Unified Effort Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in ...

FORUM | Unified Effort in AfghanistanNATO accepted, a new subordinate threestarcommand to oversee the day-to-daybattle to ensure that all the diverse U.S. (andAllied) forces in Afghanistan are in synch. Heintroduced NATO leaders to his handpickedchoices for the new commands: GeneralMcChrystal and Lieutenant General DavidM. Rodriguez, USA, respectively. McChrystaland Rodriguez are counterinsurgency expertswith close ties to Secretary Gates, and have apersonal friendship spanning several decades.General McChrystal, perhaps best known forleading the special operations forces 14 (SOF)special mission units that tracked downSaddam Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawiin Iraq, more recently led a Pentagon taskforce that reviewed strategy alternatives inAfghanistan. General Rodriguez was selectedimportant positions in the Pentagon, whichshould ensure good communication betweenthe field and headquarters in Washington.Secretary Gates gave GeneralMcChrystal 60 days to tour Afghanistan, sizeup the situation, and make a detailed reporton how best to implement the new strategyand layered commands. McChrystal’s August30 report emphasized the importance ofunified effort and identified additional ways toimprove it. To assess whether the urgent, wellconceived,and collectively unprecedentedreorganization of command structures andleadership would ensure unity of effort, it isfirst necessary to understand why collaborationin pursuit of common objectives is such achallenge in irregular warfare in general and inAfghanistan specifically.of operations and the challenge for unifiedeffort. Some examples illustrate this point.One strategy objective is to turn overmilitary operations to Afghan forces rapidly,but if done too quickly, they may not havethe capacity to respond effectively to theinsurgency. Conversely, delaying handover fortoo long and relying on international forces(meaning all non-Afghan forces in OperationEnduring Freedom [OEF] and ISAF) riskalienating a population increasingly critical ofthose forces. Another difficult implementationissue is promoting good governance, notonly in Kabul but also in the provinces. TheUnited States wants to strengthen the legitimacyof the central government and reinforceAfghan national identity by improving thegovernment’s capacity to deliver basic servicesthe situation-dependentnature of counterinsurgencystrategy implementationincreases the complexity ofoperations and the challengefor unified effortGEN McChrystal and LTG Rodriguez talk with Deputy Secretaryof Defense William J. Lynn III at ISAF Headquarters in Kabulby Secretary Gates as his personal militaryassistant after Rodriguez’s previous tour inAfghanistan was widely acknowledged asa model for successful counterinsurgencyefforts. 15In another move calculated to improveunity of effort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff Admiral Michael Mullen invitedGeneral McChrystal to handpick his subordinates,and McChrystal chose severalflag officers from the Pentagon. In addition,McChrystal is having Brigadier GeneralScott Miller, USA (a SOF veteran), assemble“a corps of 400 officers and soldiers who willrotate between the United States and Afghanistanfor a minimum of three years” toprovide deep expertise and continuity. Whennot serving in Afghanistan, officers will fillUnity of Effort in Irregular WarfareArguments about the need for a wholeof-governmentapproach to counterinsurgency(one form of irregular warfare) arecommonplace, yet the need is rarely satisfiedfor several reasons. First, counterinsurgencyis a multidimensional enterprise that requiresthe integration of diplomatic, informational,military, economic, and other elements ofpower. Thus, a nation’s multiple national securitybureaucracies must work well togetherto succeed in counterinsurgency. Second,counterinsurgency strategy must be implementedflexibly as evolving circumstancesdictate rather than be determined a priori bythe strategy. The situation-dependent natureof counterinsurgency strategy implementationsubstantially increases the complexityU.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)to the population. Yet Kabul’s ability to extendits authority and provide services across thecountry is weak, and Afghans often attachgreater significance to local relationships.Thus, support for the central governmentmust be balanced with support for good localgovernance without alienating Kabul and thelocal populace from one another.Many other difficult tradeoffs can beidentified: the timing and extent of politicalreconciliation with insurgents, how boldlyto attack sanctuaries in Pakistan, how muchintelligence to share and with whom, whichareas of the country should receive the mainfocus with a limited number of troops, andso forth. Such strategy implementation issuesmust be resolved in complex and shiftingcircumstances—including rapid adaptationby the enemy—that vary greatly from oneprovince to another. With so many issues tocoordinate, the entire effort can easily losecoherence. When counterinsurgency elementswork at cross-purposes, political andmoral capital is squandered. The populationis likely to conclude the government and itsallies are incompetent, untrustworthy, orboth. Since the center of gravity is the supportof the population, insufficient unity ofpurpose and effort in a fast-moving situation42 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

LAMB and CINNAMONDis often the critical shortcoming in a counterinsurgencycampaign.The third obstacle to unified effort isthe sheer number and competing objectivesof players and activities involved. Currently,over 40 countries, three major internationalorganizations (United Nations [UN], EuropeanUnion, and NATO), and scores of otheragencies and nongovernmental organizationsare working in Afghanistan. Moreover, thesediverse actors are more or less aligned insupport of one of two different missions withcompeting priorities that have evolved overtime: NATO’s ISAF mission, and the U.S.-ledOEF mission. ISAF has evolved from a smallsecurity force concentrated in Kabul to acountry-wide “stabilization” effort drivenby classic population-centric counterinsurgencyobjectives, including “the extension ofgovernment authority across Afghanistan;the development of the Afghan Governmentstructures necessary to maintain securityacross the country without the assistance ofinternational forces . . . and the promotionby the Afghan Government of democracy,human rights and the rule of law.” 16However, a core strategic objective ofthe OEF mission is the disruption of terroristactivity by killing or capturing al Qaedaleaders. 