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Contents<br />
List of Figures vii<br />
ListofTables ix<br />
Foreword xii<br />
Acknowledgments xiii<br />
Notes on Contributors xv<br />
Introduction 1<br />
Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin, and Philippe Gugler<br />
Part I Macro-Environmental Determinants of<br />
Chinese FDI<br />
1 An Institutional Perspective and the Role of the State for<br />
Chinese OFDI 11<br />
Bing Ren, Hao Liang, and Ying Zheng<br />
2 Home Country Macroeconomic Determinants of Chinese<br />
OFDI 38<br />
William Wei, Ilan Alon, and Liqiang Ni<br />
3 The Role of Country of Origin and Chinese OFDI 54<br />
Paz Estrella Tolentino<br />
4 Chinese SWFs: At the Crossroad between the Visible and the<br />
Invisible Hand 81<br />
Michael Keller and Laura Vanoli<br />
Part II Micro-Environmental Determinants of<br />
Chinese FDI<br />
5 Motives and Patterns of Reverse FDI by Chinese<br />
Manufacturing Firms 107<br />
Xiaobo Wu, Wanling Ding, and Yongjiang Shi<br />
6 A Two-way Causal Link between Internationalization and CEO<br />
Equity Ownership in Chinese Firms 122<br />
Xiaohui Liu and Jiangyong Lu<br />
v<br />
PROOF
vi Contents<br />
7 Effects of Absorptive Capacity on International Acquisitions<br />
of Chinese Firms 137<br />
Ping Deng<br />
Part III Chinese FDI in Europe and North America<br />
8 Push and Pull Factors for Chinese OFDI in Europe 157<br />
Yun Schüler-Zhou, Margot Schüller, and Magnus Brod<br />
9 The Rise of Chinese OFDI in Europe 175<br />
Jan Knoerich<br />
10 Chinese M&A in Germany 212<br />
Yipeng Liu and Michael Woywode<br />
11 Chinese SMEs in Prato, Italy 234<br />
Anja Fladrich<br />
12 Chinese State-Controlled Funds and Entities in Canada 257<br />
Xiaohua Lin and Qianyu Chen<br />
Part IV Chinese FDI in Africa<br />
13 Chinese OFDI in Africa: Trends, Prospects, and Threats 279<br />
Gayle Allard<br />
14 Chinese OFDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 300<br />
Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris<br />
Part V Cases of Chinese FDI<br />
PROOF<br />
15 The Case of Florida Splendid China 329<br />
Wenxian Zhang<br />
16 Benelli and Q J Compete in the International Motorbike Arena 355<br />
Francesca Spigarelli, William Wei, and Ilan Alon<br />
17 Geely’s Internationalization and Volvo’s Acquisition 376<br />
Marc Fetscherin and Paul Beuttenmuller<br />
Final Reflections 391<br />
Ilan Alon, Marc Fetscherin, and Philippe Gugler<br />
Author Index 396<br />
Subject Index 405
1<br />
An Institutional Perspective<br />
and the Role of the State for<br />
Chinese OFDI<br />
Bing Ren, Hao Liang, and Ying Zheng<br />
Napoleon called China a ‘sleeping dragon’, but recent economic<br />
developments as China enters the twenty-first century show that the dragon<br />
is awakening. China has maintained strong economic growth since 1979<br />
and sustained a GDP increase of more than 9 percent over the years. The<br />
total volume of economic output increased from 2.8 percent in 1970 to<br />
7.23 percent in 2008, ranking China as the third largest economy in the<br />
world (United Nation Statistics Division Statistical Databases).<br />
China launched its ‘Go Global’ policy in 1999 to encourage highperforming<br />
Chinese firms to invest abroad and upgrade their global competence.<br />
Since then, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows reached<br />
US$55.91 billion in 2008, equal to the FDI inflow in 2003. The annual<br />
growth rate of OFDI averaged 65.7 percent from 2002 to 2008 (Ministry<br />
of Commerce of China). OFDI flows via mergers and acquisitions (M&As)<br />
accounted for 54 percent of the total volume of OFDI (US$30.2 billion) and<br />
an annual increase rate of 379 percent (from 2002 to 2008). China’s OFDI<br />
volume reached USD52.15 billion in 2009 (excluding Hong Kong, Macao,<br />
and Taiwan), equaling 3 percent of global OFDI (World Investment Report,<br />
2009).<br />
How are Chinese firms able to ‘go global’ so quickly – given their relatively<br />
weaker competencies in technological know-how and management skills<br />
and weak ability in integrating global value chains (Deng, 2004; Sun, Peng,<br />
Ren, & Yan, 2010)? According to multinational enterprise (MNE) theories<br />
based on Western firms, such as the Ownership-Location-Internalization<br />
(OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1980, 1993), it is difficult to explain why this<br />
aggressive international expansion by Chinese firms works so well despite<br />
weaker firm-specific ownership advantage. We also note that China’s international<br />
expansion is largely undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).<br />
State policies have played a key role in pushing Chinese firms to go abroad,<br />
which poses a challenge to existing MNE and FDI theories (Dunning &<br />
Lundan, 2008; Sun et al., 2010).<br />
11<br />
PROOF
12 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
To answer these questions one must examine the driving forces of Chinese<br />
firms’ internationalization, especially the institutional forces and the role of<br />
the state that the literature has not yet explored. As China’s economic development<br />
involves a high degree of state involvement, it constitutes a unique<br />
institutional foundation that shapes OFDI trajectories at the level of both<br />
the country and the firm. Integrating the recent literature on how formal<br />
and informal institutions such as state policies and national pride influence<br />
the OFDI of emerging market enterprises (EMEs) (e.g., Buckley, Clegg,<br />
Cross, Lin, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Buckley, Cross, Tan, Liu, & Voss, 2008; Luo,<br />
Xue, & Han, 2010; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011), we argue that the fast<br />
growth of China’s OFDI is a consequence of the state’s involvement and<br />
formal and informal institutional motivating forces. We define the formal<br />
institutional drivers as governmental policy, the bureaucratic administrative<br />
system, and the government ownership arrangement in firms. Informal<br />
institutions include the state ideology and national pride (Hope et al., 2010).<br />
Driven by these institutions, Chinese firms are highly motivated to conduct<br />
OFDI for country-level political and economic objectives, or for firm-level<br />
global competence.<br />
The importance of this study is as follows. Most studies on international<br />
business have focused on OFDI by mature market enterprises through studying<br />
the motivations, processes, and outcomes of their internationalization<br />
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Hennart, 1982; Dunning, 1988; Dore, 1990).<br />
More recent studies explore the motivations for internationalization of EMEs<br />
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008). However, except<br />
for a few studies (e.g., Buckley et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2010), the role of<br />
the state in the OFDI of EMEs is largely ignored. Similarly, among the studies<br />
emphasizing the institutional perspective of EMEs’ internationalization,<br />
there is no in-depth discussion of how macro-level institutional foundations<br />
shaped by the state could influence micro-level firm strategic choices. Our<br />
study helps fill these gaps by analyzing the specific roles of the state and<br />
the broader economic and social contexts that may influence how the state<br />
performs its role. We also analyze how these state institutions might become<br />
sources of comparative ownership advantages and help shape Chinese firms’<br />
OFDI trajectories.<br />
The remainder of the <strong>chapter</strong> is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews<br />
the literature. In Section 2 we analyze the role of the state and the formal<br />
and informal institutions by looking at their influence on Chinese firms’<br />
OFDI motivations and strategies. We also discuss contingency views of our<br />
theoretical propositions and provide our conclusions.<br />
1. Literature review<br />
PROOF<br />
1.1. Motivations for OFDI<br />
There is a vast literature examining the motivations for FDI (see Meyer &<br />
Nguyen [2005] for a survey). The theory of capital movements suggests that
PROOF<br />
Bing Ren et al. 13<br />
FDI is a part of the firm’s portfolio investments (Iversen, 1935; Aliber, 1971).<br />
Hymer (1960), Kogut and Zander (1993) argue that FDI is a means of transferring<br />
knowledge and other tangible and intangible firm assets to organize<br />
production overseas. Vernon (1966) uses the concept of product lifecycle<br />
to theorize that firms set up production facilities abroad for standardized<br />
mature products in their home markets. Other literature sees FDI as a motive<br />
for risk diversification (Rugman, 1981) and a bandwagon effect exhibited by<br />
MNEs when they follow their rivals into new markets as a strategic response<br />
to oligopolistic rivalry (Knickerbocker, 1973).<br />
The international business (IB) literature, especially Dunning’s OLI<br />
paradigm, sees OFDI as a primary means by which firms can appropriate<br />
rents in overseas markets by exploiting their idiosyncratic resources<br />
and capabilities (Dunning, 1958; Caves, 1971). The internalization theory<br />
(McManus, 1972; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart,<br />
1982) sees OFDI as a way to reduce the transaction costs associated<br />
with coordinating activities across national boundaries, while the resourcebased<br />
view (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece,<br />
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) argues that firms enter foreign markets to create<br />
value. The literature suggests that the OFDI of EMEs is different from<br />
that of enterprises from developed economies (e.g., Makino, Lau, & Yeh,<br />
2002).<br />
Studies on comparative ownership and governance suggest that the<br />
unique mode of governance and control in emerging economies is particularly<br />
important in determining the OFDI decision (Claessens, Djankov, &<br />
Lang, 2000; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007). Other studies on<br />
EME international strategy emphasize the institutional perspective (e.g.,<br />
Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Witt & Lewin, 2007; Dunning & Lundan,<br />
2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Seyoum, 2009; Ge & Ding, 2011), suggesting<br />
that institutions, both formal and informal, influence EME OFDI<br />
behavior – either through positive or negative effects (Luo & Tung, 2007;<br />
Witt & Lewin, 2007). Formal institutions, such as policy, influence EME outward<br />
investment: this has been manifested in the home and host country<br />
markets (e.g., Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev,<br />
2005; Buckley et al., 2008; Seyoum, 2009; Luo et al., 2010). Informal institutions<br />
may determine OFDI flows and strategies such as choice of location<br />
and entry mode (Buckley et al., 2007; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Yiu, Lau,<br />
& Bruton, 2007; Lu & Ma, 2008). Examples include institutional distance<br />
or cultural proximity between the home and host country markets (e.g.,<br />
Buckley et al., 2007; Seyoum, 2009), and host and home country business<br />
networks. Formal and informal institutions together may influence<br />
OFDI strategy in a more dynamic way (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Peng et al.,<br />
2008).<br />
Chinese firms that invest abroad, especially large multinationals, are<br />
typically state-owned or state-controlled. Recent studies on Chinese and<br />
Indian multinational cross-border M&As reveal that SOEs constitute a bigger
14 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
proportion among the main players conducting cross-border M&As in China<br />
thaninIndia(Sunet al., 2010). As China’s global push accelerates, many<br />
observers believe that institutional factors should act as advantages for generating<br />
more aggressive OFDI activities (Luo et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2010),<br />
which is usually not the case for mature market economies (Dunning, 1988;<br />
Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart & Park, 1994). Many even suggest that<br />
Chinese firms’ OFDI is to a large extent designed to follow the state’s policy<br />
guidance, especially now (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007;<br />
Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Deng, 2009; Sutherland, 2009; Yao & Sutherland,<br />
2009; Luo et al., 2010). Chinese OFDI trajectories are likely shaped by<br />
the specific institutional regime developed under the state, although little<br />
research on the topic exists.<br />
2. Framework<br />
PROOF<br />
2.1. The role of the state<br />
To some extent, China is still a state-controlled political economy where the<br />
state plays a dominant role in driving economic transactions and performance<br />
(Chang, 1994; Deng, 2004; Dunning & Pitelis, 2009; Huang, 2010;<br />
Nee, 2010). The state designs and influences formal institutions and regulates<br />
economic and business activities through the formal policy at the<br />
central and local government levels. The state also establishes the administrative<br />
system and arranges government ownership within various industrial<br />
sectors. The state helps shape informal institutional frameworks such as<br />
firm–government relationships, political connections and inter-bureau or<br />
inter-firm network ties that influence business behavior (Peng & Heath,<br />
1996; Xin & Peace, 1996; Keister, 1998; Yiu et al., 2007). The rise of China<br />
on the global political and economic stage cultivates the role of the state in<br />
shaping China’s national pride and ideology.<br />
The state’s role is even more significant when considering the wider economic<br />
and social context into which China has stepped. China is now facing<br />
both external and internal pressure to develop better and stronger economic<br />
and social systems. Internally, the state faces pressure to enhance national<br />
wealth. Although the economy has sustained a high growth rate in the past<br />
several decades, the government is yet not sure about the sustainability of<br />
future growth. Externally, China’s economy and society now depend heavily<br />
on other economies and societies, for more successful participation in the<br />
global economic and social stage.<br />
The Chinese state has aimed to develop both hard and soft power for<br />
coping with these challenges and to construct long-term development<br />
goals (‘The Economic Observer’ [in Chinese], May 31, 2010). The state has<br />
tried to maintain strategic control over national-level formal and informal<br />
institutional development.
