INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY.pdf - CUEA

2FIRST PARTI. MONOTHEISM: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY ISLAMINTRODUCTIONThe formula "Lâ ilâh illâ llâh, Muhammad rasûl Allâh" (there is no god save Allâh and Muhammadis His prophet) is the most concentrated profession of faith of the Islamic belief in one God. It iscalled the shahâda. Obviously, many people have heard that Islam, the religion preached byMuhammad, is one of the great monotheistic religions in the world. And most of those who studythe religions of the world have certainly read the shahâda but do not realize the depths of thatexpression of faith. Thus, based on these statements, I wish objectively to present in this essaythe Islamic conception of God's unity. In this case, it is also our duty to research on its meaningand implications. For the Muslims, God (Allâh) is the one and only deity. Right from Muhammad'spreaching, Muslims worship only one Supreme Being who is the Creator of heaven and earth. Thisis what the Qur'ân preaches, the theologians defend and explain in different ways, and thephilosophers attempt to purify with the use of Hellenistic thinking. In the Qur'ân, the unity of God isnoted almost in each sûra (chapter) in order to show its importance in Islam. The Qur'ân givessufficient testimony to Muslim belief in one God.From the rise of Muhammad till the fall of the Umayyad Empire, the conception of God's unity wastaken without any questioning. But when the theologians and philosophers were allowed tocomment on Islamic dogmas, the question of the unity of God and, of course, other matters werediscussed as vastly as possible with a new outlook. Inasmuch as several books of the Greekphilosophers, especially those written by Plato, Aristotle and their immediate disciples, weretranslated and commented by the Muslim philosophers, reason found a place alongside revelation.Belief in one God reached another level. Two great schools, Mu`tazilism and Ash`arism, opposedeach other because they wanted to know if the essence of God is identical with or distinct from itsattributes. In fact the issue simply was how to purify the noble belief in one God and not a matterof doubting this truth. In spite of some differences, which can be noted between the Islamic andChristian monotheism, Islamic belief in this matter is that strict monotheism does not permit anyform of polytheism or idolatry. It also rejects any mediation or intermediary between God and man.At least belief in one God is the common point of all the monotheistic religions from where theycould build or continue the dialogue, which was undertaken almost five decades ago. In fact,writing this essay, my purpose was to find a common point that could gather together Muslims andChristians so that they may solve their problems and live in peace.A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDHistory, being a study of the past experience of man and his environment, tells us that each eventis usually influenced either negatively or positively by some previous phenomena. The advent ofIslam which is an event sui generis was surely influenced by various and important civilizations,thoughts, philosophies and religions. Furthermore, monotheism, which is the essential feature of

3the religion founded by Muhammad, 3 was as well influenced by several previous monotheisticideas expressed either implicitly or explicitly. In short, the religious thought of pre-Islamic Arabiaand the rest of the Middle East can be compared with Islamic monotheism.Pre-Islamic Arabian thoughtMuslims refer to Arabian culture before the birth of Muhammad as jâhiliyyah. In fact,zthe term Jahiliyyah, usually rendered time of ignorance or barbarism, in reality means theperiod in which Arabia had no dispensation, no inspired prophet, no revealed book; forignorance and barbarism can hardly be applied to such a cultured and lettered society asthat developed by the south Arabians. 4Thus, it is advisable for us to examine the religious situation of that period for a betterunderstanding of Islamic monotheism. Before that, let us look at how the geographical and culturalsituation led Arabians to focalise their thinking to a spiritual life.Geographical and Cultural situationThe land of Arabia determines in one way or the other the cultural and religious situation of thecountry. In other words the position of Arabia influences its culture, and culture goes with religion.Arabia is a peninsula, which is divided into two main parts: the north and the south. Both of themare covered by the Arabian Desert. Because of the desert, any organization based on fixeddwellings was impossible especially in the north where Bedouins lived. P.M. Holt observes: “TheBedouins of the desert and the sedentarized nomads of the oases are two main representatives ofthe arid area dwellers in the north. 5The south, different from the north because of its favourite climate, had an advanced civilizationbased on agriculture. 6In spite of this distinction, both northerners and southerners were submitted to desert law whichinfluenced them in all their thoughts, needs and deeds. That is why they were animist. The maintowns (Makka, â'if and Medina) followed the same law. The Arabians believed that inanimateobjects, such as trees, stones and springs, housed spirits which could influence the lives of men. 7In anything they did or thought, Arabians bore in their mind not only the presence but also theinfluence of spirits. Taylor says that animism, so defined, was the core of all religions. Accordingto him, the term "spirits" applies to gods and divinities. 8 Arabia was not exempted from this3 Robert Caspar, "The permanent signification of Islam's monotheism," in Concilium.Religion in the eighties (Edimburgh: T. and T. Clark Ltd, 1985), pp. 67-78.4 Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, from the earliest times to the present (London:Macmillan, 9th ed. 1968), p. 87.5 P.M. Holt (ed.), The Cambridge history of Islam, vol. 1, The central Islamic lands,(Cambridge: University Press, 1970), p. 5.6 Carl Brockelman, History of the islamic peoples, (New York: Capricorn books), 1960),p. 582.7 Philip Hitti K, op. cit., p. 15.8 Philip Hitti, "Arabia" in The Encyclopedia Americana, (New York: AmericanaCorporation, vol 1, 1927).

4common idea. Again, Arabians lived broadly a hard and poor life because of the desert. We canimagine that a change which might help them to live a better life was expected. W. MontgomeryWatt points this out in a particular way:Thus there is a belief, put into Muhammad's mouth in different forms, that four things are decided for ahuman being while he is still an embryo in the womb. According to one version, Anas ibn-Mâlik reported ofthe prophet that he said, "God has entrusted an angel with the womb... when God will to complete theforming of it." 9This statement leads us to believe that the geographical situation of Arabia led Arabians to trust inspiritual life. "If God wills" is an old sentence. It makes us think of monotheism beforeMuhammad. H.A.A. Gibb relates:The old legend that Islam was born of the desert is taking a long time to die. Since Renan popularized theview that monotheism is the natural religion of the desert, it seemed a plausible argument that Muhammad's insistence on the unity and unapproachable greatness of God was simply a reflection of the vastchangeless wastes of Arabia. 10In fact, the life of the city is different from desert life. Desert life makes man acknowledge hislimitations and order his relationship with the infinite. Desert life raises more a religiousconsciousness.The religious situation of pre-Islamic thoughtIslam as a culture and a civilization; is first and foremost a religion. Thus taking into account whatis said above, we realize that the religion, which stands on the Qur’ân, came to build on previousArabian religion. As far as we are concerned hic et nunc, this opinion stimulates us to study theArabian religion before Muhammad.Arabians were always religious men but their religion before Muhammad was in a primitive stage.It was polytheism. Along with their belief in spirits, Arabians worshipped several deities and builtsanctuaries and temples in many places where they kept their idols. The city of Makka, whereIslamic faith was first revealed, was the most important religious centre. Hitti said:The name Makkah, the Macoruba of Ptolemy, comes from Sabaen Makumba, meaning that it owes itsfoundation to some religious associations and therefore must have been a religious centre long beforeMuhammad was born. 11So tribal deities who were very important were represented by some idols at Makka in order tosustain the tribal life. For instance, NorthernersOften carried their idols with them when they travelled, presuming that the idols had permitted itsworshippers to travel. All these statues, whether in the Ka'bah, around it or scattered around the tribes orthe provinces, were regarded as intermediaries between their worshippers and the supreme God. Theyregarded the worship of them as a means of rapprochement with God even though in reality, that sameworship had caused them to forget the true worship of God. 129 Montgomery Watt, What is Islam (London: Longman, 1968), p. 23.10 H.A.R. Gibb, Islam. A Historical Survey, (London: University Press, 1975), p. 1.11 Philip Hitti, op. cit, p. 103.12 Muhammad Husayn, The life of Muhammad, (Lagos: Academy Press, 1982), p. 20.

5Now it is obvious that Arabians before the rise of Islam bore in mind the idea of the supreme God,one and great. Arabians were polytheists because each tribe had its own gods or divinities. Evenin this level, the tribal god became greater than other gods of other tribes. Arabia was movingtowards henotheism? 13However these gods or godesses linked Arabians to the supreme one. In fact, among the godsworshiped all over the Arabian land, Manât, `Uzza and al-Lât were predominant. These three weredaughters of Allâh, the supreme God. We will not be surprised that Allâh was the principal God ofArabia though not the only deity of Makkah. It is clearly seen that his name is an ancient one.It occurs in two south Arabic inscriptions, one a Minaean found at al-`Ula and other a Sabeaan, but aboundsin the form H L H in the Lihyamite inscription of the fifth century BC 14In this period, though monotheism was not as clear as it is in Islam, Arabians worshipped one godthrough many deities. On the eve of Islam, some native Arabians tried to abandon their deities inorder to worship only one God. That is Hannifiya.The HannifiyaAs soon as Arabians entered into relationship with other religions, namely Judaism andChristianity, some of them adopted the Hannifiya, which was a kind of monotheistic faith butdifferent from either Judaism or Christianity.Hanîf appears repeatedly in the Qur'ân as the name of those who possess the real and true religion; it isused particularly of Abraham as the representative of the pure worship of God. As a rule it contrasts himwith the idolaters... but in one or two passages it at the same time describes him as one who was neither aJew nor a Christian. 15Muhammad himself acknowledged the Hannifiya as a true religion: "And further (thus): set thy facetowards religions with true piety, and never in any wise be of the Unbelievers" (Qur'ân 10:105).Monotheism was the principal feature of the Hannifiya. A anîf is one who had abandoned idolatryand polytheism to worship only one God. Before the coming of Islam, Muhammad was not alone infeeling the need of monotheism. 16 Though towards the end of the fifth and the beginning of thesixth centuries, paganism was more influential, the coming and the spread of the two greatmonotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity in Arabia, had reinforced monotheism.Thus, looking at Arabia before Islam, we discover that the unity of God was known a long timebefore Muhammad. Islam therefore is considered as a continuation, revival and purification ofprimitive monotheism.13 Robert Caspar , Traité de théologie musulmane. Histoire de pensée religieusemusulmane, (Rome: P.I.S.A.I, 1987), p. 7.14 Philip Hitti, op. cit, p. 100.15 .A.R. Gibb, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: Cornell University Press, 1961).16 James, E.O., Comparative religion, (London: Metheun, 1961), p. 203.

6JudaismJudaism is a religion of the Jews whose founder is Abraham. Like Islam, Judaism is more than areligion because, for the Jews, it is a way of life; it contains commandments, rites traditions andbeliefs. Contrary to other religions of Semitic world, Judaism is monotheism with a revealed book.Since the time of the Patriarchs, but developed after exile, Judaism is contained in the book calledTorah.The Torah was given only as a means of purifying men - so runs a famous rabbinic dictum. It is noimpossible set of demands, meant for angels or a very few men of superior piety. Its wisdom andordinances are the way of holiness for all men, even the most ordinary among them. 17Through the Torah, Jews honoured God, one and Creator of the universe. He is mighty andpowerful; no single creature can represent him. He is also unseen but he is always with hispeople. "You will have no gods other than me. You must not make yourselves any image or anylikeness of anything in heaven above or on earth" (Dt 5, 7-8).Judaism is also guided by a tradition. Tradition carries along with its values and patterns ofbehaviour so that the young ones will be enlightened. In time of crisis, tradition was called tochallenge and to give the truth. Torah and tradition are the source of Judaism. Priests are guardsof Torah and tradition; they were also ministers of the cult that rendered God praise andforgiveness. To honour God faithfully, the Jews have some festivals namely, the Sabbath, thePassover, the Shabuoth, Sukkoth and Yom Kippur. In short, Judaism is the life of Jews. It helpsJews to live faithfully with God and their fellowmen, to keep God's commands and to be preparedagainst various systems.In fact the belief of the countries surrounding Judaism was quite different. Jews were the onlymonotheistic people in the Semitic world, so that Judaism suffered from within and without.Because of its monotheistic concept of God and its consequences, Judaism was always in conflictand war with its surroundings. By the way, there was also great influence from the outside, whichbrought some deviation in the religious practice of the Jews. Jews borrowed from all the countriessurrounding it. In spite of this deviation, Jewish nationalism made the survival of monotheismpossible and so it continues till the present day.Really, with the fore-going information and analysis, some may say that Arabian traditional pre-Islamic thought, as well as the traditions and philosophy of the ancient world, together withJudaism, gave birth to Islamic monotheism. If they did not give birth to it, at least all these ancientideas did influence Islam widely and strongly. Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, adopted some,corrected a little and rejected what was totally against his revelation and its implications. The newMuslim community superseded the old Arabian tribal society, which drew inspiration from the wholeSemitic world.17 Arthur Hertzberg, Judaism, (New York: George Braziller, 1962), p. 256.

7B. MONOTHEISM IN THE QUR'ANIntroductionWe saw in the first chapter that the Islamic conception of God (Allâh) has a very rich and largebackground. We also agreed that the pre-Islamic thought has much in common with the thought ofnearby ancient civilizations. We even can say that Islamic monotheism was inpired by thosethoughts, but we have not yet brought out its meaning and development properly within Islam. Sowe should look at the first source of Islam, the Qur'ân from which we find the earliest proclamationand the first development of Islamic monotheism. Arthur Jeffery wrote:The Qur'ân is the scripture of Islam. It is called the noble Qur'ân, the glorious Qur'ân, the mighty Qur'ân, butnever the holy Qu'rân save by modern, western-educated Muslims who are imitating the title holy Bible. Itcontains the substance of Muhammad's deliverances during the twenty odd years of his public ministry. It isclear that he had been preparing a book for his community which would be for them what the Old Testamentwas for the Jews and the New Testament for the Christians, but he died before his book was ready, andwhat we have in Qur'ân is what his followers were able to gather together after his death and issue as thecorpus of his revelations. 18The Qur'ân is the first source of Islam and Muslims claim that It is first a revealed message. Infact, it is a written book with 114 sûras in which, claim the Muslims, Allâh himself reveals to manwho He is so that man will live according to His will. In this way the Qur'ân purports to be the wordof God, which directs Muslims in their various ways. That is why the importance of the Qur'ân iscompared to what is given to the Old Testament for Jews and to the New Testament for Christians.The Qur'ân talks about Allâh in different ways gathered together in three themes: First Allâh is Godof creation, judgment and retribution; secondly, He is God omnipotent and merciful. Thirdly, He isunique and One in Himself. 19 Furthermore, as the Qur'ân is presented as the unchageable theword of God, it gives a permanent significance to Islamic monotheism that may be interpreted laterin one way or the other by different Islamic schools or groups. The Qur'ân gives the essence of thebelief in one God in Islam. According to Kenneth Cragg:The Qur'ân, for Muslims, is the ultimate literature. Having it means a human literacy reading a divinewriting. There is first the literacy of Muhammad in the vocation of prophetic word and action in the name ofGod: then the scripture in the active possession of the prophet's hearers, reading and rehearing his wordsas the directive of their being and the bond of their community. Everything in the world, wrote a Frenchpoet, exists to come to climax in a book. In a very different idiom, that is what Muslim finding their Qur'ân,the one great book which is the utmost in language and meaning, the crux of truth in literary forum - notbook about something more intimate than itself but itself the sum and centre. 2018 Arthur Jeffery, Islam, Muhammad and his religion, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press,1958), p. 47.19 Cf. The Encyclopedia of Islam, (London: Luzac and Co., vol. 1, 1960).20 Kenneth Cragg, The Mind of the Qur'ân. Chapters in reflection (London: George Allen,1973), p. 13.

8The Qur’ânic preachingAt the beginning of the seventh century of the Christian era, precisely from 610 to 632, Muhammadclaimed to receive the revelation from Allâh and started to proclaim the word of Allâh as he claimedto be told.A Muslim tradition tells us that sûra XCVI was the first to come down to the prophet Muhammad; so themission entrusted to him was from the first the preaching of the word of Allâh. Allâh, as is said toMuhammad in this first sûra, is thy Lord, creator of man, the very generous, who teaches man that which heknew not. 21Though Allâh was known before the rise of Islam, with Muhammad, the conception of Allâhchanged. We know that Allâh was one of the Meccan deities, even the supreme deity but thepreaching of the Qur'ân conceived Him as universal, one and transcendent. In fact, Muhammaddid not try at all to prove the existence of God.The existence of God is strongly affirmed in all the sûras. Muhammad talked about God who isand was revealed to him. The first sûra (of the present text) which is called the "the opening" al-Fâtia because of its importance in alât and in many other forms of prayer, gives the most precioussubstance of Islamic doctrine. 22 The formula "In the name of Allâh, most Gracious, most Merciful"Bi-smi-llâhi r-Ramâni r-Raîm, which is placed before all the sûras except sûra 9, shows that theGod that Muhammad proclaimed not only exists but also is the most Gracious and the mostMerciful. Muhammad believed in the living God; that is why he praises him "Praise to Allâh, theCherisher and Sustainer of the worlds" (sûra 1:2), and worships him: "Thee do we worship andthine aid we seek" (sûra 1:5). Moreover, Muhammad calls God the "Master of the day ofjudgement" (sûra 1:4). Nowadays Montgomery W. Watt tells us that al-Fâtia was considered bysome Muslims as an individual prayer of Muhammad. 23 On realizing this, we see more or less howMohammad was convinced that his call was real and true and came from the living God. sûra 3:2says: "Allâh! There is no God but He, the Living, the Self-Subsisting, Eternal". He is unseen; Heexists: "This is the book; in it is guidance, sure, without doubt, to those who fear Allâh; who believein the unseen, are steadfast in prayer, and spend out of what we have provided for them" (sûra2:2-3). He is present among us; He gives signs to those who obey Him. It is what is said in sûra2:251-252: "By Allâh's will they routed them: And David slew Goliath; and Allâh gave him powerand wisdom and taught him whatever (else) He willed. And did not Allâh check one set of peopleby means of another, the earth would indeed be full of mischief: but Allâh is full of bounty to all theworlds". By analysing all these verses mentioned above, we realize that Muhammad, instead ofproving the existence of God, presented the attributes, the will and the nature of God in whom hebelieved. His preaching on which all Islamic doctrines are built was to tell his contemporaries thatAllâh is the creator of the universe, that he is one. In other words, the Qur'ânic preaching shedlight on the vague knowledge that the pre-islamic Arabs had. Louis Gardet asserts:But the vague notion of supreme (not sole) divinity, which Allâh seems to have connoted in Meccan religion,has to become both universal and transcendental; it has to be turned by the Kur'anic preaching, into theaffirmation of the living God, the Exalted one. 2421 The Encyclopedia of Islam, (London: Luzac and Co., vol. 1, 1960).22 Montgomery Watt, Companion to the Qur'ân (London: George Allen, 1967), pp. 13-14.23 Ibid., p. 14.24 Cf. The Encyclopedia of Islam, (London: Luzac and Co, vol. 1, 1960).

9In Régis Blachère's periodization of the Qur'ân, we find that, among the themes developed in thethree Meccan periods, the preaching of God's oneness is emphasized implicitly or explicitlyeverywhere (cf. sûras 112, 52, 73, 70). The oneness of God is also stressed in the Medinanperiod. 25 For instance, in referring to Judaism and Christianity, the Qur'ân denounces their sinagainst the belief in one, unique and transcendental God. The Qur'ânic preaching hinges on theoneness of God; so it is very imperative for us to point out its meaning.The meaning of Islamic monotheismIt is evident that Islam is a monotheistic religion. Some scholars may even say that Muslimspractice a strict monotheism. Indeed Islam is one of the three great monotheistic religions besideJudaism and Christianity. A Rahman I. Doi says:Islam teaches and preaches monotheism the belief in one God. This belief is known as the unity ofGod-head. The belief is the foundation stone of Islam. It governs the religious faith, designs the socialpattern and gives life to the oral codes. 26We can imagine that monotheism is the central feature of Islam. The statement quoted aboveshows how it governs the internal and external expression of Islam. Robert Caspar expresses thisas follows:Belief in the one transcendent God is undoubtedly the specific feature of Islam in two senses. First, itdistinguishes it from the other great monotheistic religions: If Israel is rooted in hope andChristianity vowed to charity, Islam is centred on faith... Secondly, belief in the one transcendent God is theaxis around which all Islam's doctrine and practice is organized. 27By emphasizing the importance of the Qur'ân and how it expresses monotheism, Robert Casparadds:The whole Koran is nothing other than an urgent and reiterated repetition of that faith, of its history inhumanity and its consequences in personal and social life. It could be called the one, sufficient dogma. 28One dogma, one God: the Qur'ân repeats this in many places. Thus, in the following sub-sections,we shall point out two main factors that clarify the meaning of Islamic belief in one God.The unity of God (tawîd)"Lâ ilâha illâ llâh, there is no god save Allâh" is the digest of Islamic unity. This is the first article ofthe Islamic creed, which describes the God in whom Muhammad believed. It is called theshahâda. As Muhammad was to challenge the the beliefs of his contemporaries, he was to definethe God in whom he believed by differentiating his conception of God from that of hiscontemporaries, thus giving the real meaning of his call. Kenneth Graff reports:25 Cf. Régis Blachère, Le Coran (Paris: P.U.F, 1966), pp. 32-62.26 Rahman Doi, The cardinal principles of Islam, (Lagos: Islamic Publication Bureau,1972), p. 38.27 Robert Caspar, "The permanent significance of Islam's monotheism," in Concilium,(Edinburgh: T and T. Clark Ltd., 1985), pp. 67-68.28 Ibid., p. 68.

