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Arab Knowledge Report 2009: Towards Productive

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United Nations Development Programme<strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong><strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong><strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong> Intercommunication for <strong>Knowledge</strong>


<strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong><strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong><strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong> Intercommunication for <strong>Knowledge</strong>


This <strong>Report</strong> has been produced through joint sponsorship and support of theMohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation (MBRF) and the United NationsDevelopment Programme/ Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States (UNDP/RBAS)Cover is printed on 350 GSM paper that is chlorine–freeand meets the Sustainable Forest Initiative guidelines.Text pages are printed on 100 GSM uncoated white opaque,wood free paper. Both cover and text papers are printed with vegetable- based inksand produced by means of environmentally–compatible technology.Cover Design: Pro Creative Concepts Advertising Agency, Cairo, EgyptLayout and Production: Al Ghurair Printing & Publishing House L.L.CPrinted at: Al Ghurair Printing & Publishing House L.L.C, Dubai, UAEPrinted in Dubai - United <strong>Arab</strong> EmiratesThe analysis and policy recommendations of this <strong>Report</strong> do not necessarily reflect theviews of the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation or the United NationsDevelopment Pogramme, its Executive Board Members or UN Member States. The <strong>Report</strong>is the work of an independent team of authors jointly sponsored by Mohammed binRashid Al Maktoum Foundation and the Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States, UNDP.This work was originally published in <strong>Arab</strong>ic. In case of discrepancy, the original language shall take precedence.


Foreword by the Chairman of the Board,Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundationIt gives me great pleasure to announce to youtoday the release of The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong><strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong>—<strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong>Intercommunication for <strong>Knowledge</strong>, a fruitof the shared efforts of the Mohammedbin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundationand the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme that lays the foundation of astrategic partnership that we hope will beboth long lasting and of ongoing benefitfor our <strong>Arab</strong> societies and their upcominggenerations.Given that analysis of the state ofknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> homeland requirestireless effort and rigorous follow-up,this report can form no more than afirst link in a continuing series of <strong>Arab</strong><strong>Knowledge</strong> reports that will embody, frommore than one perspective, the essentialprinciples outlined by His Highness SheikhMohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President, Prime Minister of the UAE andRuler of Dubai, in his book My Vision,principles to which His Highness gavevoice when he wrote, “I do wish for all my<strong>Arab</strong> brothers and sisters what I wish formy people of the UAE. I just want themto reach the same advanced levels achievedby developed countries. Moreover, I wouldlike them to take control over their issuesand proceed with accomplishing theirgoals, ambitions and aspirations”The issuing of the <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>reports falls within the framework ofthe more prominent initiative of theMohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation—the largest developmentinitiative of its kind in the region—which aims to establish and develop acomprehensive knowledge base throughthe creation of a generation of futurepublic and private sector leaders capableof seizing knowledge by the forelockand setting it to work on confronting thedevelopment challenges of their societies,while at the same time raising the standardof scholarly research and development,stimulating leadership in business, fosteringinnovation and creativity among youth,revitalizing the concept of productiveculture, and strengthening ways of bringingdifferent cultures closer together.The <strong>Report</strong> now before us focuseson the organic relationship within theknowledge-society-development triad thatis linked to modernisation, productiveopenness to both the inside and theoutside, and all that contributes towardsthe strengthening of <strong>Arab</strong> human dignity.It views the current knowledge revolutionas a point of entry capable of makingdevelopment in the <strong>Arab</strong> homeland a reality.In the view of this report, knowledge, inboth its enlightenment and developmentaldimensions, is renaissance itself. It is alsoa road that requires a further sharpeningof the tools of creative human intelligencein order to establish and reinforce thefoundations of the knowledge economy inour region for the sake of the wellbeingand self-esteem of the <strong>Arab</strong> citizen.The induction of knowledge conceptsconstitutes the cornerstone of anyeffective process of human developmentand as such makes a critical contributionto the escape from the vicious circles ofpoverty, unemployment, ignorance, andfear. It follows that the right to acquire,indigenise, and develop knowledge isbeyond dispute.I


This year’s report may perhapsbest be described as a thoroughgoingmethodological and scholarly effort tostudy <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge in great detail,up to the point of its deployment inthe service of the <strong>Arab</strong> individual. Theaim is to furnish the <strong>Arab</strong> decision-maker,specialist, and citizen with a reference studythat includes reliable indicators by whichto measure the condition of knowledge inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries and thus assist with thedevelopment of plans and the assessmentof performance and to kindle the spirit ofcompetitiveness in a field in which this isof the essence.The <strong>Report</strong> departs from the norm informulating a daring proposed vision andwork plan for the establishment of theknowledge society that embrace primaryelements and required mechanisms likelyto be of use in filling in the numerous gapsthat dot the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge landscapeand in leading us through the portals ofknowledge so that we may engage withits society and participate in its processesof production. The <strong>Report</strong> also opens forgeneral discussion, critique, and review aproposed vision of work and action alongthree axes—the provision of enablingenvironments; the transfer, indigenisationand implantation of knowledge and thenits deployment in the service of <strong>Arab</strong>human development.The series of <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> reportsconstitutes a cultural podium prepared byan elite of <strong>Arab</strong> specialists and intellectualswhose objective will be to ponder thestate of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge and suggestthe methods most likely to succeed inestablishing the desired knowledge society.We may not all agree on what is to befound in this report. The goal, however,is to instigate constructive discussion thatwill lead to adoption and application ofpolicies and programmes that will translateits insights from the realm of reporting tothat of effective actions on behalf of <strong>Arab</strong>societies capable of bringing about theirwellbeing and self-esteem.This work of ours will neither becompleted nor born fruit without thecooperation of all—governments, civilsociety, and specialists from differentparts of the <strong>Arab</strong> homeland. From thisperspective, I sincerely call on all involved,and indeed on all concerned parties, toperuse these reports and subject them todiscussion, critique, and fruitful debate,with the express goal of creating themeans of putting into practice, whetherat an <strong>Arab</strong> regional or an individualcountry level, the ideas resulting from thisinteractive process.It also gives me great pleasure, inthis context, to express my thanks andappreciation to the United NationsDevelopment Programme’s RegionalBureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States and in particularthe report team in Dubai, as well as toall those—thinkers, writers, editors, andtechnical personnel—who participatedin bringing this report into being. I lookforward to further fruitful collaborationto reinforce the foundations of theintellectual edifice of knowledge in thisregion and secure the mainstays of thehuman development to which the <strong>Arab</strong>world aspires.Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumChairman of the BoardMohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum FoundationII


Foreword by the Regional Director,UNDP Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> StatesWith the publication of this first report onknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, the UnitedNations Development Programme/Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States and theMohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation inaugurate what may beconsidered one of the most ambitious andcompetent projects to build and reinforcethe knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionand to implant there its epistemological,intellectual, and cultural principles, in alltheir dimensions. This report represents afirst step in a strategic partnership, of whichwe are proud, between our developmentprogramme and that pioneeringenlightenment foundation establishedat the initiative of His Highness SheikhMohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, VicePresident, Prime Minister of the United<strong>Arab</strong> Emirates and Ruler of Dubai, andfor which generous resources have beenallocated.While this report extends and goesdeeper into the issues presented by the<strong>Arab</strong> Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2003,which addressed the subject of knowledgeas one of the most important of thethree challenges facing the <strong>Arab</strong> region inaddition to protection of freedoms andwomen empowerment; the co-publicationof this series of reports on <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgedemonstrates the harmoniousness andaccord of the efforts of the UnitedNations Development Programme andthe Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation, their shared dedication to asingle goal, and the exalted nature of theirmission and objective. All of these forma part of the range of regional and globaleffort in this field.The diagnostic analysis contained inthis first report on <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge showsthat some progress has been made in theoutward forms of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong>world. It has also made plain, however,the existence of numerous gaps that mustbe addressed, seriously and resolutely,if we wish to establish a society capableof producing knowledge. We endorse the<strong>Report</strong>’s assumption that the ground lostby the <strong>Arab</strong>s in the knowledge field can bemade up, provided, first, that the aspirationto do so is there, along with the politicalwill, supported by the allocation of theresources needed to build the enablingenvironments and the institutions capableof nurturing progress in knowledge andthe conversion of the gains achieved intomeans to realise comprehensive humandevelopment.The <strong>Report</strong> presents a number ofimportant analyses of the conditions ofknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region. We agreethat these must be dealt with urgently. Itexpatiates on monitoring the situation ofthe most important pillars of the hopedforknowledge society and dedicated specialattention to knowledge capital, makingclear in so doing the large discrepancy incapital acquired through education, notonly among the <strong>Arab</strong> countries themselvesbut within each individual <strong>Arab</strong> stateand between males and females, as wellas between young people and adults.On the question of Information andCommunications Technology (ICT),which constitutes a central pillar for theknowledge society, a set of proposals andinitiatives have been formulated that willhelp to improve the current situation ofIII


ICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and reinforceits importance in the health, economic,social, and fields of knowledge ingeneral. The report also emphasises thata revitalisation of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language isrequired to make it capable of mastering<strong>Arab</strong>ic epistemological and digital content.The writers of the <strong>Report</strong> focus on thefact that the tasks designed to provide theoptimal investment of ICT in the buildingof the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge society lie beyondthe means of individual <strong>Arab</strong> states andmake plain the necessity of mastering anddeploying modern technology throughcooperation both within <strong>Arab</strong> countries andwith their regional and global partners.The <strong>Report</strong> also touches on the subjectof the innovation that, in reinforcingall that helps humankind transcendobstacles and constraints, enriches boththe emotions and the mind. It is madeclear that the concept of innovationsanctioned in the <strong>Report</strong> goes beyond thesignifications of the term “inventiveness,”which is linked fundamentally to the purelytechnical field and its tools, to embrace the<strong>Arab</strong> particularities of innovation in thearts, literature, and the human and socialsciences. The <strong>Report</strong> presents a set ofproposals on how to instigate innovationand tie it in to the various fields ofproduction.The select group of thinkers andscholars from all parts of the <strong>Arab</strong> regionwho have participated in the writing ofthis report justly acknowledge that theirvarious proposals, which encapsulate avision for the building of the knowledgesociety in the <strong>Arab</strong> homeland, favourthe spirit and the options of humandevelopment. Special weight is given inthe <strong>Report</strong> to defence of the principleof intercommunication both inside andoutside the region, through partnershipand through productive and creativeintegration. This vision therefore suggestsan achievable plan that includes markersalong the route to an intercommunicationthat will lead to integration into spaces ofknowledge that fly the flag of humanityand human intelligence, for the sake ofpartnership and creativity in the <strong>Arab</strong>societies.The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong>–<strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong> Intercommunicationfor <strong>Knowledge</strong> has laid the foundationfor a practical treatment of this issuebased on properly documented facts anda realistic view of the building of theknowledge society. We look forward tofuture reports that treat, through researchand more profound study, the chiefelements along the path to the building ofthe hoped-for knowledge society; from thefirm grounding of enabling environmentsand the transfer and indigenisation ofknowledge to its optimal deployment inthe service of human development.Space will allow me here to do no morethan express my thanks and appreciationto all those who shared in the realisation ofthis report, including the writers, advisers,coordinators, and editing teams, as wellas the work teams at both the UnitedNations Development Programme andthe Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation. It also gives me specialpleasure to express my gratitude to HisHighness Sheikh Mohammed bin RashidAl Maktoum for his help and support forthis series of reports on knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> region, and to declare my hope that thecollaboration between us in all matters thatenrich and deepen the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge andcultural base and strengthen the outlookfor sustainable human development in the<strong>Arab</strong> homeland and the world as a wholewill continue.Amat Al Alim AlsoswaAssistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator,Regional Director, Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States,United Nations Development ProgrammeIV


<strong>Report</strong> Team(Alphabetically)Advisory BoardAbdul Monem Saeed, Abdul Rahman al- Rashed,Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Ahmad Legrouri, AntoineZahlan, Anwar Gargash, Atif Kubursi, Aziz al-Azmeh, Baqer al-Najjar, Clovis Maksoud, FahmyHowidy, Farida Allagi, Ziad Fariz, Hani Fahs,Hassan Risheh, Hazem el-Beblawi, Hisham Alibin Ali, Inaam Bayyoud, Issam Rawwas, Maithaal-Shamsi, Malak Zaalouk, Modhi al-Homoud,Mohamed el-Amin el-Tom, Nabeel I. Kassis, Nailaal-Sellini, Nemir Kirdar, Rafia Ghabash, SheikhaAbdulla Al-Misnad, Taher Kanaan, Tarik Yousef.Core TeamKamal Abdul Latif, Mouin Hamza,Nagla Rizk, Omar Bizri, Ramzi Salama.<strong>Report</strong> Director/CoordinatorGhaith Fariz (UNDP).Authors of Background PapersAbd al-Ilah al-Diwahji, Abd al-Razzaq al-Dawway,Abd al-Salam bin abd al-Ali, Ahmad Abd al-Latif,Al-<strong>Arab</strong>i al-Wafi, Al-Tahir Labib, Amr al-Armanazi,Antoine Zahlan, Asif Diyab, Atif Kubursi, Azizal-Azmeh, Dina Waked, Fahmy Howidi, FathiMustafa al-Zayyat, George Tarabishi, Hani Fahs,Hasan al-Sharif, Idris Binsaid, Ilham Kallab, TheLebanese Association for Educational Studies,Muhammad al-Said, Muhammad Arif, MuhammadImara, Mohammed Bakir, Mahmud Abd al-Fadil,Nabil Ali, Nadir Firjani, Naila al-Sellini, NaomiSakr, Nawwar Al Awwa, Nur al-Din Afaya, RafiaGhubash, Ruqayya al-Musaddeq, Sari Hanafi,Said Ismail Ali, Said Yaqtin, Zalfa al-Ayoubi.Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation (MBRF)Adel Rashid Al Shared (Vice Chairman andManaging Director), Sultan Lootah (VicePresident-Employment & Entrepreneurship),Alia Al Muttawa, Janine el-Tal, Marwan Al Kaabi,Muath Al Wari, Walid Aradi, Wesley Schwalje.TranslationHumphrey Davies, Iman Seoudi, JenniferPeterson, Lisa White, Peter Daniel, RaphaelCohen, Susan Smith Abou-Sheikha.Editors<strong>Arab</strong>ic: Fayiz SuyyaghEnglish: Humphrey DaviesStatistics ExpertMohammed H. BakirCover designPro Creative Concepts, Cairo, Egypt.Research Assistants for the Core TeamDalia Adel Zaki, Dana Abu Shakra, Rula Atweh.United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP)Amat Al Alim Alsoswa (Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator, RegionalDirector, RBAS), Adel Abdellatif (Chief, RegionalProgrammes Division, RBAS), Ghaith Fariz (<strong>Report</strong>Director/Coordinator), Ahmad Mansur, CarolineRosberg, Dima Al-Khatib, Deena Abul Fottouh,Madi Musa, Manal Habash, Mary Jreidini, MelissaEsteva, Mohamed Showman, Theodor Murphy.V


CONTENTSPREAMBLEIntroductionPreliminaries to the <strong>Report</strong>The dialectics of the <strong>Report</strong>The topics of the <strong>Report</strong>The Theoretical Framework: concepts and problematics of the knowledge society (Chapter 1)<strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> Performance Environments: expanding freedoms and building institutions (Chapter 2)Education and the formation of knowledge capital (Chapter 3)Information and Communications Technologies in the <strong>Arab</strong> Countries: the pillars and tools ofknowledge (Chapter 4)<strong>Arab</strong> research and innovation performance (Chapter 5)Building the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society in the <strong>Arab</strong> Nation: a vision and a plan (Chapter 6)The <strong>Arab</strong> nation and the world in <strong>2009</strong>The state of human development in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionConcepts and indicators of <strong>Arab</strong> human developmentThe most important evolutions in <strong>Arab</strong> human developmentGovernance and the weakness of institutional performanceVariables exerting pressure on the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge sceneWar, occupation, internal conflict, and the disruption of knowledgeExtremism and its effect on the knowledge societyThe stagnation of political reform and its effect on the enabling environment for knowledgeThe world financial crisis: opportunities and challenges for the establishment of theknowledge societyOverview of the current knowledge situation in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionCHAPTER 1THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICSOF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYIntroductionPremises and principles: The knowledge-development-freedom triadThe conceptual building blocksFrom knowledge to knowledge societyThe development of the concept of knowledge in <strong>Arab</strong> cultureThe interaction and intersection of conceptsPoles of the knowledge society: the society-economy-technology triadThe networked society: the most conspicuous feature of the knowledge societyThe knowledge society: towards expanding choices for renaissance and developmentThe basic frame of reference for the knowledge societyThe positivist trend: the quantitative orientationThe political modernisation mindset: evoking human rightsProblematic issues of the knowledge societyThe knowledge society and expanding political participationThe knowledge society and identityThe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language and the challenges of information technologyThe knowledge society and <strong>Arab</strong> womenInformation technologies and virtual spaces1122344566799991313131617182027272728282830313435363839414244464850VI


The knowledge society and the legitimacy of a new ethical codeConclusionCHAPTER 2ARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS:EXPANDING FREEDOMS AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONSIntroductionThe state of knowledge environments in the <strong>Arab</strong> world: constraints and pressuresPolitical environments: the paradox of political reform discourse and the decline in freedomsExpanding political participation: the path to knowledge and creativityContinued curbing of public freedomsFreedom of opinion and expression: additional restrictions<strong>Arab</strong> Media and government hegemonyEconomic environments: towards responsible freedom and a balanced economyMeasuring economic freedomsToward expanding economic freedomsThe oil boom did not foster economic freedom as hopedMedia, cultural, and social environmentsPoverty and social marginalisationTrends towards religious radicalism and intoleranceFreedom of intellectual propertyGlobal debate, <strong>Arab</strong> absenceRegulating intellectual property in the <strong>Arab</strong> world: disparity and occasional exaggerationChallenges and opportunities for access to knowledgeOpportunities for creative <strong>Arab</strong> cooperationSummary: Freedoms: A comprehensive cluster or disparate elements?From nurturing environments to supporting institutionsPioneering institutions and shining examplesLegislation as the way to support institutionalismOn the need for an alternative index: a project in critique and transcendencePeering into the future: Trajectories of the enabling environmentCHAPTER 3EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITALIntroductionThe general state of knowledge as provided through education in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesThe need to draw an accurate picture of knowledge capitalMeasuring a society’s knowledge capital<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital formation by childrenQuantitative indicatorsQualitative indicatorsTime allocated to school subjects in basic educationQuality of knowledge acquired through basic education<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital formation by youthQuantitative dimensionsQualitative IndicatorsGeneral secondary education and the formation of knowledge capital by youthTechnical secondary education and the formation of knowledge capital by youthThe role of higher education in the formation of knowledge capital525459596061616464656768687075757677787981818283848789909797989999101101104104105107107110111111112VII


Quantitative indicatorsTertiary education and the formation of the specialised knowledge capital needed to meetdevelopment needsDistribution of undergraduate and graduate students by disciplineQualifications of graduates<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital acquired by adults through education<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital required for participation in the knowledge societyQuantitative dimensionsQualitative dimensionsInvesting in the formation of human knowledge capital through educationSpending on educationNational income and the formation of quantitative knowledge capitalNational income and qualitative capital formationEducational reform effortsConclusionCHAPTER 4INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES:THE PILLARS AND TOOLS OF KNOWLEDGEIntroductionICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesThe spread of computers and the internetThe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language and the internetAnticipated advances in ICTTechnology applications and <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital contentRegulatory frameworksThe ICT sector in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesHardware production or assemblyThe software industryICT applications and building the knowledge societyE-government servicesICT and educationE-commerceTechnology applications for healthcareTechnology and social development<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content production<strong>Arab</strong>ic language internet content and problematicsTechnological advance and future initiativesConclusionCHAPTER 5ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATIONIntroductionInnovation and the knowledge economyThe correlation between Gross Domestic Product and innovation in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionDemographics and the challenge of inclusion of youthScience and technology policies<strong>Arab</strong> initiatives and strategiesThe production and dissemination of scientific knowledge112114114116118121121123123124124126126131143143144144149151153153154154155156156159162163163165167171173181181181183183184185185VIII


Partnership with the private sectorThe reality of <strong>Arab</strong> research centresThe capacity of research centres for innovationThe performance of <strong>Arab</strong> researchersScience research funding in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldThe outputs of <strong>Arab</strong> scientific researchGlobal engagementSocial science policies and artistic innovationSocial science researchThe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language and innovationLiterary and artistic innovationThe innovation gap and its indicators in the current state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeThe innovation gapFlight of human capitalThe social and economic impact of innovationThe dissemination of knowledge and innovationBoosting <strong>Arab</strong> research and innovation performanceCHAPTER 6BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLANIntroductionThe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge gap: deficits and holesThe knowledge gap can be overcomeA proposed vision for building the knowledge societyPrinciples and foundations for movement towards the construction of the knowledge societyin the <strong>Arab</strong> worldBroadening the scope of freedomPositive interaction with the growing needs of societyOpenness and intercommunicationProposed axes of action for the creation of the knowledge societyThe first axis: the creation of enabling environmentsThe second axis: the transfer and indigenisation of knowledgeThe third axis: deployment of knowledgeAxes and bases: intersection and interactionAspects of action towards building the components of the knowledge societyAction in the area of the enabling environmentAction in the field of transfer and indigenisation of the knowledge societyAction to deploy knowledge<strong>Towards</strong> a new mechanism to measure <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeThe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge indexConclusionREFERENCESANNEX 1. LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS (AUTHOR NAME; PAPER TITLE)ANNEX 2. PROJECT FOR A DATABASE ON KNOWLEDGE IN THE ARAB REGIONANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY(BASED ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE WORLD BANK)186186189190192196199201202203204206206207209211212219219219223225225225226227227228228229229230230232235237237238241251253257IX


LIST OF BOXESBox 1 The Effect of the Financial Crisis on Development FundingBox 1-1 The Concept of <strong>Knowledge</strong>Box 1-2 “<strong>Knowledge</strong>” in al-Tahanawi’s “The Terminology of the Arts”Box 1-3 A Linguistic Perspective on “<strong>Knowledge</strong>”Box 1-4 The Power of <strong>Knowledge</strong>Box 1-5 Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new millenniumBox 1-6 <strong>Knowledge</strong> in an Age of GlobalisationBox 1-7 Cultural and Linguistic Diversity and Local Cultural IdentitiesBox 1-8 Women’s Freedom is a Key to Many DoorsBox 1-9 The Virtual as Interrogation of the ActualBox 1-10 The Genome, a New Triumph for <strong>Knowledge</strong>Box 2-1 The Contradictory Nature of Economic Freedom IndicatorsBox 2-2 <strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong> Intercommunication for <strong>Knowledge</strong>: Translation in the Age of al-Ma’munBox 2-3 The Legal Framework for the European UnionBox 3-1 The Aims of Education for AllBox 3-2 Oman’s New Plan for EducationBox 3-3 The Growing Numbers of Universities in the <strong>Arab</strong> RegionBox 3-4 The knowledge students should acquire: the contemporary French approachBox 3-5 Expansion in General and Technical Secondary Education in Bahrain andits Impact on Female EnrolmentBox 3-6 More PhDs Needed as University TeachersBox 3-7 The Educational Level of Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iansBox 3-8 The Contribution of Non-Public Schools to Education in the <strong>Arab</strong> RegionBox 3-9 Human Capital Formation to Meet the Needs of Instruction and PedagogyBox 3-10 The Lebanese Association for Educational Studies: a model for national and pan-<strong>Arab</strong>networking for the development of educational knowledgeBox 4-1 Open Source Software and Educational ContentBox 4-2 Evaluating the Performance of Projects to Network Educational InstitutionsBox 4-3 ICT and Local Development: Examples from <strong>Arab</strong> countriesBox 4-4 ICT Incubators and <strong>Arab</strong>ic Digital ContentBox 4-5 <strong>Arab</strong>ic Language Processing Systems: machine translation, grammar checking, and searchingBox 4-6 Digital Content in Entertainment and the MediaBox 4-7 Preserving Tradition through DigitalisationBox 5-1 Official <strong>Arab</strong> Initiatives for Invigorating Research and DevelopmentBox 5-2 A Policy for Science, Technology, and Innovation in LebanonBox 5-3 Expenditure on Research and DevelopmentBox 5-4 Pioneering <strong>Arab</strong> Innovators in Genetic ScienceBox 5-5 The Ten Commandments for Researchers in Low-income StatesBox 5-6 Jordan’s “A Professor in Every Factory”Box 5-7 The European Growth StrategyBox 5-8 ICARDABox 5-9 <strong>Arab</strong> Innovators in Architecture and MusicBox 5-10 <strong>Knowledge</strong> Transfer via Migrant ScientistsBox 5-11 Corporate Funding of Research and DevelopmentBox 6-1 Rationalist Critique and Historical VisionBox 6-2 The Legitimacy of AmbitionBox 6-3 The Indigenisation of ScienceBox 6-4 Scientific Progress and Social Progress1928293034404445485053728588101106108112113114118127128130160161164165168169170184185187191191194195196205208209224227234236X


LIST OF FIGURESFigure 1 Decline in human poverty rates by country (per cent): 1996-2007Figure 2 Unemployment rate among <strong>Arab</strong> youth (A) and their share in total unemployment (B)(per cent) in 2005/2006Figure 1-1 The poles of the knowledge societyFigure 2-1 Press freedom in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, 2008Figure 2-2 Perceptions of corruption in the <strong>Arab</strong> World 2008Figure 2-3 Perceptions of corruption 2003-2008Figure 2-4 Distribution of Economic Freedom in <strong>Arab</strong> Countries, <strong>2009</strong>Figure 2-5 Average economic freedom index for seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countriesFigure 2-6 Heritage economic freedom index for <strong>2009</strong>, <strong>Arab</strong> countries-comparison countriesFigure 2-7 Fraser Institute index of economic freedom of <strong>Arab</strong> countries vs. comparison countriesFigure 2-8 Index of global competitiveness for <strong>Arab</strong> countriesFigure 2-9 Average growth of per capita GDPFigure 2-10 Net exports of manufactured goods in <strong>Arab</strong> countriesFigure 3-1 Education and human resources index for <strong>Arab</strong> Countries (most recent statistical periodcompared to 1995)Figure 3-2 Basic knowledge capital formation opportunities for children in <strong>Arab</strong> countries againstper capita GDPFigure 3-3 Advanced knowledge capital formation opportunites for <strong>Arab</strong> youth against per capita GDPFigure 3-4 Adult knowledge capital acquired through education in <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDPFigure 3-5 Actual (or expected) knowledge capital formed through education among different age groupsin <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDPFigure 3-6a Maths performance of eighth-year students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDPFigure 3-6b Math performance of eighth-year students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP(excluding Dubai)Figure 3-7 Science performance of eighth-year students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP(excluding Dubai)Figure 4-1 ICT index values for <strong>Arab</strong> countries and selected groups of non-<strong>Arab</strong> countries(1995, most recent statistics with + and – change values)Figure 4-2 Number of computers per 1,000 inhabitants, <strong>Arab</strong> region, and selected groups ofnon-<strong>Arab</strong> countriesFigure 4-3 Internet users – <strong>Arab</strong> world, world, and selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> country groups by percapita GDPFigure 4-4 Bandwidth of global internet access for the <strong>Arab</strong> World and selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> country groupsFigure 4-5 Price basket for internet (in US dollars per month) in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries, worldwide,and in selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> groups of countries by incomeFigure 4-6 Language access to internet and ratio of speakers to total internet usersFigure 4-7 Growth of languages on the internet 2000-2008Figure 4-8 Availability of e-government services (2006 values)Figure 4-9 Change in business internet use plotted against per capita income in some <strong>Arab</strong> countriesand worldwideFigure 4-10 Paper consumption worldwide and in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries by per capita GDPFigure 4-11 Paper consumption and internet use worldwide and in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries, 2004-2005Figure 5-1 Innovation system index for the most recent period in comparison to 1995Figure 5-2 Innovation and developmentFigure 5-3 Per capita GDP and the innovation system indexFigure 5-4 <strong>Arab</strong>-international cooperation in scientific dissemination, 2004Figure 5-5 <strong>Arab</strong> participation in the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006)Figure 5-6 Number of scientific papers published in the <strong>Arab</strong> region1112336262636969717273747599104110120122125125126145145146147148148150158162166167182182183187195197XI


Figure 5-7 Published scientific articles according to specialisation (1998-2007), based on Table5-7Figure 5-8 Scientific impact of <strong>Arab</strong> publicationsFigure 5-9 Percentage of <strong>Arab</strong>ic language-use in research papers published in the Maghreb, 1980-2007Figure 5-10 Languages used in human and social science research publications in the Maghreb, 2007Figure 6-1 Mechanism for movement towards the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge societyFigure 6-2 Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldFigure 6-3 Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldFigure 6-4 Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldFigure A-1 The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesFigure A-2 Normalised values for indicators concerning knowledge for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, the G7,and the worldFigure A-3 Index values for the pillars of the knowledge economy for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, the G7,and the worldFigure A-4 The latest KEI compared to 1995LIST OF TABLESTable 1 Human development indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries (2001 versus 2006)Table 2 Population and GDP per capita in <strong>Arab</strong> countries (2008, projections)Table 3 Incidence of extreme poverty in a sample of <strong>Arab</strong> countriesTable 4 The employment challenge: projected numbers of new jobs requiredTable 2-1 <strong>Arab</strong> Countries that realised positive reforms in the field of business, 2007-2008Table 2-2 <strong>Arab</strong> Countries according to their ties to trade agreements and intellectual propertyTable 2-3 Rights and responsibilities of <strong>Arab</strong> members in the World Trade Organisation in the field ofcopyright and access to knowledgeTable 3-1 Opportunities for basic knowledge capital formation in children through education in 2005(per cent)Table 3-2 Opportunities for the formation of knowledge capital by youth (ages 15-24) in <strong>Arab</strong> countries,2005 (per cent)Table 3-3 Comparison of overall results of students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries and students in USA on thebusiness administration testTable 3-4 Comparison of overall results of students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries and students in USA on thecomputer science testTable 3-5 Estimated knowledge capital acquired through education among adults (25 to 50 years)in <strong>Arab</strong> countries in 2008 (per cent)Table 3-6 Summary of estimated quantitative capital obtained through education for the different agestrata of <strong>Arab</strong> societies in 2005 (per cent)Table 4-1 Top ten languages used on the net (number of internet users by language)Table 4-2 Readiness of <strong>Arab</strong> countries to adopt e-government applicationsTable 4-3 Readiness to adopt e-government applications in some comparable countriesTable 5-1 The quality of <strong>Arab</strong> research institutionsTable 5-2 Ranking of <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the Assimilation of Technology index (out of 134 countries)Table 5-3 The number of researchers in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionTable 5-4 Expenditure on research in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionTable 5-5 Expenditure on research and development and percentage contributions from private andpublic sectors in comparison countriesTable 5-6 Number of scientific publications in selected <strong>Arab</strong> CountriesTable 5-7 Number of scientific articles published in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, 1998-2007Table 5-8 <strong>Arab</strong>-international cooperation in scientific publishingTable 5-9 Patents registration with the USPTO by seven <strong>Arab</strong> countriesTable 5-10 Sizes of cinema audiences and numbers of cinema screens, 2004-2005Table 5-11 Human capital flight index1981992032032262312332352592612622629101113707980103109117117119121149157157189189190193193197198199201205209XII


Table 5-12 Trade in technological productsTable A-1 Indicators of the knowledge economy index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesTable A-2 <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries compared to other countriesTable A-3 Economic performance and KEI indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries compared withthe world’s geographic regionsTable A-4 Availability of knowledge indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries included by the World BankSTATISTICAL ANNEXLIST OF FIGURESFigure b-1 Growth in average total number of telephone lines (fixed and mobile)per thousand people plotted against per capita income for the world’s states,some <strong>Arab</strong> states, and selected groups of statesFigure b-2 Growth in average number of fixed telephone lines per thousand peopleplotted against per capita income for the world’s states, some <strong>Arab</strong> states,and selected groups of statesFigure b-3 Growth in average number of mobile phone lines per thousand of populationplotted against per capita income for the world’s states, some <strong>Arab</strong> states,and selected groups of statesLIST OF TABLESTable 1 Total population, population growth, and proportion of children in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionTable 2 Human Development IndicesTable 3 Economic IndicatorsTable 4 World Bank <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index (most recent compared to 1995)Table 5 Relationship of <strong>Arab</strong> market competitiveness with knowledge production 2008Table 6 Worldwide governance indicators in the <strong>Arab</strong> region and comparison countries 2007Table 7 Press Freedom Index in the <strong>Arab</strong> region 2008Table 8 World Bank Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime Index(most recent compared to 1995)Table 9 Adult literacy rates by gender in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 1980 and 2005Table 10 Gross enrolment ratio in secondary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> states by gender, 1980 and 2006Table 11 Gross enrolment ratios in tertiary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> states by gender, 1980 and 2005Table 12 World Bank Education and Human Resources Index (KAM)(most recent compared to 1995)Table 13 Adult illiterate population and children (of primary school age) out of school inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries by gender 2007 (or closest two years)Table 14 Regional literacy rates and gross enrolment in primary and the upper stage ofbasic education 2007 (or the closest two years) in the <strong>Arab</strong> region andthe other regions of the worldTable 15 Ratios of gross enrolment in upper secondary and tertiary education andaverage school life expectancy in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and the other regionsof the world 2006 (or the closest two years)Table 16 Net and gross enrolment in primary education and proportion of over-age pupilsfor this stage 2006Table 17 Gross enrolment ratios in upper stage of basic education by gender, average schoollife expectancy, and number of years of compulsory education around the year 2005Table 18 Lessons in basic education devoted to each subject as a proportion of all lessons (per cent)Table 19Table 20Time devoted to education in the two stages of basic education in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesLiteracy rates among young people (15-24 years of age) and gross enrolment inupper secondary education by gender 2005210257258260264271306307307271272273274275276277278279280281282283284284285286287288289XIII


Table 21 Time devoted to secondary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesTable 22 Evolution of enrolment rates in vocational and technical secondary education in the<strong>Arab</strong> states from 1970 till 2005 (per cent)Table 23 Enrolment in tertiary education by level of study around 2005 (per cent)Table 24 Student enrolment rates in tertiary education by field of specialisation 2005 (per cent)Table 25 Number of specialists in the health fields in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 2005 (per thousand people)Table 26 Distribution of graduates of tertiary education by field of specialisation around 2005Table 27 School life expectancy in the <strong>Arab</strong> states from 1970 to 1990 (in years)Table 28 Estimated educational level of people aged 25-50 in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 2005Table 29 Government expenditure on education in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the five years 2002-2006Table 30 Enrolment rates in non-government schools at pre-university educational stages in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries 2005 (per cent)Table 31 Number of students from some <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the US before and after the events ofSeptember 2001Table 32 Number of patents granted in the US in 2007 and spending on research and developmentTable 33 World Bank Innovation System Index (most recent compared to 1995)Table 34 Indicators on research and development activity and innovation in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesand other country groupsTable 35 World Bank indicators for the Innovation System IndexTable a-1 World Bank ICT Index (most recent compared with 1995)Table c-1 Classification of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to some indicators of ICT infrastructure.Table c-2 Classification of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to internet use, access cost, and bandwidthTable c-3 Ranking of some <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to networked readiness index (2008/<strong>2009</strong>)Table c-4 Ranking of a group of <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to some criteria related to ICT policyfor 2008/<strong>2009</strong>Table c-5 The Global Competitiveness Index and rank for some <strong>Arab</strong> states with respect to selectedpillars, 2008/<strong>2009</strong>290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305309310310311311XIV


