The Report in Brief - Arab Human Development Reports

Large andfrequent shortfallscan turn the stateinto a threat tohuman securityMost statesfailed to introduceinstitutions ofrepresentationEven so, carbon dioxide emissions in NorthAfrica and the Middle East are increasingat a faster rate than any other region inthe world, except for South Asia (drivenby India) and East Asia (driven by China).From 1990 to 2004 the average annualrate of growth was 4.5 per cent, whichmeans that carbon dioxide emissions hadnearly doubled over that period.Climate change: the Arab region is one ofthose least responsible for the direct creationof the greenhouse effect. Accordingto the global Human Development Report(HDR) 2008 and world developmentindices for 2007, the region’s share of carbondioxide emissions, which contributeto this phenomenon, was no more than4.7 per cent—lower than any other regionexcept Sub-Saharan Africa. However, theregion is also the nearest to becoming adirect victim of climate change, whichwill affect it in the following ways: a)water shortages; b) reduced agriculturalproduction; c) large population transfersto foreign countries (environmental refugees);d) lower levels of economic activity;e) threats to national security.Global warming: according to the UNDPGlobal Human Development Report2007/2008, Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan, andthe countries of North Africa could bethose in the region most affected by climatechange. 4 An increase in the Earth’stemperature by three or four degreeswould raise the sea level by approximatelyone metre, creating 6 million refugees inEgypt, with 4,500 square kilometres ofagricultural land in the Delta flooded. Evenif the sea level rises by only one-half metre,it could create two million refugees andcause more than $35 billion in economiclosses. In the Kordofan region of Sudan,an increase in temperature of 1,5 degreescentigrade between 2030 and 2060 wouldreduce average rainfall by 5 per cent, leadingto a general drop in agricultural productionand a decrease in the productionof maize by 70 per cent of current levels.An increase of 1.2 degrees centigrade by2020 would reduce available water inLebanon by 15 per cent and in some areasof Morocco by over 10 per cent.2. The State and its insecure peopleIn terms of levels of human security amongcitizens, is the Arab State part of the solutionor problem? To answer that question,the Report compares the performance ofthe Arab states with the norms associatedwith good governance. It analyzes whetherthe former win the acceptance of theircitizens, uphold and guarantee their rightsto life and freedom and protect them fromaggression. Its analysis is based on fourcriteria: 1) the acceptability of the stateto its own citizens; 2) state compliancewith international charters pertaining tohuman rights; 3) how the state utilizesits monopoly of the means of force andcoercion; 4) how far institutional checksand balances prevent abuses of power. TheReport concludes that large and frequentshortfalls in these areas often combineto turn the state into a threat to humansecurity, instead of its chief support.Identity, diversity and citizenshipStates are artificial creations. The bordersof many Arab states reflect this fact, oftenenclosing diverse ethnic, religious andlinguistic groups that were incorporatedas minorities in the post-colonial era.Few Arab states saw a smooth transitiontowards inclusion in their post-independencephases. Rather, a strong nationalistictrend developed with the objective ofmasking the diversity of the populationand subduing its cultural, linguistic andreligious heterogeneity under commandstructures. The majority of states failedto introduce democratic governance andinstitutions of representation that ensureinclusion, the equal distribution of wealthamong various groups, and respect for culturaldiversity.One result of this is that identitybasedgroups in some Arab countries havesought to free themselves from the captivityof the nation-state in whose shadowthey live. This rejection of the legitimacyof the kind of state which the modernArab countries inherited and perpetuatedhas been accompanied by conflicts thatthreaten human security and to whichsome states have responded by imposingauthoritarian controls.4 Arab Human Development Report 2009

In western political history, the normativeconcept that has contributed most tothe management of ethnic, cultural andlinguistic diversity is that of citizenship.Arab states are undergoing a similarpolitical evolution rather slowly and,consequently, few sustain a level of civicconsciousness that makes it possible forcitizens themselves to resolve their differencespeacefully without state action.Observation confirms that, in the Arabcountries, ethnic, religious, sectarian, andlinguistic differences can be associatedwith persistent group struggles, especiallyin countries where the population is nothomogenous. In countries such as Somalia,Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq, ethnic, religiousand tribal loyalties have become theaxis along which communities have beenmobilized to press for inclusion or separation.This mobilization has been destructiveand destabilizing, undercutting bothhuman security and the integrity of states.Tragically, these conflicts have engenderedthe largest volume of human casualties inthe Arab countries.The Report argues that identity, per se,is not necessarily the cause of a conflict oreven the main source of tension betweendifferent groups in the region. Clashesthat appear on the surface to stem fromidentity in fact often originate in skewedaccess to political power or wealth, in alack of channels for representative politicalparticipation, and in the suppressionof cultural and linguistic diversity. Mostcommonly, such conflicts start with theexploitation by political leaders, for theirown ideological ends, of loyalty ties amonggroups who share feelings of exclusion,deprivation and discrimination.Adherence to international chartersMost Arab states have acceded to themajor international charters pertainingto human rights which stipulate boththe right to life and the right to freedom.Accession and ratification entail an obligationon the concerned Arab states to bringnational legislation and practices in linewith these conventions, an obligation thatis however more honoured in the breachthan the observance. At the regional level,the norms on human rights adopted bystates and reflected in the Arab Charteron Human Rights (2004) are inconsistentwith international standards. Indeed, thedeath penalty, which more than half thecountries of the world have abolished andwhich the United Nations condemns, isapplied liberally in several Arab countries,which do not limit it to the most seriouscrimes