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Contents<br />

List of Figures vii<br />

ListofTables ix<br />

Foreword xii<br />

Acknowledgments xiii<br />

Notes on Contributors xv<br />

Introduction 1<br />

Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin, and Philippe Gugler<br />

Part I Macro-Environmental Determinants of<br />

Chinese FDI<br />

1 An Institutional Perspective and the Role of the State for<br />

Chinese OFDI 11<br />

Bing Ren, Hao Liang, and Ying Zheng<br />

2 Home Country Macroeconomic Determinants of Chinese<br />

OFDI 38<br />

William Wei, Ilan Alon, and Liqiang Ni<br />

3 The Role of Country of Origin and Chinese OFDI 54<br />

Paz Estrella Tolentino<br />

4 Chinese SWFs: At the Crossroad between the Visible and the<br />

Invisible Hand 81<br />

Michael Keller and Laura Vanoli<br />

Part II Micro-Environmental Determinants of<br />

Chinese FDI<br />

5 Motives and Patterns of Reverse FDI by Chinese<br />

Manufacturing Firms 107<br />

Xiaobo Wu, Wanling Ding, and Yongjiang Shi<br />

6 A Two-way Causal Link between Internationalization and CEO<br />

Equity Ownership in Chinese Firms 122<br />

Xiaohui Liu and Jiangyong Lu<br />

v<br />

PROOF


vi Contents<br />

7 Effects of Absorptive Capacity on International Acquisitions<br />

of Chinese Firms 137<br />

Ping Deng<br />

Part III Chinese FDI in Europe and North America<br />

8 Push and Pull Factors for Chinese OFDI in Europe 157<br />

Yun Schüler-Zhou, Margot Schüller, and Magnus Brod<br />

9 The Rise of Chinese OFDI in Europe 175<br />

Jan Knoerich<br />

10 Chinese M&A in Germany 212<br />

Yipeng Liu and Michael Woywode<br />

11 Chinese SMEs in Prato, Italy 234<br />

Anja Fladrich<br />

12 Chinese State-Controlled Funds and Entities in Canada 257<br />

Xiaohua Lin and Qianyu Chen<br />

Part IV Chinese FDI in Africa<br />

13 Chinese OFDI in Africa: Trends, Prospects, and Threats 279<br />

Gayle Allard<br />

14 Chinese OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 300<br />

Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris<br />

Part V Cases of Chinese FDI<br />

PROOF<br />

15 The Case of Florida Splendid China 329<br />

Wenxian Zhang<br />

16 Benelli and Q J Compete in the International Motorbike Arena 355<br />

Francesca Spigarelli, William Wei, and Ilan Alon<br />

17 Geely’s Internationalization and Volvo’s Acquisition 376<br />

Marc Fetscherin and Paul Beuttenmuller<br />

Final Reflections 391<br />

Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin, and Philippe Gugler<br />

Author Index 396<br />

Subject Index 405


1<br />

An Institutional Perspective<br />

and the Role of the State for<br />

Chinese OFDI<br />

Bing Ren, Hao Liang, and Ying Zheng<br />

Napoleon called China a ‘sleeping dragon’, but recent economic<br />

developments as China enters the twenty-first century show that the dragon<br />

is awakening. China has maintained strong economic growth since 1979<br />

and sustained a GDP increase of more than 9 percent over the years. The<br />

total volume of economic output increased from 2.8 percent in 1970 to<br />

7.23 percent in 2008, ranking China as the third largest economy in the<br />

world (United Nation Statistics Division Statistical Databases).<br />

China launched its ‘Go Global’ policy in 1999 to encourage highperforming<br />

Chinese firms to invest abroad and upgrade their global competence.<br />

Since then, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows reached<br />

US$55.91 billion in 2008, equal to the FDI inflow in 2003. The annual<br />

growth rate of OFDI averaged 65.7 percent from 2002 to 2008 (Ministry<br />

of Commerce of China). OFDI flows via mergers and acquisitions (M&As)<br />

accounted for 54 percent of the total volume of OFDI (US$30.2 billion) and<br />

an annual increase rate of 379 percent (from 2002 to 2008). China’s OFDI<br />

volume reached USD52.15 billion in 2009 (excluding Hong Kong, Macao,<br />

and Taiwan), equaling 3 percent of global OFDI (World Investment Report,<br />

2009).<br />

How are Chinese firms able to ‘go global’ so quickly – given their relatively<br />

weaker competencies in technological know-how and management skills<br />

and weak ability in integrating global value chains (Deng, 2004; Sun, Peng,<br />

Ren, & Yan, 2010)? According to multinational enterprise (MNE) theories<br />

based on Western firms, such as the Ownership-Location-Internalization<br />

(OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1980, 1993), it is difficult to explain why this<br />

aggressive international expansion by Chinese firms works so well despite<br />

weaker firm-specific ownership advantage. We also note that China’s international<br />

expansion is largely undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).<br />

State policies have played a key role in pushing Chinese firms to go abroad,<br />

which poses a challenge to existing MNE and FDI theories (Dunning &<br />

Lundan, 2008; Sun et al., 2010).<br />

11<br />

PROOF


12 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

To answer these questions one must examine the driving forces of Chinese<br />

firms’ internationalization, especially the institutional forces and the role of<br />

the state that the literature has not yet explored. As China’s economic development<br />

involves a high degree of state involvement, it constitutes a unique<br />

institutional foundation that shapes OFDI trajectories at the level of both<br />

the country and the firm. Integrating the recent literature on how formal<br />

and informal institutions such as state policies and national pride influence<br />

the OFDI of emerging market enterprises (EMEs) (e.g., Buckley, Clegg,<br />

Cross, Lin, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Buckley, Cross, Tan, Liu, & Voss, 2008; Luo,<br />

Xue, & Han, 2010; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011), we argue that the fast<br />

growth of China’s OFDI is a consequence of the state’s involvement and<br />

formal and informal institutional motivating forces. We define the formal<br />

institutional drivers as governmental policy, the bureaucratic administrative<br />

system, and the government ownership arrangement in firms. Informal<br />

institutions include the state ideology and national pride (Hope et al., 2010).<br />

Driven by these institutions, Chinese firms are highly motivated to conduct<br />

OFDI for country-level political and economic objectives, or for firm-level<br />

global competence.<br />

The importance of this study is as follows. Most studies on international<br />

business have focused on OFDI by mature market enterprises through studying<br />

the motivations, processes, and outcomes of their internationalization<br />

(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Hennart, 1982; Dunning, 1988; Dore, 1990).<br />

More recent studies explore the motivations for internationalization of EMEs<br />

(Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). However, except<br />

for a few studies (e.g., Buckley et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2010), the role of<br />

the state in the OFDI of EMEs is largely ignored. Similarly, among the studies<br />

emphasizing the institutional perspective of EMEs’ internationalization,<br />

there is no in-depth discussion of how macro-level institutional foundations<br />

shaped by the state could influence micro-level firm strategic choices. Our<br />

study helps fill these gaps by analyzing the specific roles of the state and<br />

the broader economic and social contexts that may influence how the state<br />

performs its role. We also analyze how these state institutions might become<br />

sources of comparative ownership advantages and help shape Chinese firms’<br />

OFDI trajectories.<br />

The remainder of the <strong>chapter</strong> is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews<br />

the literature. In Section 2 we analyze the role of the state and the formal<br />

and informal institutions by looking at their influence on Chinese firms’<br />

OFDI motivations and strategies. We also discuss contingency views of our<br />

theoretical propositions and provide our conclusions.<br />

1. Literature review<br />

PROOF<br />

1.1. Motivations for OFDI<br />

There is a vast literature examining the motivations for FDI (see Meyer &<br />

Nguyen [2005] for a survey). The theory of capital movements suggests that


PROOF<br />

Bing Ren et al. 13<br />

FDI is a part of the firm’s portfolio investments (Iversen, 1935; Aliber, 1971).<br />

Hymer (1960), Kogut and Zander (1993) argue that FDI is a means of transferring<br />

knowledge and other tangible and intangible firm assets to organize<br />

production overseas. Vernon (1966) uses the concept of product lifecycle<br />

to theorize that firms set up production facilities abroad for standardized<br />

mature products in their home markets. Other literature sees FDI as a motive<br />

for risk diversification (Rugman, 1981) and a bandwagon effect exhibited by<br />

MNEs when they follow their rivals into new markets as a strategic response<br />

to oligopolistic rivalry (Knickerbocker, 1973).<br />

The international business (IB) literature, especially Dunning’s OLI<br />

paradigm, sees OFDI as a primary means by which firms can appropriate<br />

rents in overseas markets by exploiting their idiosyncratic resources<br />

and capabilities (Dunning, 1958; Caves, 1971). The internalization theory<br />

(McManus, 1972; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart,<br />

1982) sees OFDI as a way to reduce the transaction costs associated<br />

with coordinating activities across national boundaries, while the resourcebased<br />

view (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece,<br />

Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) argues that firms enter foreign markets to create<br />

value. The literature suggests that the OFDI of EMEs is different from<br />

that of enterprises from developed economies (e.g., Makino, Lau, & Yeh,<br />

2002).<br />

Studies on comparative ownership and governance suggest that the<br />

unique mode of governance and control in emerging economies is particularly<br />

important in determining the OFDI decision (Claessens, Djankov, &<br />

Lang, 2000; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007). Other studies on<br />

EME international strategy emphasize the institutional perspective (e.g.,<br />

Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Witt & Lewin, 2007; Dunning & Lundan,<br />

2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Seyoum, 2009; Ge & Ding, 2011), suggesting<br />

that institutions, both formal and informal, influence EME OFDI<br />

behavior – either through positive or negative effects (Luo & Tung, 2007;<br />

Witt & Lewin, 2007). Formal institutions, such as policy, influence EME outward<br />

investment: this has been manifested in the home and host country<br />

markets (e.g., Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev,<br />

2005; Buckley et al., 2008; Seyoum, 2009; Luo et al., 2010). Informal institutions<br />

may determine OFDI flows and strategies such as choice of location<br />

and entry mode (Buckley et al., 2007; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Yiu, Lau,<br />

& Bruton, 2007; Lu & Ma, 2008). Examples include institutional distance<br />

or cultural proximity between the home and host country markets (e.g.,<br />

Buckley et al., 2007; Seyoum, 2009), and host and home country business<br />

networks. Formal and informal institutions together may influence<br />

OFDI strategy in a more dynamic way (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Peng et al.,<br />

2008).<br />

Chinese firms that invest abroad, especially large multinationals, are<br />

typically state-owned or state-controlled. Recent studies on Chinese and<br />

Indian multinational cross-border M&As reveal that SOEs constitute a bigger


14 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

proportion among the main players conducting cross-border M&As in China<br />

thaninIndia(Sunet al., 2010). As China’s global push accelerates, many<br />

observers believe that institutional factors should act as advantages for generating<br />

more aggressive OFDI activities (Luo et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2010),<br />

which is usually not the case for mature market economies (Dunning, 1988;<br />

Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart & Park, 1994). Many even suggest that<br />

Chinese firms’ OFDI is to a large extent designed to follow the state’s policy<br />

guidance, especially now (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007;<br />

Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Deng, 2009; Sutherland, 2009; Yao & Sutherland,<br />

2009; Luo et al., 2010). Chinese OFDI trajectories are likely shaped by<br />

the specific institutional regime developed under the state, although little<br />

research on the topic exists.<br />

2. Framework<br />

PROOF<br />

2.1. The role of the state<br />

To some extent, China is still a state-controlled political economy where the<br />

state plays a dominant role in driving economic transactions and performance<br />

(Chang, 1994; Deng, 2004; Dunning & Pitelis, 2009; Huang, 2010;<br />

Nee, 2010). The state designs and influences formal institutions and regulates<br />

economic and business activities through the formal policy at the<br />

central and local government levels. The state also establishes the administrative<br />

system and arranges government ownership within various industrial<br />

sectors. The state helps shape informal institutional frameworks such as<br />

firm–government relationships, political connections and inter-bureau or<br />

inter-firm network ties that influence business behavior (Peng & Heath,<br />

1996; Xin & Peace, 1996; Keister, 1998; Yiu et al., 2007). The rise of China<br />

on the global political and economic stage cultivates the role of the state in<br />

shaping China’s national pride and ideology.<br />

The state’s role is even more significant when considering the wider economic<br />

and social context into which China has stepped. China is now facing<br />

both external and internal pressure to develop better and stronger economic<br />

and social systems. Internally, the state faces pressure to enhance national<br />

wealth. Although the economy has sustained a high growth rate in the past<br />

several decades, the government is yet not sure about the sustainability of<br />

future growth. Externally, China’s economy and society now depend heavily<br />

on other economies and societies, for more successful participation in the<br />

global economic and social stage.<br />

The Chinese state has aimed to develop both hard and soft power for<br />

coping with these challenges and to construct long-term development<br />

goals (‘The Economic Observer’ [in Chinese], May 31, 2010). The state has<br />

tried to maintain strategic control over national-level formal and informal<br />

institutional development.


PROOF<br />

Bing Ren et al. 15<br />

2.2. Formal institutional regime<br />

Policy<br />

The Chinese government has, to a great extent, played a crucial role in shaping<br />

the structure of China’s approved outward investment through external<br />

policy influence. However, the OFDI policies went through an evolutionary<br />

process. According to Luo et al. (2010) and others such as Buckley et al.<br />

(2008), Chinese OFDI policies moved through three major phases: the initiation<br />

of OFDI policy; the enrichment of the institutional frameworks; and<br />

setting up ‘going global’ as a country-level strategy.<br />

In Phase 1 (1979–1990), the Chinese state played a key role in initiating<br />

the OFDI policies. In 1979, with the launch of the ‘open door’ policy<br />

by Deng Xiaoping, the State Council came up with the concept of ‘setting<br />

up enterprises overseas’ (Zhao, 2007, p. 56). The state issued concrete<br />

policies and principles to guide OFDI. In 1984, the Ministry of Foreign<br />

Trade and Economic Cooperation (MFTEC, today’s MOC) released the first<br />

regulations on OFDI, called ‘Circular concerning approval authorities and<br />

administrative principles for opening up non-trade joint venture overseas’.<br />

The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) also published the first<br />

regulations on administration of foreign exchange: ‘Measures for foreign<br />

exchange control relating to overseas investment’ (1989). Since then, a primary<br />

structure of policy and administration of OFDI was established. During<br />

this period, the Chinese government was perceived as taking the plunge in<br />

OFDI activities.<br />

In Phase 2 (1991–2000), the Chinese state enriched the institutional<br />

framework of OFDI policy. On 12 October 1992, Jiang Zemin, the representative<br />

of third-generation leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, gave a<br />

report to the Fourteen Chinese Communist National Congress, emphasizing<br />

the deepening of reform and opening up policy to ‘expand OFDI and multinational<br />

operations of Chinese enterprises’ (Jiang, 1992). Following Jiang’s<br />

talk, more specific and detailed provisions were added to formulate the regulatory<br />

and administrative system on firms’ OFDI activities. For example, the<br />

Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (National Planning Commission<br />

[NPC], March 1991) normalized the approval procedure and gave<br />

more specific requirements for OFDI.<br />

In Phase 3 (2001–present), the state set the ‘Going Global’ policy as a<br />

country-level strategy to enhance competitive advantages through OFDI<br />

strategies. The Chinese government initiated the ‘going abroad’ policy<br />

as country-level strategy in 2000. (This was reflected in ‘Suggestion on<br />

Constructing the 10th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social<br />