PREAMBLEIntroductionThe <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong> examinesthe current state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge. Itderives its legitimacy from the pressing needfor information about knowledge performancein the region at a time when the importanceof knowledge for the realisation of the manynew prospects it has opened up for all areas ofsociety is increasing.An analytical approach to the evolutionof knowledge and the knowledge revolutionwitnessed by the world at the end of the lastand the beginning of this century is new tothe agendas of the relevant national andinternational research institutions. Chief amongthe numerous reasons for the current <strong>Arab</strong>interest in the subject is the desire not to missout on the anticipated effects of the knowledgerevolution and to be alert to the roles it playsin generating progress, whether on the political,economic, or social level.Today’s knowledge revolution and the differentmaterial and symbolic effects it has generatedhave opened up new possibilities to develophuman livelihoods and strengthen the effortsto increase forms of knowledge that contributetowards the achievement of human welfare.This report on knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong>region is one of a series whose object isto open up a diversity of avenues by whichto approach the status of knowledge andspeculate on the means and requirementsfor a renaissance in the <strong>Arab</strong> nation.Because the project is a large one, this firstreport offers a general introduction to thestate of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge society andits components. It also attempts to sketchthe major features of a vision of howsome aspects of the knowledge gap in the<strong>Arab</strong> world may be overcome. Subsequentreports will cast further light, from otherperspectives and analytical approaches, onthe state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge with the aimof developing knowledge performanceand so bringing about the realisation ofthe knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.The <strong>Report</strong> starts with the view thatthe literature of research into knowledgeand its various trajectories is in its infancy.The approach thus targets two poles.The first is theoretical and provides theconceptual and philosophical foundationsupon which the <strong>Report</strong> depends. Thesecond concerns itself with some of theformative components of the differentdomains of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> reality,thus permitting diagnosis and measurementof the size of the existing knowledgegaps. This preamble will summarise themajor sections of the <strong>Report</strong>, namely, thepreliminaries to the <strong>Report</strong>, the dialecticalissues, and the topics of the <strong>Report</strong>.Before considering the arrangement ofthe <strong>Report</strong>’s content, we should point outthat the task alternates between consideringinnovations associated with the knowledgesociety in countries that have alreadyentered the latter’s portals, and the state ofknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, with allits gaps and deficits. In all its chapters, theaim of the <strong>Report</strong> is to produce a diagnosisthat reveals the status of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge.At the same time, it attempts to sketch ingeneral terms aspects of the triumphs andgains of knowledge and the horizons it hasopened up for human societies. Given thedearth of data and absence of regional andnational monitoring bodies issuing reliableinformation and statistics, the <strong>Report</strong> hasscrutinised the data from internationalorganisations and in so doing has generatedChief among thereasons for thecurrent <strong>Arab</strong> interestin establishing theknowledge societyis the desire notto miss out on theanticipated effectsof the knowledgerevolution andto be alert to theroles it plays ingenerating progress,whether on thepolitical, economic,or social levelPREAMBLE1


The knowledgefield and revolutiontoday form anavenue for reformin the <strong>Arab</strong> world<strong>Knowledge</strong> isfreedom, andas such a paththat requiresfurther honingof the creativemechanisms ofhuman intelligencean internal debate that aspires to build anddevelop <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance.The <strong>Report</strong> has been careful to makeuse of available data and to evaluate thegrowth of the nuclei of an <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesociety. It has also been keen to come togrips with the major problems that afflictknowledge in our societies, whether inresearch, education, or the use of thenew technological mediums that underlietoday’s knowledge networks.Crucial to the <strong>Report</strong> is the idea thatthe local and particular should be taken asthe starting point for speculation about theuniversal and worldwide generalisation ofgains in knowledge. This concern is not theresult of any desire to deny the universalgains in knowledge but has been adoptedbecause it supports the indigenisationand reproduction of these gains. Thegoal is to achieve creative participation inthem and transcending the various aspectsof knowledge commoditisation andconsumption.Another dominating idea forms partof this <strong>Report</strong>: that the knowledge fieldand revolution today form an avenue forreform in the <strong>Arab</strong> world. Hence, the<strong>Report</strong>’s conception of knowledge hasbeen broadened to include the spirit ofknowledge, and thus its enlightenmentand development dimensions. In doingso, it seeks to transcend those views ofknowledge that emphasise technologicaland quantitative indicators, overlookingthe fact that knowledge is freedom, and assuch a path that requires further honingof the creative mechanisms of humanintelligence.PRELIMINARIES TO THEREPORTThe <strong>Report</strong>’s chapters are open-ended instructure and attempt to take stock ofexisting conditions. This supposes thatsubsequent reports will contemplatedefined questions, a specific knowledgeindex, or one of the issues of theknowledge performance improvement inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region.In the Name of God, the Merciful, theCompassionateRecite: In the name of thy Lord who created,created man of a blood-clot. Recite: And thyLord is Most Generous, who taught by the pen,taught Man that which he knew not.The Holy Qur’an, Surat al-‘Alaq (The Blood-clot)*Given the novelty of the subject and ofthe horizons it is unceasingly openingup in the various fields of knowledge,the <strong>Report</strong> seeks to work on two fronts: adescription of the state of knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> world and a sketch of some aspirationsto overcome the flaws observed. The<strong>Report</strong> thus combines the identificationof the faults in knowledge performancewith the formulation of defined proposals,which, when implemented, will help to fillsome of those gaps.The <strong>Report</strong> starts with the principle of the rightto knowledge, which it considers non-negotiable,especially in an <strong>Arab</strong> world most of which stillsuffers from knowledge and digital illiteracy.<strong>Knowledge</strong> is also perceived of as a tool and anoutcome of development. The <strong>Report</strong> links theright to knowledge and development to hopesfor renaissance and enlightenment. It takesinnovation to be the means to reinforce all thatmay aid humanity to overcome the obstaclesand constraints it faces. The linking of theseprinciples allows some of the <strong>Report</strong>’s chaptersto take on a composite character. Taken together,the <strong>Report</strong>’s chapters assume that the <strong>Arab</strong>historical regression in the domain of knowledgecan be overcome, when the ambition to do sois present, and when there is the political will toprovide the resources needed to build enablingenvironments and institutions capable of guidingknowledge evolution and transforming its gainsinto comprehensive human development.THE DIALECTICS OF THEREPORTThe <strong>Report</strong> discusses a number of arguments,combining description and observation,and highlighting contradictions andparadoxes. At the same time, it exercisescare in making judgements and adoptingpositions. The <strong>Report</strong> attempts to free itselffrom the purely economic perspective on2 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


knowledge and from the consequences ofa technologically determinist viewpoint.Equally, it tries to highlight the breadthof the concepts of both the knowledgesociety and innovation. In these choices,the <strong>Report</strong> is always conscious of theneed–at times openly, at others implicitly,expressed–to seek a knowledge societythat is in harmonious interaction withthe <strong>Arab</strong> social environment, for thefundamental goal of knowledge is theservice of humanity, its revitalisation, andthe transcendence of the problems thatlimit its potential for self-liberation.<strong>Knowledge</strong> and the pen are far stronger than anyother force.Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumOne of the chief points of contentionthat the <strong>Report</strong> strives to make apparentis that of knowledge’s relationship tofreedom, modernisation and the fosteringof human dignity. When some of the<strong>Report</strong>’s chapters defend the importance offreedom, institutions, and legislation, theyhave the aforesaid principles in mind as keysto the creation of a climate of rationalityand proportionality. Such a climate shouldopen the door to accountability, oversight,auditing, transparency, and all the othervalues needed to lay the foundations for amodern knowledge society.The <strong>Report</strong> also reviews contentiousissues linked to identity, such as languagereform. In so doing, it seeks to highlightthe pressing nature of this issue in the hopethat the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language will survive toprovide an effective and responsive vehiclefor the gains made by the new knowledgetechnologies. The <strong>Report</strong> also defendsthe principle of intercommunication withthe world while not neglecting its originalstarting point of intercommunication withthe self. This can only be achieved throughthe correction of the shortcomings ofthe self in such a way as to provide it withthe capability for productive and effectiveintercommunication with the world.This argument falls under the heading ofopening up to the gains accrued by thecontemporary revolutions in knowledge.THE TOPICS OF THE REPORTThe <strong>Report</strong> comprises a preamble andsix chapters. The preamble examines thecontextualisation of the <strong>Report</strong>, placing itamong developments lately witnessed inthe state of human development in the<strong>Arab</strong> region. It reviews the main challengesthat have succeeded one another on theregional political and economic scene andhighlights their pressures and impactson <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance. Italso deals with the global financial crisisthat intensified at the end of 2008 andbeginning of <strong>2009</strong> and its effects on theknowledge society and repercussions forthe <strong>Arab</strong> situation. The preamble alsooffers a perspective on the outcomeof reform in the region following theinception in <strong>Arab</strong> thinking, at the onset ofthe third millennium, of third-generation 1concepts of reform.Because the task of the preamble goesno further than an indication of the mostsignificant challenges in the <strong>Arab</strong> realityand their link to fields of knowledge,attention is given to the continuing USintervention in Iraq and the resultingsituation within Iraqi society. The <strong>Report</strong>also examines the continuing Israelioccupation of the Palestinian Territories,shedding light on its negative implicationsfor the establishment of the knowledgesociety.Nor does the <strong>Report</strong> neglect to deal withthe problems raised by extremist trendswithin <strong>Arab</strong> society and their relationshipto knowledge, trends that are inclined notto recognise the Other and that give theirstamp of approval to a one-dimensionaland closed logic. These trends of thoughthave considerable impact on the climate offreedom, which is considered a reinforcingelement necessary for the construction ofthe knowledge society.The preamble also devotes a summarysection to a rapid overview of the state ofknowledge over recent years and presentsThe <strong>Report</strong> freesitself from thepurely economicperspective onknowledge and fromthe consequencesof a technologicallydeterministviewpointThe <strong>Report</strong> defendsthe principle ofintercommunicationwith the worldwhile not neglectingits originalstarting point ofintercommunicationwith the selfPREAMBLE3


The literature onhuman rights placesthe discourse of theknowledge societyat the heart of thecalls for politicalmodernisationThe oil boomhas not boostedeconomic freedomsin the <strong>Arab</strong> regionsome of the knowledge indicators to betreated in detail in the following chapters.The <strong>Report</strong>’s analyses and conclusions arebased on events and available data andinformation up to the end of the firstquarter of <strong>2009</strong>.The six topics of the <strong>Report</strong> arearranged as follows:THE THEORETICALFRAMEWORK: CONCEPTSAND PROBLEMATICS OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY(CHAPTER 1)This chapter contains four main axes. Thefirst treats the foundations and originsdirecting the mechanisms of understandingand imagination. The second axis treats theformulation of the concepts, scrutinisingthe concept of the knowledge society andattempting to delineate the boundaries thathave been drawn up to delimit its varioussignifications. This section also attempts toconstruct an operational definition basedon the results of the various chapters ofthe <strong>Report</strong>. This should be seen as a firstattempt to view the foundations of theconcept from the perspective of the actualneeds and ambitions of <strong>Arab</strong> society in thefield of knowledge. The chapter examinesthe different significations of the conceptin contemporary knowledge discourse,with special attention paid to those currentin international reports. This process ofconstructing a specific definition aims toavoid a complacent acceptance of currentwisdom. This is particularly necessarygiven the complex nature and the depth ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge gap, which requiresus to draw upon the state of knowledgein the world and in the <strong>Arab</strong> region toformulate a definition that correspondsto, and harmonises with, <strong>Arab</strong> specificitiesand ambitions.The third axis of the chapter examinesthe theoretical norms and frames ofreference which form the startingpoint for the construction of conceptssynonymous with the knowledge society,such as information and communicationstechnology (ICT), the knowledgeeconomy, and the networked society,with the object of highlighting thephilosophical perspectives that standbehind these designations. Two primaryframes of reference emerge as a result ofthese processes of investigation andconstruction. The first takes aspectsof positivism, particularly in its moststrident manifestation of technologicaldeterminism, as its reference. The secondframe of reference is laid bare by the rightsconcepts that find their backing in thediverse literature on human rights, whichplaces the discourse of the knowledgesociety at the heart of the calls for politicalmodernisation.The chapter concludes with a fourth axiswhich treats the chief problematics of theknowledge society, whether in its universaldimensions or in aspects specificallylinked to the knowledge transformationsunderway in <strong>Arab</strong> society. This sectiondevelops a dialectic that alludes both toaspects of these problematics and at thesame time to their potential horizons, inthe context of the developments takingplace in the knowledge society.ARAB KNOWLEDGEPERFORMANCEENVIRONMENTS:EXPANDING FREEDOMSAND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS(CHAPTER 2)While Chapter 1 is concerned with thegeneral theoretical framework of theknowledge society, this chapter dealswith the conditions needed to enablethe development of knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> world. Thus the two chapters arecomplementary in more ways than one.Chapter 2, using a set of lines of inquiry oraxes, and using examples from the politicaland economic, as well as the social, cultural,and media environments, highlights thepressures and restrictions that preventthe formation of a nurturing and holisticenvironment for the requirements of theknowledge society.4 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


In the course of its speculationabout the political environment framingknowledge, the chapter displays concernover the reversal of freedoms in the <strong>Arab</strong>region. Likewise, in its analysis of theeconomic environment, it touches uponthe continuing absence of freedoms inthe economic sphere, making clear thatthe oil boom has not boosted economicfreedoms. The chapter also alludes to thesituation regarding intellectual propertyrights, clarifying <strong>Arab</strong> progress andweakness in this field. In the area ofculture, Chapter 2 deals with restrictionson knowledge and the rise of extremistreligious tendencies. On the social level,it points out that continued poverty andsocial marginalisation exacerbate theshortcomings in the enabling environment,the supposed catalyst for knowledge.Using all these elements, the chapter worksto shed light on many of the restraintsand restrictions that lay siege to the hopefor a renaissance in the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesituation. In doing so, the chapter viewsfreedom as an engine of knowledgewhose absence leads to a deepening of theknowledge gaps.On another axis, the chapter discussesthe institutions, legislations, and variousmechanisms for review, oversight, andaccountability that ensure the guidance andsupport required to establish the knowledgesociety. On a final axis, the chapter thendeals with the different trajectories of <strong>Arab</strong>enabling environments and makes it clearthat the only way to enter the knowledgesociety and qualify <strong>Arab</strong> society to produceand create knowledge is by laying thefoundations for these environments.EDUCATION AND THEFORMATION OF KNOWLEDGECAPITAL (CHAPTER 3)Consideration of the relationship ofeducation to the knowledge society raisesmany issues, given the link betweeneducation and upbringing on the one sideand knowledge acquisition (followed byknowledge production and knowledgecreation) on the other. The topic allows us tospeculate about the role of education in thegeneralisation of knowledge. It also providesan opportunity to deal with educational toolsand the function of education with regardto cognitive and social development andallows us to deal with broader relationshipbetween education and knowledge capitaland among that capital, the market, and thedeployment of education in the service ofliberation and development. Additionally,education occupies a special position in thelives of individuals and communities due tothe length of time those individuals spendin educational institutions, to the ongoingregeneration and accumulation occurringin the various fields of knowledge and tothe role played by education in preparingindividuals to join the labor marketequipped with productive and innovativeskills.In the knowledge society, the importanceof education has grown thanks to theamazing technologies that have come tobe deployed in that field. We have cometo talk about distance learning, collectivelaboratories, educational technologies thatcreate virtual spaces, and technologiesthat give lessons, examinations, andqualifications online. These may not,however, reflect very closely the realityof education in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, where,in many of these countries, universaleducation is yet to be achieved and whereilliteracy rates for adults, children, andyoung people remain a challenge. Therequirements of the knowledge societyin terms of quality of education, the useof up-to-date technology in teaching,and the creation of networks for the neweducation are part of <strong>Arab</strong> reality in onlysome countries, where they exist in theshape of pioneering experiments thatare difficult to generalise, at least for themoment. When we add to all the precedingthe content of education, the training ofmanpower, the reality of the universitiesand their graduates, and the state ofscientific research, we find ourselves facedwith a range of complex topics that cannoteasily be confronted all together.Continuedpoverty and socialmarginalisationexacerbate theshortcomingsin the enablingenvironmentof the desiredknowledge societyIn several <strong>Arab</strong>countries illiteracyrates for adults,children, and youngpeople remaina challengePREAMBLE5


<strong>Arab</strong>ic istechnologicallypoor in comparisonwith the languagesdominatingthe ICT fieldThe <strong>Report</strong> intendsto measure thedegree to which the<strong>Arab</strong>s have enteredthe knowledgesociety taking as astarting point theirlevels of ICT accessand acquisitionAware of the thorniness of the subject,the chapter pays attention to the pivotalissue of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge capital as it is builtup in and by schools and universities. Inorder to define the nature of this capital, thefirst part of the chapter reviews the generallandscape of knowledge acquired througheducation in the <strong>Arab</strong> region. In its secondpart, which forms the main body of thechapter, it turns, through the study of a setof quantitative and qualitative indicators,to how knowledge capital is developed.These indicators are based on a three-partdivision into children, young people, andadults. Starting with the available data, thechapter presents a map which elucidatesthe nature, deficits, and paradoxes ofknowledge capital and clarifies the areasof distinction, difference, and similaritybetween the <strong>Arab</strong> countries at the differentstages of education. The third part of thechapter, while revealing the limitations ofthis capital and highlighting some gaps andbarriers that still prevent it from attainingthe knowledge society, deals with the kindof knowledge capital appropriate for entryinto the knowledge society.INFORMATION ANDCOMMUNICATIONSTECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARABCOUNTRIES: THE PILLARSAND TOOLS OF KNOWLEDGE(CHAPTER 4)While Chapters 1 and 2 direct attention tothe theoretical frameworks and preparatoryand supportive environments for theknowledge society and Chapter 3 examinesthe subject of education (one of the mostimportant of the latter’s pillars), Chapter 4 isconcerned with the technology pillar, whichtoday occupies such a significant positionin terms of knowledge development andinformation acquisition. The chapterintends to measure the degree to which the<strong>Arab</strong>s have entered the knowledge society,taking as a starting point their levels ofICT access and acquisition.The chapter highlights the triumphs ofICT in assembling knowledge networksthat have eliminated obstacles of timeand place (for example, through internetservices) and have become essential toolsfor the increased use and expansion of thevarious spheres of knowledge and theirdeployment. These technologies havebecome the convenient and easy way toobtain knowledge and have been widelyapplied in life’s various realms, includingthe economy, management and education,thus demonstrating how far they havepenetrated society.The chapter thus deals with the presenceof ICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, by attemptingto showcase current applications and theirlimits. It reviews examples from the fieldsof education, business, healthcare, andsocial development, clarifying the existinggaps in these applications, and highlightinggains achieved.On another axis, the chapter devotesattention to the challenges confronting<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content by contemplatingits comparative weakness in the globalcontext. The chapter concerns itself withhow the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language can be developedin order to make it capable of acting as avehicle and medium to produce knowledgethat conforms to the requirements of <strong>Arab</strong>reality. On this point in particular, mentionis made of the technological poverty of<strong>Arab</strong>ic in comparison with the languagesdominating the ICT field. Attention is alsodrawn to the importance of developingthe tools of the language to render itcapable of constructing digital content,which will expand <strong>Arab</strong> gains in this field.In conclusion, the chapter formulatesinitiatives to overcome some of theobstacles which, in the <strong>Arab</strong> environment,prevent widespread access to, and use anddevelopment of, ICT.ARAB RESEARCH ANDINNOVATION PERFORMANCE(CHAPTER 5)In Chapter 5, the <strong>Report</strong> investigates thetopic of innovation in <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge,starting with an attempt to broaden theindicators used in some international6 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


eports, which equate this concept ingeneral with technical scientific innovation.In these reports, levels of innovationare measured in terms of numbers ofdiscoveries in the applied sciences andtechnology and quantity of patents appliedfor. Other areas of knowledge such as thehumanities, the social sciences, and artisticcreativity, are overlooked, despite theirimportant role as a space for innovationand creative synthesis.On its first axis, this chapter highlightsscience and technology policies in the<strong>Arab</strong> world through observations on thediffusion and production of scientificknowledge and consideration of the dataon <strong>Arab</strong> research centres. The issue ofscientific research funding in the <strong>Arab</strong>region is also addressed. The secondaxis of the chapter moves on to <strong>Arab</strong>policies towards the humanities, the socialsciences, and artistic creativity, going herebeyond current indicators to includeresearch discoveries in the humanitiesand social sciences, as well as the role ofthe arts in synthesising innovations linkedto imagination and affect. The plasticarts, and creative works in literature,the theatre, and cinema have in turn thecapacity to produce creativity whichenriches the emotions and fecundatesthe memory. This shifts the concept ofinnovation and scientific research from aquantitative and mathematical mindset toone characterised by imagination, affect,and values, which, while difficult toquantify are, equally and undeniably, lociof innovation.The third axis of this chapter observesthe manifestations of the creativity gapwithin the present <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesituation. It approaches this gap byexamining the social and economic returnsof innovation and the <strong>Arab</strong> brain drain,while also dealing forthrightly with theimportance of intermediate migrationwithin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, which expandsand contracts in the absence of any clearpolicy aimed at integration. The chapterdemonstrates how the importanceof <strong>Arab</strong> cooperation increases whenacknowledgment is made of the differinglevels of knowledge performance inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Any cooperativepolicy would have the power to deployresources in diverse and complementaryfashion among the <strong>Arab</strong> countries andthus strengthen the possibility of creatinga common <strong>Arab</strong> enabling environment.However difficult this may look today inview of the absence of coordination andcooperation, the existence of a politicalwill capable of developing an <strong>Arab</strong>icperspective on knowledge and creativity,once in place, will make it possible.BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN THE ARABNATION: A VISION AND A PLAN(CHAPTER 6)The previous chapters of the <strong>Report</strong> haveaimed to describe, observe, and investigatethe state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge and thenature of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance.They have carried out this task using atwo-pronged approach. The first prongoutlines the current features of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge based on available data andrecords major critical remarks related tothe absence of an <strong>Arab</strong> monitoring bodyto monitor evolution in the state of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge. The second prong introducesspeculation on how to develop <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance with regard to thetopics of the different chapters.In its conclusion, the <strong>Report</strong> formulatesa vision and action plan to respond to theknowledge gaps that have been identified.This plan creates a form of proposal that,if adopted, at least in spirit, will lead to theclosing of some aspects of the knowledgegap and to the exploitation by <strong>Arab</strong>society of the knowledge gains neededto support its efforts for renaissance anddevelopment.This chapter does not fall into thetrap of sketching ‘what must be done’and of resorting to fanciful exhortationsthat underplay the distance betweenthe knowledge society in the advancednations and the realities of knowledgeImagination, affect,and values, are,loci of innovationThe <strong>Report</strong>formulates a visionand action planto respond tothe knowledgegaps that havebeen identifiedPREAMBLE7


Intercommunicationwith the self meansaccurate diagnosisof its shortcomingswith regard toknowledge and ofits flaws with regardto knowledgeenvironmentsMomentum towardsentry into theknowledge societymust begin withaction in the areaof the enablingenvironmentmarginalisation in the <strong>Arab</strong> region. Itprefers to sketch the major landmarksthat must be passed and difficulties thatmust be transcended if obscurantism andknowledge poverty are to be overcome.This sketch takes the form of a specificproposal that clearly acknowledges thedifferences existing between the <strong>Arab</strong>countries in the field of knowledge andis conscious, at the same time, of theenormous gaps that exist and the difficultyof confronting them. Hence the planpromotes a step by step approach to theclosure of knowledge gaps and works toprioritise short, medium, and long-termplans for action to enable the <strong>Arab</strong>s tocommunicate with the self and with theworld on the basis of the gains that modernknowledge provides.Intercommunication with the self meansaccurate diagnosis of its shortcomingswith regard to knowledge and of its flawswith regard to knowledge environments,followed by courageous, ambitiousintercommunication with the world,undertaken in the faith that partnership inknowledge production requires dialogue.Equally, the building of alliances requiresthe building of rational relationships thatdo not view the self from a fixed angle, butsee it as the product of complex historicalprocesses. This will give the <strong>Arab</strong>s thepossibility of realising their plans to expandthe spheres of knowledge and achieve thehoped-for <strong>Arab</strong> renaissance.The concluding chapter takes theposition that the proposed vision mustconform to <strong>Arab</strong> ambitions and desiresto overcome the gaps in knowledge fromwhich they suffer. In this context, thechapter is concerned with articulating aplan, which rests on three foundations.The first is related to the necessary basesfor the knowledge society, these basesare defined in terms of three principles:expansion of the scope of freedoms;harmonisation and correspondencewith the needs of human development;and openness and intercommunication.The second foundation puts forward theaxes of the vision, which are definedas the establishment of the enablingenvironment, the indigenisation ofknowledge, and its deployment in theservice of development and renaissancein the <strong>Arab</strong> nation. The third pillar of theplan sketches priorities for action. Heretasks are prioritised in terms of urgencyaccording to the data on knowledge gapsin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries.The chapter explains that momentumtowards entry into the knowledge societymust begin with action in the area of theenabling environment as a preliminarystep towards transfer and indigenisation.Thereafter the chapter turns towardsmomentum in the deployment ofknowledge in such a way as to ensureits engagement with knowledge creationand production. The chapter does notneglect to mention that this plan leavesthe field open to any combinationsof interaction, interconnection, andgradualism that may be required, bearingin mind that momentum, confrontation,and multiplicity of points of entry willalways encourage entry into membershipof the knowledge society.This chapter also includes suggestionsrelated to the pressing need for an <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge observatory. The latter couldbe included as a component on more thanone of the axes of this proposed plan, tostrengthen and provide launching powerfor it.The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong>initiates a series of reports that are tofollow in the years to come with the aimof building a data base of informationon and prescriptions and proposals forthe improvement of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. It is assumed that the dataand results included in this <strong>Report</strong> willsupport the possibility of approaches fromother angles to the subjects of knowledge,freedom, and development. These are theaxes linked to the epistemological changeneeded in society in order to open andbroaden the road to the anticipated <strong>Arab</strong>renaissance.8 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


THE ARAB NATION AND THEWORLD IN <strong>2009</strong>The second section of this preambleprovides a set of data to place the <strong>Arab</strong><strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2009</strong> in context. Thestate of knowledge and the developmentswithin it cannot be approached withouta general contextualisation that explainsthe evolution of the existing knowledgedeficits and without careful observationof their interwoven relationships, whetherthese be with the changes underway in theworld, with internal conflicts, or with thetransformations occurring in the area ofhuman development in the <strong>Arab</strong> region atthe beginning of the twenty-first century.In this brief preamble, we shall followthe following axes of inquiry: the state ofhuman development in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionin <strong>2009</strong>; the changes and pressures onthe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge scene; and the mostimportant developments in the state ofknowledge over the past decade. The dataused and the events referred to extend tothe end of March <strong>2009</strong>.THE STATE OF HUMANDEVELOPMENT IN THE ARABREGION<strong>Knowledge</strong> is considered a central axis ofhuman development, and its importancehas multiplied thanks to the manytransformations in its numerous forms.Thesame is true of the technology revolutionsof recent decades. <strong>Knowledge</strong> today, byvirtue of its role in the development process,constitutes an instrument of empowerment.Consideration of human developmentin the <strong>Arab</strong> region and its relationship toknowledge thus sheds light on some of themost important developmental issues andindicators linked to the establishment ofthe knowledge society.CONCEPTS AND INDICATORS OFARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 2The <strong>Report</strong> views development as the meansby which an individual expands his or herchoices with regard to the life of dignityhe or she wants (Sen, 1999). Developmentis equivalent to the expansion of choices,freedoms, and individual possibilities invarious aspects of life. This vision startsfrom the view that the prosperity of anindividual is not to be measured only bythe goods and services he or she acquires,but depends in the first degree on theindividual’s capacity to choose the life hewants and can be proud of. Thus capacityis the freedom that enables the individualto transcend and overcome obstacles andattain various degrees of human welfare.In this brief contextualisation werely on the global measures that are bestknown and most pertinent to knowledge,as represented by the UNDP’s HumanDevelopment Index and the HumanPoverty Index. These two indexes consistof indicators such as the capacity toenjoy a long and healthy life and live at areasonable economic level, as well as thecapacity to acquire knowledge and to readand write, a capacity that forms one of themost important pillars of the knowledgesociety.THE MOST IMPORTANTEVOLUTIONS IN ARAB HUMANDEVELOPMENTThe latest data and indicators on humandevelopment in the <strong>Arab</strong> world show thatthe <strong>Arab</strong> states have made some slightprogress in human development sinceTable 1Year20012006<strong>Knowledge</strong> isconsidered a centralaxis of humandevelopment, andits importancehas multipliedthanks to the manytransformations inits numerous formsHuman development indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries(2001 versus 2006)Lifeexpectancyat birth(years)66.067.8GDPPercapita(PPP US $)50387760LifeExpectancyindex0.700.71Source: UNDP website, www.hdr.undp.org on 13 April <strong>2009</strong>Educationindex0.630.70GDPindex0.650.73HumanDevelopmentindex0.6620.713PREAMBLE9


Table 2CountryGroupGroup 1: OileconomiesGroup 2: Mixedoil economiesGroup 3:DiversifiedeconomiesGroup 4:Primary exporteconomiesPopulation and GDP per capita in <strong>Arab</strong> countries(2008, projections)TotalPopulation(million)PopulationShare(%)GDP(PPP US$billion)GDPShare(%)PercapitaGDP(PPP US$)40.2 13.2 1117 45.9 2778639.9 13.1 332 13.6 8313156.4 51.5 833 34.2 532867.1 22.1 153 6.3 2277Total 303.6 100 2435 100 8020Group 1: Oil economies: the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,Qatar, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and the UAE).Group 2: Mixed oil economies: Algeria and Libya.Group 3: Diversified economies: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia.Group 4: Primary export economies: Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen.Source: League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008, from the IMF and the CIA World FactbookPoverty in the<strong>Arab</strong> region isincreasing despiteall the efforts aimedat reducing itthe beginning of the current decade, andthat at the beginning of 2006 not a single<strong>Arab</strong> state fell into the category of lowhuman development (see Table 1). Forthe most part, progress was basic, with,perhaps, the exception of advance in percapita GDP, which has risen from $5,038in 2001 to $7,760 in 2006, and to morethan $8,000 in 2008. However on thelevel of the <strong>Arab</strong> region, the significanceof this improvement is reduced becauseof the great variation between the <strong>Arab</strong>states and the clear concentration ofthe increases in per capita GDP in theoil-exporting countries as opposed toothers of the region (see Table 2). Thisvariation also holds true for the overallHuman Development Index, whichshows that only seven <strong>Arab</strong> states (theGulf Cooperation Council member statesand Libya), making up 15 per cent of thepopulation of the <strong>Arab</strong> region, fall withinthe high human development band ( HDIof 0.8 or above).While the <strong>Arab</strong> Gulf states have achievedthe highest rates in terms of achievementof the Millennium Development Goals,particularly in the fields of health anduniversal education, some other <strong>Arab</strong> statesare expected to fail to reach these goalsby 2015, the year set by the MillenniumDeclaration. The list of <strong>Arab</strong> states unlikelyto reach the Millennium DevelopmentGoals covers those that still fall withinthe category of least developed states(Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan,and Yemen), as well as states suffering fromconflict, internal disputes, and occupation,such as Iraq, Palestine, and Somalia.One of the most important negativephenomena to characterise developmentperformance in many countries of theregion is the dutiful compliance with theso-called economic and social reformprogrammes, which for the most partoriginate abroad. It is clear to an observerthat most <strong>Arab</strong> societies, in the structureof authority and the state, depend on apaternalist social contract which holds thestate responsible for the welfare of societyand the provision of services in exchangefor the political allegiance that impartslegitimacy to the state.Economic and social, as well asdemographic, changes on the <strong>Arab</strong> scenehave, however, placed such systems andsocial contracts under intense pressuresthat may threaten their survival. Populationgrowth, changes in ways of life withinsociety, weak and falling incomes, andgrowing awareness among citizens areperhaps among the most significant ofthese changes. To deal with these pressures,at least on the economic level, many <strong>Arab</strong>states have engaged in economic andsocial structural reform programmes withclear encouragement from internationalinstitutions and the Western world. Thereis near consensus, however, that mostof these corrective programmes, largelylaunched in the 1980s, have not producedthe desired results and have exacerbatedeconomic and social problems. Povertyin the <strong>Arab</strong> region is increasing despite allthe efforts aimed at reducing it. In 2005,10 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 3Incidence of extreme poverty in a sample of <strong>Arab</strong> countries 3CountryGroupSurveyYearPovertyIncidence(%)Numberof Poor(million)SurveyYearPovertyIncidence(%)Numberof Poor(million)Diversified economy(six states)Mixed oil economy(one state)Primary exporteconomy(two states)1991-1999 14.7 18.4 2000-2005 16.8 22.8the proportion of people living below thelowest national income poverty line in the<strong>Arab</strong> region reached approximately 18.4per cent. Wealth is also badly distributed,for rural areas suffer much more povertythan urban ones. In rural Egypt andMorocco, one in four people is poor,compared with one in ten in urban areas.Similarly, families supported by womenare much more affected by poverty thanthose supported by men. Table 3, whichis based on the results of field research in1995 14.1 4.1 2000 12.1 3.81996-1998 41.3 8.0 2000-2006 36.2 8.1Overall Average 17.9 30.5 18.4 34.7Source: League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008nine <strong>Arab</strong> countries, shows that there wasa slight increase in the poor as a proportionof the population in the first decade of themillennium in comparison with the 1990s(18.4 and 17.9 per cent respectively).Regarding the Human Poverty Index,we find an improvement in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesfrom the end of the 1990s until 2007. Egypt,Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, Oman, Djibouti,Qatar, and the UAE have reduced theirscores on the Human Poverty Index by atleast 25 per cent over the first decade ofIn rural Egypt andMorocco, onein four people ispoor, comparedwith one in ten inurban areas, andfamilies supportedby women are muchmore affected bypoverty than thosesupported by menFigure 1Decline in human poverty rates by country (per cent): 1996-200750%45%40%35%30%25%20%15%10%5%0%LebanonEgyptSyriaJordanAlgeriaMoroccoTunisiaLibyaComorosDjiboutiMauritaniaSudanYemenSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaQatarOmanUAESource: League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008PREAMBLE11