or exclude its imposition in casesof political crime.Constitutional failingsState constitutions do not adhere inseveral key respects to the internationalnorms implicit in the charters to whichArab countries have acceded. This gravelycompromises levels of human securityin the countries concerned. Many Arabcountries’ constitutions adopt ideologicalor doctrinal formulas that empty stipulationsof general rights and freedoms of anycontent and which allow individual rightsto be violated in the name of the officialideology or faith. Others deal ambiguouslywith freedom of opinion and ofexpression, tending to restrict rather thanto permit. Arab countries’ constitutionsalso routinely delegate the definition ofrights to state regulation. In doing so, theyallow freedoms and individual rights to beviolated at the point when the latter aretranslated into ordinary law. While Arablaws and constitutions generally do notmandate discrimination between citizenson the basis of language, religion, doctrine,or confession, discrimination againstwomen is quite evident on the law booksof several states.Legal restrictionsAcross the Arab region, six countries continueto prohibit the formation of politicalparties. In many other cases, varyingdegrees of repression and restrictionson the establishment and functioning ofpolitical parties, particularly oppositionparties, effectively amount to their prohibition.With one exception, all Arabcountries support the right to form civilassociations. However, most legal systemsand regulations governing and regulatingthe civil society sector involve a wide andescalating array of restrictive measuresthat hinder the exercise of that right.Civil society groups face restrictions ontheir formation and ability to operate. Thegroups themselves, or their boards, canbe summarily dissolved by the state. Andtheir affiliations and sources of fundingare subject to tight controls.Ethnic, religious,sectarian,and linguisticdifferences canbe associatedwith persistentgroup strugglesMany Arabcountries allowfreedoms andindividual rightsto be violatedThe report in brief5

Anti-terror lawshave givengovernmentsecurity agenciessweeping powersMany Arabs liveunder various‘un-freedoms’National security measuresMany Arab states have undergoneextraordinarily long periods of martiallaw or emergency rule, transforminginterim measures into a permanent wayof conducting political life. Declarationsof emergency are often simply a pretextto suspend basic rights and exempt rulersfrom any constitutional limitations,however weak. Post-9-11, most Arabcountries passed anti-terror laws based ona wide and unspecific definition of “terrorism”.These moves have given governmentsecurity agencies sweeping powers which,although effective in some contexts, canform a threat to basic freedoms in others.Such laws allow undefined periods ofpre-trial detention and multiply instanceswhere the death penalty may be applied.They also curb freedom of expression andincrease police powers of search, eavesdroppingand arrest. In some cases, theselaws increase the use of military courts. Ingeneral, these laws have failed to find therequired balance between the security ofsociety and that of the individual.State-sponsored violations of citizens’rights to life and freedom are committedthrough the practices of torture and illegaldetention. Between 2006 and 2008, theArab Organization for Human Rights(AOHR) found examples of the officialpractice of torture in eight Arab states. Inthe same period, the AOHR reported onthe more widespread practice of illegaldetention in eleven countries of the region.Obstructions of justiceIndependent judiciaries form a major partof any state system of checks and balances.Threats to judicial independence in theArab states come not from constitutions,which generally uphold the principle, butfrom the executive branch. All Arab justicesystems suffer in one form or anotherfrom blows to their independence thatstem from executive domination of boththe legislative and judicial branches. Inaddition, judicial independence is beingundermined by the spread of state securitycourts and military courts, which representa negation of the principles of naturaljustice and detract from guarantees of afair trial. The result is a considerable gapbetween constitutional texts and actuallegal practice in protecting the personalsecurity of the Arab citizen. Judges insome Arab countries have struggled inorder to give some substance to judicialindependence, but their efforts are undertakenin a very challenging environment.State-enforced securityHuman security is reinforced when thestate is the sole wielder of the instrumentsof coercion and uses them to carryout its commitment to respect people’srights, those of citizens and non-citizensalike. When other groups gain control ofinstruments of force, the outcomes seldomfavour security for citizens. The stateauthorities in some Arab countries haveproved unable to impose security whileconfronting armed groups and others havesuffered from the armed violence in whichsome of their citizens, or those of otherArab states, have been caught.On the other hand, while many Arabslive under various ‘un-freedoms’ whicheffectively deny them voice and representation,and while the threat of state-initiatedviolence against them is ever-present,the region offers a degree of protectionfrom crime not found in other developingregions. Barring the cases of foreignoccupation and civil war, a relatively lowincidence of conventional violent crimeremains the norm for the Arab countries.Statistics from 2002 indicate that, at thattime, the region had the lowest policerecordedhomicide and assault rate, notonly among all regions of the South, butalso in both the developing and developedworlds.Executive branches and security andarmed forces that are not subject to publicoversight present grave potential threatsto human security. All Arab heads of statewield absolute authority, answering tonone. They maintain their hold on powerby leaving the state’s security apparatusan extremely wide margin for manoeuvre,at the expense of citizens’ freedoms andfundamental rights. Arab security agenciesoperate with impunity because theyare instrumental to the head of state andaccount to him alone. Their powers arebuttressed by executive interference withthe independence of the judiciary, by thedominance (in most states) of an unchangingruling party over the legislature, andby the muzzling of the media.Going by the preceding criteria, therelationship between the state and human6 Arab Human Development Report 2009