10As for the question which might be asked, that is which you have asked, as to "He is God", it is narrated thatthe Quraish said; "O Muhammad, describe your Lord to us, the one to whom you call us." It was then thatthese words were given in revelation. "One" here is in opposition (to God) or may be taken as a secondpredicate. It indicates the manifold attributes of God's majesty and points to all the elements of (his)perfection. For the truly one is transcendent in essence above all seriality and multiplicity. For He has noneed of these as physical, partial and participant entities certainly do. 29The revelation that Muhammad claimed to receive was not given at once. It came progressivelyaccording to the problems he faced. Because the Quraysh asked Muhammad to "describe yourLord to us", revelation came down to enable Muhammad to explain and defend what he had said.The request of the Quraysh shows us that at the beginning Muhammad called people to believe inone God. Abd-al-Rahman Azzam said:If we were to analyse the life of Muhammad in Mecca and contemplate the content of his message, wewould discover that Muhammad devoted his heart and efforts and offered his life and the lives of hisfollowers to the crystallization of the first fundamental belief in the unity of God. He fought his enemies andmade peace with them; he shunned and then forgave them; and he appealed to people of other religions(Christians and Jews) to join with him in one common belief: worship of the one God, a worship which wouldadmit no partners. 30We now know that Muhammad taught his followers belief in one God. Thus it is certain thatMuhammad had a monotheistic conception of God, though some scholars say that at thebeginning, the expression "Allâh akbar" meant henotheism not monotheism. But what kind ofmonotheism did Muhammad preach? Was it a simple idea? H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Framersanswer this question as follows:But unity is far from being a simple idea; it may be internal or external; it may mean that there is no othergod except Allâh, who has no partner, it may mean that Allâh is a oneness in himself; it may mean that he isthe only being with real or absolute existence, all other being having merely a contingent existence; it mayeven be developed into a pantheistic assertion that Allâh is all. 31The above statement does not clarify the issue but rather gives the opportunity to raise morequestions to develop the unity of God in Islam as it is really conceived.C. ISLAMIC MONOTHEISM CONTRASTED WITH POLYTHEISM AND IDOLATRYThe conception of God in the Qur'ân modified the shahâda as soon as the belief in one Godbecame more intimate to Muhammad and to his followers. 32 The shâhada, "There is no god butGod", became a confession and later on an adoration as is expressed in sûrah 21:87: "Andremember Dhû-Nûn, when he departed in wrath: He imagined that we had no power over him! But29 Kenneth Cragg, op. cit., p. 63.30 Abd-al-Rahmân Azzam, The eternal message of Muhammad, (New York: AmericaLibrary, 1965), p. 53.31 H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers, Shorter encyclopedia of Islam, (New York: CorneilUniversity Press, 1961).32 Kenneth Cragg, op. cit., p. 130.

11he cried through the depths of darkness. There is no god but thou: Glory to thee: I was indeedwrong". Wilfred Contnell Smith commented:To say that there is one God, and He alone is to be worshipped, means at its most immediate, as it meant inpagan Arabia when it has first proclaimed, a rejection of polytheism and idolatry. 33According to many scholars of Islam, such as Watt, Anawati, Blachère, Gardet, Jomier and nowWilfred Smith, Islamic monotheism contrasts with both polytheism and idolatry. 34 For instance,sûra 27:63-64 says: "Or, who guides you through the depths of darkness on land and sea, and whosends the winds as heralds of glad tidings, going before his mercy? [Can there be Another] godbesides Allâh? High is Allâh above what they associate with him! Or, who originates creation,then repeats it, and who gives you sustenance from heaven and earth? [Can there be another]god besides Allâh? Say, bring forth your argument, if ye are telling the truth!". To appreciate thenislamic monotheism, we have to separate from it every idea of another god. Worship is due only toAllâh, not to any idols or god. Even angels are servants of God; they should not be worshipped."He doth send down these angels with inspiration of this command, to such of his servants as Hepleaseth, (saying): warn (man) that there is no god but I: so do your duty unto me" (sûra 16:2). Inadition, Montgomery Watt says:This is the most extreme criticism of paganism in the Qur'ân, denying all reality to the pagan deities;elsewhere it is allowed that some of them may be angels, though this still does not make it permissible toworship them. 35With regard to idols, Montgomery Watt comments on sûra 53:15-22, at the same time clarifying ouropinion:The idols mentioned were known as daughters of God, though this does not imply a family system, as inGreek mythology? But only that these were (in the eyes of those who used the phrase) divine beings of asort, subordinate to God. 36Allâh is the only God. With this confession, Muhammad came to liberate his contemporaries fromtheir ignorance. Muhammad refers to the jâhiliyya, the time during which Arabs did not know thetrue God who must be worshipped and not others. Muhammad also came to unify Arabs byworship of the Creator of the universe so that his glory will shine on them and they may havesalvation. This is what Kenneth Cragg is talking about in these lines:In that sense, the shahâdah itself, there is no god but God, is not simply a proposition that negates but adisqualification that unifies. It does not proclaim itself as an idea but as a veto and liberation. 37In fact, it is no wonder that Muhammad, who claimed to have receive the revelation of the unity ofAllâh, reacted strongly against the pagan idolatry and polytheism of his time and before. Moreover,33 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, On understanding Islam. Selected studies (Paris: MontonPublishers, 1981), p. 33.34 Cf. sûras 2:225; 27:60-64; 6:101; 90:14.35 Montogomery Watt, Companion to the Qur'ân (London: GeorgeAllen, 1967), p. 245.36 Loc. cit.37 Kenneth Cragg, op. cit., p. 132.

12shirk (associating other divinities with God) is the greatest sin which cannot be forgiven. It isobvious that to worship idols or any god than Allâh is to contradict Muhammad's message. It isalso to deny the real nature of God inasmuch as polytheism has no place in the shahâda.Again, Muhammad's opposition to polytheism and idolatory was the main reason for his fightagainst his countrymen. He fought them because they believed and worshipped many gods ordeities. Polytheism is more than a sin, it is the greatest sin, the unforgivable sin. The God ofMuhammad is one. There is nothing like him on earth and in heaven. "Verify, I am Allâh; there isno god but I: so serve thou one [only] I and establish regular prayer for celebrating my praise" (sûra20:14). The formula "There is no deity but God" also means that there is nothing from eternity in itsessence and attributes but God and nothing is necessary everlasting but God. It is only God whois Self-subsistance and has power over everything possible. 38 But some scholars report thatMuhammad was still compromising with some deities. This is said in the passage called "Satanicverses".The Satanic versesThe Satanic verses, which are related by at-abarî and later on reported by Watt and RobertCaspar, are no longer in the present Qur'ân. Looking for ways to win his people, Muhammad cameto pronounce the satanic verses. Joseph Kenny, quoting at-Tabarî, says:The Messenger of God was looking for way to win a truce and rapprochement with his people.. When hesaw that his people had turned away from him and nothing to do with what he brought them from God, hewas pained and desired a message from God that would reconcile himself with his people. Because of hislove and desire for them he would be glad if the bone of their contention could be softened a little. Hethought much about it and desire it very much. Then God revealed, "By the star when it goes down, yourcompanion has not gone astray nor erred; nor does he speak what he feels like saying" (Q 53:1-3), until thewords, "Have you seen al-Lât, al-`Uzzâ and Manât?" (Q 53:19-20). At this point Satan put on his lips whathe was thinking in himself and his people wanted to hear from him: "Those are the high flying ghurnûqs[Numidian cranes] whose intersession can be counted on". 39Originally, the Satanic verses existed after verses 19 and 20 of sûra 53. Régis Blachère keeps it inhis translation: "Avez-vous considéré al-Lât et al-`Uzza et Manât, cette troisième autre? Ce sontles sublimes déesses et leur intercession est certes souhaitée". 40 In them, Muhammad seemed toaccept the mediation of al-Lât, al-`Uzza and Manât. This meant that Muhammad, after affirmingthe unity of God, continued to compromise with polytheism. However, it is accepted in Islam that insome cases God allows Satan to confus a prophet. Sûra 22:52 puts it in this way: "Never did hesend an Apostle or a prophet before thee, but, when he formed a desire, Satan threw some [vanity]into his desire: but Allâh will cancel anything [vain] that Satan throws in, and Allâh will confirm [andestablish] his signs: For Allâh is full of knowledge and wisdom".38 Joseph Kenny, Muslim theology as presented by M. b. Yusuf As-Sanusi especially in hisAl-`aqida Al-Wustâ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1970), p. 109.39 Joseph Kenny, Muhammad and the rise of Islam. A criticalpresentation of the background and major Muslim sources (1992),p. 25.40 Régis Blachère, Le Coran (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve, 1966).

13The intention and zeal of Muhammad were to proclaim the pure unity of God. In sûra 109, hedefinitely broke with polytheism: "Say: o ye that reject faith! I worship not that which ye worship; norwill ye worship that which I worship. And I will not worship that ye have been wont to worship, norwill ye worship that which I worship. To you be your way, And to me mine."Islamic monotheism contrasted with Christian ideas of divine Fatherhood and SonshipOriginally tawhîd (the unity of God) was asserted against the Arabs, but later on Muhammadextended it to Christians who worship Jesus as Son of God. Sûra 6:101 says: "To him is due theprimal origin of the heavens and the earth: How can He have a son when he hath no consort? Hecreated all things, and he hath full knowledge of all things". So Islamic monotheism does notpermit any equal or partner with Allâh. The gods of ancient Arabia certainly had wives andchildren. Even in pre-Islamic Arabian thought, Allâh, the supreme God among others, had his ownchildren. We remember that all over the Arabian land, Manât, al-`Ozza and al-Lât were conceivedas daughters of Allâh and were worshipped. Hence, Islamic monotheism does not accept anyfatherhood or sonship because Allâh has no consort or partner. "He is Lord of the East and theWest: there is no god but He: take Him therefore for (thy) Disposer of affairs" (sûra 73:9). In thesame vein, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan wrote:The Qur'ân not only excludes all idea of any equal or partner with Allâh, it specifically excludes all idea of hishaving a son except in the purely metaphorical sense in which all mankind are his children, and in which thepeacemakers are spoken of in the Bible, as the children of God (Matt 5:9). God is ever-living, All-knowing,All-hearing, the Creator of all, whose authority extends over everything. To attribute a son, in any but thepurely metaphorical sense, to God, would amount to a denial of his unity and in effect to a denial of hisGodhead. 41Thus Muslims reject the Christian teaching that Jesus is Son of God, or even a person in God'sunity.Jacques Jomier mentions:For the Muslim, monotheism does not signify only the unity of God, because there can be several persons inthe unity. Monotheism in Islam is the absolute oneness of God which formally does away with the notion ofpersons participating in the divinity... All forms or philosophies of an incarnate God are excluded by themonotheism of Islam, as are blind obedience to dictators, to clergy or to one's own whims and desires. 42Thus the oneness of God came to mean both an external and internal unity of God. It is externalfor it does not accept the existence of another god; it is internal because it does not admit anyperson within God. Islamic monotheism rejects the theology of the Trinity because, say Muslims, itsins against the oneness of God. The God of Muhammad is one and not three in one.Thus, in his combat not only with the Mekkans, but also with Christians, Muhammad gave in sûra112 the last formula of monotheism which will never change. He said: "Say: He is Allâh, the oneand only; Allâh, the Eternal, the Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And there is none41 Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Islam. Its meaning for modernman (New York: Harper, vol. 7, 1962), p. 93.42 Jacques Jomier, How to understand Islam (London: SCMPress Ltd, 1989), p. 40.

14like unto Him". With these four verses, short but very powerful, significant and determining,Muhammad affirmed a very strict monotheism. Moreover, Islamic monotheism implies also thetranscendence of God.D. THE TRANSCENDANCE OF GODBefore going into the consequences of Islamic monotheism, we would like to explain a little aboutthe transcendence of God in the Qur'ân. Indeed, the Islamic monotheism also includes thetranscedence of God. God is one and transcendent. Being the creator of all things, God is notonly different from all creatures but above all. "And there is none like unto him " (sûra 112,4).Robert Caspar is explicit on that :This one God is transcendent, in the exact sense of the term. He is the totally other and nothing islike Him. The idea of creation introduces a radical division between the creator and creatures, incontrast to religions based on emanation or mystical experience. 43While we talk about transcendence, we do not mean distance, for God is close to man and theQur'ân says that God always invites man to come close to him. But what the transcendence ofGod rejects is the concept of any intermediary or mediation other than the Qur'ân. Robert Casparproclaims:While the Koran seems to accept some cases of intercession (the angels, the prophet), both ancient andmodern Islam make a boast of this rejection: no meditation, still less if there is question of incarnate God, nochurch, no sacraments; an extremely sober liturgy in bare mosques, where the believer is alone before God,even at the Friday common prayer. 44If God sometimes allows angels (e.g. the angel Gabriel) and prophets (Moses, Jesus andMuhammad) to bring his word to man, He cannot permit at all the reality of the incarnate soncoming down from Heaven as the mediator between God and man. We give here someconsequences of belief in one and transcendent God.E. CONSEQUENCES OF ISLAMIC MONOTHEISMThe belief in one transcendent God has, of course, many implications, since faith in one Godmoves and guides all the life (social, physical, spiritual) of a Muslim. Some of these implicationswill be considered here.First, Islamic monotheism leads Muslims to conceive God as all-powerful, Almighty who will neverfail because he is not contingent. He knows everything and his knowledge will never cease.Furthermore Muslims attribute the organization of the world to the oneness of God. It is becauseHe is one that he orders and organises the universe; otherwise the world would have been in43 Ibid., p. 69.44 Ibid., p. 69.

15chaos. 45 Second, Islamic monotheism brings together the temporal and the spiritual life. Weremember that Islam is at once religion, politics, culture and civilization. Robert Caspar testifies:In relation to social life, the Moslem city, the role sovereignty of God leads to a rejection of a separationbetween temporal and spiritual (dîn and dunyâ), and so to state religion (dîn al-dawla). 46Third, Muslims strongly believe in the Qur'ânic message, for it came from God who is righteous.Therefore his righteousness makes his message true. As we know the Qur'ân claims to be arevealed book and that Muhammad is nothing more than a prophet. This idea goes with what Abdal-RahmanAzzam said:The wisdom of this is clear: From belief in the one God stems all that is righteous; it makes forrighteousness in the message. It is the bond that limits all the component parts of the message andstrengthens them, for its position is comparable to the relationship of the soul to the body, which falls slack,deteriorates and vanishes once the soul departs from it. 47If God is not one, how can he be righteous? The oneness of God makes his message one andrighteous. It goes without saying that for Muslims the Qur'ân, which is the message come downfrom God who is one, must be righteous. Moreover, Islamic monotheism determines the attitude ofeach Muslim. Muslims understand that inasmuch as God is one and transcendent, it is He whogives existence to anyone he wants.Thus man should adore him and serve him by keeping his law, because it is in this way that he canbe saved. The Qur'ân says: "And the servants of Allâh Most Gracious are those who walk on theearth in Humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say, peace (sûra 25:63). The Qur'âncontinues by saying: "Their messengers said to them: We are only human like yourselves, butAllâh bestows favour upon whomsoever he willeth of his servants" (sûra 14:13). So if everybodywho follows Allâh is his servant (`abd), inequality does not have any place in the Islamic Umma;equality and brotherhood will be the attitude of all Muslims. In the same way, it implies that nobodyrecieved special gift from God which may make him greater than others. Because of His oneness,Allâh, and no other one, is ruler of the universe. Belief in the unity of God promotes not only thesense of brotherhood but also equality.Furthermore Professor Joseph Kenny who studied the principles and the consequences of theIslamic monotheism in the philosophical point of view, wrote:Comme une variation de la shahâda, n'importe quel attribut de Dieu ou nom de Dieu peut être remplacé par"ilâha". Par exemple, "personne n'est fort (qadîr) sauf Dieu". La théologie ash'arite avait utilisé de telsénoncés pour soutenir son enseignement cardinal selon lequel il n'y a aucun pouvoir dans la nature; oupour être exact, la nature, comme principe d'action, n'existe pas. Seul Dieu agit directement à tout instant àl'occasion de la conjonction de ce qui apparaît être une cause et un effet. 4845 Kenneth Cragg, op. cit., p. 132.46 Robert Caspar, op. cit., p. 71.47`Abd-al-Rahmân Azzam, op. cit., p. 56.48 Joseph Kenny, La philosophie du monde Arabe. Auteurs etthèmes principaux (Kinshasa: F.C.K., 1994), p. 32.

16Allâh is one, almighty and powerful, therefore no creature has power over others, because it iseven He who determines all human acts. He is the principle of life. Indeed the Qur'ân attributessome responsibilities to man but accepts that it is Allâh who determines and guides. "Then seestthou such a one as takes as his god his own vain desire? Allâh has, knowing [him as such], ledhim astray, and sealed his hearing and his heart [and understanding], and a cover on his sight:who, then, will guide him after Allâh [has withdrawn guidance]? Will ye not then receiveadmonition?" (sûra 45:23). Also, in the al-fatihâ, it is said that it is Allâh who shows the straightway to man.The second consequence Professor Kenny noticed is the absence of any philosophical ethics, for ifAllâh guides nature, it means the nature cannot decide on its behalf. Can the nature say that thisis good or bad? Professor Joseph Kenny says:Le prochain pas dans le processus logique serait de nier la validité d'une éthique philosophique. Si lemonde naturel n'a aucune conduite régulière qui lui est propre, nous ne pouvons pas considérer la naturehumaine et dire que quelque chose est bon ou mauvais pour elle, parce que tout cela dépend de la libredécision de Dieu. 49Beings are not good or bad in themselves; an action is only good or bad because God declares itto be so. Nobody, nothing can challenge him.The meaning of the unity of God, which has been explained, contains several implications. I hopethat those, which are exposed, are more or less sufficient to understand what Islamic monotheismis and what it implies in the Qur'ân.F. CHRISTIAN MONOTHEISM AS ISLAM SEES ITJudaism, Christianity and Islam are known as monotheistic religions because of their commonbelief in one, unique and supreme God, creator of heaven and earth. After studying Islamicdoctrine, we notice that only a small number of the Muslims accept Christian monotheism. 50Muslims say that Christianity had a true monotheism in the past but with the dogmas of the Trinityand the Incarnation, it has deviated from what was preached by Jesus himself. Jacques Jomierwrites:Christianity as Islam sees it is essentially the form of the unique religion, eternal and immutable, which Godwilled to be valid for the children of Israel at a particular moment in history. It was preached by Jesus, butlittle by little his disciples moved away from his message and God sent Muhammad to remedy thesituation. 51In addition, Muslims reject any existent comparable to God. Muhammad `Abduh puts it in this way:The necessary Being is one in His essence, His attributes, His existence and His acts. His essential unitywe have established in the foregoing denial of compositeness in Him, whether in reality or conceptually.That He is unique in His attributes means that no existent is equal to Him therein. 5249 Ibid., p. 35.50 Jacques Jomier, op. cit., pp. 105-108.51 Ibid., p. 103.52 Muhammad `Abdul, The theology of Unity (London: George Allen, 1966), p. 51.

17So based on this statement and on what we have already said in the second and third chapters,there is no room for the Trinity and the incarnation of Jesus, in Islamic monotheism. These aresimply kinds of polytheism and idolatry. Because of that, according to some Muslimfundamentalists, conversion to Christianity is nonsense; it is a regression. Christianity is seen inthe light of the Qur'ân. What the Qur'ân says about Christianity is true and sufficient. JacquesJomier says:The first principle is that the only true source which allows a knowledge of Christianity is the Qur'ân. RecentMuslim lives of Jesus, Written in Arabic, present what they call the Jesus of history. In fact, their account isbased exclusively on Qur'ânic sources; what is taken from elsewhere is there only a supplement or forillustration. 53G. ISLAMIC MONOTHEISM AS CHRISTIANITY SEES ITThe majority of Christians, especially those who are well informed, accept Islam as a monotheisticreligion. Knowing that Christianity is not only a great religion, but is expressed in different views,we choose to stand on what the Catholic Church says. The Vatican II Council's view is in largeagreement with a wide spectrum of other Christian views, although it does not find acceptanceamong some fundamentalists and those who are called today "born again".When Massignon was asked in an interview if he believed in Islam, he replied that he believed inthe God of Abraham, a real, immanent person, and not in the abstract deity of the philosophers andof Devil. For that noble reason, Massignon is a friend to the Muslims. 54 Louis Massignon receiveda Christian faith in his childhood but lost it a while. In his encounter with Muslims, he experiencedcertain realities which helped him later on to find his faith. From his personal experience hediscovered that Islamic monotheism is true and that it is a relevent point to establish dialoguebetween Muslims and Christians. In other words, Louis Massignon want to say that Allâh is trueGod, the God of the Bible. In the same vein, Kenneth Cragg wrote:In as much as both Christian and Muslim faiths believe in one supreme sovereign Creator-God, they areobviously referring, when they speak of God under whatever terms, to the same Being. To supposeotherwise will be confusing. It is important to keep in mind that though apprehensions differ, their theme isthe same. The differences, undoubtedly real, between the Muslim and the Christian understanding of God,are far-reaching and must be pantiently studied. But it would be fatal to all our mutual tasks to doubt thatone and the same God over all was the reality in both. Those who say that Allâh is not the God and Fatherof our Lord Jesus Christ are right if they mean that God is not so described by Muslims. They are wrong ifthey mean that Allâh is other than the God of the Christian Faith. 55But, in order to show that Massignon statement is not shared by all Christians, G.J.O. Moshaypresents a number of questions:A number of thoughtful people have often asked: Is Allâh God? Is the God and the Father of our Lord JesusChrist? Many opinions abound. Some have said Allâh is simply God -the same God of the Bible as He isknown in the Arabic language. Some say he cannot possibly be; they say they do not know who he is, but53 Jacques Jomier, How to understand Islam (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1989), p. 109.54 Giulio Basselti-Sani, Louis Massignon (1883-1962), Christian ecumenist, Prophet ofinter-religious reconciliation (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1974), p. 262.55 Kenneth Cragg, The call of the minaret (New York: Orbis Books, 1985), p. 30.