PROOF<br />
Bing Ren et al. 15<br />
2.2. Formal institutional regime<br />
Policy<br />
The Chinese government has, to a great extent, played a crucial role in shaping<br />
the structure of China’s approved outward investment through external<br />
policy influence. However, the OFDI policies went through an evolutionary<br />
process. According to Luo et al. (2010) and others such as Buckley et al.<br />
(2008), Chinese OFDI policies moved through three major phases: the initiation<br />
of OFDI policy; the enrichment of the institutional frameworks; and<br />
setting up ‘going global’ as a country-level strategy.<br />
In Phase 1 (1979–1990), the Chinese state played a key role in initiating<br />
the OFDI policies. In 1979, with the launch of the ‘open door’ policy<br />
by Deng Xiaoping, the State Council came up with the concept of ‘setting<br />
up enterprises overseas’ (Zhao, 2007, p. 56). The state issued concrete<br />
policies and principles to guide OFDI. In 1984, the Ministry of Foreign<br />
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MFTEC, today’s MOC) released the first<br />
regulations on OFDI, called ‘Circular concerning approval authorities and<br />
administrative principles for opening up non-trade joint venture overseas’.<br />
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) also published the first<br />
regulations on administration of foreign exchange: ‘Measures for foreign<br />
exchange control relating to overseas investment’ (1989). Since then, a primary<br />
structure of policy and administration of OFDI was established. During<br />
this period, the Chinese government was perceived as taking the plunge in<br />
OFDI activities.<br />
In Phase 2 (1991–2000), the Chinese state enriched the institutional<br />
framework of OFDI policy. On 12 October 1992, Jiang Zemin, the representative<br />
of third-generation leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, gave a<br />
report to the Fourteen Chinese Communist National Congress, emphasizing<br />
the deepening of reform and opening up policy to ‘expand OFDI and multinational<br />
operations of Chinese enterprises’ (Jiang, 1992). Following Jiang’s<br />
talk, more specific and detailed provisions were added to formulate the regulatory<br />
and administrative system on firms’ OFDI activities. For example, the<br />
Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (National Planning Commission<br />
[NPC], March 1991) normalized the approval procedure and gave<br />
more specific requirements for OFDI.<br />
In Phase 3 (2001–present), the state set the ‘Going Global’ policy as a<br />
country-level strategy to enhance competitive advantages through OFDI<br />
strategies. The Chinese government initiated the ‘going abroad’ policy<br />
as country-level strategy in 2000. (This was reflected in ‘Suggestion on<br />
Constructing the 10th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social<br />
Development’.)<br />
In 2003, the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC) specified<br />
the boundaries for key OFDI projects, including: (1) seeking natural<br />
resources in areas where China is lacking; (2) investing in manufacturing
16 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
PROOF<br />
that promotes export of technologies, products, and equipment; (3) setting<br />
up R&D collaborative projects which could bring in advanced technologies,<br />
managerial experience, and specialized talents; (4) conducting M&As to<br />
increase international competitiveness and market exploration of firms.<br />
The Chinese government encouraged firms to pursue the above projects to<br />
upgrade firm-level competence.<br />
In the meantime, joining the World Trade Organization demanded a<br />
higher level of openness, and this also encouraged the Chinese government<br />
to modify the existing strict policies to create a friendlier institutional environment<br />
for OFDI. For example, the central state deregulated investment<br />
approval and foreign exchange controls. The government provided support<br />
for finance, credit, and insurance (Enterprise Institute of Development<br />
Research Center of the State Council, 2006) and strengthened supervision<br />
of multinational operating performance to monitor the effectiveness of the<br />
‘go global policy’. Table 1.1 provides a detailed illustration of major policies<br />
released by the state on Chinese firms’ OFDI.<br />
Five important institutional elements are particularly emphasized by the<br />
state and successfully advanced the OFDI of Chinese firms. The first institutional<br />
element refers to the approval process. The state streamlined the<br />
approval procedure and decentralized approval authority for OFDI. The state<br />
relaxed foreign exchange control gradually, especially in the examination of<br />
capital resource and exchange risks. In providing concrete investment support,<br />
the state supported investment projects for credit, capital, information,<br />
subsidies, and tax collection. The state also aimed to set up more efficient<br />
supervision mechanisms on post-investment performance of OFDI enterprises.<br />
Lastly, the state has been seeking better international protection for<br />
firms’ overseas investment through setting up bilateral investment treaties<br />
and multilateral and regional protection mechanisms (for more straightforward<br />
descriptions of the five institutions’ evolution, see Figures 1.1a–1.1e).<br />
Bureaucratic administration<br />
Bureaucratic administration policy is usually made by important players in<br />
particular bureaucratic systems, and important operating systems are also<br />
implemented by the administrators to utilize the policy effect. In general,<br />
the bureaucratic administration related to Chinese OFDI is complex due to<br />
the multiple bureaucratic players involved in decision-making, regulation<br />
and, supervision for OFDI. In the bureaucratic administration system, the<br />
first layer is the State Council, which plans China’s overall OFDI for the long<br />
term. Under the leadership of the State Council, the State Development and<br />
Reform Commission (SDRC, formerly the National Planning Commission)<br />
is the major institution of the second layer responsible for studying and<br />
advancing strategies and plans for OFDI, and examining the optimization of<br />
the policies. Guided by the strategic plan of the SDRC, the Department of
Table 1.1 The policy regime of China’s OFDI<br />
Examination<br />
and<br />
approval<br />
Key policy Key point<br />
Approval Authorities and<br />
Administrative Principles<br />
for Opening up Non-trade<br />
Joint Venture Overseas<br />
(MFTEC, May 1984)<br />
Approval Procedures for<br />
Setting up Overseas<br />
Subsidiaries (MFTEC, July<br />
1985)<br />
Administration and<br />
Approval of Establishing<br />
Non-trade Enterprises<br />
Overseas (MFTEC, July<br />
1985)<br />
Administration of<br />
Overseas Investment<br />
Projects (NPC, March<br />
1991)<br />
Verification and Approval<br />
Procedures for<br />
OFDI (SNRC, October<br />
2004)<br />
Examination and<br />
Approval of Investment to<br />
Run Enterprises Overseas<br />
(MOC, October 2004)<br />
PROOF<br />
17<br />
1. Authorize MFTEC to approve OFDI;<br />
prior to this, all OFDI has to be<br />
approved by State Council<br />
2. Major projects concerning resource<br />
and projects exceeding<br />
US$10 million to be approved by<br />
State Council<br />
3. Projects concerning state property to<br />
be approved by NPC and METEC<br />
Opens OFDI for all economic entities<br />
with financial resources, foreign<br />
joint venture partners, and relevant<br />
capabilities<br />
1. Approval result should be handed<br />
down in no more than 3 months<br />
2. Chinese OFDI should focus on using<br />
overseas technologies, resources, and<br />
markets<br />
1. Projects exceeding 1 million to be<br />
approved by NPC, exceeding<br />
30 million to be approved by the<br />
State Council.<br />
2. Projects concerning state-owned<br />
assets must be approved by State<br />
Council<br />
3. Project proposals, feasibility reports,<br />
corporate contracts, and articles<br />
should be provided by OFDI<br />
enterprises<br />
4. Approval result should be handed<br />
down in no more than 60 days<br />
1. Projects exceeding US$10 million to<br />
be approved by SNRC (except<br />
projects concerning resources),<br />
exceeding US$50 million approved<br />
by State Council<br />
2. Approval result should be handed<br />
down in no more than 20 days<br />
1. All companies are permitted to run<br />
enterprises overseas<br />
2. Project proposals, feasibility reports<br />
are substituted by project application<br />
3. Approval result should be handed<br />
down in no more than 15 days
18<br />
Table 1.1 (Continued)<br />
Foreign<br />
exchange<br />
control<br />
Key policy Key point<br />
Administration of<br />
OFDI (MOC, May 2009)<br />
Foreign Exchange<br />
Administration of<br />
Overseas Investment<br />
(SAFE, March 1989)<br />
Supplemental Provisions<br />
on Administration<br />
Measures on Foreign<br />
Exchange for Overseas<br />
Investment (SAFE,<br />
September 1995)<br />
Canceling the Deposits<br />
that Guarantee Profits<br />
from Investments<br />
Abroad (SAFE,<br />
November 2002)<br />
Simplifying<br />
Foreign Exchange<br />
Administration Relating<br />
to OFDI (SAFE, March<br />
2003)<br />
Further Measures on<br />
Foreign Exchange<br />
Administration<br />
Stimulating OFDI (SAFE<br />
May 2005)<br />
Administration<br />
Measures on Foreign<br />
Exchange for Overseas<br />
Investment (SAFE, 2009)<br />
PROOF<br />
Projects exceeding US$100 million<br />
to be approved by MOC<br />
1. SAFE evaluates the source of<br />
funds to be invested abroad as<br />
well as the foreign exchange risk<br />
2. Five percent of the OFDI sum<br />
has to be deposited in a special<br />
account<br />
3. Profit earned abroad should be<br />
remitted back to China<br />
Chinese investors are allowed to<br />
purchase foreign exchange for an<br />
OFDI project; prior to this, a<br />
Chinese investor had to earn the<br />
foreign exchange<br />
Deposits that guarantee profits are<br />
no longer needed<br />
1. SAFE will only investigate<br />
domestic foreign exchange<br />
sources<br />
2. Foreign exchange obtained from<br />
a source outside of mainland<br />
China no longer examined<br />
1. Local SAFE named as authority<br />
on OFDI projects with a higher<br />
threshold (from US$3 to US$10<br />
millions) all over the country<br />
2. Total foreign exchange available<br />
for all investors is increased from<br />
USD3.3 to USD5 billion<br />
The necessary foreign exchange for<br />
the domestic investors to invest<br />
abroad may be self-owned foreign<br />
exchange, the foreign exchange<br />
purchased by RMB or entity,<br />
intangible assets, the domestic and<br />
overseas foreign exchange loans,<br />
and other permitted source
Inspection<br />
and<br />
evaluation<br />
Guidance<br />
and support<br />
International<br />
investment<br />
protection<br />
mechanism<br />
Interim Measures for the<br />
Joint Annual Inspection<br />
of Overseas Investments<br />
(MFTEC, October 2002)<br />
Measures for<br />
Comprehensive<br />
Assessment of<br />
OFDI Performance<br />
MFTEC (October 2002)<br />
Annual Report System on<br />
Operational Obstacles in<br />
Major Target Countries<br />
(MOC, November 2004)<br />
Providing Credit Support<br />
to Key OFDI Projects<br />
Encouraged by the State<br />
(SNRC, May 2003)<br />
Guiding Directories<br />
of Target Nations<br />
and Industries for<br />
OFDI (MOC, July 2004;<br />
MOC, October 2005;<br />
MOC, January 2007)<br />
Using and Managing<br />
Special Funds for Foreign<br />
Economic Cooperation<br />
(MOC; MOF, December<br />
2005)<br />
Bilateral Investment<br />
Treaty<br />
PROOF<br />
19<br />
Provides post-investment evaluation<br />
of OFDI projects<br />
Clarification of standards and<br />
procedures for evaluating<br />
OFDI projects which have been<br />
operating overseas<br />
Using annual reports from<br />
enterprises investing abroad, MOC<br />
collects all kinds of obstacles<br />
and problems confronted by<br />
OFDI companies<br />
OFDI projects fulfilling specified<br />
requirements will be provided with a<br />
lower lending rate credit fund<br />
Provides industries and countries<br />
information for enterprises to<br />
conduct investment encouraged by<br />
the state through preferential<br />
treatment concerning funding, tax<br />
collection, foreign exchange,<br />
customs and others<br />
1. Sets up special funds to<br />
encourage Chinese enterprises to<br />
invest abroad<br />
2. Special funds may be used to<br />
support foreign economic<br />
cooperation by the following<br />
means: (1) subsidies for<br />
pre-operational fees; (2) interest<br />
discounts for medium- and<br />
long-term loans; (3) subsidies for<br />
operational fees<br />
1. In 1980s, China signed BITs with<br />
most developed countries, but in<br />
this period, most treaties are<br />
raised by developed countries to<br />
protect their investment in<br />
China<br />
2. In 1990s, China began to<br />
conclude BIT positively with<br />
developing countries to protect<br />
investment in these countries
20<br />
Table 1.1 (Continued)<br />
Key policy Key point<br />
Multilateral investment<br />
protection measures<br />
Regional protection<br />
mechanism<br />
Sources: www.mofgov.com; He (2009); Luo et al. (2010).<br />
1985<br />
Approval procedures for setting<br />
up overseas subsidiaries<br />
1985<br />
1991<br />
Administration and approval<br />
of establishing non-trade<br />
enterprises overseas<br />
1984<br />
Approval and administration<br />
of non-trading overseas enterprises<br />
1991<br />
Approval authorities and Examination and approval<br />
administrative principles for opening up of OFDI project proposals<br />
non-trade joint venture overseas and feasibility reports<br />
Acceding to WTO in 2001, China could<br />
enjoy the multilateral investment<br />
protection provided by agreements<br />
abided by WTO members, such<br />
as, Agreement on Trade-Related<br />
Investment Measures (TRIMS), General<br />
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)<br />
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, founded<br />
in 2002, providing adequate protection<br />
to investment in this area, benefits<br />
more and more investors both from<br />
China and ASEAN<br />
2004<br />
Examination and approval of investment to<br />
run enterprises overseas<br />
2004<br />
Verification and approval<br />
procedures for OFDI<br />
2003<br />
Reply on decentralization authority<br />
reforming pilot of non-trade<br />
investment overseas approval<br />
2009<br />
Administration of OFDI<br />
Initial regulations on OFDI<br />
Normalization of the approval and Further procedure simplification<br />
Strict examination of projects 1990 administration system<br />
and decentralization of authority<br />
1979 2000<br />
2009<br />
Highly centrally controlled authority<br />
Decentralization of authority Relaxed examination of projects<br />
Figure 1.1a Evolution of state’s examination and approval processes for China’s OFDI<br />
1990<br />
Rules for implementation of measures on<br />
foreign exchange control in investment abroad<br />
2002<br />
Canceling the deposits that guarantee<br />
profits from investments abroad<br />
1989<br />
1993<br />
Procedural and approval standards on<br />
OFDI-related foreign exchange<br />
Opening special account of<br />
risks and capital resources<br />
deposits that guarantee profits<br />
1995<br />
1989<br />
Foreign exchange administration<br />
of overseas investment<br />
Supplemental provisions on<br />
administration measures<br />
on foreign exchange<br />
for overseas investment<br />
2005<br />
Enlarging the reform pilots regarding<br />
the administration of foreign<br />
exchange for overseas investment<br />
Rules for implementation of<br />
measures on foreign exchange<br />
control in investment abroad 2009<br />
Administration measures on<br />
foreign exchange for<br />
2003<br />
overseas investment<br />
Simplifying foreign exchange<br />
administration relating to OFDI<br />
Rigid control on capital resource and<br />
More standard control on foreign Streamlining the examination on<br />
1979<br />
foreign exchange risk<br />
Profit deposits are required<br />
exchange risk, source of investment<br />
1990<br />
2000<br />
fund Chinese investors are allowed to<br />
risk and capital resource,<br />
canceling deposits and<br />
2009<br />
purchase foreign exchange<br />
decentralization authority.<br />
Figure 1.1b Evolution of state’s foreign exchange control for China’s OFDI<br />
2003<br />
PROOF
Bing Ren et al. 21<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
Guiding directories of target<br />
Notice on adjusting the management<br />
2000 nations and industries for OFDI<br />
mode of overseas financial guarantees<br />
for overseas investment enterprises<br />
2005<br />
Measures of capital support for<br />
2004<br />
small and medium enterprises to<br />
Providing more financing support<br />
develop international markets<br />
Notice on setting up a risk to key overseas-invested projects<br />
1999<br />
prevention mechanism for key<br />
overseas investment projects<br />
Guidance on granting credit<br />
2003<br />
2005<br />
for overseas processing Providing credit support to key OFDI<br />
Using and managing special funds<br />
and assembling<br />
projects encouraged by the state<br />
for foreign economic cooperation<br />
1979 2000<br />
Support on capital, credit, and finance, guidance on target<br />
nations and industries are provided to encourage OFDI<br />
2009<br />
Figure 1.1c Evolution of state’s inspection and evaluation processes for China’s OFDI<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
Circular on setting up an information<br />
Measures for comprehensive bank of overseas investment 2004<br />
assessment of OFDI performance intention of enterprises Annual report system on<br />
operational obstacles<br />
2002<br />
Interim measures for the joint annual<br />
inspection of overseas investments<br />
2002<br />
Provisions on statistical<br />
report of OFDI<br />
in major target countries 2005<br />
Report requirements for overseas<br />
mergers and acquisitions<br />
Annual inspection, comprehensive assessment, and other report systems are set up<br />
1979 2000 2009<br />
Figure 1.1d Guidance and support on China’s OFDI by state<br />
PROOF<br />
1985<br />
2000<br />
First BIT with developing countries<br />
Signed BIT with 54<br />
1996<br />
1982 Thailand<br />
developing countries by 2000<br />
Signed BIT with most<br />
2004<br />
First BIT with developed countries developed countries by 1996<br />
2001 China-ASEAN<br />
Sweden<br />
WTO free-trade area<br />
1979<br />
As investment host country, most BITs As investment output country, most BITs<br />
were concluded with developed countries were concluded with developing countries<br />
Seeking multilateral and<br />
regional protection 2009<br />
1990<br />
2000<br />
Figure 1.1e Evolution of China’s international investment protection mechanism<br />
Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment drafts the catalogs of guidance for<br />
foreign investment industries, and approves key OFDI projects. The Ministry<br />
of Commerce, formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation<br />
and Ministry of Domestic Commerce, is the primary government<br />
unit responsible for conducting multilateral negotiations on investment and<br />
trade treaties. Finally, the Department of Outward Investment and Economic<br />
Cooperation drafts concrete regulations on OFDI and administrates and<br />
supervises OFDI.<br />
Other important governmental departments in the second layer include<br />
the People’s Bank of China, which is responsible for making monetary policy<br />
and foreign exchange policy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for
22 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
drafting the catalog for guiding the target countries of OFDI in cooperation<br />
with other agencies; and the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Taxation,<br />
responsible for drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI. The Ministry of<br />
Taxation is also responsible for providing financial support to OFDI through<br />
special funds. A special organization, the State-owned Assets Supervision<br />
and Administration Commission, was established under the State Council to<br />
manage and supervise the national state-owned assets in the non-financial<br />
sectors, including those that invest in overseas markets.<br />
In the third layer are several departments and units that implement the<br />
policies made by the above authorities. For example, the State Administration<br />
of Foreign Exchange helps supervise and check the authenticity<br />
and legality of the receipts and payments involved in OFDI and regulates<br />
management of overseas foreign exchange accounts. Three policy-oriented<br />
financial institutions help to provide credit and insurance for OFDI firms:<br />
these include the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of<br />
China, and the China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation. Figure<br />
1.2 and Table 1.2 illustrate the Chinese OFDI bureaucratic administration<br />
system.<br />
The government ownership<br />
The third formal OFDI institutional regime relates to the wide presence of<br />
government ownership of firms in the economy. Since market reform in the<br />
late 1970s, the Chinese government has maintained control of the economy.<br />
The central and local government bureaux provide funding to the SOE<br />
Ad hoc<br />
organizations<br />
SASAC<br />
SOE<br />
State council<br />
SDRC MOC PBC MOF MFA<br />
DFCOI DOIEC SAFE<br />
MOT<br />
CECIE<br />
PROOF<br />
Policy financial<br />
institution<br />
EIBC CDB<br />
Figure 1.2 Bureaucratic system in regulating China’s OFDI<br />
Notes: MOC – Ministry of Commerce; DOIEC – Department of Outward Investment and Economic<br />
Cooperation; SDRC – State Development and Reform Commission; DFCOI – Department<br />
of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment; MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOF – Ministry<br />
of Finance; PBC – People’s Bank of China; SASAC – State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration<br />
Commission; MOT – the Ministry of Taxation; SAFE – State Administration of Foreign<br />
Exchange; SOE – State-Owned Enterprise; EIBC – Export-Import Bank of China; CDB – China<br />
Development Bank; CECIE – China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation.<br />
Sources: www.gov.cn; www.mofcom.gov.cn; zcq.mofcom.gov.cn; www.sdpc.gov.cn (2010).