security in the region is not straightforward.While the state is expected toguarantee human security, it has been, inseveral Arab countries, a source of threatundermining both international chartersand national constitutional provisions. TheReport holds up the nature and extent ofstate failures behind the crisis in Darfur,which provide an archetypal illustrationof how state performance impacts humansecurity. Establishing the rule of law andgood governance in the Arab countriesremains a precondition for the foundationof the legitimate state and the protectionof human security.Calls for state reformRecent state-sponsored reform initiativesaimed at enhancing citizens’ rights havebeen welcomed yet found to be ineffectualin changing the dictated nature of theArab social contract or the structural basisof power in the region. The path to reformin the region has been laid out most clearlyby its increasingly active and vocal civilsociety. The latter’s demands focus on:• Respect for the right to self-determinationof all people.• Adherence to the principles of humanrights, and rejection of all prevaricationbased on cultural particularism and themanipulation of national sentiment.• Public tolerance of different religionsand schools of thought.• Sound parliamentary systems.• The incorporation in Arab constitutionsof guarantees of political, intellectual,and party political pluralism,with political parties based on theprinciple of citizenshipSpecific calls by citizens for changeinclude: an end to martial law; the abolitionof emergency laws and courts; a halt tothe practice of torture; the reform of Arabcountries’ legislations that is incompatiblewith freedom of thought and expression;and the full establishment and practice ofthe rule of law.3. The vulnerability of those lostfrom sightThe personal security of citizens in Arabcountries is compromised by legal loopholes,overseen and regulated by coerciveinstitutions and based on the forfeiture offreedoms. But for some groups of peoplebeyond mainstream society—abusedand subordinated women, the victims ofhuman trafficking, child soldiers, refugeesand internally displaced persons—no personalsecurity exists at all.Violence against womenMany Arab women are still bound bypatriarchal patterns of kinship, legaliseddiscrimination, social subordinationand ingrained male dominance. Becausewomen find themselves in a lowly positionin relation to decision-making withinthe family, their situation continuouslyexposes them to forms of family andinstitutionalised violence. Arab women,like many of their peers in other regions,sustain both direct and indirect violence.In the first category, they suffer forms ofphysical assault, from beating to rape andmurder. In the second, they are victimsof cultural and social practices that causematerial harm to women, such as femalegenital mutilation (FGM) and child marriage.Although some states have bannedthe practice of FGM, it continues to bewidespread in many countries becausetraditional beliefs favour it. Influential figuresaligned with conservative political orsocial forces also speak out in its defence.Arab countries have yet to adopt lawsprohibiting child marriage before the ageof majority, namely, eighteen years of age.Yet studies indicate that early marriage andteenage pregnancies threaten the health ofmothers and children, and increase femalevulnerability to violence. Early marriagesoften lead to divorce, family breakdownand poor child-rearing. They commonlyencourage early childbearing and highfertility, which carry marked health risksfor very young mothers and their infants.Although early marriage is on the declinein the Arab countries, the numbers ofteenage girls who are married remainssignificant in some countries. Based on themost recent available data in the period1987-2006, UNICEF estimates that theproportions of women aged 20-24 thatwere married by the age of 18 were 45 percent in Somalia, 37 per cent in Yemen andMauritania, 30 per cent in Comoros, and27 per cent in Sudan. These proportionswere 10 per cent in Tunisia, 5 per cent inDjibouti, and 2 per cent in Algeria.The relationshipbetween thestate and humansecurity in theregion is notstraightforwardNo personalsecurity exists forsome groups ofpeople beyondmainstream societyThe report in brief7

It is difficultto gauge theprevalence ofviolence againstwomen in ArabsocietiesArab countriesare the site ofboth the world’slongest-standingrefugee questionand its latestsuch problemIt is difficult to gauge the prevalence ofviolence against women in Arab societies.The subject is taboo in a male-orientedculture of denial. Much of this violenceis inflicted unseen in the home, on wives,sisters and mothers. The under-reportingof offences is widespread. Marriage lawscontribute to the problem since most ofthem confirm a husband’s custodial rightsover a wife. The consecration of malesupremacy within the family culminatesin Personal Status laws since, under theselaws, most women in Arab countries donot have the right to ask for divorce or tooppose polygamy. Steps to reform personalstatus laws have been taken, especiallyin the Maghreb countries, and more arerequired.So-called ‘honour crimes’ are themost notorious form of violence againstwomen in several Arab societies. Here too,under-reporting makes the prevalence ofsuch crimes difficult to establish, but thepractice is known to continue. The punishmentfor women can be as severe as death,especially if the prohibited act results inpregnancy. In some Arab countries the lawstands on the side of those who perpetratesuch crimes by reducing penalties.Rape is considered to be a more commonform of violence against womenthan incidents reported to the police,or covered by the press, may suggest. InArab countries, where laws on rape areeither equivocal or actively biased againstwomen, and where family and society jointo deny occurrences, preserve the imageof virginity and downplay the crime, fewcases come before the courts. Thus, one ofthe most violent, intrusive and traumaticthreats to women’s personal safety continueswhile society averts its eyes.War-time assaults on women take placein a context of lawlessness, displacementand armed clashes such as those in Iraq,Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia where genderroles are polarized. In these theatres ofconflict, men often compensate for theirown insecurities and loss of dominancethrough intensified aggression againstwomen. In June 2008, the UN SecurityCouncil unanimously adopted Resolution1820 demanding the “immediate andcomplete cessation by all parties to armedconflict of all acts of sexual violenceagainst civilians”. The resolution notedthat women and girls are particularlytargeted by the use of sexual violence as “atactic of war”.Human traffickingHuman trafficking is a multi-billion dollartransnational industry that is spreadingacross the Arab countries. In the region,this underground business has certainclear traits. One is that the Arab