Figure 25045403530252015105080706050403020100UAEWorldUnemployment rate among <strong>Arab</strong> youth (A) andtheir share in total unemployment (B)(per cent) in 2005/2006MoroccoQatarYemenLibyaUAEKuwaitQatarMoroccoOccupied Palestinian TerritoriesOmanSyriaBahrainLebanonKuwaitWorldSource: League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008The <strong>Arab</strong> poor aremore affected thanothers by changesin world food pricesEgyptSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaTunisia(A)(B)SomaliaSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaEgyptMauritaniaSudanYemenSyriaLebanonBahrain<strong>Arab</strong> countriesLibya<strong>Arab</strong> countriesOccupied Palestinian TerritoriesDjiboutiJordanSudanDjiboutiSomaliaMauritaniaAlgeriaJordanTunisiaIraqIraqAlgeriathe millennium (Figure 1). However, whenwe compare the performance of thesecountries with that of other countries ofthe world with similar rankings on theHuman Development Index, we find thatit could have been better.The <strong>Arab</strong> countries also constituteone of the regions of the world mostdependent on imports for the food securityof their inhabitants. International reportsshow that most <strong>Arab</strong> states fall in theband of states with very low sovereigntyin terms of food supply, with an <strong>Arab</strong>Food Sovereignty index of 1.6. 4 Somesee the aridity of large swathes of <strong>Arab</strong>territory as the determining factor in thisarea. However, much evidence points topoor management of available resources,including environmental resources. Thedata point to significant facts, perhapsthe most important of which is thatfood imports formed 15 per cent of totalimports to the region in 2006. Worse, while<strong>Arab</strong> countries are mostly self-sufficientin terms of producing foodstuffs for thewealthy, such as meat, fish, and vegetables,foodstuffs for the poor classes, such asgrains, oils, and sugar, are largely imported.Thus, the <strong>Arab</strong> poor are more affected thanothers by changes in world food prices.From the 1980s until now, unemploymentrates have remained at high levels, or evenincreased in many <strong>Arab</strong> states. In the1980s, for countries like Algeria, Egypt,Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria(which comprise about 57 per cent of the<strong>Arab</strong> labor force), the weighted averageunemployment rate was 10.6 per cent. Thehighest rate at that time was in Algeria (16.5per cent), and the lowest in Syria (4.8 percent). In the 1990s, however, the weightedaverage unemployment rate was 14.5 percent, with the highest level in Algeria (25.3per cent) and the lowest in Syria (8.1 percent). Preliminary evidence for the 2000decade indicates that the weighted averageunemployment rate in these states has risento 15.5 per cent (League of <strong>Arab</strong> Statesand UNDP, 2008).Studies indicate that <strong>Arab</strong> womensuffer more than men in relation tounemployment (International LaborOrganisation, <strong>2009</strong>).The youth unemployment rate remainsvery high: in 2005 it varied from 46 percent in Algeria to 6.3 per cent in the United<strong>Arab</strong> Emirates (see Figure 2). The <strong>Arab</strong>states still face a major challenge in thecreation of job opportunities for youth.Table 4 refers to forecasts made in a recent2008 study carried out by the UNDP incooperation with the League of <strong>Arab</strong> Stateswhich clearly show the tangible need to findwork opportunities for the ever growing12 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 4The employment challenge: projected numbers of new jobs required.CountrygroupLaborforce in 2005(millions)Unemploymentrate 2005(%)Number ofjobs 2005(millions)Number of newjobs by 2010(millions)Number of newjobs by 2015(millions)Number of newjobs by 2020(millions)Mixed economy(six states)Mixed oil economy(two states)Oil economy(six states)Primary export economy(four states)Total (eighteen<strong>Arab</strong> states)48.3 11.82 42.59 6.55 14.16 21.7815.5 15.61 13.08 2.26 4.92 7.5613.7 4.53 13.08 3.37 7.73 12.0822.8 18.68 18.54 2.85 6.17 9.49100.3 12.97 87.29 15.03 32.98 50.91Source: League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008numbers of <strong>Arab</strong> youth who each day jointhe ranks of the unemployed. It is obviousthat the picture has become gloomier inview of the current world financial crisisand its repercussions for the region.GOVERNANCE AND THEWEAKNESS OF INSTITUTIONALPERFORMANCE 5The <strong>Arab</strong> states have remained weak andhidebound over the last two decades,without any notable change in termsof institutional performance. Availableindicators make clear that the <strong>Arab</strong> states’weak performance in 1996 in terms ofgovernance 6 indicators did not changegreatly in the ten years to 2006 (League of<strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008). The effectof this weak performance on many aspectsof development and the componentsof the knowledge society, in particularfreedoms, is no secret.One of the most recent reports hasconcluded that the major challengesfacing the region can be summarised asinstitutional reform, good governance,the provision of job opportunities–particularly for youth–, the ring-fencingof funds for development that serves thepoor, reform of the education system, anddiversification of the economic systems soas not to be dependent on one commodity(in particular oil based economies), inaddition to the provision of food security(League of <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008).VARIABLES EXERTINGPRESSURE ON THE ARABKNOWLEDGE SCENEWAR, OCCUPATION, INTERNALCONFLICT, AND THEDISRUPTION OF KNOWLEDGEOccupation, wars, and internal conflictshave an overwhelmingly disruptiveinfluence on the knowledge society.Not only do they affect its mainstays,in the form of education, technology,and innovation, they also, through theeconomic destruction, disruption todevelopment, suppression of freedoms,and restrictions on movement, strike atthe heart of the enabling environmentsneeded for the establishment of theknowledge society. Furthermore, the lackof security means that people are unableto obtain their basic needs, to say nothingof realising their hopes of setting in placeThe employmentpicture has becomegloomier in view ofthe current worldfinancial crisisOccupation,wars, and internalconflicts have anoverwhelminglydisruptiveinfluence on theknowledge societyPREAMBLE13


In the period2003-2007, morethan 830 Iraqiacademics werekilled, most of themdoctors, engineers,and physicistsPalestinians continueto suffer thenegative effects ofthe occupation onall the operativeaxes of theknowledge societythe pillars of the society to which theyaspire.With regard to Iraq, it cannot be claimedthat education prior to the US interventionin 2003 was devoid of the problems knownto other <strong>Arab</strong> countries. However, manystudies and indicators confirm that thestandard of education has declined after2003, and that educational problems havebeen exacerbated and have accumulated asa result of the conflicts that broke out.For example, a report of the UN Officefor the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA) stated that net enrolmentrates in basic education had reached 46 percent in the 2006-7 school year comparedto 86 per cent in the previous year, andthat only 28 per cent of graduation-agestudents had been able to attend their endof year final exams, which only 40 per centof them passed (UN OCHA, 2008).A UNESCO report published inApril 2007 and entitled Education underAttack, disclosed that political and militaryviolence that targets educational systems iscausing growing numbers of children tobe deprived of the right to education. Thereport depicted Iraq’s educational systemas “the education system most impactedby the severity of attacks, whose scope andnumbers of casualties have reached a levelso extreme as to threaten the collapse of theschool and university systems” (UNESCO,2007b, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). The report made clearthat over a period of not more than tenmonths between February and November2006, 280 Iraqi teachers were killed, andthat only 30 per cent of Iraq’s 3.5 millionpupils attended classes in 2007, comparedto 75 per cent in the previous school year.The UNESCO report mentioned thatenrolment at Baghdad universities declinedby 40 per cent while more than 3,000academics fled the country. A reportpresented in June 2007 to the BritishCross-party Commission on Iraq 7 statedthat in the period 2003-2007, more than830 Iraqi academics were killed, most ofthem doctors, engineers, and physicists;more than 70 per cent of the victims wereuniversity professors, PhD holders, or theequivalent.Some sources point to a recentimprovement in the state of educationand knowledge on the heels of a relativeimprovement in the political and securitysituation. This gives hope for betteropportunities to deal in the most effectiveway with the existing and cumulativeknowledge challenges if the building ofknowledge society is to be renewed in Iraqand if Iraqi energies are to be releasedanew in support of development and abetter future.Palestinians continue to suffer thenegative effects of the occupation onall the operative axes of the knowledgesociety. The Israeli occupation andrepeated incursions into the Palestinianterritories have had enormous effects onthe educational process, considered thecorner stone of any knowledge society.Many pupils, teachers, and support staffhave been killed, over and above thecontinual danger of detention and abuse atthe occupation’s barriers and checkpoints.During 2008, and without taking accountof the losses suffered during the attack onGaza that began at the end of the year,statistics from the Palestinian Ministryof Education show that forty Palestinianstudents were killed and eighty othersreceived a range of wounds. Also, 260students, teachers, and support staff weredetained. To this should be added theIsraeli incursions that led to the ongoingclosure of 100 schools and the loss of150 school days (Palestinian Ministry ofEducation and Higher Education, <strong>2009</strong>a,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). UNICEF reported that “nearlyhalf of all students have seen their schoolbesieged by troops, and more than 10 percent have witnessed the killing of a teacherin school” (UNICEF, <strong>2009</strong>).Nor have the universities been sparedattack and the infliction of varied damage.Israeli forces raided the University ofBethlehem and Al-Najah University inNablus in 2002, and Hebron University in2003, besieging them and causing lessonsto be suspended. The Al-Quds OpenUniversity in Ramallah, the Palestine14 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Technical College in Tulkarem, and BirzeitUniversity have also been raided. Attacks onuniversities culminated in the destructionof the College of Education of Al-AqsaUniversity in 2004 and of the buildings ofthe Islamic University in Gaza in January<strong>2009</strong>, during the most recent invasion ofthe Gaza Strip (Palestinian Ministry ofEducation and Higher Education, <strong>2009</strong>b,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).All these practices, as well as furtherconstraints such as the Separation Wall,have been detrimental to the Palestinianswith regard to all the mainstays ofknowledge—education, importation oftechnology, and internal and externalcommunication—not to mention thatthey have been deprived of the freedomof movement and security that constitutethe enabling environments needed for theestablishment of the knowledge society.<strong>Towards</strong> the end of the writing of thisreport (at the end of 2008 and the beginningof <strong>2009</strong>), Israel launched a major assaulton Gaza during which populated areas,schools, and UN buildings were shelled.Israeli military operations destroyed Gaza’sinfrastructure, both educational and thatrelated to the other pillars of knowledge,and left behind them what AmnestyInternational called a “humanitariancatastrophe” (Amnesty International,<strong>2009</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). In addition, the humanpopulation suffered appalling losses, with1,326 Palestinians, most of them civiliansand 41 per cent of them children andwomen (430 children and 110 women),killed. A further 5,450 Palestinians wereinjured. During the same period and asa result of military operations, fourteenIsraelis were killed and a further 182were wounded. Among them, civiliansaccounted for three deaths and eighteenwounded (UN OCHA, <strong>2009</strong>a and <strong>2009</strong>b).Despite this, the Occupied PalestinianTerritories hold an advanced positionamong the <strong>Arab</strong> countries with regardto a number of indicators related toknowledge in general and education inparticular. At the start of 2006, the adultliteracy rate indicator reached 92.4 per centwhile total primary, secondary, and tertiaryeducation enrolment reached 82.4 per cent(UNDP, 2007c, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Palestinianprofessionals of recognised competence,such as teachers, engineers, and artists areto be found in many <strong>Arab</strong> and non-<strong>Arab</strong>countries.The effects of war are not restrictedonly to Iraq and the Occupied PalestinianTerritories; Sudan too is suffering thewoes of civil war in Darfur. With the endof 2006, the number of those adverselyaffected by the conflict had reached 4million, including 2 million internallydisplaced. This has shaken the stability ofSudan and caused a humanitarian crisis toerupt whose repercussions continue to befelt until now (UN OCHA, 2006). Onemillion, eight hundred thousand childrenunder eighteen years of age are amongthose adversely affected. Educationin the schools has obviously sufferedextremely. Many schools have been seton fire and razed to the ground (AmnestyInternational Morocco, 2006, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).The war has brought ruin to all aspects oflife in Darfur, and as a result has generateda society of refugees and migrants. Thepeople have moved to distant locations asa result of the sharp escalation in fightingin many parts of Darfur, and the numberof refugees has reached 120,000 8 .Despite the dearth of data, testimoniesconfirm that Sudan’s plunge into internalconflicts will inevitably lead to the completebreakdown in the already falteringestablishment of the knowledge society.(In terms of knowledge status, the WorldBank puts Sudan in a low category, with ascore of 1.68 on the knowledge index in2005, compared with a world average of6.79 and an African average of 3.3.) 9In Somalia, which has long beenplagued by internal conflicts and wars, allthe indicators make it clear that a great dealof effort needs to be exerted in order forthe country to reach a point at which it willbe possible to initiate discussion on settingup the knowledge society. At the beginningof this millennium, Somalia’s illiteracyrate stood at 62.2 per cent (2001), with aTestimonies confirmthat Sudan’s plungeinto internal conflictswill inevitably leadto the completebreakdown in thealready falteringestablishment of theknowledge societyIn Somalia,a great deal ofeffort needs to beexerted to set up theknowledge societyPREAMBLE15


eversion, in many cases, is not associatedwith readings that set tradition in ahistorical context. The symbolic traditionalarchive has come to be widely deployed inthe battles over our present within andoutside our societies and during theirconfrontations with others, and attemptsto employ it in political battles haverevived in recent years. On this front inparticular, political action requires a newcontemporary reading of our historicaltradition and ourselves that is responsiveto the passage of time.The cultural heritage, as one componentof knowledge, should not be abandonedto become the undisputed arena ofunexamined readings. Rather, researchprojects should be launched in this areathat can arrive at an understanding thatresponds to the questions of our age andour need to respond positively to whatis happening in the world. The Islamictradition, like any other product ofhumanity in history, has innumerable faces.It is a repository capable of more than oneform of creative and innovative use. Thecontinuing presence and domination of aclosed literalist understanding of traditionover minds and consciences in our societycasts into relief aspects of the images thatwe create for ourselves and that others,relying on the evidence of the natureof knowledge prevailing among us, willthereafter apply to us.It can be said that our momentumshould start with ourselves–that is,with reform of our historical selfcharacterisationsand correction of ourself-perception through action aimed atfuller reconciliation with the values of theworld we belong to. This will enable usto join together with all those involved inthe making of contemporary history. Thisdoes not mean that the others are withoutresponsibility for the situation we findourselves in and the problems we face; itis well known that our recent past, and ourpresent and future, cannot be understoodwithout taking external factors intoconsideration. However, we do believe thatnow, after the battles for independencefrom those who colonised us, our battlesfor renaissance and a completion of ourliberation depends above all on us. Thisrequires that we work on solutions to themany problematic issues that have theirroots in our historical environment: theproblematics of innovation and renewal inIslamic jurisprudence, of creativity, and ofthe establishment of a voluntary politicalharmony that will, in our hypothesis,facilitate the reform process and themovement of our societies towards thebuilding of the hoped-for <strong>Arab</strong> future.THE STAGNATION OFPOLITICAL REFORM AND ITSEFFECT ON THE ENABLINGENVIRONMENT FORKNOWLEDGEAt the beginning of the third millennium,the language of political reform was onceagain revived in modern <strong>Arab</strong> politicalculture, and a consensus was reachedover its necessity. The failure of themajority of the <strong>Arab</strong> states to find suitableavenues to overcome underdevelopmenthas contributed to this revival. Similarly,numerous external factors have reinforcedthe calls for reform that seeks to develop<strong>Arab</strong> societies and leave their deepeningcrises stage.Talk of reform is certainly not new.What distinguishes the new calls for reformis the wholesale nature of their adoptionin the majority of <strong>Arab</strong> states, whether byexisting regimes or such organisations ofcivil society as political parties and civicinstitutions active on the political andsocial scene.This reformist trend is subsumed withina historical context that transcends current<strong>Arab</strong> circumstances and the accompanyinginteractions and events on the internationallevel. Here we refer particularly to theevents of 11 September 2001, whichrevealed the presence, especially in areassuffering from occupation, extremism,and marginalisation, of forces using newmethods of political action with the aimof inflaming conflict, whether within theThe culturalheritage shouldnot be abandonedto become theundisputed arenaof unexaminedreadingsOur momentumshould start witha correction of ourself-perception withfuller reconciliationwith the valuesof the worldwe belong toPREAMBLE17


The reformisttendency callsfor gradual andpeaceful transitionand acceptsdemocracy asthe best optionThe stagnation ofreform in various<strong>Arab</strong> countriesconstitutes a kindof regressionthat impoverishespolitical life andreduces the optionsfor comprehensivedevelopmentThe financial crisisthat escalated in2008 will furtherslow the processof knowledgeindigenisation inthe <strong>Arab</strong> milieu<strong>Arab</strong> countries or on the global level.The reformist tendency in its new formis marked by its reliance on a discourse thatcalls for gradual and peaceful transitionand accepts democracy as the best optionfor building a new consensus aimed at thegeneralisation of the language and logic ofpeaceful reform. However this call, whichhas crystallised third-generation conceptsof political reform, has not been able tomaintain its ardour, despite the positiveeffects it has produced in such <strong>Arab</strong> statesas Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, andsome Gulf countries.We spoke above of “third-generationreform concepts,” a term that affirmsthe deep roots and continuity of hopesfor reform on the <strong>Arab</strong> political scene.The history of reform in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionhas marched in step with the thought ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> renaissance, during which thefirst generation of concepts of reformwere formulated. The conceptual fabricof the second generation of reform islinked with the movements for liberationfrom colonialism. Thus reform has a longhistory in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, and the conceptsthat have crystallised at the beginning ofthis century complete and fulfil previoussteps in the evolution of the reformistorientation in <strong>Arab</strong> thought. However,we note a halt in the recent revival nowthat we find ourselves face to face witha stagnation that promises a reversion toold patterns of rule regarding the way inwhich phenomena within <strong>Arab</strong> society aredealt with. This stagnation that has affectedthe waves of reform in various <strong>Arab</strong>countries in recent years constitutes a kindof regression that impoverishes politicallife and reduces the options intended torespond to the demand for comprehensivehuman development.Without going into the details ofpast and current reform programmes,we would point to the absence of onefundamental element, that represented bythe declaration of freedoms, even thoughthe discourse of reform has raised suchslogans. We also note the absence ofsystematic and productive monitoring ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge situation. The data oneducation and the reform of knowledgeenvironments continue to be expressedin abbreviated form, in the shape ofslogans and general demands. If we casta quick glance at the reform programmesof most states or organisations, we willnotice the absence of knowledge in itsvarious manifestations and dimensions asan area of particular interest. This maybe explained by the fact that the tyrannyof the general political orientation bothoverwhelms knowledge and dominatessociety’s thinking. However, the failureto specify the contours and horizons ofknowledge reform should be considered afailure to recognise the significant pivotalrole that knowledge has come to play inhuman societies.THE WORLD FINANCIALCRISIS: OPPORTUNITIES ANDCHALLENGES FOR THEESTABLISHMENT OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY. 13The increasing disassociation of capitalflows and financial transactions from theworkings of the real economy (real, thatis, in terms of production, consumption,commodity export, and true investment)has led to greater “fragility” in the worldfinancial system, a rise in the level of riskon the world’s money markets, and growingfailure to achieve monetary and financialstability on the global level. This has ledto the major financial crisis that escalatedat the end of 2008 in Wall Street and hassince caused the bankruptcy and collapseof major financial institutions. We believethat this crisis will have repercussions forproduction and the different knowledgeprogrammes as it has on economic andsocial development. We also assume therewill be ramifications that further slow theprocess of knowledge indigenisation inthe <strong>Arab</strong> milieu.The countries of the <strong>Arab</strong> region havebeen affected by the global economic crisisaccording to their degree of engagementwith the currents of financial globalisation.18 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Thus the <strong>Arab</strong> region in general, and theoil-producing countries of the Gulf inparticular, have been affected by the fall inthe price of crude oil.The most significant negative effects ofthe global financial crisis on the economiesand societies of the <strong>Arab</strong> region can besummed up as follows:• A sharp fall in the <strong>Arab</strong> region’s stockexchanges and money markets, which,by the estimate of the internationalinvestment house, Global, have sufferedlosses of around 47 per cent to the endof November 2008.• A dramatic fallback in crude oil prices,which have tumbled from a record highof $147 per barrel as a result of a fall indemand–mostly from the US–of around3 million barrels per day.• Ahmed Goweili, the secretary of the <strong>Arab</strong>Economic Unity Council, estimates totallosses for individuals, organisations, andgovernments, including sovereign wealthfunds, in the <strong>Arab</strong> region as a result ofthe global economic crisis to be in theregion of $2.5 trillion. The negativeeffect of these losses will in turn affectthe budgets for personal consumptionand private and public business sectorinvestment programmes. This will leadto a vicious circle of further economiccontraction and stagnation due tofeedback loops.• A fallback in foreign direct investmentto the <strong>Arab</strong> region, and in particular thatoriginating from the US and the Eurozone.It is expected that the crisis will have itsmost violent effects on those <strong>Arab</strong> statesthat are highly dependent on foreign aid.There are fears that shrinkage of this aid,given the current crisis, will have a negativeimpact on development programmes and,in consequence, on the building of theknowledge society. It may also take sometime for the ramifications of the negativeimpact of the current financial crisison the state of knowledge to becomeapparent. Such crises normally break outfirst in the financial sector, spreading onlyafter an interval to the real (as definedBOX 1The Effect of the Financial Crisis on Development FundingThe Doha Declaration for Financingof Development issued in December2008 stated, “We are deeply concernedby the impact of the current financialcrisis and global economic slowdownon the ability of developing countriesto access the necessary financingfor their development objectives.Developing countries and countrieswith economies in transition risksuffering very serious setbacks to theirdevelopment objectives, in particularthe achievement of the internationallyagreed development goals, includingthe Millennium Development Goals. Itabove) economy, leading in turn to furthercontraction in the economic variables.This subsequent contraction in the realeconomy then impacts on the socialsectors, resulting in a rise in unemploymentlevels, a fall in salaries, erosion of savings,and from there, cultural and knowledgeimpoverishment. These interactions in thesocial sectors lead to the impoverishmentof the middle and lower classes. It is likelythat the three sectors will suffer greateconomic and social hardships during<strong>2009</strong>, and that these may extend till thefirst half of 2010 and perhaps further.This interval provides a good opportunityfor those concerned with the conditionsof knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> world to makeeffective plans to manage the crisis andcontain its negative repercussions.Like all crises, just as the current onehas negative results and ramifications onthe <strong>Arab</strong> region, so it may also open upnew opportunities that can give forwardmomentum to the course of development,innovation, and the knowledge society. Inwhat follows we will attempt to indicatethe most important new prospects open tothe <strong>Arab</strong> economies and societies, so longas good assessment and good planning aremaintained over the coming months andyears.is critical to adopt further decisive andprompt actions to contain the currentcrisis and restore sustained economicgrowth. Given this global context, wecall the attention of all donors to thesituation and needs of the poorest andmost vulnerable. We also urge all donorsto maintain and deliver on their overseasdevelopment aid commitments... Inthis context, it is also important fordeveloping countries to maintain soundmacroeconomic policies that supportsustained economic growth and povertyeradication.”Source: Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: outcome document of the Follow-up International Conferenceon Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, Doha, Qatar, 29 November – 2December 2008.There are fearsthat shrinkage ofaid, will have anegative impacton developmentprogrammes andknowledge societyThe financial crisismay open up newopportunities thatcan give forwardmomentum tothe course ofdevelopment,innovation, and theknowledge societyPREAMBLE19


The current crisismay help to restorethe status of honestwork and sincereeffort, and builda new systemof incentives toencourage creativityand developmentMany key problemsstill form a majorobstacle to theestablishment of theknowledge society,the most prominentamong them beingcontinuing illiteracy• Curtailment of the “culture ofspeculation” and of speculativebehaviour in general, especially withregard to stock markets and property.• The redirection of savings intoproductive investment channels thathave large development and knowledgereturns. This should be followed bytransition in the <strong>Arab</strong> economy to amode of production that encouragescreativity and innovation.• Direction of intra-<strong>Arab</strong> investmentsto areas with high developmentreturns rather than those with rapidand purely financial returns such aswere characteristic of the 1990s andthe beginnings of the twenty-firstcentury, when excessive investmentin the financial and property sectorscame at the expense of productive andknowledge-based activities with longtermdevelopment effects.• Import substitution as a result of thedecline in foreign currency reserves.This will provide impetus to furtherefforts to improve quality, spread aculture of “excellence” and raise thelevel of competitiveness of products andservices in the <strong>Arab</strong> market. This againwill lead to the concentration of effortson the local manufacture of knowledgetools, upon whose import from abroadwe are presently largely dependent. Thiswill help to solve the special problemsof the state of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong>states by developing output to serve ourneeds and priorities.• Increased technological and knowledgeself-reliance through a gradual moveaway from very high cost “turn-key”technology contracts and packages.This would include the acquisition oftechnology and knowledge by processesof creative practice, or what is known inthe economic literature as technologicaland knowledge progress via on-the-joblearning.• Expansion in the development of intra-<strong>Arab</strong> commerce to compensate for theforeign export markets in Europe andthe US to which most <strong>Arab</strong> exports aredirected. This will lead to the openingof other doors for partnership in thefuture and encourage the transfer ofknowledge.The current crisis may also open upnew prospects for a creative adaptationto globalisation through knowledgeand technological cooperation with theadvanced nations of the South such asIndia, Brazil, China, South Korea, andMalaysia and by means of other South-South arrangements and partnershipsmore closely tailored to the levels ofeconomic, social, and knowledge progressin the <strong>Arab</strong> region. This should give usthe opportunity to share in the potentialbenefits of globalisation through merit,rather than suffering merely the downsides,as has often been the case.While over the last ten years propertyand stock market speculation has led to anunprecedented centralisation of incomeand wealth in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, it hasalso led to the “divorce of effort fromreturn,” and thus dealt a severe blow tothe values of hard work, innovation, andcreativity innate in our culture and society.The current crisis may help to restore thestatus of honest work and sincere effort,and this will help to build a new systemof incentives to encourage creativity anddevelopment.Given the current crisis and thepressures on public and private budgets,there must be caution with regard todipping into allocations for researchand development activities and cultural,creative, and artistic projects. The welfareof coming generations is at stake.OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENTKNOWLEDGE SITUATION INTHE ARAB REGIONThe <strong>Report</strong> will treat of the conditionof knowledge and sustain an analysisaimed at revealing its most significantdeficits and formulating suggestions tohelp its revival. Here we present a briefpreliminary review of some of the majordevelopments that have occurred in <strong>Arab</strong>20 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


knowledge over recent years. This willpermit us to detail, and closely scrutinise,the various manifestations and foundationsof knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.<strong>Arab</strong> states have, over the last quartercentury, witnessed marked progress on theindicator set relating to the proliferation ofknowledge among their citizens, startingwith the drop in illiteracy rates and endingwith the numbers of people holding higheruniversity degrees. When we considerthe three key indicators for educationused by the World Bank to measure astate’s readiness for involvement in theknowledge society–that is, adult 14 literacyrates, enrolment in secondary education,and enrolment in higher education–theprogress is demonstrable. In 1980, theaverage adult literacy rate in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries had reached approximately 55per cent for males and 25 per cent forfemales. In 2005, this average had reached82 per cent for males and 62 per cent forfemales. 15 The median of gross enrolmentratio in all programmes of secondaryeducation had reached, in 1980, 57 percent for males and 38 per cent for females,whereas in 2006 it reached 70 per cent formales and 65 per cent for females. 16 In1980, gross enrolment in tertiary educationexceeded 25 per cent for males and 20 percent for females in Lebanon only (41 and21 per cent respectively), while the medianreached 8 per cent for males and 4.6 percent for females. Tertiary education wasabsent or virtually absent in one-thirdof <strong>Arab</strong> countries (with gross enrolmentratio of less than 5 per cent). However by2005, only three <strong>Arab</strong> states were left withenrolment rates of less than 5 per cent,while the median had reached 18 per centfor men and 29 per cent for women. 17These achievements should not deflectour gaze from the failures that are causingmany <strong>Arab</strong> states to fail to bridge theknowledge gaps. Despite the <strong>Arab</strong> regionhaving spent 5 per cent of GDP and20 per cent of government budgets oneducation over the past forty years (Leagueof <strong>Arab</strong> States and UNDP, 2008), many ofthe structural aspects of weakness remainin place. Many key problems still form amajor obstacle to the establishment ofthe knowledge society, perhaps the mostprominent among them being continuingilliteracy. Around one third of the adultpopulation is unable to read and write,meaning that there are still some 60 millionilliterate people in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries,two-thirds of them women, and almost9 million children of elementary-schoolage outside school, most of them in thecountries that have not solved the illiteracyproblem. 18 It is impossible to realise theambition of setting up the knowledgeeconomy and society as long as theregional gross enrolment ratio in uppersecondary education remains below 55per cent for males and females alike, whenthe industrially advanced states and thoseof Central Asia have achieved enrolmentrates around 84 per cent. 19In addition to this quantitative shortfallin the dissemination of education, theregion suffers from numerous qualitativeproblems. In terms of qualitativeperformance, studies from 2003 makeclear that students from <strong>Arab</strong> countriesscore much lower than world averages ingrade-8 international tests in the sciencesand mathematics. The average scores inmathematics and science in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionwere 393 and 419, while the world averageswere 467 and 474 respectively (UNDP,2007a, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Similar internationalstudies undertaken in 2007 show that thelow performance of pupils from <strong>Arab</strong>countries in mathematics and the sciencescontinues; in 2007, the performanceof <strong>Arab</strong> pupils did not exceed 388 inmathematics and 424 in the sciences, whileworld averages were 445 and 466 (UNDP,2007d, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Over and above this, it seems thatthe correlation between education andeconomic growth in the <strong>Arab</strong> world isweak. This may be due to a number ofreasons, such as lack of conformity ofeducation and training programmes interms of quality or quantity to pressingdevelopmental needs. The human assetsformed by education also have not beenIn terms ofqualitativeperformance,students from <strong>Arab</strong>countries scoremuch lower thanworld averages inthe sciences andmathematicsThe correlationbetween educationand economicgrowth in the <strong>Arab</strong>world is weakPREAMBLE21


On the ICT axis, the<strong>Arab</strong> states havemade reasonableprogressThe weakest pointin <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance may bethe lack of enablingenvironmentsappropriate to theestablishment of aknowledge societyutilised as required to serve society.On the ICT axis, it is evident that the<strong>Arab</strong> states have made reasonable progress,in that the region has continued to investin infrastructure, recording, in 2008,progress in technological performance thatexceeded that in all other regions of theworld. 20 Four <strong>Arab</strong> countries came withinthe top fifty states most ready to utiliseICT and eleven <strong>Arab</strong> countries witnesseda rise in the value of the ICT index incomparison with 1995. Yet, despite theseachievements, the gap between the <strong>Arab</strong>countries and the rest of the world remainssubstantial. The performance of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries also varies from state to state.Such variation between the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesin their utilisation of new technologiesand in the use and production of <strong>Arab</strong>icdigital content holds true also for thedifferent social categories within eachcountry, and warns of more fragmentationand extremism should these countries notinstitute equal access to technology.It is to be noted that improvementin <strong>Arab</strong> country performance accordingto the ICT index does not correlate withnational revenue. Even though some <strong>Arab</strong>countries that enjoy high revenues occupyadvanced positions on the ICT index,these positions remain lower than thoseoccupied by other countries of the worldthat enjoy comparable national revenues.Interest in investment in the field ofresearch and innovation as one of thepillars of knowledge has grown in the<strong>Arab</strong> states since the beginning of the1980s. <strong>Arab</strong> academic research centreshave steadily and noticeably developedin all specialisations, so that most <strong>Arab</strong>countries now have research centres andinstitutions, whereas in the middle of thelast century such institutions were limitedto Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Lebanon.After having been virtually absent from thefield of international scientific publication,the <strong>Arab</strong>s now contribute 1.1 per cent ofoutput in that field (TWAS, 2005). In spiteof progress on the research and innovationindex, particularly from a quantitativeangle, in recent years, <strong>Arab</strong> innovationperformance remains the major weak spoton the current <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge scene,and the scientific innovation and researchgap between the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and therest of the advanced regions of the worldremains clear, deep, and serious. The <strong>Arab</strong>region’s expenditure on scientific researchis one of the world’s lowest in terms of<strong>Arab</strong> GNP. Research and developmentinstitutions are weakly integrated with thecycle of production. The developmentreturns of <strong>Arab</strong> scientific research arevery weak and do not correspond to themagnitude of annual <strong>Arab</strong> expenditure onthem, which tops $2 billion and which, inthe period 2002-2006, resulted in no morethan approximately 38.2 patents per yearand 5,000 published scientific papers. 21The weakest point in <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance may be the lack of enablingenvironments appropriate to theestablishment of a knowledge society,particularly in relation to the key indexof freedom; as a whole, the <strong>Arab</strong> stateshave made no tangible progress withrespect to freedom of thought and ofexpression. Apart from the proliferationof <strong>Arab</strong> satellite channels and internetblogs, which have provided a safety valvefor a noticeable upsurge in activity by theregion’s youth, the outlook for freedom ofthought and of expression remains gloomy.Some <strong>Arab</strong> governments have imposedrestrictions on <strong>Arab</strong> satellite broadcasting.Additional broadcasting and medialegislation and laws have been enactedwhich have strengthened governments’grip on the media, press, journalists,internet blogs and bloggers, as well asintellectuals. Most media and knowledgediffusionmechanisms remain state-ownedand operate alongside a limited number oflarge media and entertainment companiestransmitting to the <strong>Arab</strong> countries fromthe countries of the Gulf or from outsidethe region.In contrast, a slight improvement inthe development of economic freedomscan be observed in states such as Egypt,Tunisia, and those of the Gulf, wherethis has led to increased rates of growth.22 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


However, this progress remains limited and does not necessarily reflect a vision focusedon establishment of the knowledge society or improvement of knowledge performance.<strong>Arab</strong> countries are still exporters of primary resources and importers of highvalue-added products with high knowledge content. There must be a focus on theimpossibility of achieving an <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge and development renaissance throughreliance solely on improvement in economic freedom–even if the latter is supported byintellectual property rights– given the continuation of the restrictions imposed on otherfreedoms, particularly those of thought and of expression. It is not possible to create<strong>Arab</strong> environments that stimulate knowledge without the existence of an integratedpackage of freedoms. Similarly, any hope of the equitable social distribution of the resultsof development will disappear in the absence of a democratic climate that providespopular oversight and fights corruption.The <strong>Report</strong> will deal in detail with these issues in order, seeking to draw a clearerpicture of many aspects of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region and bring together data that willprepare the way, in the widest possible form, for <strong>Arab</strong> societies to deal realistically withtheir challenges and deficits. Once they have done so, these societies will be capable ofinvesting their available capacities in achieiving a breakthrough to the world of knowledgeand the establishment of the knowledge society to which they aspire.It is not possibleto create <strong>Arab</strong>environmentsthat stimulateknowledge withoutthe existence of anintegrated packageof freedomsPREAMBLE23


End Notes* Arberry, Arthur J. The Koran Interpreted. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. p.651.1See the section devoted to stagnation in political reform and its effects on enabling environments for knowledge.2This paragraph depends on the statistical update of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2007-2008, whichgives the latest data available about the <strong>Arab</strong> region until 2006. It also depends on the data from the HumanDevelopment <strong>Report</strong> 2003 for comparative purposes (www.hdr.undp.org).3Based on the proportion of the population under the lower national poverty line.4The <strong>Arab</strong> Food Sovereignty Index has been calculated for fifteen <strong>Arab</strong> countries. It is divided into the followingbands:4.5>6.0: High food sovereignty;2.5>5: Food sovereignty;1.0>2.5: Low food sovereignty.0>1.0: Extremely low food sovereignty.5Chapter 2 discusses this matter in more detail in terms of its impact on the knowledge society.6The governance indicators are based upon six dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability andAbsence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control over Corruption.7An independent multi-party commission formed to issue recommendations around the future of British forces inIraq.Source: Jalili, Ismail. “Iraq’s Lost Generation” from the website http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/alJalili170607.pdf8From a speech by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross upon his return from Darfur inFebruary 2007 (http://www.icrc.org/web/ara/siteara0.nsf/htmlall/sudan-news-210207?opendocument).9The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Index measures the capacity of a country to produce, indigenise, and diffuse knowledge. It isthe average of a country›s score on the indicators of the three key pillars of knowledge economy (education,innovation, and ICT). See the World Bank website (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp.10CIA website, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html, on 13 March <strong>2009</strong>.11http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=int_use-internet-users&country=so- and http://www.worldpress.org/profiles2/Somalia.cfm on 13 March <strong>2009</strong>12This paragraph relies on the background papers prepared by Fahmi Huwaydi (“Extremism and its Effect on the<strong>Knowledge</strong> Society”) and Hani Fahs (“Fanaticism as an Obstacle to <strong>Knowledge</strong>” and “The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>Renaissance between the Need for Agreement and a Landscape of Division”).13This section is based on a background paper to this report prepared during the first quarter of <strong>2009</strong> by Mahmud‘Abd al-Fadil, “The Ramifications of the World Financial Crisis for <strong>Arab</strong> Economies and Societies: Losses andOpportunities.”14Adult, here, means a person over fifteen years old.15See Statistical Annex, Table 9.16See Statistical Annex, Table 10.17See Statistical Annex, Table 11.18See Statistical Annex, Table 13.19See Statistical Annex, Table 15.20This is according to the majority of available indicators, including the report of the World Bank on the <strong>Knowledge</strong>Assessment Methodology published in 2008. See Chapter 4.21World Bank website, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM) 2008, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam on25 December 2008.24 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


