Respondent contested the application of such principles, respectively,should those rules have been considered applicable, submittedthat French law was to be taken into consideration instead ofEnglish law as argued by the Appellant. The leading Swiss legaldoctrine is of the view that, in the absence of such an agreement,the applicable law of arbitration can also be chosen by referring tospecific arbitration rules which themselves contain rules on theapplicable law. In the case at hand, such specific rules are providedby the FIFA Statutes, which expressly prescribe that the rules andregulations of FIFA apply primarily and Swiss law subsidiarily.- In the absence of agreement of the parties on the meaning of thesell-on clause and in order to determine their intent or the intentwhich a reasonable person would have had in the same circumstances,it is necessary to look first to the words actually used or theconduct engaged in. However, even if the words or the conductappear to give a clear answer to the question, due consideration isto be given to all relevant circumstances of the case in order to gobeyond the apparent meaning of the words or the conduct of theparties. This include the negotiations and any subsequent conductof the parties. It appears from the negotiations that the parties hadexpressly agreed to divide the player’s transfer fee in two parts, afixed amount of FRF 20,100,000 and an “additional amount”.They also had reached an agreement on the method of calculationof this additional amount. No limit in time was either mentionedin relation with the sell-on fee. Therefore, the parties had agreed onall the essential terms of the transfer contract. As far as the subsequentconduct of the parties is concerned, the Appellant did not,until the proceedings before the CAS, challenge nor contest theprinciple of the payment due to the Respondent on the basis of thesell-on clause. The Panel was therefore of the opinion that theAppellant knew from the beginning that it had a contractual obligationto pay the sell-on fee to the Respondent.- The words “net fee” found in the sell-on clause could only refer tothe net transfer fee paid by Manchester United FC for the acquisitionof S. after deduction of the costs in direct connection with thetransfer of the player, namely the agents’ costs. Event though, in hissubmission to FIFA, the Respondent admitted to be entitled to15% of the net profit realized by the Appellant from S’ transfer, thewording he used was inadequate and not consistent with its actionsand calculations. In no case could all the costs and expenses associatedwith the employment of the player - namely agent fees, theplayer’s wages, bonuses, insurance and the fixed amount paid bythe Appellant to the Respondent pursuant to the transfer agreement- be taken into consideration to ascertain the “net fee”, as theAppellant claims.- There is no reason to adjust the sell-on fee as determined under thetransfer agreement. Even though, on the one hand, the Panelaccepted the idea that if S. had not entered into a second employmentcontract with the Appellant, the sell-on fee would have beenlower since the player’s value was determined in part by the lengthof time the second employment contract still had to run, it found,on the other hand, that it was not possible to know in how big aneed Manchester United was for a player such as S. and what it waswilling to pay for his acquisition. Therefore, it considered it toospeculative to determine how the transfer was influenced by thelength of the remaining time of the second employment contract.CAS 2005/A/899 FC Aris Thessaloniki v/ FIFA & New PanioniosN.F.C., award of 15 July 2005Panel: Mr Beat Hodler (Switzerland), President; Mr Jean-PhilippeRochat (Switzerland); Mr Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland)The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has dismissed the appealfiled by the Greek football club FC Aris Thessaloniki in relation to adispute involving another Greek football club New Panionios NFCand the FIFA.The facts related to this matter extend back to November 2004when the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber upheld a monetary claimfiled by two Players against Panionios. Considering that Panionios didnot pay the requested amounts to the Players, the FIFA DisciplinaryCommittee decided on 14 February 2005 to grant Panionios a finalperiod of grace of thirty days for the payment of the outstandingamounts and also ruled that if such payments were not made withinthis time limit, 12 points (6 for each case) would be deducted from thepoints obtained by Panionios in the A Division of the Greek FootballLeague. Panionios paid the amounts due to the Players but only afterthe expiration of the time limit fixed by the FIFA DisciplinaryCommittee. However, no points were deducted from Panionios’ firstteam. Thereafter, the FC Aris, another Greek football club which wasranked 14th in the Greek Championship with 25 points and was relegatedin second division while Panionios finished 11th with 35 points,filed a complaint with FIFA. According to FC Aris, these violationsseriously affected its own situation, since if the decisions had beencomplied with, FC Aris would have remained in first division andPanionios would have been relegated to the second division. On thisbasis, FC Aris made the following formal requests:- that, within 10 days, the decisions of 14 February 2005 be enforced;- that the Disciplinary Committee open new disciplinary proceedingsagainst Panionios;- that sanctions be imposed on the HFF for voluntarily distortingthe first