17 OEF operations have expandedto support counterinsurgency by targetingTaliban insurgent leaders. 18 Each missioninvolves organizations from many nationsand the international community, and eachmission can be pursued with more or lessemphasis on cooperation with the Afghanforces and populace. In addition, the diversemilitary forces operating in Afghanistaninclude General Purpose (or conventional)Forces and special operations forces that donot always cooperate well.For all these reasons, unity of effort isa critical but difficult challenge in irregularwarfare, especially in Afghanistan. Usingspecial operations as a cardinal example, wecan illustrate that unified effort is difficult toachieve even when all the organizations pursuingan objective share a common chain ofcommand and consider unified effort a coreorganizational value.SOF in AfghanistanSpecial operations forces typically aretrained specifically for counterterrorism andcounterinsurgency and often approach thosemissions with different tactics than thoseemployed by conventional forces. Even withinthe SOF community, units may approachcounterterrorism and counterinsurgencymissions differently for historical and culturalreasons. Thus, SOF are in the middle of thedebate over the relative priority of counterterrorismagainst al Qaeda and counterinsurgencyagainst the Taliban.Theoretically, the two missions cancomplement one another. Counterterroristkill/capture operations can disrupt insurgentoperations, produce intelligence on the insurgency,and buy time for other populationcentriccounterinsurgency efforts to bearfruit. Similarly, counterinsurgency effortscan generate good intelligence for targetingterrorists and alienate them from sympathizerswho otherwise would provide supportfor their activities. In practice, however,Afghan National Police indicate possible enemy routes to U.S. Marinesin Helmand Province during counterinsurgency operationscounterterrorism and counterinsurgency missionstend to clash. With their emphasis onnighttime raids, counterterrorist operationscan produce inadvertent civilian casualtiesthat anger the population and complicateattempts by counterinsurgents to win popularsupport. Resentment runs even higher whencounterterrorist operations are carried out byforeign forces that appear insensitive to localcommunities. Counterinsurgents workingwith Afghan authorities and forces may compromisea counterterrorist operation if theAfghan counterparts warn the enemy, or ifthose operations are carried out less skillfullythan would be the case if they were conductedby international forces.The tension between the two missionsis thus a question of priorities: the importanceof targeting individual enemies relativeto the risk of incurring civilian casualties anddamaging relationships with local communities;and the importance of working withAfghan authorities and forces relative to therisk that doing so will compromise efforts totarget enemy leaders. Only a clear strategyand unified effort can minimize the tensionbetween these two missions. Hy Rothsteinprovides a compelling account of how theoriginal focus on killing terrorist leaders anddestroying Taliban forces in 2002 needed toshift to counterinsurgency when the Talibanin practice, counterterrorismand counterinsurgencymissions tend to clashadopted insurgent tactics. 19 Instead, conventionalforces and headquarters pushed asideArmy Special Forces that had developed closeworking relationships with their Afghancounterparts. Unilateral search operations byconventional forces caused increasing resentment,particularly in Pashtun communities.Eventually, new U.S. leadership put the effortback on track:Between late 2003 and early 2005, we weremoving on the right path in Afghanistan. UnderAmbassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad and LieutenantGeneral David Barno, the United Statescompletely overhauled its strategy for Afghanistan.We increased the number of Americanforces in the country, expanded nonmilitaryassistance to the Afghan government and—mostU.S. Marine Corps (Pete Thibodeau)ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55, 56, 41 th st quarter 2010 2009 / JFQ 43

LAMB and CINNAMONDis also evident that international militaryestimates of civilian casualties can err. Afghanpublic resentment is compounded wheninternational military forces resort to blanketstatements denying or contesting the numberof civilian casualties without an adequateinvestigation. The emergence of video footageshowing dead civilians prompted a review ofinitial findings that just seven civilians werekilled during August 2008 airstrikes in ShindandDistrict, Herat Province. The investigationdetermined that at least 33 civilians werekilled during the operation. 24Although they receive less media attention,civilian casualties incurred duringhouse raids—the vast majority conducted bySOF—also cause resentment among Afghans(see table 2). Many such operations producebenefits never made public for securityreasons. Yet their cumulative political effectmay turn tactical successes into a strategicfailure, a point repeatedly highlighted byAfghan authorities and increasingly byU.S. military officials as well. For example,in December 2006, in the aftermath of aSOF operation in Khost Province, the U.S.military claimed four suspected terroristshad been killed. However, then-GovernorArsala Jamal, with whom the U.S. militaryhad developed a strong working relationship,contested the statement, stating that theraid mistakenly targeted a pro-governmentvillage. Four of the five brothers living inthe compound worked for the government,and Jamal asserted there was “little reasonto suspect them of being anti-governmentelements.” 25 In March 2008, in response totwo SOF operations that led to the deaths ofseveral Afghan women and children, Jamalcomplained to Richard Holbrooke that “thisundermines everything we are trying to dohere.” 