18that they are sure he is not the same God of the Bible. Some say he is indeed a mighty god, but not theAlmighty God. Yet some are of the opinion that there are two Allâhs. They say that Allâh of the Arab andHausa Christians is different from the Allâh of the Muslims in these same areas. According to them, whilethe Allâh of the Arab Christians is God, the Allâh of the Muslims is not. But if he is not, who he is? 56Moshay's main contention is that Allâh is not the God of the Bible. In fact, he goes so far as to saythat Allâh is demon as he wrote:I thank God for this serious observation and comment. It has served to reinforce my convictions on the spiritbehind Islam. But there is still a question whether indeed it is one god that is worshipped in Islam... There isno monotheism in heathenism. Probably the right word should be monolatry. One cannot serve satan andnot have relationship with demons. In fact, most operations and interactions in the occult and Christlessreligions are more with these demonic spirits than satan himself. 57We, however, take the position of Massignon and Cragg that Allâh (the Arabic name of God) is theGod of Israel, the God of Jesus. If we look at the themes that are stressed in the Qur'ân in order toidentify God, we will realize that God is presented as the sole divinity in relation to man, one in hisnature and the only One who is worthy to be worshiped; He is eternal. In its document Vatican IIcouncil, The authority of the Catholic Church, aware of the Islamic belief in one God, presents itspoint of view.Vatican II Council first refers to Jews and Muslims when he says that those who have not yetreceived the Gospel are related to the people of God in various ways. Vatican II Council added thatMuslims adore the one, merciful God. 58 We shall lengthwise examine Vatican II Council in thefollowing documents.From its point of view about dialogue between Christians and Muslims, the Catholic Churchpresents two documents in which we notice an acknowledgement of the monotheism in Islam. Thefirst is the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium No. 16) says:But the plan of salvation also includes those who acknowledge the creation, in the first place amongst whomare the moslems: these profess to hold the faith of Abraham, and together with us they adore the one,merciful God, mankind's judge on the last day". It goes without saying that the Catholic Church places Islamas the first monotheistic religion outside the biblical revelation because it affirms broadly that Muslims andChristians worship the same living God as unique and mankind's judge on the last day. 59The second text, longer than the first, stresses the same idea but more strongly. In its Declarationon the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate No.3), the Catholic Churchsays:The Church has also a high regard for the Muslims. They worship God, who is one, living andsubsistent, merciful and almighty, the creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to man. Theystrive to submit themselves without reserve to the hidden decrees of God, just as Abrahamsubmitted himself to God's plan, to whose faith Muslims eagerly link their own".56 G. Moshay, Who is this Allâh? (Ibadan: Fireliners International, 1987), p. 9.57 Ibid., p. 130.58 Vatican II Council, Lumen Gentium, 16.59 Robert Caspar, Traité de théologie muslmane. Histoire de la penseé Religieusemusulmane (Rome: P.I.S.A.I, 1987), t. 1, p. 84.

19In this document, the Catholic Church affirms once more that belief in one God and his worship arethe foundation of Islam. Even Christians believe in one God in three persons; Christians andMuslims worship the same God in different ways.In my point of view, should I doubt Islamic monotheism? No. Muslims adore the supreme God intheir context, language and practice. There is only one supreme God called YHWH in Hebrew,Allâh in Arabic, God in English, Dieu in French, Olúwa in Yoruba, Nzambi in Kikongo. Afterstudying a little of the Qur'ân, the period of Muhammad's lifetime and a few centuries after hisdeath, I can say that the God worshipped by Muslims is one, unique and Creator of the universe,despite their life of honouring Him. Even if some types of Christians are still doubting Islamicmonotheism, I do not complain so much because the time will come when they will believe thatAllâh in whom Muslims believe, is one, All-Mighty, Most Gracious, Most Merciful, Master of the dayof Judgement.H. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC MONOTHEISMIslamic monotheism has some negative aspects that take some people into doubt. Here, I intendto present one I have found very important according to my topic. Despite its meaning andabsoluteness, Islamic monotheism has a very serious deficiency; for instance, many Muslimsbelieve that this unique God calls them to fight or discriminate against unbelievers in order to makethem believers. E. Tyan said that jihâd in Islam is a duty which is imposed upon the communityconsidered as a whole and which only becomes obligatory for each individual according to thepurpose envisaged by the law. 60 The Qur'ân has many calls for a holy war (2:186;8:15;22:40;9:13-14). Sûra 9:13-14 has this recommendation:Will ye not fight a people who broke their oaths and aimed at the expulsion of the Messenger, and theyattacked you first? Do you fear them? But Allâh has more right that you should fear Him, if you arebelievers. Fight them; Allâh will chastise them at your hands and bring them to disgrace, and assist youagainst them and relieve the hearts of a believing people.Besides, in some sects in Islamic world, jihâd is considered as the sixth pillar after shahâda, alât,zakât, awm and ajj. Taking into account these cases, jihâd becomes an end and not a means. Butthese practices do not basically change Islamic monotheism. We keep saying that Islam is amonotheistic religion and Muslims believe in God who is one and unique. Meanwhile, we shouldknow that there is a big difference between faith and the practice of that faith. The negative aspectof Islamic monotheism lies in the practice of their belief and sometimes in its development. As amatter of fact, the Islamic view of God's unity will be different from that of Christianity because theirpractices and development are different.60 Cf. The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 2 (London: E.J. Brill, 1965).

20SECOND PARTII. SOME MAJOR THEOLOGICAL ISSUESA word may be needed about Islamic theology, concentrating on its formative period (750-950).The five points below are the main issues, in the order of their historical emergence, whichdominated Islamic theological debate in the period under consideration. These debates eitherarose from or had serious implications for the political situation of the time. The first issue, therelationship between faith and practice, arose directly from the chaos in the Islamic world followingthe assassination of ‘Uthmân. Muslims are supposed to be at peace with one another (Q 3:103;9:71) and to fight only unbelievers (Q 9:123 etc.) The three-way civil war between Mu’âwiya, ‘‘Alîand the Khârijites could be justified only by supposing that the enemy was an apostate, since byhis behavior he had forfeited the right to call himself a Muslim. The Khârijites formulated thisposition and applied it to all beside themselves who claimed to be Muslims.During the Umayyad period a party was developing based on loyalty to the family of ‘Alî. It tooksome time, until the ‘Abbâsid period, for this party to take shape and adopt the name Shî’ite. Alsoduring the Umayyad period Qur’ânic studies made much progress, laying the base for itsparamount authority in what was later to become Sunnism.The Umayyads utilized religious ideas to enhance their own authority, giving rise to the seconddebate. The pre-Islamic idea of destiny (qadar), remoulded in the Qur’ân, was used to support theirauthority as decreed by God, forcing their opponents to argue for the role of free human choice.As the Umayyads consolidated their authority, a mainstream unity developed in the Muslimcommunity, leaving on the sidelines the Shî’ite exaltation of ‘Alî (especially in Kûfa) and theKhârijite condemnation of everyone who did not measure up to their own behavior expectations.Abû-Hanîfa was the principal formulator of the teaching, which came to be known as Murji’ism.This is that Muslims should leave the judgement of the case between ‘Uthmân and ‘‘Alî to God. Inthe meantime anyone who outwardly professes Islam should be accepted as a Muslim, and rulersin power should be presumed to be legitimate. This was the Sunnite resolution of the first debate.As for the third debate, the ‘Abbâsid period saw the growth and reformulation of Shî’ism, althoughalways as an opposition movement or at times as a junior collaborator in government. RadicalShî’ism made no compromise on the primacy of ‘Alî and his rightful heirs, although there was nounanimity which these were. The caliph al-Ma’mûn patronized a compromising group of ZayditeShî’ites who recognized the superiority of ‘Alî and his line, but were prepared to accept a lessdeserving ruler who could be elected. Shî’ism eventually divided into two main branches, theIsmâ’îlîs, or ‘Seveners’, who recognize a line of seven imâms before the line went into hiding, andthe Imâmites, or “Twelvers”, who recognize twelve imâms before the line went into hiding.The ‘Abbâsid period also saw a large-scale introduction of Greek philosophy and science into theMuslim world, occasioning the fourth debate: What is the relationship between revelation and

21reason? Discussions between Muslims and Christians and between different Muslim schools ofthought led to the application of philosophical concepts to talk about God, giving rise to the fifthissue: What is the relationship between God’’s substance and his attributes and between oneattribute and another? Both questions were taken up by the Mu’tazilites and their break-awaycousins, the Ash’arites.1. ISLAM: FAITH AND PRACTICEKhârijismWhen the Khârijites protested `Alî’s agreeing to negotiate with Mu`âwiya, they shouted “Nojudgement but God’s! ” This meant that grave sinners (Mu`âwiya for rebelling, and `Alî forcompromising with him) are apostates from the Islamic community; so it is the duty of Muslims tofight them. This Khârijites action raised a theological question: What is the definition of faith? Doesit include practice, or obedience to Islamic law, or is practice something additional to faith? TheKhârijites were influenced in their position by the assumption that faith is not simply a matter ofpersonal belief but is first of all membership in a believing community. Anyone who is unfaithful tothat community cannot be a believer and cannot enter Paradise. The Khârijites laid great stress onthe Qur’an. This led them to two conclusions: 1) Membership in the community depends uponfollowing the laws of the Qur’an, and anyone who violates these laws forfeits his membership. 2)An imam, or caliph, is not necessary from a theoretical standpoint. If one is chosen out of practicalnecessity he can be from any tribe or nation, “even an Ethiopian slave”. This second conclusiontouches issue of authority, and will be dealt with in chapter 3. Like any of the movements underconsideration in Islamic theology, Khârijism is a wide label applied to many individuals and subsectswhose views differed greatly from one another. At least three groups went by the name ofKhârijites. Only the first consistently follows the logic of Khârijism; the others are compromises ordiluted versions. So, while we mention the three groups, only the first is important.1.1 AzraqitesThe first group is the Azraqites, names after Nâfi' ibn-al-Azraq, its leader, who was active in Basraat the time of Yazîd’s death and the rebellion of Ibn-az-Zubayr in Mecca. This group pointed toQur’ân 9:81 ff. that those able people who “sit still” and do not “go out” (kharaj) to fight for the sakeof God are unbelievers. They interpreted this to mean that anyone who did not join the Khârijiteswas an unbeliever. Furthermore they pointed to Qur’ân 2:117 which teaches that such apostatesare destined to hell fire for eternity, and concluded, according to the injunction of Qur’ân 9:29 tofight unbelievers, that they should attack non-members of their group, except Christians and Jews,whom the Qur’ân has declared protected.Azraqite teaching reflected Arab nomadic custom whereby members of other tribes were allpotential enemies and, unless there was an alliance, could be attacked whenever the chancecame. The Azraqites not only maintained themselves by raiding, but reinforced their groupsolidarity by a test (mihna) of those who would join their group. The candidate was given a prisonergo kill, preferably one of his own tribe. This act would make the new member a target for therevenge of the victim’’s family, and he would have to depend more solidly upon the Azraqites forprotection. Thus religion became the sole bond uniting the members, and family ties and theauthority of elders or chiefs meant nothing.

22In 683 Ibn-al-Azraq went to Mecca to support Ibn-az-Zubayr, but the latter was interested inbecoming caliph over a stable state and was not comfortable with Ibn-al-Azraq’’s anarchicaloutlook. Ibn-al-Azraq returned to Iraq and was pursued by Ibn-az-Zubayr’’s army and killed in 685,but the Azraqites continued as a terrorist band, robbing and killing whenever they saw theopportunity, until they were wiped out by the Umayyad governor al-Hajjâj in 698.1.2 The NajditesThe Najdites, a less important group of Khârijites, are called after their leader Najda ibn-'Âmir whowas also a supporter of Ibn-az-Zubayr’’s rebellion in 683. Najda did not stay with Ibn-az-Zubayr,but gained control of al-Yamâma in central Arabia and eventually most of eastern and southernArabia, a more extensive area than the territory controlled by Ibn-az-Zubayr. Najda was deposedby his followers and died in 693, yet his party continued to rule until they were defeated by al-Hajjâjin 693.Because the Najdites held political power, they were forced to modify the strict Khârijite teachingthat any Muslim who commits a serious sin is an apostate and should be killed. Najda, therefore,distinguished between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in religion. People who sin byignorance could be excused, as the leaders of one expedition who appropriated to themselvessome captured women without following the rules for the distribution of booty, but in fundamentalmatters of faith and respect for the life and property of other Muslims there no excuse wasaccepted.Another distinction was made between occasional sin and persistence in sin; thus God wouldpunish those who sometimes commit theft or adultery or lesser sins, but only those who persist insuch acts would be excluded from the community and destined to eternal punishment in hell.Najda also held that Muslims who did not join his group by “going out” to fight had the status ofhypocrites (munâfiqûn), not unbelievers, as the Azraqites said. Furthermore, Najda seems to havepermitted his followers the practice of taqiyya (cf. Q 16:106), that is, they may conceal their beliefsif their lives are in danger because of their beliefs, for instance from non-Khârijite Muslims or fromAzraqites.1.3 Other Basra KhârijitesBesides the Azraqites and Najdites there were other Khârijites in Basra who held even moremitigated views. Forced to make a pragmatic adaptation to non-Khârijite rule, their theoristsdefended abstention from revolution, or““sitting still”, saying that this did not make someone anunbeliever; likewise sins such as theft or adultery were not regarded as making someone anunbeliever. The test of accepting non-Khârijites as Muslims came when there was a question ofgiving them Khârijite women in marriage or selling them slave girls. There is the story of oneIbrâhîm who was annoyed with his slave girl and threatened to sell her to a bedouin. Some peoplechallenged the legality of his action, but the majority supported him. One group which defendedsuch dealings with non-Khârijites was the Wâqifites, whose name means to “stop” or “suspend”judgement regarding the ultimate fate of non-Khârijites or of sinners. The Wâqifites did advocatepunishing sinners, but not excluding them from the community.As Khârijism gradually disappeared from the heartlands of the caliphate, moderate Khârijitescontinued to govern some outlying states, as 'Umân, while a revolutionary form of Khârijism tookroot for a time among the Persians and among the Berbers of the Maghrib. Khârijism gave them

23justification for rebelling against the central government and also for protesting against the superiorstatus of the Arabs. After the fall of the Umayyads in 750 Khârijism was insignificant for thedevelopment of Islamic theology; yet it is important for having been the first formulated theologicalmovement in Islam and for having initiated future discussion of two major theological issues: that offaith and works, and that of the authority of the Qur’ân.Khârijite thinking, however, has always resurfaced in the Islamic world as a rallying point for theoppressed and politically disaffected, because it justifies revolution against Muslim authority. Wesee this in Hanbalism, Ibn-Taymiyya, Wahhâbism of Saudi Arabia, al-Mawdûdî, and the MuslimBrothers of Egypt and the movements they spawned. The assassins of President Sadat of Egyptwere inspired by Khârijite principles, since they held that because he did not establish Sharî'a in fullhe forfeited his claim to be a Muslim. In Nigeria the Maitatsine movement acted in a similar way,although they never were able to articulate their principles. The Izala and other such movementswhich do not recognize a secular government in Nigeria all have a touch of Khârijism, even thoughthey may not go as far as the Azraqites.1.2 Murji’’ismThe word “Murji’ism” comes from an Arabic word meaning to “postpone” or “defer”, and was usedto mean that the community should postpone judgement on whether a sinner is a Muslim or notuntil the next life when God will judge him. The word was adopted because of its use in Qur’ân9:106, where the status of three men who stayed away from the battle of Tabûk was questioned:“[These] others are deferred (postponed) to the command of God; he will either punish them orforgive them.” Later, verse 118 says they were forgiven.The history of Murji’ism, like that of Qadarism, is complicated because later Sunnite writers listed itamong the heresies; so ho respectable man could be included among the Murji’ites. For example,al-Ash'arî, writing first as a Mu'tazilite and then as a Hanbalite, condemned Abû-Hanîfa as aMurji’ite heretic because he was a member of a rival legal school; this was at a time when thevarious schools had not yet come together under the banner of Sunnism. Later al-Baghdâdî (d.1037) and ash-Shahrastânî (d. 1153) could not longer regard the founder of the Hanafite school asa heretic, yet they continued to list Murji’’ism as a heresy in order to complete the list of seventytwoheresies foretold by Muhammad in the hadîth: “The Jews are divided into seventy-one sectsand the Christians into seventy-two, but my community will be divided into seventy-three sects,only one of which will be saved.” In fact, no heretical sect of Murji’ites ever existed; on the contrary,men from the mainstream of Islam, led by Abû-Hanîfa, applied the term irjâ’’ (to postpone) toseveral teachings which became part of later Sunnism.Irjâ’ 1: Sinners are accepted as MuslimsThe first application of irjâ’ was to judgement of the case of 'Uthmân and `Alî. Judgement shouldbe “postponed” whether they (and other sinners) are believers or unbelievers, and in this life bothmen should be accepted as believers and as rightful rulers.This position was directed against the Khârijites’ placing of 'Uthmân, as well as Mu`âwiya and `Alî,among the unbelievers. It was also against the proto-Shî`ites who judged that `Alî was superior.Politically, therefore, the Murji’ites pragmatically accepted the Umayyads while they were in power,and the right of Hâshimite superiority. Murji’’ism had an anti-Khârijite tone in Basra, whereKhârijites were numerous, whereas in Kûfa, a stronghold of pro-'Alid sympathies, it was used tooppose Shî`ite attempts to revolt or condemn the 'Uthmân (Umayyad) party. Murji’ism may even

24have been primarily directed against proto-Shî`ites, since a preponderant number of the Murji’iteslisted by Ibn-Sa'd (d. 845) and Ibn-Qutayba (d. 889) are from Kûfa. By opposing the divisivetendencies of the Khârijites and Shî`ites and upholding the unity of the Islamic community, theMurji’ites are forerunners of the Sunnites.Irjâ’ 2: Faith does not include worksThe second application of irjâ’’ was with regard to faith and practice; practice was postponed, orplaced after, faith. This application of irjâ’ was demanded by the first. If judgement is to be deferredwhether a grave sinner is a believer or not, he is really accepted as a believer, although lacking inthe practice of faith. That is because the Arabs’’ communal way of thinking made them look upon abeliever primarily as a “member of a believing community” rather than simply “one who has faith”. Ifa grave sinner is accepted as a member of the Muslim community, then he must have faith, andfaith (îmân) must be defined accordingly.In the Qur’ân and the Hadîth a distinction is sometimes drawn between îmân and islâm (andsometimes ihsân, doing good). Îmân is the profession of faith from the heart and mouth, whileislâm is serving God, especially through salât and zakât. Islamic theological literature gives variousways of distinguishing the two, mainly by saying that îmân is of a higher or lesser value than islâm.Murji’ite theologians, as will be seen, gave îmân a meaning equivalent to “accepting the officialreligion”.Abû-Hanîfa, if we accept W. Montgomery Watt’s historical investigation, was the chief theologian ofMurji’ism and was not a heretic, but initiated the ideas that were to prevail in later Sunnism. Theproblem he faced was to find an intermediate position between rigorism and laxism. The Khârijiteand Mu'tazilite rigorist position caused moral anxiety, because by sin a person would be deprivedof îîmân and membership in the community.Anxiety was furthered by the Hanbalite practice of applying the phrase ““in shâ’’ Allâh” (If God wills)even to one’s own belief by saying, “I am a believer, if God wills”. They said this because theyconsidered obedience to the laws of the Qur’ân part of faith, and they were not so self-confident toassert that they had fulfilled all the requirements of the law.To correct the rigorist trend some people turned to a laxist position; for example Muqâtil ibn-Sulaymân (d. 767) said, “Where there is îmân, sin does no harm”. This statement of Muqâtil(member of the Zaydite sect) is what later Sunnite writers wrongly considered central in Murji’ism,and is the reason why they considered Murji’ism a heresy.Abû-Hanîfa’s solution was to define îmân as “confession (iqrâr) with the tongue and counting true(tasdîq) with the heart”. ÎÎmân is thus an intellectual acceptance of the basic tenets of Islam, anddoes not include fulfilling the Law. It is moreover the distinguishing factor between belonging to theMuslim community or not; someone either has îmân or he does not. Therefore, Abû-Hanîfaconcluded, it is equal among all Muslims and does not increase or decrease in degree. Faith staysthe same, and only practice can increase or decrease.The Hanbalites, including al-Ash'arî, opposed this definition of îmân, and asserted that faithincludes practice and does increase or decrease. They cited in favour of their view Qur’ân versessuch as 8:2: “Believers are only those whose hearts shake when God is mentioned; and when hissigns are recited to them, it increases their faith.” The Hanafite view, however, prevailed in laterSunnite orthodoxy.

