Connecticut District Court decision, Goodwine v. DCF

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activity protected by a federal statute or constitutional provision other than Title VII, such as theFirst Amendment. See, e.g., Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775,781 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that employee complaints that "[are] personal in nature andgenerally related to [the employee's] own situation" do not address "matters of public concern"and hence are not protected activity under the First Amendment). Therefore, there is no basis forMs. Goodwine to bring a retaliation claim under § 1983. In any case, Ms. Goodwine's failure topresent evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered an adverseemployment action according to the standard for Title VII retaliation claims would also doom aretaliation claim brought pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g., Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d217, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Second Circuit's standard for finding an adverseemployment action in the First Amendment retaliation context "has always been the equivalentto the standard set forth [for Title VII retaliation claims] in Burlington Northern").Thus, to the extent that the Complaint can be construed to contain a claim thatDefendants unlawfully retaliated against Ms. Goodwine, that claim too would fail because thereis no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any of the Defendants retaliatedagainst Ms. Goodwine in violation of Title VII or § 1983.V.In addition to her federal claims, Ms. Goodwine charges Mr. Bendig with trespass againstthe person, a state common law tort. Supplemental or pendent jurisdiction is a matter ofdiscretion, not of right. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715-26 (1966). Acourt may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the court has dismissed all claimsover which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Roncallo v.Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 3:09cv126 (MRK), 2010 WL 4365764, at *11 (D. Conn. Oct. 22,34
2010). Because the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to all ofPlaintiffs' federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms.Goodwine's remaining state law claim. Should she wish to do so, Ms. Goodwine is free to raiseher state law claim against Mr. Bendig in the Connecticut state courts.VI.For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 86] isGRANTED. Ms. Goodwine's state law claim against Mr. Bendig is DISMISSED withoutprejudice to renewal in state court. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendantson Plaintiffs' Title VII and § 1983 claims and to close this file.IT IS SO ORDERED./s/]Mark R. KravitzUnited States District JudgeDated at New Haven, Connecticut: January 14, 2011.35
Page 4 and 5: Resources on December 28, Ms. Goodw
Page 6 and 7: on February 7, 2007, Mr. Cardillo,
Page 8 and 9: Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citat
Page 10: school. See Mem. in Opp'n [doc. # 9
Page 13 and 14: Goodwine made her complaint, Mr. Be
Page 15 and 16: Contrary to Plaintiffs' suggestion,
Page 17 and 18: In response to Defendants' stated r
Page 19 and 20: transpired after Mr. Bendig was dis
Page 21 and 22: was not overturned." See Mem. in Op
Page 23 and 24: demonstrate that the conduct occurr
Page 25 and 26: environment to be abusive" and "tha
Page 27 and 28: activity are protected under § 200
Page 29 and 30: defendant, acting under color of st
Page 31 and 32: At his deposition, Mr. Cardillo cou
Page 33: deficiency in an employer's interna

Connecticut District Court decision, Goodwine v. DCF

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