CHAPTER ONETHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICSOF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY


CHAPTER ONETHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICSOF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYIntroductionThis chapter presents a general theoreticalframework for the knowledge society, basedon four major axes linked by the concernsand issues invoked by the project to create a“knowledge society” as an integral part of acomprehensive programme of <strong>Arab</strong> renaissance.The first of these axes presents the premisesand principles guiding the knowledge society.The second deals with the conceptual structureof the discourses that have attempted to shedlight on the changes in modern societies sincethe information revolution. Here we haveconstructed an operational definition of theknowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, based onthe ideas put forward in the <strong>Report</strong>’s variouschapters. The third axis constructs the systemsof reference that have guided, and continue toguide, knowledge discourse in the contemporaryworld and allows us to become acquaintedwith the dimensions and options underlyingearlier reports on the same topic. The fourthaxis examines some of the problematic issuesposed today by information and knowledgedevelopment in contemporary society, believingthat reflection on these issues will influence effortsto close knowledge gaps in the <strong>Arab</strong> world andachieve comprehensive human development.While subsequent chapters of the <strong>Report</strong>examine the quantitative and qualitativedimensions of the most significant foundationsof knowledge, this chapter deals with thetheoretical structure of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance and constructs the intellectualframe of reference that underlies it. It seeksto provide insights that will help us acquirekeys to the knowledge society, develop the fieldof knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, and supportactive intercommunication with the knowledgeadvances of our age.PREMISES AND PRINCIPLES:THE KNOWLEDGE-DEVELOPMENT-FREEDOMTRIADTwo fundamental premises lie behind thedriving concepts of the <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong><strong>Report</strong> and provide orientation for its variouschapters, be it this chapter concerned withinquiry into the concepts, problematicsand frames of reference, chapter 2 dealingwith the enabling environment, or thosechapters on the knowledge society’s mostsignificant foundations and manifestations.The first premise is that there exists atriadic relationship among knowledge,development, and freedom. When wespeak of the relationship between humandevelopment and knowledge, we evokethe teleological dimension that placesknowledge at the service of development.When we speak of freedom, we have inmind the social and political frameworksthat support knowledge and innovationthrough creative interaction between theexpansion of freedom and the creation ofknowledge.The second premise concerns therelationship between development andthe building of a knowledge society, as itis widely recognised that knowledge tendsto engender social development, includingeconomic, social, and cultural efforts toovercome the deficiencies that limit theexpansion of human well-being.<strong>Knowledge</strong> is a human right anda means to overcome many of thedifficulties and obstacles facing mankind.Today it is increasingly becoming a vitalrequirement of development. Currentdata from countries with high levels ofThere exists atriadic relationshipamong knowledge,development,and freedom<strong>Knowledge</strong> isa human rightand a means toovercome manyof the difficultiesand obstaclesfacing mankindTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY27


The successfuldeployment ofthe knowledgeproduced inall spheres ofeconomic and socialactivity contributeseffectively to theexpansion ofhuman choice andemancipationBOX 1-1This report uses the term “knowledge”to embrace all forms of a society’sepistemological and cultural assets andviews it as a major organizing principalof holistic human development.<strong>Knowledge</strong> in this sense seeks toexpand options and opportunitiesavailable to the individual <strong>Arab</strong> andto achieve for him or her freedomThe relationbetweenknowledge anddevelopmentshould not beunderstood ina frameworkof mechanisticdeterminismintellectual and technological propertyconfirm that the successful deploymentof the knowledge produced in allspheres of economic and social activitycontributes effectively to the expansionof human choice and emancipation. Thisin turn results in the achievement ofcomprehensive human development.It is important to stress here thatthe relation between knowledge anddevelopment should not be understood ina framework of mechanistic determinism.On the contrary, this relationship must beunderstood in light of the historical debatethat establishes interactions betweenthese fundamentals and thus creates themanifestations and poles of the knowledgesociety, as we aim to show.The Concept of <strong>Knowledge</strong>and an honourable life. <strong>Knowledge</strong>—whether we are talking in terms of itsacquisition, production, indigenisationor deployment—thus becomes a tooland goal that affects all levels of societyequally and involves all of fields, fromthe scientific, technical, cultural, andtraditional to accumulated communitywisdom.THE CONCEPTUAL BUILDINGBLOCKSThe concepts prevailing in the literature onthe information age fall into two categories.The first category is that of central conceptsthat outline the intellectual space of theage; these are still in a stage of theoreticalformation and development. The secondis that of intermediate concepts that gointo the production and reproductionof the discourse on knowledge. Thoseconcerned with the knowledge society haveformulated a group of concepts that seekto capture the transformations occurringwithin new realms of knowledge. Theseconcepts, however, are plagued withambiguity and conflicting significations,and this increases confusion and widensthe gap in an age in which the gainsfrom knowledge are indispensable. Thedifficulty in terminology is exacerbated bythe novelty and speed at which new termsare introduced to the literature. Most termsare no more than four decades old andhave been in common use for only threedecades. They lack “epistemic saturation,” 1for they are still marked by an operationalcharacter, and this renders agreement ontheir limits of application difficult.It follows that our goal in creating aconceptual structure for our work isto be able to delineate the limits ofepistemic saturation and, at the sametime, to scrutinise the operationaldimension behind the concepts in orderto reach a minimum of agreement onthe significations assigned to particularconcepts in the contemporary discourseon knowledge.FROM KNOWLEDGE TOKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYTHE DEVELOPMENT OFTHE CONCEPT OF THEKNOWLEDGE IN ARABCULTUREThe term “knowledge” (ma‘rifa) is used inthe <strong>Arab</strong> linguistic and cultural traditionin several ways and with more than onemeaning. <strong>Knowledge</strong> is the opposite ofignorance, as the term “knowledgeable”(‘arif ) is given to one who is well versedin something that he undertakes. Whena multiplicity of cognitive specialisationstook shape in Islamic <strong>Arab</strong> thought in theMiddle Ages, the same word, in the sense ofone who acquires and becomes a bearer ofknowledge, began to refer to the specialistin the finer points of information within aspecific field of knowledge.<strong>Arab</strong>ic use of the term ma‘rifa allowsfor a positive value since its opposite, jahl(ignorance), carries a negative value (Sa‘idYaqtin, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>).The dictionary entitled al-‘Ayn, for example,brings together the meanings given in theentry for the letters that form the root28 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


BOX 1-2“<strong>Knowledge</strong>” in al-Tahanawi’s “The Terminology of the Arts”“The term ma‘rifa is used in a number of meanings. One is ‘ilm,meaning perception, whether this be conceptualisation (tasawwur) orassent (tasdiq). Thus it has been said, “Every instance of ma‘rifa and‘ilm is one of either conceptualisation or assent.”“Another meaning of ma‘rifa is just tasawwur, in the senseindicated above; in this case tasdiq is called ‘ilm, also in the senseindicated above.“Another meaning of ma‘rifa is perception of the simple, whetherthis be conceptualisation of its nature or assent to statements thatmay be made about it. Perception of the complex on the other hand[is specific to ‘ilm], whether this be conceptualisation or assent. Withthis meaning, then, there is a distinction between ma‘rifa and ‘ilm,both being more limited than ‘ilm as perception in an absolute sense.This existence of a distinction is also the case for the second meaningof ma‘rifa and ‘ilm [i.e., that which restricts ma‘rifa to tasawwur and‘ilm to tasdiq] . . . .“One says, “The Almighty knows (has ‘ilm)” and not “(He)recognises (has ma‘rifa)”, because His perception is not (a) basedon evidence, nor is it (b) preceded by a lack of knowledge, nor isit (c) subject to forgetfulness. Ma‘rifa and ‘ilm can be consideredcoterminous when used in these [last two] senses.“Another (meaning of ma‘rifa) is a technical sense used by theSufis . . . . [As a certain writer says,] ‘Ma‘rifa strictly speaking means‘ilm simply, whereas in actual usage it means ‘ilm preceded by nonknowledge.But in Sufi parlance ma‘rifa means that ‘ilm which is notsubject to doubt, if, specifically, the thing known is the essence ofGod Almighty and His attributes . . . . Furthermore, ma‘rifa is either(a) “evidential” (istidlali)—that is, it uses signs as evidence for theexistence of their Creator, since some of the Sufis see things andthen see Him by means of the things; this ma‘rifa, if one considersit carefully, occurs only to someone to whom something from therealm of the unseen is revealed, so that he uses both the visible andinvisible signs as evidence of the existence of Almighty God . . . . orit is (b) “direct and automatic witnessing” (shuhudiyya daruriyya)—thatis, it consists of using the existence of the Creator of the signs asevidence for the signs themselves; this is the rank of the Veracious,who are those to whom such witnessing is granted. A sheikh hassaid, “I saw God before all else,” and this is the gnosis that comesthrough faith and good works, and it means that they have come toknow everything through Him, and not that they have come to knowHim through any thing’ . . .“Ma‘rifa is more particular than ‘ilm because it may be appliedto two meanings, each of which is a kind of ‘ilm, one being ‘ilm ofsomething esoteric the evidence for which is provided by somethingexoteric, as would be the case if one scrutinised a person and as aresult understood what was hidden within him through some markthat was manifest upon him . . . and the other being ‘ilm of somethingone saw and of which one had previously been aware . . . .“Al-Wasiti has said, ‘Ma‘rifa is [knowledge of] what I have “seen”through my senses, and ‘ilm is [knowledge of] what I have “seen”as a result of information I have received,’ that is, informationprovided by the prophets, peace be upon them . . .“Another (meaning of ma‘rifa) is the technical usage by thegrammarians, namely, ‘a noun adopted conventionally to indicatea specific thing,’ or, according to others, ‘a noun adoptedconventionally to be applied to a specific thing’; its opposite is‘indefiniteness’. . .“What is intended by ma‘rifa is a thing that is defined, for thehearer, with regard to its being defined, as if it were functioning as apointer to that thing by being expressed that way. By the indefinite,on the other hand, is intended the turning of the mind to whatis defined, with regard to its essence, with no attention being paid toits being defined, even if it is so defined in itself. There is a cleardifference between a thing being endowed with specificity and therecognition of its being so endowed.”Source: al-Tahanawi, Muhammad ‘Ali al-Faruqi (d. 1745). Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun (The Unveiler of the Terminology of the Arts). Beirut, Dar Sadir, Vol. 3, pp.994ff.of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic word meaning “to know”and the changes those meanings undergoaccording to their vowel signs or etymology(al-Khalil ibn Ahmad al-Farahidi, 2002, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic). Thus ma‘rifa means “the appearingand being revealed of what is hidden” andal-ma‘ruf (“that which is known”) means“what is clearly viewed” since the word“viewing” (nazar) here comprehends bothseeing and observing, as well as thinking.In this context, ma‘rifa indicates transitionfrom one state to another; i.e., transitionfrom ignorance to learning.As Islamic culture became ever morediverse and vigorous, the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languagewas further enriched. Some specialiseddictionaries highlight the change inthe meaning of the term “knowledge.’Al-Ta’rifat by al-Jurjani explains that“knowledge” is “what is written to showsomething specific.” In other words, it is“perception of the thing as it is.” Changein meaning is a movement towards asignification in a specific area of knowledge,such as grammar, jurisprudence, logic, ormysticism, resulting in the development ofa distinction between knowledge (ma‘rifa)and learning (‘ilm) and the knower (al-‘arif )and the learned (al-‘alim) (al-Jurjani, 1985,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).The word ma‘rifa continued to carry itsold meanings as found in the lexica until thebeginnings of the twentieth century, afterwhich it expanded under the influence ofthe second cultural exchange between <strong>Arab</strong>thought and trends in modern Europeanthought, during the <strong>Arab</strong> renaissance. Theword thus came to mean intellectual andAs Islamic culturebecame evermore diverse andvigorous, the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage wasfurther enrichedTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY29


The knowledgerevolution atthe end of thetwentieth century,and above all in thefield of informationtechnology, hasbrought societyto the thresholdof a new agephilosophical output and research in thevarious different sciences and theoreticalfields. In the last two decades, however,it has evolved further under the influenceof several changes and developments.These have affected the fundamentalsand bases of the concept of knowledge,including its philosophical, scientific, andcultural fundamentals and brought aboutits shift from being the preserve of anelite to a right belonging to all individualsin society and a precondition for humandevelopment. Mechanisms and means havebecome available too that allow knowledgeto play these roles, as in the case of therevolutions in information technology.Thus, the present age has witnessed aradical change in the signification of theterm “knowledge,” with new synonyms andmeanings that differ from those used in the<strong>Arab</strong> cultural patrimony, a developmentthat may lead to a disjunction between theterm “knowledge” as used in the latter andthe meanings that the compound term“knowledge society” bears today.In the <strong>Arab</strong> linguistic and intellectualtradition, the term “knowledge” refersto a symbolic product and to intellectualenquiry. Those who possessed knowledgewere called the elite—the select few whowere possessed of exceptional abilities inscrutiny and contemplation. However, theknowledge revolution at the end of thetwentieth century, and above all in the fieldof information technology, has broughtsociety to the threshold of a new age, inwhich knowledge has become the upshotof a combination of higher technologyand evolved human experience. This hasresulted in a revolution in the densityand availability of knowledge and inthe expansion of economic, social, andrecreational roles made possible by thediverse spheres and worlds of productionthat fashion the knowledge society.THE INTERACTION ANDINTERSECTION OF CONCEPTSIn contemporary usage, the phrase“the knowledge society” is taken tobe synonymous with several terms orBOX 1-3A Linguistic Perspective on “<strong>Knowledge</strong>”Careful observation of the significations and derivatives of theword ma‘rifa (knowledge) and the syntactical and morphologicaltransformations to which it may be subject, reveals that it has thefollowing meanings:• “The appearance and revelation of what has been hidden andconcealed.” Thus the various words built from the root ‘–r-f,whether ‘arf meaning “wind” or “perfume,” or ‘urf meaning“a good deed, or act of generosity or open-handedness” or“a projecting part of the body” (as in ‘urf al-faras (“the mare’smane”)), or ‘arafat in the sense of “an open space” or as a verb(‘arifa, imperfect ya‘rifu) meaning “to know,” are all indicative ofsomething becoming conspicuous, appearing, and becomingwide-spread to the point of being plain to the eye. The samemeaning is to be found in ma‘arif (“acquaintances”) and ‘arif,which is to say “the chief man among a group of people andthe most conspicuous among them.”• “Movement from one state to another.” Semantically relatedis the transformation of the signification to that of movementfrom ignorance of a thing to awareness of it, or from disavowaland denial to knowledge and acknowledgment. Thus someonewho acknowledges (ya‘tarifu) or recognises (yasta‘rifu) orcharacterises (yu‘arrifu) a thing moves from a state of keepingit secret or denying its existence to one of confessing his guiltwith regard to it or revealing its nature, thus making someother person cognisant of it (mu‘tarifun ‘alayh) and aware of it(‘alimun bihi).By examining these two semantic fields (appearance, and movementfrom ignorance to awareness) along with their various associatedsub-significations, we find that knowledge means, in sum, “acquiringawareness of something.” This has led many to define knowledge as“awareness,” in all its general and specific senses. This explains howit comes about that the various derivative forms of the words forknowledge (ma‘rifa) and awareness (‘ilm) are, by and large, syntacticallyand semantically identical, as illustrated by the following:• Ma‘rifa = ‘ilm; ‘arif = ‘alim; ma‘ruf = ma‘lum; ma‘arif =ma‘alim; ta‘arruf = ta‘allum; ta‘rif = ta‘lim.The two concepts also share antonymy with the words in thefollowing list (in the same order as the above):• Jahl/nakira; jahil/munkir; majhul/munkar; majahil/manakir;tanakkur/tankir.In the latter case, tajahhul is not used as the opposite of tanakkurand tajhil is a recent coinage. This may be explained by the fact that“adoption of ignorance” (tajahhul) and “imposition of ignorance”(tajhil) both imply intent, which means that they cannot be realisedin actual usage because both conditions (of ignorance, assumed orimposed) are involuntary.Source: Sa’id Yaqtin, Min al-Ma’rifa ila Mujtama’ al-Ma’rifa (From <strong>Knowledge</strong> to the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society), background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.30 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


phrases that do not display theoretical orfunctional equivalence. This points to anumber of difficulties, in which the logicof nomenclature becomes entwined withthe mechanisms of interpretation. Linkingthe knowledge society with widely usedconcepts such as the information society,the knowledge economy, the networkedsociety, the digital society, the informationsociety, or the technology society fails toyield a unified concept. This diversity ofterms shows that the central concept hasyet to achieve “knowledge saturation.”Thus we are faced with concepts that growup side by side with significations most ofwhich have resonances that tie them insome way to the concept of the knowledgesociety.The connotations of the term“knowledge” in “knowledge society” differfrom those in “knowledge economy” and“information technology.” Similarly, theterm “information” is not the theoreticalequivalent of the term “knowledge,” since“knowledge” implies more than the merequantity of information and data gathered..On the other hand, if we look at the manydefinitions of the word “information” thatare subsumed within the term “informationexplosion,” we see that it is at the core ofthe concept of knowledge. This explosionis creating the salient characteristics ofthe human information landscape—theimages that today are establishing a newworld and a new society.This description of nomenclatural issuesand the asymmetry of synonyms reflectsonly part of the challenge that we face in ourcurrent endeavour, since disciplinary framesof reference that influence researchers intheir specialised fields themselves control theconstruction of nomenclature. Engineersbelieve that they are behind the creationof intelligent technology, and that thelatter has banished the traditional educatedperson from the new knowledge arena andreplaced him with the media and technicalengineer. Economists likewise believethat the “knowledge-based economy” isexpressive of the major transformations ofthe age and use the concept when speakingof characteristics of economies in postindustrialsociety. Sociologists, on the otherhand, view the knowledge society throughthe lens of the post-modern age, in thatthe main traits of this society are beingformed in a new perspective of precisetechnical ideas and innovations generativeof a composite world.On this basis, we will explain the majordifference between the term “knowledge”in the <strong>Arab</strong> linguistic tradition and theconcept of knowledge in the contemporaryknowledge society. It may also be the casethat there is no link between the term“knowledge” as used in “the knowledgesociety” and the theory of knowledge inthe history of philosophy. Today the worldfinds itself confronted with new meaningsarising from the information revolution,communication techniques, and geneticengineering, in addition to those ofmathematics, sociology, anthropology,economics, and linguistics. The distinctmeanings and nuances that arise fromthese different uses of the term are oftenironed out in intellectual approaches thatcommoditize knowledge.Before, we seek to construct anoperational definition that is in keeping withour vision for the <strong>Report</strong>, we shall attemptto bypass the confusion of nomenclatureby condensing the question into majorpoles. These may help us approach oursubject, since the interconnectedness andmixing that are on-going today with regardto the significance of the concept “theknowledge society” may force us to createa way out that will advance our thinkingand help us to stay in touch with theachievements of our age.POLES OF THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETY: THE SOCIETY-ECONOMY-TECHNOLOGYTRIADLet us begin by acknowledging that theconcepts “knowledge” and “knowledgesociety” are still in process offormation, and, at the beginning ofthis new millennium, are undergoingThe conceptsof “knowledge”and “knowledgesociety” arestill in processof formation,undergoingmoments ofmaturation thataccompany anyprocess of birthTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY31


Technology, theeconomy, andsociety, constituteelementsfundamental tothe understandingof the knowledgesocietyTechnology hasits limits, butthere are no limitsto innovationone of those moments of maturation thataccompany any process of birth, or oftransition from one area of knowledge toanother. Caution is therefore called forwhen we use these concepts if productivedialogue about their meaning is to beachieved. At the same time, the diversityof synonyms reveals the existence of threemajor areas—technology, economy, andsociety—that intersect at the heart of theconcept. Thus, we find ourselves facingknowledge technology, a knowledgebasedeconomy, and a knowledge society(Wolton, 1997, in French). There is nodisputing the importance of informationtechnology to the knowledge society, justas no one downplays the importance ofthe role it plays in the formation of theconcept itself. Similarly, there is agreementon the transformations that knowledgetechnologies perform on new economiesand societies. This can only imply thattechnology, the economy, and society,in their contemporary manifestations,constitute elements fundamental to theunderstanding of the knowledge society.The new age, with all its visions andhopes of expanding the limits of humanoptions, is being established within theradius of these poles. In this context, wecannot overlook, either, the concept’sUtopian significance, for to speak of aknowledge society is, fundamentally, tospeak of an open-ended historical visionin the process of formation (Breton, 1997,in French; Nur al-Din Afayah, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). The term“knowledge” in “knowledge society” alsorefers to the outcome of the combinationof information, expertise, and capacityto govern, an outcome which makes theconstruction of knowledge possible andopens new horizons in terms of greaterhuman control over nature throughpossession of resources and systemsin spheres of work, knowledge andproduction. At the same time, it mustbe said that the societies whose majorfeatures most closely approach thoseof the knowledge society operate at theforefront of the information technologyindustry, and develop educational systemswhose universities and research centresfoster innovations and inventions.Such societies also provide an enablingatmosphere, institutions, laws, and a firmbase of individual and political freedomthat stimulate the production and use ofknowledge.The transformations seen by humansocieties at the end of the last centuryas a result of changes in the content andmechanisms of the knowledge society andof the information technology revolutionhave necessitated the reorganisation ofsociety and the economy. The result hasbeen disruption in numerous areas of life.The epistemological paradigms and appliedmechanisms that once prevailed withinsociety have ceased to be appropriate forthe structural changes this revolution hasunleashed. The terms “economy,” “society,”“culture,” “education,” and “media” are nolonger understood according to the logicof the nineteenth or the first half of thetwentieth century. Rather, they call for a newapproach using innovative mechanismsdesigned to meet the requirements of anew age. Within this vision, new economieshave formed, as have new means ofcommunications and new principles ofwork, perception, and interaction. It is nolonger adequate to do the right thing; onealso has to do it in the right way.Technology has become one of themanifestations of our existence, andour age has indeed become “the ageof technology.” Constantly and rapidlyevolving information channels dominateand have become electronic marketsproducing and distributing an infinitearray of goods and services. Globalisation,with its new economic order, has helpedtransform man into a consumer. Thiscomposite effect, represented by theinformation and knowledge-basedeconomies made possible by technology,has had its substantial impacts on humancognition and behavior.As we have shown, in the knowledgesociety, technology, economy, and societyintersect and interact, nurtured by an32 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


enabling institutional and legal environmentbased on freedom, intercommunication,and openness. If the knowledge societyforms and evolves in the light oftechnological variables, it simultaneouslyconstructs the major features of the neweconomy, an economy dominated bynetworks of transnational corporations;these, in turn give rise to new facilities andservices benefiting from human expertiseand intelligence. These networks alsoopen to the knowledge society the gatesof globalisation, which is capable ofbuilding new markets in a world wherebarriers both visible and invisible falldaily. The third side of the knowledgesociety triangle is represented by thenew consumer within society, whois distinguished by new patterns ofbehaviour, by globalised cultural patterns,and by intercommunication patternsthat create new phenomena, as shown inFigure 1-1, which compares the poles inquestion in such a way as to allow us todiagnose several current examples of thistransformation.These data are not complete. They are anattempt to capture aspects of phenomenathat are in process of formation andtransition from the industrial society to theknowledge society, an attempt to examinein detail what is happening in a changingworld. Even though <strong>Arab</strong> societies are notindustrial, and despite the knowledge gapbetween the <strong>Arab</strong> world and the developedworld, the <strong>Arab</strong>s are a part of this worldthat aspires to a firmer mastery of scientificknowledge and technology.The preceding data help us understandthe concept of the technology-economyknowledgetriad. Technology has its limits,but there are no limits to innovation, andthe economy has its spaces, albeit in thenew economies such spaces exist outsideof national borders. Despite these facts,the term “knowledge society” goesfarther than the opening-up implied bythe two previous terms, and has takenup residence in society and in thoseminds that are capable of building anddeveloping it.FIGURE 1-1EconomicPole<strong>Knowledge</strong>SocietySocietal PoleTechnologyDigital*<strong>Knowledge</strong> processingSequence machinesLogic of useElectronic informatics directed at the publicInstallation of dataWorldwide WebSystem profitabilityProcessing by topicDifferent mediaInteractive electronic carrierDynamic documentContentStrategy of cooperationMany novice usersTangible ValueNon-paper managementCollective knowledge<strong>Knowledge</strong>-based economyDemand-driven marketIntercontinental marketsThe poles of the knowledge society<strong>Knowledge</strong> societyIntermingled cultureInterest groupsData glutHorizontal hierarchy (networks)Democratic participation 2EconomySociety*A digital description of information technology data, a central pole of the knowledge society.TechnologicalPoleIndustrialSocietyAnalogueData processingCalculatorsOperational logicSpecial and specialised informaticsLarge quantity of raw dataPersonal home computersSystem strengthBundlingMultiple mediaPaper carrierRigid documentFormStrategy of competitionExperienced usersTangible CostPaper-dependent managementTechnological knowledgeProduction-intensive economySupply-driven marketNational marketsSociety of industrial unitsNational culturesMass spectatorsShortage of informationVertical hierarchyDemocratic representationTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY33


No one pursuesknowledge forits own sake, wemostly seek it for“what it can do”BOX 1-4I say, then, that the “power ofknowledge”—and I might just as wellsay “powerful knowledge”—is the firstreality which presents itself in ourcurrent age. I am not saying anythingnew. We all know that the shift fromknowledge as “contemplation,” as inthe Greek, to knowledge as “power”as in the works of Jabir ibn Hayyan,Bacon, and the modern West, is notnew. We all know that contemporarytechnology is the direct fruit of thisunderstanding. Here we must bearin mind that knowledge is not anaccumulation of scientific discoveriesbut, before anything else, a method thatencompasses the rules according towhich all the world’s data is viewed—man, nature, society, values, creations,and manufactured goods—and thatknowledge has its rigorous criticaland methodological instruments. Itsinstrumental or pragmatic naturetoday not only deals with the appliedor technical aspects, but includes allactivities of man, society and thestate, to the extent that, if “scientificknowledge” on these various fieldsof human activity were accumulated,it would be possible to shift to action.This means that knowledge wouldbecome a “tool” for the “governance”of man, society, and the state, and whatwe call the “human” and the “social”sciences could pursue these goalsWhen reviewing what has been saidabout these poles, we must emphasiseinteraction, rather than alignment orjuxtaposition. The focus on interactionbrings us into contact with productiveprocesses, narrows distances, and producesforms of interaction that are difficult toseparate or isolate unless for temporary orprocedural reasons, or for expediency.THE NETWORKED SOCIETY:THE MOST CONSPICUOUSFEATURE OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYA strong synonym for the “knowledgesociety” is the “networked society,” whichitself has given rise to several synonymsThe Power of <strong>Knowledge</strong>specifically. Today no one pursuesknowledge for its own sake, i.e., forthe pleasure produced by its magic,its exoticism, its revelations, or itsbeauty; we mostly seek it for “what itcan do.” Linguistics and the literaryarts themselves, at the end of the day,seek human intercommunication andpleasure, and what Spinoza calls the“pleasure of knowledge” operateswithin the same framework….Today the power of knowledge isevident in various forms, particularlyin the technological sector, and it isour inability to produce “technicalknowledge,” either now or perhapsin the foreseeable future, that revealsour inadequacy, weakness, and misery.We are able to participate at presentonly within the confines of the spacesthat produce that knowledge, i.e.,those of the “European West” or the“American West.” Nothing, however,prevents us from producing “humanand social knowledge.” From withinour own national spaces, we can directour research towards human issues andvalues, society and its values, and thestate and its principles. We can treatthese issues on the basis of scientific,rational methodologies and we canbenefit from them in our reformulationof humanity, society, and the state, andthus bestow on “knowledge” a power itdoes not at this time possess.Source: Fahmi Jad‘an, 2002, Riyah al-‘Asr, Al-Mu’assasa al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr, Beirut, pp. 14,15,16.such as the “digital society” and the “digitaldivide.” At the end of the last century,Manuel Castells published an importantthesis in three volumes entitled La Sociétéen Reseaux (The Networked Society), a hugework that is courageous, powerful, andoriginal, and touches on many complexaspects of the spirit of our age. Castellsbelieves that the digital character of theknowledge society raises numerous issues. Itconstitutes the most exciting characteristicof the information revolution by virtue ofthe ease with which its tools, techniques,and software may be used in productionsystems. At the same time, this very easeleads to outcomes and problematics thattouch the core of the transition to a hightechprecision technology within theknowledge society. The UNESCO <strong>Report</strong><strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies illuminates theissue with a telling simile, saying that thedifficulty of finding the appropriate itemof information in the information age islike “drinking water from a fire hose: thereis plenty of water, but one must beware ofdrowning” (UNESCO, 2005, in French).In Volume II of the former work,entitled The Power of Identity (Castells, 1999,in French), the author devotes specialattention to the networked society andexplains that the information age isgoverned and directed by two centralpoles: the network pole and the activeselfpole. In his account, the concept of“the network” does not mean any specificnetwork, but multiple networks controllingsources of power, wealth, and informationand enhanced with digital technology.The network is “the new social structurefor the information age—the age of thenetworked society made up of networksof production, power, and experience, aculture that by virtue of these networksplays a part in building a virtual culturewithin a framework of globalised flows andtranscends the concepts of time and place.In this age of ours, all societies have beenbreached by the sweeping power of thenetworked society.” Opposed to globalisednetworking, which is the salient feature ofthe knowledge society, stands the “self ”—34 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


the individual and collective identity (theindividual, the citizen, the human being,the group) that seeks to preserve its lifeamidst the sweeping transformations inknowledge. This tension between the“network” and the “self ” produces newforms of social conflict, of which knowledgeis a salient feature. Humanity faces, in placeof class conflict, a conflict in whichnetworks, with their multiple symbolicbases, play a dominant role in feeding andmarshalling its main features. Thus, Castellsstresses the roles played by new social andcultural movements, such as students’ andfeminist movements, the peace movementand environmental movements. There issomething in these different movements,as in the collapse of the socialist blockand its continuing repercussions, as wellas in the retreat of the symbolic power ofthe patriarchal system within the familyand in society at large, that reflects thecontradictions ignited by the informationage.From this perspective, the importanceof the networked society concept isrepresented by the social and informationalaxes. Because Castells highlights the roleof information in our age, information,viewed as the product of technologicalsystems and biological models, is hisparadigm for the new world. Thus thenetwork becomes an expression of acomplex activity; it resembles the humangenome strand supported by knowledge,by advanced, that is, and very precisemathematical data. Accepting the networkconcept means accepting that technology,and specifically information technology,lie behind social organisation. In Castells’words, “information” capitalism becomesthe alternative for what Marx in thenineteenth century called “industrialcapitalism.”The Internet has become the primaryinternational vehicle for conveying ideas;indeed, it has the power to globalisethe world (Castells, 2002, in French).It has helped destabilise all tools ofcommunication and has restructured theirarchitecture, their uses, and their modes ofproduction. At the same time, they havechanged how work is conducted and howauthority and control are exercised.The Internet is now the largest registryof reference information for all areasof knowledge. In addition, its networksprovide interactive possibilities throughoutthe fabric of society through rapid digitalmechanisms. As a result, the “place” in thenetworked society is not physical but isequivalent to “flows.” Capital flows and theabundant information made available onthe internet have no relation to a specificplace; they are in a “non-place” that issynonymous with all places. Furthermore,“time,” according to Castells, is “nontime,”since it is no longer connected tothe clock that, in the industrial age, definedits role. In the networked society, time is asort of vessel that allows us to be in severalplaces at once.THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY:TOWARDS EXPANDINGCHOICES FOR RENAISSANCEAND DEVELOPMENTThe 2005 UNESCO <strong>Report</strong> adopted theconcept of the knowledge society in theplural, as “knowledge societies,” viewingthis as the most appropriate term forthe changes taking place in a world ofwhich technology forms the cornerstone,and the central manifestations of whosegeneral structure are the new economyand communication networks. Themanifestations and epiphanies of thelatter are, in their turn, reflected in humanrealities, confronting humanity with newchallenges and questions. This highlightsthe importance of broadening thesignifications of the term to embrace all thechanges and social challenges influencedby this new perspective, or, perhaps moreaccurately, this new world.The importance of expanding thesignifications of the “knowledge” in“knowledge society” requires that theconcept no longer be restricted to thescientific and technological dimensions,as it clearly is in the indices and indicators“The Internet hasbecome the primaryinternational vehiclefor conveyingideas; indeed, ithas the power toglobalise the world”CastellsExpanding thesignifications ofthe “knowledge”in “knowledgesociety” requiresthat the concept nolonger be restrictedto the scientificand technologicaldimensionsTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY35