26 On a subsequent visit to the WhiteHouse in April 2008, he argued to PresidentGeorge W. Bush that “special operations isthe biggest, biggest challenge and [they havea] negative impact on the people’s mind inregard to coalition forces. There is no singlebigger issue than that.” 27 President HamidKarzai and Afghan Defense Minister AbdulRahim Wardak also have called for an end touncoordinated SOF raids.Karzai has long been extremelycritical of airstrikes and house raids. In July2002, following an American airstrike bya SOF AC–130 that killed scores of peoplecelebrating a wedding, Karzai stressed theimportance of procedures to prevent futureTable 2. Major (>5) Civilian Casualty Incidents (House Raids), 2006–2009Date Location Estimated Civilians Killed* Military ForcesApril 9, 2009Gurbuz District, KhostProvince4/5U.S. special operations forces(SOF)**March 22, 2009 Kunduz Province NA/5 U.S. forces†March 13, 2009Charkh District, LogarProvinceNA/5U.S. and Afghan SOF**March 6, 2009February 12,2009Sabari District, KhostProvinceNA/4Uruzgan Province 5/3January 23, 2009 Laghman Province NA/16 U.S. SOF**January 19, 2009 Kapisa Province NA/14 U.S. SOF**January 7, 2009 Laghman Province NA/13 U.S. SOF**September 1,2008Kabul ProvinceNA/4April 28, 2007(?) Nangarhar Province 2/5 U.S. forces†December 12,2006Mandozai District, KhostProvince5/5 U.S. SOF**U.S. forces†; Afghan forcespresent†North Atlantic TreatyOrganization Australianforces†International and Afghanforces†* In some of these cases, the Department of Defense asserts that combatants and not civilians werekilled. The first figure is the international military forces estimate; the second figure is either anAfghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not available.** Incidents involving SOF troops.† Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed.Royal Marine Commandos participatein stabilization and security operationwith Afghan National Security Forceand ISAF troops, Helmand ProvinceISAFndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 45

LAMB and CINNAMONDapproach has not been without criticism, butGeneral McChrystal has said that he “cannotoverstate” his support for operating in waysthat limit civilian casualties. 37 The directiveis also consistent with the approach someNATO military forces already use in Afghanistan,which bodes well for better unified effortwithin the Alliance.McChrystal’s directive and his prioritiesreflect the indirect approach to SOFoperations historically embraced by ArmySpecial Forces, one that gives priority toworking by, through, and with indigenousforces and populations. 38 This means therelationship with local forces and populationis determined to be more important than theeffects that U.S. forces can achieve againsttargets unilaterally. For example, in 2001 aSpecial Forces captain routinely deferred tothe judgment of the Afghan leader he workedwith, who happened to be Hamid Karzai, thecurrent president of Afghanistan: “Hamidwas very careful. If there was any doubt, wewouldn’t bother killing it. I could afford tolet a few guys go if I wasn’t sure. Hurting thepopulace hurt our own cause.” 39Soldier assesses security of villageMcChrystal’s directive givespriority to working by,through, and with indigenousforces and populationsThe spirit and challenge of implementingthe indirect approach was capturedrecently by an Army Special Forces colonelwho answered his own rhetorical questionabout which of the many overlappingforces in Afghanistan own any given battlespace: “The correct answer is the Afghansown the battle space and we are there insupport of them. But [the] mentality thatwe own the battle space in a sovereigncountry . . . can cause us to operate in waysthat are counterproductive.” 40To reiterate, the new population-centriccounterinsurgency strategy requires theindirect approach traditionally championedby Army Special Forces. This means it isnecessary to build the capacity of indigenousforces that know the populace better, evenfor kill/capture operations. However, U.S.forces operating under the OEF mandate havefocused for years on the direct approach tospecial operations, targeting individual enemyleaders unilaterally. This is true not only forSOF special mission units that specialize inU.S. Air Force (Sarah R. Webb)ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 47

FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistandirect action, but also increasingly for ArmySpecial Forces, who now often accord equalor higher priority to unilateral kill/captureoperations than the indirect approach. 41 Ironically,whereas in 2002 conventional forcessuch as the 82 d Airborne conducted counterinsurgencysweeps that damaged relationshipscarefully cultivated by Army Special Forces,today the reverse is true. It is now commonfor SOF kill/capture operations to disruptrelationships with local Afghans cultivated byconventional force commanders who, after8 years of learning in multiple theaters, areincreasingly attentive to counterinsurgencyprinciples.Disunity in Command and ControlThere is broad agreement among theU.S. national security community, the leadershipof U.S. Special Operations Command,and many individual SOF personnel thatthe indirect approach to counterinsurgencyshould take precedence over kill/captureoperations. However, the opposite hasoccurred. Understanding why is important ifunity of effort is to be improved. One reasonfor the undue emphasis on direct action isthat resources have been disproportionatelyallocated to targeting insurgent and terroristleaders rather than to indirect SOF activitiesin support of counterinsurgency. An explanationfor the discrepancy between these operationsand national policy was the overlappingand ad hoc command and control arrangementsextant in Afghanistan to date. 42In OEF, civilian casualties resultingfrom operations may not be viewed as detrimentalto the core mission of destroyingterrorist organizations. However, civiliancasualties are a critical issue for ISAF and itscounterinsurgency mission. Most Afghanscannot distinguish between OEF and ISAFforces, and relationships painstakingly developedby ISAF are adversely affected whenOEF kill/capture operations incur civiliancasualties. Despite procedures to deconflictmissions, lack of coordination between SOFand conventional forces is all too common.For example, in Nangarhar Province, theArmy brigade commander who ostensiblycontrolled the battle space was aware of only5 of the 30 operations conducted by a SOFunit in the area and had no knowledge of theone in which 17 civilians were killed and 50injured. 43The problem is exacerbated by thefragmentation of SOF command and control.Special mission units conducting directaction against terrorists do not report to thesame chain of command as other SOF units.From early on in OEF, SOF operated underthe command of multiple joint task forces.Task Force Sword, comprised of SOF specialmission units, reported directly to the combatantcommander while other SOF such asTask Forces Dagger and K-Bar reported toa Combined Joint Special Operations TaskForce (CJSOTF) component commander. 