasai (Lotuko,Karamajong-Teso and Maasai). In addition,there are the modern Highlands Niloticlanguages that comprise Kalenjin (Elgon, Pokot,South Kalenjin and the Nandian group likeElgeyo, Marakwet, Tugen, Nandi and Kipsigis).The same piece also clearly illuminates the othermembers of the Nilo-Saharan language familythat are found in Kenya. Therefore, it is a veryinstrumental piece for the study of theseaforesaid languages hence contributing to thestudies of African historical linguistics.In recognizing this piece of work as a greatcontribution in the understanding of aspects ofhistorical linguistics dealing with the origin,spread and even the relationships of languages ina family, we have to remember therefore thatlanguages are normally grouped into families byvirtue of their common descent from an earlierparent or proto language. Thus languages can betraced back to a common ancestral language soas to understand how genetically they are related(Lyons, 1981). When tracing these languagesthen the historical works become very handy.Synchronic analysis of lexicons of someAfrican languagesSynchronic study of a language simply refers toan analysis of an aspect of a language as it is at aparticular point in time (Hornby, 2010). Thisanalysis can be of any aspect of language likesentences, lexicons, phones and even wordstructures. This section of the article gives aglimpse of the aspect of lexicons by referring tosome terminologies of Kiswahili, Kalenjin andDholuo languages collected by the late scholar insome of his historical works and that werecommonly used during the colonial and also postcolonial time respectively. The following sectionhas therefore relied heavily on some selectedhistorical works of the late scholar with thelexicons of African languages.It was not a bed of roses for the Africans duringcolonial times, the struggle, immediately afterattaining independence and thereafter. Africanswere referred to as uncivilized citizens and manywords were used to belittle or insubordinatethem. The following section draws yourattention to the synchronic exposure of thecollected terminologies and their semantics inthe following languages: Kiswahili, Dholuo,179

180Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Kalenjin and even the Hindu that werecommonplace during the aforesaid periods.Atieno-Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1974)discussed in his historical piece titled ‘Theparadox of collaboration and other essays’ suchKiswahili words as askaris that was used to referto the guides who were turned to be chiefs inKikuyuland, barazas meaning meetings with thewhites during collaboration and mzungu a whiteman.During the struggle for decolonization andindependence in Kenya, the late scholarcollected many terminologies that werecommonly used. These words were in fact a signthat the Africans were very unhappy with whatwas happening during this period. Whenreferring to the what happened duringdecolonization period, Atieno-Odhiambo(Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995) was very keen incollecting terminologies in his captivatinghistorical piece titled ‘Decolonization of Kenya: Theformative years 1945-55’. In this work the scholarcited some Kiswahili words that were somehowstandard and are also technically used in literarystudies to show disgust, perennial conflicts andagitation for independence.The following Kiswahili words werecommonplace: matatizo that means problems,mgogoro referring to tumult/conflict, tulipiganakama simba we fought like lions and tulinyakuauhuru yetu kamili we grabbed our trueindependence and economy. These words werebattle cries officiated by Kenyatta. From theseKiswahili words, the figurative language that isreferred to as simile is shown in the use of thestatement like tulipigana kama simba whereby theword ‘kama’ meaning ‘like’ is used to showcomparison. These words were very common asa sign of the harsh situations that existed then.When talking about political economy in thesame piece of work, the late scholar collected thefollowing terms: African asomi that meant alearned African, ahoi means landless and is alsobasically known as hoi meaning helpless or in abad state according to the standard Kiswahili,kala-ba derived from colour bar used to segregatethe Africans from the whites, karani refers toclerical officer, kipande was used to refer to passthat was a requirement for the Africans whereverthey were for identification and mugunda aKiswahili word denoting land as household andproperty that is sometimes referred to asmgunda/shamba/konde in the standard Kiswahili.Other words are nyokonyoko everyday life was aconstant annoyance that is derived from astandard Kiswahili word nyoko meaning yourmother. If the word is repeated to formnyokonyoko then it means constant disagreementor annoyance among the whites and the Africansduring this period. The word pasi meaningunskilled labourer was also commonplace. Thefollowing insulting Kiswahili words were alsocommonplace: afriti meaning a genie who ismalignant to people/evilly/immoral, chura afrog, kafiri a pagan and mshenzi denotinguncouth/uncivilized person, pumbavu stupid andshenzi referring to house boys by the Englishpeople was also very common. These were someof the descriptions of the African being as said bythe Busaidi Arab aristocracy in Mombasa.Some Kiswahili words collected by the scholar inthe same piece of work seemingly depicted thejudicial contexts and included such words as:askarikanga utamaliza hapo mbele that meant it willbe settled at the police depo, jela rumenda/jelandogo meaning the numerous court fines paidreally to court officials or its alternative andkanyaga denoting trespass laws in towns and onsettler farms that also means injustice oroppression. In some other instances such wordswere also commonplace: kiboko that meanscorporal punishment, ‘peksen’ that refers tofrequent raid in the household anytime, ‘seksen’that means arrest by police and sokwe mutu thatmeans ape like man.Sometimes the Africans were forced to have tikitiya kodi meaning a tax receipt that was to bepermanently on your body, toa kofia referring totake your hat off to show respect to the whiteswhenever they interacted with the Africans, toarisiti was used to denote giving an account foryour personal acquisition because you are allpotential thieves and ubaguzi wa rangi/kala-baderived from colour bar and means racialsegregation.Insults were also directed to the Africans like:bladi swaini that is derived from bloody swine,180

181Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012kafiri meaning a pagan and kuma nina referring toan insult that means the mother’s vagina. Insome instances the following words were used inthe day to day discourses as: habari news, mbarireferring to a lineage, mzungu the white man,nyapara was used to mean a person who tookcharge in farms and especially the white farms,nyimbo means songs, nyumba is a household,panga a weapon used to signify liberation, rikarefers to age group and utetezi which of course isa term for agitation for African independence.During this period of decolonization, there werealso some Dholuo words like chakra or oyiwemeaning lorries for transport and passengerbuses, jodak the guest residents and kinda e teko,riwruok e teko referring to struggle lies strength,unity is strength. Besides the collection ofDholuo language lexicons, the scholar alsocollected other words like lemek, a Kalenjin wordmeaning non-Kalenjin settler. In addition, in theHindu language the following words werecommon: ayahs means female workers at thehomes of the Indians, dukawallahs pettyshopkeepers and also suthru meaning house boys.Even far much later after independence, Atieno-Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2000)interestingly captures some words when he wrotea historical work titled ‘Africa’s place in worlddialogues at the beginning of the twenty first century’.In this piece of work, the late scholar managed torecord the following Kiswahili commonplaceterminologies: matatu meaning minibus, mitumbadenotes used goods that the scholar also termedas a culture of hand-me-downs. That meansgiving somebody something that has been usedand therefore has no value to him. In the samepiece of work, the scholar talked also about‘sumuni’ meaning fifty cents, rika age mates andubepari that basically refers to economic power orthe husbandry of power and wamla ovyo thatdenotes mere consumers of the used goods.These words show the social, political andeconomic status of the African people, theirenvironment, and agitation for change inleadership especially on how the Africans wereplaying a part as a second being to the thenprevailing leadership.Contributions towards African lexicographywith special reference to DholuoLexicography is both a terminology and adiscipline in linguistics that refers to the theoryand practice of compiling dictionaries, thesaurus,encyclopedia and even glossary, and the expertwho deals with it is known as a lexicographer(Bright, 1992); (Bussmann, 1996); (Frawley,2003); (Svens’en, 2009). The art of dictionarymaking is a complex one because anylexicographer has to understand the grammar oflanguages concerned, their lexemes, themorphology, the word building techniques andin most cases the main challenge of thelexicographer is where to get the source andwords for the proposed dictionary.It has been considered by many lexicographersboth monolingual and bilingual that words forany dictionary making can be collected from thefollowing sources: novels, plays, poems,magazines, journals, speeches, translated texts,religious writings, sermons, interviews, debates,ordinary conversation, oratory and otherdictionaries. However, in this study, it is clearlyevident that even the historical writings play abig role as a corpus for both the monolingual andbilingual dictionaries. A case in point is thehistorical works of the late historian ProfessorAtieno-Odhiambo.Being a lover of lexicography and especially ofthe African languages, these historical works ofthe late scholar are invaluable means ofcommunication and form a great corpus of manylexicons of Dholuo language that can berearranged and included as headwords for bothDholuo monolingual and even bilinguallexicography. Before showing the lexicons ofDholuo language that were collected by the latescholar in his historical presentations, it isimperative to briefly introduce Dholuo language.Dholuo is considered by many linguists asrelatively an unusual among the Africanlanguages in possessing a tonal system wheretonal values are very much affected by stress andintonation (Tucker, 1994). These tonal valuescause the semantic differences of lexemes inquestion. For instance, the word ‘kendo’ in181

182Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Dholuo can be pronounced differently byvarying the intonation so as to mean fire place,again and also marriage.Furthermore, Dholuo is a Nilo-Saharanlanguage that belongs to the Luo ethnic group, iswidely spoken in Nyanza province around LakeVictoria in Kenya and is found also in Ugandaand Tanzania (Odaga, 1997). The language isalso linked to many language groups in Uganda,Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic,Zaire and Chad (McOnyango, 1997).Just like any other African languages, Dholuotends to lack adequate lexicographical materialsfor its faster growth and development, fasterlearning and teaching especially to the youngergenerations that tend to show negative attitudetowards it. The language like any other is also indire need for recognition which is a linguisticright of its people in this new millennium.Seemingly, one of the ways to develop theAfrican languages Dholuo being one of them isto strive to produce both monolingual andbilingual lexicography of the concernedlanguages by relying on other sources for datacollection.The historical works of the late Professor Atieno-Odhiambo can serve and play a great role in thisendeavour. A critical look at the various wordsthat were collected from the historical discoursesof the late scholar to a larger extent gives life tothe studies of Dholuo lexicography. Thesehistorical works form a good corpus for bothDholuo monolingual and bilingual lexicography.Therefore, in the following section belowunderlies some hidden terminologies that werecollected by the late scholar that are notcommonly used in our day to day conversationbut are very essential for the lovers of Dholuolexicography.When talking about ‘The paradox of collaborationand other essays’ in 1974, Atieno-Odhiamborecorded Dholuo words that were used duringthe Luo division at the pre-colonial days and arevery instrumental for both Dholuo monolingualand bilingual lexicography. The scholar recordedthe following words that are analysed in acontinuous prose but arranged lexicographicallyin this article such as: buch piny a council, dohosmall councils of sub chiefs, jodong dhoot clanelders, jokaruoth the chief’s people, ogaye thepeace maker, ogendini sub nations of the Luos,ogulmama a police force, ojwando the conqueredsubjects, osumba mrwayi the war leader and ruothrefers to a chief.In the historical work entitled ‘EconomicMobilization and Political leadership: Oginga Odingaand the Luo Thrift and trading Corporation to 1956’,Atieno-Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1975)enlisted Dholuo words such as: gweng’ villagearea, jodong gweng’ village elders, joringi theAfrican bicycle permit holders who bought fishfrom the lakeshores, smoked then cycle so manydistances for sell, josomo the enlightenedbookmen, nyamugas/akala motor tyre sandalsand thuondi the war leaders.When referring to the Jopadhola who aregenetically Luos, Atieno-Odhiambo (Atieno-Odhiambo, 1976) discusses the issue ofintellectuality amongst the Liganua in hiscaptivating piece titled ‘The Movement of Ideas: ACase study of intellectual responses to colonialismamong the Liganua peasant’. In addition, thescholar recorded some Dholuo lexicons like:bunde Kawango the Wanga gun, dala a walledhomestead, gweng’ rural village, jonanga thepeople of clothes, jopango people who went outof their homes for long or short periods in orderto acquire the material wealth and the ideas ofthe outside people, luth club, thuondi war leaders,Were Nyakalaga God of Migration and WereMadiodipo God of Settlement was also enshrined.When the so called jopango and the josomo cameback home, they encouraged the use of wordssuch as: chai tea, chumbi salt, jonanga people whowear clothes, kananga a place of people whowear clothes, kapango a place where clothes camefrom/place far away from home, kawasungu aplace where one met the white man, od kibandarectangular house and ogunia meaning a sack.In fact sometimes, the whites were reallyadmirable to the Luo community to an extentthat the following words were used to describethem: apala palo wuoth that means the gray man182

183Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012with a tawny gait/walk, odiero wuod lando theblue eyed son of the light skinned girl and ombogojarachar that refers to the white man. In addition,the scholar interestingly included some wordsfiguratively for example the use of simile. Theterm simile linguistically refers to a word orphrase that is used to compare something tosomething else by using in most cases the wordssuch as ‘like’ or ‘as’ (Hornby, 2010). Examplesare witnessed in the late scholar’s work as: ber kanyar silisili that is being as beautiful as aSeychelois girl and kwar ka nyar Goa denotingbeing brown like a Goan girl. Some Dholuowords that were recorded in the same piece ofwork sounded more sarcastic when the Luocommunity referred to the other communities asjamwa that is a non-Luo and jamwa man gi yiwemeaning a non-Luo, a barbarian with a tail.It is a common phenomenon that when alanguage tends to lack an equivalent word of aforeign or the original language then mostlinguists are generally coerced to derive thewords in question. Derivation of course calls forclear knowledge and skills of word buildingtechniques. Dholuo language has derived wordsnot only from Kiswahili but also from English asenshrined in the late scholar’s historical piece.The following derived words were used inDholuo to denote authority such as: Disi fromDistrict Commissioner, jaj from judge, polisreferring to police and waskar derived fromaskari. It is a clear fact that when we derivewords from other languages then we mustconsider very accurately the phonological andthe morphological aspects of the receivinglanguage as witnessed in the aforementionedexamples.Some lexicons denoting insults also seeped intothe Luo village because of the existence ofjopango and josomo who went far in the towns.These include: bladi fuul derived from bloody foolmeaning a swear word that many people findoffensive that is used to emphasize a comment oran angry statement, jangli derived from Kiswahiliword jangili that means a poacher or a rogue,kafiri taken from Kiswahili and refers to aninfidel, unbeliever, atheist or pagan and swainithat is an insult and is derived from the wordswine that means pigs, unpleasant person, adifficult or unpleasant thing or task.ConclusionIn celebrating and memorising the life of the lateProfessor Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo andhis immense contribution to knowledge, history,people and the communitarian threads in histhoughts and works, linguists, therefore paytribute to him for successfully contributing towhat may be termed as a much sought corpus forthe African linguistic studies. This indeed is a giftto the African lexicographers in general andDholuo language in particular. Remember, thereis a loud cry from African linguists that theAfrican lexicography is still at infancy,developing without a theory and therefore oneway of promoting these languages is by applyingseveral methodologies for the users of bilingualdictionaries of African languages (Prinsloo et al.,2000). It is now true that many language aspectscan also be easily studied through historicism.The late scholar was a guru of political sciencebut also provided the gamut of African lexiconinvaluable for lexicographical studies. Indeed,his captivating pieces of work full of Africanlexicons form a great corpus for Dholuolexicography and African linguistic studies ingeneral. From the few books cited, we cantherefore be able to produce a sample of bilingualDholuo-English dictionary as shown below:183

184Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Apala palo wuoth the gray man with tawnygaits.Ber ka nyar silisili being as beautiful as aSeychelois girl.Bladi fuul bloody fool.Buch piny council.Bunde Kawango the Wanga gun.Dala walled homestead.Chai tea.Chumbi salt.Disi District Commissioner.Doho small councils of sub chiefs.Gweng’ village area/rural village.Jaj judge.Jamwa a non-Luo.Jamwa man gi yiwe a non-Luo, a barbarianwith a tail.Jangli a poacher or a rogue.Jodong dhoot clan elders.Jodong gweng’ village elders.Jokaruoth the chief’s people.Jonanga the people wearing clothes.Jopango people who went out of their homesfor long or short periods in order to acquirethe material wealth and the ideas of theoutside people.Joringi African bicycle permit holders whobought fish from the lakeshores, smokedthen cycle so many distances to sell.Josomo the enlightened bookmen.Kafiri infidel, unbeliever, atheist or pagan.Kananga a place of people who wearclothes.Kapango a place far away from home.Kawasungu a place where one met thewhite man.Kwar ka nyar Goa being brown like a Goangirl.Luth club.Nyamugas/akala motor tyre sandals.Odiero wuod lando the blue eyed son of thelight skinned girl.Od kibanda rectangular house.Ogaye peace maker.Ogendini sub nations of the Luos.Ogulmama police force.Ogunia a sack.Ojwando the conquered subjects.Ombogo jarachar the white man.Osumba mrwayi the war leader.Polis police.Ruoth chief.Swaini derived from swine that means pigs,unpleasant person, a difficult orunpleasant thing or task.Thuondi war leaders.Waskar askari.Were Nyakalaga God of Migration.Were Madiodipo God of Settlement.ReferencesAtieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1974) The Paradox ofcollaboration and other Essays.Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1975) EconomicMobilization and Political Leadership:Oginga Odinga and the Luo Thrift andTrading Corporation to 1956. A. Ojuka,& W. R. Ochieng, eds. Politics andLeadership in Africa, Nairobi: EastAfrican Literature Bureau, 139-178.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1976) The Movementof Ideas: A Case study of IntellectualResponses to Colonialism among theLiganua Peasants. B. A. Ogot, ed.History and Social change in East Africa.Proceedings of the 1974 Conference ofthe Historical Association ofKenya, Nairobi: East African LiteratureBureau., 165-185.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (1995) Decolonizationof Kenya: The formative years 1945-55.B. A. Ogot, & W. R. Ochieng, eds.Decolonization and independence inKenya 1940-93, Nairobi: East AfricanEducational Publishers, 25-47.Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S. (2000) Africa’s place inworld dialogues at the beginning of theTwenty First Century. G. P. Okoth, ed.Africa at the beginning of the 21stCentury, Nairobi: Nairobi UniversityPress, 213-225.184

185Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Atieno-Odhiambo, E.S., Ouso, T.I. andWilliams, J.F.M. (1977) A history ofEast Africa. London: Longman.Bright, W.e. (1992) International Encyclopaediaof Linguistics. New York: OxfordUniversity Press 1.Bussmann, H. (1996) Rout ledge Dictionary ofLanguage and Linguistics. London:Routlege.Daily Nation. (2011, April 23) Languages grewfrom seed in Africa. Nairobi: NationMedia Group, 34.Frawley, J.W.e. (2003) InternationalEncyclopedia of Linguistics.2nd ed.Oxford: Oxford University Press.Fromkin, V., Rodman, R. and Hyams, N. (2007)An Introduction to language.8th ed.Boston: Thomson Wadsworth.Hornby, A.S.e. (2010) Oxford AdvancedLearner’s Dictionary. 8th ed. Oxford:Oxford University Press.Judge, H.e. (1993) Oxford IllustratedEncyclopedia. World History to 1800.Oxford: Oxford University Press 3.Lyons, J. (1981) Language and Linguistics: AnIntroduction. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.McOnyango, O.O. (1997) Preface. A. B. Odaga,English - Dholuo Dictionary. Kisumu:Lake Publishers and Enterprises Ltd, v-vi.Odaga, A.B. (1997) English - DholuoDictionary. Kisumu: Lake Publishersand Enterprises Ltd.Prinsloo, D., Chuwa, A.R. and Taljard, E.(2000) The Lexicons of Africa. V. Webb,& E. Kembo-Sure, eds. African Voices.An Introduction to the Languages andLinguistics of Africa. Southern AfricaCape Town: Oxford University Press,220-244.Svens’en, B. (2009) A Handbook of Theory andPractice of dictionary making.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Tucker, A.N. (1994) A Grammar of Kenya Luo(Dholuo). Koln: Rudiger Koppe Verlag8.Webb, V. and Kembo-Sure, E.e. (2000) AfricanVoices. An Introduction to languagesand linguistics of Africa. Southern AfricaCape Town. Oxford University Press.185

186Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012From Round Huts to Square Houses: Spatial Planning in Luo CultureGeorge M. OnyangoSchool of Planning and Architecture, Maseno University, E-mail: georgemarkonyango@yahoo.com___________________________________________________________________________AbstractPlanning as a profession has tended to be associated with the modern city in Africa. However, thispaper posits that planning as a process of organizing spatial function is a dynamic process. Amongthe Luos of Western Kenya, we see a process that is determined by culture and societal roles inarrangement of space. Movement from a circular form to a regular “square” format that is based onthe need to survey land and ensures individual titles sees a transition in the cultural process of accessand use of land. The process runs from pre-colonial, to colonial and post-colonial Kisumu, thecapital of the Luo nation.Key words: Houses, Spatial Planning, Luo, CultureIntroductionSpatial Planning as a concept has been presumedto be an enclave of ‘modern’ urban culture.However it must be appreciated that planning isinnate in all the activities we do. Man as arational being puts consideration in his acts toensure that he achieves a set objective. Theprocess of achieving the objective may be faulty,and we may then say that the planning wasfaulty. Planning as a rational organisation ofspace by man shall be the area of concern in thispaper. The presumption is that man alwayswants to make the best use of the land he has. Inthis endeavour he will segregate non-compatibleusers and locate compatible ones close to eachother. But all this is subject to how he perceiveshis world. This forms the basis of the analysis inthe paper.Concept of CultureCulture is a complex concept that permeates allthe elements of the society. In a previous article,Tylor gives a description of culture (Sardar andvan Loon, 1997). He states that:‘A nation s culture includes the points ofview everyone has about individual conductand social relations, his attitude towardgovernment and toward other peoples, hishabit of mind about the family, the duty ofparents to children and to parents, hisstandards of taste and of morals, his store ofaccepted wisdom which he expresses inproverbs and aphorisms, his venerations andloyalties, his prejudices and biases, hiscanons of conventionality, the wholegrouped ideas held in common by mostpeople. This body of culture comes to everyindividual mainly through well recognizedchannels, through parents and elders whohand it down by oral tradition, throughreligion, through schools and throughreading both of books and of newspapers andperiodicals’This description refers to non-material aspects ofculture. However it must be borne in mind that186

187Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the non-material aspects of culture have animportant bearing on the material aspects ofculture. The two make a complex whole.Wallis W.D (Wallis, 1917) highlights severalaspects of culture , namely;1. A culture is unique2. A culture does not travel into otherculture areas, though the people whocarry it may extend their territory and soenlarge the geographical boundaries oftheir culture3. Despite the uniqueness of tribal culture,no tribe is culturally a self complete unit.4. Though a culture dopes not travel as aunit i.e. intact, many culture traits travel5. A culture is a functioning dynamic unitand the various traits which compose itare interdependent6. Since the traits which comprise a cultureare interrelated, an innovation affects theentire culture7. Individuals do not participate in theculture to the same degree or in the sameway.From the characteristics given by Wallis, we seethat there are several variables that emanate froma culture of any given society. How the societytherefore develops its culture component willdepend on how the cultural traits are learnt orhanded down under diverse geographic andsocial conditions. The social elements of cultureare apparent in aspects of social organisation andsocial behaviour as exemplified in customs,mores, institutions, law, language, ideologies andall other societal aspects of culture. These socialelements are often shaped by the geographicalenvironment. But the culture must also be ableto take advantage of environment for the societyto exist within a given environment.It is noted that adaptation to physicalenvironment depends on the will, the training,and the social inheritance of those who inhabit agiven locality. If we wish to predict what apeople will do when they move into a newenvironment, it is more important to know thepeople than the place or better, one must knowboth.Foundation: The Round HutsTowards the end of the 19th century the areaaround Lake Victoria was basically a Luopopulated area. The Luo, a Nilotic people whohad settled in this area a few decades earlier,were an ethnic group that had engaged in mixedagriculture (livestock keeping and farming) andwere also fishermen. There were fishing villagesaround the lake and some villages further inland.187

188Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Figure 1: The Traditional Luo Homestead1st WifeGranneryKitchenGranneryGrannery2nd WifeKitchenCattle Kraal(Duol)3rd WifeKitchenMain Grannery1st Son's Hut2nd Son's Hut3rd Son's HutGATEThe Luo homestead can consist of as few as onehouse to as many as ten or fifteen. The size isdetermined by the number of wives a man has,living in the homestead, and the number of sonswho have built their own houses (Simba). Thehomestead is the smallest spatial planning unitamong the Luo. It is not just a place of abode buta point of reference to an individual’s nichewithin the community and geographic location.For the man it is the pinnacle of one’s manhood.For women, it is the place in which one can takecare of her family, bring up her children, partakein decision making and bring her family tomaturity and in a sense her whole being. Thehomestead and the family unit that lives in it, isboth a society as well as a unity of the visible andinvisible worlds.Under the traditional system of farming, all; evennewcomers, were accommodated and allocatedland to settle and put up a homestead (Odinga,1967b). However of great consideration was thefact that this system of land ownershipperpetuated the creation of links between thepeople of Luoland, which was to see itsmanifestation in the migration to urban area inlater years.The homestead went through a morphologicaltransformation over time that started from thecreation of a new home (golo dala) through youthand mature age, when most of the sons wouldhave built their houses, to an old age when thesons move out and finally to ‘death’ of thehomestead (Gunda), when there was nobodyremaining in the homestead. This process wassome form of ‘invasion-succession’ in which the188

189Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012sons moved out of the father’s compound toestablish their own homes outside thehomestead, golo dala. This system created someform of forward movement ensuring that theclan/family could encroach on and secure newparcels of land while still having the protection ofthe family behind them. This relationship hadboth an inward looking aspect and outwardencroachingdimensions ensuring that theinterests of the family and the community weretaken care of. The Luo villages that wereestablished on hillslopes and provided a vantagepoint from which the community migratedoutward into new territory. One notes theconcentration of the villages in the central hillyareas, which was naturally the best location forsettlement with focus on defence.By the turn of the century Pax Britannia hadbegan to set in and the villages were nowconstructed with Euphorbia fences, reinforcedwith strong sticks basically to keep out wildanimals and not enemies as such. As the villagesexpanded and spread, the strips of land betweenfences was determined by the necessity of leavingsufficient land to allow for movement of manand livestock to watering places. These footpathswere rarely wider than 2 meters, a tendency thathas persisted to date in the areas outside themunicipal boundaries.It must be noted that the Luos had by now beenconfined somehow to Nyanza with theirmovement eastward and southwards restrictedby the settlements of the Bantu and theestablishment of settler farms. Londsdale(Londsdale, 1989) summarises the socio-politicalstructure of the period thus,‘‘In order to understand the politics of theBritish conquest one must first grasp someidea of their own (the Luo). They were allcolonising people, for whom the control ofscarce labour was paramount. Their basicunit of production and consumption wasthe extended family. But no family couldsurvive in isolation. Each needed the cooperationof others in the seasonal choresof agriculture and herding. The idiom ofco-operation was patrilinial descentthrough the generations and the kinship ofcontemporaries. But the organisation ofwork was less egalitarian than its ideology.It was focused on the big man with largefamilies who could exploit more than theirfamilies alone - impoverished dependantworkers, immigrant families grateful forprotection, marriage alliances withneighbouring settlements or herdingsections and natural defence agreementswith other big men. Small settlementscould not prosper without wide networks’’.It is in this environment that the British nowappear. The end of the Luo villages as a distinctsettlement form in the area was near.‘Alego tat yien’ is a common remark amongstthe Luo when they speak about Alego area inSiaya. This remark refers to the fact that the‘round huts in Alego have roofs made of sticksand are grass thatched (or is it herbs!). Thesehuts were the traditional housing for the Luocommunity. But who are the Luo?The Luo constitute the only group of River-Lakeor western Nilotes in Kenya. They are foundaround the Winam Gulf of Lake Victoria, fromclose to the Uganda border to the northern partsof Tanzania. Up until 1300AD, these peopleinhabited the region south of the confluence ofrivers Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal. They weresurrounded by the Azande in the south and east,the Dinka in the west and the Nuer in the North.These people, especially the Dinka and Azandewere basically pastoralists and the expansion ofthe Luo territories resulted in conflicts of interestsince the Luos who were basically pastoralists.189

190Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012The Luos were forced to move out of this cradleto look for ‘virgin’ land where they could settleand expand without much conflict. It is arguedthat other factors could have spurred thismovement, including climatic conditions,environmental pressures, overpopulation, war,epidemics or simple restlessness. Most of thesemovements would consist of small groupsculturally and linguistically similar moving alongat intervals of perhaps twenty to fifty years apart.This movement gives the impression thatprobably one generation would move whileanother ‘watched’ to see the suitability of thenew settlement.Historians have identified four major groupsamong these early arrivals in the Lake Victoriaregion. Joka-Jok, Jok-Owiny, Joka-Omolo andBasuba. Joka-Owiny with the Padhola JokaOmolo with Alur, who are ethnic groups foundin Uganda who were laggards as the wave ofLuo diffusion spread eastwards to the Lakebasin. The spread of Luos into Kenya’s lakeregion from Uganda took place over severalcenturies. This process involved not only spatialexpansion but increase in population creating amomentum for further expansion, especiallyconsidering the fact that the majority emphasizedpastoralism, leading to a life of seasonalmigration, which was brought to a halt by theimposition of colonial boundaries. B. A. Ogot(Ogot, 1968) sums the process thus:‘In reality the settlement (of Nyanzanorth of the Gulf) was curved out inisolated detachment s and was only verygradually completed. Up to aboutthirteen generations back, the Luoimmigrants only occupied the small areaaround Ramogi Hill. From this focalpoint they expanded eastwards toestablish settlements in Alego, Sakwa,Asembo and Uyoma. Then with thesecond wave of invasion which wasformed chiefly by the Joka-Owiny, Jok-Omolo and other minor groupings, thereal conquest of these regions started.Between six and seven generations ago,south Nyanza was invaded, and theprocess was completed when the Luofinally abandoned their traditionalhabitat and invaded the higher areas ofGem, N. Ugenya, Kisumu and N. Seme.Thus the process of conquest was a veryslow affair which continued upto 1900.’Luo culture as it emerged in Nyanza, became acomposite culture of numerous disparateelement, some acquired during the migration,but many other adopted from assimilatedoutsiders such as the Abasuba, from defeatedand absorbed Bantu speakers, and fromneighbouring groups of people.Given this background, we are able to followhow the Luo migrated to establish themselvesalong the shores of Lake Victoria. This is theregion that was proliferated with round huts ofgrass thatch, ‘a symbol of Luo housing’ (Plate 1).190

191Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Plate 1. A Luo HomesteadThe round hut was the heart of the Luo home.From the round hut, we move on to the roundcompound. The question one would ask is, whatwas the essence of this circular approach toplanning?The following statement by Ochieng (Cohen andAtieno-Odhiambo, 1989) should give someguideline:‘During the wet season, individualsmigrated from the riverside plains anderected their homesteads on the hilltopsand in each homestead, each father ruledhis family. During the dry season,families crowded with their livestock nearwatering places and in these places strongfamilies often ruled the weaker ones’.From this semi-pastorol life, the Luos asthey moved into the lake region began toestablish permanent settlements. Thesetended to be on hilltops as opposed to theearlier tradition of seasonal movement.Since the Luo in western Kenya werebasically new comers, they had toestablish settlement locations indefensible sites. These locations usuallyon hill tops were circular to ensure apanoramic view of the enemy terrain.These settlements were made up of villages, eachbeing a large defence fort (Plates 2 and 3). Awall of earth, three to five metres high and aboutone metre in diameter went round the villageleaving only one opening as the gate. The wallwas surrounded by a ditch of three metres indepth. Inside the wall there were many huts inwhich lived large numbers of men, women andchildren. The land immediately around thehomestead was reserved for cultivation bywomen and their daughters while the elders andmale warriors grazed their flock in areas furtherfrom the homestead.191

192Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Plate 2: Typical collection of Luo homesteadsPlate 3: A Luo Home192

193Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012This was the basic unit of settlement amongst theearly Luo settlers. The need for a panoramicview was replicated in the hut. In the hut notonly was the view panoramic but all parts of thehut had equal access to the hearth. Heat fromthe fire place was diffused equally round the hut.Tools and implements were within easy reach.In fact a circular operation space allows for moreefficient organization of space for quick utility.There are no dark corners where snakes andunwanted creatures can hide. The circular formof structure is a problem that is probably basedon an environment that is not bounded in a strictformal sense. It gives a functional arrangementwithout resort to unnecessary calculation.Therefore all a person needs to know is theapproximate area required. Accuratemeasurement as we know it need not apply.This allowed for quick construction of structureswith locally available material. This fortifiedvillage, called gunda formed the core of theregional settlement. Atieno–Odhiambo (Cohenand Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989) notes that as thepopulation of the gunda expanded as modicum ofsecurity was established in the area, as wealthwas reckoned less exclusively in such easilyportable goods as cattle, the children of the gundaestablished dala or new homesteads (and onesless fortified) outside the gunda.What resulted was a dense settlement core withan expanding settlement of lower density. Thisexpanding settlement called gweng was notnecessarily based on agnatic kins. It was madeup of strategic alliances organised to seize andenlarge the gunda. It was leased to the strangerlineages or clans (Jodak) sometimes because thelatter had assisted in the conquest of the newterritory or on terms laid down by the clan of thegunda who claimed possession of all the land inthe territorial unit.The gunda though walled and the gwenge thoughbounded, were never isolates. There was someform of interaction between different gwenge andgundni. But there was a territory between theextreme edges of the famland which was left forcommunal grazing. This was usually a commonground or ‘no man’s land’ for people of adjacentgwenge and formed a crude boundary. This thimoccasionally was as broad as ten miles. Therituals associated with establishing fixedsettlements were more established amongst Joka-Owiny. Atieno-Odhiambo (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989) notes that from early on intheir experiences in Bukooli (Busoga) and Alego(Siaya), Owiny (Owiny-Karuoth) group alsoassociated themselves with fixed sites ofsettlement and maintained a strong attachmentto their earliest settlement sites over a longperiod of time. For Omollo groups, suchidentification with fixed sites of settlement waslong delayed.’The Omolo group basically led a parochialpastoralist existence. Joka-Owiny on the otherhand carried into E. Bukooli and Alego ‘an auraof prestige and particular ideas of dominationand subordination’. This had great implicationsfor future settlement patterns. Byinstitutionalization of political control, the Joka-Owiny perpetuated their concept of settlementfrom their assimiladoes.With the development of a more fixed form ofsettlement pattern the issue of land ownershipbegan to take on a new perspective. There wasneed to have land for cultivation and land forgrazing of livestock. The system of landownership among the Luo was communal. Aclan claimed so much land and every member ofthe clan had a right to cultivate any part of theclan sphere. Plots for cultivation were dividedamong the wives and on the death of a woman,her sons would inherit the land. However193

194Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012because of the communal mode of landownership, it was possible to ensure thatanybody who was willing to till the land hadsome portion to till for food. He growing ofmaize on these parcels of land is a recentphenomenon that went hand in hand with theestablishment of colonial boundaries thatdiscouraged migration. Millet and other hardygrains, sweet potatoes were the main cropsgrown. These crops could withstand droughtand there was rarely any catastrophe in times ofdrought because of the kind of crops grown.These crops were grown outside the home. Asthe family grew larger, and sons went out of thecompound to establish their homes, there wasmaintenance of some order. The first son wouldestablish a dala on the upper portion of the ridge,followed by the other sons in a descending orderdown the ridge. This had the effect of ensuringthat the lower down the hill or population wouldbe more youthful and more robust, thus able todefend the gweng. In each new home the eldestwife would face the gate and the other wiveswould have their houses on both sides of thecompound in a systematic order followed by thesons. The location of the household had theeffect of giving the home a systematicarrangement, maintained a certain pecking orderand gave the first wife the position of homeleadership. In the centre of all this arrangementwas the duol for’ the owner of the home’.Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo sum up thisconcept of traditional Luo settlement planningthus:‘Older Luo men often remark that before1900 people did not go around buildingjust anywhere on the terrain. The landwas rationally organised, and peoplewere settled in concentrated residentialunits (gundni bur, singular gunda bur).Defence requirements were important,according to these expositions, whilecollective settlements and collectiveplanning of the use of the land wascritical. In this popular exposition ofagrarian change, devastation of thelandscape came with the pax Britannica,when the defensive uses of the gunda burbecame less significant.Foundation and Empire:a) British PenetrationThen came the white man and his laws. TheLuo settlement landscape was drasticallychanged. Gunda bur was being replaced by anew more atomised form of settlement (Plate 4).The special resources and specialisedproduction organized by larger social units werereplaced by the monotonous repetition of smallfarms producing small amounts of basic staples.Lonsdale (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1989;Ogot, 1968) observes that in the ten yearsbetween 1895 and 1905, ‘Kenya’, if such aretrospective concept may be permitted, wastransformed from a footpath 600 miles long intoa colonial administration. This transformationwas the work of force. This conquest of thepeoples of Eastern Africa disrupted the tradingstrategies that had linked the peoples of Nyanzabasin who had already reached some workingequilibrium.194

195Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Plate 4: Later day Luo settlementsIt should be noted however that by the beginningof the sixteenth century many of the socioeconomicand cultural features of modern Kenyahad taken shape (Miller and Yeager, 1994). Bethat as it may, the knowledge of the peoples ofthe Lake Basin was rudimentary to theEuropeans. The early European explorers intothe interior of Africa, such as David Livingstone,believed that they could help wipe out the slavetrade by encouraging commerce, thus providingan alternative to the income generated by thetrade in human merchandise. This new wave ofexplorers tended to move inland unlike theearlier concentration at the coast by theirforerunners. Londsdale points out that:‘‘The British urgently needed to convert theexternal, costly and destructive force of theconquest into internal, negotiable and productivepower....But if Africans had to learn theEuropean lesson of submission, the British hadto learn the local African lesson, how to pacifytheir mastery. ‘Pacification’ rightly, is no longerused to describe the colonial conquest. Whatneeded subjugation was not so much the disorderof Africa as the eruption of Europe. ButPacification is still a proper term to describewhat the British had to do with their conquestsrather than with it. They had used African powerin order to undermine it profitably. They had tocapitalize on the politics ofconquest’’(Londsdale, 1989).The East African region had to be opened up ifthere was to be any profit in maintaining theregion as a British colony. However, the BritishForeign office did not begin serious planning forits future administration of East Africa untilApril 1894.In 1895, the Ugandan Protectorate was formed.The rest of the land between the boundary of195

196Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Uganda and the coast was to be administeredfrom Zanzibar, as a protectorate. In 1887, withthe active endorsement of the Foreign office, thathe had sought for so long, Sir WilliamMackinnon founded the British East AfricaAssociation and it was a going concern thefollowing year with the name having beenchanged to the Imperial British East AfricaCompany (IBEA) (Miller, 1971). The IBEAestablished caravan stations along its trade routesinto the interior (See Map 5.2). Mumias was itsmost important station in Uganda Protectorate.The eventual construction of the Mackinnonroad, which traversed the highlands, enhancedtrade and reduced the hazard of travel to theeastern parts of Uganda.Miller (Miller and Yeager, 1994) aptly sums upthe great fears that were driving the British at thetime.‘‘According to a logic that today seemsfanciful, British policy focused onUganda as a key to its strategic interestsin Africa. The reasoning was that unlessBritain controlled Uganda, theheadwaters of the Nile might be dammedby another European power. This woulddisrupt the river, bring Egyptianagriculture to its knee, cause peasantuprising in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, threaten the Suez Canaland prevent British entry to the Red Seaand beyond. India the Pearl of theEmpire, and the Far East trade couldbecome virtually inaccessible’’.It was however logistically and technologicallyimpossible to achieve such an engineering feat atthis point in history. In spite of this we find thatmore than any other factor, it was this concernabout the Nile waters that drove Salisbury tochange his mind about East Africa. He thusdemanded that Germany renounce its interest inUganda as a precondition for his support forGermany against France and Russia in 1890. Atreaty was signed between Britain and Germanywhich put Uganda into the British sphere ofinfluence (Dilley, 1965). In the meantime, theEast African protectorate continued to operate asa chartered company. The IBEA had increasedthe geographical knowledge of East Africa,established ‘core’ caravan stations which werepivotal to settlement development. It thussecured for Britain the route from the coast toUganda and continued to act as a buffer toforeign intervention, especially from Germany inthe German East Africa, within the Britishsphere. The 27th August 1894 saw the formalproclamation of the protectorate and in thefollowing year, on the 1st of July the actingBritish Commissioner Colonel Henry White wasdeclared the first Governor, based in Mombasa(Mungean, 1966).Until 1901, the chief British interest remained thesecurity and supply of the road to Uganda. Bythe mid 1890’s, there were three main foodbuying stations, each with a small garrison;Machakos in southern Kamba country, FortSmith at the southern end of Kikuyu, just abovethe swamp that became Nairobi, and Mumias, avillage named after its Luhya Wanga chief(Londsdale, 1989). However, the onlyjustification for possessing the wasteland ofIBEA was that it would serve as a corridorbetween the coast and Lake Victoria. The IBEAwas mainly semi-arid except for parts of centraland the coastal belt. Through this region we finda system of mails carried by runners along theUganda road. The journey from Mombasa toEldama Ravine in Uganda, some 797 km, tookmore than 20 days and was basically dependentupon portage which was quite unreliable. By1895, the system had completely broken downunder the strain of traffic (Mungean, 1966).196

197Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012At this period, we see attempts by the Britishadministration to consolidate its influence in theinterior. In 1894, Sir Henry Colville, the BritishCommissioner of Uganda annexed Mumias as agovernment station. The next important stationto be built in the region was Port Victoria and forsome time was the only other government stationin the area. From this port, goods from thecoastal ports of IBEA were bulked andtransported to the ports of the Buganda Kingdom(Obudho and Waller, 1976). In the act of takingover from the IBEA by the Uganda Protectorateadministration, the intention was to make PortVictoria the headquarters of the Eastern provinceof Uganda. The headquarters was thereforetransferred from Mumias to Port Victoria in 1899(Obudho and Waller, 1976).By 1895, the IBEA had withdrawn from the areawith the formation of the East AfricanProtectorate on 1st July 1895 and so paved theway for Kenya to change from a charteredcompany to a British colony. In 1902 the westernboundary of the protectorate was altered toinclude the Eastern Province of Uganda,effectively incorporating the Luo area into theProtectorate.It should be pointed out here that the 19thcentury caravan expeditions were the first stagein the opening up of East Africa to the productsof Western industrial revolution and they alsowere the first step in European penetration of thearea. One of the reasons for the integration ofEast Africa into the system of the capitalisteconomies was the search for cheap rawmaterials (Zwanenberg, 1975). As aconsequence, the development of the railwayline, began in 1896, tended to perpetuate theestablished spatial structure of the economiclandscape.On Friday, December 20, 1901 the line reachedrailhead, Port Florence (Miller, 1971).The Uganda railway played a key role in creatingthe demographic, political and socio-economicconfiguration of modern Kenya. The immediateaims were to extend a line deep into the unmappedheartland of Eastern Africa. Thisrailway line would make the colony pay for itselfthrough exports and by attracting settlers and tosafeguard the important source of the Nile. Theultimate consequence of the Uganda railway wasmuch more profound and far reaching than hadbeen foreseen (Miller and Yeager, 1994).Amongst the initial impacts of the line was thatduring its construction over 30000 contractworkers from India were brought in to work onthe line. The argument given for importing theIndian labour was that they had experience inrail construction in India of similar nature. TheUganda railway had also adopted the metregauge of the Indian railway. The Africans on theother hand had seen no reason why they shouldengage in the strenuous labour of railconstruction and thus, as a source of labour, theywere not available. When the railway wascompleted, a large number of Asian labour choseto remain in Kenya. Many were encouraged bythe colonial office to stay, with the view that theywould help increase the prosperity of some of theupcountry stations (Mungean, 1966).The Colonial office now had access to their goal,Uganda. The railway could be used to transportpeople and soldiers to Uganda to ensurecontinuation of the British domination of theregion Goods could be transported easily toKilidini for export to the ‘Mother Country’. TheEastern province of Uganda, later Nyanzaprovince, may well have been the railway’s bestcustomer. Most of the produce from this areawas almost entirely of African origin. Howevercolonial officials would later try to obscure thisfact to avoid the wrath of the settler population(Berman, 1990).197

198Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Eliot echoed the belief of the Colonial office. Thenew railway had to pay and to find new sourcesof revenue. He suggested that such revenueshould be obtained partly from a hut tax, whichwas proving successful in German East Africaand Uganda, and partly from what he called thescientific development of the country’s naturalresources (Mungean, 1966). The fact that therailway passed through the EAP to Uganda hadone major shortcoming. The railwayadministration was divided between two regionswith different goals. This administrative problemwas resolved in 1902 when the Eastern provinceof Uganda was transferred to the EAP andeffectively placed the whole of the Ugandarailway under one administration (compareMaps 5.4 and 5.5). This transfer also changed theperspective with which the Foreign Officeviewed the EAP. The boundary changes nowcreated more interest in this region with thebelief that if the railway was to pay for itself thewestern part of the country had to be developed.This area encompassed the western highland ofthe Rift Valley, the Nyanza area and the LakeBasin. Kisumu was the main urban centre in thisregion, since by the time the railway reached thelake, Mumias was already declining inimportance, the headquarters having beentransferred to Kisumu.Collin Leys (Leys, 1975) aptly points out that therailway was built with loan funds, provided bythe British treasury. To repay the loans andterminate the annual grants-in-aid paid by theTreasury to meet the cost of administering theEAP, the land had to be made productive. Eliot’sargument of using scientific methods totransform the natural resources into revenue wasan argument for colonial settlementdevelopment. At the turn of the century, severalmillions of acres of high altitude land, much of itclose to the rail appeared virtually unused. Theadministration began to devise ways ofencouraging white settlement in this region andbring it into production by use of modernmethods of agriculture. The settlers would investcapital and produce crops. The railway, on theother hand, would earn revenue by carryingthem to the coast, and by carrying imports inlandthey would have earned abroad, and thegovernment would finance its activities bylevying tariffs on these imports (Leys, 1975).It is within this perspective that the annexationof the Luo villages into the colonial urban ambitshould be appreciated. The dual origin of the‘raw material’ for the structural development ofthe town would most definitely affect the patternof its growth.b) The Colonial BomasColonial administrative settlements were aimedat two basic goals, first as a source of control ofthe local population and establishment of Britishrule and secondly, as a centre for collection ofrevenue and development of economicenterprises for the mother country.The colonial town followed the tradition of thecolonial style of urban development. Eachcolonial town contained an administrative bomawhere the offices and residential quarters of thegovernment offices were located. The colonialofficials and the resident European populationlived in the best areas of the town, which wereprovided with the available social services andamenities, while Africans lived in villages on theperiphery of the town (Zeleza, 1989).Planning and administration in the initial stageswere manifest in the person of the ProvincialCommissioner (PC). The first graphic planningfor land-use was undertaken by C. W. Hobley,the then PC Nyanza. In 1900, he prepared a partdevelopment plan for three firms and BritishAsians who had chosen to settle here.198

199Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012This zoning of the towns created a small enclaveof exclusive European settlement at the highestpart of the town with the buffer zone hopefullyprotecting them from the spread of the plaguefrom the denser parts of native and Indianresidences and the bazaar. The Africans in thetown such as Kisumu were mainly located in the(railway) landhies. The rest were effectively ruraldwellers in the Luo villages outside the boundaryof the town. They could continue living in theseareas as rural residents but with the advantage ofbeing within reach of the urban facilities.During this time Africans began to migrate totowns and they settled mainly in the peri-urbanareas surrounding the town core to avoid the huttax levied on urban dwellers. In fact mostAfricans, except government and railwayemployees, resided in the peri-urban area of thetownships (Obudho and Waller, 1976).An account by Oginga Odinga of his childhoodexperience in this process gives a good picture.He writes that:‘‘The villagers were told that to stop the plaguewe should trap the rats, cut off the tails and sendthem to the chief’s baraza (meeting). From there Ilearnt later, the rats’ tails were bundled in tensand sent to Kisumu headquarters; on the wall ofthe Commissioner’s office hung charts of themonthly rat returns. It was in these years that thegovernment started to collect taxes from ourpeople’’(Odinga, 1967a).This association between rats and taxes isimportant. The ridiculous pursuit of ratcollection and the painful role of tax paymentdid not endear the provincial administration tothe Luo villagers in the periphery of the town. Soit is little wonder that the majority would stillwant to live outside the town boundary. Theywould thus escape the urban taxes and have littleto do with rat collection since rats were morerampant in the dense dwellings in the urbancentre.The PC, Hobley’s control was still extremelylocal and he was unable to stop the ubiquitousIndian traders who were beginning to move tothe south of Kisumu, some of who had beensettled in Kibos by Eliot in a 1902 experiment(Mungean, 1966) . On the other hand, ChiefOdera Ulalo who had been helping Hobley inadministering the Luos of Kisumu saw a decayin his authority because he did not usuallyrepresent the traditional tribal authority.Spontaneity began to take a much greater role inthe development of the Luo settlements.The growth of the Indian population (Tables 1)was rapid. The African population was growingat a much slower rate and during the 1914-18war years fell to an appreciable low. This isattributed to the fact that most Africanscontinued to reside in the peri-urban areas (ofKisumu) and during the war those in town wererecruited for the war effort.Table 1. Kisumu Population 1904 - 1920(Kenya National Archives, 1920)Year European Indian African Total1904 50 394 2639 30831912 73 659 4357 50891916 91 956 5370 64171919 99 1428 1378 29051920 129 1429 1975 3523199

200Ainsworth pointed out that up to within recenttimes European capital and enterprise werealmost entirely absent. Fully 80% of the capitaland business energy of the country was Indian(Kenya National Archives, 1905; Miller, 1971).The number of settlers was a drop in the sea incomparison to the amount of land they had todevelop. They neither had the financial capacity,technology nor labour to fully bring the land intoreasonable productivity. Unwilling and unable topay wages that would induce the Africans towork, mainly because they did not want toreduce their profit margin, they decided to resortto compulsion. The Africans had to becompelled to work partly by force (Leys, 1975).By mid 1930s more than half the able-bodiedmen in the two largest agricultural tribes, theKikuyu and the Luo, were estimated to beworking for Europeans (Leys, 1975) . Thisdevelopment was compounded by a compulsoryregistration system installed in 1921 whichrequired adult African males to carry certifiedlabour passes. On this pass would be recordedthe types of work, wages, duration ofemployment and evaluation of the performanceof the bearer of each pass. The employer had thepower to control the movement of the worker byentering negative comments on the pass.The process of labour recruitment among theNyanza Luo, regarded as a vast reservoir ofcheap labour, would see a rapid growth ofKisumu as a conduit of labour who had to betranshipped from the lake head to theneighbouring ‘White Highlands’. This processhad the effect of sensitising the people around thelake to the ‘benefits’ of urban life and acted as afurther stimulus for migration to peri-urban areasand thus diffusion of Western concepts of spatialdevelopment.The establishment of the capitalist economy wasto be exemplified in the taxation and passsystem. The working pass (Kipande) not onlyenabled the colonial administration to keep a tagon the African labour but they could also workout the taxes to be paid from the wages. Whatthey could not calculate was the transfer ofincome as a result of the structure of the Africansocial system. It was normal for a son to movefrom the Native Reserves and seek employmentin the highlands or towns but he was expected totake care of his parents. This was a duty expectedof every son. Leys(Leys, 1975) notes thatAfricans working for wages usually paid hut andpoll taxes for those who could not, especially inthe villages. However the poor regional transportsystem created a problem in that it would takequite some time to travel to the rural homes toeffect payment of taxes. It was therefore notunexpected when quite a number of Africanworkers from the neighbouring Siaya and SouthNyanza districts migrated and settled in areasoutside Kisumu eventually becoming Jo Kisumu(people of Kisumu). They could now pay theirtaxes in Kisumu, which was now not only theplace of residence but also place of work. Thiswas a nucleus of the new spatial systems thatwere developing in sub-urbanised areas.The taxation system although crude was quiteefficient. Oginga Odinga, then a young boy in histeenage, notes the taxation in his village in Siaya.‘‘We watched them take papyrus reedsfrom the roof of each hut and cut itneatly in two. When the reeds were tiedin neat bundles they represented theregistration of that boma. One bundle wasgiven to the Elder for him to take to theChief’s baraza where he paid in the taxes;the other set of bundles was taken awayby the clerks as a tally of the tax payers ofthe area, a sort of carbon copy of theregistration’’(Odinga, 1967a).200

201Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012This was the hut tax. In a typical Luo villagethere were huts for the wives, the man’s hut andthe sons’ huts. All these huts were taxed.Eventually we find that the Africans ended uppaying the bulk of the taxes because of the natureof their spatial systems. The Settlers on theother hand received virtually the entire benefit ofgovernment services - railways, roads, schools,hospitals, extension services and so on, inaddition to being subsidised through the customstariff and having privileged access to profitableexternal and internal markets. It is little wonderthat towns, having better services comparatively,continued to act as magnets attracting peoplefrom the reserves to these central places (Table2).Table 2. African income and taxation 1920-30Africans in registered employment £145,000Cash wages paid to Africans per annum £1,000,000Direct or indirect taxes paid annually by Africans £750,000Annual African cash income from wages net of taxation £250,000When the town boundary was reduced in 1930,the African residential areas on the lee-ward,low-lying areas of the town were excluded fromthe benefits of planned urban development. Therapid growth of this area was to create a uniqueproblem in Kisumu unlike other towns inwestern Kenya. Tenant purchase housingschemes were introduced in the town by theMunicipal Council (established in 1941) but theycould not compete successfully with the cheaperaccommodation that existed in the peripheralareas of the town (Obudho and Waller, 1976).The development of these peripheral areas fellwithin the ambit of the African DevelopmentCouncil (ADC) of Central Nyanza and only theADC had the power to pass by-laws controllingthe building of houses in this ‘rural’ area at theedge of the town. The Africans found it possibleto put up housing only in this area because theland in town was in the hands of the settlers.They were thus living a rural life with no urbanadministration control, yet within the proximityof the town’s services.In his annual report the DC, Kisumu-Londiani,was of the opinion that no African housingscheme in Kisumu would be of economicpossibility until development of the peri-urbandwelling houses came under control (KenyaNational Archives, 1954).The peri-urban houses were basically a ruralsettlement, continuing the pattern of the existingLuo villages within the area. They served twomain purposes. Firstly they reduced the transportcosts and inconveniences incurred by the singlemales in the urban area who would have to makeregular trips to their villages to their families andsolve problems commensurate with their statusas the employed elite and secondly they allowedmen to live together with their wives andchildren since they were within a short walkingdistance of the town. But the pattern of life thatthey led was oriented to a rural pattern ratherthan an urban one.5. The Second Foundation: Square HousesThe first stage in urbanising the Luo villages wasdefinitely the influx of immigrants from the areas201

202Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012outside urban areas such as Kisumu who workedin town but came back in the evening to thesetraditional settlements. They developed thedesire to improve their grass thatched housingand develop relatively permanent structures.Miller and Yeager point out that African soldiersand carriers came back home with newperspectives on whites and on themselves in thecolonial milieu, developing a desire to improvetheir status (Miller and Yeager, 1994). In themeantime there were indications that the needfor improvements in housing for Africans withinthe towns was also causing‘‘The African housing problem is evenmore acute than that of European andAsiatic housing because the presenthousing is not only unsanitary for theoccupants but is a positive danger to thewhole community. Government whilstinsisting that no one shall build or renewthatched huts in the town owing to theever imminent menace of Plague,continues to build such huts in the midstof the township for its ownservants’’(Kenya National Archives,1929a).In a correspondence from the DC to theExecutive Engineer he points out that ‘‘wattleand daub huts with grass roofs in this wetclimate are most unsatisfactory and noteconomical, in fact are a perpetual source ofworry’’(Kenya National Archives, 1929b). Thisneed to improve the quality of housing for theAfrican population in Kisumu was concretisedon paper by the Chief Native Commissioner. Heprepared draft house type proposals for NativeHousing (reproduced in figures 1 and 2 herebelow) (Kenya National Archives, 1929b).These type of plans provided quite goodpossibilities for improvement from the traditionalcircular forms of grass thatched housing that hadpredominated the African housing. These newforms of housing had a strong influence on thetype of new housing that began to come up in theperi-urban settlement. Although maintaining theuse of local construction material of mud andwattle, these new forms saw a replacement of thegrass thatches with corrugated iron sheets. Thegalvanised corrugated iron (GCI) roofs were asign that the owner was advancing in socialstatus and many strived to build houses withGCI roofs.It should be pointed out here that the planproposed by the Chief Native Commissionerappreciated that the sewer plan prepared at thesame time did not cover the Africanneighbourhood and so he included the soakawaypits in the plan proposals. The sewer planhad excluded the buffer zone and areas outsidethe large plots of European housing, althoughsewers were more necessary in the denser Asianand African settlement. It would cover onlythose areas within the Municipal boundary thathad been subdivided and planned for occupation.202

203Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Figure 2. Type Plan for African Housing 1Type 1All living rooms (LR) and bedrooms (Bed)are 10 feet by 10 feet in sizeFigure 3. Type Plan for African Housing 2Type 3203

204Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Figure 4. Typical Landhies LayoutThe railways had also in the meantimedeveloped their own peculiar Landhi housingwhich were in effect bachelor quarters of singlerooms in a row. This was a common feature notonly along the railway line but also at theterminus, Kisumu. They were basically 10 ft. by10 ft. rooms with nothing else to offer andvariations of the same were built in Europeanand Asian compounds for the servants (see Fig.5.5). This form of structure was to have thegreatest impact on the design of commercialisedhousing in the African village on the periphery.The Devonshire Declaration of 1923 providedthe first indication of European flexibilitytowards land ownership by persons other thanEuropeans. However, only Asians wereauthorised to own land. This was furtherreinforced by the Kenya Land Commission of1932, usually referred to as the CarterCommission. The result was the establishment ofdistinct areas of Asian residential quarters. Theseareas generally formed a buffer between theEuropean residential area and the rapidlygrowing African villages.It is necessary at this juncture to point out thereport of the East African Royal Commissionwhich states that:‘‘Africans who have been evicted fromtheir holdings in towns and who cannotfind somewhere else to live within thetownship boundary can either go back toa rural life or settle again within easyreach of the town. At the same time thosewho came to seek employment mayprefer to live outside the town boundarywhere the control is less strict.... In thisway the land is covered with huts,usually of a primitive standard, whichcan be seen surrounding most EastAfrican Towns’’(Kenya NationalArchives, 1950).Although there were attempts to improve theliving conditions of Africans they were still notencouraged to invest in towns. Oginga-Odinga(Odinga, 1967a) recalls an attempt he and hiscolleagues made to invest in Kisumu and howthey were discouraged by the town clerk whointimated to them that all Kisumu town wasmeant to be exclusively for Europeans andAsians.204

205Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Plate 5. Mix of Rural and Urban landscape in Kisumu: The Luo CapitalBut the colonial development had gone a greatway in laying down the basic distribution of theland uses with the massive peri-urban settlementstill effectively out of the urban jurisdiction. Theboundary extensions after independenceeventually put the peri-urban villages within thedomain of the towns. However this process onlycreated a new perspective to the problem of theLuo settlements. The peri-urban areas werebasically high density settlements commensuratewith an urban area but remained functionallyrural. The village was not yet formally urban. Ofoutstanding interest is the fact that this ‘ruralised’urbanisation ended up creating urban problemsin a rural environment without control on thisdevelopment.ReferencesBerman, B. 1990. Control and crisis in colonialKenya. James Currey, London.205Cohen, D.W., and E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo. 1989.Siaya, the historical anthropology of anAfrican landscape. J. Currey, OhioUniversity Press, London, Athens.Dilley, M.R. 1965. British policy in Kenyacolony. Francass, London.Kenya National Archives. 1905. P.C. Annualreport 1905. KNA/P.C. Annual report1905.Kenya National Archives. 1920.KNA/Provincial Commissioner/Annual reports 1904 - 1920.Kenya National Archives. 1929a. KNA,PC/Nza/3/41/3/2 8th Aug. 1929. KNA,PC/Nza/3/41/3/2.Kenya National Archives. 1929b. KNA,PC/Nza/3/41/3/2 22nd May 1929.KNA, PC/Nza/3/41/3/2.Kenya National Archives. 1950. KNA, EastAfrican Royal Commission Report KNA,East African Royal Commission Report 1950.Kenya National Archives. 1954. NyanzaProvince Annual Report KNA/NyanzaProvince Annual Report.

206Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Leys, C. 1975. Underdevelopment in Kenya.University of California Press, Berkeley.Londsdale, J. 1989. The conquest of state 1895-1904. Ochieng W. R. (edit) A modern historyof Kenya 1895-1980. Evans Brothers,London.Miller, C. 1971. The lunatic express: anentertainment in imperialism. MacmillanLondonMiller, N., and R. Yeager. 1994. The quest forprosperity. Westview Press, Boulder(Colorado).Mungean, G.H. 1966. British rule in Kenya:1895-1912. Clarendon Press, Oxford.Obudho, R.A., and P. Waller. 1976. Periodicmarkets, urbanisation and regionalplanning: a case study of western Kenya.Greenwood Press , London.Odinga, A.O. 1967a. Not yet Uhuru: theautobiography of Oginga Odinga. Hilland Wang, New York,. xiv, 323.Odinga, O. 1967b. Not Yet Uhuru. HeinemannEducational Books, London.Ogot, B.A. 1968. History of the Southern Luo.EAPH, Nairobi.Sardar, Z., and B.e. van Loon, editors. 1997.Cultural Studies for Beginners.Wallis, W.D. 1917. Similarities in Culture. .American Anthropologist 19:41-54.Zeleza, T. 1989. The establishment of colonialrule 1905-1920. In: Ochieng W. R. (edit) Amodern history of Kenya 1895-1980, EvansBrothers, London.Zwanenberg, R.M.A. 1975. The economichistory of Kenya and Uganda 1800-1970. Macmillan, London.206

207Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Nationalism in Kenya: Weakening the Ties that BindPeter WanyandeUniversity of Nairobi, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Emailpwanyande@yahoo.com______________________________________________________________________________Abstract The first post-independence government in Kenya declared national unity or what theleaders generally referred to as nation building as a priority project. The commitmentto nation building was pronounced in official government documents and echoed inpublic statements by the successive presidents and other political leaders. However,these statements have not been translated into reality as a sense of common belongingor nationalism remains largely a mirage. Kenyans continue to emphasize theirethnicities and to regard those from ethnic groups other than their own withsuspicion. Political leaders also rely on ethnic support in their attempt to capture andretain political power. Oftentimes these leaders incite people of their ethnic groupagainst other ethnic groups leading to tension and animosity between and amongethnic groups. This only undermines a sense of nationalism. The ordinary Kenyanhas been unable to resist the appeal for ethnic support from their leaders includingelected representatives. It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to interrogatethe factors that underpin the weak sense of nationalism in Kenya especially afterindependence. The paper which adopts an historical approach, proceeds on thepremise that the sense of national unity has actually been destroyed by the governanceapproach used since independence. Understanding the factors responsible for thedeclining sense of nationalism or common belonging among Kenyans would thereforerequires an understanding of the dynamics of Kenya’s political economy. The lateProfessor Atieno –Odhiambo, a historian of political ideas would certainly haveconsidered the decline in nationalism as being serious enough to warrant intellectualengagement with academic colleagues as well as with policy makers and policyimplementers. Indeed Atieno-Odhiambo has written on the subject of Kenyannationalism especially when he engaged his academic colleagues in the debate on theMAU MAU movement. This paper is therefore written in his commemoration.Key words: Nationalism, Kenya, Ties that Bind______________________________________________________________________________IntroductionThere is no doubt that Kenya is characterized bya weak sense of nationalism or sense of commonbelonging. The violence between ethnic groupsthat the country experienced following thedisputed 2007 presidential election results atteststo this assertion. Another evidence of the weaksense of common belonging among the differentethnic groups is the tendency for political pattiesto be formed along ethno- regional as opposed tonational lines. Indeed this tendency provided thedrafters of the constitution of Kenya 2010 with apowerful justification to include a requirement inthe constitution that for a political party to beregistered, it must demonstrate that it has anational character as opposed to the practicecurrently in which some parties havemembership from just a few regions. Theconstitution also requires that political partiespromote and uphold national unity. The otherevidence of weak sense of common belongingamong Kenyans is that voting patterns duringelections tend to take ethno-regional character aswas evidenced by most of the elections that thecountry has held since independence and207

208Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012particularly the 2007 elections. This is especiallythe case in presidential elections as happened inthe 2007 presidential election. It is also commonin cosmopolitan constituencies such as urbanconstituencies and in settlement areas. Theestablishment of the National Cohesion andIntegration Cohesion by an Act of parliament in2008 and the establishment of Truth Justice andReconciliation Commission Act also in 2008 isanother indicator that the country is concernedabout weak sense of nationalism. NCIC isestablished to encourage national cohesion andintegration by outlawing discrimination onethnic and other grounds. The TJRC on theother hand is mandated to assess past humanrights violations and other historical injustices.These are issues that have a bearing on nationalunity or nationalism. The government alsorecently established a committee to look intoways of engaging elders of different ethniccommunities in promoting peaceful coexistencefollowing 2007 post election violence. Thereport of this committee was presented togovernment.The objective of the paperThere is a corpus lot of literature on the impactof colonial rule on different aspects of Kenyansociety. (See, for example, (Ndege, 2009) and(Jonyo, 2002). It has been said for example thatcolonial rule was responsible for the economicunderdevelopment of the country with othersarguing that it has been responsible for thedependency relations between Kenya and itsformer colonizer, the British. Others haveattributed the country’s politicalunderdevelopment to colonial rule. Few focusdirectly on the impact of the colonial rule onnationalism, the subject of this article. Theclosest attempt to link the two has been thesuggestion that colonialism unified the peoplewho then waged war to rid the country ofcolonial rule. In other words the argument hasbeen that colonialism was a unifying factor. TheMau Mau revolt of the late 1940s and early1950s is in this regard presented as representingKenyan nationalism. It was a unified reaction bythe people of Kenya to fight the colonial systemand therefore demonstrated a sense ofnationhood among all the people of Kenya. It isclear, however as indicated in the introduction tothis article, that this sense of nationalism did notoutlive the attainment of independence.The main objective of this paper is to interrogatethe factors that underpin the weak sense ofnational unity in Kenya. Stated differently, weseek to interrogate the factors responsible for thediminishing sense of nationalism among thepeople of Kenya. This is done against thebackdrop of claims by political leaders andsuccessive governments’ that they are committedto building a strong sense of nationhood or whatis leaders generally refer to as nation building.The Colonial settingIn order to fully appreciate the factors thatcontribute to the weak sense of nationalism inKenya, it is useful to situate the discussion in itshistorical context. The starting point would thenbe the colonial setting. This is necessary preciselybecause some of the factors that have andcontinue to contribute to the weak sense ofnationalism have their origins in the colonialperiod. The policies and the nature of thecolonial state are among the factors that need tobe interrogated in order to explain the weaksense of nationalism in Kenya. The next fewparagraphs will therefore be devoted to adiscussion of how the colonial policies andgovernment actions affected nationalism inKenya.By the time of establishment of colonial rule, theterritory currently called Kenya was made up ofabout 42 independent and self governingcommunities or nationalities. Each had its ownlanguage, culture, history and aspirations withnothing little binding them together before theadvent of colonial rule according to Gitu (Gitu,2005). They however lived fairly peacefully asneighbours, a few skirmishes here and therebetween different ethnic communitiesnotwithstanding. These diverse nationalitiessometimes called tribes or ethnic groups werebrought together under one central governmentfollowing the establishment of colonial rule in1887. The colonial government assumed thatthese hitherto independent communities wouldautomatically direct their loyalty to one centre ofpower under the stewardship of the colonialgovernor. Little was put in place to encourage or208

209Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012even facilitate national integration. The focuswas instead on how to effectively control thelocal people.For purposes of administration, the governordivided the country into several administrativeunits, namely Provinces, districts, divisions,locations and sub locations. Each unit washeaded by a British colonial officer. It was onlythe locations and sub locations that were headedby natives of the land. All the officers were thedirect appointees and representatives of thegovernor at their levels of administration,Provincial Commissioner at the Province, theDistrict Commissioner at the district, a DistrictOfficer at the Division, a Chief at the locationand a Sub-Chief (now assistant Chief) at the sublocationlevel. This elaborate administrativesystem was known as the ProvincialAdministration and exists today. The entiregovernment and the administrative structure inparticular were far removed from the people itwas meant to serve. The people found it difficultto identify with the system. The draconianapproach employed in carrying out theirresponsibilities in the guise of maintaining lawand order did not endear the system and itsofficers and by extension the entire colonialregime to the indigenous people.It is not surprising therefore that the provincialadministration has been the target of reformmainly and will be restructured as provided for inthe constitution of Kenya 2010 (Republic ofKenya, 2010).National unity in the colonial periodA combination of discriminatory colonialpolicies and practices as well as the fact that theentire system was imposed on the people andtherefore alien, made it very difficult for the localpeople who in any case were originallyindependent of each other to identify with thegovernment and to develop a sense of commonbelonging to the nation. By the 1920s theindigenous people began to resist colonial rule.Among the major issues that fueled theresistance was land alienation about whichAtieno-Odhiambo has written and commentedabout extensively. See for example his bookSiasa (Atieno Odhiambo, 1981). The colonialgovernment had alienated large tracts of the mostfertile land and allocated these to the Europeansettlers. Title deeds were subsequently issued tothe new land owners who lay claim to thealienated land at the exclusion of the local peopleon grounds that land tiles bestowed individualownership to the land. The result was thephenomenon of landlessness among theindigenous peoples.The fact that the colonial system wasundemocratic and did not allow the people toexercise and enjoy their human and other rightsled to sustained resistance to colonial rule. By the1950s the indigenous people of Kenya weredemanding independence from colonial rule. Allthe attempts such as the decision to confineAfrican political activity at the district- readethnic- level were resisted. The indigenouspeople had been given sufficient grounds by thecolonial injustices to transcend their ethnicdifferences and to unite against the commonenemy, the colonial government. There was afeeling and hope that nationalism had emerged.This sense of common belonging or nationalismencouraged the political leaders such as JomoKenyatta and Oginga Odinga, later referred to asnationalists, to mobilize Kenyans to demandtotal and immediate independence. This sense ofnationalism helped dislodge the colonialgovernment in 1963. This spirit of nationalismwas quite strong at independence. All indicationswere that the different nationalities that made upKenya were determined to live as one people andnot as disparate nationalities. They weredetermined to identify with the nation. Indeedthe political leaders at the time gave theimpression that they too were committed tostrengthening the bonds of nationhood and tocreate one nation out of the diverse nationalitiesas Atieno-Odhiambo would call the differentethnic groups. There were indications that thissense of common belonging or common identitywould be sustained. By the 1970s, however, asense of disappointment and disillusionmentbecame evident. The country began to showsigns of fragmentation along ethnic lines. Peoplebegan to identify more with those with whomthey shared a similar language, descent, andculture- the tribe. Indeed by the 1990s very fewKenyans would identify with the country.209

210Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Nationalism in the post colonial periodAt independence in 1963 the governmentdeclared that it was committed to building aunited country. They referred to this project asnational building. Nation building would entailthe forging of a feeling of unity among thediverse ethnic and racial communities in thecountry. This declaration is found in manypolicy documents including the five yeardevelopment plans, Sessional paper No 10 of1965 on African Socialism and its application toplanning in Kenya as well as in publicstatements(Republic of Kenya, 1965). Amongthe measures taken ostensibly to forge nationalunity was the adoption of one party rule. Theseassertions and actions notwithstanding, practiceshows that the leaders were not committed tonation building. They simply gave lip service tothis otherwise noble ideal. This observation isinformed by the fact that the government did notput in place practical measures or policies thatwould promote a strong sense of commonbelonging. Where such policies exist there wasno demonstrable commitment to theirimplementation. The case of a national languageis a good example in this regard. Thegovernment policy in this matter has been thatKiswahili is the national language while Englishis the official language. The weak commitmentto this policy is demonstrated by the fact thatpublic meetings such as chief’s barazas areusually conducted in the local language except incosmopolitan areas such as towns and settlementschemes. Secondly no initiative that I know ofhas been taken to translate major officialdocuments from English to Kiswahili. The fewthat have been done have been occasioned bypressure from Kiswahili speaking communitiesor simply as an afterthought. No governmentpolicy on translation of documents from Englishto Kiswahili exists. The case of the Constitutionis an example. To-date there is no officialKiswahili version of the country’s independenceconstitution.The present author’s attempt to get a Kiswahiliversion from the government Printer revealedthat the government printer does not printofficial documents in Kiswahili. There is clearlyno commitment to the promotion of Kiswahili asa national language. This is unfortunate becauseone of the attributes of nationhood is a shared or210common language. This must however, beaccompanied and reinforced by other supportivepolicies and practices. Some of the practices thatcome to mind in this regard include fairness inthe distribution of national or public resourcesamong the different ethnic groups and practicesthat promote a feeling or perception of fairnessamong the groups. It is instructive in this regardto observe that there are countries in Africawhose inhabitants share one language yet theyare not cohesive to a point where they can beconsidered patriotic.The Somali state is a case in point. Somali isinhabited by people who speak the samelanguage but are among the most unstable andfragmented countries in the world. They are justunable to arrive at and maintain a consensus onwhether they should be governed as onecommunity, how they should be governed andwho should govern them. The point being madeis that shared language is a necessary but not byitself a sufficient factor in making diverse groupsdevelops a strong attachment to the country theyshare. Other things need to be factored in tomake language a unifying factor. On the otherhand is Tanzania which has more than 60 ethnicgroups and more than three religions thatdifferent people subscribe to and yet is one of themoist unified countries with very patrioticcitizens. Our hypothesis is that the unity hasbeen achieved because the leadership was clearabout the kind of society he wanted to establish.This was made clear in the Arusha Declarationof 1967 that espoused a socialist and humanesociety in which everybody would be valued as ahuman being irrespective of his or her ethic,social, economic, gender and any otherbackground.Beyond this the Tanzanian leadership put inplace and implemented clear policies to helpachieve this vision for the country. Even thoughthe ideology has been abandoned it contributedto a sense of common belonging amongTanzanians. Kenya did not benefit from asimilar approach to governance. Although thecountry produced policy document that was todefine the type of society to be built, it was not asclear as the Arusha Declaration. Scholars whocritiqued the document arrived at the conclusionthat it lacked clarity in and was more confusingthan it shed light in the stated objectives. While it

211Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012talks about African socialism and its applicationto planning in Kenya, the document is full ofcapitalist ideas and aspirations. In deed thecountry adopted a capitalist approach todevelopment thus rendering the Socialist ideasespoused in the document irrelevant and of noconsequence. In circumstances in which thepolicy documents states one thing and practicesanother, it is no wonder that the country was notable to chart a clear way forward in terms of thekind of society to build. No wonder issues ofnationhood took a backseat post-colonial Kenya.The ideological confusion in Sessional paper No10 of 1965 on African Socialism and itsapplication to planning Kenya has in my view todo with the fact that very little, if any, thoughtwas given to the kind of society the leaderswished to build after the colonial era. True theKANU manifesto said that the new governmentwanted to eradicate poverty, ignorance anddisease. The manifesto however was used moreas campaign document as can evidenced by thefact that these three enemies have yet to beeradicated even after KANU’s 40 year rule. Theresult was that immediate post colonial leadersended up focusing on two selfish projects. Theimmediate project was to replace and emulate oris it imitate the departing colonial elite with andAfrican political and economic elite. This wasevidenced by the fact that Kenyatta occupiedstate house formerly occupied by the departingcolonial governor, and the DCs and PCs did thesame at their levels. Roads and buildings such aQueen’s way and King George hospital wererenamed Mama Ngina Street and KenyattaNational Hospital respectively just to give fewexamples.The second project equally selfish in the sensethat it was meant to serve the interests of those inpower was power building. Partly because thenationalist leaders had not engaged sufficientlyon the kind of society they wanted to buildfollowing independence, they ended up makingseveral governance mistakes. The focus onacquisition of wealth and power lead them toignore or neglect the aspirations of the ordinarypeople. This resulted in political despair amongthe people and some leaders. Kenyatta’sresponse was to purge his government of peoplewho did not agree with his style of governanceand therefore who identified with and advocated211the aspirations and demand of the people forbetter governance. This was followed by tortureand detentions especially of opponents. All thesewere being done to ensure that his power andthose who supported him was not challenged atall even is these challenges had no chance ofsucceeding. These reactions by the mainstreamestablishment had many consequences. One ofthem is that Kenyatta resorted to ethnic supportto stay in power. Ethnic politics began to assumea prominent place in our country. Kenyansbegan to view every political decision as ethnicdriven. Worse still is the fact that people from aparticular ethnic group whose leader waspersecuted interpreted and perceived suchdecisions as directed at their tribe or ethnicgroup. The bonds of nationalism wereweakening or better still being weakened.Absence of a unifying ideologyOne of the factors that have had a negativeimpact on national cohesion and nationalism inKenya is the absence of a unifying ideology- anideal to which the people would collectivelyidentify with and seek to realize. While in therun up to independence Kenyans were united bythe desire to rid the country of colonial rule and”uhuru” was used as the rallying ideology theideology became irrelevant after ‘uhuru’ hadbeen achieved. It was a short term unifyingideology which became irrelevant after thecommon enemy- the colonial government- hadbeen dismantled.The adoption of African socialism as anideology in 1965 did not help matters very much.Two reasons account for this. First is that theideology was not popularized. As a result of this,the majority of the people did not understand itscontents and therefore could not identify with it.The matter was made worse by the fact thatrather than lead to equality the application of theideology led to marked socio-economicinequalities in the country. This did not unify thepeople at all. Many people perceived theinequalities to be the result of a deliberate policyby those in power to marginalize somecommunities and regions or at least to perpetuatethe regional inequalities that began with colonialpolicies. Glaring socio-economic inequalitiesmost of which have taken essentially ethno-

212Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012regional dimensions has thus had the effect ofundermining national unity and a sense ofcommon belonging.Recent attempts to find a unifying ideology hashowever taken the form of mere slogans such as”a working nation” that Kibaki pronounced afterassuming power in 2002 or slogans such as “amproud to be a Kenyan: propagated by thegovernment spokesman. Apart from just being aslogan, it is also associated with just oneindividual, the president. As a result of thispublic ownership and identification with theslogan is understandably non-existent. Undersuch circumstances it is not easy for the people toembrace it. It is therefore not surprising thatpeople and even the president who came up withthe slogan no longer talk about it.What is needed therefore is to get the people ofKenya to develop a sense of common belongingthen is to develop an ideology with which peoplecan collectively identify. That ideology mustalso be such that its implementation can result intangible common benefits. It has to be powerfulenough and have the capacity to endure beyonda serving president or government.Political exclusion and marginalizationAnother factor that has undermined a sense ofcommon belonging among Kenyans is that of thepolitics of exclusion. This problem like othershas a colonial origin but has been perpetuated bygovernance policies adopted by successive postindependence governments. It has also takendifferent forms. During the colonial period thegovernment was basically controlled anddominated by non Kenyans, the British.Indigenous Kenyans were excluded fromgovernance. Indeed they were not even allowedto organize politically. For most of the colonialperiod their interests were represented in thelegislative body by the Europeans. This alonehad the effect of weakening any sense ofidentification with the government and thenation even though the colonial governmentrequired the people to identify with the entirenation. The policy of divide and rule which wasthe hallmark of colonial administrationcombined with the politics of exclusion to ensure212that national unity became a mirage. Perhapsbecause the politics of exclusion worked well tomaintain the colonial government in power thepost colonial government not only maintained itbut even extended it to other spheres ofgovernance. To start with the country adopted“the winner takes it all” electoral system. This isan electoral system in which the party that winsthe majority of members of parliament in anelection forms the government at the exclusion ofall other political parties.While this is the practice in many othercountries it poses special challenges tounderdeveloped political systems especially thosethat are ethnically fragmented like Kenya. Tostart with when one ethnic group is numericallydominant it can dominate parliament andtherefore ensure that other ethnic groups areexcluded for long periods of time. It is instructivein this regard to remember that one of thereasons behind the formation of KADU and itsadvocacy for a federal system of governmentwas the fear by the numerically small tribes thatit represented, that KANU with the supportfrom the numerically big tribes would dominateand marginalize them under a unitary structureof government. Marginalization of ethnic groupshas been and continues to be a common themeand complaint in Kenyan politics sinceindependence. The importance of this problemhas led to a number of initiatives beingundertaken by government. One is theestablishment of the National Cohesion andIntegration and Cohesion Commission (NCIC)and the Truth Justice and ReconciliationCommission (TJRC).The concern about political and other forms ofmarginalization has been important enough thatthe constitution has found it necessary to providethat it be addressed. Article 100 of theconstitution, for example, provides thatparliament shall enact legislation to promote therepresentation in parliament of women, personswith disabilities, the youth, ethnic and otherminorities and marginalized communities.(Republic of Kenya, 2010)(Article 100 of theconstitution of Kenya 2010) .A similar concern isaddressed with regard to membership in theCounty Assembly under the constitution ofKenya 2010. The relevant provision states that acounty assembly shall consist of … the number

213Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012of marginalized groups including persons withdisabilities and the youth …. (Article 177 of theConstitution of Kenya, 2010). The point is thatpolitical marginalization whether real orperceived has been a source of ethnic tension inthe country and has not promoted national unityor a sense of common belonging.Whether or not the constitutional provisions willsolve the problem of political marginalizationespecially with regard to representation anempirical matter that only time will tell.However some communities have alreadyexpressed fear that they may not be representedin major government bodies especially at thecounty level. The Kuria community in Nyanza,for example fear that they may be dominated bythe majority Luo community with whom theyshare the Migori County. Their fear is that onlyLuo may be elected as governor and senatorbecause of their numerical strength in thecounty. This would have the Kuria marginalizedor at least unrepresented in these key countyelective governance institutions. Tensions arisingfrom feelings of marginalization have beenexpressed in other ways as well. The recentlylaunched Mombasa Republican Councilbasically is about resistance to feelings ofmarginalization. To these people the solution layin secession from Kenya and the formation of anew state its viability or otherwise is for the timebeing not a major consideration as long as itsmembers and supporters feel that it may endtheir marginalization. The emergence of this andsimilar groups not only show the dangers ofmarginalization but also underscores the weaksense o f common belonging in Kenya.The challenge then is how best to deal with theproblem. At the moment the governmentappears to have adopted the approach to eitherignore the group or simply refuse to recognize it.The government has also taken the position thatthe council can be crushed or will simply die anatural death. I am not sure that any of thesepositions is tenable or that they provide thesolution. African governments have wished awaymany such movements or attempted to defeatthem by use of force including the use of militaryforce but have failed. In some cases the problemhas become more complicated as more groupsare formed or the membership of the groupbecome bigger and include more demands asthey pursue their cause. They may add newdemands to the original ones. Perhaps Kenyashould in this regard adopt the solutionsuggested by Anyang Nyong’o to the peopled ofSouth Sudan as the government of that countrytries to deal with the rebels .Writing on statebuilding and development in the Republic ofSouth Sudan Nyong’o advices as follows:…“There are a few things that theGovernment of South Sudan cannotrisk to get wrong. One is the stance itadopts towards the so-called rebels;the armed men and women who havereceded to the woods in defiance of thenew government in Juba. Theirmisgivings may be ill-placed, and attimes even wild; but that is no reasonto ignore them.The Juba government is better offopening the doors of dialoguewith these malcontents thanseeking to bomb them intooblivion. In this regard, walkingthe risky road of negotiationswould pay much better dividendsthan taking the tough posture ofa warrior heading for the jugular.Lessons from FRELIMO facedwith the RENAMO insurgentsare there to be learnt. Goingdown the path that Angola wentin Savimbi rebels, leads to avictory with much worseconsequences to peace anddevelopment.”(Nyong’o,2011).213Socio-economic marginalizationAlongside political marginalization is that ofeconomic marginalization both of whichundermine national unity or nationalism. Anumber of communities in Kenya have expressedconcern about what they consider to beeconomic marginalization or sometimes botheconomic and political marginalization. This isevident in the report of a government Task Forcethat was established by government in 2010 toseek ways by which elders from all communitiescould be involved in promoting peace in thecountry. This followed the election violence that

214Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012the country experienced as a result of thedisputed presidential election result of 2007.Virtually every community except the Kikuyu ofcentral Province and to some extent the Kalenjinof Rift Valley complained of economicmarginalization. By this they meant that theircommunities did not benefit from governmentinvestment in infrastructure and especially roads,or in social service such as education and healthfacilities.The people of North Eastern Province forexample were particularly unhappy with thelevel o f economic development in the regioncompared to the rest of the country. Successiveeconomic survey reports by the Kenya Bureau ofStatistics show that this province and itsinhabitants have always been the poorest on anyindicators of development including income percapita.Apart from whole communities, a number ofgroups including the Mungiki and the MombasaRepublican Council have argued that theyengage in acts of violence because they areeconomically marginalized. The Mungiki forexample argue that their parents and greatparents who fought in the Mau Mau war losttheir land and that they have never beencompensated by government. They are thereforelandless and have no means of livelihood. Socioeconomic marginalization has thus eroded anyfeeling of nationalism by the affected groups andcommunities. Indeed it has intensified ethnicpolitics as people who feel marginalized begin todevelop hatred for those they perceive rightly orwrongly to be the beneficiaries of the system.Economic marginalization is however, not just aperception by the people who feel that they areaffected. Nor is it accidental. President Moiconfirmed that it is actually a governmentstrategy in his infamous warning to theopposition parties that “Siasa Mbaya, MaishaMbaya”. This warning was issued at the heightof multiparty politics and was directed at thoseleaders and communities that supportedopposition parties. It meant that those inopposition would not enjoy the economicbenefits enjoyed by these leaders andcommunities that supported the government. Inother words those in the opposition would bemarginalized as far as development wasconcerned. This kind of attitude by governmentcertainly does not promote national integrationor national unity.As can be seen from the statistics below onhousehold well being n Kenya, North Easternprovince is the poorest of the eight provinces.This is followed by Coast province. When thisinformation is broken down onto districts in eachof the provinces in the districts, North Easternprovince and those in Eastern province emergeas the poorest in the country. Central provinceand Nairobi on the other hand are the richestprovinces in the country. Two otherobservations are necessary in order to explain thepoint about this regional poverty. First is thatthis has been the trend since Independence. Inother words North Eastern province has alwaysbeen the poorest region in the country. Centralprovince has also always been the richest regionin the country. While it is true that this pattern ofdevelopment or underdevelopment was inheritedfrom the colonial period, the concern by thepeople of North Eastern province has been thatno effort has been made by the successiveindependent government develop the region. Theentire province has only one stretch of tarmacroad in Garissa town. The rest of the provincehas no tarmac road while regions such as centralprovince have tarmac roads in every part of theprovince. Districts such Turkana and Marsabit inEastern province also experience neglect in termsof road and other forms of infrastructure by thesuccessive post colonial governments. Theperception, whether right or wrong, is thatCentral Province was rich because the regionproduced the country’s first president whofavoured the region as far as development isconcerned. The third president also hails fromcentral Province.214

215Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012This perception seems to suggest thatdevelopment follows power. What is importantis that this perception has caused the poorerregions to feel a sense of betrayal and that hasweakened their willingness to identify with thenation, Kenya. It affects relationship amongethnic communities. In fact this author visitedNorth Hor in eastern Province in the 1980s andwas asked by the residents of the area howKenya was. The message they were conveying isthat they do not consider themselves as part ofKenya. This is because as far as they areconcerned they are a neglected region and has noreason to be identified with the rest of thecountry. They have no pride in being associatedwith the country.It is necessary to observe that the constitutionrequires that apart from marginalized ethniccounties, any other groups of people such asthose with disability are not marginalized.TABLE 1: Poverty incidence percentage ofindividuals below poverty line, Ethnicity andnationalism in KenyaSource: Kenya National Bureau of Statisticsintegrated Household Budget Survey 2005/2006.Constituency Report on well-being in Kenya.A lot has been written about the role of ethnicityin Kenyan politics. Some of the contributors tothis literature argue that ethnicity is the mostimportant explanatory variable of Kenyanpolitics. Ghai & Ghai for example argue thatKenyan politics have become largely the politicsof ethnicity (Ghai and Ghai, 2011). Politiciansfind that stirring ethnic loyalties on one hand,and ethnic animosity on the other, are easy waysto build potential support. They promise theirtribe development and other benefits if they havetheir vote. Sometimes they incite “their:” peopleagainst other tribes, with the result we saw in2007 - 2008…. Negative ethnic feelings then spillover into other spheres of life”. This paper arguesthat one of the major effects of ethic politics hasbeen the erosion of people’s identification withthe nation. The point was made very succinctlyby a Permanent secretary at a recent workshopon the constitution. The Permanent Secretary inthe Ministry of Gender and children posed thequestion in the following way. ” Why is thatwhen Kenya the country is insulted even by aforeigner, no one gets angry but when one’s tribeis insulted, the one whose tribe is insulted isready to go to war with those who insult his orher tribe”?. What this suggests is thatidentification with the ethnic group or tribe ismuch stronger than identification with the nationor country. Put differently ethnicity hasundermined or eroded a sense of commonNo. REGION PERCENTAGE1. Nairobi 22%2. Central 30.9%3. Nyanza 46.5%4. R. Valley 48.7%5. Eastern Province 50.5%6. Western 53.1%7. Coast 59%8. North Eastern 74%belonging and common identity among thepeople of Kenya.The origins of this practice is obviously traceableto the divide and rule policy used by the colonialgovernment. This policy took different forms.One of the methods was to stereotype eachethnic group with the view to causing bothsuspicion and mistrust between ethnic groups orsimply to cause one ethnic group to regardthemselves as superior and others as inferior.This was done partly to prevent or preempt thedevelopment of strong common bonds amongthe different ethnic communities. The colonialgovernment feared that a strong bond wouldthreaten the stability of the government becausestrength lay in unity. The strategy worked wellfor the colonial government and made it possiblefor the government to stay in power for well overseventy years. The post colonial governmentshave used a similar strategy to stay in power.But ethnicity has also been practiced in otherways too by the post colonial governments. Ithas exhibited itself in the appointment of peopleto public or state jobs. The concern has been thatsome ethnic groups benefited more fromappointment to state jobs than others. Again theconcern was considered serious enough that thedrafters of the constitution of Kenya 2010 foundit necessary to include a provision requiring that215

216Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012ethnic balance be taken into account whenappointments are being made to public or stateoffices. The National Cohesion and IntegrationCohesion confirmed fears that somecommunities benefit more from appointments topublic jobs than others In a recent survey onethnic distribution of jobs in publicuniversities, the Commission reported that thebig five ethnic groups in Kenya dominate thework force of public universities. The report goeson to show that ethnic groups living in the areaswithin which a university is located tend to havethe members of that ethnic group givenpreference in employment over the rest ofKenyans. The report indicates that 68.9% ofemployees at Masinde Muliro University locatedin Western province are from the Luhyacommunity. Similarly, 55% of the employees ofMoi University located in an area occupiedmainly by the Kalenjin are from the Kalenjincommunity. Egerton University also in the RiftValley province has 25.8% and 28.9% of itsemployees from the Kalenjin and Kikuyucommunities respectively. Jomo KenyattaUniversity of Agriculture and Technology whichis located in Central Province and home to theKikuyu cpmmunity has 49.7% of its employeesfrom the Kikuyu community. With KenyattaUniversity which is also in Central province, has38% of its employees from the Kikuyucommunity. Bondo University College at theheart of Luo land in Nyanza province has 84.3%of its employees from the Luo community, withKisii University College in Kisii county having79% of its employees from the Kisii community.Pwani University College at the Coast has 71%of its employees from the Mijikenda community,while Meru University College in Meru has 83%of its employees from Meru community. Thereport also indicates that the Multi-MediaUniversity College, located in Rongai near thecity of Nairobi has 25%, 21% and 20% of itsemployees from the Kikuyu, Luhya and Luocommunities respectively. Finally the Universityof Nairobi has 38% of its employees fromKikuyu community.Another lesson from this report is that somecommunities have more public resources andfacilities than other regions. In the case of publicuniversities for example North Eastern provincehas neither a public university nor a university216college while central and Riftvalley provinceseach has two public universities. This unequalresource distribution, which is not confined tothe establishment of universities, makes thosecommunities that do not have such publicresources and facilities feel discriminated against.Under such circumstances the feeling ofidentification with the rest of the countrybecomes weak or nonexistent.These figures must however be read withcaution. While on the face of it the data givesthe impression that ethnic considerationsdominate appointments in public universities, oncloser analysis this may not be the case. To startwith the data would give a more accurate pictureif it was disaggregated into the various categoriesof employees of public universities that wereaudited.Universities have three major categories of staff.These are the ad academic staff, theadministrative staff and support staff. Theacademic staff is recruited on the bass of meritand it would not matter from which part of thecountry or world they come from. In factuniversities all over the world recruit academicstaff from all over the world. It would thereforenot mater from which ethnic group the academicstaff of a university comes from. This pointshould have been factored in the data presentedto parliament by NCIC. It would for examplehave helped if the data indicated the regionsfrom which the applicants for the academic staffcame from.Secondly some of the support staff fall underwhat we may call subordinate staff. Theseinclude employees such as groundsmen andwomen and cleaners etc. These categories ofemployees earn very low salaries. Because of thisit makes more sense to recruit them from thelocal community within which the university issituated. An employee in this category fromoutside the locality of the university would findthe cost of living too high. This considerationmay explain why the bulk if not all the categoriesof such staff are from the local community andtherefore giving the impression that there isdiscrimination in recruitment in favour of localstaff. In view of the fact that the public maybelieve the report it may cause ethnic tension andhatred to a point where national integration maybe wakened. It is instructive that only northern

217Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012part of the country does not have a single publicuniversity with most of them located in Nairobiand its environs. Using this as an example, theprovince may be justified in its claim that it isbeing marginalized. The claim is justifies alsowhen one takes into consideration that the regionhas the shortest kilometer of roads compared toother regions. The people of the regions sufferyet another form of discrimination. According toGitu (Gitu, 2005), Kenyan Somalis are treateddifferently from other Kenyans because inaddition to obtaining a national identity card,which is mandatory under the Registration ofPersons Act, CAP 107, they are to obtainadditional identification. This additionalrequirement does not apply to other Kenyans.Gitu points out further that Kenyans of Arabdescent are required to satisfy additionalrequirements to be issued with national identitycards. They are required to produce birthcertificates of their grandparents. Gitu concludesthat when different requirements are imposed ona section of the population, they feel as if theyare second class citizens. We may add here thatsuch citizens may find it hard to identify with therest of the communities in the country withnegative consequences for nationalism.Creation of ethnic districtsAs good student of colonial politics of divide andrule, Moi encouraged ethnic fragmentation bycurving out purely ethnic districts from those thatwere made up of people of different ethnicgroups and who had lived peacefully together inthese districts. He did this when his power wasthreatened during the clamour for multipartypolitics that began in the 1980s. One majorpolitical decision made by parliament throughthe influence of Moi at this point was that apresidential candidate must win at least 25 % ofthe votes cast in 5 of the eight administrativeprovinces. About 30 ethnic districts were createdby Moi and were basically intended to further thepolicy of divide and rule. The creation of Subadistrict for example out of the original Migoridistrict was meant to instill in the minds of theSuba people that they were different and distinctfrom the Luo with whom they have beenassociated from time immemorial and withwhom they shared Migori district. The idea wasto use this to persuade the Suba not to vote as ablock with the Luo as they were not Luos. Thiswould give Moi a chance to get the 25% vote inNyanza region where he was uncertain of gettingthe required number and percentage of the votes.The Luo were at this time firmly in opposition toMoi’s rule. Thus one can see that the presidentwas not interested in encouraging and promotingnationalism. Instead he was prepared to weakennationalism in order to survive politically.National heroes and National daysAnother factor that contributes to the weakeningof nationalism has been the failure bygovernment to keep the nationalist issues infocus. To start with rather than reserve a day tocelebrate all the freedom fighters as a way ofensuring that young generation got a sense ofthe fact that all Kenyan communitiescontributed to the struggle for independence andtherefore to nationalism. We chose to honor onlyone person and named the day after him,Kenyatta day. The impression thus created wasthat only Kenyatta contributed to nationaliststruggle. I am of course aware that during suchdays mention is usually made of other leadersespecially those who died. It is however alsotrue that the process has usually been quietselective.We are also aware that during our national dayswe focus more on politics rather than onnationalism. The failure to celebrate the struggleand the sacrifices that people made for the sakeof independence and for the country has alsocontributed to the weakening of nationalism inKenya. This problem has been recognized and isaddressed in the Constitution of Kenya 2010.In lieu of a conclusionConcluding this debate at this stage would bepremature. It is such an important issue for thefuture of the country that it must be open tofurther debate. Rather than conclude, therefore, Ihave chosen to make the following observationsarising from the discussion so far. The paper setout to identify the major factors that haveundermined national ism or national unity inKenya. A number of factors were identified andexplained. The paper adopted an historical217

218Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012approach to explain the current situation as far asnational unity is concerned. The major argumentof the paper is that many of these factors areinterrelated and have to do with the nature ofgovernance. This requires an understanding ofthe political and economic policies andapproaches to governance by both the colonialand post colonial governments. Secondly, thepaper attempted to make it clear that nationalismdoes not just emerge. For a people from differentnationalities living within one geopolitical unit todevelop a common sense of belonging orcommon identity, they need a common unifyingfactor, something that can cause them to want towork and live together in order to achieve thatobjective. This may take the form of an ideologywith which people may identify. It may alsorequire actions that make people develop afeeling that everybody and every community isbeing treated in the same or similar manner bythose who govern and a sense of fairness in theway people in the country are being treated. Inthis regard we pointed out that if this is not doneit is quite possible for nationalism to weakenleading to sub-nationalism based on all sorts ofidentities. Failure to nature nationalism may leadto secessionist wars. Perhaps the best example inthis regard is the separation of Southern Sudanfrom the North on 9 th July 2011. The Sudanesegovernment had failed o encourage a sense ofcommon belonging between the Northerners andthe Southerners, making the idea of a unitedSudan unattainable. We may at this point referto the Mombasa Republican Council, amovement that seeks to secede from Kenya andform its own state. Fourthly we argued that thesuccessive post colonial governments in Kenyaundermined the sense of common belongingamong the diverse ethnic communities andidentity with the country by using differentmethods. Both governments found it politicallyrewarding to play one ethnic group againstanother as a strategy for political survival.The paper also observed that failure by the postcolonial governments to restructure the colonialstate in line with the post independence realitiesand in particular the aspiration of the people didnot help matters either. The colonialgovernment and the settlers that supported itseconomic activities invested mainly n thoseregions and areas that had promise of highreturns to investment. This practice wasresponsible for the unequal development in thecolony. Unfortunately the post colonialgovernment inherited this and did little to changethe pattern of development. This led to a feelingof marginalization among some regions andcommunities. The result was ethnic suspicionthat obviously weakened nationalism.Complaints about ethnic and regionalmarginalization are addressed in theIn particular the failure by the state to addressthe inequitable distribution of public resourcessuch as jobs and infrastructure only fueledfeelings and perception of unfairness anddiscrimination. Indeed different forms ofdiscrimination do not augur well for thedevelopment of strong sense of nationhood.One way to promote a strong sense ofnationalism is to ensure respect for the rule oflaw. Both the rich and the poor must be treatedequally in terms of enforcement of the law. Theprinciple should also apply to both the politicallypowerful and those not so powerful. GenerallyKenya’s record with respect for the rule of lawhas been poor.This has left people wondering whether some aremore Kenyan than others. Under suchcircumstances it is unrealistic to expecteverybody to identify with the nation.Finally we argue that the spirit of nationalismhas never disappeared among the people ofKenya. The struggle for a new dispensation thatwould bring about a new governance system isevidence of this determination to rekindlenational unity. What is required is politicalleadership that places the interests of the countrybefore self interest.ReferencesAtieno Odhiambo, E.S. (1981) Siasa: politics andnationalism in E.A., 1905-1939. KenyaLiterature Bureau.Ghai, Y. and Ghai, J. (2011) Kenya’sConstitution: An Instrument for Change.Published by Katiba Institute, K-RepCentre Nairobi, Kenya.Gitu, M. (2005) Human rights, Citizenship andnationhood in Kenya: An Over view of218

219Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012losses, and prospects. In Bujra A, edited.Democratic Transition n Kenya: Thestruggle from Liberal to socialdemocracy. African Centre for EconomicGrowth and Development PolicyManagement Forum, 234.Jonyo, F. (2002) Ethnicity in Multiparty Politics.In Chweya L. edited Electoral Politics inKenya. Claripress.Ndege, P. (2009) Colonialism and its legacies inKenya. Paper presented at the Fulbright_Hays Group project abroad Program:July 5th to August 6th 2009 at MoiUniversity Main Campus (unpublished).Nyong’o, P.A.g. (2011) State-building andDevelopment in the South Sudan. inState building and Development in SouthSudan, Henrich Boll Stiftung East \&Horn of Africa, 22.Republic of Kenya. (2010) The Constitution ofKenya, 2010. Nairobi: GovernmentPrinter.Republic of Kenya, R. (1965) Sessional Paper.Government Printers: Nairobi. 1.219

220Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012MASENO UNIVERSITY JOURNALGuide for AuthorsSubmission of PapersManuscripts for Maseno University Journalshould be submitted by e-mail tookindaowuor@maseno.ac.ke . This is thepreferred method of submission, but only inexceptional cases where the authors have noelectronic facilities, the author should submit oneoriginal copy of the manuscript, two photocopiesand an electronic copy on disk, to the Editor-in-Chief.On a separate page, give full name(s) of authorsand institutional affiliation(s) of author(s),including address for correspondence,(approximately 50 words). Please also provide anabstract, summarizing the thesis of the article innot more than 150 words.The main title should clearly reflect the contentof the article and should be no longer than 20words. Provide headings and subheadings tosignify the structure of your article. Mainheadings should be in bold type and subheadingsitalicised; use lower case letters.It is the author's responsibility to ensure thatmanuscripts are written in clear andcomprehensible English. Authors whose mothertongue is not English language are stronglyadvised to have their manuscripts checked by anEnglish-speaking colleague prior to submission.Submission of a manuscript implies that it hasnot been published previously (except in theform of an abstract or as part of a publishedlecture or academic thesis); that it is not underconsideration for publication elsewhere; that itspublication is approved by all authors and tacitlyor explicitly by the responsible authorities wherethe work was carried out, and that, if accepted, itwill not be published elsewhere in the sameform, in English or in any other language,without the written consent of the Publisher.Limit the number of notes to those that areessential, and keep them as brief as possible.Collect them at the end of the text, not at the footof the page. Do not use the automaticFootnote/Endnote facility if you word-processyour text.Responsibility for opinion expressed and foraccuracy of facts published in articles andreviews rests solely with individual author(s).Receipt of manuscript will be acknowledgedwithin 2 weeks.Types of ContributionsContributions shall be original research papers;review papers; rapid communications; shortcommunications; viewpoints; letters to theEditor; book reviews.1. Research papers - original full-length researchpapers that have not been publishedpreviously, except in a preliminary form, andshould not exceed 10,000 words (includingallowance for no more than 6 tables andillustrations).2. Review papers - will be accepted in areas oftopical interest, will normally focus onliterature published over the previous fiveyears, and should not exceed 10,000 words(including allowance for no more than 6tables and illustrations).3. Short communications - Short communicationsof up to 1,200 words, describing work thatmay be of a preliminary nature, but whichmerits immediate publication. Authors mayalso submit viewpoints of about 1200 wordson any subject covered by the aims andscope.4. Letters to the Editor - Letters are published fromtime to time on matters of topical interest.5. Book reviews220

221Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Manuscript PreparationGeneral: Manuscripts must be 1.5-spaced, TimeRoman font size 12 with 3cm margins on bothsides of A4 page.Abstracts: Each paper should have an abstract of100-150 words, reporting concisely on thepurpose and results of the paper.Text: Follow this order when typingmanuscripts: Title page (Authors, Affiliations,Vitae, Abstract, Keywords), Main text,Acknowledgements, References, FigureCaptions, Tables and then Appendix. Do notimport the Figures or Tables into your text. Thecorresponding author should be identified withan asterisk and footnote. All other footnotes(except for table footnotes) should be identifiedwith superscript Arabic numbers. The title of thepaper should unambiguously reflect its contents.Where the title exceeds 70 characters asuggestion for an abbreviated running titleshould be given.Units: The SI system should be used for allscientific and laboratory data; if, in certaininstances, it is necessary to quote other units,these should be added in parentheses.Temperatures should be given in degrees Celsius.The unit 'billion' (10 9 in America, 10 12 in Europe)is ambiguous and should not be used. Use metricmeasurements (or state the equivalent).Similarly, give a US dollar equivalent of othercurrencies.Symbols: Abbreviations for units should followthe suggestions of the British Standardspublication BS 1991. The full stop should not beincluded in abbreviations, e.g. m (not m.), ppm(not p.p.m.), % and '/' should be used inpreference to 'per cent' and 'per'. Whereabbreviations are likely to cause ambiguity ormay not be readily understood by aninternational readership, units should be put infull.Current recognised (IUPAC) chemicalnomenclature should be used, althoughcommonly accepted trivial names may be usedwhere there is no risk of ambiguity.The use of proprietary names should be avoided.Papers essentially of an advertising nature willnot be accepted.References: All publications cited in the textshould be presented in a list of referencesfollowing the text of the manuscript. No morethan 30 references should be cited in yourmanuscript. In the text refer to the author's name(without initials) and year of publication (e.g."Oketch-Rabah, Mwangi, Listergen and Mberu(2000) studied the effects..." or "...similar tovalues reported by others (Getenga, Jondiko &Wandiga, 2000)..."). For 2-6 authors all, authorsare to be listed at first citation. At subsequentcitations use first author et al. When there aremore than 6 authors, first author et al. should beused throughout the text. The list of referencesshould be arranged alphabetically by authors'surnames and should be as full as possible, listingall authors, the full title of articles and journals,publisher and year. The manuscript should becarefully checked to ensure that the spelling ofauthors' names and dates are exactly the same inthe text as in the reference list.References should be given in the followingform:Ahmed, I. A., & Robinson, R. K. (1999). Theability of date extracts to support theproduction of aflatoxins. Food Chemistry,66(3), 307-312.Marasas, W. F. O. (1996). Fumonisins:History, worldwide occurrence and impact. InL. S. Jackson, J. W. DeVries, & L. B.Bullerman, eds. Fumonisins in food, advances inexperimental medicine and biology, vol. 392 (pp.1-18). New York: Plenum Press.Massart, D. L., & Kauffmann, L. (1983).Interpretation of analytical data by use of clusteranalysis. New York: Wiley.Noel, S., & Collin, S. (1995). Trans-2-nonenaldegradation products during mashing. InProceedings of the 25th European breweryconvention congress (pp. 483-490). Oxford: IRLPress.Citing and listing of web references: As aminimum, the full URL should be given. Any221

222Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012further information, if known (author names,dates, reference to a source publication, etc.),should also be given. Web references can belisted separately (e.g., after the reference list)under a different heading if desired, or can beincluded in the reference list.IllustrationsPhotographs, charts and diagrams are all to bereferred to as "Figure(s)" and should benumbered consecutively in the order to whichthey are referred. They should accompany themanuscript, but should not be included withinthe text. All illustrations should be clearlymarked with the figure number and the author'sname. All figures are to have a caption. Captionsshould be supplied on a separate sheet. Tablesshould be numbered consecutively and given asuitable caption and each table typed on aseparate sheet. Footnotes to tables should betyped below the table and should be referred toby superscript lowercase letters. No vertical rulesshould be used.Preparation of electronic illustrationsSubmitting your artwork in an electronic formathelps us to produce your work to the bestpossible standards, ensuring accuracy, clarity anda high level of detail. Authors must ensure thatsubmitted artwork is camera ready.ProofsWhen your manuscript is received at thePublisher it is considered to be in its final form.Proofs are not to be regarded as 'drafts'. One setof page proofs in PDF format will be sent by e-mail to the corresponding author, to be checkedfor typesetting/editing. No changes in, oradditions to, the accepted (and subsequentlyedited) manuscript will be allowed at this stage.Proofreading is solely the author(s)responsibility. A form with queries from the copyeditor may accompany your proofs. Pleaseanswer all queries and make any corrections oradditions required. The Publisher reserves theright to proceed with publication if correctionsare not communicated. Return correctionswithin 14 working days of receipt of the proofs.Should there be no corrections, please confirmthis. Maseno University Journal will doeverything possible to get your article correctedand published as quickly and accurately aspossible. In order to do this we need your help.When you receive the (PDF) proof of yourarticle for correction, it is important to ensurethat all of your corrections are sent back to us inone communication. Subsequent corrections willnot be possible, so please ensure your firstsending is complete. Note that this does notmean you have any less time to make yourcorrections, just that only one set of correctionswill be accepted.OffprintsThe editors reserve the right to copyedit andproof all articles accepted for publication.Acceptance of the article will imply assignmentof copyright by its author(s) to MasenoUniversity Journal. Authors receive acomplimentary copy of the issue. Authors ofbook reviews receive 4 off-prints.CopyrightUpon acceptance of an article, authors will beasked to transfer copyright. This transfer willensure the widest possible dissemination ofinformation. A letter will be sent to thecorresponding author confirming receipt of themanuscript. A form facilitating transfer ofcopyright will be provided. If excerpts from othercopyrighted works are included, the author(s)must obtain written permission from thecopyright owners and credit the source(s) in thearticle.222

223Maseno University Journal Volume 1 2012Contact:Editor in ChiefMaseno University JournalMaseno University,P.O. Box 333-40105 Maseno, Kenya.Email: okindaowuor@maseno.ac.ke.223