Development’.)<br />

In 2003, the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC) specified<br />

the boundaries for key OFDI projects, including: (1) seeking natural<br />

resources in areas where China is lacking; (2) investing in manufacturing


16 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

PROOF<br />

that promotes export of technologies, products, and equipment; (3) setting<br />

up R&D collaborative projects which could bring in advanced technologies,<br />

managerial experience, and specialized talents; (4) conducting M&As to<br />

increase international competitiveness and market exploration of firms.<br />

The Chinese government encouraged firms to pursue the above projects to<br />

upgrade firm-level competence.<br />

In the meantime, joining the World Trade Organization demanded a<br />

higher level of openness, and this also encouraged the Chinese government<br />

to modify the existing strict policies to create a friendlier institutional environment<br />

for OFDI. For example, the central state deregulated investment<br />

approval and foreign exchange controls. The government provided support<br />

for finance, credit, and insurance (Enterprise Institute of Development<br />

Research Center of the State Council, 2006) and strengthened supervision<br />

of multinational operating performance to monitor the effectiveness of the<br />

‘go global policy’. Table 1.1 provides a detailed illustration of major policies<br />

released by the state on Chinese firms’ OFDI.<br />

Five important institutional elements are particularly emphasized by the<br />

state and successfully advanced the OFDI of Chinese firms. The first institutional<br />

element refers to the approval process. The state streamlined the<br />

approval procedure and decentralized approval authority for OFDI. The state<br />

relaxed foreign exchange control gradually, especially in the examination of<br />

capital resource and exchange risks. In providing concrete investment support,<br />

the state supported investment projects for credit, capital, information,<br />

subsidies, and tax collection. The state also aimed to set up more efficient<br />

supervision mechanisms on post-investment performance of OFDI enterprises.<br />

Lastly, the state has been seeking better international protection for<br />

firms’ overseas investment through setting up bilateral investment treaties<br />

and multilateral and regional protection mechanisms (for more straightforward<br />

descriptions of the five institutions’ evolution, see Figures 1.1a–1.1e).<br />

Bureaucratic administration<br />

Bureaucratic administration policy is usually made by important players in<br />

particular bureaucratic systems, and important operating systems are also<br />

implemented by the administrators to utilize the policy effect. In general,<br />

the bureaucratic administration related to Chinese OFDI is complex due to<br />

the multiple bureaucratic players involved in decision-making, regulation<br />

and, supervision for OFDI. In the bureaucratic administration system, the<br />

first layer is the State Council, which plans China’s overall OFDI for the long<br />

term. Under the leadership of the State Council, the State Development and<br />

Reform Commission (SDRC, formerly the National Planning Commission)<br />

is the major institution of the second layer responsible for studying and<br />

advancing strategies and plans for OFDI, and examining the optimization of<br />

the policies. Guided by the strategic plan of the SDRC, the Department of


Table 1.1 The policy regime of China’s OFDI<br />

Examination<br />

and<br />

approval<br />

Key policy Key point<br />

Approval Authorities and<br />

Administrative Principles<br />

for Opening up Non-trade<br />

Joint Venture Overseas<br />

(MFTEC, May 1984)<br />

Approval Procedures for<br />

Setting up Overseas<br />

Subsidiaries (MFTEC, July<br />

1985)<br />

Administration and<br />

Approval of Establishing<br />

Non-trade Enterprises<br />

Overseas (MFTEC, July<br />

1985)<br />

Administration of<br />

Overseas Investment<br />

Projects (NPC, March<br />

1991)<br />

Verification and Approval<br />

Procedures for<br />

OFDI (SNRC, October<br />

2004)<br />

Examination and<br />

Approval of Investment to<br />

Run Enterprises Overseas<br />

(MOC, October 2004)<br />

PROOF<br />

17<br />

1. Authorize MFTEC to approve OFDI;<br />

prior to this, all OFDI has to be<br />

approved by State Council<br />

2. Major projects concerning resource<br />

and projects exceeding<br />

US$10 million to be approved by<br />

State Council<br />

3. Projects concerning state property to<br />

be approved by NPC and METEC<br />

Opens OFDI for all economic entities<br />

with financial resources, foreign<br />

joint venture partners, and relevant<br />

capabilities<br />

1. Approval result should be handed<br />

down in no more than 3 months<br />

2. Chinese OFDI should focus on using<br />

overseas technologies, resources, and<br />

markets<br />

1. Projects exceeding 1 million to be<br />

approved by NPC, exceeding<br />

30 million to be approved by the<br />

State Council.<br />

2. Projects concerning state-owned<br />

assets must be approved by State<br />

Council<br />

3. Project proposals, feasibility reports,<br />

corporate contracts, and articles<br />

should be provided by OFDI<br />

enterprises<br />

4. Approval result should be handed<br />

down in no more than 60 days<br />

1. Projects exceeding US$10 million to<br />

be approved by SNRC (except<br />

projects concerning resources),<br />

exceeding US$50 million approved<br />

by State Council<br />

2. Approval result should be handed<br />

down in no more than 20 days<br />

1. All companies are permitted to run<br />

enterprises overseas<br />

2. Project proposals, feasibility reports<br />

are substituted by project application<br />

3. Approval result should be handed<br />

down in no more than 15 days


18<br />

Table 1.1 (Continued)<br />

Foreign<br />

exchange<br />

control<br />

Key policy Key point<br />

Administration of<br />

OFDI (MOC, May 2009)<br />

Foreign Exchange<br />

Administration of<br />

Overseas Investment<br />

(SAFE, March 1989)<br />

Supplemental Provisions<br />

on Administration<br />

Measures on Foreign<br />

Exchange for Overseas<br />

Investment (SAFE,<br />

September 1995)<br />

Canceling the Deposits<br />

that Guarantee Profits<br />

from Investments<br />

Abroad (SAFE,<br />

November 2002)<br />

Simplifying<br />

Foreign Exchange<br />

Administration Relating<br />

to OFDI (SAFE, March<br />

2003)<br />

Further Measures on<br />

Foreign Exchange<br />

Administration<br />

Stimulating OFDI (SAFE<br />

May 2005)<br />

Administration<br />

Measures on Foreign<br />

Exchange for Overseas<br />

Investment (SAFE, 2009)<br />

PROOF<br />

Projects exceeding US$100 million<br />

to be approved by MOC<br />

1. SAFE evaluates the source of<br />

funds to be invested abroad as<br />

well as the foreign exchange risk<br />

2. Five percent of the OFDI sum<br />

has to be deposited in a special<br />

account<br />

3. Profit earned abroad should be<br />

remitted back to China<br />

Chinese investors are allowed to<br />

purchase foreign exchange for an<br />

OFDI project; prior to this, a<br />

Chinese investor had to earn the<br />

foreign exchange<br />

Deposits that guarantee profits are<br />

no longer needed<br />

1. SAFE will only investigate<br />

domestic foreign exchange<br />

sources<br />

2. Foreign exchange obtained from<br />

a source outside of mainland<br />

China no longer examined<br />

1. Local SAFE named as authority<br />

on OFDI projects with a higher<br />

threshold (from US$3 to US$10<br />

millions) all over the country<br />

2. Total foreign exchange available<br />

for all investors is increased from<br />

USD3.3 to USD5 billion<br />

The necessary foreign exchange for<br />

the domestic investors to invest<br />

abroad may be self-owned foreign<br />

exchange, the foreign exchange<br />

purchased by RMB or entity,<br />

intangible assets, the domestic and<br />

overseas foreign exchange loans,<br />

and other permitted source


Inspection<br />

and<br />

evaluation<br />

Guidance<br />

and support<br />

International<br />

investment<br />

protection<br />

mechanism<br />

Interim Measures for the<br />

Joint Annual Inspection<br />

of Overseas Investments<br />

(MFTEC, October 2002)<br />

Measures for<br />

Comprehensive<br />

Assessment of<br />

OFDI Performance<br />

MFTEC (October 2002)<br />

Annual Report System on<br />

Operational Obstacles in<br />

Major Target Countries<br />

(MOC, November 2004)<br />

Providing Credit Support<br />

to Key OFDI Projects<br />

Encouraged by the State<br />

(SNRC, May 2003)<br />

Guiding Directories<br />

of Target Nations<br />

and Industries for<br />

OFDI (MOC, July 2004;<br />

MOC, October 2005;<br />

MOC, January 2007)<br />

Using and Managing<br />

Special Funds for Foreign<br />

Economic Cooperation<br />

(MOC; MOF, December<br />

2005)<br />

Bilateral Investment<br />

Treaty<br />

PROOF<br />

19<br />

Provides post-investment evaluation<br />

of OFDI projects<br />

Clarification of standards and<br />

procedures for evaluating<br />

OFDI projects which have been<br />

operating overseas<br />

Using annual reports from<br />

enterprises investing abroad, MOC<br />

collects all kinds of obstacles<br />

and problems confronted by<br />

OFDI companies<br />

OFDI projects fulfilling specified<br />

requirements will be provided with a<br />

lower lending rate credit fund<br />

Provides industries and countries<br />

information for enterprises to<br />

conduct investment encouraged by<br />

the state through preferential<br />

treatment concerning funding, tax<br />

collection, foreign exchange,<br />

customs and others<br />

1. Sets up special funds to<br />

encourage Chinese enterprises to<br />

invest abroad<br />

2. Special funds may be used to<br />

support foreign economic<br />

cooperation by the following<br />

means: (1) subsidies for<br />

pre-operational fees; (2) interest<br />

discounts for medium- and<br />

long-term loans; (3) subsidies for<br />

operational fees<br />

1. In 1980s, China signed BITs with<br />

most developed countries, but in<br />

this period, most treaties are<br />

raised by developed countries to<br />

protect their investment in<br />

China<br />

2. In 1990s, China began to<br />

conclude BIT positively with<br />

developing countries to protect<br />

investment in these countries


20<br />

Table 1.1 (Continued)<br />

Key policy Key point<br />

Multilateral investment<br />

protection measures<br />

Regional protection<br />

mechanism<br />

Sources: www.mofgov.com; He (2009); Luo et al. (2010).<br />

1985<br />

Approval procedures for setting<br />

up overseas subsidiaries<br />

1985<br />

1991<br />

Administration and approval<br />

of establishing non-trade<br />

enterprises overseas<br />

1984<br />

Approval and administration<br />

of non-trading overseas enterprises<br />

1991<br />

Approval authorities and Examination and approval<br />

administrative principles for opening up of OFDI project proposals<br />

non-trade joint venture overseas and feasibility reports<br />

Acceding to WTO in 2001, China could<br />

enjoy the multilateral investment<br />

protection provided by agreements<br />

abided by WTO members, such<br />

as, Agreement on Trade-Related<br />

Investment Measures (TRIMS), General<br />

Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)<br />

China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, founded<br />

in 2002, providing adequate protection<br />

to investment in this area, benefits<br />

more and more investors both from<br />

China and ASEAN<br />

2004<br />

Examination and approval of investment to<br />

run enterprises overseas<br />

2004<br />

Verification and approval<br />

procedures for OFDI<br />

2003<br />

Reply on decentralization authority<br />

reforming pilot of non-trade<br />

investment overseas approval<br />

2009<br />

Administration of OFDI<br />

Initial regulations on OFDI<br />

Normalization of the approval and Further procedure simplification<br />

Strict examination of projects 1990 administration system<br />

and decentralization of authority<br />

1979 2000<br />

2009<br />

Highly centrally controlled authority<br />

Decentralization of authority Relaxed examination of projects<br />

Figure 1.1a Evolution of state’s examination and approval processes for China’s OFDI<br />

1990<br />

Rules for implementation of measures on<br />

foreign exchange control in investment abroad<br />

2002<br />

Canceling the deposits that guarantee<br />

profits from investments abroad<br />

1989<br />

1993<br />

Procedural and approval standards on<br />

OFDI-related foreign exchange<br />

Opening special account of<br />

risks and capital resources<br />

deposits that guarantee profits<br />

1995<br />

1989<br />

Foreign exchange administration<br />

of overseas investment<br />

Supplemental provisions on<br />

administration measures<br />

on foreign exchange<br />

for overseas investment<br />

2005<br />

Enlarging the reform pilots regarding<br />

the administration of foreign<br />

exchange for overseas investment<br />

Rules for implementation of<br />

measures on foreign exchange<br />

control in investment abroad 2009<br />

Administration measures on<br />

foreign exchange for<br />

2003<br />

overseas investment<br />

Simplifying foreign exchange<br />

administration relating to OFDI<br />

Rigid control on capital resource and<br />

More standard control on foreign Streamlining the examination on<br />

1979<br />

foreign exchange risk<br />

Profit deposits are required<br />

exchange risk, source of investment<br />

1990<br />

2000<br />

fund Chinese investors are allowed to<br />

risk and capital resource,<br />

canceling deposits and<br />

2009<br />

purchase foreign exchange<br />

decentralization authority.<br />

Figure 1.1b Evolution of state’s foreign exchange control for China’s OFDI<br />

2003<br />

PROOF


Bing Ren et al. 21<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

Guiding directories of target<br />

Notice on adjusting the management<br />

2000 nations and industries for OFDI<br />

mode of overseas financial guarantees<br />

for overseas investment enterprises<br />

2005<br />

Measures of capital support for<br />

2004<br />

small and medium enterprises to<br />

Providing more financing support<br />

develop international markets<br />

Notice on setting up a risk to key overseas-invested projects<br />

1999<br />

prevention mechanism for key<br />

overseas investment projects<br />

Guidance on granting credit<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

for overseas processing Providing credit support to key OFDI<br />

Using and managing special funds<br />

and assembling<br />

projects encouraged by the state<br />

for foreign economic cooperation<br />

1979 2000<br />

Support on capital, credit, and finance, guidance on target<br />

nations and industries are provided to encourage OFDI<br />

2009<br />

Figure 1.1c Evolution of state’s inspection and evaluation processes for China’s OFDI<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

Circular on setting up an information<br />

Measures for comprehensive bank of overseas investment 2004<br />

assessment of OFDI performance intention of enterprises Annual report system on<br />

operational obstacles<br />

2002<br />

Interim measures for the joint annual<br />

inspection of overseas investments<br />

2002<br />

Provisions on statistical<br />

report of OFDI<br />

in major target countries 2005<br />

Report requirements for overseas<br />

mergers and acquisitions<br />

Annual inspection, comprehensive assessment, and other report systems are set up<br />

1979 2000 2009<br />

Figure 1.1d Guidance and support on China’s OFDI by state<br />

PROOF<br />

1985<br />

2000<br />

First BIT with developing countries<br />

Signed BIT with 54<br />

1996<br />

1982 Thailand<br />

developing countries by 2000<br />

Signed BIT with most<br />

2004<br />

First BIT with developed countries developed countries by 1996<br />

2001 China-ASEAN<br />

Sweden<br />

WTO free-trade area<br />

1979<br />

As investment host country, most BITs As investment output country, most BITs<br />

were concluded with developed countries were concluded with developing countries<br />

Seeking multilateral and<br />

regional protection 2009<br />

1990<br />

2000<br />

Figure 1.1e Evolution of China’s international investment protection mechanism<br />

Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment drafts the catalogs of guidance for<br />

foreign investment industries, and approves key OFDI projects. The Ministry<br />

of Commerce, formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation<br />

and Ministry of Domestic Commerce, is the primary government<br />

unit responsible for conducting multilateral negotiations on investment and<br />

trade treaties. Finally, the Department of Outward Investment and Economic<br />

Cooperation drafts concrete regulations on OFDI and administrates and<br />

supervises OFDI.<br />

Other important governmental departments in the second layer include<br />

the People’s Bank of China, which is responsible for making monetary policy<br />

and foreign exchange policy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for


22 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

drafting the catalog for guiding the target countries of OFDI in cooperation<br />

with other agencies; and the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Taxation,<br />

responsible for drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI. The Ministry of<br />

Taxation is also responsible for providing financial support to OFDI through<br />

special funds. A special organization, the State-owned Assets Supervision<br />

and Administration Commission, was established under the State Council to<br />

manage and supervise the national state-owned assets in the non-financial<br />

sectors, including those that invest in overseas markets.<br />

In the third layer are several departments and units that implement the<br />

policies made by the above authorities. For example, the State Administration<br />

of Foreign Exchange helps supervise and check the authenticity<br />

and legality of the receipts and payments involved in OFDI and regulates<br />

management of overseas foreign exchange accounts. Three policy-oriented<br />

financial institutions help to provide credit and insurance for OFDI firms:<br />

these include the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of<br />

China, and the China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation. Figure<br />

1.2 and Table 1.2 illustrate the Chinese OFDI bureaucratic administration<br />

system.<br />

The government ownership<br />

The third formal OFDI institutional regime relates to the wide presence of<br />

government ownership of firms in the economy. Since market reform in the<br />

late 1970s, the Chinese government has maintained control of the economy.<br />

The central and local government bureaux provide funding to the SOE<br />

Ad hoc<br />

organizations<br />

SASAC<br />

SOE<br />

State council<br />

SDRC MOC PBC MOF MFA<br />

DFCOI DOIEC SAFE<br />

MOT<br />

CECIE<br />

PROOF<br />

Policy financial<br />

institution<br />

EIBC CDB<br />

Figure 1.2 Bureaucratic system in regulating China’s OFDI<br />

Notes: MOC – Ministry of Commerce; DOIEC – Department of Outward Investment and Economic<br />

Cooperation; SDRC – State Development and Reform Commission; DFCOI – Department<br />

of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment; MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOF – Ministry<br />

of Finance; PBC – People’s Bank of China; SASAC – State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration<br />

Commission; MOT – the Ministry of Taxation; SAFE – State Administration of Foreign<br />

Exchange; SOE – State-Owned Enterprise; EIBC – Export-Import Bank of China; CDB – China<br />

Development Bank; CECIE – China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation.<br />

Sources: www.gov.cn; www.mofcom.gov.cn; zcq.mofcom.gov.cn; www.sdpc.gov.cn (2010).