statesplay various roles and sometimes multipleroles. They can be destinations for thetrade, they may act as a transit point forsuch commerce, or they may be a source ofpersons being trafficked. As destinations,they receive trafficked persons from variousregions of the world: Southeast Asia,South Asia, Eastern Europe, Asia Minor,Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.For men, the trade entails forced labourunder dehumanizing conditions and withoutrespect for labour rights. For women,it usually means domestic service oftenindistinguishable from slavery, or sexualexploitation; and, for children, it leads toemployment as beggars, itinerant vendorsor camel jockeys, or to sexual abuse. For allvictims, bondage through trafficking spellsa life of permanent abject insecurity.Children are easy prey to practicesruinous to their security. Not only do suchpractices impair their liberty, they exposethem to extreme harm, ranging frompsychological stunting and physical injury,to death. The cruellest of such practices isthe recruitment of children for war. Twodifferent forms of children’s involvementin military activities are found in the Arabcountries. The first is that in Sudan andSomalia, where the recruitment of childsoldiers is widely reported. The second isthat in the region’s other conflict zones—the Occupied Palestinian Territory andIraq—where children, voluntarily or undercoercion, play support roles, while sufferingdisproportionately under the armedconflicts in these areas.The plight of refugees and internallydisplaced personsThe Arab countries are the site of boththe world’s longest-standing refugee question,that of the Palestinians, and its latestsuch problem, in Darfur. Propelled to fleeby conditions of grave insecurity—at aminimum, loss of work and income, and atworst loss of life at the hands of occupyingarmies or rival militias—refugees continue8 Arab Human Development Report 2009

to live with the insecurities associatedwith their status. They are at the mercyof conditions in camps or political andeconomic events in their host countries,which could suddenly turn against them.The refugee experience may never end, fora person may die a refugee and pass thisstatus on to a second generation.While statistics on refugees are oftendifficult to verify, it is estimated that theArab countries contain approximately7.5 million refugees, in the form of thoseregistered by the UN High Commissionfor Refugees (UNHCR) and the UNRelief and Works Agency (UNRWA), forthe year 2008. This share represents 46.8per cent of the 16 million global refugeesregistered under UNHCR and UNRWAfor 2008. The largest number of theserefugees, mostly Palestinians and Iraqis, isfound in Jordan, Syria, and the OccupiedPalestinian Territory.Internally displaced persons (IDPs) inthe region are more widespread geographicallythan refugees, whom they outnumberat an estimated total of about 9.8 million.Most are to be found in six Arab states—Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Syria andYemen—with Sudan alone accounting forup to 5.8 million. IDPs share many of theinsecurities of refugees: loss of livelihoods,status, families, roots and, sometimes, lifeitself.The Report concludes that what thestate and society do not see, they cannotprotect. Alleviating the insecurity of theregion’s most vulnerable groups starts withrecognition of the fact and extent of theinjustices they suffer, and of the political,social and developmental roots of theirexclusion.4. Volatile growth, highunemployment and persistingpovertyThe fabled oil wealth of the Arab countriespresents a misleading picture oftheir economic situation, one that masksthe structural weaknesses of many Arabeconomies and the resulting insecurity ofcountries and citizens alike. The Reportdiscusses economic security in terms ofthe dimensions originally identified byUNDP’s 1994 Human DevelopmentReport on human security: real per capitaincome levels and their growth patterns;employment options; poverty; and socialprotection. It underlines the erratic courseof oil-led growth in the Arab countries, thefragility of the economic model associatedwith it, and changing trends in intraregionalspillovers from oil producing countries.It also identifies policy gaps that haveconsequences for the economic security ofmillions of people: acute unemploymentand persisting income poverty.Economic vulnerabilityOne clear sign of the vulnerability ofArab economic growth is its high volatility.Tied to capricious oil markets, theregion’s economic security has been—andremains—hostage to exogenous trends.Rocky ups-and-downs in the Arab countries,from high growth in the 1970s toeconomic stagnation through the 1980sand back to extraordinary growth in theearly 2000s, directly reflect the turbulentcycles of the oil market. Steep drops inoil income during the 1980s had majorimpacts on oil producing countries (SaudiArabia, for example, saw its GDP halvedbetween 1981 and 1987 in current prices).A number of other countries experiencednegative economic growth, of whichthe hardest hit was Kuwait, where GDPdeclined by around 18 per cent in 1981and 1982. The shocks were transmittedto non-oil Arab economies whose receiptsfrom remittances fell away. Jordan andYemen both had negative growth in someyears.For nearly two and half decades after1980, the region witnessed hardly any economicgrowth. World Bank data show thatreal GDP per capita in the Arab countriesgrew by a mere 6.4 per cent over the entire24 year period from 1980 to 2004 (i.e. byless than 0.5 per cent annually).Oil-led growth has created weakstructural foundations in Arab economies.Many Arab countries are turning intoincreasingly import oriented and servicebasedeconomies. The types of servicesfound in most Arab countries fall at thelow end of the value adding chain, contributelittle to local knowledge developmentand lock countries into inferior positionsin global markets. This trend has grownat the expense of Arab agriculture, manufacturingand industrial production. Thestructural fragility of Arab economies asAlleviatingthe insecurityof vulnerablegroups startswith recognizingthe injusticesthey sufferThe fabled oilwealth of the Arabcountries presentsa misleadingpicture of theireconomic situationThe report in brief9