Table 1.2 The bureaucratic administration regime of China’s OFDI<br />
Department Main functions<br />
Bing Ren et al. 23<br />
State council 1. Blueprinting China’s overall OFDI in the long term<br />
MOC 1. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on investment and<br />
trade treaties<br />
DOIEC 1. Drafting concrete regulations on OFDI<br />
2. Administrating and supervising OFDI activities<br />
3. Examining and verifying non-financial enterprises’ OFDI<br />
4. Statistics for OFDI<br />
SDRC 1. Studying and putting forward strategies and plans for OFDI<br />
2. Studying policies concerning aggregate balance and<br />
structural optimization<br />
DFCOI 1. Drafting the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign<br />
Investment Industries in cooperation with relevant agencies<br />
2. Examining and approving key OFDI projects, major<br />
resources related and consuming substantial amount of<br />
foreign currency<br />
SAFE 1. Supervising and checking the authenticity and legality of<br />
receipts and payments<br />
2. Regulating management of overseas foreign exchange<br />
accounts<br />
SASAC 1. Managing and supervising the nation’s state-owned assets in<br />
non-financial sectors<br />
MFA 1. Drafting the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign<br />
Investment Countries in cooperation with relevant agencies<br />
MOF 1. Providing financial support to OFDI though special fund, etc<br />
2. Drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI in cooperation<br />
with MOT<br />
MOT 1. Drafting policies of taxation related to OFDI in cooperation<br />
with MOF<br />
PBC 1. Designing the monetary and foreign exchange policy, etc<br />
EIBC; CDB 1. Providing credit for OFDI firms as policy banks<br />
CECIE 1. Providing insurance for OFDI firms as policy insurance<br />
corporation<br />
Source: www.gov.cn<br />
PROOF<br />
sector; the state also directs funds to SOEs via state-owned banks. As the<br />
market economy develops further, SOEs seek financing from domestic and<br />
international financial markets. Through listing their stocks on the stock<br />
exchange markets, SOEs are transformed into corporations and joint stock<br />
companies. In a joint stock company, government ownership comprises<br />
one type of shares and, as the dominant shareholder, the state exerts tight<br />
control over both political and economic objectives. For example, SOEs are
24 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
Foreign investment enterprise<br />
Joint stock company<br />
0.5%<br />
5.6%<br />
Enterprise funded from<br />
Joint equity cooperative<br />
enterprise<br />
1.0%<br />
Limited liability company<br />
22.0%<br />
Others<br />
0.3%<br />
Private enterprise<br />
1.0%<br />
PROOF<br />
Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan<br />
0.1%<br />
Collectively owned enterprise<br />
0.3%<br />
State owned enterprise<br />
69.2%<br />
Figure 1.3 Chinese OFDI stocks’ distribution by different types of investors (2009)<br />
the main players in OFDI, relative to other types of enterprises, and behave<br />
aggressively in their internationalization. Figure 1.3 describes the presence<br />
of SOEs within Chinese OFDI. Table 1.3 lists the top 50 SOEs ranked by<br />
FDI outflow.<br />
SOEs, in their drive toward globalization, have encountered strong criticism<br />
from global stakeholders for their lack of accountability, transparency,<br />
and trustworthiness (Pistor and Xu, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Li, 2009).<br />
When Chinese SOEs invest overseas, their strategies may be purely economic,<br />
such as maximizing profits, or they may include political goals<br />
that take priority over economic ones. In fact, the influence of the state<br />
and adoption of the administrative governance framework in SOE business<br />
activities make economic efficiency largely unclear. The literature<br />
argues that the highly concentrated ownership gives the state substantial<br />
discretionary power to use the resources of companies and results in problems<br />
such as insider control and the exploitation of minority shareholder<br />
interests (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Control by the<br />
government may also create a fertile soil to nurture corruption (Luo &<br />
Tung, 2007). A recent study suggests that the newly transformed SOEs are<br />
‘dynamic dynamos’ rather than ‘dying dinosaurs’ (Ralston, Tong, Terpstra,<br />
Wang, & Egri, 2006), suggesting that government ownership may influence<br />
the performance of Chinese firms positively, including OFDI.<br />
2.3. Informal institutional regime<br />
The state also plays a role in cultivating, advocating, and strengthening<br />
informal institutions to enhance its economic and political objectives<br />
through OFDI. Except for the formal institutional frameworks discussed<br />
above, informal institutions – especially when non-existent or non-enforced<br />
legal systems fail to support business – influence firms’ overseas investments.
Table 1.3 Top 50 non-financial Chinese enterprises ranked by OFDI stocks (2009)<br />
No. Enterprise name Main business Firm type<br />
1 China National<br />
Petroleum Corporation<br />
2 China National<br />
Offshore Oil<br />
Corporation<br />
3 China Petrochemical<br />
Corporation<br />
4 Aluminium<br />
Corporation of China<br />
5 China Resources<br />
(Holdings) Co., Ltd.<br />
6 China Ocean Shipping<br />
(Group) Company<br />
7 China National<br />
Cereals, Oils &<br />
Foodstuffs Corporation<br />
Crude oil and gas<br />
exploitation, petroleum<br />
refining, engineering<br />
Crude oil and gas<br />
exploitation, petroleum<br />
refining, engineering<br />
Crude oil and gas<br />
exploitation, petroleum<br />
refining, engineering<br />
Bauxite, rare-earth metal,<br />
engineering<br />
Consumer goods, power,<br />
property, cement, gas,<br />
medication, finance<br />
Water transportation,<br />
shipbuilding, logistics<br />
Foodstuffs, grain and oil,<br />
hotel, real estate<br />
8 Sinohem Corporation Oil, fertilizer, gas, hotel, real<br />
estate<br />
9 China Merchants<br />
Group<br />
10 China National<br />
Aviation Holding<br />
Corporation<br />
11 China Shipping<br />
(Group) Company<br />
Transportation,<br />
infrastructure, finance, real<br />
estate<br />
25<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Air transportation Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Water transportation,<br />
shipbuilding, logistics<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
12 SinoSteel Corporation Metallurgy, engineering Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
13 SINOTRANS<br />
Changjiang National<br />
Shipping (Group)<br />
Corporation<br />
14 China Minmetals<br />
Corporation<br />
Transportation, recreation,<br />
real estate<br />
Metal and mineral,<br />
transportation<br />
15 CITIC Group Finance, real estate,<br />
engineering, resource,<br />
manufacture, information,<br />
commercial service<br />
PROOF<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Limited liability<br />
company
26<br />
Table 1.3 (Continued)<br />
No. Enterprise name Main business Firm type<br />
16 China Unicom<br />
Corporation<br />
17 China State Construction<br />
Engineering Corporation<br />
18 China Power Investment<br />
Corporation<br />
Telecommunications Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Civil construction Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Electric power,<br />
investment, engineering<br />
19 China Huaneng Group Electric power, finance,<br />
resource, finance<br />
20 China National Chemical<br />
Corporation<br />
21 China Mobile<br />
Communications<br />
Corporation<br />
22 China Metallurgical<br />
Group Corporation<br />
23 Shum Yip Holdings<br />
Company Limited<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Chemical engineering Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Telecommunications Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Metallurgy, resource, real<br />
estate, engineering<br />
Real estate, infrastructure,<br />
transportation<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Locally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
24 Legend Holdings Ltd. IT, investment, real estate Limited liability<br />
company<br />
25 Hunan Valin Iron & Steel<br />
(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />
Iron and steel Limited liability<br />
company<br />
26 GDH Limited Investment Locally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
27 Huawei Technologies Telecommunication<br />
service<br />
28 China Noferrous Metal<br />
Mining & Construction<br />
(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />
29 China Norh Industries<br />
Group Corporation<br />
30 Baosteel Group<br />
Corporation<br />
31 Shanghai Baosteel Group<br />
Corporation<br />
32 Shanghai Overseas United<br />
Investment Co., Ltd.<br />
33 Guangzhou Yuexiu<br />
Holdings Limited<br />
34 Anshan Iron & Steel<br />
Group Corporation<br />
35 State Grid Corporation of<br />
China<br />
Non-ferrous metal,<br />
engineering<br />
Limited liability<br />
company<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Military supplies Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Steel, resource, finance,<br />
manufacture, service<br />
Steel<br />
PROOF<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Investment Limited liability<br />
company<br />
Investment Limited liability<br />
company<br />
Iron, steel Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Power grid Centrally controlled<br />
SOE
36 Shanghai Automotive<br />
Industry Corporation<br />
Bing Ren et al. 27<br />
Auto manufacture Limited liability<br />
company<br />
37 Shougang Corporation Steel, resource, service Limited liability<br />
company<br />
38 Sinohydro Co., Ltd. Water conservancy,<br />
investment, engineering,<br />
service, trade<br />
39 Nam Kwong (Group)<br />
Company Limited<br />
40 Shenzhen Investment<br />
Holdings Co., Ltd.<br />
41 Shenhua Group<br />
Corporation<br />
42 China Poly Group<br />
Corporation<br />
Consumer goods, real<br />
estate, hotel, logistics<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Investment Limited liability<br />
company<br />
Resource Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
International trade, real<br />
estate, culture, resource<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
43 TCL Group Company Electronic products Limited liability<br />
company<br />
44 Aviation Industry<br />
Corporation of China<br />
Aerospace manufacture,<br />
military<br />
Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
45 Jinchuan Group Limited Resource Locally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
46 Xinjiang Zhongxin<br />
Resource Co., Ltd.<br />
47 Guangdong National<br />
Shipping Corporation<br />
48 Wuhan Iron & Steel<br />
(Group) Co., Ltd.<br />
Resource Locally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Transportation, logistics,<br />
real estate, recreation<br />
49 ZTE Corporation Telecommunication<br />
service<br />
50 China Guangdong<br />
Nuclear Power Holding<br />
Co., Ltd.<br />
Locally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Metallurgy, engineering Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Limited liability<br />
company<br />
Nuclear resource Centrally controlled<br />
SOE<br />
Sources: 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI (MOC, 2010); www.sasac.gov.cn.<br />
PROOF<br />
The state helps to create two important informal institutions that generate<br />
ideological influence on Chinese OFDI: state ideology and national pride.<br />
State ideology is a set of ideas that constitutes state goals, expectations,<br />
and actions, and it can be thought of as a comprehensive vision of the<br />
state held by all members of society. According to Smith and Kim (2006),<br />
national pride is ‘the positive effect that the public feels towards their country,<br />
resulting from their national identity (P127)’. These two factors are<br />
to some extent interrelated. A strong state ideology may increase national
28 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
PROOF<br />
pride, and national pride can also enhance state ideology. While the economic<br />
organization is intertwined with the ideological state, major Chinese<br />
multinationals usually incorporate national missions and national pride in<br />
conducting overseas strategies. Such ideology and pride may stem from the<br />
collective expectation of ‘carrying a great torch and striving to better develop<br />
the country’. Sometimes, a particular strategy at the firm level (such as a<br />
cross-border acquisition) is economically irrational (Hope et al., 2010). This<br />
could stem from an individual enterprise leaders’ greater ambition to pursue<br />
a successful ‘country image’ to foreign counterparts and infiltrate the<br />
‘Chinese brand’ into a global market.<br />
We argue that state ideology and national pride are two soft power institutions<br />
that may function as growth engines for Chinese firms to compete<br />
with international players. The effect of state ideology and national pride are<br />
more likely to be cultivated in the Chinese context because the Chinese culture<br />
is strong in collectivism and nationalism in comparison with the West.<br />
Such national culture allows the state to communicate ideology and pride<br />
through tangible and intangible social and cultural platforms as well as to<br />
create incentives and enforcement mechanisms. To fulfill its country-level<br />
strategies and thus have greater influence on the international investments<br />
of Chinese firms, the government stresses such state ideologies throughout<br />
its policy and administration process, as well as directly implements them<br />
in its wholly controlled SOEs. Hence, the formal OFDI institutional regimes<br />
further ensure the efficiency of the informal institutional-enforced effects on<br />
OFDI in China.<br />
2.4. Institutional and Chinese MNE-based OFDI<br />
We argue that the state plays important roles in shaping Chinese OFDI<br />
institutional regimes, including the formal and informal institutions. It is<br />
important to explore more thoroughly what theoretical implications we can<br />
draw from this phenomenon. Dunning and Lundan (2008) suggest that<br />
institutions influence multinational ownership, internalization, and location<br />
advantages, and thus determine the internationalization strategy of a<br />
company. Integrating institutions into the OLI paradigm offers a profound<br />
tool to understand how institutions help the formation of emerging multinational<br />
firms. Sun and colleagues (2010) propose a comparative ownership<br />
advantage framework to explain why EMEs such as those from China and<br />
India can internationalize and conduct specific cross-border M&As. The theory<br />
suggests that EMEs in developing countries can leverage country-specific<br />
advantages and combine them with firm-specific advantages to form comparative<br />
ownership advantages to drive their internationalization.<br />
Combining the ideas of Dunning and colleagues (Dunning, 2001;<br />
Dunning & Lundan, 2008) with those of Sun and colleagues (Sun et al.,<br />
2010), we argue that not only the factor endowment structure but also the
PROOF<br />
Bing Ren et al. 29<br />
institutional structure help EMEs generate comparative ownership advantages.<br />
Hence, we can broaden the country-specific advantages concept to<br />
include an institutional dimension, suggesting that institutions could be<br />
leveraged by EMEs to combine with company advantages to form specific<br />
ownership advantages. These institutional factors could be the formal and<br />
informal ones shaped under the role of state. For example, formal institutions<br />
(such as favorable credit and financing policies and the establishment<br />
of resource and information platforms overseas) can be combined with company<br />