Table 1.2 The bureaucratic administration regime of China’s OFDI<br />

Department Main functions<br />

Bing Ren et al. 23<br />

State council 1. Blueprinting China’s overall OFDI in the long term<br />

MOC 1. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on investment and<br />

trade treaties<br />

DOIEC 1. Drafting concrete regulations on OFDI<br />

2. Administrating and supervising OFDI activities<br />

3. Examining and verifying non-financial enterprises’ OFDI<br />

4. Statistics for OFDI<br />

SDRC 1. Studying and putting forward strategies and plans for OFDI<br />

2. Studying policies concerning aggregate balance and<br />

structural optimization<br />

DFCOI 1. Drafting the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign<br />

Investment Industries in cooperation with relevant agencies<br />

2. Examining and approving key OFDI projects, major<br />

resources related and consuming substantial amount of<br />

foreign currency<br />

SAFE 1. Supervising and checking the authenticity and legality of<br />

receipts and payments<br />

2. Regulating management of overseas foreign exchange<br />

accounts<br />

SASAC 1. Managing and supervising the nation’s state-owned assets in<br />

non-financial sectors<br />

MFA 1. Drafting the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign<br />

Investment Countries in cooperation with relevant agencies<br />

MOF 1. Providing financial support to OFDI though special fund, etc<br />

2. Drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI in cooperation<br />

with MOT<br />

MOT 1. Drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI in cooperation<br />

with MOF<br />

PBC 1. Designing the monetary and foreign exchange policy, etc<br />

EIBC; CDB 1. Providing credit for OFDI firms as policy banks<br />

CECIE 1. Providing insurance for OFDI firms as policy insurance<br />

corporation<br />

Source: www.gov.cn<br />

PROOF<br />

sector; the state also directs funds to SOEs via state-owned banks. As the<br />

market economy develops further, SOEs seek financing from domestic and<br />

international financial markets. Through listing their stocks on the stock<br />

exchange markets, SOEs are transformed into corporations and joint stock<br />

companies. In a joint stock company, government ownership comprises<br />

one type of shares and, as the dominant shareholder, the state exerts tight<br />

control over both political and economic objectives. For example, SOEs are


24 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

Foreign investment enterprise<br />

Joint stock company<br />

0.5%<br />

5.6%<br />

Enterprise funded from<br />

Joint equity cooperative<br />

enterprise<br />

1.0%<br />

Limited liability company<br />

22.0%<br />

Others<br />

0.3%<br />

Private enterprise<br />

1.0%<br />

PROOF<br />

Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan<br />

0.1%<br />

Collectively owned enterprise<br />

0.3%<br />

State owned enterprise<br />

69.2%<br />

Figure 1.3 Chinese OFDI stocks’ distribution by different types of investors (2009)<br />

the main players in OFDI, relative to other types of enterprises, and behave<br />

aggressively in their internationalization. Figure 1.3 describes the presence<br />

of SOEs within Chinese OFDI. Table 1.3 lists the top 50 SOEs ranked by<br />

FDI outflow.<br />

SOEs, in their drive toward globalization, have encountered strong criticism<br />

from global stakeholders for their lack of accountability, transparency,<br />

and trustworthiness (Pistor and Xu, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Li, 2009).<br />

When Chinese SOEs invest overseas, their strategies may be purely economic,<br />

such as maximizing profits, or they may include political goals<br />

that take priority over economic ones. In fact, the influence of the state<br />

and adoption of the administrative governance framework in SOE business<br />

activities make economic efficiency largely unclear. The literature<br />

argues that the highly concentrated ownership gives the state substantial<br />

discretionary power to use the resources of companies and results in problems<br />

such as insider control and the exploitation of minority shareholder<br />

interests (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Control by the<br />

government may also create a fertile soil to nurture corruption (Luo &<br />

Tung, 2007). A recent study suggests that the newly transformed SOEs are<br />

‘dynamic dynamos’ rather than ‘dying dinosaurs’ (Ralston, Tong, Terpstra,<br />

Wang, & Egri, 2006), suggesting that government ownership may influence<br />

the performance of Chinese firms positively, including OFDI.<br />

2.3. Informal institutional regime<br />

The state also plays a role in cultivating, advocating, and strengthening<br />

informal institutions to enhance its economic and political objectives<br />

through OFDI. Except for the formal institutional frameworks discussed<br />

above, informal institutions – especially when non-existent or non-enforced<br />

legal systems fail to support business – influence firms’ overseas investments.


Table 1.3 Top 50 non-financial Chinese enterprises ranked by OFDI stocks (2009)<br />

No. Enterprise name Main business Firm type<br />

1 China National<br />

Petroleum Corporation<br />

2 China National<br />

Offshore Oil<br />

Corporation<br />

3 China Petrochemical<br />

Corporation<br />

4 Aluminium<br />

Corporation of China<br />

5 China Resources<br />

(Holdings) Co., Ltd.<br />

6 China Ocean Shipping<br />

(Group) Company<br />

7 China National<br />

Cereals, Oils &<br />

Foodstuffs Corporation<br />

Crude oil and gas<br />

exploitation, petroleum<br />

refining, engineering<br />

Crude oil and gas<br />

exploitation, petroleum<br />

refining, engineering<br />

Crude oil and gas<br />

exploitation, petroleum<br />

refining, engineering<br />

Bauxite, rare-earth metal,<br />

engineering<br />

Consumer goods, power,<br />

property, cement, gas,<br />

medication, finance<br />

Water transportation,<br />

shipbuilding, logistics<br />

Foodstuffs, grain and oil,<br />

hotel, real estate<br />

8 Sinohem Corporation Oil, fertilizer, gas, hotel, real<br />

estate<br />

9 China Merchants<br />

Group<br />

10 China National<br />

Aviation Holding<br />

Corporation<br />

11 China Shipping<br />

(Group) Company<br />

Transportation,<br />

infrastructure, finance, real<br />

estate<br />

25<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Air transportation Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Water transportation,<br />

shipbuilding, logistics<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

12 SinoSteel Corporation Metallurgy, engineering Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

13 SINOTRANS<br />

Changjiang National<br />

Shipping (Group)<br />

Corporation<br />

14 China Minmetals<br />

Corporation<br />

Transportation, recreation,<br />

real estate<br />

Metal and mineral,<br />

transportation<br />

15 CITIC Group Finance, real estate,<br />

engineering, resource,<br />

manufacture, information,<br />

commercial service<br />

PROOF<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Limited liability<br />

company


26<br />

Table 1.3 (Continued)<br />

No. Enterprise name Main business Firm type<br />

16 China Unicom<br />

Corporation<br />

17 China State Construction<br />

Engineering Corporation<br />

18 China Power Investment<br />

Corporation<br />

Telecommunications Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Civil construction Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Electric power,<br />

investment, engineering<br />

19 China Huaneng Group Electric power, finance,<br />

resource, finance<br />

20 China National Chemical<br />

Corporation<br />

21 China Mobile<br />

Communications<br />

Corporation<br />

22 China Metallurgical<br />

Group Corporation<br />

23 Shum Yip Holdings<br />

Company Limited<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Chemical engineering Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Telecommunications Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Metallurgy, resource, real<br />

estate, engineering<br />

Real estate, infrastructure,<br />

transportation<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Locally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

24 Legend Holdings Ltd. IT, investment, real estate Limited liability<br />

company<br />

25 Hunan Valin Iron & Steel<br />

(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />

Iron and steel Limited liability<br />

company<br />

26 GDH Limited Investment Locally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

27 Huawei Technologies Telecommunication<br />

service<br />

28 China Noferrous Metal<br />

Mining & Construction<br />

(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />

29 China Norh Industries<br />

Group Corporation<br />

30 Baosteel Group<br />

Corporation<br />

31 Shanghai Baosteel Group<br />

Corporation<br />

32 Shanghai Overseas United<br />

Investment Co., Ltd.<br />

33 Guangzhou Yuexiu<br />

Holdings Limited<br />

34 Anshan Iron & Steel<br />

Group Corporation<br />

35 State Grid Corporation of<br />

China<br />

Non-ferrous metal,<br />

engineering<br />

Limited liability<br />

company<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Military supplies Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Steel, resource, finance,<br />

manufacture, service<br />

Steel<br />

PROOF<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Investment Limited liability<br />

company<br />

Investment Limited liability<br />

company<br />

Iron, steel Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Power grid Centrally controlled<br />

SOE


36 Shanghai Automotive<br />

Industry Corporation<br />

Bing Ren et al. 27<br />

Auto manufacture Limited liability<br />

company<br />

37 Shougang Corporation Steel, resource, service Limited liability<br />

company<br />

38 Sinohydro Co., Ltd. Water conservancy,<br />

investment, engineering,<br />

service, trade<br />

39 Nam Kwong (Group)<br />

Company Limited<br />

40 Shenzhen Investment<br />

Holdings Co., Ltd.<br />

41 Shenhua Group<br />

Corporation<br />

42 China Poly Group<br />

Corporation<br />

Consumer goods, real<br />

estate, hotel, logistics<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Investment Limited liability<br />

company<br />

Resource Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

International trade, real<br />

estate, culture, resource<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

43 TCL Group Company Electronic products Limited liability<br />

company<br />

44 Aviation Industry<br />

Corporation of China<br />

Aerospace manufacture,<br />

military<br />

Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

45 Jinchuan Group Limited Resource Locally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

46 Xinjiang Zhongxin<br />

Resource Co., Ltd.<br />

47 Guangdong National<br />

Shipping Corporation<br />

48 Wuhan Iron & Steel<br />

(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />

Resource Locally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Transportation, logistics,<br />

real estate, recreation<br />

49 ZTE Corporation Telecommunication<br />

service<br />

50 China Guangdong<br />

Nuclear Power Holding<br />

Co., Ltd.<br />

Locally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Metallurgy, engineering Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Limited liability<br />

company<br />

Nuclear resource Centrally controlled<br />

SOE<br />

Sources: 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI (MOC, 2010); www.sasac.gov.cn.<br />

PROOF<br />

The state helps to create two important informal institutions that generate<br />

ideological influence on Chinese OFDI: state ideology and national pride.<br />

State ideology is a set of ideas that constitutes state goals, expectations,<br />

and actions, and it can be thought of as a comprehensive vision of the<br />

state held by all members of society. According to Smith and Kim (2006),<br />

national pride is ‘the positive effect that the public feels towards their country,<br />

resulting from their national identity (P127)’. These two factors are<br />

to some extent interrelated. A strong state ideology may increase national


28 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

PROOF<br />

pride, and national pride can also enhance state ideology. While the economic<br />

organization is intertwined with the ideological state, major Chinese<br />

multinationals usually incorporate national missions and national pride in<br />

conducting overseas strategies. Such ideology and pride may stem from the<br />

collective expectation of ‘carrying a great torch and striving to better develop<br />

the country’. Sometimes, a particular strategy at the firm level (such as a<br />

cross-border acquisition) is economically irrational (Hope et al., 2010). This<br />

could stem from an individual enterprise leaders’ greater ambition to pursue<br />

a successful ‘country image’ to foreign counterparts and infiltrate the<br />

‘Chinese brand’ into a global market.<br />

We argue that state ideology and national pride are two soft power institutions<br />

that may function as growth engines for Chinese firms to compete<br />

with international players. The effect of state ideology and national pride are<br />

more likely to be cultivated in the Chinese context because the Chinese culture<br />

is strong in collectivism and nationalism in comparison with the West.<br />

Such national culture allows the state to communicate ideology and pride<br />

through tangible and intangible social and cultural platforms as well as to<br />

create incentives and enforcement mechanisms. To fulfill its country-level<br />

strategies and thus have greater influence on the international investments<br />

of Chinese firms, the government stresses such state ideologies throughout<br />

its policy and administration process, as well as directly implements them<br />

in its wholly controlled SOEs. Hence, the formal OFDI institutional regimes<br />

further ensure the efficiency of the informal institutional-enforced effects on<br />

OFDI in China.<br />

2.4. Institutional and Chinese MNE-based OFDI<br />

We argue that the state plays important roles in shaping Chinese OFDI<br />

institutional regimes, including the formal and informal institutions. It is<br />

important to explore more thoroughly what theoretical implications we can<br />

draw from this phenomenon. Dunning and Lundan (2008) suggest that<br />

institutions influence multinational ownership, internalization, and location<br />

advantages, and thus determine the internationalization strategy of a<br />

company. Integrating institutions into the OLI paradigm offers a profound<br />

tool to understand how institutions help the formation of emerging multinational<br />

firms. Sun and colleagues (2010) propose a comparative ownership<br />

advantage framework to explain why EMEs such as those from China and<br />

India can internationalize and conduct specific cross-border M&As. The theory<br />

suggests that EMEs in developing countries can leverage country-specific<br />

advantages and combine them with firm-specific advantages to form comparative<br />

ownership advantages to drive their internationalization.<br />

Combining the ideas of Dunning and colleagues (Dunning, 2001;<br />

Dunning & Lundan, 2008) with those of Sun and colleagues (Sun et al.,<br />

2010), we argue that not only the factor endowment structure but also the


PROOF<br />

Bing Ren et al. 29<br />

institutional structure help EMEs generate comparative ownership advantages.<br />

Hence, we can broaden the country-specific advantages concept to<br />

include an institutional dimension, suggesting that institutions could be<br />

leveraged by EMEs to combine with company advantages to form specific<br />

ownership advantages. These institutional factors could be the formal and<br />

informal ones shaped under the role of state. For example, formal institutions<br />

(such as favorable credit and financing policies and the establishment<br />

of resource and information platforms overseas) can be combined with company<br />

production and entrepreneurial capabilities to exploit international<br />

market opportunities. From the informal institutional perspective, managing<br />

the state ideology and national pride institutional elements in the<br />

strategic management processes of companies can help them better co-opt<br />

the formal institutional regimes, thus maximizing globalization benefits.<br />

In essence, through a successful integration of the national level institutional<br />

advantages and the company level advantage, EMEs can build<br />

‘institution-based comparative ownership advantages’. With this institutionbased<br />

comparative ownership advantage, EMEs can cultivate business opportunities<br />

in specific host country markets and conduct institution-based<br />

OFDI.<br />

Proposition 1: The formal and informal institutions developed under the role<br />

of the state are sources of comparative ownership advantage for Chinese firms, to<br />

‘pull’ Chinese firms to conduct institution-based OFDI.<br />

2.5. The strategic choices of OFDI by Chinese multinationals<br />

While institutions are helpful for developing firm-specific ownership advantage,<br />

corporate executives may view the institutional framework as a favorable<br />

pull factor for internationalization (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999).<br />

On the one hand, they increase EME confidence in internationalization.<br />

On the other hand, they can be exploited to change the cost and benefit<br />

structure in a multinational’s potential OFDI activity in a host country<br />

market. We will discuss Chinese multinational strategic choices in<br />

OFDI below.<br />

Choice of OFDI mode<br />

In contrast to mature market multinationals, EMEs have fewer incentives<br />

for efficiency-seeking and cost-minimizing outward investments, as the EME<br />

itself has ample supplies of low-cost, productive labor and inexpensive land.<br />

Rather, Chinese firms have higher incentives for asset-seeking and marketseeking<br />

OFDI. In comparison to independent OFDI and contractual joint<br />

ventures, M&A strategy can help Chinese firms to more quickly access<br />

strategic assets and potential markets, and thus upgrade their global competence<br />

more efficiently. However, in these aggressive cross-border M&As,<br />

the pressures of managing strategic and operating risks are much higher


30 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

PROOF<br />

than when seeking only cost efficiency (Kumar, 2009). We believe the formal<br />

and informal institutions mentioned above will help overcome the risks<br />

and facilitate adopting the M&A mode.<br />

Formal institutional support will help the resource and domestic market<br />

demand of potential multinationals and thus facilitate more entrepreneurial<br />

and aggressive international exploration. Formal institutional support also<br />

allows firms to focus on managing the strategic and operating risks in<br />

M&As with greater efficiency. The informal institutions can help intrinsically<br />

reinforce political or strategic objectives of the involving parties. These<br />

arguments suggest that formal and informal institutional supports can help<br />

Chinese multinationals adopt more aggressive OFDIs such as M&As.<br />

Proposition 2: In relation to independent OFDI and greenfield joint ventures,<br />

Chinese multinationals are more likely to adopt acquisition in their internationalization.<br />

Choice of OFDI location<br />

Multinationals invest in the most advantageous locations to fulfill the firm’s<br />

efficiency, asset- and market-seeking strategic objectives (Dunning, 1980,<br />

1988). In Chinese OFDI, the endogenous formal and informal institutions,<br />

shaped by the role of the state, help determine location choice. Regarding<br />

formal institutions, the government encourages firms to target resource<br />

and strategic asset-intensive regions through various preferential policy supports<br />

such as credit and tax incentives, as well as other administrative<br />

methods. For example, Chinese SOEs enter countries such as Africa and<br />

South America more extensively because they are resource-intensive countries<br />

where the Chinese state can acquire strategic raw materials to enhance<br />

the country-level resource endowments. Examples include Capital Iron &<br />

Steel’s acquisition of Hierro Peru Mining and Baosteel’s investment in a steel<br />

plant in Brazil. Informal institutions also influence which countries Chinese<br />

firms enter, including those helpful for maintaining Chinese national pride.<br />

The Chinese prefer to invest in regions where national pride and state ideology<br />

can be better maintained and leveraged. For example, regions such as<br />

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong (the so-called ‘four dragons’),<br />

as well as Malaysia, one of the new ‘four tigers’, give better location<br />

advantages (Sun et al., 2010). These institutional enforcements will help set<br />

the boundaries of locations for Chinese OFDI.<br />

Proposition 3: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in countries or regions<br />

where both formal and informal institutions developed under the role of the state<br />

are more likely to play a role.<br />

Choice of OFDI industry<br />

We believe formal institutions play a major role in guiding OFDI industry<br />

choice. As the Chinese government views OFDI as an important means


Bing Ren et al. 31<br />

of integrating global resources and value chain markets, its aim is carried<br />

out mainly through securing stable sources of raw materials and obtaining<br />

technological assets scarce in China. The government has specifically<br />

encouraged OFDI in the resource exploration and extraction industries (Cai,<br />