The <strong>Report</strong> adoptsa concept ofknowledge thatis broad enoughto encompassthe link betweenknowledgeand humandevelopment<strong>Knowledge</strong>acquisition,production,indigenisation anddeployment is atool and goal forall levels of societyequally and involvesall of its fieldsrelated to the knowledge-based economypopular in some literature, such as thereports of the World Bank. While it is truethat scientific knowledge is important, thescope of knowledge is broader than that.A more inclusive perspective on humanknowledge is called for, one that does notexclude the humanities and other sciencesrelated to aesthetics, values, and the arts,one that excludes none of the symbolicproduct that fashions humanity’s wisdomand infinite capacity for invention, and formaterial and symbolic production.Expansion of the significations of theterm “knowledge” makes the conceptof the knowledge society better able toembrace several aspects of humanity’stheoretically recognised competence. Theinterdependence and interaction amongthese aspects are no longer in dispute, sincethe capacity for rational thought is equal tothe potential of the imagination, and sinceepistemological synthesis is an act thatincludes the outcome of the human effortto understand and innovate (UNESCO,2005, in French). What makes it desirable toexpand these significations is the tendencyof certain reports by some internationalorganisations to impose knowledge datalinked to certain specific societies. A criticalexamination of the indices and indicatorsfashioned by the World Bank on the subjectof the knowledge society and knowledgeeconomies, for example, reveals that theunit of analysis in these reports is based ondata from Western Europe and the UnitedStates. How can terms be transferred andgeneralised to other social paradigms thatwere not under consideration at the timewhen the research was conducted and theterms constructed? How, in fact, can theeconomy or the enabling environment forthe knowledge society be reformedwithout a precise diagnosis of theforms of knowledge accumulation and theknowledge gaps linked to the <strong>Arab</strong> reality?The knowledge society, sometimesreferred to as the “digital society,” isa collective project. It is more thanits instruments and its networks.Furthermore, the state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge,with its multiple gaps, calls upon us todefine a vision that will help us preparethe appropriate points of entry to therequirements of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge as itnow is. In this regard, we believe thatthe concern for knowledge innate in the<strong>Arab</strong> renaissance project, and especially inthose of its dimensions devoted to culturalenlightenment, is part and parcel of theorientation of this report.This report adopts a comprehensivevision for an <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge society.It seeks to build a society in whichknowledge is a product of the union ofinformation technology, experience, andthe capacity to govern with an eye to thewise use of resources, exploitation of themeans available to attain renaissance, andan ability to seize the achievements ofhuman development. The <strong>Report</strong> adopts aconcept of knowledge that is broad enoughto encompass the link between knowledgeand human development. It seeks toexpand options and opportunities availableto the individual <strong>Arab</strong> and to achieve forhim or her freedom and an honourablelife. <strong>Knowledge</strong>—whether we are talkingin terms of its acquisition, production,indigenisation or deployment—thusbecomes a tool and goal for all levels ofsociety equally and involves all of its fields,from the scientific, technical, cultural,and traditional to that of accumulatedcommunity wisdom.THE BASIC FRAME OFREFERENCE FOR THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYThe intellectual frames of referenceand philosophical underpinnings thatencompass the system of fundamentalassumptions underlying the reportsof international organisations on theknowledge society must be made explicit,since these establish the latter’s goals,indicators, and working strategies. Evenif these reports are, on the whole, issuedin a neutral language, rely on quantitativemethods, and are careful to benefit inthe construction of their data from the36 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


services of seasoned experts and scholars,this is insufficient to give them an objective,neutral stamp, which would, in any case,be hard to achieve. This observationdoes not imply doubt about the scientificand practical value of the reports ofinternational organisations or reservationsabout their approaches and results; rather,in order to construct a more humaneand more cooperative human space, itaspires to shed light on the “relativity” oftheir results and conclusions at a time ofincreasing interdependence between statesand societies, and of burgeoning questionsabout human co-existence dedicated toconstructing a human space that is morehumane and cooperative.An understanding of the frame ofreference of such reports and studies allowsus to grasp messages that are not alwaysclearly expressed, as well as to benefit fromtheir data. Since the World Bank’s 2002report on the knowledge society, its 2007report on the knowledge economy, the2005 UNESCO report <strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>Societies, the 2003 <strong>Arab</strong> Human Development<strong>Report</strong>, and other reports issued duringthe 1990s on the subject of knowledgeand development have taken as theirstarting points particular theoreticalperspectives based on certain philosophicalframeworks and methodologies. Further,these reports have relied on similar dataand comparative indicators to address thesubject of knowledge performance in ourage.The introductions, conclusions, andaction plans of reports issued on thesubject of the knowledge society, whetherby the World Bank or the United Nationsand its educational, cultural, and scientificinstitutions, may be read as efforts to dealwith the predicament brought about bythe lexicon of economic analysis thatremained in use after the end of the ColdWar. Important efforts have been madeby scholars and experts to coin new termsthat go beyond the ideological positionsthat continued to describe world economicconditions in terms of the crises createdby global capitalism. The theoreticalside of their work has assumed variousdimensions. The most prominent ofthese has been the construction of topicsto diagnose the dilemmas of our world,important theses of these has been basedon various topics, such as the environment,gender, world peace, issues of health andnutrition. These and others once appearedunder other labels and today refer to newresearch areas related to comprehensivehuman development.Since it is clear that these reports belongto a new tradition of research and writing,those negative positions that totally rejectthem may not be justified. The heatedpolitical and ideological positions opposingthese reports are for the most part basedon pre-conceived stances and may not beof value in advancing intercommunicationwith the world, its institutions, and thereports issued by these institutions.This in no way, however, means thatdisciplined criticism should be set aside,for the latter seeks among other thingsto play a role in deepening the dialogue,developing the discussion, and enrichingthe approaches and outcomes of thesereports by using local and idiosyncraticcomparative indicators and analyticaltools. This helps to develop concepts andexpand significations.The reports of internationalorganisations on the knowledge societymay be approached with this positiveoutlook. Thus, the aim becomes thatof modifying and developing theirmethodology and results in light of theactual situation of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance and <strong>Arab</strong> attempts to bridgethe information gap and gain access to theinformation age. Critical examination ofthe reports of international organisationson the knowledge society reveals that theyare informed by at least two main framesof reference:1. A positivist tendency in which thequantitative orientation dominates. Thisorientation limits the comprehensivenessof the phenomena under discussion,as well as subjecting the developmentand knowledge trajectories to a notionImportant effortshave been madeby scholarsand expertsto go beyondthe ideologicalpositions thatdescribe worldeconomicconditions interms of thecrises created byglobal capitalismTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY37


The goal of thiscritical review isnot to diminishthe value ofinternationalreports, but touncover theirlimitationsThe shortcomingof the prevailingpositivist trendin the literatureof internationalinstitutions is itsconcentrationon the economicdimension andthe Westernexperience as theexclusive modelto measure whathappens in therest of the worldof technological determinism, with noalternative to its results and decisions.This position makes the triumph andhegemony of technology the symbolof an age still in fact in the process offormation.2. The political modernisation trend thatinvokes the bases and principles ofinternational human rights charters.This tendency is inadequate and riddenwith many contradictions and paradoxes(Ruqayya al-Musaddaq, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Before clarifying the contradictions inthese systems of reference, it is importantto emphasise that the goal of this criticalreview is not to diminish the value of thesereports, but to uncover their limitationsand highlight their shortcomings,particularly in aspects related to<strong>Arab</strong> society, in order to advance the<strong>Arab</strong> theoretical discourse around theestablishment of the knowledge society.THE POSITIVIST TREND:THE QUANTITATIVEORIENTATIONThe contemporary knowledge scene revelsin the positivist mindset that is drawnto science and technology. This positivisttrend is undoubtedly a powerfulcontinuation of the ideas of the Renaissanceand Enlightenment philosophy. However,the developments affecting the state of theworld today warrant caution with regardto its general drift, with its optimisticand self-confident attitude towards thecourse of history, no matter what claimsmay be made as to its capacity to assistman in his dealings with nature and life.The most conspicuous characteristicof the positivist mind set is its resort toquantitative methods in its epistemologicalparadigms. Although these methods allowfor neutral and objective examinationof phenomena, the final conclusionsoften support predetermined intellectualpreferences. The greatest shortcomingof the prevailing positivist trend in theliterature of international institutions is itsconcentration on the economic dimensionand its view of the Western experiencewith its underlying values as the exclusivemodel whose data it then seeks to transforminto indicators by which to measure whathappens in the rest of the world.An objective historical view of theknowledge society cannot be limited toobservations on the relationship betweenknowledge and technology or discussionof knowledge-based economies. In thecurrent state of knowledge, we assume thatdiscussion will be more comprehensive andwill turn to the subject of the knowledgesociety in those of its dimensions thatare not blind to the importance of acritical perspective to the constructionof knowledge and the realisation ofinnovation. If we cannot constructknowledge from a critical perspective, wewill continue to describe and quantifyphenomena without reaching a diagnosisof the deep-seated weaknesses thatproduce the current state of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge (al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i al-Wafi, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).This critique does not question thevalue of the epistemological paradigmof scholars who have developed severalmethods and tools for studying newphenomena and have sought to illuminatemany of their aspects. Nevertheless, wemust be aware of the implicit ideologicaldimensions in reports by internationalorganisations, and we urge that theirresults and recommendations be read withcaution.For example, the indicators foran information and communicationstechnology (ICT) index proposed bythe World Bank reveal that we are facedwith an exercise in quantification thatpays not the slightest attention to thebackground of the quantitative data.The index is measured on the basisof population counts, income levels,and level of spending. Some scholarshave pointed out the shortcomings ofthese indicators, believing that they giveinsufficient importance to the fruits ofeconomic and social knowledge, and38 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


pay too little attention to the qualitativedimension. Education indicators, forexample, concentrate on the number ofstudents enrolled and not on other, moreknowledge-relevant aspects, such as thequality of education available frominstructors, what qualifications thelatter hold, and the presence or absenceof buildings, science labs, and so on(Mohammed Bakir, background paper forthe <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).The paradigms that give rise to theseindicators, with their operational character,claims to objectivity, and technologicaldeterminism, could be useful in thesocieties in which they were constructed.These paradigms may acquire a limitedefficacy outside their historical context.However, they must be modified andaugmented so that they become suitablefor a new unit of analysis related to anew reality, such as that of the <strong>Arab</strong>s.This gives the methodology a universalcharacter, since testing it in variedresearch areas would provide an occasionto reconstruct or create alternatives thatmeet new requirements. <strong>Report</strong>s issuedby international organisations havenot been able to rid themselves of thispositivist mindset, and the indicatorsand concepts devised within thesereports are not merely vessels to storeeverything and nothing. Similarly, the factthat we can measure the knowledge gapquantitatively does not exempt us from amore profound diagnosis of knowledgeperformance in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, since theprevalence there of systems of referencethat have no connection to what happensin the world around them compounds theknowledge gap. This is what makes thechallenges of closing the knowledge gapin the <strong>Arab</strong> world complex and multiple.We do indeed most urgently need to closethe existing knowledge gap. However, wealso need to shake up what is stagnantin our knowledge and rock the pillars ofour unquestioned convictions and ourpreconceived notions in such a way asto help us to go beyond our text-bound,traditional epistemologies. When thishappens, the broadening of the orbit ofthe study of knowledge, especially froma critical perspective, may become one ofthe means of expanding our options inlife and establishing a knowledge societyfulfilling our aspirations for our societies.THE POLITICALMODERNISATION MINDSET:EVOKING HUMAN RIGHTSThe second major system of referenceguiding the construction of knowledgesociety reports, emerging at the end ofthe last century and the beginning of thethird millennium rests on the premisesof a liberal and neo-liberal politicalmodernisation.This becomes clear when we studythe principles of the World Summits onthe Information Society (Geneva 2003,Tunis 2005), especially in their strong linkwith the “human rights” vocabulary asestablished in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights of 1948 and the Covenantson Economic, Social and Cultural Rightsof 1966 and 1976. The 2005 UNESCO<strong>Report</strong> <strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies springsfrom the same perspective as portrayedby its appeal for adherence to the principleof “the right to knowledge” and itsdefence of the principles of tolerance andsolidarity.Some human rights issues are framedin the context of a defence of thevalues of transparency and democraticreform as a pre-condition of the enablingenvironment that fosters knowledge. Inthis way, the right to knowledge, accessto information, and difference of opinionare transformed into unquestionedrequirements for the establishment of theknowledge society and the improvementof knowledge performance (UNESCO,2005, in French).Declarations of principles defendingthe rights to development, knowledge,and access to information have, however,nothing to do with what actually happenson the ground. They are no more thandeclarations of intent and hope cast inWe need toshake up what isstagnant in ourknowledge androck the pillars ofour unquestionedconvictions andpreconceivednotionsAccess toinformation,and differenceof opinion areunquestionedrequirements forthe establishmentof the knowledgesocietyTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY39


In our bidfor economicand humandevelopment inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world, wecannot be contentwith the benefits ofthe “invisible hand”of the marketthe language of solidarity, cooperation,and common destiny (Cenre Europe-Tiers Monde, 2007, in French). Whatcontrols actions in reality is the logic ofpower and domination, whose rigidity thecontradictions innate in the knowledgesociety have made more extreme. There isno longer any hesitation over declaring thepower of knowledge or of its possessors,since the knowledge gap has becomesynonymous with poverty, weakness,marginalisation, and, subsequently,dependency and subordination.The political modernisation mindset isdistinguished by its ability to incorporatepolitical values linked to the neo-liberalmodel. It converges with political andstrategic choices supportive of theinterests of the strong, of those whopossess knowledge and deploy it to runthe world. This “neo-liberal” view doesnot hesitate to declare a pragmatic goalwith respect to the conclusions fosteredby such reports, thus confirming theincompatibility between the economicpolicies of the knowledge economy andthe political goals of the democraticpolitical project, which, when examined,turns out to be the maker and organiser ofthe network of institutions and laws thatrule the world.In our bid for economic and humandevelopment in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, wecannot be content with the benefits of the“invisible hand” of the market—the handthat is the common factor in many reportson development and knowledge. Theinvisible hand may do its work throughstrangulation, which, where knowledgeis concerned, means cutting off its lifeblood.This is all the more grave given thatlife is interdependent with knowledge.The global financial crisis that beganin late 2008 showed that financial choicesbased on the invisible hand of a completelyopen market with no effective societalsupervision necessarily have negative effectson the various enabling environments andexisting markets. The choices by whichthe future of global financial institutionsis determined reveal in turn furtherdimensions of the crisis.Thus there are innumerable difficultiesin bridging the knowledge gap in the <strong>Arab</strong>BOX 1-5Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new millenniumExcerpts from the 2003 Geneva Declaration of Principles on Building the Information SocietyIn the Declaration of Principles of the 10-12 December 2003meeting in Geneva, we read:Our challenge is to harness the potential of information andcommunication technology (ICT) to promote the developmentgoals of the Millennium Declaration, namely the eradication ofextreme poverty and hunger; achievement of universal primaryeducation; promotion of gender equality and empowerment ofwomen; reduction of child mortality; improvement of maternalhealth; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;ensuring environmental sustainability; and development of globalpartnerships for development for the attainment of a more peaceful,just and prosperous world. We also reiterate our commitment to theachievement of sustainable development and agreed developmentgoals, as contained in the Johannesburg Declaration and Plan ofImplementation and the Monterey Consensus, and other outcomesof relevant United Nations Summits.We reaffirm, as an essential foundation of the InformationSociety, and as outlined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion andexpression; that this right includes freedom to hold opinions withoutinterference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideasthrough any media and regardless of frontiers. Communication is afundamental social process, a basic human need and the foundationof all social organisation. It is central to the Information Society.Everyone everywhere should have the opportunity to participateand no one should be excluded from the benefits the InformationSociety offers.We are aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and not as anend in themselves. Under favourable conditions, these technologiescan be a powerful instrument, increasing productivity, generatingeconomic growth, job creation and employability and improving thequality of life of all. They can also promote dialogue among people,nations and civilisations.We are also fully aware that the benefits of the informationtechnology revolution are today unevenly distributed between thedeveloped and developing countries and within societies. We are fullycommitted to turning this digital divide into a digital opportunity forall, particularly for those who risk being left behind and being furthermarginalised.We affirm that development of ICTs provides enormousopportunities for women, who should be an integral part of, and keyactors, in the Information Society. We are committed to ensuring thatthe Information Society enables women’s empowerment and theirfull participation on the basis on equality in all spheres of society andin all decision-making processes. To this end, we should mainstreama gender equality perspective and use ICTs as a tool to that end.40 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


egion, greatest among them that thebridging of this gap hinges on a sharingof power. The appeals for solidarity,cooperation, and joint action in theconclusions and data of these reports maybe nothing more than a mask to obscurethe real face of power, which in fact createsand widens the knowledge gap (CentreEurope-Tiers Monde, 2007, in French).Reading Chapter 10 of UNESCO’s 2005report on “The Renewal of DemocraticPractices in <strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies,” andChapter 9, which calls for “LinguisticPluralism, Strengthening CulturalDiversity, and Sharing <strong>Knowledge</strong>,” wesee the distances that are opening upbetween report discourses and the realityof the situation in countries of the South,including the <strong>Arab</strong> countries. At thesame time, the thickness of the walls thatseparate knowledge from the externalmechanisms that create the knowledge gapand the meagreness of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance become apparent.This does not mean that we are callingfor an adoption of the values of others,or arguing that we should becomedependent on and compliant with thewishes of power. It does not meanwhat Ibn Khaldun called “imitating theconqueror.” What we mean first andforemost is the incorporation within ourown thinking of the knowledge that isavailable today to all mankind (‘AbdallahAl-‘Urawi, 1996, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic), or, in otherwords, the values of knowledge andscholarship and the fundamentals ofpolicy, economics, and management. Inthis last sphere, specifically, we believe thatopenness to the world is an expressionof the desire to achieve reconciliationwith our historical identity and the worldand to attain the human development towhich we aspire.The battle over political modernisationcontinues under various guises, just asthe values of enlightenment and reasonare still embraced to varying degreesin the majority of <strong>Arab</strong> countries, as away to build a political discourse morefaithful to the values of reason, justice,and balance (Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif, 1997, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic). These are the shared values whosegeneral principles all of humanity triesto reconstruct, in a spirit of agreementover the importance of interdependence,consensus, and mutual assistance ininternational relations. At the same time,the necessity of benefiting from the newrealities to allow the emergence of theknowledge society cannot be overlooked.Using the tools that brought about theknowledge revolution, declarations ofprinciples and intentions can be convertedinto deeds and action, not simply in orderto bring about political modernisationin <strong>Arab</strong> society, but to achieve a formof political modernisation that isreinforced with solidarity and cooperationworldwide.PROBLEMATIC ISSUES OFTHE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAs a reality still in process of formation, theknowledge society, with all its componentsand programmes, raises many theoreticalissues and practical questions, requiring thatvisions be formed and positions taken. Ifthe ICT revolution that helped prepare forthe birth of new economies and drew theborders of knowledge in a new society isdescribed by most as “the soft revolution,”the softness was merely the superficialoutward form of actions intended to carveout new directions in a rapidly globalisingworld. Faced by the “softness” of thesymbols used to penetrate the worlds of theimage, of information, and of the market,to manage them in new ways, and to laythe foundation for a new society, we mustpay attention to the problematic issuesthat have arisen and will continue to arise.We must look at the issues consequent onthis revolution, particularly given that theirresults affect us all in our concern to enterthe knowledge society and experience itsadvances and achievements.We should not delay dealing withproblematic issues raised by the knowledgesociety, whether local or global, on thepretext that most <strong>Arab</strong> countries have notWe are affectedby everything thathappens in theworld since we arean active party—even though, as<strong>Arab</strong>s, we may bemerely second orthird level actorsWe should notdelay dealingwith problematicissues raised by theknowledge society,whether local orglobal, on thepretext that most<strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave not yet joinedthis societyTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY41


The political reformproject remains asine qua non forsocieties that areseeking to buildenvironmentssupportive of theknowledge societyIn the <strong>Arab</strong> region,the legitimacyof democraticreform receivedits highest officialrecognition at the2004 Tunis Summityet joined this society. However preparedor unprepared the <strong>Arab</strong> region may be toindigenise the knowledge society, its likelyrepercussions are a pressing concern. Weare affected by everything that happens inthe world since we are an active party—eventhough, as <strong>Arab</strong>s, we may be merely secondor third level actors—to events that havealready unfolded, as we shall be to othersthat have yet to unfold. This in and of itselfgives us numerous opportunities to upgradeour knowledge systems and to begin dealingwith the issues of the new society.Given the number of problematicissues that have come to the fore as themain features of the knowledge societybegin to form, we have decided to focuson a limited sample of the former that areconnected to the knowledge society and itsrelationship to identity, the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language,new ethical values, and the performanceof <strong>Arab</strong> women in the knowledge society.In addition, we will deal with politicalparticipation, while not ignoring thetopic, central to our age, of technologyitself. Clearly, in these problems there isan interaction between the local and theuniversal, the private and the public. Thejustification for this selection of issues istheir link, as a whole, to the <strong>Arab</strong> realityand our wish to develop an objectivediscussion leading to the theoreticalpreparation that must accompany theenabling environment that will permitthe <strong>Arab</strong>s, to bridge, in word and deed,the knowledge gap and to enter intoepistemological intercommunication withthe rest of the world (Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif,2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAND EXPANDING POLITICALPARTICIPATIONWith regard to this particular problematic,we seek to compare the current politicalchanges in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, directing ourgaze at political participation, hoping in sodoing to highlight the importance of thepolitical factor in bringing about enablingconditions of the knowledge society. Wepoint out that the political reform projectremains a sine qua non for societies thatare seeking, to different degrees, to buildenvironments supportive of the knowledgesociety. At the same time it is clear thatmany of the values and achievements ofthe knowledge society are inseparable fromfreedom and the construction of socialand institutional contracts in support of astate in which individual rights and the ruleof law are preserved. Attempts to achievethese goals and aspirations proceed atdifferent rates in most of the <strong>Arab</strong> world,and have done so for decades.We cannot favour the politicaldemocracy project above all others, foron the political scene globally we find thatthis project in its various forms has raisedmany problematic issues that require us totake a new look at the democratic politicalsystem. Furthermore, in many parts of theworld, including the Mashreq (eastern)<strong>Arab</strong> countries, certain appropriationsof language used within the internationalconflict and that concern the need toestablish “societies dedicated to freedom,democracy and human rights” do notconform to the principles of politicalmodernisation and the spirit of thedemocratic message (Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif,2008, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Rather than respectingdifference and diversity, they satisfythemselves with making political reforminto a pre-packaged technical prescription.Recent and more distant historicalexperience has not seen it as such: the shifttowards democracy in numerous cases wasthe outcome of lengthy experience and theproduct of much laborious spade work toprepare the road for democracy.In the <strong>Arab</strong> region, the legitimacy ofdemocratic reform received its highestofficial recognition at the 2004 TunisSummit, when, in their closing statement,<strong>Arab</strong> leaders announced a consensus onthe need to expand democracy to enhanceparticipation in decision-making andrespect for human rights. In addition, anobserver of <strong>Arab</strong> political life may see thepolitical disputes of political parties andcivil society institutions as embedding42 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


the values of democratic politicalreform in varied ways, and these effortshave recently borne fruit in the formof calls for agreement on peacefuldemocratic transformation. None ofthis, however, excludes the possibilityof disingenuousness, meaning that thediscussion is carried on with two sets oflogic and two languages, the disingenuouslanguage helping in turn to build othertypes of deception. This issue has becomemore acute with the entrance of certainpolitical forces that appropriate religiousslogans for the service of politics.In addition, approaches that jump tounjustified conclusions about <strong>Arab</strong> societydo not fully comprehend that democracyin the West took shape over a long periodof historical experience and, in fact, is stillreshaping itself to address the challengesposed by the knowledge society. Thismeans that in order to continue to defendpolitical reform, more efforts must bemade to achieve a free society, since it isthe cornerstone of the knowledge society(Markaz Disarat al-Wihda al-’<strong>Arab</strong>iyya,2000, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Some may have reservations aboutthe relationship between knowledge andfreedom, since this link is not alwaysrequired. In many countries that havereached the threshold of the knowledgesociety, we find signs of a lack of freedom.However, for the <strong>Arab</strong> region freedom isan inescapable condition if many of theshackles that prevent the blossoming ofinnovation are to be removed and theway prepared for the knowledge society(Ruqayya al-Musaddaq, 1990, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Expanding the ambit of freedomwill help <strong>Arab</strong> societies to indigenise themechanisms and values of the knowledgesociety. In the wake of the failure, especiallyin Egypt, of the late nineteenth- and earlytwentieth-century renaissance project, andthat of the second generation reformistvocabulary that took shape after the 1967defeat, the political reform movement inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region has been constructingfor two decades past a third generationreformist vocabulary. As of the end ofthe last century, the <strong>Arab</strong> political elite hasbeen moving towards the promulgationof a new vocabulary, through which theyhope to build an agreed-upon democratictransformation that will transcend thedefeats and shortcomings so prevalent inmany areas of <strong>Arab</strong> political life.If some global paradigms indicatelack of an organic, causative link betweenpolitical reform and establishment of theknowledge society, this does not mean thatpolitical reform is not necessary. In fact,it serves as a catalyst for the processes ofinnovation and allows them to appropriatefor themselves new values and advances.Indeed, we might even go so far as to saythat freedom is the other face of knowledge(see Chapter 2).The UNESCO <strong>Report</strong> <strong>Towards</strong><strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies stressed the importanceof revitalizing the democratic public spacesin knowledge societies. It revealed that, inthe view of the report writers, the dilemmaof democratic reform is a universal one,since reform of the democratic politicalsystem is a challenge to all–a challengethat includes that of how to ingrain theirexperiences in democracy (UNESCO,2005, in French).In this context, the report underscoredthe importance of technological democracy,pointing out that the benefits ofinformation technologies must be made useof in political practice. This position raisessignificant doubt about the compatibilityof democratic government with postmodernistsocieties, some scholarsbelieving that the age of democracy inEurope has only a short life ahead of it.They base this position on the internaland external contradictions of the socalleddemocratic countries, in addition tothe decline of traditional moral authorityand the restrictions placed on freedomswithin these societies after the events ofSeptember, 2001 (Saint Mary, 1999, inFrench).The preceding comments pertain to thedeveloped world. In the <strong>Arab</strong> world, theproblem primarily concerns the need tocontinue to expand the package of freedomIn order to continueto defend politicalreform, moreefforts must bemade to achievea free society,since it is thecornerstone of theknowledge societyThe <strong>Arab</strong> politicalelite has beenmoving towardsthe promulgationof an agreedupondemocratictransformationthat will transcendthe defeats andshortcomings of<strong>Arab</strong>ic political lifeFreedom is theother face ofknowledgeTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY43


Globalisation isdependent oninformation andis not restrictedto one siteConflict continues,over wealth andpower and overinformation,identities, andculturesin its basic elements (‘Azmi Bishara, 2007,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). The 2005 UNESCO report,dealing with the democratic question inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries from this perspective,stresses the importance of continuedefforts to achieve political reform. Thismakes it clear that demand for reform inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world cannot be avoided. Giventhe many challenges it has to face, it willbe a complex battle.THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAND IDENTITYOn-going global transformations showsynchronicity between the formation ofknowledge societies and the appearanceof globalisation. We cannot separateglobalisation from the informationexplosion and the latter’s economicand knowledge ramifications. Today’sglobalisation mechanisms are governedby network systems and directed by theWorldwide Web, which is overseen fromafar by global financial institutions. Theseinstitutions seek to regulate and adjust theWeb so that its equilibrium is not disturbed,particularly since, in the eyes of the neoliberals,the state has become a hindranceto unfettered market activity (Albert, 1991,in French).Globalisation is dependent oninformation, the foremost actor in ongoingglobal standardisation. The newknowledge-based economy does notoperate in a single place and is notrestricted to one site, and it is thisphenomenon that links globalisation andinformation. However, this linkage, inwhich major forces that own the coffersand symbols of knowledge play the centralrole, places new challenges before societiesBOX 1-6<strong>Knowledge</strong> in an Age of GlobalisationToday the “power of knowledge” intersects with the “the impactof universal cultural dissemination,” for knowledge, if it is not itselfculture, is most certainly a part or aspect of it. As everyone is aware,for years, “globalisation” and “the effect of globalisation on culturalidentity and cultural personality” and especially on “<strong>Arab</strong> culture”and its particular characteristics have been on every tongue.There is no doubt that the “universal cultural system” propagatedby globalisation through advanced media tools that place everyoneat the centre of the world is a strong wind knocking at our doors,blowing through the chambers of our houses and of our minds, andawakening our aesthetic and emotional sensitivities. Our authors,scholars, and media have gone to great lengths in describing thephenomenon and monitoring its influence and effects. Naturally,some of us have praised it from a neo-liberal point of view andothers have criticised it from the standpoint of religion, culturaltradition, or nationalism. The rational, realistic view, however,clearly tells us that in the framework of the current age and in thecontext of our political, economic, and cultural circumstances, wemust “live” this reality and be at home in its midst whether welike it or not. However, it is imperative that we assimilate to this“living” critically, with open eyes. The most important thing aboutsuch an assimilation is that we realise that the universal culturalsystem that accompanies globalisation rests on a neo-liberal visionshaped by a host of ethical, social, political, and economic valuesspread by forces of communication and modern information mediaacross borders and through local spaces, reformulating in so doingour cultural existence and special identity. The values of freedom,democracy, multiculturalism, and human rights established by theuniversal cultural system, in which some of us see an overwhelmingdanger to our culture and our distinct identity, represent this dangeronly with regard to one particular understanding of this culturalidentity and one pattern of assimilation of these values. The truthis that contemporary <strong>Arab</strong> culture is not completely homogeneous,but has numerous cultural systems, including the religio-cultural,the national-cultural, and the liberal-cultural. The first is epitomisedby the “Salafist” view, which emphasises its incompatibilitywith universal cultural values. The other two systems, however,tend towards conditional acceptance of aspects of the universalcultural system. Believers in “cultural Islam,” Muslim and Christian<strong>Arab</strong> nationalists, and humanist socialists—the largest groups ofsecularists and liberals—willingly accept the basic principles of thisuniversal culture, with occasional reservations. In this regard, thebelief prevails that what all <strong>Arab</strong> spaces lack is specifically thesevalues that the universal culture claims it alone advocates. The truthis that the main difference between the globalised neo-liberal spaceand the <strong>Arab</strong> space in all its manifestations centres on questions offreedom and utilitarianism. It is these two principles, which dominatethe philosophy of the universal culture, that generally appear in <strong>Arab</strong>contexts in their rough, overzealous (here I mean “extreme”) form.It is possible to reorient these principles, rethinking the meaning offreedom and turning the individualistic overtones of utilitarianisminto a more collectivist; more social connotation of “interest.” Inother words, we could change from “expedient individualism” to“interest-oriented community.” The concept of democracy—oneof the most salient of the values that the universal cultural systemclaims for itself—could also be channelled in such a way as to meana “collective” democracy in keeping with the requirements of <strong>Arab</strong>societies rather than those of the liberal democracy that is suitedto the new capitalism in the American-dominated West. This muchneeded transformation has already attracted a substantial group ofintellectuals in the liberal West itself.Source: Fahmi Jad‘an, 2002, Riyah al-‘Asr, Al-Mu’assasa al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya lid-Dirasat wal-Nashr, Beirut, pp. 16-18.44 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


that occupy the lowest rung of the indicesand indicators of the knowledge society.Manuel Castells addresses this matter,taking as his starting point the fact thatthe network age generates new patterns ofknowledge-related conflict, patterns thatare caught between the logic of identityand the unchecked and explosive logicof information (Castells, 1998, in French;Nur al-Din Afaya, background paper forthe <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).It is true that the conflict continues, at itsdeepest level, to be over wealth and power,but it has further complex manifestations,including the conflict over information,identities, and cultures.The confrontation of cultural identitiesin a rapidly globalising world requires usto clarify certain phenomena, for <strong>Arab</strong>s area party to this many-fronted battle withina quadripartite globalisation process thatconsists of the following trends:(1) continual expansion of informationcapital,(2) rapidly paced evolution of technologicaldiscoveries,(3) the desire of political powers to controlthe world, and(4) the insertion of the world into a singlecultural mould.The information technology revolutionsupports these trends and choices that seekto take ownership of knowledge, power,and influence. The question to considerhere is how can national culture andmother tongue be preserved; how, in fact,can we rethink the meanings of identityin the face of the spate of material fromnetworks promoting informational andeconomic uniformity whose trademarksand cultural icons have filled the cities,and the even villages, of the world? Beforewe answer, we should point out that inthe view of some to talk of identity inan era that recognises only the logic ofcompetition, profitability, and increasedproduction is to dream, or indulge innostalgia. This is an era dominated by asearch for architectural plans for marketsyet to be built and the goods to fill themand for the accumulation of further assetsBOX 1-7Cultural and Linguistic Diversity andLocal Cultural IdentitiesExcerpts form the 2003 Geneva Declaration of Principleson Building the Information SocietyCultural diversity is the commonheritage of humankind. TheInformation Society should befounded on and stimulate respect forcultural identity, cultural and linguisticdiversity, traditions, and religions,and foster dialogue among culturesand civilisations. The promotion,affirmation, and preservation ofdiverse cultural identities and languagesas reflected in relevant agreedUnited Nations documents includingUNESCO’s Universal Declaration onCultural Diversity, will further enrichthe Information Society.The creation, dissemination andpreservation of content in diverselanguages and formats must be accordedhigh priority in building an inclusiveInformation Society, paying particularattention to the diversity of supply ofin the chain of an information economythat has exceeded all the previous century’sexpectations for the material economy.Current uses of the concept of identityin the context of current conflicts showhow ambiguous the word is. It is a termused frequently in times of war, when theparties to the conflict need to give each otherwell defined features in preparation for theconfrontation. Historical events, however,indicate that there is no closed, completeidentity. A pure identity is merely a fantasy,since market logic requires acceptance ofa degree of the standardisation that shapesthe destiny of the world (Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif, 2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Here, the worldfaces a paradox. At their conferencesand meetings, international organisationsadopt the vocabulary of solidarity, sharing,and respect for identity and difference.They explain that diversity should be seenas a source of wealth and employ a lot ofother similar vocabulary useful for dealingwith the problematic issues of identity andglobalisation. In contrast, the knowledgebasedeconomy and the informationcreative work and due recognition ofthe rights of authors and artists. It isessential to promote the productionof and accessibility to all content—educational, scientific, cultural orrecreational—in diverse languagesand formats. The development of localcontent suited to domestic or regionalneeds will encourage social andeconomic development and willstimulate participation of allstakeholders, including people livingin rural, remote and marginal areas.The preservation of culturalheritage is a crucial component ofidentity and self–understanding ofindividuals that links a communityto its past. The Information Societyshould harness and preserve culturalheritage for the future by all appropriatemethods, including digitisation.The knowledgebasedeconomyand the informationrevolution fiercelyand destructivelypermeate alllocal culturesand economiesHistorical eventsindicate thatthere is no closed,complete identity.A pure identity ismerely a fantasyTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY45