production and entrepreneurial capabilities to exploit international<br />
market opportunities. From the informal institutional perspective, managing<br />
the state ideology and national pride institutional elements in the<br />
strategic management processes of companies can help them better co-opt<br />
the formal institutional regimes, thus maximizing globalization benefits.<br />
In essence, through a successful integration of the national level institutional<br />
advantages and the company level advantage, EMEs can build<br />
‘institution-based comparative ownership advantages’. With this institutionbased<br />
comparative ownership advantage, EMEs can cultivate business opportunities<br />
in specific host country markets and conduct institution-based<br />
OFDI.<br />
Proposition 1: The formal and informal institutions developed under the role<br />
of the state are sources of comparative ownership advantage for Chinese firms, to<br />
‘pull’ Chinese firms to conduct institution-based OFDI.<br />
2.5. The strategic choices of OFDI by Chinese multinationals<br />
While institutions are helpful for developing firm-specific ownership advantage,<br />
corporate executives may view the institutional framework as a favorable<br />
pull factor for internationalization (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999).<br />
On the one hand, they increase EME confidence in internationalization.<br />
On the other hand, they can be exploited to change the cost and benefit<br />
structure in a multinational’s potential OFDI activity in a host country<br />
market. We will discuss Chinese multinational strategic choices in<br />
OFDI below.<br />
Choice of OFDI mode<br />
In contrast to mature market multinationals, EMEs have fewer incentives<br />
for efficiency-seeking and cost-minimizing outward investments, as the EME<br />
itself has ample supplies of low-cost, productive labor and inexpensive land.<br />
Rather, Chinese firms have higher incentives for asset-seeking and marketseeking<br />
OFDI. In comparison to independent OFDI and contractual joint<br />
ventures, M&A strategy can help Chinese firms to more quickly access<br />
strategic assets and potential markets, and thus upgrade their global competence<br />
more efficiently. However, in these aggressive cross-border M&As,<br />
the pressures of managing strategic and operating risks are much higher
30 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
PROOF<br />
than when seeking only cost efficiency (Kumar, 2009). We believe the formal<br />
and informal institutions mentioned above will help overcome the risks<br />
and facilitate adopting the M&A mode.<br />
Formal institutional support will help the resource and domestic market<br />
demand of potential multinationals and thus facilitate more entrepreneurial<br />
and aggressive international exploration. Formal institutional support also<br />
allows firms to focus on managing the strategic and operating risks in<br />
M&As with greater efficiency. The informal institutions can help intrinsically<br />
reinforce political or strategic objectives of the involving parties. These<br />
arguments suggest that formal and informal institutional supports can help<br />
Chinese multinationals adopt more aggressive OFDIs such as M&As.<br />
Proposition 2: In relation to independent OFDI and greenfield joint ventures,<br />
Chinese multinationals are more likely to adopt acquisition in their internationalization.<br />
Choice of OFDI location<br />
Multinationals invest in the most advantageous locations to fulfill the firm’s<br />
efficiency, asset- and market-seeking strategic objectives (Dunning, 1980,<br />
1988). In Chinese OFDI, the endogenous formal and informal institutions,<br />
shaped by the role of the state, help determine location choice. Regarding<br />
formal institutions, the government encourages firms to target resource<br />
and strategic asset-intensive regions through various preferential policy supports<br />
such as credit and tax incentives, as well as other administrative<br />
methods. For example, Chinese SOEs enter countries such as Africa and<br />
South America more extensively because they are resource-intensive countries<br />
where the Chinese state can acquire strategic raw materials to enhance<br />
the country-level resource endowments. Examples include Capital Iron &<br />
Steel’s acquisition of Hierro Peru Mining and Baosteel’s investment in a steel<br />
plant in Brazil. Informal institutions also influence which countries Chinese<br />
firms enter, including those helpful for maintaining Chinese national pride.<br />
The Chinese prefer to invest in regions where national pride and state ideology<br />
can be better maintained and leveraged. For example, regions such as<br />
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong (the so-called ‘four dragons’),<br />
as well as Malaysia, one of the new ‘four tigers’, give better location<br />
advantages (Sun et al., 2010). These institutional enforcements will help set<br />
the boundaries of locations for Chinese OFDI.<br />
Proposition 3: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in countries or regions<br />
where both formal and informal institutions developed under the role of the state<br />
are more likely to play a role.<br />
Choice of OFDI industry<br />
We believe formal institutions play a major role in guiding OFDI industry<br />
choice. As the Chinese government views OFDI as an important means
Bing Ren et al. 31<br />
of integrating global resources and value chain markets, its aim is carried<br />
out mainly through securing stable sources of raw materials and obtaining<br />
technological assets scarce in China. The government has specifically<br />
encouraged OFDI in the resource exploration and extraction industries (Cai,<br />
1999) as well as the manufacturing (processing and assembling) industries<br />
where Chinese companies have a competitive edge. But these Chinese<br />
industries are weak in designing, researching and developing (R&D) and,<br />
through preferential policies and direct administrative control, the government<br />
is encouraging OFDI. The government has recently favored more<br />
investments in the financial sector overseas. China Investment Corporation<br />
(CIC) invested in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley to use the global<br />
financial crisis to leverage China’s huge foreign currency reserves. However,<br />
we do not regard these overseas investments as traditional MNE behavior<br />
explained by theory. Informal institutions support formal institutions in<br />
deciding which sectors should be involved in OFDI. Some target OFDI industries<br />
may involve greater elements of national pride and state ideology to<br />
help generate greater political benefits. Because of the ideology concern, it<br />
may be hard for Chinese multinationals to conduct OFDI in industries that<br />
generate ideology conflicts such as the media sector. Figure 1.4 synthesizes<br />
the above propositions in this <strong>chapter</strong>.<br />
Proposition 4a: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in overseas manufacturing<br />
(design and R&D) industries that can help upgrade their domestic industrial<br />
structure and global value chains.<br />
Proposition 4b: Chinese multinational firms tend to invest in overseas resource<br />
exploration and extraction industries that can help China pursue and secure scarce<br />
natural resources.<br />
Hard power (economic)<br />
Formal institutional<br />
determinants<br />
State policy<br />
Administrative<br />
system<br />
Government<br />
ownership<br />
The state Soft power (political)<br />
Chinese multinationals’<br />
comparative ownership<br />
advantages<br />
Chinese multinationals’<br />
OFDI:<br />
motivation<br />
strategy<br />
PROOF<br />
Informal institutional<br />
determinants<br />
State ideology<br />
National pride<br />
Figure 1.4 The role of state and Chinese multinationals’ institution-based OFDI
32 Macro-Environmental Determinants of Chinese FDI<br />
3. Discussion and conclusion<br />
PROOF<br />
As China emerges as an important player in the world economy, the<br />
role of the state is crucial through the promotion of OFDI by Chinese<br />
multinationals. The Chinese state executed its role through constructing<br />
formal and informal institutions to influence OFDI trajectories. Under such<br />
circumstances, we observe an extensive interplay between the macro-level<br />
state policy and institutional frameworks and the micro-level firm and OFDI<br />
strategic choices. In both cases, formal and informal institutional factors<br />
drive Chinese firms to conduct OFDI in different investment modes, location<br />
choices, and types of industries.<br />
Due to space limitation, there are some important issues our <strong>chapter</strong> did<br />
not capture in detail although they deserve attention. Institutions do not<br />
matter to all firms, and they do not matter in similar ways (North, 1990;<br />
Scott, 1995). This suggests that the institutions derived from the role of the<br />
state may generate contingent effects on OFDI by Chinese firms. The first<br />
contingent factor is related to a stratified structure that the state constructs<br />
in developing the formal and informal institutional OFDI regime. In such<br />
a structure, the institutional regime is exclusive in nature where the state<br />
renders the advantageous institutions only to certain groups of firms: not all<br />
Chinese multinationals enjoy the benefits in their internationalization. The<br />
state makes such exclusions using criteria such as how important the firm is<br />
to the whole economy. Only influential firms such as large firms or firms in<br />
more important industries benefit from the supportive regime.<br />
The second contingency factor is related to a ‘double-edged sword’ or ‘dark<br />
side’ of the institutional influence. In contrast to the ‘benefits’ generated<br />
by institutional regimes for ‘some’ firms, there may be ‘costs’ or ‘liabilities’<br />
assigned by similar institutions to other firms. While we discuss the pull role<br />
of the state and institutional regimes on Chinese OFDI, we cannot ignore the<br />
push role of the same institutional regime to some OFDI activities (e.g., Luo<br />
& Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007). The ‘supporting’ institutional regime<br />
may create costs and disadvantages to some firms’ domestic market competition,<br />
and thus crowd them out to the international markets to pursue<br />
growth. This is reflected by the large number of Chinese overseas investments<br />
in Latin America, many of them in three tax havens (Witt & Lewin,<br />
2007).<br />
The third contingency factor is related to the ‘mixed’ objectives that the<br />
state sets for OFDI (Luo and Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010). Except for the<br />
economic driving forces (mostly efficiency and effectiveness from the firm’s<br />
perspective), Chinese firms are also pulled to conduct political OFDI that<br />
mostly satisfies country-level objectives. Key Chinese multinationals are<br />
forced to exert ‘helping hand’ behaviors to fulfill the country-level political<br />
goals such as strengthening inter-governmental political ties (Luo and Tung,<br />
2007). This was particularly evident in China’s investment in some Third
Bing Ren et al. 33<br />
World countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). The state is more likely to mandate<br />
SOEs to conduct such OFDI activities because the state has a direct control<br />
of the SOE sector. Such political mandates may also be possible with private<br />
firms, especially when the private parties’ interests are intertwined with<br />
the state’s interests. However, compared with SOEs, private sector firms are<br />
more likely to act independently in OFDI and be driven by economics, even<br />
when such OFDIs result from exploiting the state’s supportive institutional<br />
regime.<br />
The last contingency is that to leverage better the advantageous OFDI<br />
institutional regime, firms must have specific internal conditions. The most<br />
important internal conditions are capabilities that can facilitate successful<br />
integration of company resources and OFDI objectives with the countryspecific<br />
institutional supports. Such capabilities include strong adaptation<br />
capabilities in relation to the external institutional environments (Elango &<br />
Pattnaik, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007); cross-border learning and absorptive capacity<br />
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1997; Teece et al., 1997); and creativity and innovation<br />
in company integration of global value chains (Sun et al., 2010). Other<br />
factors can be managerial intentionality (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, &<br />
Volberda, 2007; Kumar, 2009) and international entrepreneurship (Yiu et al.,<br />
2007). Given the supporting institutional environments, these factors are<br />
important for generating effective strategic choices and adjustments in<br />
exploiting international market opportunities. The capability factor is more<br />
important than resources (Deng, 2007; Sun et al., 2010) because firms with<br />
unique capabilities can obtain essential resources that they lack, either<br />
through exploiting the home country institutional environments or through<br />
integrating the global resource platform.<br />
These four contingency views suggest future research directions on<br />
Chinese firms’ internationalization, to derive better predictions on the path<br />
and trajectory of Chinese OFDI: these need to include other theoretical<br />
approaches such as political economy perspectives; views on resource and<br />
capability; evolutionary theory; and the institutional perspective.<br />
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Author Index<br />
Acharya, R., 270<br />
Ackerly, A., 345<br />
Ahlstrom, D., 24<br />
Aizenman, J., 58<br />
Ajakaiye, O., 308, 311, 313, 314<br />
Akoorie, M., 39<br />
Alden, C., 293<br />
Alessandri, T., 122<br />
Aliber, R. Z., 13, 44<br />
Allard, G., 6–7<br />
Almeida, J. G., 39<br />
Almeida, P., 39, 178<br />
Alon, I., 1, 2, 8, 39, 109, 137, 142, 151,<br />
212, 236, 258, 280, 376, 379, 380,<br />
391, 393<br />
Altbach, E. G., 81, 85, 86, 87, 94<br />
Amelio, William, 145<br />
Amit, R., 138<br />
Andreosso-O’Callaghan, B., 178<br />
Antkiewicz, A., 191<br />
Ash, R., 178, 179<br />
Asiedu, E., 289<br />
Astrachan, J. H., 215<br />
Atkins, R., 212<br />
Au, L. W., 329<br />
Autio, E., 39<br />
Baisden, D. R., 344<br />
Bakkalapulo, A., 344<br />
Balfour, F., 234, 236, 244<br />
Ball, M., 337<br />
Bandelj, N., 165<br />
Bankston, J., 344<br />
Barbosa, F., 387<br />
Barkema, H., 142<br />
Barnett, C., 342, 343, 345, 347<br />
Barney, J. B., 39, 177, 213<br />
Barrell, R., 57, 58<br />
Bartlett, C. A., 39<br />
Beamish, P., 74, 124<br />
Beausang, F., 177, 178<br />
Becattini, G., 240, 245<br />
Benelli, G., 355<br />
Benelli, T., 354<br />
396<br />
PROOF<br />
Bengston, M., 245<br />
Bergsten, C., 57<br />
Besada, H., 304<br />
Bethel, J., 126<br />
Beuttenmuller, P., 8<br />
Bhattacharjee, S., 260, 261<br />
Bieri, J., 56<br />
Billington, N., 56<br />
Bird, Ningbo, 49<br />
Birkinshaw, J., 214<br />
Björkman, I., 214<br />
Blangiardo, G., 243<br />
Blank, D. M., 347<br />
Blonigen, B. A., 56, 58<br />
Bloodgood, J. M., 39<br />
Boie, B., 86, 235, 236, 239,<br />
267, 377<br />
Boisot, M. H., 14, 40, 258<br />
Bolling, C., 57<br />
Bonaglia, F., 179<br />
Bond, M. H., 243, 247<br />
Booth, W., 345<br />
Bordonaro, F., 259<br />
Bouw, B., 257<br />
Bowen, P., 123<br />
Brandes, P., 122<br />
Brandt, P. T., 58<br />
Brautignam, D., 310<br />
Broadman, H. G., 306, 311, 313<br />
Brod, M., 4, 392<br />
Bromiley, P., 124<br />
Browning, M., 337, 344<br />
Brush, T., 124<br />
Bruton, G. D., 13, 24<br />
Buck, T., 55, 123, 126, 132, 179, 238<br />