1999) as well as the manufacturing (processing and assembling) industries<br />

where Chinese companies have a competitive edge. But these Chinese<br />

industries are weak in designing, researching and developing (R&D) and,<br />

through preferential policies and direct administrative control, the government<br />

is encouraging OFDI. The government has recently favored more<br />

investments in the financial sector overseas. China Investment Corporation<br />

(CIC) invested in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley to use the global<br />

financial crisis to leverage China’s huge foreign currency reserves. However,<br />

we do not regard these overseas investments as traditional MNE behavior<br />

explained by theory. Informal institutions support formal institutions in<br />

deciding which sectors should be involved in OFDI. Some target OFDI industries<br />

may involve greater elements of national pride and state ideology to<br />

help generate greater political benefits. Because of the ideology concern, it<br />

may be hard for Chinese multinationals to conduct OFDI in industries that<br />

generate ideology conflicts such as the media sector. Figure 1.4 synthesizes<br />

the above propositions in this <strong>chapter</strong>.<br />

Proposition 4a: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in overseas manufacturing<br />

(design and R&D) industries that can help upgrade their domestic industrial<br />

structure and global value chains.<br />

Proposition 4b: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in overseas resource<br />

exploration and extraction industries that can help China pursue and secure scarce<br />

natural resources.<br />

Hard power (economic)<br />

Formal institutional<br />

determinants<br />

State policy<br />

Administrative<br />

system<br />

Government<br />

ownership<br />

The state Soft power (political)<br />

Chinese multinationals’<br />

comparative ownership<br />

advantages<br />

Chinese multinationals’<br />

OFDI:<br />

motivation<br />

strategy<br />

PROOF<br />

Informal institutional<br />

determinants<br />

State ideology<br />

National pride<br />

Figure 1.4 The role of state and Chinese multinationals’ institution-based OFDI


32 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />

3. Discussion and conclusion<br />

PROOF<br />

As China emerges as an important player in the world economy, the<br />

role of the state is crucial through the promotion of OFDI by Chinese<br />

multinationals. The Chinese state executed its role through constructing<br />

formal and informal institutions to influence OFDI trajectories. Under such<br />

circumstances, we observe an extensive interplay between the macro-level<br />

state policy and institutional frameworks and the micro-level firm and OFDI<br />

strategic choices. In both cases, formal and informal institutional factors<br />

drive Chinese firms to conduct OFDI in different investment modes, location<br />

choices, and types of industries.<br />

Due to space limitation, there are some important issues our <strong>chapter</strong> did<br />

not capture in detail although they deserve attention. Institutions do not<br />

matter to all firms, and they do not matter in similar ways (North, 1990;<br />

Scott, 1995). This suggests that the institutions derived from the role of the<br />

state may generate contingent effects on OFDI by Chinese firms. The first<br />

contingent factor is related to a stratified structure that the state constructs<br />

in developing the formal and informal institutional OFDI regime. In such<br />

a structure, the institutional regime is exclusive in nature where the state<br />

renders the advantageous institutions only to certain groups of firms: not all<br />

Chinese multinationals enjoy the benefits in their internationalization. The<br />

state makes such exclusions using criteria such as how important the firm is<br />

to the whole economy. Only influential firms such as large firms or firms in<br />

more important industries benefit from the supportive regime.<br />

The second contingency factor is related to a ‘double-edged sword’ or ‘dark<br />

side’ of the institutional influence. In contrast to the ‘benefits’ generated<br />

by institutional regimes for ‘some’ firms, there may be ‘costs’ or ‘liabilities’<br />

assigned by similar institutions to other firms. While we discuss the pull role<br />

of the state and institutional regimes on Chinese OFDI, we cannot ignore the<br />

push role of the same institutional regime to some OFDI activities (e.g., Luo<br />

& Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007). The ‘supporting’ institutional regime<br />

may create costs and disadvantages to some firms’ domestic market competition,<br />

and thus crowd them out to the international markets to pursue<br />

growth. This is reflected by the large number of Chinese overseas investments<br />

in Latin America, many of them in three tax havens (Witt & Lewin,<br />

2007).<br />

The third contingency factor is related to the ‘mixed’ objectives that the<br />

state sets for OFDI (Luo and Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010). Except for the<br />

economic driving forces (mostly efficiency and effectiveness from the firm’s<br />

perspective), Chinese firms are also pulled to conduct political OFDI that<br />

mostly satisfies country-level objectives. Key Chinese multinationals are<br />

forced to exert ‘helping hand’ behaviors to fulfill the country-level political<br />

goals such as strengthening inter-governmental political ties (Luo and Tung,<br />

2007). This was particularly evident in China’s investment in some Third


Bing Ren et al. 33<br />

World countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). The state is more likely to mandate<br />

SOEs to conduct such OFDI activities because the state has a direct control<br />

of the SOE sector. Such political mandates may also be possible with private<br />

firms, especially when the private parties’ interests are intertwined with<br />

the state’s interests. However, compared with SOEs, private sector firms are<br />

more likely to act independently in OFDI and be driven by economics, even<br />

when such OFDIs result from exploiting the state’s supportive institutional<br />

regime.<br />

The last contingency is that to leverage better the advantageous OFDI<br />

institutional regime, firms must have specific internal conditions. The most<br />

important internal conditions are capabilities that can facilitate successful<br />

integration of company resources and OFDI objectives with the countryspecific<br />

institutional supports. Such capabilities include strong adaptation<br />

capabilities in relation to the external institutional environments (Elango &<br />

Pattnaik, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007); cross-border learning and absorptive capacity<br />

(Johanson & Vahlne, 1997; Teece et al., 1997); and creativity and innovation<br />

in company integration of global value chains (Sun et al., 2010). Other<br />

factors can be managerial intentionality (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, &<br />

Volberda, 2007; Kumar, 2009) and international entrepreneurship (Yiu et al.,<br />

2007). Given the supporting institutional environments, these factors are<br />

important for generating effective strategic choices and adjustments in<br />

exploiting international market opportunities. The capability factor is more<br />

important than resources (Deng, 2007; Sun et al., 2010) because firms with<br />

unique capabilities can obtain essential resources that they lack, either<br />

through exploiting the home country institutional environments or through<br />

integrating the global resource platform.<br />

These four contingency views suggest future research directions on<br />

Chinese firms’ internationalization, to derive better predictions on the path<br />

