C. Conscious Presence:The Strategic Implementation ofProgrammes to Promote Protection& Prevent ViolationsThe equation ‘presence equalsprotection’ does say <strong>the</strong> rightthing, but it doesn’t say enough.International presence alone willnot bring protection. Thepresence must be conscious,forceful, and courageous. It mustbe an engaged presence that isnot afraid to resist injustice andcruelty.– Bill Frelick,US Committee for RefugeesI am 100% sure that presence hasmade a difference.– Relief worker, AfghanistanI believe that 80% of <strong>the</strong> time Iam invited to go places withpeople just for <strong>the</strong> sake of mypresence with <strong>the</strong>m.– Civil Affairs Officer, AfghanistanAs noted in <strong>the</strong> quote to <strong>the</strong> left, presence alone willnot provide protection. Conscious presence isrequired: presence that has <strong>the</strong> specific aim of preventingor reducing violations and that seeks to exploitwhat may be very narrow windows of opportunity.It should not be forgotten that just as humanitarianorganizations engage in ‘strategic planning’, so dothose who are participants in armed conflict or campaignsof violence. It is important to determine what<strong>the</strong> goals of <strong>the</strong> parties are and how this will affectpresence and protection activities in general.Humanitarians are unarmed and are morally committedto respect for international law – thoseengaging in abuses, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, do not placerestraints on <strong>the</strong>ir behaviour. For this reason, presencewill not always prevent violations. Those perpetratingviolations are often conscious that humanitarians arewitnesses and may limit access for this reason. Theymay deliberately attack humanitarian aid workers inorder to force <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of aid operations or mayo<strong>the</strong>rwise manipulate <strong>the</strong> situation (by demandingpresence in one area while denying access to ano<strong>the</strong>r,for example).The presence of international witnesses who fail toact may be taken as a sign of acceptance of violationsand may fur<strong>the</strong>r embolden perpetrators, <strong>the</strong>reby fur<strong>the</strong>rincreasing risk. It is critically important thatwould-be perpetrators are aware that some action willbe taken when <strong>the</strong>y violate <strong>the</strong> law.Irrespective of <strong>the</strong> above caveats, people in dangerconfirm that presence is an essential protection tooland may have o<strong>the</strong>r benefits, such as preventing flightdue to panic and maintaining a sense of hope. Itseffectiveness as a protection strategy will vary accordingto time, place and circumstance, so it is importantto consider <strong>the</strong> specific situation at hand and planaccordingly.Peace Brigades International (PBI), which hasextensive experience in <strong>the</strong> use of presence through<strong>the</strong> protection strategy of accompaniment (physicalpresence with endangered persons) notes that given<strong>the</strong> limited resources available to many organizations,it is important to focus <strong>the</strong> work very carefully – howcan <strong>the</strong> most be gained from field presence? Accordingto one PBI expert, <strong>the</strong> only way is to select <strong>the</strong> majornodes of <strong>the</strong> social fabric of <strong>the</strong> community, and concentrateprotective efforts on <strong>the</strong>m. These nodes areusually individuals (natural leaders, elders, etc.), bodies(internal or tribal councils, for example), ororganizations (NGOS providing support to those indanger). If an attacker hits <strong>the</strong>se nodes, <strong>the</strong> protectionof <strong>the</strong> whole community is thrown into question. Butif <strong>the</strong>se social structures are able to go ahead with <strong>the</strong>irintegrative work, probably <strong>the</strong> whole community willmove ahead, even if <strong>the</strong>y suffer attacks or repression.This is a strategic and operative choice (of course, alllives, whe<strong>the</strong>r of leaders or ordinary citizens, areequally valuable). Obviously, it is not always easy toimplement this in daily work. For example, PBI providedround-<strong>the</strong>-clock presence in <strong>the</strong> PeaceCommunity of San José de Apartadó in Urabá,Colombia. It was impossible to protect <strong>the</strong> 2,000inhabitants – most of <strong>the</strong>m IDPS – in <strong>the</strong> communityor to protect <strong>the</strong> entire perimeter. In an agreementwith <strong>the</strong> Peace Community, it was established that PBIwould provide international presence with a focus on42