Buckley, P. J., 12–15, 13, 14, 15,<br />
39–45, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,<br />
55, 57, 97–8, 108, 109, 123, 158,<br />
164, 177, 179, 191, 212, 238, 239,<br />
377, 391, 394<br />
Burgers, W., 123<br />
Burghart, N., 179<br />
Burke, C., 311, 313, 314<br />
Byrd, A., 341–42, 346
Cai, K. G., 31, 55, 236<br />
Calderon-Rossell, J. R., 56<br />
Cantwell, J., 43, 57, 74, 108, 177, 178<br />
Capron, L., 141, 143, 217<br />
Carney, M., 219<br />
Carpenter, M., 122, 124, 125, 130<br />
Carroll, T. N., 29<br />
Cartwright, S., 213<br />
Casson, M., 13, 108, 177<br />
Caves, R. E., 13, 39, 56, 177<br />
Ceccagno, A., 237, 241, 243, 244,<br />
246, 248<br />
Chaisse, J., 81<br />
Chakrabarti, A., 57<br />
Chan, S., 97, 98, 238<br />
Chang, H.-J., 14<br />
Chang, S. J., 55, 57<br />
Chang, T., 39<br />
Chauduri, S., 139<br />
Chen, C., 238, 239<br />
Chen, E., 108<br />
Chen, F., 330<br />
Chen, G., 330, 337, 348<br />
Chen, H., 158<br />
Chen, J., 330<br />
Chen, Q., 6<br />
Chen, T.-J., 158<br />
Chen, X. H., 273<br />
Chen, Y., 120<br />
Cheng, L. K., 49, 204<br />
Chetty, S. K., 39<br />
Cheung, Y., 38<br />
Child, J., 14, 39, 40, 41, 49, 109, 137,<br />
138, 141, 145, 157, 178, 179, 239,<br />
259<br />
Chiou Wei, S. Z., 57<br />
Choi, J. J., 57<br />
Chowdhury, A. R., 56<br />
Chuanzhi, Liu, 144<br />
Churchward, C., 344<br />
Churchward, J., 346<br />
Claessens, S., 13<br />
Clark, L., 345<br />
Clegg, L. J., 12, 45, 55, 57, 109, 123, 179<br />
Cogman, D., 213, 214<br />
Cognato, M. H., 81, 85, 86, 87, 94<br />
Cohen, M. W., 137, 138, 140, 215<br />
Collier, P., 292<br />
Connelly, B., 124, 125<br />
Constantine, G., 343<br />
PROOF<br />
Cooke, F. L., 217<br />
Cool, K., 13<br />
Corkin, L., 301, 311, 313, 314<br />
Cotner, M. G., 347<br />
Covin, J., 138<br />
Cristaldi, F., 243, 245<br />
Cross, A. R., 12, 55<br />
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., 280, 291<br />
Cui, L., 40, 42, 109, 212<br />
Culem, C. G., 56<br />
Curran, L., 189<br />
Author Index 397<br />
daCosta, R., 124<br />
Daily, M., 138<br />
Dalekowschodnia, S., 167<br />
Dalton,D.R.,138<br />
Daoyu, L., 337<br />
Datta, D., 122, 124, 126<br />
Davies, K., 258<br />
Davies, R. B., 263<br />
De Propris, L., 179<br />
DeFusco, R., 126<br />
Dei Ottati, G., 241, 245<br />
Delios, A., 128<br />
Deng, P., 4, 11, 14, 33, 39, 40, 41, 49, 55,<br />
97, 137, 142, 143, 145, 149, 178,<br />
179, 212, 219, 238, 239, 329, 330,<br />
349, 392<br />
Denicolai, S., 39<br />
Denison, T., 241, 243<br />
Devies, K., 234<br />
Dharwadkar, R., 122<br />
Diamond, R., 348<br />
Diaz, G., 339<br />
Diebold, F., 73<br />
Dierickx, I., 13<br />
Dillon, P., 340<br />
Ding, D. Z., 13, 235<br />
Ding, W., 3, 392<br />
Djankov, S., 13<br />
Dobler, G., 301, 311<br />
Donadio, R., 251<br />
Dongsheng, L., 148<br />
Doolittle, L., 339, 340<br />
Dore, R. P., 12<br />
Drahokoupil, J., 165, 167<br />
Driffield, N., 179<br />
Du, J., 120<br />
Dunlop, J., 337
398 Author Index<br />
Dunning, J. H., 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 30,<br />
38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 54, 57, 108, 109,<br />
123, 158, 163, 164, 177, 178, 189,<br />
314, 315, 376<br />
Dyer, G., 212<br />
Dykes, B., 124<br />
Easterly, W., 292<br />
Edwards, C., 179<br />
Edwards, S., 56<br />
Egger, H., 263<br />
Egger, P., 263<br />
Egri, C., 24<br />
Eisenhardt, K. M., 110, 142, 220, 222<br />
Eisner, M., 340<br />
Elango, B., 13, 33<br />
Enderwick, P., 39<br />
Evangelista, F. U., 39<br />
Falkner, D., 138<br />
Fama, E., 124<br />
Farmer, G., 332<br />
Farooki, M., 312, 321–22<br />
Farrell, D., 217<br />
Farrell, R., 58<br />
Fetcherin, M., 1<br />
Fetscherin, M., 1, 8, 151, 376, 377, 379,<br />
394<br />
Fields, K. J., 282<br />
Filatotchev, I., 13, 122, 124<br />
Filippov, S., 161, 168, 179<br />
Finkelstein, S., 214, 215<br />
Fioretti, G., 240, 241<br />
Fladrich, A. M., 6, 237, 244, 245, 249<br />
Flores, I., 331, 333, 335, 345<br />
Foss, N. J., 137<br />
Foster, V., 313<br />
Fotak, V., 269, 273<br />
Foushee, B., 346<br />
Franklyn, P., 261<br />
Freeman, D., 312<br />
Froot, K. A., 56<br />
Fuchs, H. J., 235, 236, 237, 239<br />
Fung,H-G.,55<br />
García-Canal, E., 280<br />
Garnaut, R., 249<br />
Gaston, N., 58<br />
Gavin, M., 338<br />
Ge, G. L., 13, 235<br />
PROOF<br />
Gedajlovic, E., 219<br />
Gelb, S., 304, 305<br />
Genc, M., 280, 291<br />
George, G., 137, 138, 213, 215, 219, 330,<br />
333, 337, 348<br />
Georgopoulos, G. J., 56, 57<br />
Geringer, J., 124<br />
Ghauri, P. N., 39<br />
Ghosh, I., 58<br />
Ghoshal, S., 39<br />
Gilboy,G.J.,178<br />
Globerman, S., 189<br />
Glossop, P., 261<br />
Goldstein, A., 179<br />
Gomes-Casseres, B., 14<br />
Gomez-Mejia, L., 124<br />
Gopinath, M., 57<br />
Goranova, M., 122<br />
Graham, E. M., 165<br />
Grant, A. J., 217<br />
Gray, H. P., 54<br />
Griffin, L., 344<br />
Griffith, D. A., 13<br />
Grollmann, P., 217<br />
Grubaugh, S. J., 43, 45, 57<br />
Grubb, P. D., 39<br />
Grunwald, R., 225<br />
Gu, J., 234, 236, 282, 301, 302, 310<br />
Guang, Y., 338, 339, 347<br />
Gugler, P., 1, 81, 86, 151, 235, 236, 239,<br />
267, 377<br />
Guillén, M., 217, 280<br />
Guisinger, S., 13<br />
Guo, B., 120<br />
Guo, J. Q., 56<br />
Haig, A., 336<br />
Haleblian, J., 214, 215, 218<br />
Hall, P. A., 69, 218<br />
Hambrick, D., 126<br />
Hamilton, J. D., 63<br />
Hamilton, R. T., 39<br />
Han, B., 12, 158, 191, 259<br />
Harney, A., 234<br />
Harrison, B., 240<br />
Harrison, J. S., 141<br />
Harzing, A. W. K., 158<br />
Hattingh, D., 387<br />
Hawawini, G. V., 54<br />
Hay, F., 179, 180
Hayward, M. L. A., 141<br />
He, F., 82, 83, 85, 87<br />
He, L., 20<br />
Heath, P., 14<br />
Heckman, J. J., 216<br />
Hendrickx, M., 124<br />
Henley, J., 309<br />
Hennart, J. F., 12, 13, 14<br />
Herrmann, P., 122, 124, 126<br />
Hesterly, W., 177<br />
Hilsum, L., 317<br />
Hitt, M. A., 39, 74, 122–7, 141, 150, 214,<br />
215<br />
Ho, P. C., 61, 62<br />
Hodges, H., 344<br />
Hodgson, G., 260<br />
Holslag, J., 312<br />
Hong, E., 39, 55, 74, 97, 188, 238<br />
Hong, S., 56<br />
Hongbin, J., 55<br />
Hood, G., 336<br />
Hope, O.-K., 12, 28<br />
Horst, F., 57<br />
Hoskisson, R., 122–4, 126, 127<br />
Hua, J., 218<br />
Huang, C.-H., 55, 179<br />
Huang, Y., 14<br />
Hughes, S., 250<br />
Hummer, 107<br />
Hunt, A., 347<br />
Hutzschenreuter, T., 33<br />
Hwang, P., 123<br />
Hymer, S. H., 13, 108, 177<br />
Inkpen, A. C., 188<br />
Ireland, R. D., 39, 122, 123, 126, 141<br />
Ivarsson, I., 178<br />
Iversen, C., 13<br />
Jackson, J. W., 347<br />
Jackson, S., 74<br />
Jacobson, S., 330, 346<br />
Jansen, J. P., 139, 141<br />
Jensen, M., 124, 126, 213<br />
Jeon, B. N., 56, 57<br />
Jiang, F., 40, 42, 109, 212<br />
Jiang, Y., 24, 179<br />
Jiang, Z., 15<br />
Jiannian, Y., 339, 340<br />
Jindra, B., 122, 124<br />
PROOF<br />
Jiwei, L., 87<br />
Johanson, J., 12, 33, 108, 177<br />
Johnson, J. P., 239<br />
Johnson, R., 126, 127<br />
Jonsson, T., 178<br />
Jopsom, B., 316<br />
Joseph, S., 339<br />
Author Index 399<br />
Kagame, P., 281<br />
Kale, D., 301, 311<br />
Kang, R., 179<br />
Kang, Y., 217<br />
Kao, E. H. C., 55<br />
Kaplan, R. D., 282, 284<br />
Kaplinsky, R., 7, 281–3, 285, 305, 311,<br />
393<br />
Kato, T., 132<br />
Ke, Y., 179<br />
Keister, L. A., 14<br />
Keller, M., 2, 81, 84, 392<br />
Keller von, E., 179<br />
Kenney, B., 332<br />
Kern, S., 82, 84<br />
Khan, G., 344<br />
Khana, T., 258<br />
Khosravian, C., 245<br />
Kieser, A., 225<br />
Kim, H., 124, 127<br />
Kim, L., 139, 140<br />
Kim, S., 27, 56<br />
Kim, W., 123<br />
Kim, Y. K., 54<br />
Kincaid, R., 347<br />
Kindleberger, C. P., 177<br />
King, D. R., 213<br />
King, R., 138, 141<br />
Klein, M. W., 56<br />
Kloss, M., 387<br />
Knickerbocker, F. T., 13<br />
Knoerich, J., 5, 179, 186, 188, 392<br />
Koch, U., 225<br />
Kogut, B., 13, 57, 138, 141<br />
Kohlhagen, S. W., 44<br />
Komasa, B., 167<br />
Komesaroff, M., 318<br />
Konka, 148<br />
Koop, G., 59<br />
Kravis, I. B., 56<br />
Krueger, J., 338<br />
Krugman, P., 240
400 Author Index<br />
Kshetri, N., 217<br />
Kuemmerle, W., 178<br />
Kumar, K., 54<br />
Kumar, N., 30, 33<br />
Kurihara, J., 235, 239<br />
Kwan, C., 260<br />
Kyrkilis, D., 42, 44, 45, 48, 57<br />
Lall, S., 57, 108, 177, 315<br />
Lancee, B., 248, 250<br />
Lane, P. J., 138, 140, 141, 216<br />
Lang, L., 13<br />
Langley, F., 333, 334<br />
Lardy, N. R., 234<br />
Larsson, R., 214, 215<br />
Lattemann, C., 216<br />
Lau, C.-M., 13<br />
Lau, M., 133<br />
Lecraw, D. J., 177, 178, 315<br />
Lee, C. K., 264<br />
Lee, J., 343<br />
Lee. T. D., 336<br />
Lei, D., 140<br />
Leonidou, L. C., 39<br />
Leung, M. W. H., 243<br />
Levinson, H., 215<br />
Levinthal, D. A., 137, 138, 140, 215<br />
Levitt, B., 215<br />
Lewin, A. Y., 12, 13, 29, 32<br />
Li, J. T., 218<br />
Li, K., 55<br />
Li, M., 218<br />
Li,P.P.,55<br />
Li, W., 24<br />
Liang, H., 391<br />
Lichtenthaler, U., 216<br />
Lien, Y.-C., 13<br />
Lin, J. D., 12<br />
Lin, X., 6, 273<br />
Lin, Z. J., 218, 219<br />
Lindenbaum, B., 178<br />
Lippman, S. A., 13<br />
Lipsey, R. E., 56<br />
Liqiang, N., 2, 391<br />
Liu, C., 329<br />
Liu, L., 179<br />
Liu, M., 179, 218<br />
Liu, Q. W., 55, 217<br />
Liu, X., 4, 43, 55, 122, 238<br />
Liu, Y., 5, 217<br />
PROOF<br />
Long, C. P., 29, 132<br />
Loree, D., 13<br />
Love,J.H.,179<br />
Lovelock, P., 264<br />
Low, S. P., 55<br />
Lu, J. W., 4, 13, 122, 124<br />
Lu, Z., 217<br />
Lubatkin, M., 213<br />
Lundan, S. M., 11, 13, 28, 177, 376<br />
Luo, Y., 12, 13, 14, 15, 24, 32, 33, 39,<br />
126, 158, 159, 191, 212, 216, 238,<br />
239, 259<br />
Luski, I., 263<br />
Lyles, M. A., 137, 140<br />
Lyons, G., 89, 99<br />
Ma, C., 329<br />
Ma, X., 13<br />
Ma, Z., 49<br />
Madhok, A., 39<br />
Maduell, Michael, 100<br />
Magagnini, S., 329, 331<br />
Makino, S., 13, 40<br />
March, J. G., 18, 101, 215<br />
Mariano, W., 345, 346<br />
Markusen, A., 240<br />
Marshall, A., 239, 240<br />
Martin, M. F., 87, 259<br />
Martin, R., 240<br />
Masron, T. A., 157, 158, 163<br />
Mathews, J. A., 40, 109, 126, 164, 179,<br />
280, 315<br />
Mathieu, J., 74<br />
McCollum, B., 336<br />
McCoy, A., 343<br />
McDermott, M., 55<br />
McIntyre, J., 39<br />
McIntyre, J. R., 109, 137, 142, 212, 236,<br />
280, 376<br />
McManus, J., 13<br />
Megginson, W., 269, 273<br />
Meikie, S., 344<br />
Mervine, B., 341<br />
Messner, D., 322<br />
Meyer, K., 12, 109–10<br />
Meyer, M. W., 14, 40, 258<br />
Miao, Y. C., 259<br />
Mica, J., 336<br />
Miesing, P., 218<br />
Milelli, C., 179, 180
Miller, J., 124<br />
Miller, K., 343<br />
Miller, T., 124, 125<br />
Ming, D., 337<br />
Miracky, W., 82, 84, 86<br />
Mitchell, W., 124, 141, 143<br />
Mizruchi, M., 126<br />
Mody, A., 56<br />
Moon, H.-C., 178<br />
Moran, T., 57<br />
Morck, R., 55, 143<br />
Morgan, B., 339<br />
Morgan, P., 341, 345<br />
Morgenstern, O., 263<br />
Morris, M., 7<br />
Moyo, D., 292, 293<br />
Muekalia, D., 282<br />
Mueller, M., 264<br />
Murphy, K., 126<br />
Murphy, M., 331<br />
Musselle, K., 344<br />
Musteen, M., 122, 124, 126<br />
Nachum, L., 54, 158<br />
Nadeau, B., 243<br />
Nadolska, A., 142<br />
Narula, R., 108, 315<br />
Nee, V., 14<br />
Nelson, C., 125<br />
Nelson, R. R., 215<br />
Newman, R., 143<br />
Ng, S. H., 39, 55<br />
Nguyen, H., 12<br />
Ni, L., 2, 391<br />
Nicolas, F., 164, 171, 179, 236, 237<br />
Nixon, R., 336<br />
Nolan, P., 178, 302<br />
Norbu, T. J., 346<br />
North, D. C., 32<br />
Noy, I., 58<br />
Oxelheim, L., 122<br />
Pablo, A. L., 213<br />
Pain, N., 57, 58<br />
Palamara, G., 39<br />
Palmer, T., 126<br />
Pantelidis, P., 42, 44, 45, 48, 57<br />
Pantulu, J., 58<br />
Pappu, R., 380<br />
Author Index 401<br />
Paris, R., 260<br />
Park, Y. P., 14<br />
Pattnaik, C., 13, 33<br />
Pavitt, K., 177<br />
Peace, J. L., 14<br />
Pearce, R. D., 43<br />
Pedersen, T., 33<br />
Peng, L., 337<br />
Peng, M. W., 11, 13, 14, 24, 41, 133, 158,<br />
216, 218<br />
Pennings, M., 126<br />
Perkins, T., 257<br />
Pick, D., 57<br />
Piesse, J., 13<br />
Pietrobelli, C., 235, 236, 238, 239, 242,<br />
243, 244, 245<br />
Pin, Ni, 114<br />
Ping, D., 109<br />
Ping, Z., 55<br />
Pino, M., 347, 348<br />
Pisano, G., 13<br />
Pisano, V., 140<br />
Piscitello, L., 245<br />
Pistor, K., 24<br />
Pistoresi, B., 56<br />
Pitelis, C., 14<br />
Pitkethly, R., 138<br />
Polzcer, S., 257<br />
Poncet, S., 97–8<br />
Poon,J.P.H.,58<br />
Porter, M., 54<br />
Portes, A., 240, 245<br />
Power, M., 281, 293, 311<br />
Prugel, T. A., 43, 45<br />
Pruthi, S., 109<br />
Pugel, T. A., 57<br />
Puranam, P., 139, 141<br />
Pyke, F., 240<br />
Qian, W., 55, 178<br />
Qian, X., 38<br />
Qichen, Q., 337<br />
Qimou, M., 340<br />
Qiusheng, H., 148<br />
Rajgopal, S., 126<br />
Ralston, D. A., 24<br />
Raskin, A., 178<br />
Rauner, F., 217<br />
PROOF
402 Author Index<br />
Rebellotti, R., 235, 236, 238, 239, 242,<br />
243, 244, 245<br />
Redding, G., 74<br />
Reed, J., 229<br />
Ren, B., 1, 11, 391<br />
Rhee, S. S., 56<br />
Roberts, D., 234, 236, 244<br />
Rodrigues, S. B., 14, 39, 40, 41, 49,<br />
109, 137, 157, 178, 179,<br />
239, 259<br />
Roe, T., 57<br />
Roehl, T. W., 178<br />
Rohter, L., 345<br />
Rolle,J.D.,54<br />
Rosenboim, M., 263<br />
Rosengren, E., 56<br />
Rossi, V., 179<br />
Rozanov, A., 86<br />
Ruback, R. S., 213<br />
Rugman, A. M., 13, 55<br />
Rui, H., 12, 39, 41, 55<br />
Rumelt, R. P., 13<br />
Rupert, C., 337<br />
Russell, C. J., 13<br />
Sader, F., 56<br />
Saebi, T., 168, 179<br />
Saggi, K., 180<br />
Salk, J., 140<br />
Sanders, W., 122, 124–6, 130<br />
Sanfilippo, M., 235, 236, 238, 239,<br />
242–5<br />
Sapienza, H. J., 39<br />
Sardy, M., 379–80<br />
Sargent, R., 340–1<br />
Sauvant, K. P., 234, 257, 260<br />
Schmitz, A., 56<br />
Schnedler, J., 335<br />
Schneider, A., 149<br />
Schneider, M., 345, 347<br />
Schoemaker, P. J. H., 138<br />
Schoenberg, R., 213<br />
Schüler-Zhou, Y., 4<br />
Schüller, M., 4<br />
Schweiger, D. M., 213, 214<br />
Scott, W. R., 32<br />
Seligman, S. D., 250<br />
Sengenberg, W., 240<br />
Seyoum, B., 13<br />
Sforzi, F., 240, 242<br />
PROOF<br />
Sgobbi, F., 245<br />
Shahbudin, A. S., 157, 158, 163<br />
Shan, W., 178<br />
Shane, M., 57<br />
Shangkun, Y., 336<br />
Shapiro, D., 189<br />
Shattuck, H., 337<br />
Shaver, M., 124<br />
Shenot, C., 338, 339, 341<br />
Shevlin, T., 126<br />
Shi, L., 179<br />
Shi, Y., 392<br />
Shimizu, K., 140, 214<br />
Shou, Y., 120<br />
Shrivastava, P., 214<br />
Shu, C., 238<br />
Shuen, A., 13<br />
Shufu, Li, 116<br />
Sigurdson, J., 178<br />
Simmons, M. S., 239<br />
Simon, H., 212<br />
Sims,C.A.,58<br />
Singh, H., 140<br />
Smith, T. W., 27<br />
Smolenski, N., 357<br />
Snyder, J., 348<br />
Södermana, S., 41<br />
Song, J., 178<br />
Sorge, A. M., 158<br />
Soskice, D., 218<br />
Spigarelli, F., 8<br />
Spitz, J. J., 340, 341<br />
Stahl, G. K., 138, 141, 214<br />
Stearns, L., 126<br />
Stein, J. C., 56<br />
Stephan, J., 122, 124<br />
Stevens, G. V. G., 44<br />
Stoltenberg, C., 236<br />
Strange, R., 13<br />
Stratton, J., 346<br />
Strother, S. G., 331, 332, 336<br />
Sturm, J-E., 58<br />
Subacchi, P., 84<br />
Subramanian, V., 54<br />
Sun, L. X., 39, 55, 74, 97, 188, 238<br />
Sun, S. L., 11, 14, 28, 30, 33<br />
Sunley, P., 240<br />
Sutherland, D., 14<br />
Swedenborg, B., 57<br />
Szulanski, G., 140
Tan, H., 12, 134, 179<br />
Tan, J., 213, 214, 218<br />
Tang, F.-C., 235, 236, 239<br />
Taylor, R., 39<br />
Teece, D. J., 13, 33<br />
Terheggen, A., 322<br />
Terpstra, R. H., 24<br />
Thomas, D., 244<br />
Thomas, M., 339, 341, 344<br />
Thomas W. B., 12<br />
Tian, Y., 39<br />
Tianle, Y., 55<br />
Tihanyi, L., 13<br />
Tijaja, J., 321–2<br />
Timmerman, K., 345<br />
Tin, A., 332, 334, 335, 336, 337, 339<br />
Ting,C.C.,336<br />
Tolentino, P. E., 2, 392<br />
Toncar, M., 379, 380<br />
Tong, J. T., 24<br />
Trivedi, P. K., 56<br />
Truman, E. M., 100<br />
Tse, D. K., 178<br />
Tull, D. M., 316<br />
Tulman, J. P.<br />
Tung, R. L., 12, 13, 24, 32, 33, 126<br />
Turner, A., 189<br />
Uhlaner, R. T., 214<br />
Vaara, E., 141<br />
Vahlne, J.-E., 12, 33<br />
Vaidyanath, D., 140, 153<br />