and trajectory of Chinese OFDI: these need to include other theoretical<br />

approaches such as political economy perspectives; views on resource and<br />

capability; evolutionary theory; and the institutional perspective.<br />

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Author Index<br />

Acharya, R., 270<br />

Ackerly, A., 345<br />

Ahlstrom, D., 24<br />

Aizenman, J., 58<br />

Ajakaiye, O., 308, 311, 313, 314<br />

Akoorie, M., 39<br />

Alden, C., 293<br />

Alessandri, T., 122<br />

Aliber, R. Z., 13, 44<br />

Allard, G., 6–7<br />

Almeida, J. G., 39<br />

Almeida, P., 39, 178<br />

Alon, I., 1, 2, 8, 39, 109, 137, 142, 151,<br />

212, 236, 258, 280, 376, 379, 380,<br />

391, 393<br />

Altbach, E. G., 81, 85, 86, 87, 94<br />

Amelio, William, 145<br />

Amit, R., 138<br />

Andreosso-O’Callaghan, B., 178<br />

Antkiewicz, A., 191<br />

Ash, R., 178, 179<br />

Asiedu, E., 289<br />

Astrachan, J. H., 215<br />

Atkins, R., 212<br />

Au, L. W., 329<br />

Autio, E., 39<br />

Baisden, D. R., 344<br />

Bakkalapulo, A., 344<br />

Balfour, F., 234, 236, 244<br />

Ball, M., 337<br />

Bandelj, N., 165<br />

Bankston, J., 344<br />

Barbosa, F., 387<br />

Barkema, H., 142<br />

Barnett, C., 342, 343, 345, 347<br />

Barney, J. B., 39, 177, 213<br />

Barrell, R., 57, 58<br />

Bartlett, C. A., 39<br />

Beamish, P., 74, 124<br />

Beausang, F., 177, 178<br />

Becattini, G., 240, 245<br />

Benelli, G., 355<br />

Benelli, T., 354<br />

396<br />

PROOF<br />

Bengston, M., 245<br />

Bergsten, C., 57<br />

Besada, H., 304<br />

Bethel, J., 126<br />

Beuttenmuller, P., 8<br />

Bhattacharjee, S., 260, 261<br />

Bieri, J., 56<br />

Billington, N., 56<br />

Bird, Ningbo, 49<br />

Birkinshaw, J., 214<br />

Björkman, I., 214<br />

Blangiardo, G., 243<br />

Blank, D. M., 347<br />

Blonigen, B. A., 56, 58<br />

Bloodgood, J. M., 39<br />

Boie, B., 86, 235, 236, 239,<br />

267, 377<br />

Boisot, M. H., 14, 40, 258<br />

Bolling, C., 57<br />

Bonaglia, F., 179<br />

Bond, M. H., 243, 247<br />

Booth, W., 345<br />

Bordonaro, F., 259<br />

Bouw, B., 257<br />

Bowen, P., 123<br />

Brandes, P., 122<br />

Brandt, P. T., 58<br />

Brautignam, D., 310<br />

Broadman, H. G., 306, 311, 313<br />

Brod, M., 4, 392<br />

Bromiley, P., 124<br />

Browning, M., 337, 344<br />

Brush, T., 124<br />

Bruton, G. D., 13, 24<br />

Buck, T., 55, 123, 126, 132, 179, 238<br />

Buckley, P. J., 12–15, 13, 14, 15,<br />

39–45, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,<br />

55, 57, 97–8, 108, 109, 123, 158,<br />

164, 177, 179, 191, 212, 238, 239,<br />

377, 391, 394<br />

Burgers, W., 123<br />

Burghart, N., 179<br />

Burke, C., 311, 313, 314<br />

Byrd, A., 341–42, 346


Cai, K. G., 31, 55, 236<br />

Calderon-Rossell, J. R., 56<br />

Cantwell, J., 43, 57, 74, 108, 177, 178<br />

Capron, L., 141, 143, 217<br />

Carney, M., 219<br />

Carpenter, M., 122, 124, 125, 130<br />

Carroll, T. N., 29<br />

Cartwright, S., 213<br />

Casson, M., 13, 108, 177<br />

Caves, R. E., 13, 39, 56, 177<br />

Ceccagno, A., 237, 241, 243, 244,<br />

246, 248<br />

Chaisse, J., 81<br />

Chakrabarti, A., 57<br />

Chan, S., 97, 98, 238<br />

Chang, H.-J., 14<br />

Chang, S. J., 55, 57<br />

Chang, T., 39<br />

Chauduri, S., 139<br />

Chen, C., 238, 239<br />

Chen, E., 108<br />

Chen, F., 330<br />

Chen, G., 330, 337, 348<br />

Chen, H., 158<br />

Chen, J., 330<br />

Chen, Q., 6<br />

Chen, T.-J., 158<br />

Chen, X. H., 273<br />

Chen, Y., 120<br />

Cheng, L. K., 49, 204<br />

Chetty, S. K., 39<br />

Cheung, Y., 38<br />

Child, J., 14, 39, 40, 41, 49, 109, 137,<br />

138, 141, 145, 157, 178, 179, 239,<br />

259<br />

Chiou Wei, S. Z., 57<br />

Choi, J. J., 57<br />

Chowdhury, A. R., 56<br />

Chuanzhi, Liu, 144<br />

Churchward, C., 344<br />

Churchward, J., 346<br />

Claessens, S., 13<br />

Clark, L., 345<br />

Clegg, L. J., 12, 45, 55, 57, 109, 123, 179<br />

Cogman, D., 213, 214<br />

Cognato, M. H., 81, 85, 86, 87, 94<br />

Cohen, M. W., 137, 138, 140, 215<br />

Collier, P., 292<br />

Connelly, B., 124, 125<br />

Constantine, G., 343<br />

PROOF<br />

Cooke, F. L., 217<br />

Cool, K., 13<br />

Corkin, L., 301, 311, 313, 314<br />

Cotner, M. G., 347<br />

Covin, J., 138<br />

Cristaldi, F., 243, 245<br />

Cross, A. R., 12, 55<br />

Cuervo-Cazurra, A., 280, 291<br />

Cui, L., 40, 42, 109, 212<br />

Culem, C. G., 56<br />

Curran, L., 189<br />

Author Index 397<br />

daCosta, R., 124<br />

Daily, M., 138<br />

Dalekowschodnia, S., 167<br />

Dalton,D.R.,138<br />

Daoyu, L., 337<br />

Datta, D., 122, 124, 126<br />

Davies, K., 258<br />

Davies, R. B., 263<br />

De Propris, L., 179<br />

DeFusco, R., 126<br />

Dei Ottati, G., 241, 245<br />

Delios, A., 128<br />

Deng, P., 4, 11, 14, 33, 39, 40, 41, 49, 55,<br />

97, 137, 142, 143, 145, 149, 178,<br />

179, 212, 219, 238, 239, 329, 330,<br />

349, 392<br />

Denicolai, S., 39<br />

Denison, T., 241, 243<br />

Devies, K., 234<br />

Dharwadkar, R., 122<br />

Diamond, R., 348<br />

Diaz, G., 339<br />

Diebold, F., 73<br />

Dierickx, I., 13<br />

Dillon, P., 340<br />

Ding, D. Z., 13, 235<br />

Ding, W., 3, 392<br />

Djankov, S., 13<br />

Dobler, G., 301, 311<br />

Donadio, R., 251<br />

Dongsheng, L., 148<br />

Doolittle, L., 339, 340<br />

Dore, R. P., 12<br />

Drahokoupil, J., 165, 167<br />

Driffield, N., 179<br />

Du, J., 120<br />

Dunlop, J., 337


398 Author Index<br />

Dunning, J. H., 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 30,<br />

38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 54, 57, 108, 109,<br />

123, 158, 163, 164, 177, 178, 189,<br />

314, 315, 376<br />

Dyer, G., 212<br />

Dykes, B., 124<br />

Easterly, W., 292<br />

Edwards, C., 179<br />

Edwards, S., 56<br />

Egger, H., 263<br />

Egger, P., 263<br />

Egri, C., 24<br />

Eisenhardt, K. M., 110, 142, 220, 222<br />

Eisner, M., 340<br />

Elango, B., 13, 33<br />

Enderwick, P., 39<br />

Evangelista, F. U., 39<br />

Falkner, D., 138<br />

Fama, E., 124<br />

Farmer, G., 332<br />

Farooki, M., 312, 321–22<br />

Farrell, D., 217<br />

Farrell, R., 58<br />

Fetcherin, M., 1<br />

Fetscherin, M., 1, 8, 151, 376, 377, 379,<br />

394<br />

Fields, K. J., 282<br />

Filatotchev, I., 13, 122, 124<br />

Filippov, S., 161, 168, 179<br />

Finkelstein, S., 214, 215<br />

Fioretti, G., 240, 241<br />

Fladrich, A. M., 6, 237, 244, 245, 249<br />

Flores, I., 331, 333, 335, 345<br />

Foss, N. J., 137<br />

Foster, V., 313<br />

Fotak, V., 269, 273<br />

Foushee, B., 346<br />

Franklyn, P., 261<br />

Freeman, D., 312<br />

Froot, K. A., 56<br />

Fuchs, H. J., 235, 236, 237, 239<br />

Fung,H-G.,55<br />

García-Canal, E., 280<br />

Garnaut, R., 249<br />

Gaston, N., 58<br />

Gavin, M., 338<br />

Ge, G. L., 13, 235<br />

PROOF<br />

Gedajlovic, E., 219<br />

Gelb, S., 304, 305<br />

Genc, M., 280, 291<br />

George, G., 137, 138, 213, 215, 219, 330,<br />

333, 337, 348<br />

Georgopoulos, G. J., 56, 57<br />

Geringer, J., 124<br />

Ghauri, P. N., 39<br />

Ghosh, I., 58<br />

Ghoshal, S., 39<br />

Gilboy,G.J.,178<br />

Globerman, S., 189<br />

Glossop, P., 261<br />

Goldstein, A., 179<br />

Gomes-Casseres, B., 14<br />

Gomez-Mejia, L., 124<br />

Gopinath, M., 57<br />

Goranova, M., 122<br />

Graham, E. M., 165<br />

Grant, A. J., 217<br />

Gray, H. P., 54<br />

Griffin, L., 344<br />

Griffith, D. A., 13<br />

Grollmann, P., 217<br />

Grubaugh, S. J., 43, 45, 57<br />

Grubb, P. D., 39<br />

Grunwald, R., 225<br />

Gu, J., 234, 236, 282, 301, 302, 310<br />

Guang, Y., 338, 339, 347<br />

Gugler, P., 1, 81, 86, 151, 235, 236, 239,<br />

267, 377<br />

Guillén, M., 217, 280<br />

Guisinger, S., 13<br />

Guo, B., 120<br />

Guo, J. Q., 56<br />

Haig, A., 336<br />

Haleblian, J., 214, 215, 218<br />

Hall, P. A., 69, 218<br />

Hambrick, D., 126<br />

Hamilton, J. D., 63<br />

Hamilton, R. T., 39<br />

Han, B., 12, 158, 191, 259<br />

Harney, A., 234<br />

Harrison, B., 240<br />

Harrison, J. S., 141<br />

Harzing, A. W. K., 158<br />

Hattingh, D., 387<br />

Hawawini, G. V., 54<br />

Hay, F., 179, 180


Hayward, M. L. A., 141<br />

He, F., 82, 83, 85, 87<br />

He, L., 20<br />

Heath, P., 14<br />

Heckman, J. J., 216<br />

Hendrickx, M., 124<br />

Henley, J., 309<br />

Hennart, J. F., 12, 13, 14<br />

Herrmann, P., 122, 124, 126<br />

Hesterly, W., 177<br />

Hilsum, L., 317<br />

Hitt, M. A., 39, 74, 122–7, 141, 150, 214,<br />

215<br />

Ho, P. C., 61, 62<br />

Hodges, H., 344<br />

Hodgson, G., 260<br />

Holslag, J., 312<br />

Hong, E., 39, 55, 74, 97, 188, 238<br />

Hong, S., 56<br />

Hongbin, J., 55<br />

Hood, G., 336<br />

Hope, O.-K., 12, 28<br />

Horst, F., 57<br />

Hoskisson, R., 122–4, 126, 127<br />

Hua, J., 218<br />

Huang, C.-H., 55, 179<br />

Huang, Y., 14<br />

Hughes, S., 250<br />

Hummer, 107<br />

Hunt, A., 347<br />

Hutzschenreuter, T., 33<br />

Hwang, P., 123<br />

Hymer, S. H., 13, 108, 177<br />

Inkpen, A. C., 188<br />

Ireland, R. D., 39, 122, 123, 126, 141<br />

Ivarsson, I., 178<br />

Iversen, C., 13<br />

Jackson, J. W., 347<br />

Jackson, S., 74<br />

Jacobson, S., 330, 346<br />

Jansen, J. P., 139, 141<br />

Jensen, M., 124, 126, 213<br />

Jeon, B. N., 56, 57<br />

Jiang, F., 40, 42, 109, 212<br />

Jiang, Y., 24, 179<br />

Jiang, Z., 15<br />

Jiannian, Y., 339, 340<br />

Jindra, B., 122, 124<br />

PROOF<br />

Jiwei, L., 87<br />

Johanson, J., 12, 33, 108, 177<br />

Johnson, J. P., 239<br />

Johnson, R., 126, 127<br />

Jonsson, T., 178<br />

Jopsom, B., 316<br />

Joseph, S., 339<br />

Author Index 399<br />

Kagame, P., 281<br />

Kale, D., 301, 311<br />

Kang, R., 179<br />

Kang, Y., 217<br />

Kao, E. H. C., 55<br />

Kaplan, R. D., 282, 284<br />

Kaplinsky, R., 7, 281–3, 285, 305, 311,<br />

393<br />

Kato, T., 132<br />

Ke, Y., 179<br />

Keister, L. A., 14<br />

Keller, M., 2, 81, 84, 392<br />

Keller von, E., 179<br />

Kenney, B., 332<br />

Kern, S., 82, 84<br />

Khan, G., 344<br />

Khana, T., 258<br />

Khosravian, C., 245<br />

Kieser, A., 225<br />

Kim, H., 124, 127<br />

Kim, L., 139, 140<br />

Kim, S., 27, 56<br />

Kim, W., 123<br />

Kim, Y. K., 54<br />

Kincaid, R., 347<br />

Kindleberger, C. P., 177<br />

King, D. R., 213<br />

King, R., 138, 141<br />

Klein, M. W., 56<br />

Kloss, M., 387<br />

Knickerbocker, F. T., 13<br />

Knoerich, J., 5, 179, 186, 188, 392<br />

Koch, U., 225<br />

Kogut, B., 13, 57, 138, 141<br />

Kohlhagen, S. W., 44<br />

Komasa, B., 167<br />

Komesaroff, M., 318<br />

Konka, 148<br />

Koop, G., 59<br />

Kravis, I. B., 56<br />

Krueger, J., 338<br />

Krugman, P., 240


400 Author Index<br />

Kshetri, N., 217<br />

Kuemmerle, W., 178<br />

Kumar, K., 54<br />

Kumar, N., 30, 33<br />

Kurihara, J., 235, 239<br />

Kwan, C., 260<br />

Kyrkilis, D., 42, 44, 45, 48, 57<br />

Lall, S., 57, 108, 177, 315<br />

Lancee, B., 248, 250<br />

Lane, P. J., 138, 140, 141, 216<br />

Lang, L., 13<br />

Langley, F., 333, 334<br />

Lardy, N. R., 234<br />

Larsson, R., 214, 215<br />

Lattemann, C., 216<br />

Lau, C.-M., 13<br />

Lau, M., 133<br />

Lecraw, D. J., 177, 178, 315<br />

Lee, C. K., 264<br />

Lee, J., 343<br />

Lee. T. D., 336<br />

Lei, D., 140<br />

Leonidou, L. C., 39<br />

Leung, M. W. H., 243<br />

Levinson, H., 215<br />

Levinthal, D. A., 137, 138, 140, 215<br />

Levitt, B., 215<br />

Lewin, A. Y., 12, 13, 29, 32<br />

Li, J. T., 218<br />

Li, K., 55<br />

Li, M., 218<br />

Li,P.P.,55<br />

Li, W., 24<br />

Liang, H., 391<br />

Lichtenthaler, U., 216<br />

Lien, Y.-C., 13<br />

Lin, J. D., 12<br />

Lin, X., 6, 273<br />

Lin, Z. J., 218, 219<br />

Lindenbaum, B., 178<br />

Lippman, S. A., 13<br />

Lipsey, R. E., 56<br />

Liqiang, N., 2, 391<br />

Liu, C., 329<br />

Liu, L., 179<br />

Liu, M., 179, 218<br />

Liu, Q. W., 55, 217<br />

Liu, X., 4, 43, 55, 122, 238<br />

Liu, Y., 5, 217<br />

PROOF<br />

Long, C. P., 29, 132<br />

Loree, D., 13<br />

Love,J.H.,179<br />

Lovelock, P., 264<br />

Low, S. P., 55<br />

Lu, J. W., 4, 13, 122, 124<br />

Lu, Z., 217<br />

Lubatkin, M., 213<br />

Lundan, S. M., 11, 13, 28, 177, 376<br />

Luo, Y., 12, 13, 14, 15, 24, 32, 33, 39,<br />

126, 158, 159, 191, 212, 216, 238,<br />

239, 259<br />

Luski, I., 263<br />

Lyles, M. A., 137, 140<br />

Lyons, G., 89, 99<br />

Ma, C., 329<br />

Ma, X., 13<br />

Ma, Z., 49<br />

Madhok, A., 39<br />

Maduell, Michael, 100<br />

Magagnini, S., 329, 331<br />

Makino, S., 13, 40<br />

March, J. G., 18, 101, 215<br />

Mariano, W., 345, 346<br />

Markusen, A., 240<br />

Marshall, A., 239, 240<br />

Martin, M. F., 87, 259<br />

Martin, R., 240<br />

Masron, T. A., 157, 158, 163<br />

Mathews, J. A., 40, 109, 126, 164, 179,<br />

280, 315<br />

Mathieu, J., 74<br />

McCollum, B., 336<br />

McCoy, A., 343<br />

McDermott, M., 55<br />

McIntyre, J., 39<br />

McIntyre, J. R., 109, 137, 142, 212, 236,<br />

280, 376<br />

McManus, J., 13<br />

Megginson, W., 269, 273<br />

Meikie, S., 344<br />

Mervine, B., 341<br />

Messner, D., 322<br />

Meyer, K., 12, 109–10<br />

Meyer, M. W., 14, 40, 258<br />

Miao, Y. C., 259<br />

Mica, J., 336<br />

Miesing, P., 218<br />

Milelli, C., 179, 180


Miller, J., 124<br />

Miller, K., 343<br />

Miller, T., 124, 125<br />

Ming, D., 337<br />

Miracky, W., 82, 84, 86<br />

Mitchell, W., 124, 141, 143<br />

Mizruchi, M., 126<br />

Mody, A., 56<br />

Moon, H.-C., 178<br />

Moran, T., 57<br />

Morck, R., 55, 143<br />

Morgan, B., 339<br />

Morgan, P., 341, 345<br />

Morgenstern, O., 263<br />

Morris, M., 7<br />

Moyo, D., 292, 293<br />

Muekalia, D., 282<br />

Mueller, M., 264<br />

Murphy, K., 126<br />

Murphy, M., 331<br />

Musselle, K., 344<br />

Musteen, M., 122, 124, 126<br />

Nachum, L., 54, 158<br />

Nadeau, B., 243<br />

Nadolska, A., 142<br />

Narula, R., 108, 315<br />

Nee, V., 14<br />

Nelson, C., 125<br />

Nelson, R. R., 215<br />

Newman, R., 143<br />

Ng, S. H., 39, 55<br />

Nguyen, H., 12<br />

Ni, L., 2, 391<br />

Nicolas, F., 164, 171, 179, 236, 237<br />

Nixon, R., 336<br />

Nolan, P., 178, 302<br />

Norbu, T. J., 346<br />

North, D. C., 32<br />

Noy, I., 58<br />

Oxelheim, L., 122<br />

Pablo, A. L., 213<br />

Pain, N., 57, 58<br />

Palamara, G., 39<br />

Palmer, T., 126<br />

Pantelidis, P., 42, 44, 45, 48, 57<br />

Pantulu, J., 58<br />

Pappu, R., 380<br />

Author Index 401<br />

Paris, R., 260<br />

Park, Y. P., 14<br />

Pattnaik, C., 13, 33<br />

Pavitt, K., 177<br />

Peace, J. L., 14<br />

Pearce, R. D., 43<br />

Pedersen, T., 33<br />

Peng, L., 337<br />

Peng, M. W., 11, 13, 14, 24, 41, 133, 158,<br />

216, 218<br />

Pennings, M., 126<br />

Perkins, T., 257<br />

Pick, D., 57<br />

Piesse, J., 13<br />

Pietrobelli, C., 235, 236, 238, 239, 242,<br />

243, 244, 245<br />

Pin, Ni, 114<br />

Ping, D., 109<br />

Ping, Z., 55<br />

Pino, M., 347, 348<br />

Pisano, G., 13<br />

Pisano, V., 140<br />

Piscitello, L., 245<br />

Pistor, K., 24<br />

Pistoresi, B., 56<br />

Pitelis, C., 14<br />

Pitkethly, R., 138<br />

Polzcer, S., 257<br />

Poncet, S., 97–8<br />

Poon,J.P.H.,58<br />

Porter, M., 54<br />

Portes, A., 240, 245<br />

Power, M., 281, 293, 311<br />