25The Hanafite position fostered the belief that every Muslim is assured of ultimately enteringParadise, provided he does not sin against faith by shirk (worshiping other beings in associationwith God), according to Qur’ân 4:48 : “God does not forgive the associating [of any being] with him,but he forgives what is less than that to whom he wishes.” Even al-Hasan al-Basî held that anyonewho affirms the shahâda at his death will enter Paradise. The Hanafites evolved the teaching that asinner who has not denied the faith will suffer Hell fire temporarily. According to at-Tahâwî, “If Godwills, in his justice he punishes them in Hell to the measure of their offense, then in his mercy, atthe intercession of intercessors from among the people obeying him, he removes them from Helland raises them to his Paradise.” There are many Qur’ânic references to God’’s forgiveness (e.g.2:284; 3:129; 4:48,116; 5:18,40) and to intercession (e.g. 10:3; 19:87; 20:109; 34:23; 43:86). TheQur’ân does not explicitly mention Muhammad as an intercessor, yet the idea became stronglyrooted in Islam. The Wasiyya of Abû-Hanîfa seems to contain the earliest mention of it.Irjâ’ 3: `Alî is last in meritFinally, two other applications of the word irjâ’ can be mentioned to complete the discussion ofMurji’ism. One of them was al-Ash'arî’s transformation of the first application of the word to thecase of 'Uthmân and `Alî. For al-Ash'arî there was to be no deferment of judgement, but `Alîhimself was to be deferred to the fourth place, so that the chronological order of the first fourcaliphs was also that of merit. This view (initiated, as we will see, by the 'Uthmânites of the first`Abbâsid century) became the standard Sunnite view.Irjâ 4: Paradise is assuredThe other application of irjâ was a later transformation of the second application to the question offaith and practice. Since the word irjâ can also mean “to give hope””, ash-Shahrastânî gave theinterpretation that anyone who preserves his faith, even without practice, is assured of enteringParadise.1.3 The Mu'tazilite “intermediate position” of a sinnerMu'tazilism as a movement will be discussed in chapter 3. Yet the fourth of their five principles, thatof the “intermediate position” of a sinner, belongs to this chapter.Politically, the Mu'tazilites tried to reduce tension between the constitutionalist and absolutistfactions in the empire, represented by the proto-Sunnites and the proto-Shî`ites respectively. Theydid this by their compromise of recognizing the elections of all the first four caliphs, although theBasra and Baghdad schools differed concerning the superiority of `Alî. Abû-l-Hudhayl and most ofhis Basra followers held that the imâm must be chosen by election and should always be the bestman (afdal). He also maintained that the first four caliphs were each the best men at the time oftheir election, yet he refused to pronounce whether 'Uthmân was right or wrong during his last sixyears, and whether `Alî was right or wrong at the Battle of the Camel. Only al-Asamm varied fromthe general Basra view by holding that `Alî was never imâm. Bishr and the Baghdad school heldthat an inferior or less qualified man (mafdûl) may become imâm if there is some ground ('illa) forchoosing him. although Bishr recognized the election of all the first four caliphs, he had a definitepreference for `Alî, and judged that he was in the right in his disputes; this is because the Baghdadschool favoured the tendency of the proto-Shî`ites and the `Abbâsids towards absolutism.

26The meaning of the “intermediate position (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn) is that a sinner isneither a believer nor an unbeliever. In this life criminals should be punished, but neverthelessaccepted as Muslims. This position is anti-Khârijite and differs from Murji’’ism only by the fact thatthe Mu'tazilites taught that the sinner will be eternally in Hell in the next life if he dies unrepentant,whereas the Murji’ites held that for all Muslims eventual entrance to Paradise is assured.Later developmentsThe influential al-Ash'arî, who broke away from Mu'tazilism, maintained the Khârijite position thatfaith includes practice and therefore admits of degrees. He thought that the intercession ofMuhammad may gain the release of some Muslims from Hell, but that God may decide to punishsome Muslim sinners eternally in Hell. Nevertheless he did not go the whole way of the Khârijitesregarding the treatment of sinners in this life.Although Ash'arî is the father of Sunnî theology, most Sunnî theologians did not follow him onthese points. The view of al-Mâturîdî (d. 944) overruled al-Ash'arî, so that pure Murji’ism is thecommon teaching: Faith does not include practice, and no Muslim will stay eternally in Hell.2. DIVINE AND CREATED POWER: THE QUESTION OF QADARQadarismThe word qadar first of all means God’s determination of all events, including what people chooseto do. We would expect a Qadarite to be someone who maintains that God determines everything,but in fact the term historically came to mean the opposite, namely, one who asserts that qadarbelongs to man, and man himself determines his own acts, and not his Creator. Qadar in thissense refers to man’s power freely to choose.Later Sunnism considered Qadarism a heresy, but in Umayyad times the issue was not so clear,and the debate went on right within the general proto-Sunnite movement, although some moderateKhârijites also took part. The debate is similar to that within Christianity concerning free will andgrace. Does man require God’’s help to do or think anything good in his sight, or to do anything atall, even evil things? If so, how can man be responsible for what he does?Pre-Islamic Arabian thoughtThe pre-Islamic background to the discussion of qadar is important. In a land where rainfall andweather are completely erratic and people sometimes have plenty and other times nothing at all, itis natural for them to have a fatalistic outlook. Pre-Islamic poetry made an impersonal force out ofTime (dahr, zamân) or Days. This force determined everything, especially man’s ajal (term of life)and rizq (sustenance). On the other hand the Arabs honoured human achievement, especiallyvictory in battle, and took it as a sign of inherited excellence enabling a man to do wonderful things.The Qur’ânThe Qur’ân retains the notions of ajal and rizq, but teaches that these are determined by God, notan impersonal Time (cf. 45:23-25; 57:22); moreover God’’s decrees are not simply inevitable

27results of his omnipotence but also the execution of his designs of love and mercy for mankind. Inits teaching concerning judgement on the Last Day, the Qur’ân implies human responsibility. Thisteaching, however, must be reconciled with the teaching that God can forgive or punish sins as hewishes (cf. 2:284; 3:129; 4:43,116; 5:18,40) or forgive because of persons he has given permissionto intercede. Moreover God is said to “guide” (ahdâ) people or “lead them astray”(adalla) just ashe pleases (cf. 6:125; 16:93), and in the same way help them to succeed (nasara) or abandonthem (khadala). Other passages make God’’s guidance or leading astray dependent on people’sprevious good or evil actions (e.g. 2:26; 3:86).The Umayyad periodIn the Umayyad period the debate had political overtones. The Umayyad authorities favouredpredestinarian views in order to support their claim to divinely given authority. Their argument,especially as put forth by the poets Jarîr and al-Farazdaq, was that the Umayyads inherited thecaliphate from 'Uthmân as his blood-heirs. God decreed (qadâ) their authority and made them hisrepresentatives on earth. The Umayyads claimed to be the caliphs of God (khalîfat Allâh) and hisshadow on earth, in this way changing the word caliph from meaning “successor” (of Muhammad)to mean “deputy” as Adam was God’s deputy in Qur’ân 2:30, and David in 38:26; the Qur’ânspeaks of this generation as both God’s “deputy” on earth and “successor” of previous generations,6:165; 7:79,73; 10:14,73, 35:39). Everything the Umayyads did was therefore decreed by God andshould be accepted as such by their subjects. In this context Qadarites were considered opponentsof the regime, although in assessing their number we should be aware that the Umayyads tendedto brand any of their opponents as Qadarites, and later Sunnites tried to minimize the number ofUmayyad opponents who subscribed to Qadarism.The alleged founder of Qadarism is Ma'bad al-Juhanî, who took part in the rising of Ibn-al-Ash'athin 701 and was executed around 704; about all we know about him is that he had the reputation ofbeing the first to discuss the question of qadar. Another important man is Ghaylân ad-Dimashqî,who was a critic of the regimes of 'Umar ibn-'Abdal'azîz (717-20) and of Hishâm (724-3); he had toflee to Armenia, but was captured and executed. His followers, however, helped the reformistYazîd III to occupy the throne for a few months in 744. Ghaylân is reported to have combated thepopular opinion that evildoing is by God’s determination (qadâ wa-l-qadar). There were many moreproto-Sunnites of Qadarite sympathies, but later Sunnite reports give us few names and onlydescribe certain tendencies.One Qadarite tendency was to say that good actions are from God, but evil actions are from man.Al-Ash'arî tells a story making fun of a Qadarite named Maymûn: Maymûn had some money owedto him by Shu'ayb and demanded its repayment. Shu'ayb said to him, “I shall give it to you if Godwills.” Maymûûn said, “God has willed that you should give it to me now.” Shu'ayb said, “If God hadwilled it, I could not have done otherwise than give it to you.” Maymûn said, “God has willed whathe commanded; what he did not command he did not will, and what he did not will he did notcommand...” The dispute was then carried to Ibn-'Ajarrad, who was then in prison (from 723 to738), and he said in support of Maymûn, “We do not fix evil upon God.”Another tendency was to say that both good and evil actions are from man, yet through an ability(istatâ'a) or power (qudra) given to man by God.

28Still another tendency which said that man is the originator of both his good and evil actions gavethe explanation that God does not know beforehand what any man will do, because if he knewbeforehand he would be responsible. Al-Hasan al-Basrî, because of his standing, was claimed byboth Mu'tazilites (who agreed with Qadarism) and Sunnites as their forefather. His political actioncontributed support to Qadarism in that he criticized authorities, yet his repudiations of theuprisings of Ma'bath and Ibn-al-Ash'ath give the opposite impression. In his Risâla he explains thatthe circumstantial events of men’s lives designated by ajal and rizq are determined by God, yet godcannot be blamed for misfortunes, since they are for the punishment of evildoers or the testing ofgood people. Man, however is responsible for choosing good or evil, because God has given himthe power (qudra) to choose. Al-Hasan explained that God’’s determination (qadar is the same ashis command (amr), and that he influences human choice only by commanding good or forbiddingevil. Predestinarian Qur’ân verses such as 16:93, “God leads astray whom he wishes and guideswhom he wishes”, al-Hasan explains in concordance with other Qur’ân verses to mean, “Godsends astray the evildoers”; in other words, God’’s action always follows man’’s free choice of goodor evil. Regarding Qur’ân 6:35, “Had God wished, he could have guided them”, al-Hasan admitsthat God could compel men to believe, but he does not in fact do so. Al-Hasan al-Basrî’s position isthus fundamentally a form of Qadarism. The debate between the Qadarite identification of God’’swill with his command and the Determinist identification of his will with what actually happens isbased on an apparent conflict between God’’s goodness and his power. If God causes evil tohappen, then he is not good. If evil happens independently of God, then God is not all-powerful.Predestinarian views became less identified with support for Umayyad rule as it became weaker;so that the traditional Arab predestinarian outlook was able to reassert itself and pious men couldoppose Qadarism without appearing pro-Umayyad. The Hadîth movement in the early 8th centurywas strongly predestinarian. Determination of the circumstantial aspects of man’’s life (ajal andrizq) is expressed, for example, by the Hadîth: “What reaches you could not possibly have missedyou, and what misses you could not possibly have reached you.” Determination of human choice isexpressed in the following Hadîth: “[The Prophet said:] By God, one of you will work the work of thepeople of the Fire until there is between him and it less than an arm’s length, and the book [ofdestiny] will overtake him and he will work the work of the people of the Garden and enter it; andanother man will work the work of the people of the Garden until between him and it there is lessthan an arm’s length, and then the book will overtake him and he will work the work of the peopleof the Fire and enter it.” Still other Hadîths assert that if anyone dies without believing in God’’sdetermination of all things he will go to Hell. On the other hand, a very few traditions condemnfatalistic inactivity and urge people to action.Opposition to Qadarism also appeared, as later theologians relate, in the objection that it wasChristian-inspired. The stories of Christian influence on Ma'bath and others may be true, becauseChristianity does emphasize human responsibility (although the all-importance of grace is alsoaffirmed), yet the debate about qadar took place in an Islamic setting because of questions raisedby the Qur’ân itself, and the solutions proposed by all the parties had an Islamic form and usedQur’ânic concepts.

29Mu'tazilite QadarismWhen the `Abbâsids came to power in 750 Qadarism was transformed. It was no longer a symbolof political opposition, and was absorbed by the Mu'tazilite movement, which for a time wasofficially endorsed by the caliphs. Mu'tazilite Qadarism was expressed in their teaching of justice('adl), the second of their five principles, and “the promise and the threat”, their third principle.These principles assert man’s mastery over his own acts, on the basis that God would be unjust ifhe punished or rewarded people for doing things for which they were not responsible. TheMu'tazilites interpreted Qur’ânic phrases indicating God’s “leading astray” as his declaration thatsinners are astray; his “guidance” means the sending of prophets with warnings and promises, andhe gives “help” as a reward to those who are good or because he knows they will use it well. Inevery case predestination of human acts is avoided. The Mu'tazilites tried to explain humanfreedom by positing a power (qudra, quwwa, or istatâ'a) to act. This is not merely simultaneouswith the act, as the determinists said, but precedes the act. The Mu'tazilites did not define thispower precisely; it simply stood for the internal decision which precedes an external act. They wereconcerned with affirming that man is master of his external acts, not with giving a psychologicalanalysis of the freedom of the internal decision.Besides defending human responsibility, the Mu'tazilites tried to combat popular belief in thedetermination of ajal and rizq. In the case of murder, they said that the victim’s ajal was the timeGod foreknew that someone would kill him; in other words, free human activity is involved. TheMu'tazilites were bolder in denying the determination of rizq; they asserted, contrary to an-Najjâr,that a man who eats stolen food is consuming another man’’s rizq, and not his own, since God didnot determine the stealing.The Mu'tazilites’ critics confronted them with a series of problems. One of these concerned theconsequences of an act, because of the problem of responsibility for chain effects which may go oneven after the first agent is dead. If a man shoots an arrow at his enemy but dies before the arrowreaches, did a dead man kill a living man? Mu'ammar said that the consequences belong towhatever directly brings them about; thus the arrow killed the man. Bishr disagreed and introducedthe concept of tawallud, or “generated effects”, which for him all belong to the first agent; headmitted that the dead man killed his living enemy. Abû-l-Hudhayl said the same, but added theprinciple that a man is responsible only for the foreseen consequences of his action. Thepreoccupation of all these thinkers was to explain responsibility only for the external act, since “theman’’s intention (irâda) cannot be called killing until the arrow reaches the opponent and his spiritleaves him”Since the principle of justice implied that evil should not be fixed on God in any way, theMu'tazilites tried to answer various other problems. One was that had God given some peopleextra favour (lutf), they would not have gone to Hell. Bishr ibn-al-Mu'tamir admitted that, since Godis all powerful, he could always do something better than what he has done; he does no evil by notgiving all the favour he could give. Abû-l-Hudhayl and an-Nazzâm disagreed, and said God mustalways do what is best or perfect (aslah), although there are various ways of perfection he couldchoose from; whatever God does has to be interpreted as a best or perfect thing.

30Another problem was why does God let children and animals suffer, when they are not responsible.Some explained that they suffer for the benefit of others, such as the warning of adults, and theywill be compensated by being given entry into Paradise by a special act of God’s generosity.(tafaddul). This thought was developed by al-Jubbâ’î (d. 915), who maintained that God is bound todo what is best in matters of religion, since his command for men to believe in him would bemeaningless if he did not provide the means to obey it. The means includes the sending ofprophets to instruct and also the interior movement of a person’’s will to obey. The latter gift iscalled a grace (lutf) and it makes obeying God easier, yet it does not compel the recalcitrant nor isit strictly necessary for those who are inclined to obey. In fact, the more grace God gives, the lessthe human input and the less the reward. It would be better to let a man struggle on his own andearn a great reward than to have the way made easy by grace and thereby make him deserve lessreward.Abû-Hâshim (d. 933), son and successor of al-Jubbâ’î, reverted from his father’’s teaching aboutGod’s free generosity and returned to the older Mu'tazilite teaching that man believes in God andobeys him by his own efforts only and God is obliged to treat him according to the norms of strictjustice.A final problem is the eternity of punishment in Hell; what good does it do? Al-Iskâfî said thatsinners are punished to warn the sinners and unbelievers of this world. The Mu'tazilites’ replies toall these questions, however, were not very satisfactory, and their opponents continued to multiplyobjections and put them in an embarrassing state of defense.Ash'arite determinismDirâr ibn-'Amr (d.c. 800) was originally counted as a Mu'tazilite, but differed from them on thequestion of free will. He said that God determines man’s acts, but man “acquires” them, so that thesame action can be attributed to both God and man. The concept of “acquisition” (kasb), whichseems to have originated with Dirâr, became an important part of Ash'arite theology. Dirârexplained that man acquires his acts, and is therefore responsible for them, because they proceedfrom an ability (istatâ'a) which God creates in him enabling him to choose.Husayn an-Najjâr, who lived in the time of al-Ma’mûn, was a vigorous anti-Mu'tazilite anddeveloped many of the views of Dirâr. He is strongly deterministic whenever he speaks ofgoodness or evil in the world or in human choice. Thus he accepts the idea of acquisition (kasb),but says that the ability (istatâ'a) to act exists only at the time of the act, not before or after.Ibn-Karrâm (d. 869) was a sûfî and a preacher with many followers. Known as Karrâmites, thesewere influential chiefly in Persia. They did not have a great impact on the mainstream of Islamicthought, yet they contributed to a Sunnî consensus on some points. One of these was their view onistatâ'a which was the same as that held by an-Najjâr, just mentioned.The question of qadar is one of the focal points of al-Ash'arî’’s opposition to Mu'tazilism. Al-Ash'arîrepeats the idea developed by the above-mentioned anti-Mu'tazilite thinkers, that God determinesman’’s acts and gives him the power to act only at the time of acting. The power to act gives manthe appearance of freedom, but fundamentally he is not free, because the power does not causebut only occasions the act. Yet al-Ash'arî says that this power is the basis of kasb and gives him atitle to claim the act as his own.

31Atomistic occasionalismThe Ash'arite school developed the idea of determinism, basing it on the cosmic principle ofatomism. The idea goes back to pre-Socratic Greek philosophy and was developed by Democritus.It was introduced to the Muslim world by al-Kindî (c. 840) and taken up by Hishâm ibn-al-Hakam(d.c. 805) and Dirâr ibn-'Amr. Al-Bâqillânî (d. 1013) popularized atomistic occasionalism whichmeans that all physical beings are simply gatherings or clouds of atoms with particular qualities,and that all of these last only an instant and must constantly be recreated by God. They thereforehave no power to act on their own, but all apparent activity or causality that seems to be theirs isreally God’s direct action, and they are only the occasion. For instance, the sun does not causeheat and light, but God does so directly when the sun happens to be shining.The same idea was reiterated and systematized by al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111) and other Ash'arites.Muhammad as-Sanûsî (d. 1490) says in his al-'Aqîda al-wustâ. For the same reason, you becomeaware of the impossibility of anything in the world producing any effect whatsoever, because thatentails the removal of that effect from the power and will of our majestic and mighty Protector, andthis necessitates the overcoming of something from eternity by something which came into being,which is impossible. Therefore a created power has no effect on motion or rest, obedience ordisobedience, or on any effect universally, neither directly nor through induction. (n. 35)For that matter, food has no effect on satiety, nor water on moistening the land, growing plants, oron cleaning, nor fire on burning, heating or cooking food, nor clothing or shelter on covering orrepelling heat and cold, nor trees on shading, nor the sun and the rest of the heavenly bodies onillumination, nor a knife on cutting, nor cold water on diminishing the intensity of heat of otherwater, as neither has the latter in diminishing the intensity of cold in the former. Conclude byanalogy from these examples that whenever God acts in his ordinary way he makes somethingexist on the occasion of another. but know that it is from God from the start, without the otheraccompanying things having any intermediary or effect on it, neither by their nature, nor by a poweror peculiarity placed in it by God, as many ignorant people think. More than one sound imâm hasrecalled that there is agreement that whoever holds that those things produce an effect by theirnature are an unbeliever. (n. 39) The total lack of power in creatures applies also to human choice.The same as-Sanûsî maintains that man has a “power” to choose, but this power has no effect onhis act whatsoever. It merely gives him a feeling of ease and freedom, whereas in reality he isforced (n. 37). God rewards obedience and punishes disobedience by his own free decision, notbecause of any obligation of justice (n. 38). As-Sanûsî’s position is in line with Ash'arite theologicaltradition, even though Qur’ânic texts can be cited in favour of both human freedom and divinedetermination.The basis of Ash'arite thinkingWe have seen how Ash'arite thought is wedded to atomistic occasionalism ,but that is not the realstarting point of Ash'arism. The starting point is a particular understanding of the shahâda, thefundamental statement of Islamic belief. The shahâda begins: “Lâ ilââha illâ llâh”, “There is nodivinity but Allâh”. This is an exclusive statement and is meant to exclude the theoretical existenceof other divinities and the practical worship of such. The latter is the sin of shirk, associating otherdivinities with God. As the Ash'arites understand the shahâda, whatever pertains to God isexclusively his and cannot be shared with a creature. This applies particularly to the attribute of

32power. God alone is sovereign and powerful; there is no natural power in creation; otherwisecreatures would be part of God, which is the meaning of pantheism.Why do the Ash'arites say that nothing divine can be shared with creation? Briefly, it s becausethey think only in terms of Plato’s analogy of attribution. For Plato, only the ideal world is real; thesensible world is just a shadowy imitation, not really participating in the nature of the ideal world. Ifwe are to be consistent, such thinking should conclude that only the ideal world (or god exists, andeverything else is no-being, but neither Plato nor the Ash'arites theologians went that far.Aristotle completely rejected Plato’s theory of an ideal world, but did accept the existence of Godand of other spirits. Also, although eh did not carry his theological speculation very far, he laid thebasis for understanding how divine qualities can be shared with creatures. This is in his discussionof analogy in Book 5 of his Metaphysics. There he says that “things are one analogically whichhave the same relations as something else to another object”. In his commentary on this passage,Thomas Aquinas says that analogy can be taken in two ways: 1) Two things can have the samerelationship to a third thing, such as “healthy urine” which is a sign of health, and “healthymedicine” which is a cause of health; both are related to the health of an animal. 2) Two things canhave the same relationship to different things, such as calmness of the sea and stillness of the air;in this case we have four terms. In this passage Thomas set the distinction between analogy of“proportion” or “attribution” and analogy of “proportionality”.Applying this concept to God, Thomas maintained in his Disputed questions on Truth and hisDisputed questions on power that the analogy characterizing the relationship between God andcreatures cannot be one of attribution, because we do not say God is being and goodness becausehe is the cause of being and goodness in creatures, since this would imply that real goodness andbeing is principally in creatures and God must be defined in relationship to them. Rather it is theother way around. So Thomas opts for analogy of proportionality: As God has being, goodnessetc. in an infinite way, so creatures have these in a finite way. Any positive attribute observed increation may be applied to God in a “super excellent way”, provided it does not imply a defect orlimitation, such as materiality. Names such as “the Sun of justice” are not proper analogicalexpressions, but simply metaphors, and are sometimes categorized as “analogies of improperproportionality”.In the Summa theologiae and in the Summa contra gentiles Thomas passes over the analogy ofproportionality, which involves four terms, and returns to a revised version of the two term analogyof attribution. Using the same illustration of “health”, this time medicine is not defined as “healthy”merely because it cause health in an animal, but because it has a power to heal which is prior innature to the health that is in the animal. So, although our knowledge of God’s goodness stemsfrom our knowledge of created goodness, his own goodness does not consist merely in causinggoodness outside himself, but in possessing goodness essentially and in a more eminent way. ForThomas, then, both proportionality and attribution are two valid forms of analogy in language aboutGod.To look at the relationship of creatures to God exclusively in terms of analogy of attribution logicallyleaves no being or reality to creation. To see creatures as sharing in divine qualities in any way(See Wisdom 13:1-6; Romans 1:19-20, 2 Peter 1:4), we must make use of the analogy ofproportionality. That is what the Ash'arites failed to do.