44 Anew SOF headquarters established in February2009 layers a one-star command on topof the CJSOTF command. Ostensibly, thepurpose is to enhance coordination betweenSOF units and conventional internationalmilitary forces, but many in Army SpecialForces worry that the net effect of anotherlayered headquarters will be less, ratherthan more, unity of effort. 45 In any case,special mission unit forces remain outsidethis command structure, so the potentialfor working at cross-purposes remains. Thesame point holds for other U.S. organizationsconducting kill/capture operations, such asthe Drug Enforcement Administration. Theiroperations targeting individuals linked todrugs and the insurgency are increasing andneed to be coordinated with military operations,so they will not undermine broadercounterinsurgency objectives. 46The disproportionate emphasis onkill/capture operations also can be attributedto organizational culture and rewardsystems that reinforce the different objectivesembraced by OEF and ISAF commands.Americans in general, the military in particular,and SOF especially are results-oriented.The capture or elimination of enemy leadersis a measurable, concrete, and energeticactivity that is easily rewarded in individualand unit performance assessment. Making acontribution to population security is passive,difficult to measure, often ambiguous, andtherefore less likely to be rewarded. Withinthe subgroups of SOF, there are differentcultural propensities toward the indirectapproach to operations, but in general, themilitary ethos provides all SOF commandersincentives to give priority to kill/captureoperations instead of population security.This is particularly true now that SOF unitshave built up a remarkable capability toconduct such operations frequently and forsustained periods. 47Unity of effort is difficult in irregularwarfare, even within the military and withinSOF organizations that embrace unity ofcommand as a core value. Unified effortis even more difficult among U.S. departmentsand agencies, and between Allies thatlack common organizational values anddo not share a single, hierarchical chain ofcommand. Disunity of command within themilitary, the U.S. Government, and amongthe United States and its Allies unfortunatelyis the norm, not the exception. Yet the architectsof the current strategy recognize that itrequires “clear unity of effort at all levels andwith all participants.” 48 The administrationtherefore needs to take every possible step toimprove unified purpose and effort.Observations and RecommendationsNews reports suggest the Obamaadministration is evaluating the option ofgiving precedence to counterterrorism overcounterinsurgency, and concentrating onrelatively low-cost “surgical” strikes. 49 Whilethis strategy alternative should be evaluatedin detail, several observations based on theresearch offered here are in order. Effectivekill/capture operations require politicalsupport and intelligence from indigenousmaking a contribution topopulation security is passive,difficult to measure, oftenambiguous, and therefore lesslikely to be rewardedpopulations, which are more easily obtainedwhen the population has confidence in thegovernment and its forces. For this reason,General McChrystal’s indirect approach toirregular warfare 50 is more likely to produceeffective kill/capture operations than attemptsto strike surgically from afar. In addition, astrategy shift to give precedence to counterterrorismwould not reduce the irregular warfarerequirement for greater unity of effort, askill/capture operations in Iraq demonstrated.51 Whether the emphasis is oncounterterrorism or counterinsurgency, therequirement for improved unity of effort is aconstant in irregular warfare.If the United States does decide tostick with its current strategy and providethe additional resources it requires, it canand should take some more steps to improveunity of effort, particularly with NATOallies. Eliminating the tension between OEF48 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

LAMB and CINNAMONDforces targeting enemy leadership and ISAFforces pursuing stabilization and populationsecurity efforts is the single most importantrequirement for better unified effort. Towardthis end, almost all of the U.S.-led OEF forcesshould be consolidated under the NATO ISAFmission, to include most SOF forces and allU.S. training command forces that supportAfghan force development and employmentprograms. 52 Only SOF special mission units(and their support elements) would continueto operate under the OEF mandate. Takingthis step would solidify the strategic directionfrom General Petraeus and General McChrystalthat nests counterterrorism within a widercounterinsurgency mission. 53 More importantly,it would improve the legitimacy of theinternational effort in Afghanistan and reinforceEuropean support for the endeavor. TheNATO ISAF mission is operating under a UNSecurity Council resolution and has a broaderbase for popular support than the U.S.-ledOEF mission. Finally, the consolidation underNATO would be consistent with the administration’sfocus on multilateral solutions.Merging the two missions is more practicablethan might be assumed. The missionshave been converging for several years. TheOEF counterterrorism focus has broadenedto include disrupting the Taliban insurgencyby targeting its leadership. More importantly,since 2006 the OEF mission has included anationbuilding component in the form of theCombined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, which is charged with trainingand equipping Afghan National SecurityForces. General McChrystal’s reportindicates the OEF training componentcommand will be subsumed under ISAF, apositive step that is consistent with the decisionannounced at the April NATO summitto form an Alliance training mission andhave it led by a single commander whoalso would control the U.S.