The battle overknowledge in oursocieties is a multilayered,all-outstruggle, whichrequires greaterindigenisation ofthe notions ofreason, history,enlightenment andcritical thought<strong>Arab</strong>ic madetangible advancesthat playedtheir part in thedevelopmentof written,auditory, andvisual media withthe constructionof new formsunknown to ourold linguisticsystemrevolution fiercely and destructivelypermeate all local cultures and economies.Are we dealing with a smoke-screendesigned to conceal the interests thatgovern international relations?It appears that, in contemplating howbest to deal with the information age, wecannot set aside the principle of benefitingfrom the new technologies. This thinkingis likely to construct a defined space in aworld governed by institutions with thecapacity to transcend hopes and dreamsand to use the missteps of the past tobuild the present and produce a future thatis more open to the advances of humanknowledge, both present and future (Djait,1978, in French).To summarize, all discussion of therepercussions of the knowledge societyon <strong>Arab</strong> culture and identity overlook thefact that the knowledge society essentiallyrequires rational economic managementand relies on a social structure supportedby a contemporary culture, as well as greatcapacities of intercommunication with theoutside world. Can the <strong>Arab</strong> region enterthe knowledge society on this basis? Can itgrasp that buying the technologies of luxurywith money does not create a knowledgesociety and does not lay the foundationson which an enabling environment capableof creating a knowledge-based economycan be built? The battle over knowledgein our societies is a multi-layered, alloutstruggle, which requires above allgreater indigenisation of the notions ofreason, history, enlightenment and criticalthought.THE ARABIC LANGUAGEAND THE CHALLENGES OFINFORMATION TECHNOLOGYWhat has been said about identity appliesequally to the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language, with whichit is interdependent. <strong>Arab</strong>ic’s continuinginadequacy with regard to the challengesof the knowledge society, particularlyin the area of information technology,results in linguistic isolation that revealsthe powerlessness of linguistic media todevelop appropriate tools for work andproduction.Two positions may be identifiedwith regard to linguistic reform. Thefirst is the “nihilistic” position, whichassumes the death of local languagesand cultures as a result of globalisation.This ignores the importance of linguisticand cultural diversity in a complexworld with contradictory interests andgoals. Indeed, it fails to take in that thesupposed universality is subject to allparties playing a role in its construction.The second issue is the “political andideological debate” over the state of the<strong>Arab</strong>ic language. This is a debate thatgenerally fails to address the heart of thesubject, which is the state of educationalinstitutions. It also ignores the state oflanguage teaching and the competenceof teachers and students in the areas ofcommunication, expression, and writing.For this reason, the debate tends towardsthe adoption of political positions basedon emotion and incapable of visualizingthe fate that awaits the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languagein the absence of a defined and publiclyannounced linguistic strategy.The reality of linguistic pluralism inour society includes inherited featureslinked to our history and accumulatedexperience of dealing with the problematicsof the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language. To ignore whatthis has cost us will make it doubly difficultfor us to initiate a programme of resolutereform for the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language that willequip it to join the knowledge society.In creative languages, the rules are nottransformed into hindrances. On thecontrary, these rules are likely to generatenew ones to replace antiquated matricesthrough the renewal of the linguisticstructures that innovation calls for. Thisis something that has not happened inthe history of <strong>Arab</strong>ic to date. Modestmodifications in the practise and writingof <strong>Arab</strong>ic have been made startingfrom the time of the <strong>Arab</strong> renaissance.Nevertheless, the classical languagehas continued to be generally contentwith values and vocabulary preserved from46 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


the Middle Ages, as if all that has happenedand is happening in the developmentof knowledge and the world concernedneither ourselves nor our means ofintercommunication with the world andits new products (Sa‘id Yaqtin, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).In the last century, the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languagemade tangible advances that played theirpart in the development of written,auditory, and visual media with theconstruction of new forms unknown toour old linguistic system. The increasedvolume of books and other printed media,the satellite channels, broadcast stationsand other media have given expressionin <strong>Arab</strong>ic new abilities to grasp subjectsand approximate them with new linguisticmechanisms. Text books, movies, and<strong>Arab</strong>ic novels have also played importantroles in expanding linguistic sensibilities,enabling them to translate contemporarypsychological and social emotions, feelings,and trends.In the area of informatics in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, it isnow possible to find software that offers anelectronic library with edited encyclopaediasand books, as well as software teaching the<strong>Arab</strong>ic language for different age groups.These positive indications are no excusefor the continuing decline of the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage, which faces several challengesposed by information technology and theknowledge revolution. The question ofwhether the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language can confrontthe challenges of knowledge globalisationis addressed in Chapter 4.Those who see language as a closed,self-sufficient system confuse the rulesfor a specific stage of development of aspecific system in a language with the wayin which that language is used to produceand create knowledge, to create newrules appropriate to its evolving course,its shifting system, and its self-renewingsymbolic reserves. The sentimental and thestatic non-historical views of languageencourage the evaluation of a languageaccording to criteria of perfection. Webelieve it is important to isolate and groupthese two views together, since both play arole in the dessication and mummificationof the language.The sentimental position on the languagecomprises a group of epistemologicalvalues, such as its absolute perfection, and aclosed rule set. These require examination.Both positions ignore the fact that <strong>Arab</strong>ic,like all languages, develops, declines,and is affected by the same incidentaltransformations that have affected culturalmedia and symbols throughout history.The problems of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languageare due to the neglect that it has experiencedin recent decades, since most <strong>Arab</strong> statessuffer from a lack of a clear linguistic policyaimed at reforming linguistic performance.<strong>Arab</strong>ic will not regain its position until alinguistic reform policy takes shapethat allows it to exercise its properrole in administration and economics,in commerce and contracting, and in allthe other areas of modern life, and untilwe fashion within it the determinants ofour existence in a changing world (UNDP,2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).If we take language to be the vesselthat preserves and conveys culture andknowledge, we must also believe that theproblems of language cannot be solvedby improvisation or in haste. First andforemost, they require inventive, innovativeconstruction of knowledge-related options.After this we can proceed to institutionbuildingand the development ofprogrammes, leading to the accumulationof experience and expertise in developingthe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language. This is a particularlypressing challenge since we live at a timewhen languages that are not in harmonywith the mechanisms of innovation,production, and development are slatedfor oblivion. Today these mechanismsare a prominent feature on the universallinguistic landscape, since, while fourthousand languages compete in the world,only fourteen enjoy an effective, productivepresence in the universal language network(UNDP, 2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Challenges to the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languagehave been exacerbated by the informationrevolution and easy access to the highwaysThe problemsof the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage are dueto the neglect thatit has experiencedin recent decades,since most <strong>Arab</strong>states suffer froma lack of a clearlinguistic policyThe problemsof languagerequire inventive,innovativeconstructionof knowledgerelatedoptionsTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY47


The most obviousexample of the gapbetween the statusof <strong>Arab</strong> womenand men in theknowledge societyis the high illiteracyrate among girlsand women, as wellas the low rate offemale educationalenrolmentBOX 1-8of the knowledge society. Its current realitynot only requires growth and development,but the building of new languages withinthe language as well, as with all languagesthat play a creative and interactive role inthe knowledge society. This issue may alsohave a political dimension, in addition tothe historical and structural givens that withthe passage of time have become part ofthe structure of the language itself. Thesecall for serious critiques that can move usfrom language to ideas, or, in other words,to a critique of petrified ways of thinking(see Chapter 4).Linking the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language withthe knowledge society strengthens itsposition and enables it to develop itsmedia, symbols, and systems (Nabil ‘Aliand Nadiya Hijazi, 2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Thehistory of the formation of <strong>Arab</strong>ic tells ofinnate capacities that we must now releasein order to tear down the barriers that thelanguage has tended to turn into absolutenorms. These two facets—the language’sinnate capacities and the technologiesof the knowledge society—provide theopportunity for <strong>Arab</strong>ic to overcome thestagnation that dominates it. Both call forconscious effort, inspiring vision, and aWomen’s Freedom is a Key to Many DoorsGiving women the same opportunitiesas men is basic for women’sinvolvement in the knowledge society.It poses the empowerment of womenas an integrated system includinglaw, politics, society, economics, andculture, as a way to end the multidimensionaldigital divide and toestablish the conditions needed forthe assumption of citizenship on thepolitical, economic, social, and culturallevels. That we recognise educationas a fundamental driving force of theknowledge society should not lead usto restrict empowerment of women tothis critical sector. Education can in factplay that role only if we deal with it asa right and a freedom that expands toand intersects with, not only economic,social and cultural rights, but also civiland political freedoms. It is preciselySource: Ruqayya al-Musaddaq, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.these expansions and intersectionsthat open the door to the enjoymentof education as a right, one that is ineffect a debt owed to the individual bythe state under the rubric of “rights andobligations,” and a freedom to be enjoyedat the same level as those of choice andconduct and that falls under the rubric“freedom—independence.” This canonly happen through empowermentconsidered as a societal act in whichthe legal, political, economic, social,and cultural aspects of life intermingle.The active parties in this effort cannotbe limited to civil society organisationsconcerned with women’s issues butmust include all institutions, be thesepolitical parties, trade unions, or evengovernment bodies and internationalorganisations.comprehensive strategy. This is a politicalissue and, at the same time, a technicalchoice to be confided to specialised andqualified people, who are required to put inplace new rules and mechanisms in keepingwith the requirements of the knowledgeage. There can be no doubt that success inthis realm is possible, so long as attentionis paid to the exigencies of the age and theissues of change posed by the knowledgesociety (see Chapter 6).THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAND ARAB WOMENIn comparison to their situation in societyin the early part of the second half ofthe twentieth century, <strong>Arab</strong> women haveregistered advances. These gains are stillnot commensurate, however, with theactual role required of them in society.Nor are they fully in accord yet with thevalues of the knowledge society.The most obvious example of the gapbetween the status of <strong>Arab</strong> women andmen in the knowledge society is the highilliteracy rate among girls and women, aswell as the low rate of female educationalenrolment compared with that of males,especially in higher education (UNDP,2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).It is a fact that the <strong>Arab</strong> presence inthe knowledge society is still in its infancyand lacks a unified, concrete strategy, andthat much energy is squandered because ofpoor management and the lack of a clearvision and goal. This said, the positionof women on this unsteady ladder is stillunquestionably lower than that of men. Itis vital that a multi-pronged approach beadopted that seeks to bring women furtherinto the knowledge landscape, with effortson multiple fronts of empowerment toovercome the many problems that leavewomen at a lower level in society thanmen.The 2005 UNESCO <strong>Report</strong> <strong>Towards</strong><strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies raised the subject ofthe relationship between women andscience and revealed the issue of theunderrepresentation of women and that48 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of various ethnic, religious, and othermarginalised social groups, as well as ofyoung people in that area. According tothe report, this applies equally to advancedand developing countries, in that the crisisin science education for women may beunderstood as an indicator of genderinequality. This report called for supportof initiatives to make science educationaccessible to all regardless of gender. Eventhough the influence of the positivistapproach on the report is clear, whatmatters is that, in general terms, educationis an appropriate way to approach thestatus of women in the knowledge societyproject. To release the freedom andinnovativeness of <strong>Arab</strong> girls and womenrequires preparation of numerous enablingenvironments. These should include thoseof the family, of societal education andupbringing, and of culture, in order todiscourage gender discrimination in itsvarious shapes and foster everythingthat may encourage women to playa distinguished role in development,knowledge, and public life. Difficult as itmay be, this choice may equip <strong>Arab</strong> societyto expand human well-being and give newgenerations of girls more opportunitiesto enhance their dignity within society.Discussion of the status of womenin the knowledge society requires anacknowledgment of the complex natureof the subject. Inequality between menand women is longstanding and rootedin history. Ending discrimination meansupsetting many delicate balances that havebecome immutable principles (Kamal ‘Abdal-Latif, 2006, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). To confront thisproblematic issue requires caution andcourage—caution in constructing andanalysing the data and courage in buildingvisions and perspectives that are capableof shaking loose the discriminatorybehaviours and beliefs which have beenperpetuated in society through extantrules, laws, and cultures (Ruqayya al-Musaddaq, background paper for the<strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Let us then proclaimthe slogan: “No knowledge societywithout women!”To transform this slogan into reality, wemust reinforce the successes accumulatedby human experience, since educationshould be considered a central motorin the drive to prepare women to beproductive agents in the knowledge society.In recent times, a certain consensus hasbeen arrived at on the importance ofeducation in the life of women and insocial revival. Reformist writings of the<strong>Arab</strong> Renaissance tend to link educationand work and their joint role in putting anend to the inferior status of women in oursociety. In 2007, UNESCO dedicated areport to the relationship between scienceand technology learning and gender. Itsmost significant recommendations were:1. Expanding women’s participation in thescientific and technological professionsand in scientific research.2. Raising public awareness of issuesrelated to science, education, andgender.3. Increasing the amount of data collectedin this area in order to support researchand construct suitable policies to endexisting disparities (UNESCO, 2007a,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).In <strong>Arab</strong> countries, political and culturalpressures and social constraints formmultiple and complex restrictions thatstrengthen tradition and conservatism andcreate options contradictory to those ofjustice, equality, and freedom. The effectsof these restrictions may be seen on thevarious structures of society and help delayestablishment of the knowledge society,whose material and symbolic options areunlimited. The Tunis Commitment issuedby the World Summit on the InformationSociety (United Nations, 2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic)contained a clear recognition that a “genderdivide exists as part of the digital divide insociety” as well as clear support for genderequality and empowerment of women toovercome this divide. 3Women in general, and <strong>Arab</strong> womenin particular, have been subject tomuch discrimination, since informationtechnology has employed new mechanismsto draw stereotyped, degrading imagesIn <strong>Arab</strong> countries,political and culturalpressures andsocial constraintsform multiple andcomplex restrictionsthat strengthentradition andconservatism<strong>Arab</strong> womenhave beensubject to muchdiscrimination,since informationtechnology hasemployed newmechanisms todraw stereotyped,degrading imagesof women, suchas those prevalentin the media andthe internetTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY49


BOX 1-9The Virtual as an Interrogation of the ActualThe French word virtuel apparently cameinto <strong>Arab</strong>ic from the field of optics,where the virtual image meets the actualbody in front of the mirror—that imagethat we assume is at the same distancefrom the mirror as that of the body andwhich is assumed to be the source ofthe rays reflected from the mirror thatmake us believe we are seeing an imageof ourselves.This carry-over from the field ofoptics brought with it meanings thatare still linked with the concept of thevirtual, in that it is closer to the realm ofhypothesis, illusion, and imagination,and faces and opposes reality.The French term, it is true, isderived from the idea of “potential”as contrasted with “actual” existence.However, the virtual is not merelyillusion and imagination, or even merelypossibility. Virtual is to possible as actualis to real. The possible, according toDeleuze, is ready and waiting to becomereal; it is in a state of perfect readinessfor realisation and is therefore fixed,stationary. The possible confronts thereal, but the virtual confronts the actual.For the virtual to become actual it mustface difficulties and solve problems; itSource: ‘Abd al-Salam bin ‘Abd al-‘Ali, 2008, Fi al-Infisal, Dar Tubqal, Casablanca, p. 58.Today, at the startof the twentyfirstcentury, ourlives are enframedby the growingfusion betweenman and machinemust renew and invent. The possibleis a composite of solutions, while thevirtual is composed of problems . . .For entrepreneurial work, forexample, to become virtual is forthe spatial and temporal dimensionsof the work to become a permanentproblematic, an issue constantly posed,rather than a static condition. Instead,then, of being a solution, these becomea problem, or a complex of problems.The entrepreneurial work becomesvirtual if its centre of gravity is nolonger a stationary group of institutions,jobs, and timetables and turns intoan act of harmonization that, in anuninhibited and fluctuating fashion,constantly reorders the spatial andtemporal dimensions of the work teamin accordance with imposed conditionsthat are constantly being recreated.Virtuality, then, is not a shift from areality to a variety of possibilities and isnot e fortiori a cancellation of reality. It isa new way of looking at the traditionalconcepts of definition and identity andof forcibly inserting the possible “into”the existing. It is a convulsion of theactual.of women, such as those prevalent in themedia and the internet (UNDP, 2005, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic). However, information technologyitself can present alternatives to suchexamples of gender discrimination so longas the environments and institutions existthat guarantee construction of a societyof knowledge citizenship built on equalownership of the power of knowledge,thus placing mankind on the path toinnovation and well-being.INFORMATIONTECHNOLOGIES ANDVIRTUAL SPACESWe assume that those who call our agethe “information age” want to highlightthe fundamental role of informationtechnology in the formation of theknowledge society. Certainly the pace atwhich science and its technologies havepermeated civil societies since the first andsecond industrial revolutions has reachedan extreme in information technologies.At the heart of individual and civil life,and in the knowledge society itself, theresult has been uncontrolled outcomesand unimagined prospects.Today, at the start of the twentyfirstcentury, our lives are framed bythe growing fusion between man andmachine. We are living in the age oftechnology and its manifestations parexcellence, at a point when it is no longerpossible for man to dispense with many oftechnology’s advances and achievements.Its overwhelming presence, and that of itsinstruments and perspectives, embracesall manifestations of production withinsociety. This situation has nothing to do withinformation technologies and their newand old economies, which in informationcontracts took on the characteristics ofthe dominant technical format, whetheras foundation or as framework, or inthe fields of organisation and the searchfor markets. Instead, it transcends thisspecialised sector of knowledge to enterother sectors in numerous areas, suchas the environment, mining, and thechemical industry. Today, labor is orientedto constructing more new research spacesemploying new methods. Informationtechnologies are applied to the constructionof natural disaster early warning systems,biotechnology, genetics, space technology,micro-electronics, new applications ofbiotechnology in the diagnosis andtreatment of disease and desalination, aswell as increased agricultural productionand energy production and conversion.Man seeks to know and to control natureto achieve human well-being and a life ofdignity.It should be noted here thattechnological innovation no longerrequires prolonged periods of time, as inthe case of the first and second industrialrevolutions. New technologies allow forspeedy development. Through combinedefforts, and an appropriate institutional50 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


infrastructure, effort, energy, and resourcesare saved. What have come to be known ascollective laboratories provide prominentexamples of such infrastructure. In theselabs, the same work is carried out in differentlocations and the pace of research isfacilitated through the use of informationand communication technologies, whichcomplement the distributed researchefforts. This reduces wasted effort, energy,and resources and enhances the potentialfor cooperation and complementarity forinnovation.This revolution has brought us highlevels of production, as well as continuallytearing down the relationships inheritedfrom the first and second industrialrevolutions. Simultaneously, it has broughtus continuous tension and uncertainty. Allthat was once solid vanishes like smoke,and new scientific ideas and discoveriesbecome obsolete before they are able tomature and take root.There are those who believe thattechnology is merely the applicationof scientific knowledge. This belief hasgained strength through its associationwith profit, since technology in its currentmanifestations has been viewed merelyas a means to realise specific gains andbenefits. For this reason, the importationof technologies is always defended on thebasis that they are no more than neutralmeans to an end. This is not only an<strong>Arab</strong> way of thinking, it is popular in theWest as well, many Western philosopherstaking the same position on technology.It is only recently that technology hasbecome a philosophical question initself: “Technique is a kind of knowing”(Heidegger, 1958, in French). Mechanism,in its contemporary meaning, is not merelyan application of science (except in so faras it contains mathematical calculations),but encompasses a certain theory andembodies it. Mathematics is the field ofknowledge through which practice tooka mechanistic character. Science itselfbecame mathematical only because of itslink with the desire for knowledge andcontrol over nature.Today, therefore, technology hasbecome one of the manifestations ofexistence, and our age has indeedbecome the “age of technology.” Diversemanifestations spring from the technologythat moulds so many of the outwardexpressions of our lives, most prominentamong them the homogenization of lifestyles and thought, the industrialisationof technological, cultural and touristactivity, the dislocation of place and time,the loss of a sense of closeness, excessiveconsumption and consumerism, planningand programming, the depletion ofnatural resources and formation of hugeenergy reserves. These manifestations andcharacteristics define the role of technologyin standardisation and homogenization,while at the same time revealing the mainfeatures of new questions that we arecalled upon to construct and solve (‘Abdal-Salam bin ‘abd al-‘Ali, background paperfor the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).We live in the midst of a newtechnological revolution, whose impacttouches the ways in which life andknowledge are organised and hasgenerated an unprecedented efflorescenceof knowledge. As we know, digitaltechnology has produced new, apparentlylimitless means to store knowledge. TheInternet has created a revolutionaryenlargement of our mental capabilities, asin the fields of memory, representation,and innovation. However, in the opinionof some, increasing reliance on themachine and dependence on it when calledupon to remember weakens the memoryitself, which maintains its functionalitythrough use. Apprehension is rising inthe knowledge society over new formsof technology and their effects on ourpsychological skills and ability to work.We cannot separate knowledge frompower. The technological boom thatcreated many aspects of “virtual reality”gives those involved new means to controlthe world. “The United States and WesternEurope together own by far the largestshare of knowledge technologies andmonitor all global systems. They monitorWe live in themidst of a newtechnologicalrevolution, whoseimpact touches theways in which lifeand knowledgeare organisedTechnology hasbecome one of themanifestations ofexistence, and ourage has indeedbecome the “ageof technology”We cannot separateknowledgefrom powerTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY51


The upsurge intechnologicalprowess hasraised a numberof complex issues,most significant ofthem its effect onthe system of ethicsand the future ofsocietal valuesThere is aconsensus thatknowledge societiesare linked to thebasic system ofhuman values offreedom, equality,justice, solidarity,and respect forcultural diversityThe need for a newcode of ethics forthe knowledgesociety cannotbe deniedthe financial, economic, media andinformation systems, the systems by whichknowledge and expertise are transferredand armies and military material moved.They monitor strategic points of entryand exit, controlling the global monetarymarkets, the markets for primary andmanufactured goods, the entertainmentmarkets, and the worlds of virtual education;in fact, they are trying to establish a single,universal style for the world in behaviour,clothing, and taste” (Muhammad Sabila,2007, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).We are not portraying here a fantasyoctopus. However, in the manifestations ofthe current and continuing technologicalrevolution we see a world still developing,some of the aspects of which arepredictable while others remain to bediscovered. Our abilities to see the bigpicture and project the likely results havebecome limited in a world changing too fastto respond to. We may need to maintaincaution in our relationship with technologyin order to succeed in our new relationshipwith ourselves and with our new tools in aworld that we are fashioning. The pace ofthis world is too fast for us to absorb, andwe will become its victims if we do notmanage our affairs vigilantly, wisely, andwith insight.THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAND THE LEGITIMACY OF ANEW ETHICAL CODEThe upsurge in technological prowess inhuman societies has raised a number ofcomplex issues, most significant of themthe effect this has had on the system ofethics and the future of societal values.While values systems have interactedwith the challenges unleashed by changeand development throughout history,they have also restricted the impactof transformations generative of newrealities and questions, since processesof adaptation and acclimation must takeplace before such shifts can have impacton value systems.Certainly, the ethical question isbecoming increasingly complex in theknowledge society. It has manifesteditself in the many aspects of life wherecontradictions and new forms of conflictare rife, such as the question of genderequality, and issues of migrant labor andmigration, combating terrorism, violence,corruption, and organised crime. Thisis particularly the case on the internet,where new crimes such as banking fraud,violations of personal data, copyrightviolations, and the repercussions ofvirtual reality, have arisen as a result ofpermeation by the systems and symbols ofthe knowledge society.In addition, the scientific revolution hasraised issues about innovations in geneticengineering (UNESCO, 2005, in French),for humanity finds itself confronted byethical issues that the values of the pasthave no ways to address or solve (CentreEurope-Tiers Monde, 2007, in French).Environmental ethics, which have becomepart of our new view of the world (UNDP,2007c, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic) and the ethics of newknowledge systems call for the rethinkingof the concepts of freedom, equality,security, and trust, concepts that in thepast had specific meanings and now mustbe rebuilt to meet the needs of the changesoccurring in knowledge societies.True, there is a consensus amonginternational institutions that seek toinfluence aspects of these on-goingchanges to the effect that knowledgesocieties are linked to the basic system ofhuman values of freedom, equality, justice,solidarity, and respect for cultural diversity.True too, these values are spelled out insuccessive human rights charters, makingthem a foundation of the new code ofvalues. Nevertheless, we must ask: Are thesignifications and appeals to be found in theletter and the spirit of these rights chartersenough, or must we strive to include thevariables that arise under the influence ofthe knowledge and information revolutionand thus establish values that fit the currentreality?Inherited philosophical meaning in theage of enlightenment awarded a specific52 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


value to the lexicon of ethics, but wecannot think or work at the beginning ofthe third millennium using eighteenthornineteenth-century values. Theknowledge society practices constructivetranscendence by creating new aspirationsthat require the building up of codesof individual and collective values in thearea of rights, with content appropriateto the transformations taking place onthe ground. The disconnect betweeninherited significations, the informationexplosion, epistemological transformation,and the mounting revolution in highprecisionscientific discovery and the lifeof humanity requires us to fashion newmeanings that encompass the spirit andlogic of epistemological change (‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Dawway, background paper forthe <strong>Report</strong>).The need for a new code of ethics forthe knowledge society cannot be denied. In2007, UNESCO released the draft of justsuch a code. Before we provide any ideas indefence of this new draft and highlight itsmost important points, we must present aninventory of the most important advancesin this area, advances that must be furtherdeveloped to respond to the challenges andquestions posed by the knowledge society(UNESCO, 2007, in French).The Declaration on “The Right toDevelopment” issued by the UN GeneralAssembly in 1986 represented a qualitativeshift in the history of internationalcharters, especially with regard to itssupport for equal opportunity of accessto basic resources such as education,health services, food, housing, work, andincome. This Declaration was reinforcedby a second document containing theDeclaration and Programme of Action ofthe 1993 World Conference on HumanRights, Vienna. This added to the rightsin the first Declaration the recognition ofdemocracy, development, and respect forhuman rights and fundamental freedoms,which are interdependent and mutuallyreinforcing.These declarations were not easy tobring about. More than four decades ofdeliberation went into their preparationin this form. We must look at the actualindicators that the on-going global conflictsreflect. These data show the transformationof the contents of the declarations intoacts. They form a pattern of relationshipscontaining a major paradox—theconfrontation between these declarationsof principles and their signature, and whatactually happens on the ground.Looking at the harsh struggle takingplace on the ground, we may say thatpromises the international communityBOX 1-10The Genome, a New Triumph for <strong>Knowledge</strong>The Genome Project has at its core thetracing and drawing of the informationcontained by the cell (twenty-three pairsof chromosomes for organisms thatreproduce sexually, such as man, and asmaller number for other organisms).These single-cell chromosomes give usthe complete story of the organism’scharacteristics—physical, psychological,and intellectual—and are the basis onwhich we may make predictions (insome cases with certainty) about thecourse the natural development of thisorganism will take. . . .What makes the Genome Projectimportant is that it can draw the geneticmap of a living being in its mother’swomb, before it is a complete foetus.The result is analogous to findingthe mistakes in the letters, words,paragraphs, and chapters of a recentlywritten novel before the original is sentto the printer’s, fixing those that canbe fixed and predicting defects thatcannot be fixed with available medicaltechnologies.We are, therefore, at the thresholdof a new triumph that will open upvast new prospects for the human raceand be the dominant feature of thetwenty-first century, surpassing thedevelopments in the natural sciencesand related technologies of the previouscentury...With this new beginning, we findhuman societies forced to review theirethical values and economic principlesto form appropriate legislation to limitman’s excessive aggressiveness on theone hand and to steer these discoveriestowards uses conducive to society’s wellbeingand a better standard of living onthe other. Entering the genome agemeans, in the best case scenario, that aglobal commercial network will provideincreased and improved agriculturalyields and remove pesticides fromthe environment. In preparation forthis change, human societies will beobliged to review economic conceptsand geo-political boundaries, which inturn may lead to a new understandingof the role of governments and theirrelationships to individuals, and therole of international institutions. Thenew genome society will have amongstits goals the treatment of illness beforeit strikes and the tailoring of medicaltreatment to the genome blueprint ofeach individual. This will complementthe currently only theoretical capacityto provide the sick person with spareparts taken from his or her own body.Undoubtedly, getting nearer to some ofthese achievements means a new type ofmedicine and different medical training,as well as health care of a sort thefoundations of which do not yet exist.Increasing longevity and the possibleelimination of some of the diseases ofaging will mean an increasing burden ofelderly people on society and a changein the age map, with collateral impactson other aspects of life. All of this,of course, is in addition to possiblenightmare scenarios—such as thedeliberate interference with the humangenome map leading to human cloning,with all the scientific, ethical, legal, andeven catastrophic, repercussions thatthat implies.Source: Mustafa Ma‘rafi, “Al-Bahth ‘an Al-Kamal Al-Bashari” in ‘Alam al-Fikr, vol. 2, issue 35, pp.10-11.Promises of theinternationalcommunityconcerning theknowledge societyhave not kept upwith the wideningand deepening ofthe gaps betweenthe North andthe SouthTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY53


Collective humaneffort must bedirected towardsthe developmentof a code of ethicsbroad enough toencompass thespirit of older codesand inclusive ofthe new variablesbrought about bythe revolution inknowledge areashas made concerning the knowledgesociety have not kept up with the wideningand deepening of the gaps between thesocieties of the North and those of theSouth. The problematic of varying ratesof development today creates symbolicfacts that exercise frightening control overaccess to knowledge. These facts produceforms of marginalisation, isolation, andsuffocation that have compounded andcontinue to compound the disparity amongcountries of the world, especially betweenthe wealthy nations and the developingworld.The official position in some developedcountries remains ambiguous. It speakswith two tongues and employs doublestandards. It finds no contradiction inits proclaimed positions and thus helpsto create further forms of unequalrelationship in the world. This questionwas very accurately analysed by the 2005UNESCO report <strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> Societies(UNESCO, 2005a, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). The 2001UNESCO Universal Declaration onDiversity considered protection of culturaldiversity a human right, calling at the sametime for it to be viewed as a moral demandthat must be respected.The advances of the knowledge societyraise several issues that must be resolvedwith <strong>Arab</strong> participation. Is the worldtoday moving towards becoming a merevictim of the “soft” but overwhelmingtechnological revolution, a revolution thatis difficult to stop or divert? In thinkingabout knowledge societies, will we continueto use approaches and ethical systems thatfail to assimilate the changes taking placein the world?By way of example, the most explosiveissue in the area of knowledge societyethics is that of the limits of innovationin biology and the life sciences. Discoveryof the genome, today considered oneof the greatest advances in science andtechnology, has prompted some to relaunch“gene selection” in the frameworkof the “liberal inclination towardseugenics.” This has led to consideration ofthe possibilities provided by biotechnologyand its accelerating breakthroughs for earlydiagnosis of artificially fertilised embryosbefore they are implanted in the womb(Habermas, 2001). In his book Consequencesof the Biotechnology Revolution, FrancisFukuyama deals with the relationshipbetween the new biotechnology revolutionand the value system, highlighting theimportance of the subject and the necessityof creating concrete foundations to guideit (Fukuyama, 2002).Collective human effort must thereforebe directed towards the developmentof a code of ethics broad enough toencompass the spirit of older codes.Above all, it must include the new variablesbrought about by the unprecedentedrevolution in knowledge areas andmodern communications networks. Anew generation of crimes and ethicalcontradictions accompanies the ongoingrevolution and defines certain ofits repercussions. This is evident in manyof the double standards that governinternational relations, requiring that wework collectively to reach thresholds ofharmony and balance that create andguarantee more humane internationalrelations. We must urge that the newethical framework for knowledge societiesadvance our hope to build a moreflourishing, humane world, founded onvalues of human solidarity, coexistence,cooperation, and connectedness.CONCLUSIONIt is no simple matter to pin down theconcept of the “knowledge society”and its synonyms or to grasp its relatedconcepts. The process of argumentationfollowed in this chapter has constructedseveral arguments that have helped usto take a closer look at the concept andits corollaries. We have in the processconsciously dispensed with two importantfacets of the concept of knowledge:first, significations implied by the term“knowledge” that have been inheritedfrom <strong>Arab</strong> historical tradition, and,second, the positivist implications that54 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


limit knowledge exclusively to the realmof science and technology. The remainingfacets of the definition were presentedin the form of assertions that identifiedthe technological and economic polesas the main reflections of the knowledgesociety. The knowledge society based oninnovation creates its new manifestationsthrough the give and take of technologicaldevelopment and the improvement ofhuman theoretical acuity, and contributesto the goal of expanding human options.In the repertoire of concepts nowcommonly used, “synonymity” has beenreplaced by “interaction,” which betterexpresses the relationship of the termswithin whose framework the discoursesof the knowledge society are organised.A critical attitude was necessary with regardto the positivist quantitative mindsetand the modernisation orientation in itshuman rights and political aspects. Thisattitude allowed us to deconstruct thesetwo positions, uncover their ideologicaldimensions, and scrutinise some of theirparadoxes and contradictions of reality. Themeaning of the concept of the knowledgesociety was expanded by reference tothe requirements of the state of <strong>Arab</strong>epistemological reality. The axis dealingwith the problematics of the knowledgesociety raised a sample of the mostimportant questions posed, such as thoserelated to identity, language, technology,gender inequality, and challenges to valuesand ethics. It also raised the question ofpolitical participation and democraticreform in the <strong>Arab</strong> world. We expressedour belief that the reinforcement of thepath to attaining the knowledge societyin the <strong>Arab</strong> world is inseparable from thetwin demands for a renaissance and forhuman development, which form the longrange goals of this report. Our objectivein the above has been to formulate an<strong>Arab</strong> perception of these topics andproblematics and thus produce a visionthat combines an analysis of the data andindicators with consideration of them inthe light of the complex and compositenature of the knowledge society.The knowledge society will never bebrought into being through the meretransfer of technology or its complacentconsumption, nor will it come aboutthrough acceptance of the status quo andof dependency, or of the unreflectivecommoditization of knowledge. Effectiveand creative involvement can only beattained by building an all-embracingvision of the topic, a vision that doesnot ignore the fact that epistemologicalcommodities and tools, and technologies,repress certain values and create others,and that the progress to which we aspirecalls for a major infusion of knowledge,alertness, and awareness.Passage through the portals ofknowledge—the rite of passage of ourage par excellence—requires of the <strong>Arab</strong>sthat they complete two steps at one andthe same time: reconciliation with the self,through the diagnosis of its weaknessesand failures, and reconciliation with therest of the world, through a commitmentto learn from its achievements. Both stepscall for considerable daring and courage—qualities that are essential if history is tobe made.Attaining theknowledge societyrequires of the<strong>Arab</strong>s that theycomplete twosteps at one andthe same time:reconciliation withthe self, throughthe diagnosis ofits weaknessesand failures, andreconciliation withthe rest of theworld, througha commitmentto learn from itsachievementsTHE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY55


End Notes1Epistemic saturation refers to the absence of the lines that set the limits of the connotation of the concept.Early in the process of their formation, concepts emerge in a specific epistemic field in a pre-saturated formby virtue of their novelty and the absence of agreement among their users. Saturation takes place during theprocess of the cumulative use of the concept, and as a result of agreement on its signification among specialistsand practitioners. We must not here associate epistemic saturation with obscurantism and static constancy.Concepts have their own life-spans and forms of crystallization. A signification therefore varies then settlesdown, then becomes a vocabulary item in the knowledge repository within the frame in which it is used.2Michel Cartier, http://www.michelcartier.com and Idris Binsa‘id, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.3Tunis Commitment, Article 23.56 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


CHAPTER TWOARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCEENVIRONMENTS:EXPANDING FREEDOMS ANDBUILDING INSTITUTIONS


CHAPTER TWOARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCEENVIRONMENTS: EXPANDINGFREEDOMS AND BUILDINGINSTITUTIONSIntroduction<strong>Knowledge</strong> is no longer the purely intellectual andcontemplative issue it once was; today it is aneconomic, political, and social issue influenced bythe regulatory environment, development policies,and the sum of political, economic, and socialfreedoms. It is influenced also by recent globaldevelopments that, due to the communicationsrevolutions underway around the world, knowno barriers.The relationship of knowledge to a societyand its culture and heritage is not a unilateralone; it is a multi-faceted interactive dialectic.<strong>Knowledge</strong> acts as a support to development,powerfully leveraging it and improving thequality of life. Thus, any positive progress inknowledge performance reflects on the totality ofdevelopment performance.Global knowledge environments havewitnessed continuous activity, particularlywith the emergence of the globalised economy,which does not recognise traditional bordersand depends to a high degree on knowledgeand intellectual capital. Ideas and informationhave emerged as the basic engine for economicdevelopment, or even for development in itsbroadest sense. This corroborates EndogenousGrowth theory, wherein knowledge is both afundamental underpinning for development andthe result of steadily increasing dividends oninvestments in human and intellectual capital; asa result the “ideas gap,” considered a basic causeof the development gap, is closed (Romer, 1986,1993). This theory is supported by actual events:developed countries and some in the developingworld which have emerged as pioneeringepistemological paradigms have succeeded inexploiting digital economic innovations so asto tie knowledge to development and realiserapid economic growth through the provision ofenabling environments. At the forefront of suchenvironments are those that have provided aclimate characterised by freedom of thought andexpression and broad participation.In the midst of this global activity, issueshave emerged of paramount concern to developingnations, among them the <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Themost pressing of these issues may perhaps beformulated as follows: What is the nature ofthe relationship between knowledge performanceand freedom? Is knowledge a public good andto what extent can it be made more democratic,in the sense of being accessible to all? Debatehas also ensued over intellectual property. Whatis its connection to the exercise of monopoliesby trans-national corporations? How legitimateare the alternatives available to developingcountries?Sharp disagreement has also arisen overtariff barriers to knowledge exports and therole of a free media in a world of open satellitechannels, the internet, and digital media. Theseare but a sample of the issues and questions onthe table in a world teeming with the dynamics ofknowledge, technological activity, and intellectualdebate. These issues reflect fundamentallynew tensions and contradictions, while alsoconstituting what may be described as fuel forthose enabling environments which come togetherto promote the establishment of a new societythat might be broadly labelled a “knowledgesociety.”This chapter cannot do justice to all thecomponents of these enabling environments inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world, which range from regulatory,legislative, institutional, and legal, to social,economic, and political. Nor will it list allthe factors which stimulate or impede <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge advancement. Instead, it will focusThe relationshipof knowledgeto a society andits culture andheritage is not aunilateral one<strong>Knowledge</strong> actsas a support todevelopment,powerfullyleveraging it andimproving thequality of lifeARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS59