Overall, the Arabcountries were lessindustrialized in2007 than in 1970Arab countrieswill need about51 million newjobs by 2020a result of oil-led growth is reflected in aconspicuous decline in the share of non-oilproductive sectors (agriculture and manufacturing)to GDP in all Arab countriesexcept the high-income countries. Overall,the Arab countries were less industrializedin 2007 than in 1970, almost four decadespreviously.In the region’s most recent episode ofprosperity, fluctuation in growth rates hasabated somewhat across all country groups.While this development is comforting, itoffers no grounds for complacency, sincethe current plunge in oil prices is boundto undo growth prospects and once againcause volatility.Arab oil producing countries haveopted to put much of their latest windfallinto foreign investments, external reservesand oil stabilization funds, and to paydown debts. They have also embarked onmajor domestic investments in real estate,construction, oil refining, transport andcommunication and social services. Thisapproach clearly differs from patterns ofthe past, which emphasized imports andconsumption. Some Arab oil exportingcountries have also been in a position todirect large streams of revenue towardstheir military and security forces.However, their new patterns of investmentalso expose Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC) countries more widelythan in the past to global economicdownturns, the latest of which posessevere challenges to their capital-intensivegrowth model. New external shocks forthe Arab countries are associated with thecurrent global recession. All of the majoroil producers have substantial holdings inthe US and elsewhere abroad, and are notable to decouple their economies from thespreading international crisis. The knockoneffects on the rest of the Arab countriesof a protracted slow-down in investmentfinancing and remittances from GCCcountries would be considerable.In fact, other Arab countries may havegained less from the short-lived third boomthan they did from the first two. Althoughoil wealth still crosses borders, and whileseveral rich countries switched a numberof foreign investments to regional marketsin the aftermath of 9-11, intraregionalflows are becoming less copious and arehaving less impact than in the past. First,population increases in non-oil countriesoffset much of these flows. Second, workerremittances from the oil states have beenhit by the practice of ‘job nationalization’;and third, non-oil countries are incurringhigher energy costs through rising oilimport bills and expensive fuel subsidies.The spectre of unemploymentUnemployment is a major source of economicinsecurity in most Arab countries.Data from the Arab Labour Organization(ALO) show that in 2005 the overallaverage unemployment rate for the Arabcountries was about 14.4 per cent of thelabour force compared to 6.3 per centfor the world at large. The weightedaverage growth rate in unemployment inthe Arab countries (using the number ofunemployed in 2005) was about 1.8 percent annually. While national unemploymentrates vary considerably, ranging fromabout 2 per cent in Qatar and Kuwait toabout 22 per cent in Mauritania, youthunemployment is a serious challenge commonto many Arab countries.These trends in unemployment, coupledwith population growth rates, indicate thatArab countries will need about 51 millionnew jobs by 2020. Most of those jobs willbe essential to absorb young entrants to thelabour force who will otherwise face anempty future. ALO estimates for the year2005/6 show that youth unemploymentrates in the region vary from a high of about46 per cent in Algeria to a low of 6.3 percent in the United Arab Emirates. With theexception of the latter, high income Arabcountries suffer from double digit youthunemployment rates. Relatively high youthunemployment rates are also recorded forthe middle and low income Arab countries.Overall, the unemployment rate amongthe young in the Arab countries is nearlydouble that in the world at large.Unemployment also often wears afemale face. Unemployment rates for Arabwomen are higher than those for Arabmen, and among the highest in the world.This reflects more than the failure of Arabeconomies to generate sufficient jobs; itpoints as well to entrenched social biasesagainst women.Three primary factors account for theregion’s slumping employment trends: first,the contraction under structural reformsof the large public sector, which employsmore than a third of the workforce; second,10 Arab Human Development Report 2009

the limited size, hobbled performanceand weak job-generating capacity of theprivate sector, which has not taken up theslack; and third, the quality and type ofeducation generally provided, which doesnot stress technical or vocational skillsin demand.Arab policies will have to focus onrevamping education to close skills gaps,respond to labour market signals andstimulate knowledge-based capabilitiesmatching opportunities in the global, aswell as regional economy. National savingswill need to be converted efficientlyinto sizeable investments for expandinghealth, housing and labour markets inorder to cater for the needs of this youngworkforce and provide it with the facilitiesto increase productivity. A special effortis required to remove entrenched socialbarriers to women’s entrance to highproductivityjobs. In many of these policyshifts, private-public partnerships offerthe best option for mobilizing resources,transferring skills and creating new jobs.The backlog of povertyThe Report considers economic insecurityassociated with poverty from two perspectives:income poverty (defined in terms ofpeople’s enjoyment of goods and services,represented in real per capita consumptionexpenditure); and human poverty(defined by income as well as by othervalued dimensions of life, such as education,health, and political freedom). Itsanalysis of income poverty, in turn, takesinto account both the international povertyline at two-dollars-a-day and nationalpoverty lines.Arab countries are generally regarded ashaving a relatively low incidence of incomepoverty. In 2005, about 20.3 per cent ofthe Arab population was living below thetwo-dollars-a-day international povertyline. This estimate is based on seven Arabmiddle and low income groups, whosepopulation represents about 63 per cent ofthe total population of the Arab countriesnot in conflict. Using the international lineindicates that, in 2005, about 34.6 millionArabs were living in extreme poverty.However, the two-dollars-a-daythreshold may not be the most illuminatingmetric for looking at poverty inthe Arab countries. Applying the uppernational poverty line shows that the overallpoverty rate ranges from a low of 28.6 – 30per cent in Lebanon and Syria to a highof 59.5 per cent in Yemen, with that forEgypt being about 41 per cent. Extrapolatingfrom a sample of countries representing65 per cent of the region’s population, theReport projects that the overall headcountpoverty ratio at the upper poverty line is39.9% and that the estimated number ofArabs living in poverty could be as high as65 million.Extreme poverty is especially acutein the low-income Arab countries, wheresome 36.2 per cent of the population areliving in extreme