Prugel, T. A., 43, 45<br />

Pruthi, S., 109<br />

Pugel, T. A., 57<br />

Puranam, P., 139, 141<br />

Pyke, F., 240<br />

Qian, W., 55, 178<br />

Qian, X., 38<br />

Qichen, Q., 337<br />

Qimou, M., 340<br />

Qiusheng, H., 148<br />

Rajgopal, S., 126<br />

Ralston, D. A., 24<br />

Raskin, A., 178<br />

Rauner, F., 217<br />

PROOF


402 Author Index<br />

Rebellotti, R., 235, 236, 238, 239, 242,<br />

243, 244, 245<br />

Redding, G., 74<br />

Reed, J., 229<br />

Ren, B., 1, 11, 391<br />

Rhee, S. S., 56<br />

Roberts, D., 234, 236, 244<br />

Rodrigues, S. B., 14, 39, 40, 41, 49,<br />

109, 137, 157, 178, 179,<br />

239, 259<br />

Roe, T., 57<br />

Roehl, T. W., 178<br />

Rohter, L., 345<br />

Rolle,J.D.,54<br />

Rosenboim, M., 263<br />

Rosengren, E., 56<br />

Rossi, V., 179<br />

Rozanov, A., 86<br />

Ruback, R. S., 213<br />

Rugman, A. M., 13, 55<br />

Rui, H., 12, 39, 41, 55<br />

Rumelt, R. P., 13<br />

Rupert, C., 337<br />

Russell, C. J., 13<br />

Sader, F., 56<br />

Saebi, T., 168, 179<br />

Saggi, K., 180<br />

Salk, J., 140<br />

Sanders, W., 122, 124–6, 130<br />

Sanfilippo, M., 235, 236, 238, 239,<br />

242–5<br />

Sapienza, H. J., 39<br />

Sardy, M., 379–80<br />

Sargent, R., 340–1<br />

Sauvant, K. P., 234, 257, 260<br />

Schmitz, A., 56<br />

Schnedler, J., 335<br />

Schneider, A., 149<br />

Schneider, M., 345, 347<br />

Schoemaker, P. J. H., 138<br />

Schoenberg, R., 213<br />

Schüler-Zhou, Y., 4<br />

Schüller, M., 4<br />

Schweiger, D. M., 213, 214<br />

Scott, W. R., 32<br />

Seligman, S. D., 250<br />

Sengenberg, W., 240<br />

Seyoum, B., 13<br />

Sforzi, F., 240, 242<br />

PROOF<br />

Sgobbi, F., 245<br />

Shahbudin, A. S., 157, 158, 163<br />

Shan, W., 178<br />

Shane, M., 57<br />

Shangkun, Y., 336<br />

Shapiro, D., 189<br />

Shattuck, H., 337<br />

Shaver, M., 124<br />

Shenot, C., 338, 339, 341<br />

Shevlin, T., 126<br />

Shi, L., 179<br />

Shi, Y., 392<br />

Shimizu, K., 140, 214<br />

Shou, Y., 120<br />

Shrivastava, P., 214<br />

Shu, C., 238<br />

Shuen, A., 13<br />

Shufu, Li, 116<br />

Sigurdson, J., 178<br />

Simmons, M. S., 239<br />

Simon, H., 212<br />

Sims,C.A.,58<br />

Singh, H., 140<br />

Smith, T. W., 27<br />

Smolenski, N., 357<br />

Snyder, J., 348<br />

Södermana, S., 41<br />

Song, J., 178<br />

Sorge, A. M., 158<br />

Soskice, D., 218<br />

Spigarelli, F., 8<br />

Spitz, J. J., 340, 341<br />

Stahl, G. K., 138, 141, 214<br />

Stearns, L., 126<br />

Stein, J. C., 56<br />

Stephan, J., 122, 124<br />

Stevens, G. V. G., 44<br />

Stoltenberg, C., 236<br />

Strange, R., 13<br />

Stratton, J., 346<br />

Strother, S. G., 331, 332, 336<br />

Sturm, J-E., 58<br />

Subacchi, P., 84<br />

Subramanian, V., 54<br />

Sun, L. X., 39, 55, 74, 97, 188, 238<br />

Sun, S. L., 11, 14, 28, 30, 33<br />

Sunley, P., 240<br />

Sutherland, D., 14<br />

Swedenborg, B., 57<br />

Szulanski, G., 140


Tan, H., 12, 134, 179<br />

Tan, J., 213, 214, 218<br />

Tang, F.-C., 235, 236, 239<br />

Taylor, R., 39<br />

Teece, D. J., 13, 33<br />

Terheggen, A., 322<br />

Terpstra, R. H., 24<br />

Thomas, D., 244<br />

Thomas, M., 339, 341, 344<br />

Thomas W. B., 12<br />

Tian, Y., 39<br />

Tianle, Y., 55<br />

Tihanyi, L., 13<br />

Tijaja, J., 321–2<br />

Timmerman, K., 345<br />

Tin, A., 332, 334, 335, 336, 337, 339<br />

Ting,C.C.,336<br />

Tolentino, P. E., 2, 392<br />

Toncar, M., 379, 380<br />

Tong, J. T., 24<br />

Trivedi, P. K., 56<br />

Truman, E. M., 100<br />

Tse, D. K., 178<br />

Tull, D. M., 316<br />

Tulman, J. P.<br />

Tung, R. L., 12, 13, 24, 32, 33, 126<br />

Turner, A., 189<br />

Uhlaner, R. T., 214<br />

Vaara, E., 141<br />

Vahlne, J.-E., 12, 33<br />

Vaidyanath, D., 140, 153<br />

van den Bosch, F. A. J., 139, 140<br />

Vandaele, J., 318<br />

Vanoli, L., 2, 392<br />

Vasavada, U., 57<br />

Vaughan, V., 331<br />

Vega-Redondo, F., 263<br />

Verdin, P., 54<br />

Vernon, R., 13<br />

Voigt, A., 138, 153, 214<br />

Volberda, H. W., 33<br />

von Neumann, J., 263<br />

Voss, H., 12, 40, 42, 55, 123, 158, 179,<br />

191, 236, 238<br />

Vyas, D., 12<br />

Wadhwa, V., 217<br />

Walter, G. A., 213<br />

Wan, W., 218<br />

Wang, C. M., 264<br />

Wang, D., 13<br />

Wang, K., 120<br />

Wang, M. Y., 39, 158<br />

Wang, W., 24<br />

Wang, Y., 41<br />

Wanling, D., 3, 109, 392<br />

Ward, S., 145<br />

Warner, M., 39, 55<br />

Wei,W.,8,391<br />

Weidenbaum, M., 250<br />

Wiedersheim-Paul, F., 108, 177<br />

Weil, S., 312<br />

Weiss, M. A., 99, 101<br />

Wells, L., 108, 177, 315<br />

Wenk, K., 188<br />

Wesson, T., 178<br />

West, A. S., 214<br />

Westhead, P., 39<br />

Whalley, J., 191<br />

Wheeler, D., 56<br />

Wheeler, M., 56<br />

Whitley, R. D., 218<br />

Whittington, L., 265, 273<br />

Wiersema, F., 123<br />

Wild, F., 318<br />

Williams, J. T., 58<br />

Williamson, O. E., 177<br />

Williamson, P. J., 178, 258, 316<br />

Winter, S. G., 215<br />

Wiseman, P. M., 126<br />

Wiseman, R., 124<br />

Witt, M. A., 12, 13, 32<br />

Wolf, B. M., 57<br />

Wong, J., 97, 98<br />

Wong, S. R., 126, 238<br />

Woywode, M., 5<br />

Woyzbun, E., 274<br />

Wright, C., 336<br />

Wright, M., 109<br />

Wu, B., 237<br />

Wu, D., 120<br />

Wu, F., 39, 55, 74, 178, 179<br />

Wu, H., 46, 238–9<br />

Wu, J., 128<br />

Wu, X., 3, 392<br />

Xian, W., 340<br />

Xiaobo, W., 3, 109<br />

Xiaoping, D., 15, 329<br />

PROOF<br />

Author Index 403


404 Author Index<br />

Xin, L., 14, 55, 179<br />

Xu, B., 122, 124<br />

Xu, C., 24<br />

Xu, X., 39, 55<br />

Xue, Q., 12<br />

Yan, D., 11<br />

Yang, C. N., 336<br />

Yang, D., 55<br />

Yang, H., 179<br />

Yang,J.Y.Y.,56<br />

Yang, S., 340–1<br />

Yang, X., 218<br />

Yao, S., 14<br />

Yao, Y., 350<br />

Yauch, A., 344<br />

Yeh, R.-S., 13<br />

Yeo, H. S., 55<br />

Yeung, B., 55<br />

Yeung, H. W., 55, 109, 124, 143<br />

Yin, E., 258<br />

Yin, R. K., 142, 222<br />

Yip, G. S., 12, 39, 41, 55<br />

Yiu, D., 13, 14, 33<br />

Yongjiang, S., 3<br />

Young, M., 24, 133<br />

Young, S., 55, 178<br />

Yu, J., 350<br />

Yuanxing, Z., 338<br />

Zaheer, S., 158<br />

Zahra, S. A., 39<br />

Zander, U., 13<br />

Zanin, V., 237<br />

Zemin, J., 15, 336<br />

Zeng, M., 178, 316<br />

ZEW, 212<br />

Zhan, J. X., 39, 178<br />

Zhang, H., 350<br />

Zhang, M., 82, 83, 85, 191<br />

Zhang, W., 7<br />

Zhang, Y., 161, 191<br />

Zhao, H., 41<br />

Zhao,X.D.,15<br />

Zheng, P., 12<br />

Zheng, S., 120<br />

Zheng, Y., 1, 391<br />

Zhimin, M., 335<br />

Zhoa, M., 55<br />

Zhou, N., 128<br />

Zhou, W., 179<br />

Zhu, Z., 57<br />

Zollo, M., 140<br />

Zorn, T., 126<br />

Zou, S., 39<br />

Zucchella, A., 39<br />

Zuyun, J., 360<br />

PROOF


Subject Index<br />

AAA, see American Automobile<br />

Association (AAA)<br />

absorptive capacity, 137–51, 215–20<br />

conceptual model of, 220<br />

cross-border mergers and acquisitions<br />

and, from China, 142–50<br />

Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />

Computing business, 143–7<br />

TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />

TV business, 147–50<br />

individual, 220<br />

multidimensional perspective of,<br />

219–20<br />

multilevel perspective on, 216–19<br />

individual levels, 216–17<br />

national levels, 218–19<br />

organizational levels, 217–18<br />

national, 220<br />

organizational, 220<br />

preferred research method for, 220–2<br />

data collection for, 221–2<br />

results of, 222–8<br />

theoretical model for, 138–42<br />

case study research method, 142<br />

strategic assets, 140–2<br />

Academy of Management Annual<br />

Meeting, 151<br />

acquisitions<br />

of Benelli, 356–8, 366–7<br />

cross-border, 30<br />

of IBM Personal Computing business,<br />

143–7<br />

of Thomson’s TV business, 147–50<br />

of Volvo, 384–5<br />

see also mergers and acquisitions<br />

(M&As)<br />

AD Week, 335<br />

Administration of Overseas Investment<br />

Projects, 15<br />

AEI, see American Eastern International<br />

(AEI)<br />

AERC, see African Economic Research<br />

Consortium (AERC)<br />

AES Wind Generation, 91<br />

405<br />

PROOF<br />

Africa<br />

future research on, 293<br />

limitations of, 293<br />

outward foreign direct investment in,<br />

Chinese, 6–7, 279–98<br />

future research on, 293<br />

limitations of, 293<br />

theory and hypothesis on, 279–84<br />

dependent variables, 284–90<br />

results on, 290–1<br />

Africa Frontier Advisory, 305<br />

African Development Bank, 312<br />

African Economic Research Consortium<br />

(AERC), 282, 303, 306–9<br />

African Growth and Opportunities<br />

Agreement (AGOA), 305<br />

Agence France Presse, 332<br />

agency theory, 124<br />

AGOA, see African Growth and<br />

Opportunities Agreement (AGOA)<br />

Agricultural Bank of China, 94<br />

AIC, see Akaike Information Criterion<br />

(AIC)<br />

Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),<br />

47, 62<br />

Aluminum Corporation of China, 25<br />

American Automobile Association<br />

(AAA), 341<br />

American Eastern International (AEI),<br />

330, 331<br />

Anglo-American CEO compensation,<br />

132<br />

Animal Kingdom, 340<br />

Anshan Iron & Steel Group Corporation<br />

Apax, 91<br />

APF, 262<br />

Aprilia, 364<br />

Areva T&D, 91<br />

ASEAN, see Association of Southeast<br />

Asian Nations (ASEAN)<br />

Asia, 88<br />

Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 50,<br />

179<br />

Asian-African Bandung Conference, 281


406 Subject Index<br />

Asian capitalism, 219<br />

Asian Driver program, 303, 312<br />

Asian Tigers, 315<br />

Asian Trade Center, 340<br />

assembling industries, 31<br />

asset exploration, 119<br />

Associated Press, 346<br />

Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />

(ASEAN), 376<br />

AST Computers, 143<br />

ATLAS.ti, 220<br />

AU, 320<br />

Audi, 116, 384<br />

Australia and New Zealand Bank, 95<br />

automobile industry, 8, 377–80<br />

see also Geely Automobile Holdings<br />

Limited (Geely Auto)<br />

Aviation Industry Corporation of<br />

China, 27<br />

Aviva, 95<br />

bamboo capitalism, 6<br />

Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned<br />

Nations, 300<br />

Bank of China, 90, 94, 341<br />

Baosteel Group Corporation, 30, 236<br />

BBC News, 281<br />

Beastie Boys, 344<br />

Beijing Olympics, 185<br />

Benelli, 8<br />

acquisition of, 356–8, 366–7<br />

post-, phase of, 367–70<br />

industrial activities, 368–9<br />

operational changes, 367–8<br />

organizational changes, 367–8<br />

sales activities, in commercial<br />

network, 369–70<br />

problem analysis of, 370–1<br />

by Qianjiang Group, 358–61<br />

international expansion of, 360–1<br />

strengths of, 359–60<br />

‘Benelli Garage,’ 356<br />

BG Group, 95<br />

BHP, 264, 272<br />

Big Blue, 145<br />

Black Rock, 91<br />

Blackstone Group, 31, 91, 259<br />

Bluesky, 360<br />

BMW, 116, 384<br />

Boateng, 55<br />

PROOF<br />

BOE, 41<br />

Bok Tower, 341<br />

Boston Consulting Group, 148<br />

BP Plc, 95<br />

BRIC motorcycle market, 360<br />

Brookhill LLC, 339–40<br />

bureaucratic administration, 16–22<br />

Business China, 147<br />

Business Source Premier, 93<br />

Business Wire, 339<br />

BYD Auto, 107<br />

CACCP, see Citizens against Communist<br />

Chinese Propaganda (CACCP)<br />

Cadbury, 95<br />

CAGR, 362<br />

Canada, 257–74<br />

Chinese Investment Corporation<br />

in, 88<br />

Chinese outward foreign direct<br />

investment in, 261–3<br />

foreign direct investment in, 6,<br />

260–1<br />

game modeling in, 263–4<br />

interpretation of, 268–71<br />

key players, 265–7<br />

Petro-China, 271–2<br />

research on, 264–8<br />

structure of, 267–8<br />

investment by Chinese<br />

state-controlled entities in, 6<br />

state controlled funds and entities in,<br />

258–60<br />

closed, 269<br />

open, 269<br />

predictions of, 270–1<br />

restricted access to, 269–70<br />

Cape Canaveral military base, 335<br />

Capital Iron & Steel, 30<br />

capital movements theory, 12–13<br />

capitalism<br />

Asian, 219<br />

bamboo, 6<br />

liberal market model of, 218–19<br />

theory of, 218<br />

western-style, 330<br />

CAS, see Chinese Academy of Sciences<br />

(CAS)


CCPIT, see China Council for the<br />

Promotion of International Trade<br />

(CCPIT)<br />

CDB, see China Development Bank<br />

(CDB)<br />

CECIE, see China Export & Credit<br />

Insurance Cooperation (CECIE)<br />

CEMEC, 313<br />

Center of Competitiveness, 90, 93<br />

Central Florida Future, 345<br />

Central Huijin Investment Company,<br />

87, 90, 99<br />

CEO compensation<br />

Anglo-American aspect of, 132<br />

Granger causality tests for, 127–8<br />

methodology for, 128<br />

results of, 128–32<br />

variables for, 127, 128<br />

internationalization and, 125–7<br />

reverse causation between, 125–32<br />

Chemical Engineering Machinery<br />

Factory, 358<br />

Chesapeake Energy, 91<br />

Chicago Sun Times, 337<br />

China<br />

automobile industry, role in<br />

globalization of, 8, 377–80<br />

Chinese Investment Corporation<br />

in, 88<br />

‘Go Global’ policy in, 11<br />

gross domestic product of, 11<br />

motorcycling industry in, 364–6<br />

outward foreign direct investment<br />

from, global, 109–10, 234–8<br />

characteristics of, 238–9<br />

development of, 238–9<br />

theoretical perspectives on, 109–10<br />

state in, institutional perspective on<br />

role of, 1<br />

two-step currency reform in, 44<br />

China Construction Bank, 90, 94<br />

China Council for the Promotion of<br />

International Trade (CCPIT), 180,<br />

262<br />

China Daily, 385<br />

China Desk or Investment Office, 165<br />

China Development Bank (CDB), 22, 94<br />

China Everbright Bank, 94<br />

China Export & Credit Insurance<br />

Cooperation (CECIE), 22<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 407<br />

China Forum Bayer, 222<br />

China Goes Global Conference, 230, 274<br />

China Guangdong Nuclear Power<br />

Holding Co., Ltd., 27<br />

China Huaneng Group, 26<br />

China Investment Promotion Agency<br />

(CIPA), 166, 181<br />

China Jianyin Investment Company, 87,<br />

365<br />

China Merchants Group, 25<br />

China Metallurgical Group<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China Mimetals Corporation, 25, 257,<br />

260–263, 270, 272<br />

China Mobile Communications<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China National Aviation Holding<br />

Corporation, 25<br />

China National Cereals, Oils &<br />

Foodstuffs Corporation, 25<br />

China National Chemical<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China National Offshore Oil Company<br />

(CNOOC), 25, 49, 239, 257, 260, 269<br />

China National Petroleum Corporation,<br />

25, 271<br />

China Noferrous Metal Mining &<br />

Construction (Group) Co., Ltd., 26<br />

China North Industries Group<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China Ocean Shipping (Group)<br />

Company, 25<br />

China Petrochemical Corporation, 25<br />

China Poly Group Corporation, 27<br />

China Power Investment<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China Railway Hong Kong, 94<br />