-led CombinedSecurity Transition Command–Afghanistanunder OEF. 54At the same time, the ISAF missionhas broadened as well. After NATO assumedcommand of ISAF in 2003, the UN SecurityCouncil authorized the extension of the ISAFsecurity and stabilization mission to cover theentire country, an expansion that ISAF completedby late 2006. ISAF experienced morecombat when it moved into the south and eastwhere insurgent activity is concentrated. Inthis environment, the practical distinctionsbetween “security and stabilization” andclassic population-centric counterinsurgencymissions almost disappear. The terminologyremains politically important because NATOdoes not refer to ISAF’s mission as counterinsurgencybut rather prefers the euphemism“the comprehensive approach” to emphasizethe full range of civil-military activitiesrequired to stabilize Afghanistan. SomeNATO forces will continue to avoid offensiveoperations against the Taliban, but the currentstrategy emphasis on population security andthe indirect approach underscores the needto have Afghan forces take the lead in suchoperations anyway. Thus, this limitation is nota severe handicap.NATO prefers the euphemism“the comprehensiveapproach” to emphasize thefull range of civil-militaryactivities required to stabilizeAfghanistanU.S. Army (Matthew Freire)Soldiers secure detainee during joint operation with AfghanNational Security Forces and ISAF in Khowst Provincendupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 49

FORUM | Unified Effort in AfghanistanMoreover, past NATO reluctance to considermerging elements of the two missionsappears to be dissipating. Until 2005, Britain,France, and Germany all opposed mergingISAF and OEF because they believed theUnited States wanted to dump the mission onNATO and concentrate on Iraq, and becausethey thought the U.S. focus was on fightingthe Taliban and al Qaeda rather than populationsecurity and nationbuilding. Since 2006,however, some Allies (or particular politicalparties within NATO countries) have recommendedmerging the missions; Italy explicitlydid so with the rationale that the mergerwould reduce civilian casualties by rampingdown OEF operations. 55 Since the ISAF stabilizationmission now includes the full rangeof activities necessary to execute the newU.S. population-centric counterinsurgencystrategy, NATO should be more amenableto seeing the ISAF mission absorb the bulkof OEF forces and activities if the UnitedStates emphatically renews its commitment tosuccess in Afghanistan. 56Many observers would be hesitant togive the lead to ISAF because European countrieshave demonstrated a marked reluctanceto use lethal force. But the new U.S. strategydeemphasizes the attrition of insurgentforces, the type of operations Europeanscould not support. 57 In addition, NATOtroop-contributing states are relaxing theiropposition to having their forces involved incombat operations when such operations arean unavoidable byproduct of stabilizationoperations. 58 The French, for example, nowexpress frustration with national caveats thatlimit combat by NATO troops, and recently, aEuropean Parliament report made the argumentthat national caveats are counterproductive.On the ground, more nations are findingcombat unavoidable and a necessary meansof pacification. 59 Even German forces, witharguably the most restrictive national caveats,now routinely are involved in combat. 60 ISAFforces also can rely more heavily on NATOSOF when combat operations are necessary.Many Allies have been willing to allow theirSOF to conduct combat operations with a lowprofile.Where fighting is heaviest, U.S. forcesand likeminded Allies will have to bear thebrunt of the operations until Afghan forcesare ready. However, that is the case today andnot an argument against rolling OEF activitiesunder ISAF. Any U.S. concerns over thefuture direction of the ISAF NATO missioncould be assuaged by the provision that thecommander of ISAF would always be a U.S.flag officer, which is entirely reasonable giventhat the United States provides the majority offorces and support to the mission.The second most important requirementfor better unified effort is improvedcivil-military collaboration. Since, as arguedabove, successful irregular warfare requiresrapid resolution of innumerable implementationissues, mechanisms for authoritativecivil-military decisionmaking are imperative.The United States must lead the wayfor NATO in this area by ensuring closecollaboration between General McChrystaland Ambassador Eikenberry. In this regard,McChrystal’s plan is insufficient. It calls forparallel chains of command with coordinationat every level. Historically, however, theway to ensure civil-military cooperation isto formally integrate the military and civilianchains of command, as occurred whenGeneral Douglas MacArthur was givenauthority over all U.S. activities in Japanand when the Civil Operations and RevolutionaryDevelopment Support Program inVietnam was instituted. These rare experimentsin formally integrated civil-militarychains of command produced good resultsthat more than justify their broader use incomplex politico-military contingencies.The standard practice, however, has been toproclaim the importance of civil-militaryintegration while doing nothing to facilitateit, which, typically and not surprisingly, producesunsatisfactory results. 61Occasionally, a pair of extraordinarypersonalities will mesh and develop anoteworthy rapport, as was the case withAmbassador Robert Oakley and LieutenantGeneral Robert Johnston in Somalia (1993),Ambassador Khalilzad and LieutenantGeneral Barno in Afghanistan (2003), andGeneral Petraeus and Ambassador RyanCrocker in Iraq (2007). The fact that AmbassadorEikenberry is a retired Army lieutenantgeneral may improve the odds that heand General McChrystal will collaborate,but it does not guarantee it. Even if they do,their positive example will not ensure cooperationdown the line through subordinatelevels of organization, as the experience withthe civil-military Provincial ReconstructionTeams in Afghanistan attests. 62 GreatAmbassador–military commander teamsare the rare exceptions that prove the generalrule that such leaders typically respond tothe demands of their own organizations andcultures, as do their subordinates. As a recentreport from the House Armed Services Committee(HASC) concluded, “While seniorleaders should get along in the interest ofthe mission, history is replete with exampleswhere they have not. Rather than dependingexclusively on personalities for success, theright interagency structures and processesneed to be in place and working.” 63The optimum means of ensuringunified effort would be a formal decision tointegrate the civilian and military chainsthe optimum means of ensuring unified effort would be aformal decision to integrate the civilian and military chains ofcommandof command for the purpose of complexcontingency operations such as counterinsurgency,but this would require changes tolaws that mandate a dual civil and militarychain of command at the country level. 