n246 See id.n247 Simon, supra note 16.n248 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2972 (1997). See also La Fond, supra note 27.n249 Simon, supra note 16, at 466.n250 For an excellent analysis of this question, see Janus, supra note 12.n251 See Schopp, supra note 12.n252 This shift in goals is reflected by the change in official rhetoric. Jettisoning the legal term'patients' traditionally used to describe individuals being civilly committed, legislation and otherpublic discourse now calls these individuals "sexually violent predators," a term that encouragespublic fear and loathing. See J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name? A Rhetorical Readingof Washington's <strong>Sexual</strong>ly Violent <strong>Predator</strong>s Act, 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 781 (1992).n253 See also supra note 27.n254 This reconfiguration of mental health law and policy and the role of mental healthprofessionals in the United States is not a new development. It has been underway since the mid-1970s. See John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Back to the Asylum: the Future of Mental HealthLaw and Policy in the United States 150-71 (1992).n255 See supra note 27.n256 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.n257 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-19-203 (1996); Greenfeld, supra note 241, at 19-20.n258 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12 (1998); 1996 Wash. <strong>Laws</strong> ch. 288, amending Wash.Rev. Code § 9.94A.030 and § 9.94A.120(4) (authorizing a mandatory life sentence <strong>for</strong> a secondtimeserious sex offender). The Washington law is commonly referred to as a "two strikes andyou're out law." Rachel Zimmerman, Two-Strikes Sex Crime Law Getting Second Test; LakeForest Park Man is Charged, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 10, 1997, at B1.n259 See William D. Pithers & Alison Gray, The Other Half of the Story: Children with <strong>Sexual</strong>Behavior Problems, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 200 (1998).n260 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).n261 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095.n262 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (ex post facto); U.S. Const. amend. V (double jeopardy). See alsoCollins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). The U.S. Constitution precludes enactment oflegislation that: (1) punishes as a crime an act previously committed that was not unlawful whendone; (2) makes more burdensome the punishment <strong>for</strong> a crime after its commission; and (3)
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available under the law at the time it wascommitted. Id. at 42 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1789)).n263 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095.n264 A disturbing corollary of constitutional litigation involving commitment laws in general andsexual predator laws in particular is the seeming severance by courts of the question of whetherindividuals are being denied their constitutional right to treatment from the question of whethersuch commitment laws are constitutional. Increasingly, courts may find that individuals committedunder these laws are not receiving constitutionally adequate treatment but that the plaintiffs'remedies are limited to requiring the state to provide such treatment. Courts are very reluctant tostrike down the laws as unconstitutional or to order the release of individuals simply because thestate is not providing them with constitutionally adequate treatment.n265 See supra note 6.n266 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover,Violence]; Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).n267 Cover, Violence, supra note 267, at 1608.n268 Id. at 1609.n269 See Robert F. Schopp, <strong>Sexual</strong> <strong>Predator</strong>s and the Structure of the Mental Health System:Expanding the Normative Focus of <strong>Therapeutic</strong> <strong>Jurisp</strong>rudence, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 161(1995). Robert Schopp has started this important enterprise by developing and applying anormative TJ theory by examining the role of criminal law and the role of civil commitment law.His brilliant pioneering work provides one way of approaching this crucial enterprise.n270 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.n271 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 8.n272 See, e.g., La Fond, supra note 96.n273 See Winick, supra note 8.n274 See id.n275 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.n276 See House Subcommittee #3 of the House Judiciary Committee, Oct. 25, 1971, Part II, at15357 (statement of Philip Zimbardo, Professor at Stan<strong>for</strong>d), reprinted in Richard G. Singer,Rights of the Imprisoned: Cases, Materials and Directions 551-54 (1974).n277 Id. at 552.n278 Id.
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