Freedom is the basisof development.It contributes toa broadeningof choicesand individualpossibilitiesin the variousspheres of life<strong>Arab</strong> environments,as a whole, still lackthe most importantmechanisms forempowerment basedon knowledgeAchievements inpublic freedom,social and economicfreedoms, andthe freedom tocreate are modestin <strong>Arab</strong> countries,despite a degreeof progress andsome signs that givegrounds for hopeon the enabling environments from a particularangle, that of freedoms, since they are thecornerstone of such environments. It willalso make reference to the role of supportinginstitutions, given the important role theirorganisational structure plays in paving the wayto a knowledge society.This chapter takes as its starting point thefundamental premise that freedoms in theirvarious forms are the most salient feature ofthose environments that stimulate knowledge.This premise has become a touchstone of theera and a guide to all experiments in theadvancement of knowledge. Every enablingenvironment that fosters freedoms provides anappropriate framework for the establishmentof a knowledge society. <strong>Knowledge</strong> and freedomare two sides of the same coin. Similarly,freedom, according to Amartya Sen, is the basisof development (Sen, 1999). It contributesto a broadening of choices and individualpossibilities in the various spheres of life. As aconsequence, freedoms, here, are both an end anda means to development, a cause and a result.A cluster of political, economic, and socialfreedoms constitutes the best environment forthe production and optimal use of knowledge.It is the most important motivational tool fordevelopment in the broad, humanistic sense ofthe word—development, that is, that transcendsmere economic growth and rises in averageindividual income to include the enrichment ofindividuals’ lives, improvement in their livingconditions, and the advancement of the active,contributing citizen. In this sense, freedomsconstitute a fundamental axis of knowledgeenvironments.However, our concern with loosening thereins on freedoms does not mean overlookingthe frameworks of responsibility which allowfor the protection and investment of the fruitsof freedom. These frameworks are comprisedof the institutions that support and preserveeverything that helps develop knowledge andbrings a knowledge society into being. Whilethe environments which enable knowledge areestablished thanks to a prevailing climateof freedom, they can only ensure continuityand efficacy through sponsoring institutionsthat organise systems for the production andpropagation of knowledge. Furthermore, theyonly bring about legitimacy and rationalitythrough the agency of the arsenal of lawsand legislation that guarantee that they willcontinue to thrive and develop.THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGEENVIRONMENTS IN THEARAB WORLD: CONSTRAINTSAND PRESSURESWe take this dependence of enablingenvironments on participation andfreedom as our starting point. We may,however, ask ourselves: What is meantby knowledge environments? And do<strong>Arab</strong> environments stimulate or impedethe production, use, and acquisition ofknowledge? If we take as our premisethat development is freedom and thatknowledge is a human right as well as abasic component in the implementationand realisation of development, mostindicators show that <strong>Arab</strong> environments,as a whole, still lack the most importantmechanisms for empowerment based onknowledge. Political, social, and economicrestrictions are the rule, freedoms theexception. Achievements in publicfreedom, social and economic freedoms,and the freedom to create are modestin <strong>Arab</strong> countries, despite a degree ofprogress and some signs that give groundsfor hope. That freedoms in the <strong>Arab</strong>world are abused is no value judgment orprejudice but rather a fact corroboratedby reports, statistics, and qualitative andquantitative indicators. It is true that thereis considerable disparity in some of thesedata from one <strong>Arab</strong> country to another.This is because the state of freedomsexperiences ups and downs, periods ofprogress, retreat, and instability accordingto external pressures and states’ priorities,over and above the givens of any internalstruggles. However, the general trend offreedoms in the <strong>Arab</strong> world is from badto worse, not from good to better, despitesome successful reform initiatives anddespite the indicators of rapid economicgrowth in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries in recentyears, previous to the aggravation of the60 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


current economic crisis in the autumn of2008.The cluster of freedoms necessary forthe knowledge-enabling environment isnot limited to political freedom; it includeseconomic, social, intellectual, academic,and creative freedoms, all of them linkedto the principles of equality and justiceespoused in the principles of humanrights. While human rights are consideredan integral whole the <strong>Arab</strong> reality showsa clear disparity in the provision of somefreedoms as opposed to others. Thus, arealistic analysis requires that we studythe state of each facet of freedom on itsown.It is impossible to rely solely uponimprovements in the domain of economicfreedoms to bring about an <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge revival in development if thereis a continued imposition of curbs on otherfreedoms, especially those of thoughtand expression. Relying on economicfreedoms alone, in fact, leads to diminisheddevelopment whose sustainability cannot be guaranteed. In addition, hopesof achieving a fair distribution ofdevelopment’s social yields will also recedein the shadow of an undemocratic climatein which the people have no oversight andin which corruption burgeons.Limiting political, social, andintellectual freedoms threatens to producenegative repercussions not only on <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance or developmentperformance; it may bring harm tothe body politic as a whole, especiallyin the midst of attempts to containextremism and eliminate terrorism. Aslong as oppression, poverty, and socialmarginalisation remain, extremism andterrorism in all of their forms will abound,with negative impact on the establishmentof the hoped-for knowledge society.Furthermore, in the absence of politicalfreedom accomplied by tranparency,accountability, and oversight by judiciousgovernments whose goal is to realisestructural reform linked to new vision,possibilities for responsible economicdevelopment will dwindle. Freedoms likethese can only flourish in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionwhen they are linked to leaderships opento the outside world and intent on reformthrough investment in human capital andknowledge industries that rely on <strong>Arab</strong>human and physical potentials.POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS:THE PARADOX OF POLITICALREFORM DISCOURSE AND THEDECLINE IN FREEDOMSEXPANDING POLITICALPARTICIPATION:THE PATH TO KNOWLEDGEAND CREATIVITYFreedom of thought and expression is aprincipal component, along with politicalparticipation, of the enabling environmentthat contributes to the advancement ofknowledge performance. Despite someimprovement in some <strong>Arab</strong> countriesin the realms of political participation,democratic reform, and human rights andfreedoms, there has been palpable retreatin others. This is because the democraticopening up in the last decade did notachieve the desired results. Many freedomsof opinion, expression, and participationin <strong>Arab</strong> countries are bound by fettersboth visible and invisible, some of whichhave turned into a reality that constrainsknowledge and creativity.Talk of reform is common in anumber of <strong>Arab</strong> countries, but seems inmost instances to be suspended in theair, unable to come to ground in the realworld. Since the events of 11 September2001, and perhaps before them, there hasbeen serious—though also, at times,prevaricating—talk of the necessityof political reform and relaxation ofconstraints on freedoms, without even theleast of these being accomplished. The<strong>Arab</strong> Human Development <strong>Report</strong> of2004 on the state of freedoms concludedthat the problem of freedom in the <strong>Arab</strong>world was increasing due to the spread ofrepression, the hegemony of censorship,and the proliferation of mechanisms thatThe cluster offreedoms necessaryfor the knowledgeincludes economic,social, intellectual,academic, andcreative freedomsFreedom of thoughtand expression is aprincipal component,along with politicalparticipation,of the enablingenvironment thatcontributes tothe advancementof knowledgeperformanceTalk of reformis common in anumber of <strong>Arab</strong>countries, but seemsin most instancesto be suspendedin the air, unableto come to groundin the real worldARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS61


FIGURE 2-1Press freedom in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, 2008Number of <strong>Arab</strong> Countries87654321002Good Satisfactory Noticeableproblems67 7DifficultsituationVery SerioussituationSource: <strong>Report</strong>ers without Borders, 2008restrict freedoms. That diagnosis continuesto apply, despite a few harbingers ofchange in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries (see thePreamble).This perception finds support innumerous international statistics andstudies, to which we must have recoursegiven the almost complete absence ofauthoritative and credible <strong>Arab</strong> scholarshipin this field. The Freedom of the Pressindex published by <strong>Report</strong>ers withoutBorders ranks all <strong>Arab</strong> countries amongthose which restrict the press, though todiffering degrees. This index delineates themargin of freedom that both journalistsand media organisations enjoy and theefforts they expend on behalf of pressfreedom. We find that the situation in themajority of <strong>Arab</strong> countries according tothis index 1 falls between “very serious”FIGURE 2-2Perceptions of corruption in the <strong>Arab</strong> World 2008Number of <strong>Arab</strong> Countries76543210008.0-8.99.0-10.0 Least Corrupt07.0-7.916.0-6.945.0-5.924.0-4.963.0-3.962.0-2.931.0-1.9 Most Corrupt0No Data AvailableSource: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index62 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 2-3Perceptions of corruption 2003-200876543210QatarUAEBahrainJordanTunisiaOmanKuwaitMoroccoSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaAlgeriaLebanonDjiboutiEgyptMauritaniaLibyaComorosYemenSyriaSudanIraqOccupied Palentian TerritoriesSomaliaMalaysiaSouth AfricaTurkeyChinaBrazilIndia20082003Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (May 11, <strong>2009</strong>)and “difficult” (Figure 2-1). We note toothat in 2008, all but two <strong>Arab</strong> countriesranked at the very bottom of 173 countriesstudied.In this context, it is possible to compare<strong>Arab</strong> countries to other areas of the worldusing the Democracy Index published bythe Economic Investigations Unit of TheEconomist 2 . This index is based on sixtyindicators which track performance in thefollowing five areas: the electoral processand plurality, civil liberties, governmentperformance, political participation, andpolitical culture. Most <strong>Arab</strong> countriesreceived rankings on this index thatpoint to a lack of democracy, and onlythree—Iraq, Lebanon, and the OccupiedPalestinian Territories—received relativelyhigher marks.All <strong>Arab</strong> countries receive a low rankingcompared to others such as Malaysia,India, Brazil, and South Africa. Swedentopped the list of 165 countries includedin the 2008 study with an average of 9.88,while North Korea came last with 0.86 3 .The other side of the coin is theperformance of government itself. Herewe refer to the Corruption PerceptionIndex published by TransparencyInternational, which assesses the magnitudeof corruption in 180 countries on thebasis of experts’ evaluations and opinionpolls. The index depends on statisticsfrom thirteen independent sources inthe public sector and the political sector.Evaluation is based on a normative scalerunning from zero to ten. Every step upon the scale indicates a fall in the averagerate of corruption in the opinion of thosesurveyed. In seventeen of the twentytwo<strong>Arab</strong> countries studied, the level ofperception of corruption was less thanhalf the value of the scale, i.e., less thanfive (Figure 2-2), while Somalia camein last with a score of one. Iraq had thenext lowest score, of 1.3. Thus, we findthat the situation of <strong>Arab</strong> countries onthe world map according to this index 4is not much better than their situationon the map of freedoms. This implies adirect correlation between the decline inthe levels of freedom and democracy, thespread of corruption, and the decline ofgovernment performance.It should be pointed out thatQatar and the UAE recorded the bestperformance in combating corruptionon the <strong>Arab</strong> front (Figure 2-3). The mostimportant indication of this is that theymaintained this good performance in theIn the <strong>Arab</strong>countries, thereclearly is a directcorrelation betweenthe decline in thelevels of freedomand democracy,the spread ofcorruption, andthe decline ofgovernmentperformanceARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS63


Stringent legislativeand institutionalrestrictions innumerous <strong>Arab</strong>countries preventthe expansion of thepublic sphere andthe consolidation ofopportunities for thepolitical participationWhile most <strong>Arab</strong>constitutionsstipulate humanrights and freedoms,martial laws such asanti-terrorism lawsserve to limit theserights in practiceCorruption Perception Index from 2003-2008, in addition to achieving a markedimprovement in the 2008 report. Jordan,Morocco, Algeria, and Libya also recordedimprovement, while Lebanon maintainedits status quo, and performance deterioratedin the remainder of the <strong>Arab</strong> world.CONTINUED CURBING OFPUBLIC FREEDOMSIn the realm of public freedoms, <strong>Arab</strong>countries as a whole failed to realisetangible gains in terms of freedomof thought and expression. With theexception of the spread of <strong>Arab</strong> satellitechannels and internet blogs, which haveprovided a very active outlet for youthin the region, the dossier on freedomof thought and expression continuesto make depressing reading. <strong>Arab</strong> stateshave imposed additional restrictionson <strong>Arab</strong> satellite channels and issuedadditional regulations and laws thathave tightened their grasp on the media,journalism, journalists, blogs, bloggers,and even on intellectuals: many <strong>Arab</strong>dissenters and innovators are targets ofinvestigations, exposed to various formsof restriction on their ability to earna living or travel, to surveillance andpossible arrest. <strong>Arab</strong> countries lead theworld in arrests of bloggers, imposing onthem fines and prison sentences. Bookshave been impounded, newspapers andinternet sites closed, and some oppositionauthors or those who have promulgatedviews deemed indecent have even beendeclared infidels. Most news media andoutlets of knowledge dissemination inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world are still state-owned,though a limited number of large newsand entertainment media companies areoperational in the region, most operatingout of the Gulf, or even from outside the<strong>Arab</strong> region.Stringent legislative and institutionalrestrictions in numerous <strong>Arab</strong> countriesprevent the expansion of the public sphereand the consolidation of opportunitiesfor the political participation of thecitizenry in choosing their representativesin elected representative bodies on asound democratic basis. The restrictionsimposed on public freedoms, alongside arise in levels of poverty, and poor incomedistribution, in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries, haveled to an increase in marginalisation ofthe poor and further distanced them fromobtaining their basic rights to housing,education, and employment, contributingto the further decline of social freedoms.Given this climate, it is only naturalthat rigid social ideas which reject ‘theother’ should spread and take root, andthat discrimination against women andminorities should be practiced, with allthe negative corollaries for knowledgeand development performance in <strong>Arab</strong>countries.FREEDOM OF OPINION ANDEXPRESSION: ADDITIONALRESTRICTIONSWhile <strong>Arab</strong> countries announce theirdetermination to guarantee publicfreedoms and political reform and toexpand and actualize participation of thecitizenry, they actually provide little scopefor freedom of opinion and political andtrade union activities, thus widening thegap between word and deed. Publiciseddiscourse, especially when addressingmajor powers or world opinion, isreformist and distinctly democratic, butactual practice on the ground differsfrom or even contradicts it. And whilemost <strong>Arab</strong> constitutions stipulate humanrights and freedoms, martial laws such asanti-terrorism laws serve to limit these inpractice, leaving the door wide open tothe authorities to interpret what is unclearin the legal texts. Some <strong>Arab</strong> statesacknowledge the principle of a pluralityof political parties while practicingrepression in the name of security and onoccasion throwing leaders of oppositionparties into prison.In addition, we note that at thesame time that lavish investments arebeing made in upgrading information64 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


technology infrastructure, blogs areclosed down and young bloggersrepressed, as if a distinction could bemade between knowledge disseminationmechanisms and their knowledge content,even though it is the latter that is moredeserving of patronage, protection, andconcern. This is closely tied to academicand literary freedoms, for <strong>Arab</strong> writersand scholars risk being declared infidels orlegally interrogated on the opinions theyespouse or the books and creative worksthey publish which express opposition,innovation, or criticism. This can bepartially explained by cultural seclusionand the outward adherence to constantsthat this entails. In some instances,unfortunately, this seclusion is actuallypromoted to isolation from the worldand its latest cultural innovations andintellectual developments (al-Tahir Labib,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic).Digital content and the internet in the<strong>Arab</strong> world have not escaped censorshipand government interference in recentyears. More and more cases of censorshipand internet site prohibition have beenrecorded; these are a straightforwardviolation of a citizen’s right to privacyand access to information (al-Tahir Labib,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic). In one <strong>Arab</strong> country, a decreewas issued requiring internet site ownersto record the personal data of writers ofarticles and comments published on thesites. In another, a blank page appearsinstead of the banned site. And in a third,a message appears saying that the site hasbeen blocked for ‘political, moral, andreligious’ reasons. One <strong>Arab</strong> governmentobliges companies providing internetservice to implement systems that permitthe blocking of internet sites on a religiousand moral basis. And finally, internetcafes in at least two <strong>Arab</strong> countries aresubject to the possibility of inspectionand surveillance, and the owners of thesecafes are required to submit informationon those who use them (Naomi Saqr,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>).Nor have bloggers and activists escapedsecurity surveillance or even arrest. Inone <strong>Arab</strong> country, an editor of electronicsites belonging to one of the country’sminorities was arrested and broughtbefore a military tribunal on the charge of‘maligning the president, disparaging thegovernment, and inciting ethnic unrest.’ Inanother country, a blogger was imprisonedfor four and a half months for writingon religious subjects. In a third country,three participants in an electronic chatroom were arrested in 2005 for messages‘inciting hatred of the government,’ andthe government obliged everyone with aninternet site to register it with the ministryof information or risk legal proceedings.It is thus not surprising that thelist of the fifteen most internet-hostilecountries in the world should includefour <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Five <strong>Arab</strong> countriesappear on another list of ten so-called‘countries under observation’ (Naomi Saqr,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>).ARAB MEDIA ANDGOVERNMENT HEGEMONY 5The <strong>Arab</strong> media have been established andcontinue to develop under the hegemonyof <strong>Arab</strong> governments or large multimediacompanies operating on the <strong>Arab</strong> regionallevel. The alliances and interaction betweenthese are no secret, with the two partiesbetween them owning most of the mediaoutlets, which are put to work for theirmutual interests. Thus, content profferedin the newspapers, radio, television,and satellite channels is characterisedto a large degree by its superficiality, thepredominance of shallow entertainmentpieces, and diminishing knowledgecontent, along with a political discoursecharacterised by loyalty to governmentsand praise of their achievements. Allof this confirms the need for some sortof separation between knowledge andpolitics, or more precisely, an end to thedependency of knowledge on politics.In the <strong>Arab</strong> region, knowledge contentis subject to a number of restrictionsDigital content andthe internet in the<strong>Arab</strong> world have notescaped censorshipand governmentinterference inrecent yearsThe list of the fifteenmost internet-hostilecountries in theworld includes four<strong>Arab</strong> countries, andfive of them appearon another list of tenso-called ‘countriesunder observation’The <strong>Arab</strong> media havebeen establishedand continue todevelop under thehegemony of <strong>Arab</strong>governments orlarge multimediacompanies operatingon the <strong>Arab</strong>regional levelARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS65


<strong>Arab</strong> creativeproduction,especially in theliterary and artisticfields, collides notonly with lawsrestricting freedomof opinion andexpression but alsowith administrativeimpedimentsThe production,publication, anddistribution of booksin <strong>Arab</strong>ic sufferrestrictions thatlimit the diffusionof printed <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge contentWith the continuingrestrictions onfreedom of thoughtand expressionin many parts ofthe region, it isdifficult to foreseean upsurge in<strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeexercised through a chain of officialoversight on more than one level andaccording to more than one law. Amongthese restrictions are the penal code, thepress law, laws governing the content offilms, censorship laws for books, theatre,and cinema production, and even, at times,emergency and counterterrorism laws.The concept of censorship of knowledgecontent has also been broadened toinclude other restrictions, such as thosethat impinge on political party activity andthe holding of elections, the granting oflicenses to civil society institutions, andconstraints on volunteers who work inthe field of human rights and companiesworking in so-called “free zones.”Some governments have announcedguidelines and instructions prohibitingthe arrest of journalists, but the latter arestill subject to imprisonment and criminalproceedings under the penal code ratherthan the press law. Publishing a newspaperrequires a government license, which isgranted primarily on a political basis. Inaddition, a huge sum of money must bepaid in advance as collateral or the like(Naomi Saqr, background paper for the<strong>Report</strong>). These conditions constituteadditional restrictions on the freedomof the press and on the right to publishnewspapers, freedoms and rights that areconsidered among the most importantpillars of freedom of opinion andexpression.<strong>Arab</strong> creative production, especiallyin the literary and artistic fields, collidesnot only with laws restricting freedomof opinion and expression but also withadministrative impediments, foremostof which is the need for licenses, whichmay be withdrawn at any time. Formsof discrimination on the basis ofspecialization, profession, and nationalityare also practiced. The greater the numberof administrative and security restrictions,the greater the possibility for being turneddown. For example, a certain director wasasked to ‘tone down’ some scenes in oneof his films that were deemed demeaningto the police. In another <strong>Arab</strong> country,security services prohibited productionof a documentary film despite its havingobtained permission from the countrywith which it dealt. Films, by a number ofdifferent directors, have been repeatedlybanned, and this may lead <strong>Arab</strong> filmmakers to produce their works outsidethe <strong>Arab</strong> world, adding one more formof brain drain to the haemorrhaging ofintellect from the region.The production, publication, anddistribution of books in <strong>Arab</strong>ic sufferfrom similar restrictions, and theselimit the diffusion of printed <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge content. For example, theauthorities of a certain <strong>Arab</strong> countryprohibited the publication of seventythreebooks for reasons associated with‘moral principles, derision of religions,the public interest, and issues affectingspecific individuals.’ In another country,books are reviewed before publication byreligious authorities and security bodies,and ten to fifteen books are turned downevery year. Censorship and surveillanceare not confined to the pre-publishingphase; books may be impounded,sometimes a number of years after theirpublication. Among recent examples isthe impounding of a work by a femalewriter on the grounds that it offendsreligion. A book may be exhibited in thebook fairs of one country and prohibitedin those of another. The phenomenonof multiple standards for permissionto circulate books has sometimes ledto reviewing the books and editing theoriginal text so that they might be puton sale in those <strong>Arab</strong> countries whichimpose stricter standards. Such revisionsconstitute self-censorship, which isdestructive of innovation and boldendeavours (Naomi Saqr, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>).In view of the above, and with thecontinuing restrictions on freedom ofthought and expression in many parts of theregion, it is difficult to foresee an upsurgein <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge. Accomplishmentsin this field will, therefore, remain quitelimited, especially so long as the <strong>Arab</strong>66 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


nations continue to occupy their presentposition on the world map of freedoms anddemocracy. No distinction can be drawnbetween democracy in the broad meaningof the word and the democratization ofknowledge, with all the latter carriesin terms of opportunities for politicalparticipation and, in particular,communicativeness, since the latter cannot be achieved in isolation from thefirst.ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS:TOWARDS RESPONSIBLEFREEDOM AND A BALANCEDECONOMYThe economic environment whichstimulates the production and spread ofknowledge is based on a cluster of freedoms,such as free enterprise, the freedom toinvest, the encouragement of competition,and fair trade. These are practiced throughthe agency of a judicious and responsibleadministration that imposes transparencyand accountability. The existence of sucha cluster leads to the creation of the properclimate for advancement in knowledgeperformance and for connectedness witha rapidly evolving world which is growingever more open and interdependent.There is no doubt that the globaleconomic crisis has put the subject ofeconomic freedom on the docket forreview and has produced doubts aboutthe credibility and effectiveness of thisfreedom as a matter of principle. Somehave even gone so far as to call for theabolition, or restriction, of economicfreedoms. This logic is, to a great extent,fallacious. It is not reasonable to demandthat freedoms be abolished simply becausethey have been abused by an irresponsibleminority. In this context, as with allother freedoms, we differentiate betweenresponsible and irresponsible uses ofeconomic freedom. We look at economicfreedom as an enabling tool for the properexploitation of resources, which includescatalyzing a healthy business sector andpromoting a varied and vibrant economy.We cite the outstanding economicperformance built over the course ofseveral decades on economic freedomin industrialised countries and even inthose of recent growth, like South Korea,which have realised the greatest benefitfrom economic freedoms by focussing ondevelopment, which has led to outstandingeconomic performance derived largelyfrom knowledge industries of advancedtechnical content.Those countries most open and mostcommitted to the cluster of responsibleeconomic freedoms record high averagesof success in participating in and benefitingfrom the global knowledge reserve. Thisconfirms the assertion that economicfreedom and the encouragement ofcompetition within a stimulating economicenvironment are elements of success inconnecting with the world on the basisof knowledge. This is particularly so inlight of international entanglements andthe appearance of new business modelsin the global economy which dependprincipally upon technology and ideas,and in which knowledge performanceplays an important role in promotingdevelopment.On the economic front, competitivemarkets and open economies stimulatecompetition for domestic and foreignmarkets among companies in any givencountry. As a consequence, the relativegrowth of open economies depends onthe ability to innovate and acquire marketshare among consumers. <strong>Knowledge</strong>plays a fundamental role in penetratingthese markets by virtue of its role inthe production and development ofcompetitive products. On the otherhand, knowledge itself is regeneratedas a result of this competitive processthrough new, ‘dynamic and sequential,’models and the economy moves ‘fromone temporary equilibrium to another.’According to economist Paul Romer’stheory of endogenous growth, up-to-dateknowledge is an essential element of thedevelopment process; this differs fromneo-classical theory, which focuses onThe global economiccrisis has put thesubject of economicfreedom on thedocket for reviewand has produceddoubts about itscredibility andeffectivenessEconomicfreedom and theencouragement ofcompetition within astimulating economicenvironment areelements of successin connecting withthe world on thebasis of knowledgeThe relative growthof open economiesdepends on theability to innovateand acquire marketshare amongconsumersARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS67


The <strong>Arab</strong> countriesmost preparedto produce andput knowledgeto use are thosethat observe thelargest numberof the clusterof responsibleeconomic freedomsencouraging localcompetitionAlthough most<strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave passed lawswhich encouragecompetition, thechallenge lies inactual compliancewith these lawsclosed economies and considers technicalchange an external factor, not determinedby the will of the local economy and theinternal knowledge and technologicaldevelopment policies (‘Atif Qubrusi,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic).In view of the above, the <strong>Arab</strong>countries most prepared to produce andput knowledge to use, especially businessrelatedknowledge, are those that observethe largest number of the cluster ofresponsible economic freedoms whileencouraging local competition. Theyalso limit monopolistic practices and thehegemony of mega-corporations over themarket. Although most <strong>Arab</strong> countries havepassed laws which encourage competition,the challenge lies in actual compliancewith these laws. In addition, the creationof a balance between the interests ofconsumers and foreign companies on theone hand, and local heads of business onthe other, is also a challenge, especially inthat many of the latter participate, underother guises, in the game of politics anddecision-making in the <strong>Arab</strong> world.MEASURING ECONOMICFREEDOMSThe best method to measure economicfreedoms might be that which focuseson opportunities to produce knowledgefrom the inside and fend off theadvance of knowledge products comingin from developed countries and giantmultinational corporations. Based onthat method, an <strong>Arab</strong> index could beconstructed, focusing on thecompetitiveness of knowledge output, thefree flow of knowledge products, and theextent of <strong>Arab</strong> participation as equal, andnot simply dependent, partners in globalknowledge industries (see the sectionsdevoted to a proposed <strong>Arab</strong> index inChapters 2 and 6).The absence of such an <strong>Arab</strong> indexmakes it necessary to rely on availableinternational indicators. Here we presenttwo indices fundamental for trackingeconomic freedom. The first is theHeritage Foundation’s Index of theEconomic Freedom. 6 The second is theEconomic Freedom Index publishedby the Fraser Institute for InternationalResearch, which consists of fiveindicators. 7 In addition, we have used theCompetitiveness <strong>Report</strong> published by theWorld Economic Forum, 8 as well as theWorld Bank’s Doing Business indicators. 9TOWARD EXPANDINGECONOMIC FREEDOMSIn the Economic Freedom Index of theHeritage Foundation, performance isevaluated using ten components of equalweight. 10 Each of the ten freedoms isevaluated on a scale of 1-100, where 100represents the maximum in freedom. Inevaluating the ten freedoms, the authorsdepended on reliable, internationallyrecognised sources. The index for <strong>2009</strong>includes data from the second half of2007 through the second half of 2008. 11Hong Kong led the list of 183 countriesstudied with a total of 90.0, while NorthKorea came in last with a balance of twopoints.The average of economic freedom forthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries studied 12 was below theinternational average on the basis of theHeritage Index. This places them amongthose countries that are ‘mostly unfree’.In addition, no <strong>Arab</strong> country is foundamongst those designated as ‘free’ (Figure2-4). However, nine of the seventeen<strong>Arab</strong> countries studied rank among thosedescribed as ‘largely unfree,’ and six areamongst those designated ‘moderatelyfree.’By measuring the chronologicalperformance of the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesstudied, it becomes clear that thepredominant trend for the average ofeconomic freedoms since 2003 is one ofdecline followed by recovery, despite therealisation of some progress in the field,most of it in the form a slight increasein the last three years, 2006-<strong>2009</strong> (Figure2-5). This slight increase may be linked68 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


to the third oil boom, which reached itsclimax between 2006 and 2008, propellingfreedoms to the increase shown over their1999 values.<strong>Arab</strong> countries included in the studyrecorded a noteworthy superiority in onecategory of the Heritage Index, and thatis fiscal freedom. This is attributable tothe low rate of taxation, and indeed itsabsence in a number of <strong>Arab</strong> countries,particularly those of the Gulf (World Bankand International Finance Corporation,2007). The lowest levels of freedomsin this index for <strong>Arab</strong> countries overallare in the categories of property rightsand freedom from corruption, both ofwhich play a vital role in the promotionof business and competitiveness and, as aresult, the enrichment of the knowledgesociety.In addition to the low rate of taxation,fiscal freedom, and the stability of themonetary system, there were some othersuccesses in the business environment inEgypt came amongthe top ten countriesenacting reforms forthe third time in fouryears, particularlyin terms of the taxsystem and the fieldof business start-upFIGURE 2-4Distribution of Economic Freedom in <strong>Arab</strong> Countries, <strong>2009</strong>Number of <strong>Arab</strong> Countires196100-49.9 50-59.9 60-69.9 70-79.9 80-100Repressed Mostly Unfree Moderately Free Mostly Free FreeSource: Heritage Foundation, <strong>2009</strong>FIGURE 2-5Average economic freedom index for seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countries60.059.559.058.558.057.557.056.556.01999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 <strong>2009</strong>Economic FreedomAverageThe Heritage Foundation, <strong>2009</strong>ARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS69


TABLE 2-1<strong>Arab</strong> Countries that realised positive reforms in the field of business, 2007-2008Starting abusinessDealing withconstruction permitsEmployingworkers*RegisteringpropertyGettingcreditProtectingInvestorsPayingTaxesTradingacrossbordersEnforcingcontracts*Closing abusinessEgyptEgyptEgyptEgyptEgyptMoroccoEgyptSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaJordanMauritaniaUAEMoroccoSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaTunisiaDjiboutiLebanonTunisiaTunisiaMoroccoMauritaniaUAESyriaOmanOccupiedSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaPalestinianSyriaTerritoriesTunisiaOccupiedPalestinianTerritoriesYemen* No <strong>Arab</strong> country undertook positive reforms in the business domains of employment contracts enforcement.Source: World Bank and IFC (International Finance Corporation), 2007GCC countrieswere able to realisecash surplusesthanks to a rise inpetroleum revenuesAccording to somereports, there is nopositive conditionalrelationship betweenincreased oil andgas revenuesand support foreconomic freedomssome <strong>Arab</strong> countries. This was the casein Egypt, which came among the topten countries enacting reforms for thethird time in four years, particularly interms of the tax system and the field ofbusiness start-up, as well as in dealing withbuilding permits and property registration,obtaining funding, and protectinginvestors. Similarly, positive reforms in thefield of business start-up were carried outin Tunisia and Yemen, where the minimumfor capital required for that purpose wascancelled, and in Jordan, where it waslowered. It is worth mentioning thatSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia made progress in reforms inthe field of business closure, a categorywhich included no <strong>Arab</strong> countriesbetween 2003 and 2007. These reformsinclude the introduction of declarationof bankruptcy as a means of liquidationand a market exit device, as well as areduction in the role of the courts, settingof time frames, and the maintenance oftransparency through use of the internet(World Bank, IFC, 2007).THE OIL BOOM DID NOT FOSTERECONOMIC FREEDOM ASHOPEDThe Heritage Index for <strong>2009</strong> shows thatthe <strong>Arab</strong> Gulf countries realised thehighest relative average for economicfreedoms among <strong>Arab</strong> countries, and thatthis happened thanks to the policy ofeconomic openness, the attraction offoreign investments, and the modernisationof the infrastructure. In addition,initiatives were undertaken that gave theprivate sector a larger, wider role in theproduction process. Member countries ofthe Gulf Cooperation Council were ableto realise cash surpluses thanks to a risein petroleum revenues (Fraser Institute,2008). However, with the exception ofQatar and Bahrain, per capita income‘averages’ witnessed a decline as a resultof the swelling demand for imports. Thisresulted in the depletion of resources thatwould have been better invested locally(World Bank, <strong>2009</strong>).Since 2003, certain <strong>Arab</strong> oil-producingcountries (Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Libya, and Oman)70 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


have realised a degree of progress withregard to economic freedoms as comparedwith five non-oil-producing countries(Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Jordan)(Figure 2-6). The figure also makes clearthe absence of any positive conditionalrelationship between increased oil andgas revenues and support for economicfreedoms. Some <strong>Arab</strong> countries depend onoil economically and have benefited fromthe third oil boom, yet have recorded noimprovement on the Heritage economicfreedom index. In contrast, certainnon-oil-producing <strong>Arab</strong> countries enjoymore economic freedoms than the oilproducingcountries when freedom ismeasured against size of population,and in addition may enjoy lower ratesof inflation and slightly better rates ofboth employment and income (HeritageFoundation, <strong>2009</strong>).The index of the Fraser Institute forInternational Research points out thatmost <strong>Arab</strong> countries studied, whethernon-petroleum producers, such as Egypt,Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, and Syria, orpetroleum producers, like Kuwait, 13 Oman,and the UAE, made acceptable progressin economic freedoms between 2003 and2006 (Figure 2-7). This index relies on fortytwovariables in five areas of economicfreedom: size of government (spending,taxes, and commercial enterprises); legalstructure and security of property rights;access to sound money; freedom to tradeinternationally, and the regulation of credit,labor, and business. Overall evaluation isbased on the combined average of the fivecategories on a scale of 0-10 (Mu’assasatal-Buhuth al-Dawliyya, 2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). 14According to the competitivenessindex published by the World EconomicForum, the countries of the <strong>Arab</strong> Gulf,and in particular Qatar, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, theUAE, and Kuwait, lead <strong>Arab</strong> countries andoccupy a leading position among countriesaround the world (Figure 2-8). This indexis constructed on the basis of twelvecritical pillars of competitiveness andpresents a comprehensive picture of thecompetitive arena in the various countriesat all phases of development. Thesepillars include institutions, infrastructure,macroeconomic stability, health, primaryeducation, higher education and training,goods market efficiency, labor marketefficiency, financial market sophistication,technological readiness, market size,Certain non-oilproducing<strong>Arab</strong>countries enjoy moreeconomic freedomsthan the oilproducingcountrieswhen freedom ismeasured againstsize of populationMost <strong>Arab</strong> countriesstudied madeacceptable progressin economicfreedoms between2003 and 2006FIGURE 2-6Heritage economic freedom index for <strong>2009</strong>, <strong>Arab</strong> countries-comparison countries9080706050403020100<strong>2009</strong>2003BahrainOmanQatarKuwaitJordanUAESaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaLebanonEgyptTunisiaMoroccoYemenAlgeriaMauritaniaDjiboutiSyriaLibyaMalaysiaSouth AfricaTurkeyBrazilIndiaChinaOn a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free)Source: Heritage Foundation, <strong>2009</strong>ARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS71