333. AUTHORITY IN RELIGION SHÎ’ISM VERSUS SUNNISMShî`ismShî`ism, as well as Sunnism, contrary to the impression given by later Muslim historians ofheresies and Shî`ite writers, had no definite shape in the Umayyad period, and not even during thefirst century of `Abbâsid rule, that is, until the latter part of the 9th century. The movement we are todescribe, which does not correspond in every way to later Shîî`ism, can better be called proto-Shî`ism. This movement was intellectually quiet during the time of the Khârijite debates, yet we cannote four historical phases it underwent during the Umayyad period.The early Arab phaseThe early Arab phase encompassed the time of `Alî and his sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn. Shî`ite(meaning “partisan”) was likely the name by which the supporters of `Alî and his sons at that timecalled themselves. Even after the Khârijites left him, numbers of people still supported `Alî, but theywere not strong and numerous enough to overcome the opposition of both the Khârijites andMu`âwiya. After `Alî died in 661 and al-Hasan accepted the retirement Mu`âwiya offered him, thenext heir to `Alî’s claims was al-Husayn. He accepted no compromise, yet bided his time untilMu`âwiya’s death in 680. Al-Husayn’s bid for power led to the massacre at Karbalâ, but the longtermresult of his “martyrdom” was the devotion of Shî`ite Penitents over the centuries who havecontinued to lament al-Husayn’s death and give their total support to the Shî`ite cause.The revolt of al-MukhtârThe next phase began with the revolt of al-Mukhtâr in 685. He not only aroused the Arab Penitents(who repented having abandoned al-Husayn at Karbalâ), but also assured the future of Shî`ism bywinning a basis of support among the non-Arab Mawâlî. Al-Mukhtâr built his policy upon fiveprinciples: 1) the Book of God, 2) the Sunna of the Prophet, 3) vengeance for the family of `Alî, 4)defense of the weak, and 5) jihâd against evildoers. The first principle was aimed against Shî`iteextremists who tended to prefer the voice of the imâm to directions given in the Qur’ân. Thesecond principle may have been directed against the Khârijites, who accepted the authority of theQur’ân alone. The third principle was an appeal to the Arab Penitents, and was put into effect whenal-Mukhtâr executed those responsible for killing al-Husayn. The fourth principle echoes Qur’ân4:75, and is an appeal to the Mawâlî, who were “the weak” (mustad'afûn) or deprived members ofthe Muslim community. The fifth principle was an appeal to action, in opposition to those whowould wait indefinitely for God to send a messianic imâm.The original feature of al-Mukhtâr’s revolt was his claim to be acting on behalf of Ibn-al-Hanafiyya.This device became a precedent for future Shî`ism, when the imâm became a remote or hiddenpersonality imbued with superhuman or divine qualities. The task of managing day to day politicsand military operations, where human defects and mistakes are so evident, was left to someoneelse who acted as a “prime minister” and could be blamed for anything that went wrong. The latterdid not have to be of the family of `Alî or Muhammad in any sense.The fact that al-Mukhtâr acted on behalf of Ibn-al-Hanafiyya disproves the claim of later Shî`itewriters that their sect was in agreement from the beginning that the imâm, by divine right and

34Muhammad’s designation, must be a descendant of Muhammad through Fâtima and her husband`Alî, and then through their sons al-Hasan or al-Husayn. In proto-Shî`ism there was no such fixedteaching, but only a respect for the family of Muhammad, particularly for `Alî. Thus it was possibleto recognize Ibn-al-Hanafiyya as imâm, and also to give special honour to `Alî’s brother Ja`far andto Muhammad’s uncle al-'Abbâs. Proto-Shî`ite sentiments were built upon the Arab idea thathuman excellence is inherited and can be characteristic of certain families. That is why it waspossible for the proto-Shî`ites to collaborate with the `Abbâsids; both attributed a specialexcellence to Muhammad’’s clan of Hâshim in general.Traditional Arab ideas are responsible for attributing to the imâm special qualities or charisma on ahuman level. The Aramaean or Persian Mawâlî, however, are responsible for attributing to himsuperhuman or divine powers, in accordance with their tradition of divine kingship.A period of quietudeAfter al-Mukhtâr’s death came a period of quiet incubation. Ibn-al-Hanafiyya himself died in 700,and soon the idea spread, especially through the poet Kuthayyir and the Kaysânite sect (namedafter Kaysân, a supporter of al-Mukhtâr), that he was not really dead, but hiding on a mountainnear Medina where he is miraculously taken care of and protected until the day he should return asMahdî, or “divinely guided one”, and restore justice on earth. Legends about a hidden imâm, whichbecame a legacy of much of later Shî`ism, served the purpose of excusing people from challengingthe existing authorities; many proto-Shî`ites taught that the obligation of “commanding the right andprohibiting the wrong” applied only to jihâd of the heart and of the tongue, but not to jihâd of thesword until the appearance of the “speaking imâm” (al-imâm an-nâtiq). Proto-Shî`ism in fact wasquiet until around 740, when it became apparent that the Umayyads would not be able to restrainthe growing opposition to their rule.A revival of militancyThe revival of proto-Shî`ite militancy started with preachers of the 'Alid’s cause, and these rousedthe suspicion of Umayyad officials. One of them was Bayân ibn-Sim'ân, who preached in Kûfaclaiming that he was the representative of the imâm; yet four different versions exist of who thisimâm was: either 1) Abû-Hâshim, son of Ibn-al-Hanafiyya, or 2) Muhammad al-Bâqir, a grandsonof al-Husayn, or 3) Ja`far as-Sâdiq, son of Muhammad al-Bâqir, or 4) Muhammad an-Nafs az-Zakiyya, a great-grandson of al-Hasan. Bayân and a companion were executed by burning in 737.Another man, Abû-Mansûr, was executed in 742 after claiming to be both the agent and thesuccessor of Muhammad al-Bâqir. Muhammad al-Bâqir’’s brother Zayd also claimed to havesucceeded him as imâm and led a revolt himself in 740, but he was killed by the Umayyads withoutdelay. The Zaydite sect of Shî`ites, formed in the `Abbâsid period, was named after him. Anotherrevolt started in 744 by 'Abdallâh ibn-Mu`âwiya, a great-grandson of `Alî’s brother Ja`far; he waskilled in 747. The final revolt in which proto-Shî`ites took part brought the `Abbâsids to power.These facts show that many different men claimed to be the imâm in succession to `Alî, and nosingle one was unanimously accepted by the proto-Shî`ites, contrary to the assertion of laterShî`ites that a single line of imâms was always recognized. According to later Shî`ites the imâmswere: 1st) `Alî, 2nd) his son al-Hasan, 3rd) the latter’s brother al-Husayn, 4th) al-Husayn’s son `AlîZayn al-`Âbidîn (d.c. 712), 5th) the latter’s son Muhammad al-Bâqir (d. 731), 6th) the latter’s sonJa`far as-Sâdiq (d. 765), and 7th) the latter’s son Mûsâ al-Kâzim (d. 799), according to theImâmites, or his brother Ismâ`îl, according to the Ismâ`îlîs.

35To check the multiplication of claims to be the imâm or his representative, the idea was spreadduring the late Umayyad period that there was only one rightful imâm at any one time, and he gothis authority by appointment (nass) from the previous rightful imâm. Anyone who claimed to be theimâm’s military or political representative also had to be appointed (wasî). Because this idea wasso widespread, the `Abbâsids claimed for Muhammad ibn-`Alî, their first propagandist, appointmentby Abû-Hâshim, son of Ibn-al-Hanafiyya, as his successor.The early `Abbâsid periodFor the first century of `Abbâsid rule (750-850) we must still speak of “proto-Shî`ism”, since themovement had not yet taken definite shape. Proto-Shî`ites, especially of the important Kaysâniyyasect, supported the `Abbâsids’ seizure of power and may have accepted their claim of designationby Abû-Hâshim, son of Ibn-al-Hanafiyya. Yet when it became apparent that the `Abbâsids werecreating a dynasty for their family alone, many proto-Shî`ites were disaffected; they certainly didnot accept al-Mahdî’s claim that Muhammad had designated his uncle al-'Abbâs as Imâm. In spiteof revolts by many Shî`ite leaders, for the most part proto-Shî`ites evolved a kind of practicalaccommodation with the `Abbâsids.One such proto-Shî`ite group was the Râfidites, who were claimed by the later Imâmites as theforefathers of their movement. The name Râfidite comes from an Arabic word meaning “to reject”,and was given to them by their opponents because they rejected Abû-Bakr and 'Umar (and, ofcourse, 'Uthmân) as rightful caliphs. They also maintained that the imâm, or caliph, was not meantto be chosen by election, but by his predecessor’s designation. According to them, Muhammaddesignated `Alî as his immediate successor. Yet for long the Râfidites refused to decide whatseries of imâms followed `Alî. This was a safe policy, especially when al-Ma’mûn took the title ofimâm; al-Ma’mûn even permitted the Râfidites to defend their ideas in his presence. Nevertheless,before al-Ma’mûn’s time many Râfidites recognized some of the first seven Imâmite imâms andargued about who was the successor of the seventh imâm, Mûsâ al-Kâzim (d.c. 799). One group,called the Wâqifa (“stopper”), said that he was not really dead, but one day would return fromhiding. Another group, called the Qat`iyya (“the decisive”), said that he was definitely dead and thathis son `Alî ar-Ridâ succeeded him. Al-Ma’mûn favoured the latter group when he designated `Alîar-Ridâ his heir apparent in 817. After the latter’s death in the following year the Râfidites againargued about who was his successor. All these Râfidite debates could not have been about whowas the rightful caliph, for the `Abbâsids would tolerate no such pretender, but they must havemeant who was the head of the 'Alid family. The Kaliph would be glad to give such a man somerecognition in order to rally his supporters to the Kaliphal cause.Râfidite writers of the Qat`iyya branch, such as Hishâm ibn-al-Hakam (d.c. 805) and `Alî ibn-Mîtham (who lived a little later), were fundamentally supporters of the absolute power of the`Abbâsid caliphs. Their political absolutism was based on three theological points: The first wasthat succession to the caliphate goes by designation, not election. The second point was that mostof the Companions were unbelievers for having elected Abû-Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmân in place of`Alî; consequently all the Hadîth, which by this time had isnâds going back to these Companions,was worthless, and Hadîth masters should therefore have nothing to say in public affairs. The third

36point was the rejection of ijtihâd, or the attempt to develop and apply Sharî'a; the voice of theimâm, or caliph, was sufficient. This point was also aimed against the power of the `ulamâ.Another proto-Shî`ite group was the Zaydites. This movement was named after Zayd ibn-`Alî, agrandson of al-Husayn, who revolted against the Umayyads in 740 and was killed within a shorttime. The revolutionary members of this movement seem to have maintained that only a Fâtimid (adescendant of al-Hasan or al-Husayn) could be imâm, and that if there is a qualified claimant ofthis line people are obliged to follow him from the moment he takes up the sword. Such Zayditeclaimants were Muhammad an-Nafs az-Zakiyya in 762, whom we have mentioned, Muhammadibn-al-Qâsim in Khurasân in 834 and Yahyâ ibn-'Umar in Kûfa in 864.There were many non-revolutionary Zaydites, however, who were ready to accept the `Abbâsids asimâms and enjoyed the support of al-Ma’mûn, who wanted to use them to promote an absolutistinterpretation of the caliphate. Their position was basically a compromise between the Rââfiditesand the proto-Sunnite `ulamâ. They elaborated a theory of the “imâmate of the inferior” (imâmat almafdûl–– see chapter 1 on Mu'tazilite support for this theory). This meant, to please the Râfidites,that `Alîî was superior and that the imââm should preferably be a descendant of `Alîî and Fâtima,but it was legitimate to choose a less worthy ruler; so they recognized Abû-Bakr and 'Umar, andsome were prepared to recognize the first six years of 'Uthmân’s rule. Moreover they said theimââm was to be chosen by election. This point put the non-revolutionary Zaydites on the side ofthe constitutionalists, and was meant to please the proto-Sunnite Hadîîth masters and jurists. Thecompromise, however, did not work, because the Râfidites’ dearest teaching, that the imââm ischosen by designation, was not accepted; and the `ulamâ would always have to fear that animââm would overrule their interpretations of the law.The Zaydites did not become a definite sect with a system of laws all their own until theyestablished two states, one to the north of the Islamic world, on the south shore of the CaspianSea, and the other in Yemen. By 850 Zaydism disappeared from the heartlands of the caliphate,and survived only in these two states. These outlying Zaydites made no attempt to spread theirteachings; so Zaydism remained outside the mainstream of Islamic thought.The maturation of Shî`ismAt the beginning of the 2nd `Abbââsid century (850) Shîî`ism was a greatly fragmented movement,but by the early 10th century the various Shîî`ite groups had come together into two mainmovements, the Ismâ`îlites and the Imâmites, and one fringe movement, the Zaydites.Ismâ`îlism takes its name from Ismâ`îl the son of Ja`far as-Sâdiq (the latter d. 765), whom theIsmâ`îlites hold to have been the seventh imâm rather than his brother Mûsâ al-Kâzim. Althoughfor this reason they are called the Seveners, they believed in a continuing sequence of imâms whoremained hidden while the movement was propagated by missionary agents (dâ'î). These agentshad their first success around 894 when they led the Ismââ`îîlite sub-group known as Carmathians(Qarâmita) to establish a state in eastern Arabia with its centre in Bahrayn. This state served as abase for some effective propaganda within `Abbââsid domains which the caliphs had difficulty incontaining. The eastern Arabian Carmathian state lasted to the beginning of the 12th century.Ismâ`îlism had greater success in North Africa where the agent Abû-'Abdallâh became powerfulenough with Berber support to allow the hidden imââm to come out in the person of the claimant'Ubaydallâh, who took the title al-Mahdî and started the Fâtimid dynasty. The Fâtimids conquered

37Egypt and moved the capital from Mahdiyya on the Tunisian coast to the new city of Cairo. TheFâtimids sent agents to preach in `Abbâsid lands and came close to winning these lands to theircause. But the movement had already peaked with the conquest of Egypt and dwindled as a worldpolitical force thereafter. Sunnite theologians, however, came to grips with Fâtimid arguments onlyin the 11th century. Ismâ`îlism still survives in Bombay and central India and in scatteredcommunities in the Middle East; it is also followed by Indian Muslims in Kenya. The current leaderis Agha Khan, who lives in Paris.The name Imâmism came into use only around the year 900, although Imâmites claimed earlierorigins in the Râfidites and others before them to lend legitimacy to their movement. Imâmites differfrom Ismâ`îlites mainly in their adherence to Mûsâ al-Kâzim (d. 799) as the 7th imâm rather thanhis brother Ismâ`îl. Furthermore, while the Ismâ`îlites held that the successors if Ismâ`îl werehidden and unknown except to their chosen agents, the Imâmites held that the series of imâmscontinued publicly until the 12th imâm, Muhammad son of Hasan al-`Askarî ibn-`Alî. The latter, the11th imâm, died in 874, and his son Muhammad is alleged to have disappeared miraculously in878. Thereafter the Imâmites have maintained allegiance to a series of hidden imâms. Thelegitimacy of this line they say derives from the designation which Muhammad the Prophet made to`Alî, and he and each imâm thereafter made to his successor. The Imâmites’ allegiance to theirown imâm did not mean that they planned a coup against the `Abbâsids. First of all, by this timethe `Abbâsid caliphs had lost most of their power anyway, and their position was not coveted;secondly the acceptance of a hidden imâm excused them, like the Râfidites before, from activepolitical involvement. Today Imâmite Shî`ites dominate Iran, where they became politicallyprominent in the 16th century.Like the Ismâ`îlites, the Imâmites regard Abû-Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmân as usurpers and theCompanions who supported them as partners in crime. They therefore repudiate the Sunnitecollections of Hadîth which include these men in the isnâds and accept instead the collection of al-Kulînî (d. 939). This contains over 15,000 Hadîths, with the name of the imâm in the isnâd of eachHadîth. The name of the imâm, according to the Imâmites, is what guarantees the Hadîth’sauthenticity, since he is an infallible teacher. This difference regarding the fundamentals ofreligions set Shî`ites far apart from Sunnite Muslims and at the same time stimulated the Sunnitesto a greater awareness of their own identity.The basic principles of Shî`ism, as it matured, are: 1) that the imâm must be a descendant ofMuhammad through `Alî and Fâtima; 2) that the imâm is immune from sin and error, so that hisinterpretation of the Qur’ân and his commands must be followed; 3) the imâm gets his authority byappointment from his predecessor, not by election; 4) the imâm has long ago gone into hiding, butsometimes acts through a representative who, in popular opinion, has the same authority; 5) jihâdto establish the rule of the imâm is necessary only when the imâm or his representative appearsand calls for action; 6) the martyrdom of `Alî and Husayn show the way to salvation, and everyShî`ite should be happy to shed his blood in the same way.SunnismAs in the case of Shî`ism, Muslim writers since the 10th century have presented a picture of a fullyformed Sunnism going right back to Muhammad. The assumption in both cases is that Islamic