division championship.On 6 June 2005, the FIFA administration replied that the executionof a decision taken by a FIFA body fell under the competence of therelevant member association, namely the Hellenic FootballFederation.FC Aris filed an appeal with CAS on 8 June 2005 requesting in particularan order against FIFA to execute the decisions of itsDisciplinary Committee by instructing the Hellenic FootballFederation and the Hellenic Football League to deduct 12 points fromthe club Panionios.The Appellant submitted that FIFA’s letters of 6 and 7 June 2005constitute decisions issued by FIFA, which can be appealed to CAS.As its argumentation on this point, the Appellant quotes the Awardissued by CAS on 17 March 2004 (CAS 2004/A/659) in another matter,where CAS ruled that a certain letter written by FIFA constituteda decision under Article R47 of the Code . The Appellant alsoexplains that the form of the decision, a letter, is irrelevant, as thedecisive criteria are related to the content of the decision, not its form,and decisions could be issued in the form of letters.Concerning the merits of the dispute, the Appellant argued thatFIFA cannot ignore the non-execution of its decisions by the HFFagainst Panionios and has an obligation to make sure that its decisionsare promptly and fully enforced, especially where the non-executionaffects the sporting and financial rights/interests of an indirect member,such as the Appellant.The Respondent submitted that its letter of 6 June 2005 did notcontain any decision against which an appeal could be lodged. On thecontrary, this letter was only meant to inform the Appellant of the situation.As a consequence, according to the Respondent, there is no“valid subject” for an appeal to CAS.Panionios stated that it eventually paid its football players and,therefore, there is no legal reason for it to be punished.In its written decision, the CAS has considered that:- The form of the communication has no relevance to determinewhether there exists a decision or not. In particular, the fact thatthe communication is made in the form of a letter does not rule outthe possibility that it constitute a decision subject to appeal. Whatis decisive is whether there is a ruling - or, in the case of a denial ofjustice, an absence of ruling where there should have been a ruling- in the communication. The Panel considers that letter at stakecontains no ruling that affects the legal situation of the Appellant.- The purpose of the letter at stake was only to inform the Appellantof the applicable FIFA rules and to the fact that the FIFADisciplinary Committee was competent to address disciplinaryissues and to pronounce sanctions. The CAS Panel noted that theFIFA administration had immediately transmitted the case to the140 <strong>2008</strong>/1-2DOCUMENTS
FIFA Disciplinary Committee and thus did not commit a denial ofjustice. Considering that FC Aris has not exhausted all legal remediesinternal to FIFA before the appeal to CAS, the Panel concludedthat it had no jurisdiction to hear this case in the absence of afinal decision of FIFA.Arbitration CAS 2005/A/908 WADA v/ Wium, award of 15November 2005Panel: Mr Michael Geistlinger (Austria), President; Mr Hans Nater(Switzerland); Mr Conny Jörneklint (Sweden)The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has decided to uphold theappeal filed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA; the“Appellant”) against the decision issued by the InternationalParalympic Committee’s (IPC) Management Committee on 2 May2005 whereby the latter infirmed a previous decision imposing a twoyears ineligibility period on a South African paralympic powerlifter,Coetzee Wium (the “Respondent”), and a disqualification of all competitiveresults obtained by the Respondent from 13 December 2004,including forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes. Therefore, theCAS ruled that the previous sanctions (ineligibility period and disqualification)were to be confirmed.On 13 December 2004, the Respondent underwent a WADA outof-competitiondoping control at his place of work. He was notifiedof the test at 9.39; the test was concluded at 9.54. On his way back,the Doping Control Officer (the “DCO”) realized that he had forgottenthe samples. He called the Respondent immediately, drove backto the Respondent’s place of work and received the samples from thelatter. In his view, the time that could have elapsed between the conclusionof the test and getting back to the Respondent was 45 minutes.Throughout this period, the samples were sealed in a tamperproof “Berlinger Test Kit”.The date of the sample collection by DHL as indicated in the documentationpackage for the samples of the Respondent was 14December 2004, whereas the waybill showed 15 December 2004. TheDCO explained this difference by stating that he had scheduled apick-up via the Internet on 14 December 2004 but since no collectionof the samples had taken place on this day, he had to take himself thebag into the DHL depot on the next day. There, the clerk who acceptedthe bag altered the date on the waybill to 15 December 2004, butthe chain of custody still showed 14 December 2004.The IPC Management Committee was presented with an AdverseAnalytical Finding of the urine provided by the Respondent fortestosterone or testosterone prohormones by the South AfricanDoping Control Laboratory on 5 January 2005 and confirmed byIRMS analysis of the Doping Control Laboratory of the DeutscheSporthochschule Köln on 27 January 2005 and reported to WADAand IPC on 3 February 2005. The T/E ratio was 43.2 for screen, wellabove