van den Bosch, F. A. J., 139, 140<br />
Vandaele, J., 318<br />
Vanoli, L., 2, 392<br />
Vasavada, U., 57<br />
Vaughan, V., 331<br />
Vega-Redondo, F., 263<br />
Verdin, P., 54<br />
Vernon, R., 13<br />
Voigt, A., 138, 153, 214<br />
Volberda, H. W., 33<br />
von Neumann, J., 263<br />
Voss, H., 12, 40, 42, 55, 123, 158, 179,<br />
191, 236, 238<br />
Vyas, D., 12<br />
Wadhwa, V., 217<br />
Walter, G. A., 213<br />
Wan, W., 218<br />
Wang, C. M., 264<br />
Wang, D., 13<br />
Wang, K., 120<br />
Wang, M. Y., 39, 158<br />
Wang, W., 24<br />
Wang, Y., 41<br />
Wanling, D., 3, 109, 392<br />
Ward, S., 145<br />
Warner, M., 39, 55<br />
Wei,W.,8,391<br />
Weidenbaum, M., 250<br />
Wiedersheim-Paul, F., 108, 177<br />
Weil, S., 312<br />
Weiss, M. A., 99, 101<br />
Wells, L., 108, 177, 315<br />
Wenk, K., 188<br />
Wesson, T., 178<br />
West, A. S., 214<br />
Westhead, P., 39<br />
Whalley, J., 191<br />
Wheeler, D., 56<br />
Wheeler, M., 56<br />
Whitley, R. D., 218<br />
Whittington, L., 265, 273<br />
Wiersema, F., 123<br />
Wild, F., 318<br />
Williams, J. T., 58<br />
Williamson, O. E., 177<br />
Williamson, P. J., 178, 258, 316<br />
Winter, S. G., 215<br />
Wiseman, P. M., 126<br />
Wiseman, R., 124<br />
Witt, M. A., 12, 13, 32<br />
Wolf, B. M., 57<br />
Wong, J., 97, 98<br />
Wong, S. R., 126, 238<br />
Woywode, M., 5<br />
Woyzbun, E., 274<br />
Wright, C., 336<br />
Wright, M., 109<br />
Wu, B., 237<br />
Wu, D., 120<br />
Wu, F., 39, 55, 74, 178, 179<br />
Wu, H., 46, 238–9<br />
Wu, J., 128<br />
Wu, X., 3, 392<br />
Xian, W., 340<br />
Xiaobo, W., 3, 109<br />
Xiaoping, D., 15, 329<br />
PROOF<br />
Author Index 403
404 Author Index<br />
Xin, L., 14, 55, 179<br />
Xu, B., 122, 124<br />
Xu, C., 24<br />
Xu, X., 39, 55<br />
Xue, Q., 12<br />
Yan, D., 11<br />
Yang, C. N., 336<br />
Yang, D., 55<br />
Yang, H., 179<br />
Yang,J.Y.Y.,56<br />
Yang, S., 340–1<br />
Yang, X., 218<br />
Yao, S., 14<br />
Yao, Y., 350<br />
Yauch, A., 344<br />
Yeh, R.-S., 13<br />
Yeo, H. S., 55<br />
Yeung, B., 55<br />
Yeung, H. W., 55, 109, 124, 143<br />
Yin, E., 258<br />
Yin, R. K., 142, 222<br />
Yip, G. S., 12, 39, 41, 55<br />
Yiu, D., 13, 14, 33<br />
Yongjiang, S., 3<br />
Young, M., 24, 133<br />
Young, S., 55, 178<br />
Yu, J., 350<br />
Yuanxing, Z., 338<br />
Zaheer, S., 158<br />
Zahra, S. A., 39<br />
Zander, U., 13<br />
Zanin, V., 237<br />
Zemin, J., 15, 336<br />
Zeng, M., 178, 316<br />
ZEW, 212<br />
Zhan, J. X., 39, 178<br />
Zhang, H., 350<br />
Zhang, M., 82, 83, 85, 191<br />
Zhang, W., 7<br />
Zhang, Y., 161, 191<br />
Zhao, H., 41<br />
Zhao,X.D.,15<br />
Zheng, P., 12<br />
Zheng, S., 120<br />
Zheng, Y., 1, 391<br />
Zhimin, M., 335<br />
Zhoa, M., 55<br />
Zhou, N., 128<br />
Zhou, W., 179<br />
Zhu, Z., 57<br />
Zollo, M., 140<br />
Zorn, T., 126<br />
Zou, S., 39<br />
Zucchella, A., 39<br />
Zuyun, J., 360<br />
PROOF
Subject Index<br />
AAA, see American Automobile<br />
Association (AAA)<br />
absorptive capacity, 137–51, 215–20<br />
conceptual model of, 220<br />
cross-border mergers and acquisitions<br />
and, from China, 142–50<br />
Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />
Computing business, 143–7<br />
TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />
TV business, 147–50<br />
individual, 220<br />
multidimensional perspective of,<br />
219–20<br />
multilevel perspective on, 216–19<br />
individual levels, 216–17<br />
national levels, 218–19<br />
organizational levels, 217–18<br />
national, 220<br />
organizational, 220<br />
preferred research method for, 220–2<br />
data collection for, 221–2<br />
results of, 222–8<br />
theoretical model for, 138–42<br />
case study research method, 142<br />
strategic assets, 140–2<br />
Academy of Management Annual<br />
Meeting, 151<br />
acquisitions<br />
of Benelli, 356–8, 366–7<br />
cross-border, 30<br />
of IBM Personal Computing business,<br />
143–7<br />
of Thomson’s TV business, 147–50<br />
of Volvo, 384–5<br />
see also mergers and acquisitions<br />
(M&As)<br />
AD Week, 335<br />
Administration of Overseas Investment<br />
Projects, 15<br />
AEI, see American Eastern International<br />
(AEI)<br />
AERC, see African Economic Research<br />
Consortium (AERC)<br />
AES Wind Generation, 91<br />
405<br />
PROOF<br />
Africa<br />
future research on, 293<br />
limitations of, 293<br />
outward foreign direct investment in,<br />
Chinese, 6–7, 279–98<br />
future research on, 293<br />
limitations of, 293<br />
theory and hypothesis on, 279–84<br />
dependent variables, 284–90<br />
results on, 290–1<br />
Africa Frontier Advisory, 305<br />
African Development Bank, 312<br />
African Economic Research Consortium<br />
(AERC), 282, 303, 306–9<br />
African Growth and Opportunities<br />
Agreement (AGOA), 305<br />
Agence France Presse, 332<br />
agency theory, 124<br />
AGOA, see African Growth and<br />
Opportunities Agreement (AGOA)<br />
Agricultural Bank of China, 94<br />
AIC, see Akaike Information Criterion<br />
(AIC)<br />
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),<br />
47, 62<br />
Aluminum Corporation of China, 25<br />
American Automobile Association<br />
(AAA), 341<br />
American Eastern International (AEI),<br />
330, 331<br />
Anglo-American CEO compensation,<br />
132<br />
Animal Kingdom, 340<br />
Anshan Iron & Steel Group Corporation<br />
Apax, 91<br />
APF, 262<br />
Aprilia, 364<br />
Areva T&D, 91<br />
ASEAN, see Association of Southeast<br />
Asian Nations (ASEAN)<br />
Asia, 88<br />
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 50,<br />
179<br />
Asian-African Bandung Conference, 281
406 Subject Index<br />
Asian capitalism, 219<br />
Asian Driver program, 303, 312<br />
Asian Tigers, 315<br />
Asian Trade Center, 340<br />
assembling industries, 31<br />
asset exploration, 119<br />
Associated Press, 346<br />
Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />
(ASEAN), 376<br />
AST Computers, 143<br />
ATLAS.ti, 220<br />
AU, 320<br />
Audi, 116, 384<br />
Australia and New Zealand Bank, 95<br />
automobile industry, 8, 377–80<br />
see also Geely Automobile Holdings<br />
Limited (Geely Auto)<br />
Aviation Industry Corporation of<br />
China, 27<br />
Aviva, 95<br />
bamboo capitalism, 6<br />
Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned<br />
Nations, 300<br />
Bank of China, 90, 94, 341<br />
Baosteel Group Corporation, 30, 236<br />
BBC News, 281<br />
Beastie Boys, 344<br />
Beijing Olympics, 185<br />
Benelli, 8<br />
acquisition of, 356–8, 366–7<br />
post-, phase of, 367–70<br />
industrial activities, 368–9<br />
operational changes, 367–8<br />
organizational changes, 367–8<br />
sales activities, in commercial<br />
network, 369–70<br />
problem analysis of, 370–1<br />
by Qianjiang Group, 358–61<br />
international expansion of, 360–1<br />
strengths of, 359–60<br />
‘Benelli Garage,’ 356<br />
BG Group, 95<br />
BHP, 264, 272<br />
Big Blue, 145<br />
Black Rock, 91<br />
Blackstone Group, 31, 91, 259<br />
Bluesky, 360<br />
BMW, 116, 384<br />
Boateng, 55<br />
PROOF<br />
BOE, 41<br />
Bok Tower, 341<br />
Boston Consulting Group, 148<br />
BP Plc, 95<br />
BRIC motorcycle market, 360<br />
Brookhill LLC, 339–40<br />
bureaucratic administration, 16–22<br />
Business China, 147<br />
Business Source Premier, 93<br />
Business Wire, 339<br />
BYD Auto, 107<br />
CACCP, see Citizens against Communist<br />
Chinese Propaganda (CACCP)<br />
Cadbury, 95<br />
CAGR, 362<br />
Canada, 257–74<br />
Chinese Investment Corporation<br />
in, 88<br />
Chinese outward foreign direct<br />
investment in, 261–3<br />
foreign direct investment in, 6,<br />
260–1<br />
game modeling in, 263–4<br />
interpretation of, 268–71<br />
key players, 265–7<br />
Petro-China, 271–2<br />
research on, 264–8<br />
structure of, 267–8<br />
investment by Chinese<br />
state-controlled entities in, 6<br />
state controlled funds and entities in,<br />
258–60<br />
closed, 269<br />
open, 269<br />
predictions of, 270–1<br />
restricted access to, 269–70<br />
Cape Canaveral military base, 335<br />
Capital Iron & Steel, 30<br />
capital movements theory, 12–13<br />
capitalism<br />
Asian, 219<br />
bamboo, 6<br />
liberal market model of, 218–19<br />
theory of, 218<br />
western-style, 330<br />
CAS, see Chinese Academy of Sciences<br />
(CAS)
CCPIT, see China Council for the<br />
Promotion of International Trade<br />
(CCPIT)<br />
CDB, see China Development Bank<br />
(CDB)<br />
CECIE, see China Export & Credit<br />
Insurance Cooperation (CECIE)<br />
CEMEC, 313<br />
Center of Competitiveness, 90, 93<br />
Central Florida Future, 345<br />
Central Huijin Investment Company,<br />
87, 90, 99<br />
CEO compensation<br />
Anglo-American aspect of, 132<br />
Granger causality tests for, 127–8<br />
methodology for, 128<br />
results of, 128–32<br />
variables for, 127, 128<br />
internationalization and, 125–7<br />
reverse causation between, 125–32<br />
Chemical Engineering Machinery<br />
Factory, 358<br />
Chesapeake Energy, 91<br />
Chicago Sun Times, 337<br />
China<br />
automobile industry, role in<br />
globalization of, 8, 377–80<br />
Chinese Investment Corporation<br />
in, 88<br />
‘Go Global’ policy in, 11<br />
gross domestic product of, 11<br />
motorcycling industry in, 364–6<br />
outward foreign direct investment<br />
from, global, 109–10, 234–8<br />
characteristics of, 238–9<br />
development of, 238–9<br />
theoretical perspectives on, 109–10<br />
state in, institutional perspective on<br />
role of, 1<br />
two-step currency reform in, 44<br />
China Construction Bank, 90, 94<br />
China Council for the Promotion of<br />
International Trade (CCPIT), 180,<br />
262<br />
China Daily, 385<br />
China Desk or Investment Office, 165<br />
China Development Bank (CDB), 22, 94<br />
China Everbright Bank, 94<br />
China Export & Credit Insurance<br />
Cooperation (CECIE), 22<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 407<br />
China Forum Bayer, 222<br />
China Goes Global Conference, 230, 274<br />
China Guangdong Nuclear Power<br />
Holding Co., Ltd., 27<br />
China Huaneng Group, 26<br />
China Investment Promotion Agency<br />
(CIPA), 166, 181<br />
China Jianyin Investment Company, 87,<br />
365<br />
China Merchants Group, 25<br />
China Metallurgical Group<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China Mimetals Corporation, 25, 257,<br />
260–263, 270, 272<br />
China Mobile Communications<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China National Aviation Holding<br />
Corporation, 25<br />
China National Cereals, Oils &<br />
Foodstuffs Corporation, 25<br />
China National Chemical<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China National Offshore Oil Company<br />
(CNOOC), 25, 49, 239, 257, 260, 269<br />
China National Petroleum Corporation,<br />
25, 271<br />
China Noferrous Metal Mining &<br />
Construction (Group) Co., Ltd., 26<br />
China North Industries Group<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China Ocean Shipping (Group)<br />
Company, 25<br />
China Petrochemical Corporation, 25<br />
China Poly Group Corporation, 27<br />
China Power Investment<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China Railway Hong Kong, 94<br />
China Reinsurance, 94<br />
China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd., 25<br />
China Rules, 1, 391<br />
China Security Regulation Committee<br />
(CSRC), 127<br />
China Shipping (Group) Company, 25<br />
China State Construction Engineering<br />
Corporation, 26<br />
China Telecom, 264<br />
China Travel Service (CTS) Ltd., 329,<br />
331, 340<br />
China Unicom Corporation, 26<br />
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 143
408 Subject Index<br />
Chinese brand, 28, 118<br />
Chinese Communist Party, 15, 50<br />
Chinese EXIM Bank, 281, 310,<br />
314, 319<br />
Chinese Folk Culture Villages, 329<br />
Chinese foreign direct investment<br />
in Canada, 6<br />
in Europe, 4–6<br />
global, case studies on, 7–8<br />
inflow-outflow ratio of, 38<br />
macro-environmental determinants<br />
of, 1–3<br />
micro-environmental determinants of,<br />
3–4<br />
in North America, 6<br />
outward, in Africa, 6–7<br />
Chinese Government, ‘open-door’ policy<br />
by, 97<br />
Chinese ‘insatiable appetite,’ 236<br />
Chinese Investment Corporation<br />
(CIC), 3, 31, 81, 86, 87, 89,<br />
257, 259<br />
Annual Report by, 88<br />
in Asia, 88<br />
in Blackstone Group, 31<br />
board of directors for, 87<br />
in Canada, 88<br />
in China, 88<br />
establishment of, 81, 259<br />
funding for, 86<br />
global expansion of, 81<br />
headquarters for, 86<br />
in Hong Kong, 88<br />
investment strategy of, 3, 98<br />
in Morgan Stanley, 31<br />
in North America, 88<br />
ownership by, 90<br />
purpose of, 86<br />
SAFE, competition with, 81<br />
Transparency Index of, 100<br />
website for, 88<br />
Chinese mergers and acquisitions, 41<br />
cross-border, 142–50<br />
Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />
Computing business, 143–7<br />
combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />
knowledge of business, 143–4<br />
strategy for, effective execution,<br />
145–7<br />
PROOF<br />
TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />
TV business, 147–50<br />
combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />
knowledge of business, 147–8<br />
strategy for, problematic execution<br />
of, 149–50<br />
Chinese Ministry of Commerce<br />
(MOFCOM), 98–9, 285, 304<br />
Chinese Ministry of Finance, 285, 366<br />
Chinese Ministry of Industry and<br />
Technology Information, 366<br />
Chinese Ministry of Science and<br />
Technology, 366<br />
Chinese multi-national enterprises,<br />
advantages of, 109<br />
Chinese outward foreign direct<br />
investment, 234–8<br />
in Africa, 6–7, 279–96<br />
future research on, 293<br />
limitations of, 293<br />
theory and hypothesis on,<br />
279–90<br />
in Canada, 261–3<br />
characteristics of, 238–9<br />
in China, theoretical perspectives on,<br />
109–10<br />
country of origin and, role of, 2,<br />
54–75, see also vector<br />
autoregressive (VAR) model<br />
development of, 238–9<br />
empirical analysis of determinants<br />
of, 2<br />
in Europe, 4–5<br />
institutional perspective on<br />
formal, 15–27<br />
informal, 27–8<br />
key driving forces of, 41<br />
macroeconomic determinants of,<br />
38–50<br />
methodology and data for,<br />
46–7<br />
model and hypothesis for,<br />
43–6<br />
motivations for, 12–14<br />
multi-national enterprises, 28–9<br />
industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />
institutional influence on, 28–9<br />
location of, choice of, 30<br />
mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />
strategic choices of, 29–32
policy implications for, 318–21<br />
strategic capabilities, development<br />
of, 318–20<br />
state for, role of, 14<br />
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 7<br />
vector autoregressive model, 58–63<br />
analysis of, 66–72<br />
exogeneity, tests for, 63–6<br />
volume statistics of, 11<br />
Chinese sovereign wealth funds, 85–96,<br />
88, 98, 99, 101<br />
characteristics of, 86–7<br />
government policy behind, 97–8<br />
investment strategies of, 87–96<br />
issues concerning, 99–101<br />
private policy behind, 98–9<br />
purpose of, 85–6<br />
Chinese State Council, 358<br />
Chongqing Loncin Industry Co., Ltd.,<br />
365<br />
Chrysler, 115, 141<br />
CIC, see Chinese Investment<br />
Corporation (CIC)<br />
CIPA, see China Investment Promotion<br />
Agency (CIPA)<br />
CIS, see Commonwealth of Independent<br />
States (CIS)<br />
Citic Capital Holdings Ltd., 91<br />
CITIC Group, 25<br />
Citizens against Communist Chinese<br />
Propaganda (CACCP), 346<br />
closed state controlled funds and entity,<br />
269<br />
cluster theory, 240<br />
CNOOC, see China National Offshore<br />
Oil Company (CNOOC)<br />
Coca Cola, 339<br />
combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />
‘coming in’ investment streams, 235<br />
Commercial Bank of China, 305<br />
commercial hubs, 164<br />