38teaching is completely unchangeable, and that it is passed on in the form of a faithfully preservedQur’ân and Hadîth guaranteed by correct isnâds. In fact, in the Umayyad period we can only talk of“proto-Sunnism” or “the general religious movement”, to use the term of W.M. Watt. The differencebetween Sunnism and Shî`ism is fundamentally a question of inspiration: whether it applies only tothe composition of Scripture or also to its interpretation.The Umayyad periodIf there were scholarly and political differences within the general religious movement, was thereconsensus about anything? A general feature of proto-Sunnism, as opposed to Khârijism andproto-Shî`ism, was the acceptance of all the first four caliphs and Mu`âwiya as well. This neutralityregarding the past did not extend to each of Mu`âwiya’s successors, however, as can be seen inthe revolt of Ibn-az-Zubayr and various other revolts. Nevertheless, proto-Sunnites generallyaccepted Umayyad rule until its last years, when they nearly unanimously supported the `Abbâsidrise to power.A typical figure of the proto-Sunnite movement was al-Hasan al-Basrî (642-728). Born in Medina,he went to Basra around 657, and served as a soldier in Afghanistan from 663 to 665. He thenturned to secretarial and scholarly work and made his home in Basra. There he served thegovernor al-Hajjâj and helped with his project of pointing the Qur’ân text. For some reason hebroke with al-Hajjâj and went into hiding until al-Hajjâj’s death in 714; afterwards he served as qâdîof Basra. Politically he supported the Umayyad rulers in that he faithfully carried out hisresponsibilities and actively discouraged the many revolts he was invited to endorse. Yet, as aforefather of the Sûfic movement, his concern was God’s judgement, and he was not afraid tocriticize the authorities, warning them of hell fair; he also preached moderation in the use of worldlygoods and intolerance of “innovators” or heretics. Al-Hasan al-Basrî’s teachings in many waysanticipate later Sunnism, but he never thought out many questions with the precision of laterSunnites.The early `Abbâsid periodLike Shî`ism, Sunnism was still fluid in the early `Abbâsid period, and can better be called proto-Sunnism. Anti-Shî`ism manifested itself in the 'Uthmânite movement. This was a group opposed tothe Râfidite exaltation of `Alî. The name goes back to Umayyad times, when 'Uthmânites werethose who sided with the cause of 'Uthmân and repudiated `Alî; these also became supporters ofthe Umayyad rule. In `Abbâsid times the repudiation of `Alî was continued by a small grouppromoting a cult of Mu`âwiya, but the 'Uthmânites of `Abbâsid times had a more moderate position.As expressed by al-Jâhiz (who was also a Mu'tazilite), 'Uthmânism first of all meant the recognitionof all the first four caliphs, with the qualification that the chronological order of these caliphs wasalso the order of merit. Thus 'Uthmân is preferred to `Alî, who comes last in order of merit. Thecaliphs gain their authority, moreover, by election, not appointment.Politically, 'Uthmânism of `Abbâsid times was no longer a call for Umayyad rule, but was arepudiation of the absolutism implied in the Râfidite cult of `Alî (and encouraged by al-Ma’mûn),which attributed to the imâm immunity (`isma) from error (= infallibility) and from sin (impeccability),and gave the imâm’s decision priority over any interpretation of the Qur’ân or appeal to Hadîthmade by the `ulamâ. The 'Uthmânites are, therefore, forerunners of Sunnism because of their

39insistence on the priority of the Qur’ân and Hadîth and because of the teaching which theyoriginated concerning the order of merit of the first four caliphs.Sunnism takes final shapeUp to the 2nd century of `Abbâsid rule (850) there was widespread difference about many basicmatters which are now considered essential to Sunnism. Only in this century (850-950) did aconsensus emerge, which most Muslims today think goes back to the time of Muhammad. Theword “Sunnism” (originally meaning “beaten path”) became the name for the new orthodoxy. Itsearliest general use is in the works of al-Ash'arîî, who uses the terms ahl as-sunna wa-ashâb al-Hadîth (“people of Sunna and followers of Hadîth”), ahl as-sunna wa-l-istiqâma (“people of Sunnaand the right way”), and ahl as-sunna wa-l-jamâ`a (“people of Sunna and the community”-“themajority”).The consensus which distinguished Sunnism from Shî`ism concerned chiefly the order of merit ofthe first four caliphs. In accepting the chronological order as the order of merit, as opposed to theShî`ites who said that only `Alî was the rightful successor to Muhammad, Sunnites affirmed thefundamental righteousness of the historical Muslim community, at least in its early years, andthereby validated the Islamic beliefs and practices for which this historical community stood. Thesebeliefs and practices were formulated in the Hadîth literature, with each Hadîth resting on andisnâd, or chain of authorities going back to Muhammad. Because most of these isnâds containnames of Companions of Muhammad whom the Shî`ites did not regard as genuine Muslims,because they were supporters of the first three caliphs or even opponents of `Alî, the Shî`itesrejected the whole corpus of Hadîth literature which the Sunnites accepted, and compiled separateHadîth collections of their own.Qur’ânic studiesWe can now examine the status of the Qur’ân, tradition and law within the general religiousmovement of the Umayyad period, then see how they developed in the Sunnism of the `Abbâsidperiod, assessing as well the influence of the government and of Sûfism on theology. Qur’ânicstudies in the Umayyad period were not yet a separate specialized discipline, but the same menwho devoted themselves to the study of law and of tradition also led the way in Qur’ânic studies. Itmay seem surprising that the Qur’ân, which is the first authority in Islam, should become thesubject of a debate which could be settled only by an appeal to tradition, but the history of the textmakes this clear. We cannot take time her to evaluate the historicity of the so-called 'Uthmânedition of the Qur’ân. But by the time of 'Uthmân, if not earlier, the order and canonicity of the sûrasas well as the consonantal text was established. This text did not contain vowel marks or even thedots which differentiate many consonants from one another; for example, only a dot makes thedifference between “H”, “j” and “kh”, or between “b”, “y”, “n”, “t” and “the”. These marks were firstadded to the text only at the time of the caliph 'Abdalmalik (685-705) - at same time that Hebrewand Aramaic (Syriac) were provided with similar diacritical marks. The general al-Hajjâj promotedthe pointing of Arabic to make the 'Uthmânian edition of the Qur’ân more legible as a means ofcombatting the non-'Uthmânian texts used by Ibn-az-Zubayr’s followers and other opponents of theUmayyad regime. Nevertheless it took nearly two more centuries before a full system of wiringcontaining all the vowels and other diacritical marks was generally accepted. The history of theQur’ân text, then, indicates that there were as many varieties of readings as there were Qur’ân

40scholars, even though some degree of uniformity emerged within particular schools or cities.Fundamentally Sunna, or living tradition, together with consensus (ijmâ'), determined which readingwas acceptable; and Sunna, as will be seen varied from school to school and place to place.In the `Abbâsid period Qur’ânic studies gave Sunnism further definition. Interpretation (tafsîr)gained some stability in this period especially because of the voluminous commentary of at-Tabarî(d. 923). The major development, however, came in the field of qirâ’. This refers to the selection ofvowels and other distinguishing marks to be inserted into the consonantal text. A system of writingvowels, doubling consonants etc. had been devised, as seen above, in the time of 'Abdalmalik (d.705), but a great deal of variety continued to exist in the vowels used in Qur’ân recitation.Trying to meet the general desire for uniformity, Ibn-Mujâhid (d. 935) collected many traditions ofQur’ân recitation and came to the conclusion that complete agreement would be impossible, sincedifferent cities were attached to different readings. He achieved a limited success, however, byreducing the various sets of readings to seven basic sets which were all to be considered equallyvalid. To justify accepting seven readings, he appealed to a Hadîth which states that Muhammadwas taught to recite the Qur’ân according to seven “letters” (ahruf). The seven readings werebased, like Hadîth, on chains of transmitting authorities (isnâds). Of the seven authorities heselected, three were from Kûfa and one each was from Mecca, Medina, Damascus and Basra.Yet even these seven readings were not enough to accommodate the diversity of acceptedreadings; so the readings of two disciples of each of the seven authorities were acknowledged aslegitimate variants. In this way the number of legitimate readings became fourteen. Ibn-Mujâhid’swork was challenged by some scholars, but it soon caught on and in various court cases scholarswere condemned for using other traditional readings (as those of Ibn-Mas'ûd or Ubayy ibn-Ka`b)not included in the seven or fourteen, and for proposing that any reading which was grammaticaland made reasonable sense could be accepted without regard for Tradition.HadîthThe Hadîth collections which we have today were written down only in the 9th century. Thesecollections present problems of authenticity even to conservative Muslim scholars. During theUmayyad period certainly there were related traditions concerning things the Prophet said or did,but these were few and fragmentary, and not used to settle theological or legal disputes. Thepractice of giving and isnâd, or chain of authority, did not exist until the time of az-Zuhrî (d. 742),according to one account, and such chains were only partial, citing one or another notable scholarwho used a particular tradition in his teaching. Only later, under the influence of political andtheological controversy, were the isnâds completed backwards to a Companion of the Prophet orthe mouth of Muhammad himself. If the position of Hadîth was not particularly important at thistime, Islamic tradition in a wider sense, nevertheless, was very influential in all aspects of life, andthere were numerous full time scholars devoted to explaining and developing this living tradition.The Hadith movement in the first `Abbâsid century also saw the formulation of some basicpositions which became part of later Sunnism. Sunna, as we saw above, meant the “beaten path”,and thus “normative custom” or “standard practice”. It included the Qur’ân (but was laterdistinguished from it) and the practice of Muhammad, his Companions and their successors. In itsearly stages Sunna grew as a result of the ijtihâd (individual reasoning, or original thinking) of these

41Companions and the following generations of Muslim scholars, as their thinking was accepted byconsensus (ijmâ') of scholars. Ijtihâd at first simply stood for considered personal opinion (ra’y,istihsân), but this gave rise to many disagreements and criticism; so that the secretary ibn-al-Muqaffa' vainly urged al-Mansûr to impose a revised uniform Sunna on the whole empire. Juriststhen tried to make their legal reasoning more systematic, and so gave more emphasis to themethod of analogy (qiyâs); new cases were solved in the light of previous cases which had acommon ground. Even this method, however, came under criticism because it did not provideuniform permanent solutions to legal problems, and opponents to such reasoning appealed insteadto the authority of early Muslim masters and eventually to Muhammad himself. Before they wouldaccept any practice they required a Hadîth, or verbal tradition, stating something that Muhammadsaid or did to authorize such a practice.Ash-Shâfi`î (d. 820) was the man who assured the final victory of Hadîth over living tradition andany form of reasoning. By insisting on a Hadîth equipped with ad complete isnâd going back toMuhammad wherever the Qur’ân is silent about a particular matter, he established a totally newapproach to the sources of faith and practice. Sunna was no longer in the fourth place, theculminating result of the Qur’ân, ijtihâd and consensus, but was transferred to the second place,just after the Qur’ân. It thereby lost its wider meaning of living tradition, and becameinterchangeable with Hadîth.Consensus and qiyâs became the third and fourth principles, but were very much subsidiary to thefirst two. Consensus, for ash-Shâfi`î, as opposed to earlier theory and later Sunnite theory, was notthat of scholars, but of the whole Muslim community, and was limited to their agreement about theconclusions of qiyâs reasoning. The fourth and weakest principle, qiyâs, was the only form ofijtihâd ash-Shâfi`î would allow; it was a form of argumentation consisting of applying Hadîth to newsimilar situations. If the whole community could agree about the conclusion of a qiyâs argument,the conclusion would have the added force of consensus, but to find consensus of the wholecommunity about something not in the Qur’ân or any Hadîth is so rare in ash-Shâfi`î’’s system thatit would practically be eliminated as a source of law.The only change later Sunnites made in ash-Shâfi`î’’s scheme was to redefine consensus as theagreement only of the scholars of a particular generation, and to apply it not simply to the results ofqiyâs argumentation, but primarily to the acceptance of the Qur’ân and Hadîth (in so far as thevarious collections of Hadîth are accepted). Ash-Shâfi`î was not as careful in his own use ofHadîth and qiyâs as his theory demanded; frequently he gives a Hadîth from hearsay or without aproper isnâd and violates his own rules of qiyâs. The realization that not all accepted practicecould be justified by a Hadîth with an isnâd gave impetus to the invention of a new type of Hadîth,the mutawâtir, or “widely-transmitted” Hadîth. This is one which does not have a proper isnâd, butreflects widely accepted practice; the assumption was that Muhammad must have sanctioned sucha practice, since so many people could not be mistaken.In the second `Abbâsid century the authoritative position of Hadîth gave impetus to the collection ofHadîth and the formulation and critique of isnâds. Shortly, after sifting the hundreds of thousands ofHadîths then in circulation, al-Bukhârî (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875) each produced a collection withthe same title, al-Jâmi' as-Sahîh (“the sound collection”). Four other collections appeared soon

42afterwards, the Sunan (“sunnas”) of Ibn-Mâja (d. 886), of Abû-Dâwûd (d. 888) and of an-Nasâ’î (d.915), and the Jâmi' of at-Tirmidhî (d. 892). These six collections came to be accepted asauthoritative by practically all Sunnite Muslims, although they were subject to some criticism,especially Ibn-Mâja, for some time.Besides these six collections, respect was also given to the Musnad of ad-Dârimî (d. 869), theMusnad of Ahmad ibn-Hanbal (d. 855), and the Muwatta' of Mââlik ibn-Anas (d. 795). The Musnadof Ibn-Hanbal, in spite of his great repute, was not included with the six authoritative collectionsprobably because of its inconvenient arrangement of Hadîths according to the men who relatedthem rather than by topic. Mâlik’s Muwatta', although containing many Hadîths, was written beforethe time of ash-Shâfi`î, and therefore does not have the same concern for isnâds and whether apractice goes all the way back to Muhammad. As a legal work it is content to quote distinguishedjurists or even Companions of Muhammad, not worrying whether their opinions were innovations ornot.The accepted collections of Hadîth resulted in a unified Sunna throughout the Sunnite world. Thiswas in contrast to the situation before ash-Shâfi`î, when each major town had its own Sunna.Legal studiesLegal practice was the area where these scholars particularly developed Islamic tradition. Duringthe lifetime of Muhammad a considerable amount of legislation took shape, particularly in theQur’ân, but also in the precedents set by cases the Muhammad settled on his own authority. Bothforms of legislation, however, were for the most part circumstantial and did not constitute acomplete legal system even for their own time. They nevertheless were a beginning of the “beatenpath”, or sunna, which future generations would follow and beat further.After the death of Muhammad the entirely new situation of a far-flung empire forced a vastdevelopment of legislation which was both new and somehow in continuity with the past. Sunnawas in continuity with the past in that its ideal and intention was to follow the spirit of Muhammadand what he would have done in such new circumstances. It was new because it originated fromdecisions of the caliphs, from public opinion, or from the considered personal opinion (ra’y) ofscholars or from what they thought reasonable and good (istihsân). Accepted scholarly opiniondiffered from place to place, and it soon became evident that there was no one uniform Sunna, butthat the schools of Medina, Kûfa, Basra, Damascus etc. each had its own Sunna, representing theideal practice of the place, even though actual practice fell short of the ideal. From conflictsbetween these schools and also between majority and minority parties in a single city theregradually emerged opposition groups which did not accept the identification of Sunna or traditionwith established custom, and appealed to the authority of Hadîth instead. Only then did Hadîthmultiply and become and important branch of study, and that was in the `Abbâsid period.The second `Abbâsid century saw the formation of the four legal schools or rites (madhhab) ofSunnite Islam which have lasted to the present day. During the first Islamic century different legalpractices grew up in the different cities of the Islamic world, practices which became the Sunna ofthese cities and were eventually formulated in Hadîth. Just as the collections of Hadîth are thework of certain great scholars, so also legal practice was systematized and popularized by certaingreat jurists who dominated their own towns and gained followers in many other places as well.

43The somewhat liberal Hanafite school, named after Abû-Hanîfa (d. 867), prevailed in Kûfa and isnow followed in Lower Egypt, Western Asia, Pakistan and India. Kûfa also had the rival school ofSufyân ath-Thawrî (d. 778) which died out after a short time. The Mâlikite school, named afterMâlik ibn-Anas (d. 795), prevailed in Medina and is now followed in Upper Egypt, North and WestAfrica. The Shâfi`ite school was named after the Hadîth master ash-Shâfi`î (d. 820), who originallybelonged to the Medina school but developed his own legal system, which gained a following inCairo and also prevails in Indonesia. The Hanbalite school, which follows its founder Ahmad ibn-Hanbal (d. 855) in emphasizing Tradition and opposing the use of reasoning, is followed innorthern and central Arabia by the Wahâbîs. Several other schools formed during this period butdid not last long.All these schools, even those with an earlier history, took definite shape as a result of ash-Shâfi`î’sfixing the role of the Qur’ân, Hadîth, Ijtihâd and Ijmâ'. These four roots of law (usûl al-fiqh) servedas reference points for argument among the schools and a way of bridging their differences. At firsteach school considered the others heretical or at least erroneous, but as discussion among themproceeded they came to tolerate one another. By at least the year 1300 any of the schools wasconsidered a legitimate option for Muslims to follow, although an eclectic choosing of some pointsfrom one school and some from another was frowned upon.Government influenceGovernmental pressure had minimal influence on the formation of Islamic theology. Thegovernment intervened if there was a clear abandonment of Islam, but tried to enforce doctrinalassent only in matters it considered affecting public security or vital interests. In the case of al-Ma’mûn’s mihna (inquisition) the point of insisting on the createdness of the Qur’ân (to bediscussed in chapter 5) was its connection with the Zaydite (Shî`ite) theory of the absolute power ofthe caliph, which al-Ma’’mûûn wanted to maintain. At this time of theological controversies peopleeasily used takfîr (declaration of being an unbeliever) against their opponents. In the trial of theSûfî al-Hallâj this did not lead to the court’’s condemning him to death until the additional charge ofzandaqa was made. This originally meant the Manichaean dualism held by many Persians, butlater came to mean any doctrinal error threatening the security of the state. Even when the courtscondemned the use of Qur’ân readings not included in Ibn-Mujâhid’s list, the reason seems to havebeen to preserve public order in worship, not to define a matter of religion.In Islam there is nothing comparable to a doctrinal Magisterium, or teaching authority, such as isfound in traditional Christian Churches which have ecumenical councils, bishops’’ synod or thepapacy. In Islam doctrinal definition can only come by consensus (ijmâ'). Some say that thisconsensus must be of all Muslims, others that it need only be of the `ulamâ’, which is equallydifficult if not impossible to achieve; some also say that any consensus thus achieved is valid onlyfor its generation, and may be overturned by dissent in another generation. Consequently, apartfrom the uncontroverted meaning of certain essentials expressed in the Qur’ân, there is no strictorthodoxy in Sunnite Islam, only more common or pervasive beliefs and practices for which manywriters claim consensus, but their opponents often contest. In such cases we can only speak of theprevalent or majority viewpoint, or the sunnite view, remembering that there are variant viewswhich are not strictly heretical.

44SûfismSûfism has sometimes been credited, by Louis Massignon for instance, with an important influenceon the formation of Sunnite theology. Yet no significant points of Sunnite doctrine can be traced toSûfic inspiration. Sûfism is a movement concentrating on personal experience in religion. It has itsmystical aspects in personal prayer often associated with altered states of consciousness, such astrances and visions; it also has a social dimension in that it has been organized in various orders orbrotherhoods (tarîqa) with an initiation rite and different stages of mystical initiation under theguidance of an elder (shaykh). Such orders at times were a refuge for people disgusted with thecorruption prevailing in a society that claimed to be Islamic. Yet, true to their Islamic nature, theywere not limited to purely spiritual purposes, but also served social and economic needs and attimes became combat forces to rectify injustices or infringements against the Islamic order ofsociety.As could be expected, Sûfism lent itself to many different expressions, ideas and practices.Towards the year 900, at the same time that Qur’ânic, Hadîth and juridical sciences were takingshape, Sûfism was given a formal theoretical foundation in the writings of al-Junayd (d. 910) andal-Hallâj (d. 922). The status of Sûfism in Islam was not clear until the time of al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111).In the meantime it suffered suspicion and at times persecution at the hands of the theologians andjurists. As a whole, however, the movement was tolerated, possibly because of its opposition toShî`ism.Like Shî`ism, Sûfism was based on experiential divine enlightenment. But, whereas Shî`ismrestricted visionary experience and divine inspiration to the imâms or members of the family of `Alî,Sûfism extended the validity of this experience to ordinary Muslims. In so doing, Sûfism alsochallenges “fundamentalist” Sunnism as well, which closes all divine inspiration with Muhammad,leaving scholarship – Qur’ânic, Hadîth and legal studies –– as the only way to get at the messageof revelation and the reality it represents. Sûfism offers direct access to the divine reality as well asinspired enlightenment about many aspects of his revealed word.4. REVELATION AND REASONThe relationship between revelation and reason became a subject of debate as a result ofexposure to foreign tought in the Abasid period. Only at this time did Persian and Greek influencehave a major impact on Muslim thinking.Persian InfluenceDuring the Umayyad period the Arabs maintained a position of supremacy, but the growing numberof non-Arab converts, called Mawali, particularly of Persian extraction, could not be long ignored,and by their support the Abassids came to power. Large number of educated PersianZoroastrians, who were the backbone of the pre-Islamic Sasanian administration and thecustodians of Persian culture, entered Islam. Educated converts were few in the Greek culturezone, either because many cultured people fled before the invaders or because those whoremained were more strongly attached to Christianity. The Abassids were not only obliged tocompensate the Mawali by giving them equal status with the Arabs, but also had to depend on the

45Persian Mawali for the administration of the islamic empire, particularly as Secretaries or civilservants.Persian political traditions changed the style of government, making the kalif more regal, aloof andinclined to absolutism. This change was fostered by translations, especially those by Ibn-al-Muqaffa`, of Persian literature and books concerning government. Persian also was absorbed intoIslamic tradition at this time, while Greek and Roman history remained largely ignored, becausecomparatively few educated Greek speakers became Muslim.A more threatening aspect of Persian influence was the fact that many of the educated Persianswere more attached to their traditional culture than to Islam. They were accused of zandaqa, orirreligion. Ibn-al-Muqaffa, for example, wrote a book criticizing Muhammad, Islam and the Qur’an;this was likely one reason for his execution by al-Mansur. Apart from the accusation of zandaqa,the Persian secretarial class found themselves the rivals of the Proto-Sunnite `Ulama, the mastersof Hadith and jurisprudence. They expressed their disdain for the `Ulama through the Shu`biyyamovement (from shu`ub, “people”), which glorified the culture and the achievements of non-Arabs,especially Persian, people of the empire and belittled arabic Qur’anic and religious literary style.Ibn-al-Muqaffa, who was the best master of arabic style in his time, was in the forefront of theShu`ubiyya movement. For Islam what was at stake was not just the question of literary style oreven some doctrinal points, but the fundamental question whether Islam would absorb andtransform the conquered nations or the conquered nations would absorb and transform Islam.Arabic culture is essential to Islam, and the challenge of Persian zandaqa and Shu`ubiyya forcedthe Arabs or Arabized Muslims to develop an Arabic religious culture of high quality. Al-Jahiz(d.869) and Ibn-Qutayba (d.889) were two men who answered the challenge by combining goodarabic literary style with a traditional Islamic outlook.Another aspect of the challenge of zandaqa and Shu`ubiyya trends was the political contextbetween people of constitutionalist or of absolutist persuasion. The Ulama, who included Persiansas well as Arabs, represented the constitutional block, because they were the interpreters of theQur’an and the hadith which were the constition of the Empire. The secretaries , who were joinedby some Arabs, particularly from Yeman of Proto-Shi`ite sympathies, represented the absolutistblock.The Kaliphs found it advantageous to tap the strong points of both blocks. In general, they willwelcome an acceptance of their absolute power, but had to check the exclusively `Alid trendamong the Shi`ites and ant-Islamic and anti-Arab trend among the secretaries. We saw how al-Mamun attempted to win the Shi`ites by nominating Ali ar-Rida as his heir apparent and adoptingwhat amounted to the zaidite compromise, which allowed the best Hashimite (including himself) tothe be recognized as an Imam. By another move, the adoption of the Mu`tazilite teaching that theQur’an is created, al-Mamun attempted to win the absolutist sympathies of the Shi`ites and thesecretaries and check the power of the `Ulama. The teaching that the Qur’an is the uncreatedspeech of God implied that it was sacred and unchangeable in all its implications, as interpreted bythe `ulama, whereas to say that it is created implies that its provisions may overruled by the decreeof an inspired imam. Likewise the Mu`tazilite Qadirite position squared with the teaching that theQur’an is created, because the historical events mentioned in the Qur’an would have beendetermined from eternity, and room would be left for free human choice.