China Reinsurance, 94<br />

China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd., 25<br />

China Rules, 1, 391<br />

China Security Regulation Committee<br />

(CSRC), 127<br />

China Shipping (Group) Company, 25<br />

China State Construction Engineering<br />

Corporation, 26<br />

China Telecom, 264<br />

China Travel Service (CTS) Ltd., 329,<br />

331, 340<br />

China Unicom Corporation, 26<br />

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 143


408 Subject Index<br />

Chinese brand, 28, 118<br />

Chinese Communist Party, 15, 50<br />

Chinese EXIM Bank, 281, 310,<br />

314, 319<br />

Chinese Folk Culture Villages, 329<br />

Chinese foreign direct investment<br />

in Canada, 6<br />

in Europe, 4–6<br />

global, case studies on, 7–8<br />

inflow-outflow ratio of, 38<br />

macro-environmental determinants<br />

of, 1–3<br />

micro-environmental determinants of,<br />

3–4<br />

in North America, 6<br />

outward, in Africa, 6–7<br />

Chinese Government, ‘open-door’ policy<br />

by, 97<br />

Chinese ‘insatiable appetite,’ 236<br />

Chinese Investment Corporation<br />

(CIC), 3, 31, 81, 86, 87, 89,<br />

257, 259<br />

Annual Report by, 88<br />

in Asia, 88<br />

in Blackstone Group, 31<br />

board of directors for, 87<br />

in Canada, 88<br />

in China, 88<br />

establishment of, 81, 259<br />

funding for, 86<br />

global expansion of, 81<br />

headquarters for, 86<br />

in Hong Kong, 88<br />

investment strategy of, 3, 98<br />

in Morgan Stanley, 31<br />

in North America, 88<br />

ownership by, 90<br />

purpose of, 86<br />

SAFE, competition with, 81<br />

Transparency Index of, 100<br />

website for, 88<br />

Chinese mergers and acquisitions, 41<br />

cross-border, 142–50<br />

Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />

Computing business, 143–7<br />

combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />

knowledge of business, 143–4<br />

strategy for, effective execution,<br />

145–7<br />

PROOF<br />

TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />

TV business, 147–50<br />

combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />

knowledge of business, 147–8<br />

strategy for, problematic execution<br />

of, 149–50<br />

Chinese Ministry of Commerce<br />

(MOFCOM), 98–9, 285, 304<br />

Chinese Ministry of Finance, 285, 366<br />

Chinese Ministry of Industry and<br />

Technology Information, 366<br />

Chinese Ministry of Science and<br />

Technology, 366<br />

Chinese multi-national enterprises,<br />

advantages of, 109<br />

Chinese outward foreign direct<br />

investment, 234–8<br />

in Africa, 6–7, 279–96<br />

future research on, 293<br />

limitations of, 293<br />

theory and hypothesis on,<br />

279–90<br />

in Canada, 261–3<br />

characteristics of, 238–9<br />

in China, theoretical perspectives on,<br />

109–10<br />

country of origin and, role of, 2,<br />

54–75, see also vector<br />

autoregressive (VAR) model<br />

development of, 238–9<br />

empirical analysis of determinants<br />

of, 2<br />

in Europe, 4–5<br />

institutional perspective on<br />

formal, 15–27<br />

informal, 27–8<br />

key driving forces of, 41<br />

macroeconomic determinants of,<br />

38–50<br />

methodology and data for,<br />

46–7<br />

model and hypothesis for,<br />

43–6<br />

motivations for, 12–14<br />

multi-national enterprises, 28–9<br />

industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />

institutional influence on, 28–9<br />

location of, choice of, 30<br />

mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />

strategic choices of, 29–32


policy implications for, 318–21<br />

strategic capabilities, development<br />

of, 318–20<br />

state for, role of, 14<br />

in Sub-Saharan Africa, 7<br />

vector autoregressive model, 58–63<br />

analysis of, 66–72<br />

exogeneity, tests for, 63–6<br />

volume statistics of, 11<br />

Chinese sovereign wealth funds, 85–96,<br />

88, 98, 99, 101<br />

characteristics of, 86–7<br />

government policy behind, 97–8<br />

investment strategies of, 87–96<br />

issues concerning, 99–101<br />

private policy behind, 98–9<br />

purpose of, 85–6<br />

Chinese State Council, 358<br />

Chongqing Loncin Industry Co., Ltd.,<br />

365<br />

Chrysler, 115, 141<br />

CIC, see Chinese Investment<br />

Corporation (CIC)<br />

CIPA, see China Investment Promotion<br />

Agency (CIPA)<br />

CIS, see Commonwealth of Independent<br />

States (CIS)<br />

Citic Capital Holdings Ltd., 91<br />

CITIC Group, 25<br />

Citizens against Communist Chinese<br />

Propaganda (CACCP), 346<br />

closed state controlled funds and entity,<br />

269<br />

cluster theory, 240<br />

CNOOC, see China National Offshore<br />

Oil Company (CNOOC)<br />

Coca Cola, 339<br />

combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />

‘coming in’ investment streams, 235<br />

Commercial Bank of China, 305<br />

commercial hubs, 164<br />

Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 95<br />

Commonwealth of Independent States<br />

(CIS), 181<br />

competition effect, 179<br />

Conference Board of Canada, 260, 269,<br />

272<br />

cost reducing foreign direct investment,<br />

315<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 409<br />

Countries and Industries for Overseas<br />

Investment Guidance Catalog, 4,159<br />

country image, 28<br />

cross-border Chinese mergers and<br />

acquisitions, 28, 142–50<br />

Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />

Computing business, 143–7<br />

combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />

knowledge of business, 143–4<br />

strategy for, effective execution,<br />

145–7<br />

TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />

TV business, 147–50<br />

combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />

knowledge of business, 147–8<br />

strategy for, problematic execution<br />

of, 149–50<br />

CSRC, see China Security Regulation<br />

Committee (CSRC)<br />

CTS, see China Travel Service (CTS) Ltd.<br />

Cypress Gardens, 341<br />

Daimler Benz, 141<br />

Dalai Lama, 340, 343, 346<br />

Darfur, 281<br />

Data Appendix, 58<br />

Datamonitor – Company, 93<br />

Days Inn, 340, 348<br />

De Tomaso Industries, Inc., 356<br />

Dell, 145<br />

demonstration effect, 180<br />

Department of Foreign Capital and<br />

Overseas Investment (DFCOI), 16,<br />

21, 22<br />

Department of Outward Investment and<br />

Economic Cooperation (DOIEC),<br />

22, 38<br />

dependent variable, 43<br />

Detroit International Auto Show, 386–7<br />

Deutsche Bank Research<br />

developed nations, 264<br />

development funds, 83<br />

DFCOI, see Department of Foreign<br />

Capital and Overseas Investment<br />

(DFCOI)<br />

DG Trade, 181<br />

Diageo, 91<br />

Disney-MGM Studios, 333<br />

Disney World, 330–1, 333, 347<br />

diversification, international, 123–4


410 Subject Index<br />

DOIEC, see Department of Outward<br />

Investment and Economic<br />

Cooperation (DOIEC)<br />

double-edged sword, 32<br />

Drax Group Plc, 95<br />

Drivetrain Systems International (DSI),<br />

115<br />

Ducati, 364<br />

dummies, 128<br />

Eclectic Paradigm Theory, 39, 177,<br />

314–15<br />

Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 285,<br />

303<br />

‘Economic Observer, The,’ 14<br />

Economist, The, 330, 344<br />

Economist.com<br />

economy, openness of, 45<br />

ECOWAS, 320<br />

educated tourists, 335<br />

efficiency-seeking, 112<br />

EIBC, see Export-Import Bank of China<br />

(EIBC)<br />

EIU, see Economic Intelligence Unit<br />

(EIU)<br />

EME, see emerging market enterprise<br />

(EME)<br />

emerging market enterprise (EME),<br />

12–13, 28–9<br />

Encyclopedia Britannica, 263<br />

Enterprise Institute of Development<br />

Research Center of the State<br />

Council, 16<br />

Epcot Center, 333<br />

Ericsson, 187<br />

ethnic enclave, 240<br />

Europe<br />

Chinese outward foreign direct<br />

investment in, 4–6, 157–72<br />

pull factors for, 163–7<br />

push factors for, 158–63<br />

rise of, 175–93<br />

foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />

4–6<br />

Investment Promotion Agency in, 4<br />

outward foreign direct investment in,<br />

Chinese, 157–72<br />

conceptualizations of, 180–1<br />

pull factors for, 163–7<br />

push factors for, 158–63<br />

PROOF<br />

rise of, 175–93<br />

theoretical models for, 176–80<br />

small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />

enterprises in, 234–52<br />

cluster theory, 240<br />

ethnic enclave, 240–1<br />

industrial districts, 239–40<br />

Prato, 245–51<br />

scoping study on, 241–2<br />

European Journal of Development Research,<br />

321<br />

European Union, Chinese outward<br />

foreign direct investments in, 5,<br />

167–70<br />

competition of, 188–90<br />

entry mode for, 187–8<br />

evidence of, 181–93<br />

locations for, 181–7<br />

perspectives on, 170–2<br />

exchange rate, 44–5, 48–9<br />

exogeneity tests, 63–6<br />

Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC), 22<br />

Falun Gong religious movement, 346<br />

Fantasy of Flight, 341<br />

FAO, 312<br />

Far Eastern Economic Review, 341<br />

FDI, see foreign direct investment (FDI)<br />

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 335<br />

financial investors, 83<br />

Financial Times, 88, 164<br />

firm age, 128<br />

firm size, 128<br />

Florida Historical Quarterly, 350<br />

Florida Splendid China (FSC), 329–50<br />

conception of, 330–1<br />

construction of, 332–5<br />

controversies in<br />

protests for, 343–6<br />

Tibetan display, 343–4<br />

opening, 336–8<br />

preparations for, 335–6<br />

park design for, 331–2<br />

promoting, 338–40<br />

struggles of, 341–3<br />

Sunny Yang as president of, 340–1<br />

Flying Tigers, 344<br />

FOCAC, see Forum for China African<br />

Cooperation (FOCAC)<br />

‘follow the command’ approach, 226


Forbidden City, 332<br />

Ford, 107, 115, 116, 385<br />

forecast error variance decomposition,<br />

66–72<br />

foreign currency reserves, 46<br />

foreign direct investment (FDI)<br />

in Canada, 260–1<br />

Chinese<br />

in Canada, 6<br />

in Europe, 4–6<br />

in Germany, 5–6<br />

global, case studies on, 7–8<br />

inflow-outflow ratio of, 38<br />

macro-environmental determinants<br />

of, 1–3<br />

micro-environmental determinants<br />

of, 3–4<br />

in North America, 6<br />

outward, in Africa, 6–7<br />

by Chinese manufacturing firms,<br />

107–20<br />

case study method for, 110<br />

cross-, analysis of, 117–19<br />

Geely Holding Group, 115–17<br />

motives for, 117–18<br />

patterns of, 118–19<br />

Sany Group, 110–13<br />

single, analysis of, 110–17<br />

Wanxiang Group, 113–15<br />

cost reducing, 315<br />

from developed countries<br />

extension of, 108–9<br />

theories, traditional, 108<br />

leveraging, 315<br />

market-seeking, 315<br />

resource-seeking, 315<br />

South-South, 177–8<br />

theoretical foundation for,<br />

108–10<br />

foreign exchange policy, 15, 21<br />

foreign government-controlled<br />

company, 260<br />

formal Chinese outward foreign direct<br />

investment, 15–27<br />

bureaucratic administration,<br />

16–22<br />

government ownership, 22–7<br />

policies, 15–16<br />

Fortescue Metals Group, 91<br />

Fortune, 137, 138, 142<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 411<br />

Forum for China African Cooperation<br />

(FOCAC), 321<br />

‘four dragons,’ 30<br />

‘four tigers,’ 30<br />

Fourteen Chinese Communist National<br />

Congress, 15<br />

FSC, see Florida Splendid China (FSC)<br />

fund managers, 82<br />

Galanz, 49<br />

game modeling, 6, 263–4<br />

interpretation of, 268–71<br />

key players, 265<br />

interests and concerns of,<br />

265–7<br />

Petro-China, 271–2<br />

research on, 264–8<br />

structure of, 267–8<br />

‘Gateway to Europe,’ 184<br />

Gateway Tours, 340<br />

GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Ltd., 92<br />

GDH Limited, 26<br />

GDP, see gross domestic product (GDP)<br />

Geely Automobile Holdings Limited<br />

(Geely Auto), 115, 117, 377<br />

Geely Holding Group (Geely), 107, 110,<br />

115–17<br />

future outlook of, 387–8<br />

global brand, establishment of,<br />

386–7<br />

international role of, development of,<br />

383–4<br />

limited holdings in, 380–7<br />

overseas investment by, 115–16<br />

market-seeking and, 116<br />

motives of, 116<br />

Volvo, acquisition of, 116,<br />

384–5<br />

overview of, 115<br />

performance of, overview of,<br />

382–3<br />

resource augmentation and control,<br />

degree of, 116–17<br />

strategic asset-seeking by, 116<br />

strategic shifts by, 385–6<br />

General Motors, 107<br />

Generalized Least Squares, 290<br />

generalized method of moments (GMM),<br />

128<br />

Generic, 360–1


412 Subject Index<br />

Germany, Chinese mergers and<br />

acquisitions in, 212–30<br />

absorptive capacity of, 215–20<br />

multidimensional perspective of,<br />

219–20<br />

multilevel perspective on, 216–19<br />

preferred research method for, 220–2<br />

foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />

5–6<br />

integration of, 213–15<br />

Sany Group in, motives for, 111–12<br />

GFC, see global financial crisis (GFC)<br />

GIC, 86<br />

global brand, 386–7<br />

‘Global Champions,’ 236–7, 244<br />

global financial crisis (GFC), 236<br />

global foreign direct investment,<br />

Chinese, 7–8<br />

Globalization of Chinese Enterprises, 1, 391<br />

GMM, see generalized method of<br />

moments (GMM)<br />

GNP, see gross national product (GNP)<br />

‘Go Global’ policy, 3, 11, 15, 49, 98–9,<br />

158, 236<br />

‘going abroad’ policy, 15<br />

‘going out’ investment streams, 235<br />

Golden Peacock Theater, 339<br />

Goldman Sachs, 144<br />

Goodman Group, 92<br />

Government of Canada, 260<br />

Government of Singapore Investment<br />

Corporation, 84<br />

government ownership, 22–7<br />

GoVideo, 149<br />

Granger causality tests, 2, 127–8<br />

control variable for, 128<br />

methodology for, 128<br />

results of, 128–32<br />

variables for, 127<br />

Great Wall, 333, 348<br />

greenfield operations, 239<br />

gross domestic product (GDP), 11<br />

gross national product (GNP), 43–4<br />

Guangdong National Shipping<br />

Corporation, 27<br />

Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited, 26<br />

Gulliver’s Travels, 331<br />

H2, 130–1<br />

Haier, 41, 49, 236<br />

PROOF<br />

Handelsblatt, 281<br />

Hannan-Quinn Criterion, 62<br />

Harley Davidson, 362<br />

Harvard University, 230, 274<br />

heavyweight industries, 50<br />

Hewlett-Packard, 143<br />

‘Hidden Champion,’ 212<br />

Hierro Peru Mining, 30<br />

Holley Group, 282, 310<br />

Honda, 362, 364<br />

Hong Kong, 88<br />

Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 115, 329<br />

Houston Chronicle, 337<br />

HP-Compaq, 146<br />

Huawei Technologies, 282, 310<br />

Huaweik Technologies, 26, 49, 236<br />

Hunan Valin Iron & Steel (Group) Co.,<br />

Ltd., 26<br />

Hungary, 166<br />

IB, see international business (IB)<br />

IBM, 43, 138, 143<br />

IBM Personal Computing (PC) business,<br />

143–7<br />

ICA, see Investment Canada Act (ICA)<br />

ICT, see information communication<br />

technology (ICT)<br />

Idea Center, 145<br />

IdeaPad, 145<br />

IDT Hungary, 166<br />

IFR, see impulse response function (IRF)<br />

IMF, 75, 83, 89, 101, 303, 312, 319<br />

impulse response function (IRF), 69<br />

impulse response analysis, 66–72<br />

income, 43–4<br />

independent variables, 43–6<br />

exchange rate, 44–5<br />

foreign currency reserves, 46<br />

income, 43–4<br />

interest rate, 45<br />

openness of economy, 45<br />

technology, 43<br />

Indesit Group, 356<br />

individual absorptive capacity, 220<br />

individual influence, 216<br />

industrial activities, 368–9<br />

Industrial and Commercial Bank of<br />

China, 94, 309<br />

industrial districts, 239–40<br />

Industry Canada, 266


inflow-outflow ratio of Chinese foreign<br />

direct investment, 38<br />

InFocus Corp., 150<br />

informal Chinese outward foreign direct<br />

investment, 27–8<br />

information communication technology<br />

(ICT), 235<br />

‘insatiable appetite,’ Chinese, 236<br />

institutional influence, ‘dark side’ of, 32<br />

intangible resources, 4<br />

Intel Capital, 92<br />

interest rate, 45<br />

internalization, 13, 316<br />

international business (IB), 13, 258<br />

International Campaign for Tibet, 343<br />

international diversification, 123–4<br />

International Lease Finance<br />

Corporation, 92<br />

internationalization, 12, 122–34, 125–7,<br />

130<br />

CEO compensation and<br />

Granger causality tests for, 127–8<br />

reverse causation between, 125–7<br />

hypothesis for, 123–5<br />

of multi-national enterprises, 108<br />

theoretical framework for, 123–5<br />

Invest in Germany, 185, 195<br />

Investment Canada Act (ICA), 260, 261,<br />

266, 269<br />

Investment Development Path (IDP), 2,<br />

38, 42, 43–4, 108<br />

investment funds, 85<br />

Investment Promotion Agency (IPA), 5,<br />

157<br />

in Europe, 4, 180–1<br />

in Hungary, 166<br />

in Poland, 167<br />

investments<br />

of Chinese Investment Corporation,<br />

3, 98<br />

by Chinese state-controlled entities, 6<br />

inward, 304<br />

in Italy, 6<br />

return on, 3<br />

for sovereign wealth funds, 87–96<br />

inward investment, 304<br />

IPA, see Investment Promotion Agency<br />

(IPA)<br />

Italian Piaggio Group, 364<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 413<br />

Italy<br />

foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />

5–6<br />

motorcycling industry in, 362–4<br />

small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />

enterprises in, 242–5<br />

trade and investment in, and Chinese<br />

diaspora in, 6<br />

Japan Bank for International<br />

Cooperation Institute (JBICI),<br />

179–80<br />

JBICI, see Japan Bank for International<br />

Cooperation Institute (JBICI)<br />

JC Flowers PE Fund, 92<br />

Jiangmen Grand River Group Co. Ltd.,<br />

365<br />

Jinchuan Group Limited, 27<br />

joint venture (JV), 239<br />

JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration<br />

Production, 92<br />

JV, see joint venture (JV)<br />

k-step-ahead forecast, 66<br />

Kawasaki, 362, 364<br />

Keeway, 360–1<br />

Kennedy Space Center, 335<br />

knowledge, 4, 143–4, 219<br />

KPSS, see Kwiatkowski-Phillips-<br />

Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test<br />

KW, 370<br />

Kwiatkowski-Phillips- Schmidt-Shin<br />

(KPSS) test, 61<br />

latecomer firms, 109<br />

Lee-Potter, 244<br />

Legend Holdings Ltd., 26<br />

Lenovo (Legend Group), 41, 43,<br />

138, 236<br />

combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />

IBM Personal Computing (PC)<br />

business, acquisition of, 143–7<br />

knowledge of business, 143–4<br />

strategy for, effective execution, 145–7<br />

Lenovo University, 144<br />

leveraging foreign direct investment, 315<br />

LG.Philips LCD Co., 150<br />

liberal market model of capitalism,<br />

218–19<br />

light touch approach, 214–15, 219


414 Subject Index<br />

limited holdings, 380–87<br />

Linaburg, Carl, 100<br />

Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index,<br />

100<br />

linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL)<br />

model, 109<br />

linkages driver, 315<br />

Lion Group, Malaysia’s, 360<br />

listening posts, 179<br />

LLL, see linkage, leverage, and learning<br />

(LLL) model<br />

local enterprises, 264, 266<br />

location-bound approach, 55<br />

London Olympics, 185<br />

London Stock Exchange, 96<br />

Lung Ming, 92<br />

MachineA, 224–7<br />

MachineB, 227–8<br />

MachineCN, 227–8<br />

macro-environmental determinants of<br />

Chinese foreign direct investment,<br />

1–3<br />

China, institutional perspective on<br />

role of state in, 1<br />

outward foreign direct investment,<br />

Chinese, 2<br />

sovereign wealth funds, 2–3<br />

‘Made-in-Germany’ brand, 228<br />

Magic Kingdom, 333<br />

Manganese Bronze Holdings, 115<br />

manufacturing firm investments,<br />

motives and patterns of Chinese, 3<br />

Marco Polo, 333<br />

market knowledge, 219<br />

market-seeking foreign direct<br />

investment, 315<br />

M&As, see mergers and acquisitions<br />

(M&As)<br />

McKinsey & Company, 144<br />

McKinsey Global Institute, 313<br />

MENA, see Middle East and North Africa<br />

(MENA)<br />

Mercedes-Benz, 116, 384<br />

mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 239<br />

Chinese cross-border, 41, 142–50<br />

cross-border, 41, 212–13<br />

Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />

Computing business, 143–7<br />

combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />

PROOF<br />

knowledge of business, 143–4<br />

strategy for, effective execution,<br />

145–7<br />

TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />

TV business, 147–50<br />

combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />

knowledge of business, 147–8<br />

strategy for, problematic execution<br />

of, 149–50<br />

MFA, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

(MFA)<br />

MG Rover Group, 188, 385<br />

Miami Herald, 344<br />

micro-environmental determinants of<br />

Chinese foreign direct investment,<br />

3–4<br />

manufacturing firm investments,<br />

motives and patterns of Chinese, 3<br />

strategic assets, integration of<br />

knowledge and intangible<br />

resources into, 4<br />

Middle East and North Africa<br />

(MENA), 84<br />

Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 11,<br />

21, 22, 38, 46, 87, 98, 107, 159, 180<br />

Ministry of Domestic Commerce, 21<br />

Ministry of Finance (MOF), 22, 86, 87<br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 21, 98,<br />

