Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action - Reason Foundation

19than its tendency to break and control theviolence of faction.Federalist No. 10 at 77 (Madison) (Rossiter ed.1961).“By a faction,” Madison wrote, “I understand anumber of citizens, whether amounting to a majorityor a minority of the whole, who are united andactuated by some common impulse of passion, or ofinterest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, orto the permanent and aggregate interests of thecommunity.” Id. For example, at various points inMadison’s own lifetime, rice planters may have virtuallyowned the South Carolina low country, mercantileinterests may have ruled the roost in Boston,and various religious denominations may havedominated one region, state or locality or another.But no such “faction” could dominate at the nationallevel—at least not for long. In Madison’s view,only through the creation of fragile coalitions ofspecial interests could activities manifestly contraryto the public interest be undertaken at the nationallevel.Madison was no political naïf. He knew thatspecial interests could do some serious damage tothe public interest at the national level too. But doingso would take a great deal of effort. Back at thelocal level, it might be accomplished all too easily.Federalist No. 10 did not specifically addressrace or ethnicity. Nevertheless, they are perhapsthe most noxious forms of special interest—not justin this country but around the world. It is thus fortunatethat they are a special concern of the EqualProtection Clause. Cf. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08