members of <strong>the</strong> Internal Council of <strong>the</strong> communityand <strong>the</strong> Missionary Team accompanying <strong>the</strong>m.FP25 The Presence of Outsiders Provides a Measure ofProtection for Individuals or Communities Threatenedwith Displacement in ColombiaIn <strong>the</strong> Colombian ‘violencia’, individuals or entirecommunities often received direct threats that <strong>the</strong>ywill be killed or removed from an area. Those receivingwarnings face life-or-death decisions aboutwhe<strong>the</strong>r to comply with <strong>the</strong> threats and join <strong>the</strong>legions of displaced, or remain to risk beatings, tortureor murder. Often <strong>the</strong>se decisions were made with littlesuccour from civil authorities, who lacked <strong>the</strong> capabilityor will to provide protection.Colombian and international organizations, primarilyNGOS, and in particular PBI, partially filled thisprotection gap by providing volunteers to reside withthreatened individuals or within at-risk communitiesin a number of areas in Colombia. The presence ofvolunteers on a 24-hour a day basis (‘accompaniment’)deterred attacks by armed forces who fearoutside witnesses. Although volunteers, especiallythose from international organizations, have occasionallybeen criticized for lacking in-depth knowledge oflocal culture or political situations, presence was frequentlyused as a protection tool in <strong>the</strong> Colombianconflict and has been widely acclaimed as successful.FP26 The Presence of Unarmed Official Monitors CanHelp to Prevent or Mitigate Abuses Under <strong>the</strong> ProperLeadershipIn <strong>the</strong> fall of 1998, <strong>the</strong> Serbian leadership, under risingthreat of NATO intervention, agreed to allow <strong>the</strong>deployment of unarmed ‘verifiers’ into Kosovo under<strong>the</strong> mandate of <strong>the</strong> Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (called <strong>the</strong> KVM- Kosovo VerificationMission). Although not humanitarians, <strong>the</strong>rewas a nexus between <strong>the</strong> work of <strong>the</strong> verifiers andhumanitarians – part of <strong>the</strong>ir job was to ensure accessfor humanitarian aid. It was also understood that partof <strong>the</strong> mission was to provide protection of civiliansthrough presence. John Fawcett, a veteran humanitarianaid worker in war zones, notes that while scepticalof <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of unarmed or even lightly armedmonitors in protecting civilians when armed groupsare determined to harm <strong>the</strong>m is limited, one unit inKosovo that was particularly effective. The PrizrenKVM personnel had a clear mission defined by <strong>the</strong>ircommander: to be as aggressive as possible in protectingpeople. In one example of how this mission wascarried out, KVM personnel were instructed that at <strong>the</strong>first sign of an outbreak of violence, <strong>the</strong>y were toimmediately proceed toward <strong>the</strong> threatening Serb militaryinstallations and into <strong>the</strong> village under threatitself. Their presence was intended to head off anyescalation of violence. This action stood in direct contrastto <strong>the</strong> reaction of o<strong>the</strong>r KVM units, whichwithdrew to barracks at <strong>the</strong> first sign of trouble. Fawcettpoints out that <strong>the</strong> action of <strong>the</strong> Prizren unit wasrisky, based upon analysis and calculated risk and waseffective at <strong>the</strong> time. KVM also created a ‘drop-in centre’for UN and NGO humanitarian agencies in orderto share information and to keep <strong>the</strong>ir finger on <strong>the</strong>pulse of what was happening in <strong>the</strong> field.¹FP27 Established Field Presence and Widespread Contactswith Contending Groups Provides ProtectionThe ICRC programme in Colombia illustrates howprotection activities must sometimes be built on <strong>the</strong>foundation of a major field presence, and on a majorinvestment in ongoing dialogue with contending parties.The ICRC established some 16 offices andsub-delegations across Colombia, by far <strong>the</strong> largestinternational presence in <strong>the</strong> nation. Its regular contactsinclude civilian authorities, local andinternational NGOS, <strong>the</strong> high command of <strong>the</strong> Colombianmilitary, every military brigade or division of <strong>the</strong>Colombian army, battalions of <strong>the</strong> anti-guerilla unitsof <strong>the</strong> army, <strong>the</strong> major self-defense and private secu-1 John Fawcett conducted a study of <strong>the</strong> KVM in 1998 under <strong>the</strong>auspices of <strong>the</strong> International Rescue Committee and <strong>the</strong> InternationalCrisis Group.FP25 FP26 FP27A communiqué dated 24 May1999 from human rights activistin Belgrade who courageouslyvisited <strong>the</strong> Kosovo provinceseveral times since <strong>the</strong> bombingstarted reads:“After mass expulsions ofAlbanians from surroundingvillages, <strong>the</strong> targets have nowshifted to doctors, professors,lawyers, political activists andAlbanians who worked for <strong>the</strong>OSCE [Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe] orrented <strong>the</strong>ir houses to OSCEpersonnel. They are questionedby police and <strong>the</strong>n expelled toAlbania (from Kosovo) by force…Some of <strong>the</strong> expelled sent signals<strong>the</strong>y were safe… o<strong>the</strong>rs disappearedleaving no trace behind…Everybody fears paramilitarygroups, unmarked cars, policequestioning, possible expulsion,and, as of late, hunger… They donot know what to do. If <strong>the</strong>y go,this will mean leaving behind<strong>the</strong>ir homes, property, and <strong>the</strong>town <strong>the</strong>y love. If <strong>the</strong>y stay, all<strong>the</strong>y can expect is humiliation. Ifonly <strong>the</strong>re were some internationalorganization in <strong>the</strong> area,<strong>the</strong>y say, <strong>the</strong>y would feel moresecure and this would give <strong>the</strong>mstrength to persevere and stay<strong>the</strong>re.”CHAPTER 2. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & PROTECTION:DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH43