159<br />

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic<br />

Cooperation (MOFTEC), 15, 21, 98<br />

Ministry of Science and Technology of<br />

the People’s Republic of China<br />

(MOST), 47<br />

Ministry of Taxation (MOT), 22<br />

MNC, see multinational company (MNC)<br />

MNE, see multi-national enterprises<br />

(MNE)<br />

MOC, 15<br />

Modern Cikande Industrial Estate,<br />

Indonesia’s, 360<br />

MOF, see Ministry of Finance (MOF)<br />

MOFCOM, see Ministry of Commerce<br />

(MOFCOM)<br />

MOFTEC, see Ministry of Foreign Trade<br />

and Economic Cooperation<br />

(MOFTEC)<br />

monetary policy, 21<br />

Morgan Stanley, 31, 92<br />

Morini, 364


MOST, see Ministry of Science and<br />

Technology of the People’s Republic<br />

of China (MOST)<br />

MOT, see Ministry of Taxation (MOT)<br />

Moto Guzzi, 356<br />

Motobi, 356<br />

MotoGp, 369<br />

motorcycling industry<br />

analysis of, 361–2<br />

global trends in, 362<br />

local trends in<br />

in China, 364–6<br />

in Italy, 362–4<br />

multi-national enterprises (MNE), 11,<br />

28–9<br />

Chinese, advantages of, 109<br />

industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />

institutional influence on,<br />

28–9<br />

internationalization of, 108<br />

location-bound approach to, 55<br />

location of, choice of, 30<br />

mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />

outward foreign direct investment by,<br />

Chinese, 28–9<br />

industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />

institutional influence on, 28–9<br />

location of, choice of, 30<br />

mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />

strategic choices of, 29–32<br />

strategic choices of, 29–32<br />

universalist approach to, 55<br />

Multifiber Agreement, 305<br />

multinational company (MNC), 54<br />

MV, 364<br />

Nam Kwong (Group) Company<br />

Limited, 27<br />

Nanjing Automobile, 188<br />

Napoleon, 11<br />

national absorptive capacity, 220<br />

National Australia Bank, 95<br />

National Bureau of Statistics of China<br />

(NBS), 46–7<br />

National Council, 87<br />

National Development and Reform<br />

Commission (NDRC), 87, 159, 161,<br />

366<br />

national identity, 28<br />

national influence, 216<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 415<br />

National Natural Science Foundation of<br />

China, 120<br />

National Planning Commission (NPC),<br />

15, 16<br />

see also State Development and Reform<br />

Commission (SDRC)<br />

NBS, see National Bureau of Statistics of<br />

China (NBS)<br />

NDRC, see National Development and<br />

Reform Commission (NDRC)<br />

neo-Marshallian cluster concept, 240<br />

NEPAD, 320<br />

net benefit test, 260<br />

Nobel Group, The, 93<br />

Nobel Oil Group, 93<br />

Noranda, 257, 260, 262–3, 269<br />

North America<br />

in Canada, investment by Chinese<br />

state-controlled entities in, 6<br />

Chinese Investment Corporation<br />

in, 88<br />

foreign direct investment in,<br />

Chinese, 6<br />

NPC, see National Planning Commission<br />

(NPC)<br />

Oaktress Capital Management, 93<br />

OECD, 75, 89, 234, 240, 257, 259, 314<br />

OEM, see original equipment<br />

manufacturer (OEM)<br />

OFDI, see outward foreign direct<br />

investment (OFDI)<br />

offshore mergers and acquisitions<br />

(OMA), 41<br />

OICA, 378<br />

OLI, see ownership, location,<br />

internalization (OLI)<br />

OLS, see ordinary least squares (OLS)<br />

OMA, see offshore mergers and<br />

acquisitions (OMA)<br />

‘100 Day’ program, 222<br />

‘open-door’ policy by Chinese<br />

Government, 15, 97, 236<br />

open state controlled funds and entity,<br />

269<br />

openness of economy, 45<br />

operational changes, 367–8<br />

ordinary least squares (OLS), 128<br />

organizational absorptive capacity, 220<br />

organizational changes, 367–8


416 Subject Index<br />

organizational influence, 216<br />

original equipment manufacturer<br />

(OEM), 187<br />

Orlando Business Journal, 341<br />

Orlando International Airport, 338<br />

Orlando Sentinel, 336, 341<br />

outside director ratio, 128<br />

outward foreign direct investment<br />

(OFDI)<br />

approval authority for, 16<br />

boundaries of, 15–16<br />

global statistics of, 11<br />

growth rate for, 11<br />

institutional framework for,<br />

15, 16<br />

via mergers and acquisitions, 11<br />

see also Chinese outward foreign<br />

direct investment<br />

ownership, location, internalization<br />

(OLI), 11, 39, 108, 315<br />

<strong>Palgrave</strong>, 391<br />

PBC, see People’s Bank of China (PBC)<br />

Penn West Energy Canada, 93<br />

pension reserve funds, 83<br />

People for the Ethical Treatment of<br />

Animals (PETA), 343<br />

People’s Bank of China (PBC), 21, 85, 86,<br />

87, 88<br />

People’s Palace, 319<br />

PETA, see People for the Ethical<br />

Treatment of Animals (PETA)<br />

Petro-China, 258, 260, 271, 272<br />

Philips, 187<br />

PMI, see post-merger integration (PMI)<br />

Poland, 167<br />

Politburo, 236<br />

portfolio investments, 83<br />

post-merger integration (PMI), 214<br />

Potala Palace, 343, 344<br />

Potash Co., 264, 272<br />

potential absorptive capacity, 215<br />

Powertrain Ltd., 385<br />

Prato, 245–51<br />

PRC Political Consultative Conference,<br />

337<br />

predictive causality, 73<br />

private policy, 98–9<br />

processing industries, 31<br />

product knowledge, 219<br />

PROOF<br />

Pronto Moda business model,<br />

248<br />

Proper Glory, 380<br />

psychic distance, 108, 177<br />

PT Bumi Resources Tbk, 93<br />

PT Sanex, Indonesia’s, 360<br />

‘pull’ factors, 50<br />

Qianjiang Group (QJ), 358–9<br />

international expansion of, 360–1<br />

strengths of, 359–60<br />

Qianjiang Motor Company<br />

QJ, see Qianjiang Group (QJ)<br />

‘quasi-government’ corporation, 345<br />

RCA, 148<br />

R&D, see research and development<br />

(R&D)<br />

realized absorptive capacity,<br />

215, 227<br />

‘reform and opening policy,’ 217<br />

research and development (R&D), 184,<br />

239<br />

reserve investment corporations, 83<br />

resource augmentation and control,<br />

degree of, 116–17<br />

resource-seeking foreign direct<br />

investment, 315<br />

return on investment, 3<br />

return on sales, 128<br />

reverse causation, 125–32<br />

reverse spillovers, 179<br />

Rio Tinto, 95<br />

RMB, 44, 48–9, 85–6<br />

Rolling Oaks Investment Properties LLP,<br />

348<br />

Royal Dutch Shell, 96<br />

SADC, 320<br />

SAFE, see State Administration of Foreign<br />

Exchange (SAFE)<br />

SAFE Investment Company, 96<br />

St. Petersburg Times, 344<br />

sales activities, in commercial network,<br />

369–70<br />

Samsung, 143<br />

Sanex Qianjiang Motor International,<br />

360<br />

Santiago Principles, 101


Sany Group (Sany), 110–13, 117<br />

efficiency-seeking by, 112<br />

overseas investment by, 111<br />

in Germany, motives for, 111–12<br />

overview of, 110–11<br />

resource augmentation and control by,<br />

112–13<br />

strategic asset-seeking by, 112<br />

Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (Sany<br />

Heavy), 111<br />

SASAC, see State-owned Assets<br />

Supervision and Administration<br />

Commission (SASAC)<br />

savings funds, 83<br />

SCFE, see state controlled funds and<br />

entity (SCFE)<br />

Scharwz Criterion, 62<br />

Schneider Corp., 149<br />

School of Oriental and African Studies,<br />

University of London, UK, 193<br />

SDC Platinum, 221<br />

SDRC, see State Development and<br />

Reform Commission (SDRC)<br />

SE, see standard error (SE) shock<br />

Sea World, 330, 347<br />

SEQ, see simultaneous equation (SEQ)<br />

model; structural equation (SEQ)<br />

model<br />

‘setting up enterprises overseas’<br />

concept, 15<br />

Severn Trent, 96<br />

SEZ, see Special Economic Zones (SEZ)<br />

Shanghai Automotive Industry<br />

Corporation, 27, 377<br />

Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation<br />

Shanghai Institutions of Higher<br />

Learning, 151<br />

Shanghai LTI Automobile Components<br />

Company Limited, 115<br />

Shanghai Overseas United Investment<br />

Co., Ltd.<br />

Shanghai Stock Exchange, 111,<br />

127, 217<br />

shareholder value, 316<br />

Shenhua Group Corporation, 27<br />

Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co.,<br />

Ltd., 27<br />

Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 127,<br />

217, 359<br />

Shougang Corporation, 27<br />

PROOF<br />

Subject Index 417<br />

Shum Yip Holdings Company<br />

Limited, 26<br />

Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial<br />

Machinery Co Ltd. (Tengzhong), 107<br />

simultaneous equation (SEQ) model, 58<br />

Sino-African Business Conference, 304<br />

Sinohem Corporation, 25<br />

Sinohydro Co., Ltd., 27<br />

Sinopec, 49, 236<br />

SinoSteel Corporation, 25<br />

SINOTRANS Changjiang National<br />

Shipping (Group) Corporation, 25<br />

‘sleeping dragon’, see China<br />

small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />

enterprise (SME), 234–52<br />

cluster theory, 240<br />

ethnic enclave, 240–1<br />

industrial districts, 239–40<br />

Prato, 245–51<br />

scoping study on, 241–2<br />

SME, see small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />

enterprise (SME)<br />

Social Security Fund, 87<br />

SOE, see state-owned enterprises (SOE)<br />

SOE ZTE, 317<br />

Songbird Estates, 93<br />

Sony, 143<br />

South Africa’s Standard Bank, 309<br />

South Gobi Energy Resources, 93<br />

South-South foreign direct investment,<br />

177–8<br />

sovereign wealth fund (SWF), 2–3,<br />

81–101, 100, 258<br />

Chinese, 85–96, 88, 98, 99, 101<br />

characteristics of, 86–7<br />

government policy behind, 97–8<br />

investment strategies of, 87–96<br />

issues concerning, 99–101<br />

private policy behind, 98–9<br />

purpose of, 85–6<br />

defined, 82, 259<br />

features of, 82–4<br />

global trends in, 84<br />

strategic objectives of, 101<br />

transparency of, 100<br />

types of, 82–3<br />

Special Economic Zones (SEZ), 171<br />

Splendid China Day, 336, 344<br />

Ssangyong Motors, 115<br />

stabilization funds, 83


418 Subject Index<br />

Stadium of the Martyrs, 319<br />

standard error (SE) shock, 69<br />

State Administration of Foreign<br />

Exchange (SAFE), 15, 22, 42, 47, 49,<br />

81, 86–9<br />

China Investment Corporation,<br />

competition with, 81<br />

investment strategy of, 98<br />

Transparency Index of, 100<br />

state controlled funds and entity (SCFE),<br />

257, 264<br />

in China, 258–60<br />

closed, 269<br />

open, 269<br />

predictions of, 270–1<br />

restricted access to, 269–70<br />

State Council, 15, 16, 87<br />

State Development and Reform<br />

Commission (SDRC), 15, 16, 22<br />

State Economic and Trade Commission,<br />

97<br />

State Grid Corporation of China<br />

state of China, institutional perspective<br />

on role of, 1<br />

State-owned Assets Supervision and<br />

Administration Commission<br />

(SASAC), 22, 50<br />

state-owned enterprises (SOE), 11, 22,<br />

49, 217<br />

state shareholding, 128<br />

strategic investors, 83<br />

Statistical Bulletins of Chinese Outward<br />

Foreign Direct Investment, 180<br />

strategic assets, 116, 140<br />

applying, 141–2<br />

intangible resources and, 4<br />

integrating, 140–1<br />

knowledge and, 4<br />

understanding, 140<br />

strategic industries, 50<br />

structural equation (SEQ) model, 58<br />

Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese foreign<br />

direct investment flows to, 300–22<br />

distinctiveness of, 311–17<br />

resources, 311–13<br />

trade reversal, 311–13<br />

dynamics of, 300–3<br />

eclectic theory of, 314–15<br />

estimates of, 303<br />

PROOF<br />

African Economic Research<br />

Consortium scoping study,<br />

306–9<br />

official, 303–6<br />

public-domain, 303–6<br />

United Nations Industrial<br />

Development Organization<br />

survey, 309–10<br />

outward, 7<br />

small private sector, studies of, 310–11<br />

strategic integration of, 313–14<br />

Suntec Power Holding, 107<br />

Suzuki, 362<br />

SWF, see sovereign wealth fund (SWF)<br />

SWF Institute, 88, 96<br />

TAMP, see TCL & Alcatel Mobile Phones<br />

Limited (TAMP)<br />

Tampa Tribune, 341<br />

Tate & Lyle, 96<br />

TCL & Alcatel Mobile Phones Limited<br />

(TAMP), 150<br />

TCL Group Company, 27, 41, 43<br />

Tech Resources Limited, 93, 257<br />

Temasek, 86<br />

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior<br />

(Morgenstern and von Neumann),<br />

263<br />

ThinkPad, 144, 146<br />

ThinkVantage, 144<br />

‘Third World Solidarity,’ 300<br />

Thomson’s TV, 43, 138, 147–50<br />

Tibetan display, 343–4<br />

Tibet’s Potala Palace, 332<br />

Times Picayune, 337<br />

TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s TV<br />

business, 41, 147–50<br />

combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />

knowledge of business, 147–8<br />

strategy for, problematic execution of,<br />

149–50<br />

TNC, see transnational company (TNC)<br />

TOL, see transactive organizational<br />

learning (TOL)<br />

Total SA, 96<br />

TPG Fund, 96<br />

trade in Italy, 6<br />

trade reversal, 311–13<br />

transactive organizational learning<br />

(TOL), 225


transnational company (TNC), 167<br />

Transparency Index, 100<br />

Triumph, 364<br />

Tsing Tao Beer, 339<br />

TUV Company, 360<br />

two-step currency reform in China, 44<br />

UBS, 84<br />

UNCTAD, see United Nations<br />

Conference on Trade and<br />

Development (UNCTAD)<br />

UnctadStat, 234<br />

UNIDO, see United Nations Industrial<br />

Development Organization<br />

(UNIDO)<br />

United Nation Statistics Division<br />

Statistical Database, 11<br />

United Nations Conference on Trade<br />

and Development (UNCTAD), 38,<br />

54, 178<br />

United Nations Industrial Development<br />

Organization (UNIDO), 303, 309–10<br />

U.S. Department of Justice, 346<br />

U.S. Treasury, 85<br />

universalist approach, 55<br />

University of Central Florida, 350<br />

University of Fribourg, 90, 93<br />

University of London Central Research<br />

Fund, 193<br />

Unocal, 257<br />

VAR, see vector autoregressive (VAR)<br />

model<br />

vector autoregressive (VAR) model, 54–5,<br />

58–63<br />

analysis of, 66–72<br />

forecast error variance<br />

decomposition, 66–72<br />

impulse response analysis, 66–72<br />

exogeneity tests for, 63–6<br />

Visa Inc., 93<br />

Volvo, 107, 115–17, 384, 385<br />

acquisition of, 116, 384–5<br />

market-seeking and, 116<br />

motives of, 116<br />

Subject Index 419<br />

Wanxiang America Corporation, 113<br />

Wanxiang Group (Wanxiang), 110,<br />

113–15, 117<br />

overseas investment by, 113<br />

in United States, motives by, 114<br />

overview of, 113<br />

resource augmentation and control,<br />

degree of, 114–15<br />

strategic asset-seeking by, 114<br />

‘we versus they’ antagonism, 215<br />

wealth creation, 41<br />

Wenling Electric Tools Factory, 358<br />

Wenling Locomotive Factory, 358<br />

Wenling Saccharification Factory, 358<br />

Wenling Vehicle Repair Factory, 358<br />

western-style capitalism, 330<br />

wholly-owned foreign enterprise<br />

(WOFE), 218<br />

‘Win-Win’ cooperation, 225<br />

WIR, see World Investment Report (WIR)<br />

WOFE, see wholly-owned foreign<br />

enterprise (WOFE)<br />

World Bank, 288, 313<br />

World Investment Report (WIR), 11<br />

World Trade Organization (WTO), 16,<br />

44, 127, 236, 264, 347, 379, 391<br />

WTO, see World Trade Organization<br />

(WTO)<br />

Wuhan Iron & Steel (Group) Co., Ltd., 27<br />

Xiaolin Supermarket, 246<br />

Xinhua, 137<br />

Xinjiang Zhongxin Resource Co.,<br />

Ltd., 27<br />

Yamaha, 362<br />

year dummies, 128<br />

PROOF<br />

Zeller Corporation, 114<br />

Zhejiang Meikeda Motorcycle Co., Ltd.,<br />

359<br />

Zhejiang Motorcycle Factory, 358<br />

Zhongxing ZTE Corporation, 282<br />

Zhongyu Auto, 385<br />

zou chu qu strategy, 236, 244<br />

ZTE Corporation, 27

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