poverty. Expectably,income poverty, and the insecurity associatedwith it, is more widespread amongrural populations.Another lens for the analysis ofimpoverishment is human poverty, whichrefers to the deprivation of capabilitiesand opportunities, and can be measuredthrough the Human Poverty Index (HPI),a composite index built on three components:a) longevity, b) knowledge and c)standard of living. Applying that index,low income Arab countries exhibit thehighest incidence of human poverty in theregion, with an average HPI of 35 per centcompared to a 12 per cent average in highincome countries. This metric shows thatinsecurity undercuts health, educationand standards of living, all of which putsin question the effectiveness of the state inproviding, and ensuring access to the basicnecessities of life. In particular, humanpoverty affects children’s attendance atelementary school and their levels of continuationat post-elementary stages. Lowschool completion rates perpetuate theinsecurity of the poor.Arab countries scoring an HPI of 30per cent or more include three low incomecountries and a lower middle incomecountry: Sudan (with an HPI of 34.3 percent), Yemen (36.6 per cent), Mauritania(35.9 per cent), and Morocco (31.8 percent). In almost all of these countries,significant insecurity (i.e. a value of morethan 30 per cent) is recorded for the educationcomponent, represented by the adultilliteracy rate. In addition, in Mauritania,Sudan and Yemen insecurity from lack ofaccess to safe water and child nutrition isalso significant.Despite moderate levels of incomeinequality, in most Arab countries socialThe Report projectsthat the estimatednumbers of Arabsliving in povertycould be as highas 65 millionExtreme poverty isespecially acutein the low-incomeArab countriesThe report in brief11

Inequality inwealth hasworsenedsignificantlymore than thedeteriorationin incomePatterns ofeconomicinsecurity are theresult of severalpolicy gapsexclusion has increased over the past twodecades. In addition, there is evidenceto suggest that the inequality in wealthhas worsened significantly more than thedeterioration in income. In many Arabcountries, for example, land and assetconcentration is conspicuous and provokesa sense of exclusion among othergroups, even if absolute poverty has notincreased.The patterns of economic insecurityillustrated in the Report are the result ofseveral policy gaps. First, the increasedstructural fragility of Arab economies isan evident consequence of continuing torely on volatile, oil-led growth. Economicgrowth itself has been, for the most part,erratic and low. Correspondingly, theperformance of productive sectors (andmanufacturing in particular) has beenweak and uncompetitive. Second, thisgrowth model has negatively impacted thelabour market, and Arab countries nowsuffer the highest unemployment rates inthe world. Third, overall poverty, definedas the share of the population under thenational upper poverty line, is significantlyhigher than the underestimate yielded byusing the international poverty line of twodollars a day. Hence, poverty in the Arabcountries is a more conspicuous phenomenonthan commonly assumed.5. Hunger, malnutrition andfood insecurityDespite its ample resources, and low incidenceof hunger relative to other regions, theArab countries are seeing hunger and malnutritionamong their people rise. Althoughprevalence rates and absolute numbers inindividual countries vary quite markedly,the region, as a whole, is falling behind inachieving the hunger-reduction target of theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs). Inaddition, the backlog from hunger and malnutritionin the past continues.According to Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO) figures, among developingcountry regions, the Arab countrieshave a low ratio of undernourished peopleto the total population. It is only surpassedin this regard by transition countries inEastern Europe and the former SovietUnion. Yet it is one of two world regions—theother being sub-Saharan Africa—where thenumber of undernourished has risen sincethe beginning of the 1990s—from about19.8 million in 1990-1992 to 25.5 millionin 2002-2004.Considerable disparities exist amongindividual Arab countries in their fightagainst hunger. The countries that havemade the greatest progress towards loweringthe prevalence of undernourishmentbetween 1990 and 2004 are Djibouti,Kuwait and Mauritania. Sudan has alsomade strides, but still experiences serioushunger prevalence. Saudi Arabia, Egypt,Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco and Yemen,on the other hand, recorded increases inboth the absolute numbers and prevalenceof undernourishment, while Syria andAlgeria achieved very small reductions inprevalence but none in numbers.The direct causes of hunger in theregion are related to insufficient dailynutritional intake, which is attributableto limited supplies of different foods andthe resulting imbalance in diets. Foodavailability, in turn, is connected withthe forces of supply—which is contingentupon such factors as agricultural production,access to global markets, the growthof food industries, and the size of foreignaid—and demand, which is connected, inparticular, to per capita income levels. Interms of local food production, some Arabcountries have the lowest cereal yields inthe world and, moreover, between 1990 and2005, production in 7 countries declined.The Report illustrates that Arab countriesare altogether more self-sufficient in foodcommodities that are favoured by the rich(meats, fish and vegetables) than in thoselikely to be consumed by the poor (cereals,fats and sugar).In a seeming paradox, while malnutritionis on the rise in both absolute andrelative terms in some Arab countries,obesity is also an increasing health riskin the region. In fact, the two are linkedby their common origins in poor diet.Obesity and overweight are more commonamong women than men in Arabcountries, contrary to the situation in theUS, for example, where these problemsare more prevalent among men. In theregion, obesity is generally attributed toover-consumption of high-fat foods combinedwith little physical activity, whichmay partly explain its prevalence amongArab women, who are often prevented by12 Arab Human Development Report 2009