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 95<br />
Commonwealth of Independent States<br />
(CIS), 181<br />
competition effect, 179<br />
Conference Board of Canada, 260, 269,<br />
272<br />
cost reducing foreign direct investment,<br />
315<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 409<br />
Countries and Industries for Overseas<br />
Investment Guidance Catalog, 4,159<br />
country image, 28<br />
cross-border Chinese mergers and<br />
acquisitions, 28, 142–50<br />
Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />
Computing business, 143–7<br />
combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />
knowledge of business, 143–4<br />
strategy for, effective execution,<br />
145–7<br />
TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />
TV business, 147–50<br />
combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />
knowledge of business, 147–8<br />
strategy for, problematic execution<br />
of, 149–50<br />
CSRC, see China Security Regulation<br />
Committee (CSRC)<br />
CTS, see China Travel Service (CTS) Ltd.<br />
Cypress Gardens, 341<br />
Daimler Benz, 141<br />
Dalai Lama, 340, 343, 346<br />
Darfur, 281<br />
Data Appendix, 58<br />
Datamonitor – Company, 93<br />
Days Inn, 340, 348<br />
De Tomaso Industries, Inc., 356<br />
Dell, 145<br />
demonstration effect, 180<br />
Department of Foreign Capital and<br />
Overseas Investment (DFCOI), 16,<br />
21, 22<br />
Department of Outward Investment and<br />
Economic Cooperation (DOIEC),<br />
22, 38<br />
dependent variable, 43<br />
Detroit International Auto Show, 386–7<br />
Deutsche Bank Research<br />
developed nations, 264<br />
development funds, 83<br />
DFCOI, see Department of Foreign<br />
Capital and Overseas Investment<br />
(DFCOI)<br />
DG Trade, 181<br />
Diageo, 91<br />
Disney-MGM Studios, 333<br />
Disney World, 330–1, 333, 347<br />
diversification, international, 123–4
410 Subject Index<br />
DOIEC, see Department of Outward<br />
Investment and Economic<br />
Cooperation (DOIEC)<br />
double-edged sword, 32<br />
Drax Group Plc, 95<br />
Drivetrain Systems International (DSI),<br />
115<br />
Ducati, 364<br />
dummies, 128<br />
Eclectic Paradigm Theory, 39, 177,<br />
314–15<br />
Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), 285,<br />
303<br />
‘Economic Observer, The,’ 14<br />
Economist, The, 330, 344<br />
Economist.com<br />
economy, openness of, 45<br />
ECOWAS, 320<br />
educated tourists, 335<br />
efficiency-seeking, 112<br />
EIBC, see Export-Import Bank of China<br />
(EIBC)<br />
EIU, see Economic Intelligence Unit<br />
(EIU)<br />
EME, see emerging market enterprise<br />
(EME)<br />
emerging market enterprise (EME),<br />
12–13, 28–9<br />
Encyclopedia Britannica, 263<br />
Enterprise Institute of Development<br />
Research Center of the State<br />
Council, 16<br />
Epcot Center, 333<br />
Ericsson, 187<br />
ethnic enclave, 240<br />
Europe<br />
Chinese outward foreign direct<br />
investment in, 4–6, 157–72<br />
pull factors for, 163–7<br />
push factors for, 158–63<br />
rise of, 175–93<br />
foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />
4–6<br />
Investment Promotion Agency in, 4<br />
outward foreign direct investment in,<br />
Chinese, 157–72<br />
conceptualizations of, 180–1<br />
pull factors for, 163–7<br />
push factors for, 158–63<br />
PROOF<br />
rise of, 175–93<br />
theoretical models for, 176–80<br />
small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />
enterprises in, 234–52<br />
cluster theory, 240<br />
ethnic enclave, 240–1<br />
industrial districts, 239–40<br />
Prato, 245–51<br />
scoping study on, 241–2<br />
European Journal of Development Research,<br />
321<br />
European Union, Chinese outward<br />
foreign direct investments in, 5,<br />
167–70<br />
competition of, 188–90<br />
entry mode for, 187–8<br />
evidence of, 181–93<br />
locations for, 181–7<br />
perspectives on, 170–2<br />
exchange rate, 44–5, 48–9<br />
exogeneity tests, 63–6<br />
Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC), 22<br />
Falun Gong religious movement, 346<br />
Fantasy of Flight, 341<br />
FAO, 312<br />
Far Eastern Economic Review, 341<br />
FDI, see foreign direct investment (FDI)<br />
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 335<br />
financial investors, 83<br />
Financial Times, 88, 164<br />
firm age, 128<br />
firm size, 128<br />
Florida Historical Quarterly, 350<br />
Florida Splendid China (FSC), 329–50<br />
conception of, 330–1<br />
construction of, 332–5<br />
controversies in<br />
protests for, 343–6<br />
Tibetan display, 343–4<br />
opening, 336–8<br />
preparations for, 335–6<br />
park design for, 331–2<br />
promoting, 338–40<br />
struggles of, 341–3<br />
Sunny Yang as president of, 340–1<br />
Flying Tigers, 344<br />
FOCAC, see Forum for China African<br />
Cooperation (FOCAC)<br />
‘follow the command’ approach, 226
Forbidden City, 332<br />
Ford, 107, 115, 116, 385<br />
forecast error variance decomposition,<br />
66–72<br />
foreign currency reserves, 46<br />
foreign direct investment (FDI)<br />
in Canada, 260–1<br />
Chinese<br />
in Canada, 6<br />
in Europe, 4–6<br />
in Germany, 5–6<br />
global, case studies on, 7–8<br />
inflow-outflow ratio of, 38<br />
macro-environmental determinants<br />
of, 1–3<br />
micro-environmental determinants<br />
of, 3–4<br />
in North America, 6<br />
outward, in Africa, 6–7<br />
by Chinese manufacturing firms,<br />
107–20<br />
case study method for, 110<br />
cross-, analysis of, 117–19<br />
Geely Holding Group, 115–17<br />
motives for, 117–18<br />
patterns of, 118–19<br />
Sany Group, 110–13<br />
single, analysis of, 110–17<br />
Wanxiang Group, 113–15<br />
cost reducing, 315<br />
from developed countries<br />
extension of, 108–9<br />
theories, traditional, 108<br />
leveraging, 315<br />
market-seeking, 315<br />
resource-seeking, 315<br />
South-South, 177–8<br />
theoretical foundation for,<br />
108–10<br />
foreign exchange policy, 15, 21<br />
foreign government-controlled<br />
company, 260<br />
formal Chinese outward foreign direct<br />
investment, 15–27<br />
bureaucratic administration,<br />
16–22<br />
government ownership, 22–7<br />
policies, 15–16<br />
Fortescue Metals Group, 91<br />
Fortune, 137, 138, 142<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 411<br />
Forum for China African Cooperation<br />
(FOCAC), 321<br />
‘four dragons,’ 30<br />
‘four tigers,’ 30<br />
Fourteen Chinese Communist National<br />
Congress, 15<br />
FSC, see Florida Splendid China (FSC)<br />
fund managers, 82<br />
Galanz, 49<br />
game modeling, 6, 263–4<br />
interpretation of, 268–71<br />
key players, 265<br />
interests and concerns of,<br />
265–7<br />
Petro-China, 271–2<br />
research on, 264–8<br />
structure of, 267–8<br />
‘Gateway to Europe,’ 184<br />
Gateway Tours, 340<br />
GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Ltd., 92<br />
GDH Limited, 26<br />
GDP, see gross domestic product (GDP)<br />
Geely Automobile Holdings Limited<br />
(Geely Auto), 115, 117, 377<br />
Geely Holding Group (Geely), 107, 110,<br />
115–17<br />
future outlook of, 387–8<br />
global brand, establishment of,<br />
386–7<br />
international role of, development of,<br />
383–4<br />
limited holdings in, 380–7<br />
overseas investment by, 115–16<br />
market-seeking and, 116<br />
motives of, 116<br />
Volvo, acquisition of, 116,<br />
384–5<br />
overview of, 115<br />
performance of, overview of,<br />
382–3<br />
resource augmentation and control,<br />
degree of, 116–17<br />
strategic asset-seeking by, 116<br />
strategic shifts by, 385–6<br />
General Motors, 107<br />
Generalized Least Squares, 290<br />
generalized method of moments (GMM),<br />
128<br />
Generic, 360–1
412 Subject Index<br />
Germany, Chinese mergers and<br />
acquisitions in, 212–30<br />
absorptive capacity of, 215–20<br />
multidimensional perspective of,<br />
219–20<br />
multilevel perspective on, 216–19<br />
preferred research method for, 220–2<br />
foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />
5–6<br />
integration of, 213–15<br />
Sany Group in, motives for, 111–12<br />
GFC, see global financial crisis (GFC)<br />
GIC, 86<br />
global brand, 386–7<br />
‘Global Champions,’ 236–7, 244<br />
global financial crisis (GFC), 236<br />
global foreign direct investment,<br />
Chinese, 7–8<br />
Globalization of Chinese Enterprises, 1, 391<br />
GMM, see generalized method of<br />
moments (GMM)<br />
GNP, see gross national product (GNP)<br />
‘Go Global’ policy, 3, 11, 15, 49, 98–9,<br />
158, 236<br />
‘going abroad’ policy, 15<br />
‘going out’ investment streams, 235<br />
Golden Peacock Theater, 339<br />
Goldman Sachs, 144<br />
Goodman Group, 92<br />
Government of Canada, 260<br />
Government of Singapore Investment<br />
Corporation, 84<br />
government ownership, 22–7<br />
GoVideo, 149<br />
Granger causality tests, 2, 127–8<br />
control variable for, 128<br />
methodology for, 128<br />
results of, 128–32<br />
variables for, 127<br />
Great Wall, 333, 348<br />
greenfield operations, 239<br />
gross domestic product (GDP), 11<br />
gross national product (GNP), 43–4<br />
Guangdong National Shipping<br />
Corporation, 27<br />
Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited, 26<br />
Gulliver’s Travels, 331<br />
H2, 130–1<br />
Haier, 41, 49, 236<br />
PROOF<br />
Handelsblatt, 281<br />
Hannan-Quinn Criterion, 62<br />
Harley Davidson, 362<br />
Harvard University, 230, 274<br />
heavyweight industries, 50<br />
Hewlett-Packard, 143<br />
‘Hidden Champion,’ 212<br />
Hierro Peru Mining, 30<br />
Holley Group, 282, 310<br />
Honda, 362, 364<br />
Hong Kong, 88<br />
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 115, 329<br />
Houston Chronicle, 337<br />
HP-Compaq, 146<br />
Huawei Technologies, 282, 310<br />
Huaweik Technologies, 26, 49, 236<br />
Hunan Valin Iron & Steel (Group) Co.,<br />
Ltd., 26<br />
Hungary, 166<br />
IB, see international business (IB)<br />
IBM, 43, 138, 143<br />
IBM Personal Computing (PC) business,<br />
143–7<br />
ICA, see Investment Canada Act (ICA)<br />
ICT, see information communication<br />
technology (ICT)<br />
Idea Center, 145<br />
IdeaPad, 145<br />
IDT Hungary, 166<br />
IFR, see impulse response function (IRF)<br />
IMF, 75, 83, 89, 101, 303, 312, 319<br />
impulse response function (IRF), 69<br />
impulse response analysis, 66–72<br />
income, 43–4<br />
independent variables, 43–6<br />
exchange rate, 44–5<br />
foreign currency reserves, 46<br />
income, 43–4<br />
interest rate, 45<br />
openness of economy, 45<br />
technology, 43<br />
Indesit Group, 356<br />
individual absorptive capacity, 220<br />
individual influence, 216<br />
industrial activities, 368–9<br />
Industrial and Commercial Bank of<br />
China, 94, 309<br />
industrial districts, 239–40<br />
Industry Canada, 266
inflow-outflow ratio of Chinese foreign<br />
direct investment, 38<br />
InFocus Corp., 150<br />
informal Chinese outward foreign direct<br />
investment, 27–8<br />
information communication technology<br />
(ICT), 235<br />
‘insatiable appetite,’ Chinese, 236<br />
institutional influence, ‘dark side’ of, 32<br />
intangible resources, 4<br />
Intel Capital, 92<br />
interest rate, 45<br />
internalization, 13, 316<br />
international business (IB), 13, 258<br />
International Campaign for Tibet, 343<br />
international diversification, 123–4<br />
International Lease Finance<br />
Corporation, 92<br />
internationalization, 12, 122–34, 125–7,<br />
130<br />
CEO compensation and<br />
Granger causality tests for, 127–8<br />
reverse causation between, 125–7<br />
hypothesis for, 123–5<br />
of multi-national enterprises, 108<br />
theoretical framework for, 123–5<br />
Invest in Germany, 185, 195<br />
Investment Canada Act (ICA), 260, 261,<br />
266, 269<br />
Investment Development Path (IDP), 2,<br />
38, 42, 43–4, 108<br />
investment funds, 85<br />
Investment Promotion Agency (IPA), 5,<br />
157<br />
in Europe, 4, 180–1<br />
in Hungary, 166<br />
in Poland, 167<br />
investments<br />
of Chinese Investment Corporation,<br />
3, 98<br />
by Chinese state-controlled entities, 6<br />
inward, 304<br />
in Italy, 6<br />
return on, 3<br />
for sovereign wealth funds, 87–96<br />
inward investment, 304<br />
IPA, see Investment Promotion Agency<br />
(IPA)<br />
Italian Piaggio Group, 364<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 413<br />
Italy<br />
foreign direct investment in, Chinese,<br />
5–6<br />
motorcycling industry in, 362–4<br />
small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />
enterprises in, 242–5<br />
trade and investment in, and Chinese<br />
diaspora in, 6<br />
Japan Bank for International<br />
Cooperation Institute (JBICI),<br />
179–80<br />
JBICI, see Japan Bank for International<br />
Cooperation Institute (JBICI)<br />
JC Flowers PE Fund, 92<br />
Jiangmen Grand River Group Co. Ltd.,<br />
365<br />
Jinchuan Group Limited, 27<br />
joint venture (JV), 239<br />
JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration<br />
Production, 92<br />
JV, see joint venture (JV)<br />
k-step-ahead forecast, 66<br />
Kawasaki, 362, 364<br />
Keeway, 360–1<br />
Kennedy Space Center, 335<br />
knowledge, 4, 143–4, 219<br />
KPSS, see Kwiatkowski-Phillips-<br />
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test<br />
KW, 370<br />
Kwiatkowski-Phillips- Schmidt-Shin<br />
(KPSS) test, 61<br />
latecomer firms, 109<br />
Lee-Potter, 244<br />
Legend Holdings Ltd., 26<br />
Lenovo (Legend Group), 41, 43,<br />
138, 236<br />
combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />
IBM Personal Computing (PC)<br />
business, acquisition of, 143–7<br />
knowledge of business, 143–4<br />
strategy for, effective execution, 145–7<br />
Lenovo University, 144<br />
leveraging foreign direct investment, 315<br />
LG.Philips LCD Co., 150<br />
liberal market model of capitalism,<br />
218–19<br />
light touch approach, 214–15, 219
414 Subject Index<br />
limited holdings, 380–87<br />
Linaburg, Carl, 100<br />
Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index,<br />
100<br />
linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL)<br />
model, 109<br />
linkages driver, 315<br />
Lion Group, Malaysia’s, 360<br />
listening posts, 179<br />
LLL, see linkage, leverage, and learning<br />
(LLL) model<br />
local enterprises, 264, 266<br />
location-bound approach, 55<br />
London Olympics, 185<br />
London Stock Exchange, 96<br />
Lung Ming, 92<br />
MachineA, 224–7<br />
MachineB, 227–8<br />
MachineCN, 227–8<br />
macro-environmental determinants of<br />
Chinese foreign direct investment,<br />
1–3<br />
China, institutional perspective on<br />
role of state in, 1<br />
outward foreign direct investment,<br />
Chinese, 2<br />
sovereign wealth funds, 2–3<br />
‘Made-in-Germany’ brand, 228<br />
Magic Kingdom, 333<br />
Manganese Bronze Holdings, 115<br />
manufacturing firm investments,<br />
motives and patterns of Chinese, 3<br />
Marco Polo, 333<br />
market knowledge, 219<br />
market-seeking foreign direct<br />
investment, 315<br />
M&As, see mergers and acquisitions<br />
(M&As)<br />
McKinsey & Company, 144<br />
McKinsey Global Institute, 313<br />
MENA, see Middle East and North Africa<br />
(MENA)<br />
Mercedes-Benz, 116, 384<br />
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 239<br />
Chinese cross-border, 41, 142–50<br />
cross-border, 41, 212–13<br />
Lenovo, acquisition of IBM Personal<br />
Computing business, 143–7<br />
combinative capabilities, 144–5<br />
PROOF<br />
knowledge of business, 143–4<br />
strategy for, effective execution,<br />
145–7<br />
TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s<br />
TV business, 147–50<br />
combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />
knowledge of business, 147–8<br />
strategy for, problematic execution<br />
of, 149–50<br />
MFA, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />
(MFA)<br />
MG Rover Group, 188, 385<br />
Miami Herald, 344<br />
micro-environmental determinants of<br />
Chinese foreign direct investment,<br />
3–4<br />