the WADA threshold of 4.On 14 March 2005, the IPC Management Committee decided toimpose a two (2) years ineligibility period on the Respondent, basedon art. 12.2 IPC Anti-Doping Code. In addition and based on art.12.7 IPC Anti-Doping Code, all competitive results obtained by theRespondent from 13 December 2004 were disqualified including forfeitureof any medals, points and prizes. The IPC ManagementCommittee considered the facts and held that there was a minordeparture from the WADA International Standard for Testing. Butthere was no evidence that the sample had been tampered with in anyway and the seal on the sample was wholly intact. Therefore, theCommittee found that this departure did not invalidate the result.On 16 and 23 March 2005, the General Manager of the DisabilitySport South Africa (DISSA) filed two Notices of Appeal on behalf ofthe Respondent under art. 9.9 IPC Anti-Doping Code. She drew theconclusion that the forgetting of the samples as well as the change ofthe date on the waybill effectively caused a break in the chain of custody,which should render the decision of 14 March 2005 invalid.With regard to the issue of whether the sanction applied was the correctone, she argued that art 12.5.2 of the IPC Anti-Doping Code -“no significant fault or negligence” - should be taken into considerationfor defining the sanction if it was found that no significant deviationfrom the International Standard occurred. As a consequence, sherequested a reduction of the 2 years’ suspension.On 2 May 2005, the IPC Management Committee decided touphold the appeal and to immediately reinstate the Respondent tosport. The Committee found that a significant departure from theInternational Standard had occurred, as the samples were left unattendedfor 45 minutes and there was no clear record of exactly whathad happened to them during this period, clearly breaking the chainof custody. In addition, it stated that the IPC Anti-DopingSubcommittee had not established, on the balance of probabilities,that this departure had not caused the adverse analytical finding. Inlight of this finding, it did not consider the second question ofwhether the sanction applied by the IPC Anti-Doping Subcommitteewas the correct one.In its Statement of Appeal, dated 21 June 2005, WADA asked theCAS to amend the IPC decision of 2 May 2005 in order to impose a2 years ineligibility period on Coetzee Wium.In its written decision, the Panel considered that:- In a case where it is established that departures from the WADCInternational Standard for Testing and/or the WADA TechnicalDocuments for Laboratory Analysis occurred during transportation,collection and/or testing, the question the Panel has to answeris : “Do these deviations cast sufficient doubt on the reliability ofthe test results to an extent that the finding of a ProhibitedSubstance in the athlete’s urine was not sufficient to establish adoping offence to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel” ? If anathlete demonstrates such departures, then the IPC (or applicableADO) shall have the burden to establish that they did not cause theAdverse Analytical Finding. The standard of proof required by CASin all such cases is greater than mere balance of probability but lessthan proof beyond a reasonable doubt.- WADA had established to its comfortable satisfaction that thedeviation from the testing standard by having the samples left unattendedfor 45 minutes had not cast any doubt on the reliability ofthe test results. The practical impossibility to destroy a Berlingerbottle and the fact that the seal was intact at the samples’ arrival atthe laboratory excluded any act of sabotage with a possible impacton the result of the laboratory analysis as well as any probabilitythat a negligent mishandling of the samples by the cleaning ladymight have occurred involving any impact on the AdverseAnalytical Finding. Also, irrespective of whether there was or wasnot a departure from the International Standard with regard to thenon-correspondence of the date in the documentation package andon the waybill, the Panel found the explanation given by the DCOto be fully satisfactory. Given the finding of another CAS Panel inthe CAS case 2001/A/337, Bray v/FINA, p. 24, that even a delay oftwo weeks could not influence an Adverse Analytical Finding, itcould exclude any probability that the delay of one day could havecast any doubt on the reliability of the test results under the givencircumstances.- Although prepared to assume in favour of the Respondent thatthere was a departure from WADA Technical Documents forLaboratory Analysis, it nevertheless felt comfortably satisfied thatthe Appellant had established that such assumed departure had notrisen any doubt regarding the reliability of the test results. Giventhe exogenous origin of the Prohibited Substance, it found that thestatement regarding anabolic androgenic steroids, including testosterone,on page 3 of the WADA 2004 Prohibited List had to beapplied. Since the Respondent had not risen any doubts regardingIMRS being such a reliable method, it did not find that the athletecould rebut the presumption that a WADA-accredited laboratoryhad conducted Sample Analysis and custodial procedures in accordancewith the WADC International Standard for Laboratories.No departure from the International Standard, which would haveundermined the validity of the Adverse Analytical Finding, hadbeen established, once the exogenous origin of the ProhibitedSubstance had become clear.DOCUMENTS<strong>2008</strong>/1-2 141
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