46Greek philosophical influencebefore considering Greek influence, we must remark that Islamic systematic theology, or Kalaam,did not originate solely from interaction with Greek thought, but had already been prepared by thegrowth systematic juridical science and the method of qiyas. Qiyas, Schachtobserves, did notcome from Greek thought, but from Jewish exegetical science. Theologians who took and interestin Greek thought, however, had a juridical background.Greek thought was unique in the ancient world up to the time under consideration, it alone reacheda scientific level. It was not all scientific, nor were its scientific theories valid in their entirety, but itsmethod and outlook were scientific, in that it attempted, first, empirically to ascertain facts about thesubject under enquiry and secondly to analyse these facts in relation to their proper causes,whether in logic, mathematics or natural science. The Persians, Egyptians and others hadremarkable achievements in astronomical observations, building, etc. which required considerablemathematical understanding, but their mathematics was not formally demonstrative in terms oftheorems, and remained on a pre-scientific level.The early Christian Fathers took an interest in philosophy when they came into contact with theGreek community of Alexandria, which had an old and flourishing school. The Greek of Alexandriawere won over to Christianity in the 2 nd century by attraction of Christ as the incarnation of divineWisdom, as early Christian apologetes presented him. The school of Alexandria, however, did nothave deep roots among the Coptic speaking Egyptians, and when the Arabs conquered Egypt, theGreek philosophers and theologians left Egypt. Around 718, the school moved to Antioch in Syria,where philosophical and theological learning was more flourishing. In pre-Islamic times Christianschools developed in Syria and Iraq, which gave instructions in syriac (Aramaic) language.Especially in Gondeshapur, in Iraq, the chief Greek philosophical treatises had been translated inthe syriac and much original literature was being written. We must note, however, that theNeoplatonic form of Greek philosophy was dominant in these shools.Greek logical, physical and metaphysical enhanced the analytical perception of Christian theology,even though these notions were not always accurately or adequately applied to the questionsChristian theology was facing. In their use of Greek philosophy Christian theologians emphasizedthat it was only an instrument for explaining the Christian message; it was not to determine thecontent of Christian theology.When the Arab Muslims conquered Egypt, Syria and Iraq they largely avoided the existing schoolsand educational system. They were suspicious of anything non-Arab, and thought this learningwas either anti-Islamic or superfluous, since all that was worth knowing was in the Qur’an. In spiteof this prevalent attitude, some Muslims took an interest in philosophy, for several reasons:1. Muslims engaged in religious debate with Christians and found themselves in the defensivewhen Christians used philosophical learning to bolster their position, particularly about theimplication of the term “Word of God”, applied by the Qur’an to Jesus (4:171). Many Muslimsdecided to learn some philosophy in order to answer the Christians.Muslim interaction with Christian theologians at this time has not been thoroughly studied. Yet thediscussion between educated Muslims with St. John of Damascus (d. 749), his disciple TheodoreAbu-Qura (d.826)) and the Nestorian Catholicus (Bishop) Timothy I (d. 823 at the age of 95) arewell known. For Christians such debated were mostly defensive, since Muslims were protected

47from conversion by the death penalty for apostasy and by the teaching that Jewish and ChristianScriptures are corrupt and unreliable. The latter teaching was based on Qur’anic passages suchas 2:75-79 and 5:13-15, which refer for forging, distortion, concealing and effacing of theScriptures. The Qur’an is clear to what extent such distortion (tahrif) affect the scriptural textsthemselves, but various Hadiths warn Muslims against reading Jewish or Christian books. Also,according to at-Tabari (d.923), the earlier Qur’an commentators held that the Bible as a whole iscorrupt. At-Tabari himself rejected this view, as did al-Baydawi (d. 1388). Such partial acceptanceof the Bible may have begun during the first Abassid century, when Muslims were looking forpassages to prove that Muhammad was predicted in the Bible according to Qur’an 61:6 and 7:157.At the beginning of the Abassid period, around 782, the Nestorian Timothy I mentions only threepassages used by al-Madhi to prove his point, namely John 15:23, 16,1 and Isaiah 21:9, anddeuteromy 18:18. Yet a century later, Ibn Qutayba (d. 889) and others were able to quote manypassages. Muslim scholras generally, however, have not been prepared to accept the Bible exceptin so far as it agrees with the Qur’an, and even when they seem to accept certain passages theiracceptance is often only hypothetical, for the sake of arguing with the opponents.In discussing with Christian theologians, Muslim scholars would certainly have met manyphilosophical notions and observed how they were relevant to theological problems. Yet directcontact of Muslims with Greek philosophy was more important. This came about partly through theconversion of some educated people who had a Greek intellectual background, and partly from theinterest some Muslims took in philosophy with the encouragement of the Kaliphs.2. The second reason is that Muslims, especially the rulers, desired the advantages ofphilosophical learning. Philosophy, we must keep in mind, at that time meant all human sciences,such as astronomy, mathematics, medicine and technology.3. The third reason is that the Kaliphs, for a time found it politically convenient to support thephilosophers, because they were associated with the secretarial class of civil servants who weremostly Persian and attached to their traditional culture more than to Islam; this class of peoplewere rival to the Ulama, constitutionalist religious scholars who considered themselves theproprietors of Qur’anic learning and hence of the legislation which must guide the Kaliphs in rulingthe Islamic Community.Accordingly, the Kaliph al-Mamun (reigned from 813-833) established in Bagdad the Bayt-al-Hikma(house of wisdom), which as a translation and research center for philosophy, a kind of universitywhere Muslim and non-Muslim scholars freely mingled. Iraq became the intellectual center of theMuslim World. So that the Christian Alexandrian school moved again from Antioch to Haran around850, where the Sabians ) a religious sect), had a philosophical school. It moved to Bagdad around900. A number of important Christian Schools in Iraq taught theology, medicine, mathematics,physics and other branches of philosophy. The principal Greek scientific works had beentranslated into Syriac, and this was the language of Isntruction in these schools. To make thiswork accessible to readers of Arabic, al-Mamun maintained a team of translators at the Bayt al-Kikma. As a result, a vast amount of translation was done, mostly by Christians.The environment created by al-Mamun permitted the rise of the first notable Muslim philosopherand the only one of Arab descent: al-Kindi )800-866). He had a huge library and mastered all theGreek sciences available. Neoplatonism with some correction such as creation form nothing rather

48than natural emanation, to him seemed in harmony with Islamic revelation. Al-Kindi influenced theMu`tazilites, the first philosophical theologians of Islam, who also had the official support of the`Abassid Kaliphs until 849.The religious scholrs and Hadith-Master, Ibn-Hanbal, was persecuted by the `Abassids for notsubscribing to the Mu`tazilite view of the createdness of the Qur’an. The hostile reaction of theHanbilite people of Bagdad led the Kaliph al-Mutawakkil in 849 to expel the Mu`talites andphilosophers from his court, both these groups continued to write and study on their own outsidecourt, while a more traditional group of theologians gained official favour. Al-Ashari (873-935), whotook over the leadership of this group, continued to use the rational methods and philosophicalconcepts of the Mu`tazilites and the philosophers, but did so in defense of conservative traditionalpositions. He stood in contrast to Ibn-Hanbal and the Hanbalistes, who wanted to stick to theQur’an and Hadith and avoid rational arguments and philosophical terminology altogether.The rise of KalamMuslim religious scholars and other ordinary devout Muslims generally kept well away fromChristian schools and the “foreign sciences” they taught. Their attitude was one of suspicion ofanything non-Arab and also an assurance that all is important to know is in the Qur’an or isexplained in Islamic religious sciences. Anything else is either anti-Islamic or superfluous.Therefore those Muslims who took an interest in Greek thought and sciences were suspect and cutoff from the mainstream of Islamic intellectual life. Becoming like a sect to themselves.Only a few daring Muslim theologians entered the court circles of Harun ar-Rashid and al-Mamun,where for some years Muslim and Christian philosophers were freely mixing, and Christiantheologians wre sometimes to be seen. The result of this contact was a new kind of theologycalled Kalam. This word means “speech”, and was used by critics who called this kind of theologyjust a “talk”. The aim of Kalam was to provide, with the help of philosophical analysis, a thematic orsystematic presentation and defense of Islamic teachings. It was used first in debates with non-Muslims, and afterwards brought into disputes between differing Muslim theologians or schools ofthought.Al-Kindi wrote about many topics which were not related to theological debates, such as logic,ethics, mathematics, astronomy, meteorology and medicine, but some of his writings dealspecifically with with notions which were central to Mu`tazalite positions on ceratin questions.Some of these notions were: 1. The atom (indivisible part), which was key to predestinarianoccasionalism, which the Mu`tazilites rejected; 2. essences of bodies (jawahir al-ajsan), related tothe same question; 3. Nature or quidity (mahiyya). Which was used in the discussions of God’sattributes; and 4. ability to act (istata`a), which was used in the discussion concerning free will.These notions were discussed among philosophers and theologians well before the time of Al-Kindiand the Mu`tazilites, certainly during the time of Harun ar-Rashid, but the relationship between al-Kindi and the Mu`tazilites shows how far the influence of philosophy on Kalam had progressed.A few prominent Mutakalimun (practitioners of Kalam) who made inovative theological speculationwith philosophical concepts were: Hisham ibn-Hakam (d.805), Dirar ibn-`Amr (a contemporary ofthe latter), Bishr al-Marisi (d. 833), and Husayn an-Najar (of the same time).

49The new theology , or Kalam, was not well received by a large body of traditional religious scholarsbecause of its use of non-Qur’anic philosophical concepts. The Hanafite judge, Abu-Yusuf (d.798),equated it with zandaqa. The Hanbalite school was the most opposed to Kalam, as it was tophilosophy, and al-Ashari, who had a Hanbalite background, had to write a defense of hisinvolvement in this study.Although the philosophical movement in the Islamic world produced great men who contributedmuch to Western thought, this movement, as noted above, was an isolated counter-culture in itsown home. Nevertheless, at two points of time it had an important influence on Islamic theologicalthought. The first time was during the reign of Harun ar-Rashid and al-Mamun; the second wasduring the life of al-Ghazali (d.1111). In between this time there was virtually complete isolation,and the concepts and problems brought into Islamic theology prior to 849 remained the same untilal-Ghazali’s time, three centuries later. Except for these two periods, the theologians were happyto avoid the philosophers , and the philosophers developed some theses that were irreconcilablewith Islamic revelation.Some philosophers of the `Abassid periodTo indicate the importance of the philosophical movement, some notable philosophers or scientistscan be pointed out: Qusta ibn-Luqa (d.919), a translator, Abu Bishr Matta (d.940), a translator andlogician; Thabit ibn-Qura (d.910), a mathematician; Sinan (d.942), son of the latter, amathematician and astronomer; an-Nayrizi (d.921), a mathematician and authority on Euclid,known to the West as Anaritius; Abu-ma`shar (d.886), an astronomer known to the West asAlbumasar; al-battani (d.929), an astronomer, known to the West as Albategnius; ibn-masara, aSpanish metaphysician and Sufi.Another philosopher of this time is Muhammad ar-Razi (865-932). He was most famous as aphysician, but also wrote on ethics and metaphysics; for him philosophy took a place of religion.He advocated that the philosopher should keep away from political matters and devote himself tocontemplative scientific pursuits. One point in which he deviated from Islam is that, since all menare equally endowed with reason, prophets are not necessary.Al-farabi (875-950), however, held the contrary view that all things emanate from God in ahierachichal pattern. Also, since God is immaterial, he should know only the general nature ofmaterial things and not individual particular things, such as the actions of individual men; al-farabiwas accused of holding God’s ignorance of particulars because it accords with his principles, buthe avoided drawing the conclusion publicly. The first head of the ideal state is a prophet; othermen with lesser qualities succeeded him. The Kaliph should be a man of wisdom, and hence aphilosopher, a role which in al-farabi’s time could also coincide with that of a Shi`ite Imam.Ibn-Sina (980-1037), known to the Latins as Avicenna, was once of the greatest Muslimphilosopher. Of Persian and maybe Turkish background, he mastered all available learning beforethe age of 18, and was particularly skilled in medicine. He read Aristotle’s metaphysics 40 timesand could not understand it until he came across a commentary by al-farabi. Ibn-Sina servedvarious princes in the fragmentized islamic Kaliphate of his time and upheld the role of a prophet inthe foundation of an ideal state. He did not theorize, however, as al-farabi did, on the role ofsuccessors of the prophet, fatimid propaganda was at that time disturbing the realms loyal to the`Abassids.

50In metaphysics, ibn-Sina maintained that God is a pure and simple being, as opposed to thecomposite being of creatures, yet, following Plotinus’ Tgheology of Aristotle (which he believed tobe Aristotle’s), he taught a creation as necessary and eternal emanation, rather a free act of God.Ibn-Sina maintained the immortality of thye soul (even without personal agent intellectual), yet,thinking that happiness consists in seeing God without the nuisance of the body, he opposedIslamic teaching about the resurrection, or gave it only a symbolic interpretation. Moreover, hetaught that Qur’anic language, which is loaded with metaphors, is suited only for ignorant people;theologians go one step higher by trying to understand the deeper meaning of Qur’anic language,but the philosopher (who is also a Sufi) stands at the apex of human understanding. The positionof a philosopher would seem to be superior to that of a prophet, yet, ibn-Sina, sometimes explainsprophesy as an exalted form of human philosophical thinking.Such philosophy could hardly be called Islamic, although its proponents claimed to be Muslims andoften twisted Qur’anic passages to suit their position. Louis Gardet is right in saying that it is“essentially of platonic-Aristotelian inspiration. In Arabic language, with Islamic influence. It is notsurprising that the theologians opposed the philosophical movement; the chief combatant was al-Ghazali (1058-1111), who will be discussed later.The Mu`tazilitesThe word Mu`tazilite means “someone who withdraws”. But withdrew from whom, for whatreason? Muslim historians relating Mu`tazilite accounts of their origins give various versions. Oneis the Wasil may have been the originator of the theory of the” intermediate position” regarding thestatus of a sinner, the five principles of the Mu`tazilites containing this theory were not fullydeveloped in his time, nor were they agreed upon by group of people as a unified set of tenets.A more accurate history, if we follow the reconstruction made by W. M. Watt, is that the termMu`tazilite was most likely first applied by proto-Shi`tes in a pejorative sense to those who wereneutral regarding Ali, neither supporting nor opposing him. Later, Qatada called `Amr ibn-Ubaydby this time, and he accepted it in a favorable sense, since in the Qur’an Abaraham (19:48) and themen of the Cave (18:16) are praised for withdrawing from the worship of false gods. Finally, whenAbu-l-Hudhayl and his followers agreed upon the “five principles”, the looked back to Wasil and`Amr for their ancestral legitimacy and adopted their name of Mu`tazilites, since these also taughtthe”intermediate position” of a sinner.Some Mu`tazilites fabricated an even better account of their ancestral legitimacy. According totheis account, “Abu-l-Hudhayl received the “teaching of justice and unity” from Uthman at-Tawiland the latter told him that he had received it from Wasil who had it from Abu-Hashim ibn-Muhammad ibn-Hanafiyya who had it from his father Muhammad ibn-al-hanifiyya who had it fromAli who had it from the Messenger of God, to whom Gabriel had brought it from God”.What is clear is that Abu-Hudhayl is the founder of Mu`tazilism properly so-called, yet he adoptedthe name which already existed and had been applied to Wasil and `arm, who could be claimed assuitable forefathers of the movement, giving it respectability and legitimacy.Basra and Bagdad were the two centers of Mu`tazilites. Abu-Hdhayl was the successor of Dirar asthe leader the Basra theologians. Although he died in 842, he was not well in his later years, and

51did most of his greater works before 800. Other Mu`tazilites who followed him in Basra were: an-Nazam (d.836), Mu`amar (d.830), al-Asamm (d.816), Hisham al-Fuwati (d.830), al-Jahiz (776-869,a black man, probably from Ethiopia, and master of arabic literature), and Ash-Shaham (d.880).The Bagdad school, which constituted the court theologinas of al-Mamun and his two successors,was founded by Bishr ibn-al-Mu`tamir, who may have learned Mu`tazilism from Mu`amar in Basra,and then lived in Bagdad during the reign of al-Mamun. Bishr criticised some of the view ofmembers of the Basra school and was a supporter of al-Mamun’s declaration of Ali ar-Rida as hissuccessor. Other Bagdad theologians were: Thumama (d.828), a man of great political influence),Ibn-abi-Duad (776-854, grand qadi and administrator of the Mihna under al-Mu`tasin), al-Murdar(840, an ascetic and student of Bishr), Ja`far ibn-Hrab (d.800, a follower of al-Murdar, who was atthe court of al-Wathiq), Ja`far ibn-Mubashir (d.848, a companion of the previous Ja`fa), and al-Ishkafi (d.854), a companion of the two Ja`fars).The political implications of Mu`tazilism concern the questions of faith and practice and werediscussed in chap.1.Mu`tazilism is distinguished by its five principles: 1) Tawhid (unity), 2) Adl (Justice), 3) al-wa’d wa-lwa’id(the promise and the threat), 4) al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn (the intermediate position),and 5) al-amr bi-l-ma`ruf wa-n-nahy’an al-munkar (commanding the right and forbidding thewrong). The last three principles are probably historically earlier. Numbers 3 and 4 have beendiscussed in chap. 1. Number 1 in chap2, and number 2 will be discussed in chap.5.Number 5 was interpretaed to oblige action to the extent that one has the opportunity and ability todo so, whether by tongue or sword. Thus an armed revolt against an unjust ruler is obligatorywhen there is a likelihood of success. On the other hand, a just ruler should be supported; for theMu`tazilites this meant the `Abassids.Throughout these five principles there is the supposition that human reason is capable ofdiscovering truth about God and what is good or bad for man; revelation may help to understandthese things better, but it does not take away reason’s autonomy. Sunnite theologians rejected theautonomy of reason (except inpreliminary matters of faith, such as the existence of God) and mostother Mu`tazilite teachings, but adopted many of the ideas and methods of argument theMu`tazilites had taken over from Greek philosophy. This was the permanent contribution theMu`tazilites made to Islamic theology.Mu`tazilism survived into the 2 nd `Abassid century even after it lost the official support it had duringthe mihna. Some important Mu`tazilites of this period are al-Jubbai (d.915), Abu-Hashim (d.933),and al-Kabi (d.929 or 931). Some of their teachings will be mentioned in chap.5.HanbalismMu`tazilism was opposed by the break-away Ash`arite school, but even more fundamentally byHanbalim, which aslo opposed Ash`arism. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.855) has been mentionedalready, he was important not only in the area of Hadith and jurisprudence, but also, even thoughhe rejected Kalam, for this theological positions. These are summarized in the creed (`aqida), ofwhich number 16 and 17 interest us in here.

