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Chapter 4: Government Coalitions and Institutional Reform at the IGCIn contrast to Germany and France which largely ignored the newcomers,Britain actively involved them, offering guidance and support, and raisingtheir support for British positions.⁸⁷ The British targeted all countries, butespecially Poland given its large size and history of partnership, and Maltaas a member of the Commonwealth, but also Estonia, Czech Republic andothers.⁸⁸ Obviously Britain sought to create public displays of strategicpartnership with as many new-comers as possible. Also, contrary to the past,UK’s managed to construct the reputation of being a more cooperative andless problematic member state, especially among the newcomers. However,its reputation was not without blemishes. Many newcomers believed thatBritain approached them opportunistically – arguing in favour of issuesit cares about and asking for support, while its willingness to reciprocatethis support on issues which were of importance by some of the targetedcountries remained in some doubt.⁸⁹To be sure, the UK did not only ask for support, it also gave it to othercountries. In the closing stages of the Convention, the UK supportedSpain and Poland and a group of smaller states in defending the Nice dealon qualified majority voting and the number of commissioners. On bothquestions, the UK was rather indifferent, and maintained a low profileuntil near the end of the Convention. Since it did not expect especiallythe new member states to withdraw from the Nice compromise of onecommissioner per member state at least until the EU reached 27 members,it saw accepting this proposal as a way to trade-off on the permanent chairof the Council. It also calculated that the support for Spain and Poland onthe system of QMV might be reciprocated by in their support against theuse of QMV in the field of taxation.In conclusion, during the Convention and the 2003/04 IGC, Britaindeveloped a number of tactical bilateral coalitions on single issues withstates that had convergent interests on these matters. Although thecooperation did not raise expectations on the future cooperation, itnevertheless built strategic relationships which may be rebuilt in futurenegotiations. Apart from tactical coalitions with the member states, the87) Confidential interview with government officials from new member states in Brussels on 19 September2004.88) Only Britain’s relationship with Cyprus (among the newcomers) was at the time of negotiations probablyat the lowest point in history due to the conflicting positions on the Cyprus problem.89) Confidential interview with a Czech government official in Brussels on 19 September 2004.126Chapter 4: Government Coalitions and Institutional Reform at the IGCBritish government also kept strategic links to both Presidencies duringthe IGC. In the same way it was also strategically offering support to bothFrance-Germany and Spain-Poland in order to obtain their support on itsred lines. In all these examples, Britain was motivated by a combinationof power considerations and shared interests. Ideology did indeed playa role in particular when it came to the intergovernmentalist character ofthe member states. Shared culture could be seen as an explanation onlyin the case of Ireland, but there also cooperation only happened whentheir interests were convergent.ItalyContrary to the British who adopted the ‘pro-active loner behaviour’ bychoice, Italy, arguably ended in such a role due to the absence of a cleargovernmental position or a clear negotiation strategy on institutionalissues. In the past, Italy often used to ally itself with the large states and/orthe pro-integrationist block, given its traditional national consensus onpromoting the furthering of European integration. With the governmentof Prime Minister Berlusconi, Italy’s position within the EU and its viewson the future of European integration became at best unclear. The centrerightcoalition which succeeded in the parliamentary elections in 2001 wasinternally divided on many issues, including EU issues. Italian governmentsare notorious for being unstable and fragile coalitions of different partieswith rather divergent views. Berlusconi’s government is no exception. ForzaItalia, the party with the largest number of seats claims to be pro-European,however, rejects that EU would move closer towards a federation. AlleanzaNazionale, the second largest party, is nationalistic and hence EU-sceptic.Lega Nord is similarly EU-sceptic, but has (unsurprisingly) a strong intereston the role of the regions within the EU, and the UCD (the ChristianDemocrats) appear the most pro-European of all.In such situation it is no surprise that Italy arrived to the Convention withoutset preferences on any (including institutional) issues and with deepdivisions between its numerous representatives (including the governmentrepresentatives).⁹⁰ What could be observed then was a series of individual(rather than coordinated) contributions and amendments by differentItalian representatives, which sometimes even appeared to be contradictory.90) Riccardi (2003).127