64The more immediate solution would be aninformal agreement between Eikenberry andMcChrystal to work collaboratively. Such arelationship can be hoped for, but the moreprudent route would be for the administrationto take steps to ensure a collaborativerelationship.General McChrystal and AmbassadorEikenberry have developed a joint plan forAfghanistan, 65 as should be the norm incomplex civil-military operations. Theyshould also exchange key staff members andmake decisions collaboratively whenever possible,in keeping with the best practices of ourmost accomplished Ambassador-commanderteams. However, as the HASC recommends,they also should be given some proceduralrules of thumb for collaboration. When diplomaticand military needs sharply conflict—asthey must on occasion in irregular war—whohas the final say should be a function of thesecurity situation, which could be determinedon a province-by-province basis. AmbassadorEikenberry would have the last say for the fewcontentious issues that could not be resolvedcollaboratively in those provinces wheresecurity was good enough to allow progress50 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

LAMB and CINNAMONDtoward political objectives to take priority—generally the northern half of the country atthe moment. In provinces where the securityenvironment is so poor that progress towardsecurity objectives must take precedencebefore political progress can be realized—generallythe southeast and southern half of thecountry—General McChrystal would resolvethe issue at hand. 66 Knowing in advance whohas the final say will minimize the conflict,tardy decisions, stalemates, and least commondenominator solutions that are frequently thedeleterious results of forcing equal authoritieswith competing mandates to cooperate.As for unified effort within the militaryand SOF community, General McChrystal’splan calls for improved SOF command andcontrol, and it hints that some SOF will berealigned under ISAF, as recommendedhere. Improved coordination between OEFand ISAF SOF will be provided by enhanced“SOF operations and planning staff, SOFadvisors, and liaison officers to the RegionalCommand Headquarters.” 67 McChrystalhas the credentials to reorient the SOF focusin Afghanistan so that population-centricstrategy objectives take precedence overkill/capture operations. He is a veteran ofboth Army Special Forces and special missionunits who recognizes that decapitation of theenemy leadership will not work, but that afocused effort to keep the insurgency on thedefensive is valuable if conducted properly.Offensive operations against insurgentsmust be informed by the kind of interagencyintelligence fusion McChrystal pioneered inIraq. 68 In-depth knowledge of local personalitiesand politics increases the odds that kill/capture operations will improve security andreduces the likelihood that local informationsources might manipulate internationalforces for their own objectives. 69 To improveintelligence and political awareness, GeneralMcChrystal’s new command and controlguidance for SOF should pair Army SpecialForces with Afghan units that have graduatedfrom basic training and are ready foremployment, and with local irregular forcesgenerated through the Afghan Public ProtectionForce program (if that controversial pilotprogram continues). 70SOF kill/capture operations shouldcontinue, but only in support of counterinsurgencyobjectives. In some cases, conventionalunits integrate SOF kill/capture operationsinto their counterinsurgency efforts in away that strengthens rather than weakensrelationships with local Afghans. 71 However,this must be done systematically and not beleft to chance. Layering of headquarters thatconstrains the latitude SOF traditionally exerciseis not the preferred way to achieve thisobjective. Instead, SOF must be subject to theculture change on the issue of civilian casualtiesthat General McChrystal is advocating. 72Several steps already taken or currently underway should help ensure the change in perspectiveextends to all SOF.Moving Army Special Forces from OEFto the ISAF counterinsurgency mission wouldunderscore national mission priorities forSOF. Collaboration between SOF and Afghanarmy units working on counterinsurgencyobjectives should be the norm, and it is morelikely to happen if SOF are working underthe ISAF mission mandate. Making ISAFthe main effort in Afghanistan would alsomake it easier to eliminate irregularitiesthat complicate unity of effort, such as differentOEF/ISAF target lists of key enemyleaders. 73 General McChrystal’s emphaticstatements about the need to limit civiliancasualties and the subordinate importanceGEN McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry visit Konar Province to meet withdistrict governors and see U.S.-funded reconstruction projectsof targeting enemy leadership effectivelycommunicate commander’s intent to all SOFforces, including the special mission units heknows so well. 74 McChrystal’s priorities andplan should also help reinforce the traditionalArmy Special Forces indirect approach, whichemphasizes the critical importance of theAfghan population and forces.General McChrystal will have to personallyattend to setting SOF special missionunit priorities within the OEF mandate.They do not formally report to him, andthey would continue to operate under differentrules of engagement than ISAF forces.Historically, special mission units reportdirectly to combatant commanders. If theplan to realign all SOF to the commanderof ISAF does not include special missionspecial operations forcesmust be subject to the culturechange on the issue of civiliancasualties that GeneralMcChrystal is advocatingunits, General McChrystal’s past experienceshould at least allow him to exercise aninformal veto over their operations shouldthey threaten counterinsurgency objectives.If this kind of informal oversight relationshipproves insufficient, SOF special mission unitscould be further constrained to operate ina geographically limited area and by a veryprecise list of high-value targets and costbenefitprocedures. In the past, the frequencyof SOF special mission unit operations grewwithout sufficient accountability until theywere targeting less important leaders andwith unacceptably higher risks, and the samecould easily happen in Afghanistan. 75 In Iraq,General McChrystal successfully executedU.S. Department of Statendupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 51

FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistanhigh-value human target operations in amanner consistent with counterinsurgencyprinciples, so there is reason to believe thesame can be done in Afghanistan. Once hehas established the priorities and proceduresinformally, the informal coordination relationshipwith special mission units shouldbe transferred to General Rodriguez, who isgoing to coordinate the day-to-day militaryoperations in Afghanistan. Rodriguez couldemulate McChrystal’s success in Iraq andensure the coordination procedures for directaction are not so laborious as to precludesuccessful kill/capture operations with fewcivilian casualties.Progress in Afghanistan is not possibleuntil the strategic objectives currently underdebate are resolved and priority is assignedto either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism.Paraphrasing the Cheshire cat’s pointin Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: “If youdon’t know where you are going, any roadwill get you there.” Choosing among competingpaths is only relevant in the context ofclear objectives. But it is equally true that “ifyou can’t stay on the road you choose, no roadwill get you where you want to go.” Choosingthe best ways to achieve strategic objectivesis relevant only to the extent that we canimplement a strategy with unified effort. Thegeneral U.S. experience with counterinsurgencyillustrates this point well. U.S. militarydoctrine often accurately codifies rules forwinning counterinsurgency warfare, but theorganizations implementing the doctrineignore it with comparable regularity. 76 Thesame point holds true for unified effort acrossthe government and among allies. We know itis critically important, but we seldom achieveit. With so much at stake and so little time toreverse a deteriorating situation, the administrationmust clarify its strategy and then gothe extra mile by taking additional steps toimprove the odds that everyone will stay onthe same road to success. JFQN o t e s1Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF InitialAssessment,” August 30, 2009, available at ; Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,”The Washington Times, August 20, 2009.2Fred Kaplan, “CT or COIN? Obama mustchoose this week between two radically differentAfghanistan policies,” Slate.com, March 24, 2009.3Bill Gertz, “Afghanistan Debate,” The WashingtonTimes, March 26, 2009, B1.4Richard Holbrooke, testimony on Afghanistan/Pakistanbefore the House Foreign RelationsCommittee, May 5, 2009, available at .5Jim Hoagland, “Foreign Policy by Deadline,”The Washington Post, July 19, 2009, 17.6Jim Garamone, “Gates Says New Commandin Afghanistan Will Look to NATO,” AmericanForces Press Service, June 11, 2009; see also JulianE. Barnes, “Americans won’t accept ‘long slog’in Afghanistan war, Gates says,” The Los AngelesTimes, July 19, 2009.7Ann Scott Tyson, “Top U.S. Commander inAfghanistan Is Fired,” The Washington Post, May12, 2009.8David Petraeus, statement before the SenateArmed Services Committee, April 1, 2009.9“New U.S. general looks to shift tackin Afghanistan,” June 12, 2009, available at.10Karl W. Eikenberry, testimony before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, March 26,2009, available at .11Anthony H. Cordesman, “More Troops,Fewer Caveats. Let’s Get Serious,” August 10,2009, available at .12Greg Bruno, Afghanistan’s NationalSecurity Forces, Council on Foreign RelationsBackgrounder, April 16, 2009, available at .13David W. Barno, testimony before the SenateArmed Services Committee, February 26, 2009.14In this paper, the term special operationsforces (SOF) refers to all forces under thecommand of U.S. Special Operations Command.When delimiting SOF to subcomponents of thecommand, they are identified as such (for example,Army Special Forces or special mission units).15Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires:America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: Norton,2009), 297ff.16ISAF Theatre Strategic CommunicationsStrategy, 2008. Copy on file with author.17“Press Conference with General TommyFranks,” available from .18Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Shifting Drones’Focus to Taliban,” The Los Angeles Times, July 30,2009, 1.19Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the TroubledFuture of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis,MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006), 7.20John McCain, remarks at the AmericanEnterprise Institute, February 25, 2009, available at.Emphasis added.21Pauline Jelinek, “Afghan Civilian DeathsBig Problem in War,” Washingtonpost.com, June18, 2009.22Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s WinningStrategy in Afghanistan (Washington, DC:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2009).23Greg Sanders, “How Deleterious is theImpact of Airstrikes on Popular Opinion inAfghanistan?” Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, March 10, 2009, available at .24“U.S. Probe: Afghan Airstrike Killed at Least33 Civilians,” CNN News, October 8, 2008.25See Jason Staziuso, “Afghan Mess Up:Crossed signals lead each side to mistake the otherfor the enemy,” Associated Press, January 13, 2007.26See Richard Holbrooke, “The Longest War,”The Washington Post, April 1, 2008.27See “U.S. President Gets an Earful fromAfghan Governors,” Agence France Presse, April9, 2008.28A study by the Centre for Conflict and PeaceStudies cites revenge against international forcesas a key motivation for joining the insurgency. SeeHekmat Karzai, “Is the West losing the Pashtuns?”Al Jazeera, January 26, 2009.29Carlotta Gall and David E. Sanger, “CivilianDeaths Undermine Allies’ War on Taliban,” TheNew York Times, May 13, 2007; Carlotta Gall, “U.S.Faces Resentment in Afghan Region,” The NewYork Times, July 3, 2009.30Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy forthe Afghan War, Washington, DC, February 3,2009, 9.31“Frustration with War, Problems in DailyLife Send Afghans’ Support for U.S. Efforts Tumbling,”ABC News/BBC/ARD National Survey ofAfghanistan, February 9, 2009, available at .32Jones, 303.33“Response Posture for Noncombatant CivilianCasualty Incidents in Afghanistan,” memorandumfor the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, October 29, 2008; see also Peter Graff, “NewTactic for U.S., NATO in Afghanistan: Say Sorry,”Reuters, April 17, 2009.52 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu

LAMB and CINNAMOND34See “U.S. Deeply Regrets Civilian Deaths inAfghanistan: Clinton,” Agence France Presse, May7, 2009.35See Adam B. Ellick, “U.N. Official Calls forReview of American Raids,” The New York Times,June 14, 2009.36See “NATO/ISAF Tactical Directive (ReleasablePortions) 6 July 2009”; David Zucchino andLaura King, “U.S. to Limit Airstrikes in Afghanistanto Help Reduce Civilian Deaths,” The LosAngeles Times, June 23, 2009.37General Stanley McChrystal, statementbefore the Senate Armed Services Committee, June2, 2009.38The distinction between the direct and indirectapproach to special operations is controversialand often confused within the special operationscommunity. The authors’ usage is drawn fromDavid Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, U.S.Special Operations Forces (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2007).39Rothstein, 140.40Email exchange with Colonel DavidMaxwell, USA, U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.41Jones, 265; interviews with Special Forcesofficers, July 22, 2009, July 27, 2009; interview with0–6 staff officer, July 20, 2009. For evidence of theconfusion surrounding the focus of Special Forces,see Major Darin Blatt and Major Glenn BollingerIII, “3 d SFG Develops Special Army Forces CombatAdvisers for Afghanistan,” June 24, 2009, availableat .42Institute for National Strategic Studiesroundtable, Washington, DC, March 3, 2009.43Colonel Ian Hope, Unity of Command inAfghanistan: A Foresaken Principle of War, CarlislePapers in Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S.Army War College, November 2008), note 50.44Denis P. Doty, “Command and Control ofSpecial Operations Forces for 21 st Century ContingencyOperations” (Master’s thesis, Naval WarCollege, 2003), available at .45Sean Naylor, “New Special Forces HQcoming to Afghanistan. Buildup of forces meansneed for closer oversight, official says,” The MilitaryTimes, January 31, 2009.46James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down AfghanDrug Lords Tied to Taliban,” The New York Times,August 10, 2009; Anthony H. Cordesman, “TheAfghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report: 2009,”Center for Strategic and International Studies, June18, 2009.47Interview with David W. Barno, July 31,2009; interview with Special Forces officer, July22, 2009.48Petraeus.49Peter Baker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “ObamaConsiders Strategy Shift in Afghan War,” The NewYork Times, September 22, 2009.50McChrystal, 1–2, 1–3, 2–1, 2–10, 2–11.51Project for National Security Reform(PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC:PNSR, 2008).52For more arguments on the need to mergeOEF and ISAF, see Ambassador James Dobbins(Ret.), “Obama’s Af/Pak Strategy,” a draft chapterfrom a forthcoming book.53Ibid.; McChrystal.54Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO inAfghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,”Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009.55“Italy’s D’Alema Advises U.S. to End ‘EnduringFreedom’ Mission in Afghanistan,” AgenceFrance Presse, July 25, 2007.56Victoria Burnett and Rachel Donadio,“Spain is Open to Bolstering Forces in Afghanistan,”The New York Times, July 29, 2009.57For a European take on population-centriccounterinsurgency operations that is consistentwith the new U.S. approach, see Colonel PhilippeCoste, “La Phase de Stabilisation et la ContreRebellion,” Doctrine: Revue d’etudes Generales no.17 (July 2009), Centre de Doctrine, d’Emploi desForces, Ministry of Defense, France.58We are indebted to Institute for NationalStrategic Studies expert Leo Michel for insightsand an assortment of articles from European presson this topic.59Morelli and Belkin, 11.60“German Troops Beef up Fight againstTaliban,” Spiegel Online International (Germany),July 9, 2009.61Bob Killebrew, “The Left-Hand Side of theSpectrum: Ambassadors and Advisors in FutureU.S. Strategy,” Center for a New American Security,2009.62David Kobayashi, “Integrating Civilianand Military Efforts in Provincial ReconstructionTeams,” Mini-Case Study for the Projecton National Security Reform (Washington, DC:PNSR, 2009); Henry Nuzum, “Shades of CORDSin the Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’”(Master’s thesis, The Johns Hopkins School ofAdvanced International Studies, 2007); AnnaHusarska, “Trampled by the ‘Civilian Surge,’” TheWashington Post, July 10, 2009.63U.S. House of Representatives, HouseArmed Services Committee, Subcommittee onOversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipesvs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learnfrom Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq andAfghanistan,” April 2008.64PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 473ff; see alsoFranz-Stefan Gady and Rei Tang, “AfghanistanInteragency Team Scenario,” Research and AnalysisDirectorate, PNSR, February 2009.65Gertz, “Inside the Ring.”66This recommendation is consistent with thedivision of labor recommended by General Barno.See Barno, testimony.67McChrystal, annex B.68Interagency intelligence fusion is difficultbut can be mastered, as British forces in NorthernIreland and McChrystal in Iraq demonstrated.Peter Spiegel, “Commander Maps New Course InAfghan War: U.S. Gen. McChrystal Departs FromSpecial-Ops World With Focus on Diplomacy;‘Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work,’” The WallStreet Journal, June 12, 2009, 6.69Fisnik Abrashi and Jason Straziuso,“Afghans say deadly raid was based on misleadingtip,” Associated Press, August 28, 2008.70We are indebted to Colonel David Maxwellfor the distinction between remote area operationswith irregular forces and consolidation operationswith host-nation forces, both conducted in supportof the Foreign Internal Defense mission.71James Dao, “Neighbors by Day, Soldiersby Night in Afghanistan,” The New York Times,August 5, 2009, available at .72Pauline Jelinek and Anne Gearan, “GeneralSeeks New Afghan Approach: He urges ‘culturalshift’ in how troops handle civilians,” The PhiladelphiaInquirer, August 1, 2009.73Interview with Army Special Forces officer,July 27, 2009.74Spiegel, 6; McCain.75See Tucker and Lamb.76Austin G. Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence:The U.S. Military and CounterinsurgencyDoctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006, RANDCounterinsurgency Study Paper 6 (Santa Monica,CA: RAND, 2008).ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 53