custom from pursuing sports and otherphysical exercise. Obesity contributes tosuch non-contagious chronic illnesses asdiabetes, high blood pressure, coronaryarterial diseases, degenerative joint diseases,psychological illnesses, and sometypes of cancer. Such ailments are steadilyincreasing in Arab countries.The main indirect causes of hunger inthe region are poverty, foreign occupationand domestic conflict and economicpolicies for dealing with globalization. TheReport shows that, while poverty and malnutritionoften co-exist in Arab countries,poverty is not necessarily associated withundernourishment when the consumptionpattern of the poor tends towardsinexpensive but nutrient-rich foods, andwhen such foods are readily accessibleunder targeted government programmes.Conversely, when conditions of conflictdisrupt food supplies, as in Iraq, theOccupied Palestinian Territory, Somaliaand Sudan, a high degree of malnutritionand food insecurity follows.Food accessibility is strongly influencedby government economic policies andopenness to world markets. Subsidisingfood commodities to make them moreaffordable to the public is one such policy;lifting subsidies is another. Most Arabgovernments have adopted food supplypolicies as part of a social contract basedon state provision of essential needs inexchange for the people’s loyalty. But sincethe 1980s, economic and market deregulationpolicies adopted by governments haverendered domestic food prices vulnerableto fluctuations in international prices.Arab countries as much as any others,have recently suffered from spirallingfood prices traceable to various causes.Among these are the climate changes thathave affected production in grain exportingcountries, the extensive depletion ofgrain stocks, and the rising consumptionof meat and dairy products in emergingeconomies, especially in China. Anothermajor cause is the growing demand in theUS and Europe for biofuels derived fromgrain, in response to the rising costs of oiland transportation. The Report contrastshow Arab economic policies have fared incoping with these pressures with the relativesuccesses of countries such as Braziland Mexico, which have simultaneouslyfollowed liberal economic policies andensured a minimum level of food for thepoor.The Report discusses the feasibility ofachieving food sovereignty and food securityin Arab countries. It concludes thatfood security needs to be pursued, notin terms of absolute sovereignty in foodproduction, a goal impractical in lightof regional water scarcities, but rather interms of sufficiency for all members ofsociety in essential commodities. In thiscontext, the region’s low self sufficiencyrate in staple foods is one of its most seriousdevelopment gaps.6. Health security challengesHealth is both a vital goal of humansecurity that is influenced by non-healthfactors, and an instrumental capabilitythat significantly impacts other aspects ofhuman security. In the last 40 years, Arabcountries have made striking progress inforestalling death and extending life, asevidenced by falling infant mortality ratesand rising life expectancy. Yet health is byno means assured for all citizens of Arabcountries, with women suffering the mostfrom neglect and gender biased traditions.Health systems are often shackledby bureaucratic inefficiency, poor professionalcapabilities and underfunding; andhealth risks from new infectious diseasesare on the rise.General statusDespite improvements in health across theregion,• The health status of Arabs, in general,is lower than that enjoyed by citizensof industrialized countries.• While life expectancy increased andchild mortality declined between2000 and 2005, other health indicatorsstagnated.• Disparities are apparent betweencountries and within countries• Health data are insufficient, incompleteand often unreliable, making itdifficult to frame effective health policiesor reach those in need• Harmful health practices, deeplyrooted in culture, continue to lowerhealth levels, especially among womenThe region’s lowself sufficiencyrate in staplefoods is one ofits most seriousdevelopment gapsHealth is by nomeans assuredfor all citizens ofArab countriesThe report in brief13

HIV/AIDSrepresentsa stubborn,proximate andmisunderstooddangerMany of thethreats to humansecurity coalescein situations ofoccupation, conflictand militaryinterventionLimits of health systemsHealth care systems in the region are letdown by:• A narrow biomedical model based onhospital and curative care, and focusedon the treatment of diseases• The absence of inter-sectoral linkagesthat would help to bring vital indirecthealth determinants into the equation.Arab health systems do not recognizethe role of such factors as the qualityand coverage of education, women’sempowerment, and social and economicjustice. Neither do they evincethe mindset required to address keyfactors such as gender, social class,identity and ethnicity, all of whichhave obvious effects on health andhuman security• Disparities in health care provision andfinancing• Profitable high technology hospitalsthat provide expensive state-of-the-arttreatment for only a small minority ofwealthy citizens• Over-stretched public health services,frequently low in qualityHealth financingHealth system financing is challenged by:• The rising costs of health care• Inadequate government expenditureon health in low and middle incomecountries• Inefficient systems in the high incomecountries where ample funding doesnot translate into health gains• Increasing out-of pocket expenditureson health that burden individuals andfamilies• A general lack of social health insuranceand employer-provided benefitsEmerging health threatsHIV/AIDS represents a stubborn, proximateand misunderstood danger in theregion. In 2007, more than 31,600 adultsand children died from AIDS in the Arabcountries (80 per cent of which are inSudan). Between 2001 and 2007, therewere 90,500 estimated new cases of HIVinfections in the Arab countries, 50,000of which in Sudan alone.According to WHO and UNAIDSestimates, the number of those livingwith HIV in Arab countries was 435,000in 2007, 73.5 per cent of which were inSudan. A significant observation aboutSudan concerns the relatively high percentageof HIV-positive women. Compared toa world average of 48 per cent in 2007,53 per cent of adults living with HIV inSudan were women. This percentagestood at 30.4 in the other Arab countries,for the same year, which is comparableto the situation in Western Europe. It isestimated that about 80 per cent of femaleinfections in the region occur within thebonds of marriage where the subservientposition and weak negotiating capacity ofmany women leave them exposed to theirhusbands’ high risk behaviours.The destructive power of the disease liesnot solely in the power of the virus whichcauses it, but also in the social stigma thatcomes with it. Those living with the virusare often deprived of their livelihoods and,with their families, denied access to socialopportunities in a climate of shame.While malaria has been almost eliminatedin the majority of Arab countries, itremains highly endemic in the Arab LDCswhere on average 3,313 cases per 100,000were reported in 2005. Djibouti, Somalia,Sudan and Yemen accounted for 98 