52Religions is only the Book of God, the athar (sayings or acts of pious men), the sunan (standardpractices), and sound narratives from reliable men about recognized sound valid Traditions (akbar)confirming one another...until that ends with the messenger of God and his companions and thefollowers and the followers of the followers, and after them the recognized Imams (Scholars) whoare taking as examplars, who hold to the Sunna and keep to the athar, who do recognize heresyand are not accused of falsehood or of divergence (from one another). They are upholders ofQiyas (analogical reasoning) and Ra`y (personal opinion), for Qiyas in religion is worthless, andRa`y is the same and worse. The upholders of Ra`y and Qiyas in religion are heretical and inerror, except where there is an Athar from any of the reliable Imams.He who supposes that Taqlid (following an authority without criticism) is not approved and that hisreligion is not thus following anyone...only wants to invalidate the Athar and to weaken knowledgeand the Sunna, and to stand isolated in Ra`y and Kalam and heresy and divergence (from others).Although this creed is aimed mostly against the Ash`arites, it applies as well to the Mu`tazilites. Itcondemns their Kalam for abandoning the primacy of the Qur’an and the Hadith, and secondly foranthropomorphism (tashbih) in positing analogies between God and creation. The second criticismis opposed to the Hanbalite approach to God of bi-la-kayf (do not say how).Hanbalism was very important not only theologically but also politically. In bagdad the masses ofpeople followed the Hanbalite leaders and could hold the kaliph to ransom whenever they madeany demands.Two famous medieval Hanbalite writers are Ibn-batta (d.997) and Ibn-Taymiyya (d.1328).Ash`arismAl-Ash`ari (873-935) was the culminating figure in the development of Sunnite theology. Hestudies Law, and is claimed bi both the Hanafite and the Shafi`ite schools (although in thebeginning the Hanifites opposed Ash`arite kalam). He studied Mu`tazilite thology under al-Jubba’iand might have succeeded him as master in Basra school had he not abandon Mu`tazilism about912. The story of his conversion comes in various versions, all of which associate it with threedream he had during the month of Ramadan. In the first dream the prophet Muhhamadcommanded him to defend the teachings handed down from himself in the Hadiths. In the secondhe inquired how he was carrying out his command. Al-Ash`ari then gave up the study of Kalamand devoted himself interely to the Hadith study. Thereupon in the third dream the prophet angrilysaid he commanded him to study the hadith, but not to give up Kalam.Another story of Al-Ash`ari’s conversion is a supposed debate he had with Juba`i about threebrothers, one who was a good believer, the other a wicked unbeliever and the tird died as a boy. Ifonly those who earn paradise will enter it, then only the first brother will go in. It seems unjust thatGod did not let the third brother grow up and earn paradise. If it is said that God foreknew that theboy will be wicked, then he should have made the second brother die before he became wicked.Al-Ash`ari supposedly abandoned Mu`tazilism because of his inconsistency in this problem. Yetthe story is suspect because it was attributed first to Al-Ash`ari only in the 14 th century by as-Subki(d.1370), secondly it did not argue against al-Jubba’i, whose teaching about lutf, or God’s freegenerosity, was close to al0Ash`ari’s ideas, but against some of the Mu`tazilites of Bagdad, andthirdl because there are other stories about his conversion and the possible factors influencing it.

53Al-Ash`ari’s theological style relies heavily on comparison of Qur’an verses and to some extentHadiths, in addition to rational arguments. This might be surprising after hearing how theHanbalites condemned him for sellinf out to philosophical thinking. But the stories of Louis Gardetand Georges Anawati, R.McCarthy and Michel Allard have pointed out that al-Ash`ari is very muchin the style of the Mu`tazilites who relied heavily on Qur’an quotations to support their rationalsrguments.Al-Ash`ari agreed with the basic teaching of Ahmad ibn-Hanbal. The only difference was his use ofrational arguments. This led him to treat the questions of god’s attributes, which the Hanbalitesavoided, and to look for human analogies to explain how God can will evil. He drew comparisonwith the case of a man who did not resist murder in order not to be guilty of sin himself and in thisway willed his own death. Similarly Joseph , in the Qur’an story , preferred prison to adultery withhis master’s wife, and in this way willed an act of injustice upon himself. Such comparisons wererational in a way, but still simplistic and lacking philosophical precision.Al-Ash`ari’s importance should not obscure the fact that there were theologians before him(especially Ibn Kullab) who defended Sunnite positions with rational methods. Moreover al-Ash`aridid not dominate the scene of Sunnite Kalam during his lifetime, but had many influentialcompanions, such as al-Qalanisi. Yet al-Ash`ari lft writings which were the inspiration of latertheologians who therefore looked to him as their father. Some ofhis immediate pupils were Abusahlas-Su`luki of Nishapur (d.979), Abu-l-Hasan al-bahili of Basra, and Abu-Abdalad ibn-Mujahidof Basra and Bagdad (d.980), different from Ibn Mujahid, the Qur’anic scholar). These, however,are not well known.Al-Marurudi (d.944), although regarded fromn the 16 th century as equal in importance to al-Ash`ari,is likewise little known with regard to his life, and most early biographical dictionaries do not evenmention him. This may be because he lived in Samarqand, far to the East, and the Hanifites whocultivated his theology were not much interested in biographies or the history of the theologicalmovements and heresies. Al-Maturudi entered into prominence when the Seljud and OttomanTurks brought Hanafism to the forefront.Al-Maturudi differed from al-Ash`ari in three areas, discussed in this work: the first is therelationship between faith and practice (chap 1). The second is Qadar (chap 2), and the thirdconcerns the attributes of God (chap5).Better know are three second generations Ash`arites, namely al-Baqilani (d.1013), ibn-Furak(d.1015) and al-Isfara`ini (d.1027). These were all students of al-bahili, while al-baqilani alsostudied under ibn Mujahid, and ibn-Furak under as-Su`luki.Concerning the question of scriptural authority, al-baqilani developed the concept of mu`jiza, ormiracle. A controversy had arisen as a result of the Sufi who were reputed to have visions orrevelations and to work miracles. These, however, were considered to be the exclusiveprerogatives of prophets. Al-baqilani distinguished between a mu1`jiza, a miracle adducedevidence of prophecy, confounding any attempt to imitate it, and a karama, a wonder or anextraordinary work of god produced at the prayer of a holy man but not as evidence of a propheticmission. Applying the notion of mu`jiza to the Qur’an, of all its aspects (style, teaching content,

54prophesy of the future etc.) Al-baqilani saw its superior literary quality as the aspect, which defiesimitation.On the same question, al-Isfara`ini held that the Qur’an was miraculous only because Godobstructed any attempt at imitation, not that it is inimitable in itself.Al-Juwayni (d.1085) was another important Ash`arite who lived in Nishapur in Seljuq period. Hehad to go into exile to Makka and Madina— hence gaining the name imam al-haramayn (Imam ofthe two shrines). With the accession of Alp-Arslan to the Seljuq throne, the famous Nizamalmukwas appointed Wazir. The numerous Nizamiyya schools he founded were centers of ash`arism,and to head the one in Nishapur he called al-Juwayni back from exile. Al-Juwayni was atheologian in his won right, but is known chiefly as the teacher of al-Ghazali.Al-GhazaliAt the age of 19 Abu-hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali began to study under al-Juwayni at Nishapur,mastering all branches of legal and theological studies. When his master died in 1085, he joindedthe scholars surrounding Nizamalmuk. His good performance in debates won him an appointmentas chief professor at the Nizamiyya College in Bagdad in 1091, at the age of 33. He lectured onJurisprudence to classes op to 300 students. In the meantime he set himself to reading the worksof al-Farabi and ibn-Sina, and wrote a polemical aatck on their views in his Tahafut al-Falasifa(Incoherence of the philosophers).Psychological tensions, together with fear of hell fire, came to his crisis in 1096, producing aspeech impediment which prevented him from lecturing. He then decided to make a pilgrimage toMakka, but spent a year of retreat in Damascus and Jerusalem before doing so. Back in his hometown of Tus, he adopted a kind of monastic sufi life together with some young disciples. Heregained his health and peace of mind and in 1106, the beginning of the 6 th Islamic century, he wasurged by his friends, including the son of Nizamalmuk, to return to teaching. They were convincedhe was the Mujadid (renewer of religion) expected by Tradition at the beginning of each century.Back at Nishapur he taught until 1110, the year before his death.Al-Ghazali autobiography, al-Munqidl min ad-dalal (deliverance from error), tells how in his crisis hesought relief from his scepticism by testing the various movements of his time: philosophicaltheology (Kalam), philosophy, Batiniyya (Isma`ili Shi`ism), and Sufism, He discovered that onlySufism could and did deliver him from his breakdown and restore him to health.The fullest exposition of al-Ghazali’s thought is in his legtly Ihaya’ulum ad-din (revival of religioussciences), a kind of Summa theologiae. In this and many other works he developed Ash`aritetheology and made a lasting impact in several areas:. Many new philosophical elements were absorbed into theology, particulrly most of Aristoltelialsyllogistic logic. The result was an enrichment of systematic theology.. He helped kill philosophy as an autonomous study, at the least in the East. In spite of his ownexposure to philosophy, al-Ghazali was the view that, of its branches, medicine, arithmetic andsome other basic skills should be learned by a few individuals who would serve the community(fard al-kifaya). Logic and metaphysical study of God (as done by Aristotle) was absorbed intotheology. Natural science was considered either false (as astrology or magic or any recognition ofnature and causality in the world) or useless (detailed knowledge of physical universe).

55Only in Spain, which was always independent of the `Abbasids, first under the Umayyads, thenunder the Murabits (after 1086), and finally under the philosophy-loving Muwahhids (1147-1225),did philosophy continue to be studied for some time to come, although with intermittentpersecution.Al-Ghazali also attacked indiscriminate study of theology and Islamic legal science, insisting thatonly a few people should have specialized knowledge of these subjects.. His anti-Isma`ili polemic neutralized Fatimid propaganda..He reconcilied Sufism with Sunnite practice, 1) by allowing Sufi to talk about Love of God whichbrings nearness (muqaraba) to him, but not union or indwelling, 2) by demanding the Sufi’subjection to the Shar`ia as the advance of their tariqa towards the haqiqa, and 3) by insisting ontheir disavowal of any claims to work strick miracles (mu`jizat), which is the prerogative of aprophet. They could only work Karamat by God’s permission.. He softened the rivalry between the Hanbalites and the Ash`arites and among the four legalschools by insisting that scholars should not be accused of apostasy for differences of views innon-essentials.In spite of these achievements, al-Ghazali’s fame in the next two centuries came not from histheology but from his earlier contribution on the field of jurisprudence. Today, however, he isregarded as the greatest of the medieval Muslim Theologians.Philosophy in Spain after al-GhazaliThe earliest philosopher of note in Spain was ibn-Bajja (d.1138), known to the Latins asAvempace. Much indebted to al-Farabi, he studied all branches of knowledge and knew Aristotlethoroughly. His ethical treatise, Tabdir al-Mutawahhid (Guidance of the solitary), urgesphilosophers to keep aloof from ordinary society and be friends with one another, indicating theisolated stutus of philosophers in Spain of that time.Abu-Nakr M. ibn-Tufayl (in Latin Abubacer, d. 1185) was a physician familiar with all branches ofscience, but he is famous for his etical novel Hayy ibn-Yaqzan which contasts the philosophicaland sufic wisdom of an island solitary to the ignorance of the crowd of people on another islandwho can understand only the sensible language of the Qur’an.The great ibn-Rushd (1126-1198), is a Spanish Arab known to the Latins as Averroes, wrote arefutation of al-Ghazali’s Tahafu, called Tahafut at-Tahafut (the incoherence of the incoherence), .In his Fasl al-Maqal (The harmony of religion and philosophy) he proposes his cvonvistion thatphilosophy and revelation are both true and in harmony with one another. Yet, significantly, heworks out any apparent contradictions by insisting on the truth of the philosophy and the need forreinterpretation of the Qur’an.Ibn Rushd, like ibn Sina, trough spanish translators had tremendous influence on Europianthooght, culminating in Thomas Aquinas. Thomas worked out permanent principles for the

56reconciliation of philosophy and theology, science and religion, which permitted science andphilosophy to flourish, in spite of incidental conflicts, in the Christian world. In the Muslim world,however, the theologians failed to integrate the tought of the philosophers. Philosophy, includingscientific and technological research, died out of an independent study, and only the elementswhich were absorbed into theology were retained. This was the situation until the impact of Europeon the Muslim world in the 19 th century cause a reawakening.We may summirize the movements discussed in this chapter by pointing out that Hanbalismrepresented one extreme: keeping to the letter of revelation only, rejecting all rational ideas andmethods. The opposite extreme is that of some of the philosophers, who had nothing to do withrevelation and confined themselves to what reason taught them. In between we find theMu`tazilites who mixed philosophy with rational ideas and methods, and the Ash`arites who mixedphilosophy with rational methods, but rejected the rational ideas of the Mu`tazilites and thephilosophers. To complete the picture, we may refer to the Sh`ites and the Susis, who held torevelation but gave it an exoteric interpretation based on divine inspiration and expressed in poeticor sometimes philosophical language.5. THE UNITY AND ATTRIBUTES OF GODThe createdness of the Qur’anThe question of the createdness of the Qur’an probably arose from discussion with Christians.Since the Qur’an calls Jesus “the Word of God” (4:171), Christians asked whether he was created(implying that God was one once without a word) or uncreated (and therefore divine).The argument was most transferred to the Qur’an because of the question of Qadar. Since theQur’an is said to have pre-existed on a “a preserved Tablet” )lawh mahfuz, 85:22) or as the motherof the Book (“umm al-kitab, 13:39; 43:4) and “was sent down” on the night of destiny (97:1), itwould seem that the historical events described in the Qur’an were predestined.To counter the idea of predestination, the Mu`tazilites argued that the Qur’an was created. Theyappealed to various Qur’anic expressions such as, “We have made it (ja`alna-hu) an ArabicQur’an” (43:3), or it is on a “preserved tablet” (85,22), which implied that it finite and thereforecreated, “falsehood does not come to it from in front or from behind” (41,42), which also impliesfinitude. They also argued by raising speculative questions such as, how can a man hear, read orgo over inhis memory the eternal speech of god, and is this speech, the Qur’an, God’s verysubstance or an accident distinct from his substance?The quetion of the createdness or the uncreatedness of the Qur’an was prominent at the beginningof the 2d `Abbasid century, echoing the focus of this question during the mihna. Among earlydefendants of the Sunnite position who used Kalam were `Abdal`aziz al-Makki (d.849 or 854) andthe Sufi al-Mahasibi (d.857). Al-Khuraybi (d.828), however, followed by many others, avoided theuse of Kalam in this subject and supported al-Mutawakkil’s prohibition of discussing the intricaciesof what is created and what is uncreated in the copy or vocal recitation of the Qur’an.

57Al-Karabisi (d.859 or 862) is regarded as the founder of the theory called lafziyya. Lafz means“Utterance”, and according to this theory, the Qur’an is uncreated, but anyone’s utterance orrecitation is created. Ahmad ibn-Hanbal bitterly opposed this theory and attacked its proponents.He quoted Qur’an 9:6 which speaks of an unbeliever being granted protection “so that he may hearthe Word of God”. But if he is hearing only a created representation of the Word of God (as theMu`tazilite Ja`far ibn-Harb (d.850) and Ja`far ibn-MUbashshir (d.848) maintained, he is not nearingthe real Word of God.Some people avoided taking sides on this question, like the Hadith collector al-Bukhari (d.870),who said: “The Qur’an is the speech of god uncreated, the acts of men are created, and inquiry intothe master is heresy”. Similar caution was shown by the Hanifite at-Tahawi (d.933) and al-Ah`ari.Yet the Hanifite creed, the Wasiyya (written around 850), while avoiding the word lafs, says that thepen, paper and writing are created manifestations of the Qur’an. Another Hanifite creed of the late10 th century, Al-Fiqh al-akbar II, explicitly says that the lfs of the Qur’an is created. Al-Ash`arifollowers took a similar line and introduced the concept of Kalam nafsi, the Qur’anic speech whichis the soul (nafs) before it is expressed; this they maintained was created.The Mu`tazilites and God’s unityThe question whether the Qur’an is created came up only in the time of Harun ar-Rashid, and ashort time afterwards the question of Go’s attributes arose. The influence of philosophy ledtheologians to ask what it meant by the assertion that God has knowledge, speech, power,ect.The opponents of the Mu`tazilites said tha these attributes were somehow distinct from God’sessence, whereas the Mu`tazilites retorted that if they were distinct, there would be several eternalbeings, and therefore several gods or hypostases as in the Christian Trinity. The Mu`tazilites saidthat all God’s attributes are identical with one another and with God’s essence. Only his speech isnot identical with his essence; in fact it is not part of God at all, but creation.The Mu`tazilites went on to teach that anthromosphic expressions in the Qur’an should be given ametaphorical interpretation (ta`wil). Thus God’s hands mean his “grace” or “power”, and his facemeans his “essence”.Al-Jubba`i (d.915), among the later Mu`taziliets, held strictly to the Mu`tazilite idea of God’s unity,saying that god knows and acts by his essence and not by any attribute such as knowledge, even ifthis is equivalent to his essence. Al-Jubba`i also held strictly to rational or linguistic criteria and notthe Qur’an in deciding whether any name was fitting for God. He rejected, for instance, the name`aqil (intelligent) because it derives from the word `iqal, the tether of a camel, and this might implythat God was subject to some impediment. Al-Jubba`i also distinguished “essential” and “active”attributes, but his whole discussion of divine names appears to be strict linguistic nominalism; inother words, the names are merely a matter of human language and not reflect anything of thereality of God and the richness of his being.Abu-Hashim (d.933), son of al-Jubba`i and his successor as leader of the Basra Mu`tazilites,introduced the idea of “states” (ahwal, sg. Hal). Originally a grammatical term indicating amodifying action word, like a participle, it was applied to adjectival attributes of God (e.g knowing),and these he said were distinct from God’s essence, while existing only in (and not apart from)

58God’s essence. This teaching about ahwal, or adjectival attributes, was accepted by later Ash`aritetheologians, who also maintained a distinct existence for God’s sifat al-ma`ani, or substantialattributes.Al;-Ka`bi (d.929 or 931) was at a time leader of the Mu`tazilites of Bagdad. He tried to reduce themany names applied to God to just a few basic ones. Thus “willing” is simply a combination of“knowing” and “creating”, while “hearing” and “seeing” are just aspects of “hnowing”. In spite ofthese men’s allowing of a real disatinction among the attributes of God, the general Mu`taziliteposition was that God and his attributes are all identical, with no real distinction in him whatsoever.Those who distinguished God’s attributesOne of the earliest speculators of God’s unity was Hisham ibn-Hakam (d.805). He used the termjism, which usually means “body”, in the wider sense of susbatance and applied to God (for whichhe was criticized). He was also the first to use the term ma`na (literally “meaning”) in the technicalsense of an inseparable attribute, and in this way spoke of the attributes of God, such as powerand knowledge.Bishr al-Marisi (d.833) introduced a distinction between essential and active attributes, and amongthe latter he recognized four: will (mashi`a), knowledge (`ilm), power (qudra) and creativity (takhlid).Anthropomorphic attributes mentioned in the Qur’an he interpreted away. Ibn-Kullab (d.855) tookthis speculation a step further by positing for each adjectival attribute (sifa ma`nawiyya), such as“power” or “knowledge”, a corresponding substance attribute (sifa al-ma`na), such as” power andknowledge”. Furthermore he distinguished attributes, such as all the foregoing, which pertain toaction, and attributes which discribe God’s essence, such as “existence or eternity”.Ibn-Kullab had a student named al-Qalanisi who, using Kalam to defend these and other Sunniteteachings, brought them to the attention of al-Ash`ari, who adopted them. In the meantime ibn-Karram (d.869) in Persia tried to face the problem of relationship between the eternal and thetemporal, or the uncreated and the created. He and his followers asserted that God was Creator orcreating )khaliq) through the attribute of creativeness (kaliqiyya) evn before creation existed. Thisattribute they interpreted as a power over creation. Yet when any creature comes into being, theysaid that this requires some change (hudud) in God, which the addition of the decision and thecommand that the creature come into being. Such a position was criticized in many quarters asleading to pantheism, since it sets up a continuity of mutual dependence between God andcreatures. Al-Ash`ari accepted the ideas of various kinds of attributes in God, distinct from oneanother and from God’s essence, but he himself did not systematize his teaching with the precisionof later Ash`arites.Al-Maturidi (d.944), as noted in the previous chapter, differed from al-Ash`ari on some points. Oneof then concerns the discussion on creation. Al-Maturidi held that all attributes are eternal, whileAsh`ari and his immediate followers said that the active attributes are not eternal; for instance Godis creating only when creatures exist. A late exponent of Ash`arite theology who had been veryinfluential in North and West Africa is Muhammad ibn-Yusuf as-sanusi (d.1490). Inhis umm albarahimor small catechism, he lists what has become a standard list of 20 attributes:Among what is necessary to our Lord -the majestic and mighty- are twenty attributes. These are:1) existence (wujud), 2) being from eternity 3) being everlasting 4) otherness from thing that come

59into being, 5)self-subsistence, that is, he does not need a subject-of-inherence nor a determiningagency, 6) oneness, that is, there is no duplication of his essence, attributes or acts. The first ofthese six attributes, existence, pertains to the essence itself (nafsiyya), whereas the other five arenegative attributes (salbiyya). Then the most high necessarly possesses seven attributes calledsubstantive attributes (sifat al-ma`ani). They are 7)power and 8) will, which are related to allpossible things, 10) life, which is related to nothing, 11) hearing and 12) sight, which are rekated toall existing things, and 13) speech, which is without letters or sound, and is related to the samethings knowledge is related to.The most High necessarily possesses seven attributes called adjectival attributes (sifatma`nawiyya). They follow upon the first seven, and are the most high’s being: 14)powerful, 15willing, 16) knowing, 17) living, 18) hearing, 19) seeing, 20) speaking.The first part is conceived and written by Frederic Ntedika Mvumbi, OpThe second part is a revised course (revised by Frederic Ntedika) taught by Joseph Kenny, O.PProfessor of Islamic studiesUniversity of IbadanNigeria