manufacturing firm investments,<br />
motives and patterns of Chinese, 3<br />
strategic assets, integration of<br />
knowledge and intangible<br />
resources into, 4<br />
Middle East and North Africa<br />
(MENA), 84<br />
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 11,<br />
21, 22, 38, 46, 87, 98, 107, 159, 180<br />
Ministry of Domestic Commerce, 21<br />
Ministry of Finance (MOF), 22, 86, 87<br />
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 21, 98,<br />
159<br />
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic<br />
Cooperation (MOFTEC), 15, 21, 98<br />
Ministry of Science and Technology of<br />
the People’s Republic of China<br />
(MOST), 47<br />
Ministry of Taxation (MOT), 22<br />
MNC, see multinational company (MNC)<br />
MNE, see multi-national enterprises<br />
(MNE)<br />
MOC, 15<br />
Modern Cikande Industrial Estate,<br />
Indonesia’s, 360<br />
MOF, see Ministry of Finance (MOF)<br />
MOFCOM, see Ministry of Commerce<br />
(MOFCOM)<br />
MOFTEC, see Ministry of Foreign Trade<br />
and Economic Cooperation<br />
(MOFTEC)<br />
monetary policy, 21<br />
Morgan Stanley, 31, 92<br />
Morini, 364
MOST, see Ministry of Science and<br />
Technology of the People’s Republic<br />
of China (MOST)<br />
MOT, see Ministry of Taxation (MOT)<br />
Moto Guzzi, 356<br />
Motobi, 356<br />
MotoGp, 369<br />
motorcycling industry<br />
analysis of, 361–2<br />
global trends in, 362<br />
local trends in<br />
in China, 364–6<br />
in Italy, 362–4<br />
multi-national enterprises (MNE), 11,<br />
28–9<br />
Chinese, advantages of, 109<br />
industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />
institutional influence on,<br />
28–9<br />
internationalization of, 108<br />
location-bound approach to, 55<br />
location of, choice of, 30<br />
mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />
outward foreign direct investment by,<br />
Chinese, 28–9<br />
industry of, choice of, 31–2<br />
institutional influence on, 28–9<br />
location of, choice of, 30<br />
mode of, choice of, 29–30<br />
strategic choices of, 29–32<br />
strategic choices of, 29–32<br />
universalist approach to, 55<br />
Multifiber Agreement, 305<br />
multinational company (MNC), 54<br />
MV, 364<br />
Nam Kwong (Group) Company<br />
Limited, 27<br />
Nanjing Automobile, 188<br />
Napoleon, 11<br />
national absorptive capacity, 220<br />
National Australia Bank, 95<br />
National Bureau of Statistics of China<br />
(NBS), 46–7<br />
National Council, 87<br />
National Development and Reform<br />
Commission (NDRC), 87, 159, 161,<br />
366<br />
national identity, 28<br />
national influence, 216<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 415<br />
National Natural Science Foundation of<br />
China, 120<br />
National Planning Commission (NPC),<br />
15, 16<br />
see also State Development and Reform<br />
Commission (SDRC)<br />
NBS, see National Bureau of Statistics of<br />
China (NBS)<br />
NDRC, see National Development and<br />
Reform Commission (NDRC)<br />
neo-Marshallian cluster concept, 240<br />
NEPAD, 320<br />
net benefit test, 260<br />
Nobel Group, The, 93<br />
Nobel Oil Group, 93<br />
Noranda, 257, 260, 262–3, 269<br />
North America<br />
in Canada, investment by Chinese<br />
state-controlled entities in, 6<br />
Chinese Investment Corporation<br />
in, 88<br />
foreign direct investment in,<br />
Chinese, 6<br />
NPC, see National Planning Commission<br />
(NPC)<br />
Oaktress Capital Management, 93<br />
OECD, 75, 89, 234, 240, 257, 259, 314<br />
OEM, see original equipment<br />
manufacturer (OEM)<br />
OFDI, see outward foreign direct<br />
investment (OFDI)<br />
offshore mergers and acquisitions<br />
(OMA), 41<br />
OICA, 378<br />
OLI, see ownership, location,<br />
internalization (OLI)<br />
OLS, see ordinary least squares (OLS)<br />
OMA, see offshore mergers and<br />
acquisitions (OMA)<br />
‘100 Day’ program, 222<br />
‘open-door’ policy by Chinese<br />
Government, 15, 97, 236<br />
open state controlled funds and entity,<br />
269<br />
openness of economy, 45<br />
operational changes, 367–8<br />
ordinary least squares (OLS), 128<br />
organizational absorptive capacity, 220<br />
organizational changes, 367–8
416 Subject Index<br />
organizational influence, 216<br />
original equipment manufacturer<br />
(OEM), 187<br />
Orlando Business Journal, 341<br />
Orlando International Airport, 338<br />
Orlando Sentinel, 336, 341<br />
outside director ratio, 128<br />
outward foreign direct investment<br />
(OFDI)<br />
approval authority for, 16<br />
boundaries of, 15–16<br />
global statistics of, 11<br />
growth rate for, 11<br />
institutional framework for,<br />
15, 16<br />
via mergers and acquisitions, 11<br />
see also Chinese outward foreign<br />
direct investment<br />
ownership, location, internalization<br />
(OLI), 11, 39, 108, 315<br />
<strong>Palgrave</strong>, 391<br />
PBC, see People’s Bank of China (PBC)<br />
Penn West Energy Canada, 93<br />
pension reserve funds, 83<br />
People for the Ethical Treatment of<br />
Animals (PETA), 343<br />
People’s Bank of China (PBC), 21, 85, 86,<br />
87, 88<br />
People’s Palace, 319<br />
PETA, see People for the Ethical<br />
Treatment of Animals (PETA)<br />
Petro-China, 258, 260, 271, 272<br />
Philips, 187<br />
PMI, see post-merger integration (PMI)<br />
Poland, 167<br />
Politburo, 236<br />
portfolio investments, 83<br />
post-merger integration (PMI), 214<br />
Potala Palace, 343, 344<br />
Potash Co., 264, 272<br />
potential absorptive capacity, 215<br />
Powertrain Ltd., 385<br />
Prato, 245–51<br />
PRC Political Consultative Conference,<br />
337<br />
predictive causality, 73<br />
private policy, 98–9<br />
processing industries, 31<br />
product knowledge, 219<br />
PROOF<br />
Pronto Moda business model,<br />
248<br />
Proper Glory, 380<br />
psychic distance, 108, 177<br />
PT Bumi Resources Tbk, 93<br />
PT Sanex, Indonesia’s, 360<br />
‘pull’ factors, 50<br />
Qianjiang Group (QJ), 358–9<br />
international expansion of, 360–1<br />
strengths of, 359–60<br />
Qianjiang Motor Company<br />
QJ, see Qianjiang Group (QJ)<br />
‘quasi-government’ corporation, 345<br />
RCA, 148<br />
R&D, see research and development<br />
(R&D)<br />
realized absorptive capacity,<br />
215, 227<br />
‘reform and opening policy,’ 217<br />
research and development (R&D), 184,<br />
239<br />
reserve investment corporations, 83<br />
resource augmentation and control,<br />
degree of, 116–17<br />
resource-seeking foreign direct<br />
investment, 315<br />
return on investment, 3<br />
return on sales, 128<br />
reverse causation, 125–32<br />
reverse spillovers, 179<br />
Rio Tinto, 95<br />
RMB, 44, 48–9, 85–6<br />
Rolling Oaks Investment Properties LLP,<br />
348<br />
Royal Dutch Shell, 96<br />
SADC, 320<br />
SAFE, see State Administration of Foreign<br />
Exchange (SAFE)<br />
SAFE Investment Company, 96<br />
St. Petersburg Times, 344<br />
sales activities, in commercial network,<br />
369–70<br />
Samsung, 143<br />
Sanex Qianjiang Motor International,<br />
360<br />
Santiago Principles, 101
Sany Group (Sany), 110–13, 117<br />
efficiency-seeking by, 112<br />
overseas investment by, 111<br />
in Germany, motives for, 111–12<br />
overview of, 110–11<br />
resource augmentation and control by,<br />
112–13<br />
strategic asset-seeking by, 112<br />
Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (Sany<br />
Heavy), 111<br />
SASAC, see State-owned Assets<br />
Supervision and Administration<br />
Commission (SASAC)<br />
savings funds, 83<br />
SCFE, see state controlled funds and<br />
entity (SCFE)<br />
Scharwz Criterion, 62<br />
Schneider Corp., 149<br />
School of Oriental and African Studies,<br />
University of London, UK, 193<br />
SDC Platinum, 221<br />
SDRC, see State Development and<br />
Reform Commission (SDRC)<br />
SE, see standard error (SE) shock<br />
Sea World, 330, 347<br />
SEQ, see simultaneous equation (SEQ)<br />
model; structural equation (SEQ)<br />
model<br />
‘setting up enterprises overseas’<br />
concept, 15<br />
Severn Trent, 96<br />
SEZ, see Special Economic Zones (SEZ)<br />
Shanghai Automotive Industry<br />
Corporation, 27, 377<br />
Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation<br />
Shanghai Institutions of Higher<br />
Learning, 151<br />
Shanghai LTI Automobile Components<br />
Company Limited, 115<br />
Shanghai Overseas United Investment<br />
Co., Ltd.<br />
Shanghai Stock Exchange, 111,<br />
127, 217<br />
shareholder value, 316<br />
Shenhua Group Corporation, 27<br />
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co.,<br />
Ltd., 27<br />
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 127,<br />
217, 359<br />
Shougang Corporation, 27<br />
PROOF<br />
Subject Index 417<br />
Shum Yip Holdings Company<br />
Limited, 26<br />
Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial<br />
Machinery Co Ltd. (Tengzhong), 107<br />
simultaneous equation (SEQ) model, 58<br />
Sino-African Business Conference, 304<br />
Sinohem Corporation, 25<br />
Sinohydro Co., Ltd., 27<br />
Sinopec, 49, 236<br />
SinoSteel Corporation, 25<br />
SINOTRANS Changjiang National<br />
Shipping (Group) Corporation, 25<br />
‘sleeping dragon’, see China<br />
small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />
enterprise (SME), 234–52<br />
cluster theory, 240<br />
ethnic enclave, 240–1<br />
industrial districts, 239–40<br />
Prato, 245–51<br />
scoping study on, 241–2<br />
SME, see small-to-medium-sized Chinese<br />
enterprise (SME)<br />
Social Security Fund, 87<br />
SOE, see state-owned enterprises (SOE)<br />
SOE ZTE, 317<br />
Songbird Estates, 93<br />
Sony, 143<br />
South Africa’s Standard Bank, 309<br />
South Gobi Energy Resources, 93<br />
South-South foreign direct investment,<br />
177–8<br />
sovereign wealth fund (SWF), 2–3,<br />
81–101, 100, 258<br />
Chinese, 85–96, 88, 98, 99, 101<br />
characteristics of, 86–7<br />
government policy behind, 97–8<br />
investment strategies of, 87–96<br />
issues concerning, 99–101<br />
private policy behind, 98–9<br />
purpose of, 85–6<br />
defined, 82, 259<br />
features of, 82–4<br />
global trends in, 84<br />
strategic objectives of, 101<br />
transparency of, 100<br />
types of, 82–3<br />
Special Economic Zones (SEZ), 171<br />
Splendid China Day, 336, 344<br />
Ssangyong Motors, 115<br />
stabilization funds, 83
418 Subject Index<br />
Stadium of the Martyrs, 319<br />
standard error (SE) shock, 69<br />
State Administration of Foreign<br />
Exchange (SAFE), 15, 22, 42, 47, 49,<br />
81, 86–9<br />
China Investment Corporation,<br />
competition with, 81<br />
investment strategy of, 98<br />
Transparency Index of, 100<br />
state controlled funds and entity (SCFE),<br />
257, 264<br />
in China, 258–60<br />
closed, 269<br />
open, 269<br />
predictions of, 270–1<br />
restricted access to, 269–70<br />
State Council, 15, 16, 87<br />
State Development and Reform<br />
Commission (SDRC), 15, 16, 22<br />
State Economic and Trade Commission,<br />
97<br />
State Grid Corporation of China<br />
state of China, institutional perspective<br />
on role of, 1<br />
State-owned Assets Supervision and<br />
Administration Commission<br />
(SASAC), 22, 50<br />
state-owned enterprises (SOE), 11, 22,<br />
49, 217<br />
state shareholding, 128<br />
strategic investors, 83<br />
Statistical Bulletins of Chinese Outward<br />
Foreign Direct Investment, 180<br />
strategic assets, 116, 140<br />
applying, 141–2<br />
intangible resources and, 4<br />
integrating, 140–1<br />
knowledge and, 4<br />
understanding, 140<br />
strategic industries, 50<br />
structural equation (SEQ) model, 58<br />
Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese foreign<br />
direct investment flows to, 300–22<br />
distinctiveness of, 311–17<br />
resources, 311–13<br />
trade reversal, 311–13<br />
dynamics of, 300–3<br />
eclectic theory of, 314–15<br />
estimates of, 303<br />
PROOF<br />
African Economic Research<br />
Consortium scoping study,<br />
306–9<br />
official, 303–6<br />
public-domain, 303–6<br />
United Nations Industrial<br />
Development Organization<br />
survey, 309–10<br />
outward, 7<br />
small private sector, studies of, 310–11<br />
strategic integration of, 313–14<br />
Suntec Power Holding, 107<br />
Suzuki, 362<br />
SWF, see sovereign wealth fund (SWF)<br />
SWF Institute, 88, 96<br />
TAMP, see TCL & Alcatel Mobile Phones<br />
Limited (TAMP)<br />
Tampa Tribune, 341<br />
Tate & Lyle, 96<br />
TCL & Alcatel Mobile Phones Limited<br />
(TAMP), 150<br />
TCL Group Company, 27, 41, 43<br />
Tech Resources Limited, 93, 257<br />
Temasek, 86<br />
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior<br />
(Morgenstern and von Neumann),<br />
263<br />
ThinkPad, 144, 146<br />
ThinkVantage, 144<br />
‘Third World Solidarity,’ 300<br />
Thomson’s TV, 43, 138, 147–50<br />
Tibetan display, 343–4<br />
Tibet’s Potala Palace, 332<br />
Times Picayune, 337<br />
TLC, failed acquisition of Thomson’s TV<br />
business, 41, 147–50<br />
combinative capabilities, 148–9<br />
knowledge of business, 147–8<br />
strategy for, problematic execution of,<br />
149–50<br />
TNC, see transnational company (TNC)<br />
TOL, see transactive organizational<br />
learning (TOL)<br />
Total SA, 96<br />
TPG Fund, 96<br />
trade in Italy, 6<br />
trade reversal, 311–13<br />
transactive organizational learning<br />
(TOL), 225
transnational company (TNC), 167<br />
Transparency Index, 100<br />
Triumph, 364<br />
Tsing Tao Beer, 339<br />
TUV Company, 360<br />
two-step currency reform in China, 44<br />
UBS, 84<br />
UNCTAD, see United Nations<br />
Conference on Trade and<br />
Development (UNCTAD)<br />
UnctadStat, 234<br />
UNIDO, see United Nations Industrial<br />
Development Organization<br />
(UNIDO)<br />
United Nation Statistics Division<br />
Statistical Database, 11<br />
United Nations Conference on Trade<br />
and Development (UNCTAD), 38,<br />
54, 178<br />
United Nations Industrial Development<br />
Organization (UNIDO), 303, 309–10<br />
U.S. Department of Justice, 346<br />
U.S. Treasury, 85<br />
universalist approach, 55<br />
University of Central Florida, 350<br />
University of Fribourg, 90, 93<br />
University of London Central Research<br />
Fund, 193<br />
Unocal, 257<br />
VAR, see vector autoregressive (VAR)<br />
model<br />
vector autoregressive (VAR) model, 54–5,<br />
58–63<br />
analysis of, 66–72<br />
forecast error variance<br />
decomposition, 66–72<br />
impulse response analysis, 66–72<br />
exogeneity tests for, 63–6<br />
Visa Inc., 93<br />
Volvo, 107, 115–17, 384, 385<br />
acquisition of, 116, 384–5<br />
market-seeking and, 116<br />
motives of, 116<br />
Subject Index 419<br />
Wanxiang America Corporation, 113<br />
Wanxiang Group (Wanxiang), 110,<br />
113–15, 117<br />
overseas investment by, 113<br />
in United States, motives by, 114<br />
overview of, 113<br />
resource augmentation and control,<br />
degree of, 114–15<br />
strategic asset-seeking by, 114<br />
‘we versus they’ antagonism, 215<br />
wealth creation, 41<br />
Wenling Electric Tools Factory, 358<br />
Wenling Locomotive Factory, 358<br />
Wenling Saccharification Factory, 358<br />
Wenling Vehicle Repair Factory, 358<br />
western-style capitalism, 330<br />
wholly-owned foreign enterprise<br />
(WOFE), 218<br />
‘Win-Win’ cooperation, 225<br />
WIR, see World Investment Report (WIR)<br />
WOFE, see wholly-owned foreign<br />
enterprise (WOFE)<br />
World Bank, 288, 313<br />
World Investment Report (WIR), 11<br />
World Trade Organization (WTO), 16,<br />
44, 127, 236, 264, 347, 379, 391<br />
WTO, see World Trade Organization<br />
(WTO)<br />
Wuhan Iron & Steel (Group) Co., Ltd., 27<br />
Xiaolin Supermarket, 246<br />
Xinhua, 137<br />
Xinjiang Zhongxin Resource Co.,<br />
Ltd., 27<br />
Yamaha, 362<br />
year dummies, 128<br />
PROOF<br />
Zeller Corporation, 114<br />
Zhejiang Meikeda Motorcycle Co., Ltd.,<br />
359<br />
Zhejiang Motorcycle Factory, 358<br />
Zhongxing ZTE Corporation, 282<br />
Zhongyu Auto, 385<br />
zou chu qu strategy, 236, 244<br />
ZTE Corporation, 27