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Sierra Leone, 1998An instructor tea
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FP101FP104FP102FP103FP101 Important
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FP105FP105 Neighbourhood or Village
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CHAPTER 4PRESERVING & PROTECTING LI
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dignity
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FP106A. Family Unity & TracingFamil
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Rwanda, 2000Family reunification in
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FP114FP116FP115FP117B. Nutrition/Fo
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FP118 FP119 FP120FP121 FP122 FP123A
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Rwanda, 1999A girl smiles as she co
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FP130D. Shelter & Site PlanningQuot
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FP132FP134FP133E. Health ServicesDi
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FP135FP136widely decreased the inci
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FP140FP143FP141FP142KFOR.The Campai
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FP147 FP148 FP149FP150Protection is
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FP151appearance of discrimination i
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FP156FP157• technical assistance
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FP161clinics to IDP centres. These
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FP164J. Preventing & Respondingto T
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• ‘Drop-in Centres’ had been
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FP167FP169FP168FP170L. Preventing &
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FP172M. Preventing & Respondingto t
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FP173FP175FP174N. Preventing & Resp
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Rwanda, 1994Women, many with their
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FP182P. Preventing & Respondingto A
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FP183FP184FP185those who obstructed
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CHAPTER 5PRACTICES THAT PROMOTE & P
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groups
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FP188 FP189Local women used meeting
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FP190 FP191 FP192FP193They realised
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FP194FP197FP195FP198FP196speak out
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Sierra Leone, 1998Led by an instruc
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FP202 FP203 FP204Children join the
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FP207activities were encouraged in
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C. Practices to Protect DisplacedPe
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FP209FP212FP210FP213FP211FP209 Rema
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FP218FP221FP219FP220back. IDP leade
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FP225FP225 A Returnee Monitoring Fr
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FP228 FP229 FP230Support us where w
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FP231 FP232 FP233We lost some groun
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FP236 FP237Security officers should
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FP238FP239FP238 Clear Incidents Man
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CHAPTER 6REMEDIAL ACTIVITIES & ACTI
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accountability
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FP240A. Justice:Ending Impunity“W
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FP241B. Truth CommissionsFP241 The
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FP244 FP245 FP246“Even though war
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FP247FP248physical space of the tra
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Sudan, 2001Surrounded by smiling on
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NotesNOTES
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NotesNOTES
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INDEXEc-MoECHO 41, 158, 200economic
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Special Representative of the Secre
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Center for Sustainable Human Rights
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Global IDP Database website (see ab
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AcknowledgementsSpecial mention goe