Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action - Reason Foundation

14based on “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation”and prohibited future legislation designed toban discrimination on that basis. In contrast to thecase at bar, therefore, Romer’s facts were reasonablyanalogous to Hunter’s. A Colorado trial courtissued a preliminary injunction against the enforcementof Amendment 2 and the Colorado SupremeCourt affirmed relying on Hunter and SeattleSchool District. In affirming those courts, thisCourt explicitly stated that it was relying “on a rationaledifferent from that adopted by the State SupremeCourt” and cited the two cases only in describingthe decisions below. Romer, 517 U.S. at624 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy, writingfor the majority, instead relied upon the conclusionthat “the amendment seems inexplicable by anythingother than animus.” Id. at 632.Justice Scalia explained in his dissent why the“political landscape alteration” rationale in Hunterwould be an unsuitable foundation for the Court’sdecision:[I]t seems to me most unlikely that any multileveldemocracy can function under such aprinciple. For whenever a disadvantage isimposed, or conferral of a benefit is prohibited,at one of the higher levels of democraticdecisionmaking (i.e. by that state legislaturerather than local government, or by the peopleat large in the state constitution ratherthan the legislature), the affected group has(under this theory) been denied equal protection.To take the simplest of examples, considera state law prohibiting the award ofmunicipal contracts to relatives of mayors ….