percent of notified cases in the region; Sudanalone bore about 76 per cent of the regionalburden. Achievement of the MDG targetof halting and beginning to reverse malariain the sub-region, and in the region as awhole, is therefore heavily dependent onprogress in Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.7. Occupation and militaryinterventionMany of the threats to human security discussedin the Report coalesce in situationsof occupation, conflict and military intervention.In Iraq, the Occupied PalestinianTerritory and Somalia, people’s basicrights to self-determination and peacehave been forcibly annulled. They facethreats to their lives, freedom, livelihoods,education, nutrition, health and physicalenvironment from outside forces whosepresence wreaks institutional, structuraland material violence on them every day.The Report assesses in detail the damageto human security that ensues fromsuch travesties of human rights, focusingon the impacts of the US intervention inIraq, Israel’s continuing hold on Occupied14 Arab Human Development Report 2009

Palestinian Territory, including its recentcampaign against Gaza, and on the specialcircumstances of the beleaguered peopleof Somalia.Military intervention and occupationnot only contravene international law andabrogate the rights of peoples in the affectedcountries. They spark both resistance anda cycle of violence and counter-violencethat engulfs occupied and occupier alike.Occupation and military interventionundercut human security in other Araband neighbouring countries in severalways. First, they displace peoples acrossborders, creating humanitarian challengesfor affected states and seeding tensions inthem. Second, as a cause célèbre of extremistgroups that resort to violence, theystrengthen the militant appeal of thosewho perpetuate the cycle of destruction inthe region and whose acts provoke a backlashagainst citizens’ rights and freedoms.Finally, as a threat to sovereignty, occupationand military intervention allow Arabgovernments to cite national security as apretext for halting or postponing democratizationand for prolonging oppressive rule.Occupation and military intervention arethus responsible for creating conditions ofsystemic insecurity in the region.The Report observes that the fact thatoccupation and intervention have plaguedthe region so long indicates its vulnerabilityto the policies of external parties.Prospects for settling major conflicts inthe affected countries are very largelygoverned by the will of non-Arab parties.This throws into strong relief the responsibilityof the UN as the sole impartialguarantor of human and national securityin occupied countries, a role howeverwhich the world body has been kept fromplaying effectively by the powers that havemarginalized it.Seven building blocksof Arab human securityThe Report’s analysis illustrates that theconcept of human security provides aframework for re-centring the Arab socialcontract on those vital yet neglected prioritiesthat most affect the wellbeing ofcitizens of Arab countries. While the stateof human security is not uniform throughoutthe Arab countries, no country canclaim to be free from fear or free fromwant, and many are affected by spilloversfrom insecurity in neighbouring countries.The Report’s individual chapters outlinevarious policy orientations that the state,civil society, individual citizens and internationalactors could adopt within theirrespective spheres of action, suggestingspecific steps that can be taken to reducethreats across all dimensions of the concept.In doing so, the Report underlinesthe central importance of:1. The preservation and enhancement ofthe land, water, air and ecology thatsustain the Arab peoples’ very existenceunder rising national, regionaland global environmental, populationand demographic pressures;2. The guarantees of essential rights,freedoms and opportunities withoutdiscrimination, that only a well governed,accountable and responsive stateruled by just laws can provide; and thediffusion of identity conflicts rooted incompetition for power and wealth thatbecomes possible when such a statewins the trust of all citizens;3. The recognition by the state and societyof the abuse and injustice that vulnerablewomen, children and refugeesacross the region encounter each day,and the resolve to change their legal,economic, social and personal conditionsfor the better;4. The will to address the weak structuralunderpinnings of the Arab oileconomy, reduce income poverty andmove towards knowledge-based, equitableand diversified economies thatwill create the jobs and protect thelivelihoods on which coming generationswill depend in the post-oil era;5. Ending persisting hunger and malnutritionin all sub-regions, but especiallythe poorest, which continue to erodehuman capabilities, cut short millionsof lives and set back human development.The economics of food securityin the global economy may call for anew realism in defining food securityless in terms of absolute food sovereigntyand more in terms of sufficiencyOccupationand militaryintervention sparka cycle of violenceand counterviolencethatengulfs occupiedand occupier alikeThe concept ofhuman securityprovides aframework for recentringthe Arabsocial contract onvital yet neglectedprioritiesThe report in brief15

Occupationand militaryinterventionundermine thefragile progressof political reformin the regionfor all members of society in essentialcommodities.6. The promotion of health for all as ahuman right, a prerequisite for humansecurity and an instrumental enableracross the gamut of human functioning.The significant progress that Arabcountries have made in this field isbeing undercut by policy and institutionalfailures that produce disparitiesin access, affordability and quality, andby the growing health threats fromserious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosisand HIV/AIDS.7. Policy recognition abroad that longstandinghuman rights violations againstthe Arab peoples and the continuingviolation of Arab sovereignty and livesby regional and global powers throughoccupation and military interventionare self-defeating and unacceptable tothe international and regional public.Such violations have inflicted enormousdamage through the disproportionateuse of force and a total disregard forcivilian lives, as highlighted in Israel’srecent campaign on Gaza. These violationshave caused untold human sufferingand chaos, stained the image of thepowers implicated in them and underminedthe fragile progress of politicalreform in the region by bolsteringextremist forces and driving moderatevoices out of the public arena.Endnotes1UNDP 1994.2UNDP 2002.3UNDP/AHDR calculations based on FAO’s AQUASTAT database.4UNDP 2007.16 Arab Human Development Report 2009