BOX 2-1The Contradictory Nature of Economic Freedom IndicatorsThe evident contradiction amongthe data produced mostly by westerninternational institutions forcefullyindicates the need for careful deliberationbefore issuing judgements based onthem. This points to the pressing needfor <strong>Arab</strong> society to become more deeplyinvolved in the relevant global discoursesand the production of relevant data andreliable indicators. The absence in the<strong>Arab</strong> sphere of institutions capable ofproducing and publishing authenticatedindicators leaves the <strong>Arab</strong> researcher andplanner before a particular selection ofinformation and indicators which maycontradict each other—as demonstratedabove—or lack the legitimacy andauthority which accuracy would confer.This is a powerful indication of theurgent need to draft <strong>Arab</strong> indices forknowledge environments and theirantecedents, indices that should springfrom the actuality of the <strong>Arab</strong> world.This would lend them credibility andrespect, and as a result, authority,whether on the front of <strong>Arab</strong> society,in both its formal and civil sectors, oramongst specialised bodies at the local,regional, and international levels.business sophistication, and innovation.The report also includes comprehensivelists of the most significant strengths andweaknesses of the countries included inthe study. The index is on a scale of 0to 7, where seven indicates the greatestcompetitiveness. Qatar, Bahrain, andthe UAE were all among the list of theworld’s forty most competitive countries(World Economic Forum, 2008b). 15According to this index, non-petroleumexporting <strong>Arab</strong> countries received arelatively favourable rating vis-à-vis <strong>Arab</strong>petroleum exporters when comparedto their peers in other countries of thesame group. The competitiveness reportattributes this to the modest score ininnovation and business sophisticationin petroleum countries and the negativeeffect of this in terms of their overalleconomic stability and improvement inthe institutional environment (WorldEconomic Forum, 2007).The composite business environmentindex published by the World EconomicForum describes an outstandingperformance by a number of <strong>Arab</strong>countries, such as Tunisia, the UAE,and Jordan, with regard to its variouscomponents, namely effectivenessof anti-trust policy, intensity of localcompetitiveness, and degree of marketdominance. 16 This may afford promisingsigns, however provisional, of the existenceof enabling environments for knowledgeindustries in both some petroleum andsome non-petroleum <strong>Arab</strong> countries.In summary, the <strong>Arab</strong> region witnessed,up to the onset of the global economiccrisis in the autumn of 2008, two principalchanges. First was the third petroleumFIGURE 2-7Fraser Institute index of economic freedom of <strong>Arab</strong> countries vs. comparison countries98765432003200420052006210AlgeriaSyriaMoroccoTunisiaEgyptJordanBahrainOmanKuwaitUAESouth AfricaMalaysiaIndiaTurkeyChinaBrazilSource: Fraser Institute data base (January, <strong>2009</strong>), http://www.freetheworld.com72 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 2-8Index of global competitiveness for <strong>Arab</strong> countries6543210QatarSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaUAEKuwaitTunisiaBahrainOmanJordanMoroccoEgyptLibyaAlgeriaMauritaniaBrazilTurkeyIndiaSouth AfricaChinaMalaysiaOn a Scale of 1.00 (least competitive) to 7.00 (most competitive)Source: The World Economic Forum, 2008bboom, beginning in 2000, from whichthe oil and gas producing and exportingcountries in particular derived great benefit,and which led to an exceptional economicrevival, unlike what was happening at thesame time in many countries of the world,including certain developed countries.From 2000-2007, there was an increasein GNP (gross national product) in <strong>Arab</strong>countries, especially the petroleum exportersamong them, and even a number of nonpetroleumexporters such as Egypt andTunisia, which benefited partially from theincrease in petroleum prices (World Bank,<strong>2009</strong>). Secondly, some <strong>Arab</strong> countries likeEgypt, Kuwait, and Jordan took importantsteps towards openness and on the road tothe deregulation of their economies andthe removal of some inhibiting restrictionsto business and to commercial, banking,and investment activity. This contributedto a relatively good economic performancefor this period, which preceded the currenteconomic crisis.However, most of these huge petroleumrevenues were invested in specific sectorslike construction, which relies heavily onforeign labor, as well as in investmentsoutside the <strong>Arab</strong> world which producerapid returns. Therefore, petroleumrevenues did not produce a comparablesurge in the growth of the per capita GDPin many Gulf countries. On the contrary,after 2005, these averages actually declined 17in a number of petroleum countries, suchas the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, andKuwait (see Figure 2-9). Likewise, the oilboom was not accompanied by a boom inknowledge mirroring the investment of oilrevenues in knowledge sectors, nor was itreflected in an improvement in individualliving conditions in all the social brackets inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world as a whole. In fact, the poorgrew poorer in the shadow of the inflationwhich swept across the world and throughthe <strong>Arab</strong> region at least until the autumnof 2008. Investment in the establishmentof a knowledge society and economy wasvery modest, whether in quantitative orqualitative terms or in terms of impact. Thisis not to deny the numerous praiseworthyefforts and initiatives that have beenmade in this regard, both by the publicand private sectors and by civil societyorganisations 18 whose goals are the transferand indigenisation of knowledge andthe enhancement of knowledge contentor that include knowledge programmesand activities in one form or another.Numerous initiatives have been undertakenin the region in production fields such asindustry, agriculture, and services, and inThe oil boom wasnot accompaniedby a boom inknowledge mirroringthe investmentof oil revenues inknowledge sectorsin the <strong>Arab</strong> worldas a wholeARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS73


External pressure,restrictions imposedby internationalagreements,and stipulationsof free tradeagreements do notalways contributepositively to theestablishment ofknowledge societieseducation, involving a reasonable quantityof knowledge value added and includingdifferent forms of knowledge transfer.These initiatives remain, however, modestand uncoordinated, especially whencompared to total investment and revenuesand to the opportunities in the field ofknowledge transfer that might otherwisehave been generated at the <strong>Arab</strong> regionallevel. All in all, the third oil boom hasnot sufficiently contributed to producinglong-term <strong>Arab</strong> development, let alone arise in <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge content.The slight improvement that may bedetected in the <strong>Arab</strong> region is embodiedin the advancement of economicfreedoms in some countries, whichhas occasionally led to an increasein growth averages, as in the casesof Egypt and Tunisia. Nevertheless,that advancement remains limited anddoes not necessarily reflect a visionwhich aims at establishing a knowledgesociety and advancing <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. This is evidenced by thefact that <strong>Arab</strong> countries continued toexport raw materials and import highvalue-added products that embody a highknowledge content. Statistical findingsof the UN conference on commerceand development (UNCTAD) point to acontinuing, even increasing, deficit in netexports of manufactured goods in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries between 2003 and 2006(Figure 2-10). In contrast, most <strong>Arab</strong>countries had a steadily increasing surplusin exports of raw primary commoditiesduring the same period.Discussion of freedoms is fraught withdifficulties, and measurements of economicfreedom allow for numerous interpretationsdepending on the content and implicationsof each index. No matter how precisethe indicators, there are reservations asto the perspective of each in measuringeconomic freedom. This perspective doesnot necessarily reflect the circumstancesof developing countries, <strong>Arab</strong> countriesincluded. These indices do not speak, forexample, of the need for emancipationfrom the external hegemony and externallegal restrictions that play a negative role inthe rise of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance.Similarly, external pressure, restrictionsFIGURE 2-9Average growth of per capita GDP9876541996-9932000-04210-1LibyaSyriaUAE200520062007*OmanEgyptTunisiaQatarJordanAlgeriaBahrainDjiboutiKuwaitSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaMoroccoYemenLebanon-2-3-4-5*World Bank estimatesSource: The World Bank, <strong>2009</strong>74 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 2-10Net exports of manufactured goods in <strong>Arab</strong> countries0.00Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaUAEAlgeriaQatarKuwaitOmanSudanMoroccoEgyptLibyaLebanonJordanIraqYemenSyriaTunisiaBahrainMauritaniaBillions of dollars-5.00-10.00-15.00-20.00-25.00-30.002003200420052006-35.00-40.00Source: UNCTAD website, http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/reportfolders/reportfolders.aspx, on 22 March <strong>2009</strong>imposed by international agreements, andstipulations of free trade agreements donot always contribute positively to theestablishment of knowledge societies indeveloping countries, and, among them,countries of the <strong>Arab</strong> world.And now that the global economiccrisis is upon us, buffeting the economiesof developed and developing nations insuccession, the fact remains that <strong>Arab</strong>countries neglected to exploit the climateof revival and economic openness thataccompanied the oil boom to bridge theknowledge gap, and to invest those returnsin building <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge content. Thiscould have allowed for the accumulationof organisational knowledge which, viathe business sector, is engendered inknowledge industries and knowledgeeconomies that are open to the world.More than ever before, this crisis calls forredoubling cooperative efforts not onlyto ward off the dangers associated withit but also to increase investment in <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge capital. It should guaranteethe sustainability of development built onsolid foundations, rather than on economicrent-seeking, and should move towardssupporting responsible economic freedomthat gives priority to joint <strong>Arab</strong> investment,especially in knowledge industries, with afocus on supporting an <strong>Arab</strong> capability tocatch up with the knowledge economy.MEDIA, CULTURAL, ANDSOCIAL ENVIRONMENTSPOVERTY AND SOCIALMARGINALISATIONSocial freedoms are considered thereal guarantee of individuals’ ability toexercise their individual freedoms andpolitical rights as they wish, withoutviolating others’ rights. Specific referenceshould be made to marginalised groupsin society and, pre-eminently among these,the poor, who suffer from social exclusionand inequitable income distribution.In its modern definition, poverty is thecurtailment of an individual’s opportunitiesto attain his or her basic rights in society(Sen, 1999). Marginalisation constitutes,in all its forms and at all levels, a barrierto the individual’s exercise of socialfreedom.The globaleconomic crisiscalls for redoublingcooperative effortsnot only to wardoff the dangersassociated with itbut also to increaseinvestment in <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge capitalARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS75


The <strong>Arab</strong> poorsuffer from socialmarginalisation,economic privationand socialinequality–all ofwhich have powerfulrepercussionson knowledgeacquisition andproduction<strong>Arab</strong> cultureexists within theframework of abody of texts,established truths,and deep-seatedlore that impactconvictions andcodes of behaviourDespite the discrepancy in the sizeof this bracket from one <strong>Arab</strong> societyto another, this group constitutes animportant segment of the population inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world. Reference can be madeto Yemen and Mauritania, among themost difficult <strong>Arab</strong> cases, for which theHuman Poverty Index, published by theUnited Nations, 19 shows a poverty rate ofmore than 35 per cent. Eight other <strong>Arab</strong>countries that together account for about60 per cent of all <strong>Arab</strong>s record averages ofgreater than 20 per cent on the UNDP’sHuman Poverty Scale. 20It is obvious that the <strong>Arab</strong> poor,some of whom are growing poorer,suffer from social marginalisation andeconomic privation, and that they do notenjoy equality with the remainder of theirfellow citizens. If the poor representthe most important and most dangerousgroup among the marginalised, thenclass differences represent another largebarrier to achieving social equity andfreedom. And all of the above havepowerful repercussions in the domain ofknowledge acquisition and production.TRENDS TOWARDSRELIGIOUS RADICALISMAND INTOLERANCEIt is difficult to approach the topic ofsocial freedoms and their developmentwithout also considering the generalstructure of <strong>Arab</strong> culture, which restson a complex of customs, traditions,practices, premises, social convictions, andreligious beliefs. Space does not permitus to discuss all the areas of dysfunctionwithin <strong>Arab</strong> culture. The analysis here isof freedoms, especially social freedomsand their relationship to the evolutionof the environments needed to enablean <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge society. Furthermore,this analysis does not proceed fromvalue judgments that either exaggerate orunderestimate the extent of the matter.The first thing to be noted is that <strong>Arab</strong>culture exists within the framework ofa body of texts, established truths, anddeep-seated lore that impact convictionsand codes of behaviour. The limits ofpractices that have been handed downgeneration after generation are morepowerful and more numerous than thoseof the law. This cultural heritage constitutesthe general framework of society anddetermines its trajectories in a way thatmakes emancipation from its influencedifficult (al-Tahir Labib, backgroundpaper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Theseconstants reflect, in many instances, anintellectual inertia which dominates theculture, resulting in a society that lives andthinks with a one-dimensional vision thatrejects change, creativity, and innovation,believing in and preferring to submit torestrictions. As a result, society often takesa preconceived stance vis-à-vis ‘the other,’one of rejection and condemnation thatforecloses dialogue. All of this leads tothe drawing up of civilisational battlelines, to reciprocal bouts of cultural mudslinging,and to an enmity that may reachthe point of symbolic and even armedviolence. (see Chapter 1)One cannot go into the restrictionsimposed on social freedoms withoutreferring to the fears that accompanywriting on certain topics that have arole in shaping our social situation, suchas religion, politics, and sex. These areproblematic issues that stir up a host oftaboos, fears, and sensitivities (al-TahirLabib, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, and Nabil ‘Ali, 2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic),and the operative spheres of these taboosand their interpretations have widenedin recent decades. This escalation hascoincided with the high tide of religiousdogma that has been disposed in mostcases to outward forms and ritual at theexpense of the true essence of religions asrepresented by their ethical values, tolerantteachings, and moderate practices. Andthese narrow-minded interpretations havebecome wide-spread among religions. Anumber of factors may have assisted thespread of this radical current amongbroad social groupings in the <strong>Arab</strong> world,especially the easily influenced young,76 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


namely the spread of poverty, socialmarginalisation, political frustration,and repeated political defeats, not tomention the waves of westernizingpropaganda broadcast by the newsmedia. As a result, obscurantism hasincreased, as has people’s reliance onradical interpretations of texts as sourcesof religious authority. Likewise, there isa spread of religious rulings, or fatwas,labelling certain people as infidels aswell as of resort by lay-people to closedmindedinterpreters in understanding thematters of daily life. This phenomenonhas reached alarming proportions withthe spread of illiteracy in a number of<strong>Arab</strong> countries. Many such mistakennotions and practices have come to bereflected in aspects of daily life, creatingrestrictions on social freedoms and achallenge for knowledge advancementand intercommunication with the outsideworld.Careful consideration of the contentof some <strong>Arab</strong> media, especially thatbroadcast by some satellite channels,reveals a proliferation in productionand dissemination of a radical religiousdiscourse far from the language of religioustolerance. An opposite discourse, no lessprofuse in <strong>Arab</strong> media, springs fromextreme consumerist, materialist values andtries to exploit politics, sex, or the dream offame and quick profit. This polarizationin broadcasting between openness to thepoint of libertinism, and isolationism tothe point of hostility to the age and theworld, that is at odds with knowledgeand openness and constantly pulling theindividual back into the past, has becomewide-spread. All this redoubles intellectualand behavioural polarization, which isfollowed by social polarization. Thediscourse of rationality and moderationhas a weak presence on the <strong>Arab</strong> airwavesin general, despite the serious effort itrepresents to present a knowledge contentthat is modern, critically balanced, tolerant,and in tune with the times, times whichare responsible for many of the greatknowledge feats of our world.FREEDOM OF INTELLECTUALPROPERTY 21Intellectual property is an area of overlapbetween economic and socio-cultural data.It also brings together phenomena withmutually intersecting economic, cultural,and social indicators. These we will dealwith under the rubric of cultural and socialstability, while recognizing their directimplications on more than one economicfront.Economic and social freedoms arestrongly tied to the issue of intellectualproperty, which plays a fundamental role inmoving the process of human developmentforward. Intellectual property includes theoutput of the human intellect and all itinvolves in the field of patents, copyrights,trademarks, and industrial design. There ismuch debate in this domain over whetherknowledge is a public or a private good,over the congruence between literary andfinancial rights, and over the consequentextent of the conflict between excessiveprotectionism and the principle ofcompetition, especially in knowledgeindustries.Intellectual property acquires particularimportance through its relevance to themeans by which developing countriesbenefit from and interact with the globalreservoir of knowledge, both in termsof production and use. Thus, the issue offreedom of intellectual property has cometo occupy centre stage, becoming a pivotfor discussion in global discourse on theproduction and distribution of knowledgeand its connection to development. Whiledeveloped countries, backed by megacorporations,call for additional protectionof intellectual property, developingcountries, backed by NGOs, defend themargins of available freedoms and affirmthat a hard-line approach to protectionismand its improper application may have anegative impact on innovation and thespread of knowledge, and even on theother dimensions of development as well.Some developing countries havesucceeded in profiting from these marginsA spread of religiousrulings, or “fatwas”,labelling certainpeople as infidels hasreached alarmingproportions withilliteracy in a numberof <strong>Arab</strong> countriesCareful considerationof the contentof some <strong>Arab</strong>media reveals aproliferation inproduction anddissemination ofa radical religiousdiscourse far fromthe language ofreligious toleranceARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS77


<strong>Arab</strong> countries havebeen absent fromthe negotiationsspecifically devotedto intellectualproperty, toknowledge access,and to efforts tocombat internationalmonopoliesand externalmonopolisticpressuresLegislation onintellectual propertyand its applicationhas been passedin <strong>Arab</strong> countrieswithout regardfor their particularcircumstancesof freedom of intellectual property tosubsidise their knowledge industries, withpositive impacts on development. Forexample, in 2007, by national decree, Brazilused the flexibility related to compulsorylicensing for immune deficiency medicationand obtained permission to import anequivalent alternative from India (Martini,2008). Such actions stem from a clearvision which stipulates that the individualcitizen’s right to health is a constitutionalright guaranteed to all citizens (Shaver,2008) and have led to a more than 70 percent drop in the price of the medication.Likewise, India has been careful to promotethe manufacture of generic drugs andinvest in them. It has also decided thatsoftware programmes do not fall underthe rubric of inventions and thus are notsubject to the patent restrictions 22 thatlimit the exchange of knowledge andparticipation in its production. Theseactions reflect a vision intent on promotingknowledge industries.GLOBAL DEBATE, ARABABSENCENaturally, we now find in the global arenaa clear polarization in stances betweenadvanced countries on the one hand anddeveloping ones on the other. This makesdebate and discussion, with an enlargedcircle of participants, doubly importantand adds impetus to the dialogue.Nevertheless, <strong>Arab</strong> countries have nopresence, no active participation, in thismomentous global discussion. They havealso been absent from the negotiationsspecifically devoted to intellectual property,to knowledge access, and to efforts tocombat international monopolies andexternal monopolistic pressures. Egyptmay be the only <strong>Arab</strong> country to haveparticipated in a number of internationalefforts calling for freedom of intellectualproperty for developing countries. Theseefforts include setting up a group ofdevelopment-friendly countries, draftinga development document in 2004,launching the Access to <strong>Knowledge</strong>initiative, and making a rough draft of atreaty for it in 2005. This treaty is stillunder discussion internationally.Perhaps one of the most importantaxes of global discussion and debate isthat of access to knowledge. This involves“the necessity of applying protection ina way that supports development andthe spread of knowledge, especially bymaximizing countries’ ability to benefitfrom the flexibilities and exceptionspresent in legislation for the protection ofintellectual freedom.” Among the mostimportant of these are the exclusions forthe purposes of education and scientificresearch and the manufacture of genericdrugs classified by quality. Most <strong>Arab</strong>countries have not made full use of theexceptions and provisions for flexibilityin the World Trade Organisation’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual PropertyRights (TRIPS) agreement of 1994, theagreement of international reference thatgoverns all countries in their dealings withthe intellectual property issue. Flexibilityincludes numerous facets, most prominentof which are flexibility in implementation,extended grace periods for the intellectualproduct, standard setting, 23 andimplementation of intellectual projects,especially anything connected to educationand scientific research.While NGOs and consumer groupsfrom other developing countriesparticipate in the global debate onfostering knowledge and development,<strong>Arab</strong> civil society is absent from a globalscene that is witnessing effective actionfrom a number of countries in Africa,Asia, and South America. <strong>Arab</strong> debateon the subject is limited to the localpurview among a restricted circle of legalspecialists, as if the issue did not extendbeyond the cloisters of the halls of justice.Legislation on intellectual propertyand its application has been passed in<strong>Arab</strong> countries without regard for thesecountries’ particular circumstances andtheir need to benefit from the exceptionsand privileges that international schoolsprovide. Neither does this legislation78 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TABLE 2-2<strong>Arab</strong> Countries according to their ties to tradeagreements and intellectual property<strong>Arab</strong> Non-Members in the WTO<strong>Arab</strong> Members in the WTO<strong>Arab</strong> signatories to a bilateral freetrade agreement with the USAAlgeria Jordan JordanIraq UAE BahrainSudan Bahrain MoroccoYemen Djibouti OmanLebanonOccupied Palestinian TerritoriesSyriaKuwaitMoroccoSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaTunisiaEgyptMauritaniaQatarOmanSource: Muhammad al-Sa‘id and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.reflect a clear vision directed towardsestablishing a national perspective oninnovation, the catalysis of creativity,and development of local knowledgecontent.REGULATING INTELLECTUALPROPERTY IN THE ARABWORLD: DISPARITY ANDOCCASIONAL EXAGGERATIONPerhaps without realizing the importanceof intellectual property, <strong>Arab</strong> legislationhas codified the restrictions that newinternational legislation dictates, basedon the priorities of those countries mostadvanced economically, technologically,and in terms of knowledge performance.There is considerable disparity among the<strong>Arab</strong> countries in terms of the featuresof regulatory systems that protect therights of intellectual property, dependingon how closely tied they are to the TRIPSagreement. As a corollary, it is possibleto divide <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to theregulations currently on their books forthe protection of intellectual propertyinto three groups, on the basis of howclosely they apply the standards found ininternational accords (see Table 2-2).The first group includes <strong>Arab</strong> countrieswith fewer laws and standards than existin the multilateral international systemrepresented by the TRIPS agreement. Anexample is Yemen, which grants copyrightfor thirty years, rather than the fifty of theaccord. Countries of the second groupinclude <strong>Arab</strong> members of the WTO. Allobligations and standards on the protectionof intellectual property as set out in theseaccords are necessarily incumbent uponthem as a fundamental and inescapablecondition for membership. The third groupis composed of those <strong>Arab</strong> countries thatare members in the WTO but which, atthe same time, are party to a number ofadditional trade agreements, such as freetrade agreements or a bilateral economiccooperation agreement with the UnitedStates or the European Union. Theseagreements usually stipulate additional andmore stringent restrictions and standardsfor intellectual property protection thanthose set out in the TRIPS agreement.In fact, these agreements reflect theinterest of mega-corporations and theterms of advanced countries, leaving littlescope for creativity in developing countries.Free tradeagreements usuallystipulate additionaland more stringentrestrictions andstandards forintellectual propertyprotection thanthose set out in theTRIPS agreementARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS79


TABLE 2-3Rights and responsibilities of <strong>Arab</strong> members in the World TradeOrganisation in the field of copyright and access to knowledgeCountryNumber of years author’srights are protectedAccepts specialobligations in technicalprocedures for protection?Permits compulsorylicensing?Makes exceptions forlibraries and universitiesfor scientific andeducational purposes?Bahrain70YesYesYesDjibouti25NoYesYesEgypt50YesYesYesJordan50YesYesYesKuwait50YesYesYesMauritania70NoYesYesMorocco70YesNoYesNine <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave acceptedspecial obligationsfor technicalprocedures forthe protection ofdigital productsnot found in TRIPS,and these shouldhave been avoidedOmanQatarSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaTunisiaUAEThere, the strict protectionism in, forexample, the pharmaceutical industry orof software protects the interests of megacorporationsthat belong, for the mostpart, to industrialised countries that builttheir harvest of knowledge, historically,in a climate free from restrictions onknowledge exchange.On the legislative level, regulations inEgypt, Lebanon, and Syria stipulate someexceptions specific to the pharmaceuticalindustry. In addition, some exceptionsfrom the articles of patent law have beenratified in Egypt, Tunis, and Jordan, whilein Syria, Morocco, and Jordan regulationsallow for some flexibility in copyright laws.Djibouti and Mauritania remain exemptfrom implementing the provisions of theTRIPS agreement on medicines until 2013and 2016, respectively. Bahrain, Morocco,and Oman, however, have broadenedsome of their commitments under this7050507050Source: Muhammad al-Sa‘id and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.YesYesNoYesYesNoYesYesNoYesagreement, and even accepted additionalcommitments in the framework ofother free trade agreements ratified withdeveloped countries such as the UnitedStates and the European Union. Similarly,legislation of many <strong>Arab</strong> countriesincludes special obligations for technicalprocedures for technology protection,such as encryption, even though these arenot among the requirements of the TRIPSagreement.Table 2-3 on rights and responsibilitiesof <strong>Arab</strong> countries shows that five of twelve<strong>Arab</strong> countries apply stricter provisionsfor protection of authors’ rights thanthose called for by TRIPS, with protectionextending to seventy, rather than the fiftyyears mandated by the agreement. Nine <strong>Arab</strong>countries have accepted special obligationsfor technical procedures for the protectionof digital products not found in TRIPS,and these should have been avoided. AndYesYesYesYesYes80 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


while some of these nine countries becamesubject to these obligations because they arelinked to secondary free trade agreementswith developed countries, Egypt includedthem in its own national legislation for noapparent reason.Noticeable in Table 2-3 is the fact thatmost <strong>Arab</strong> countries–nine of the twelvecovered by the sample–have the rightto issue and use compulsory licensingto exploit intellectual work without theagreement of its owner, in cases thatserve the public welfare. However, thisright has not been put into actual practice,and no compulsory license has beenissued by any <strong>Arab</strong> country. However,all the <strong>Arab</strong> countries listed in the tableobtained exclusions from the agreementfor libraries and universities for scientificpurposes. This is an issue of criticalimportance which must be implementedand awareness of which must be promotedin the <strong>Arab</strong> world to foster widespreadaccess to knowledge.CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES FORACCESS TO KNOWLEDGEThe <strong>Arab</strong> world faces a number ofchallenges in the field of protectingintellectual property rights and transmittingand providing access to knowledge. The firstchallenge lies in the absence of the subjectfrom national agendas. Here, partneringwith the global knowledge reserve andgaining access to its sources and resourcesof knowledge in important fields suchas health, education, and developmentis of particular importance. The secondchallenge is embodied in the bilateralagreements on economic cooperationand free trade with industrial countries,especially countries of the EuropeanUnion and the USA, which aim both atincreasing opportunities for products of<strong>Arab</strong> countries to penetrate these marketsand at increasing foreign investment flows.This has not actually transpired, due tothe great disparity between the resourcesof these <strong>Arab</strong> countries and the capacitiesof the developed countries. In fact, it isgenerally the opposite that happens, withall that that entails in terms of negativeeconomic and social consequences forthe <strong>Arab</strong> side.The third challenge relates to how tobenefit from the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge product,however modest, through the provisionof adequate support, accompanied byincreased positive interaction with therich and accessible global knowledgereserve, and the beneficial deploymentof any outcomes. Finally, there must beparticipation in knowledge production ina way that moves sustainable developmentin the <strong>Arab</strong> world forward and diminishesthe sharp disparities between countriesin light of the rapid advancements intechnology. In this context, referencemust be made to the appearance of newbusiness models in the world economythat depend principally on ideas. In thesemodels, knowledge performance plays aneffective role in boosting developmentthrough knowledge production, andthe promotion of and investment inendogenous resources, rather than throughthe remittance of ever larger annualpayments to manufacturers of knowledgein the developed world.OPPORTUNITIES FORCREATIVE ARABCOOPERATIONThe <strong>Arab</strong> world, like other developingareas, suffers from a lack of competentspecialists in legal texts in the field ofintellectual property, a new field subjectto global considerations. Along withthese deficiencies come constant externalpressures, pressures that may be formidablein the case of non-compliance with thearticles of intellectual property agreementsand which are often quickly capitulatedto. This highlights the necessity forcoordination and the sharing of expertiseamong <strong>Arab</strong> countries, especially thosethat have undergone such experiences,even if the results were of limited value(Muhammad al-Sa‘id and Ahmad ‘Abd al-<strong>Arab</strong> countriessuffer from a lackof competentspecialists in legaltexts in the field ofintellectual property.This highlightsthe necessity forcoordination andthe sharing ofexpertise amongcountries thathave undergonesuch experiencesIt is possible tobegin with specificand practicalprocedural stepsto create real <strong>Arab</strong>cooperation in thefield of knowledgeby freeing upintellectual propertyARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS81


The current state ofknowledge-enablingenvironments asviewed from theangle of freedomsin the <strong>Arab</strong> world isnot one to stimulatethe advancementof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance<strong>Knowledge</strong> isan integral,homogenous wholein its essentialcategories andcomponents,influenced bythe elementsof the enablingenvironmentsand the clusterof freedomsLatif, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic).It is possible to begin with specificand practical procedural steps to createreal <strong>Arab</strong> cooperation in the field ofknowledge. For example, one couldprovide latitude for the strengthening ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge reserve by freeingup intellectual property, in emulationof other countries that have realisedthe importance of providing latitudefor freedom to produce and implementknowledge, with all the positive effectsthis has had on development. This strategyrequires that government, the privatesector, and civil society organisationsparticipate in the formulation of policiesand practical programmes. It also requiresthe existence of a wise and seriousleadership at all levels able to implementthese policies and present new initiatives.In this context, the maximum degree ofcoordination and cooperation between<strong>Arab</strong> countries would have to be realisedin order to agree on united stances inthe face of whatever issues might arisewith regard to intellectual property onthe world stage. An exchange of legalexpertise to review many of the lawsthat some <strong>Arab</strong> countries have issuedwithout benefiting from the allowancesand flexibilities for which internationalagreements provide would also beneeded.These efforts would not begin fromscratch, given that, in fact, there arealready examples of <strong>Arab</strong> cooperation inthe field of intellectual property, such asthe <strong>Arab</strong> Agreement for Copyright (1981,then 2002), and the special legislation onprotecting author’s rights and associatedrights (1998). Cooperation amongmembers of the Gulf Cooperation Councilin the field of patent law is considered asuccessful example of <strong>Arab</strong> legislativecoordination; through this, a single systemfor patenting was applied from 1998,and modified in 2002. This system givesautomatic protection in the six memberstates of the Gulf Cooperation Councilwithout the patent having to be registeredin each of the states separately. TheUnified Gulf Patent Office in Riyadh takesan active role in the process of examining,registering, and protecting the patents.SUMMARY: FREEDOMS: ACOMPREHENSIVE CLUSTEROR DISPARATE ELEMENTS?It can be said that the current state ofknowledge-enabling environments asviewed from the angle of freedoms inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world is not one to stimulatethe advancement of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. The picture looks bleakwhen one compares freedoms in the <strong>Arab</strong>world to those in other regions. However,while this characterization is accurate, thesituation with regard to <strong>Arab</strong> enablingenvironments varies considerably fromone country to another and conflictingpictures sometimes emerge. Caution,therefore, is called for in makingjudgments and generalizing results, evenwhen defining the relationship betweenknowledge performance and the enablingenvironment in any given country.Performance also varies considerably fromone year to another, as the internationalreports show. While a particular <strong>Arab</strong>country may lead in economic freedomsand occupy an outstanding position in oneof the pivotal knowledge performancecategories, it may record in the same yeara slump on the front of political andintellectual freedoms. This will inhibitthe pivotal category of innovation that isso closely tied to the abundant supply ofintellectual freedom (see Chapter 6).This phenomenon may be explainedby the fact that knowledge is an integral,homogenous whole in its essentialcategories and components, and influencedas a single entity by the elements of theenabling environments and the clusterof freedoms. <strong>Knowledge</strong>, after all, is aharvest of different kinds of informationacquired from a number of sources,such as education, scientific research,media and publication, economic activity,cultural heritage, historical wisdom,82 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


and political participation. All of theseenvironmental components are affectedby and affect each other in the contextof whatever freedoms are dominantin the society. As a result, knowledgeperformance can improve in one countryand deteriorate in another, just as one ofthe basic categories of knowledge mayadvance while the other categories relapseas a result of the performance of thosefreedoms, which constitute, in the end,an important and authentic part of anyenabling environment for knowledge.<strong>Arab</strong> countries, as societies and asindividuals, suffer from tensions andcontradictions in their performance inenabling knowledge, because, perhaps, ofthe lack of a clear vision and an organisingstrategy to catch up with the age ofknowledge. These tensions may be theresult of security or political fears whichexert pressure in the direction of curbingfreedom and deregulating commerce.Here, the lack of awareness that knowledgeenvironments on the global front areheading in the direction of greaterdemocratization of knowledge becomesclear. In that process of democratization,the principle of sharing by all citizens inthe production of knowledge sparkles,offering an expression of thinking bygroups of individuals through horizontalcommunication media, not through anelite discourse coming from on high.Generally speaking, it can be said thatchange in the actual situation of freedomsin the region in recent years has beenconfined to an improvement in economicfreedoms. An analogous improvementin political and intellectual freedoms,democratic pursuits, and freedom ofexpression has not occurred; they haveremained as before in most <strong>Arab</strong> countries.There also has been no improvement insocial and cultural freedoms; in fact, theymay even have suffered a decline in someareas.The freedom of thought andexpression are still the weakest link in thecluster of freedoms and environmentsfor advancement of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. And the possibility ofseparating the various freedoms anddefining the role of each in the advancementof knowledge performance remain amongthe most problematic of considerationsthat must be addressed. Clearly, exercisingjust a few types of freedom, and to amost minimal degree, will not be enoughto establish a knowledge society in the<strong>Arab</strong> world, which lacks both political andsocial freedoms.FROM NURTURINGENVIRONMENTS TOSUPPORTING INSTITUTIONSIn the previous section of this chapter wehave laid out what we believe to be thecornerstone of the enabling environmentsthat should assist in the formation of aknowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, andwe have classified these environmentswithin a general orientation that we believeto be central to the formulation of sucha society. All of this relates to what wehave called an expansion of the domainof freedoms, whether at the political,economic, social, cultural, or media level.The catchword ‘freedom’ is not apanacea for all the obstacles that fall inthe way of the formation of a knowledgesociety and an advancement of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance. Definitely, otherfactors besides a shortfall in freedomshinder our ability to reach the thresholdsof a knowledge society. One might citethe hegemony of custom, petrifactionof ideas, closed-mindedness, rejectionof innovation, introversion, and a lack ofinteraction with the latest developments ofour age.Freedom, with the possibilities itoffers of a leap forward towards allthat contributes to strengthening andtransforming the human experience,must be considered a central pillar ofempowerment. It is also, as we havesaid, a pursuit that correlates with theneeds of <strong>Arab</strong> society. Nevertheless, thisempowerment, which is based on theresponsible exercise of freedoms, requires<strong>Arab</strong> countries sufferfrom tensions andcontradictions intheir performancein enablingknowledge becauseof the lack of aclear vision and anorganising strategyEmpowerment,which is based onthe responsibleexercise offreedoms, requiresthe creationof supportiveand protectiveinstitutionalframeworks thatensure sustainability,development,evaluation, andoversightARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS83


To build andimplementan enablingenvironment in the<strong>Arab</strong> world, wemust propagatethe institutionalclimate thatnurtures the effortsmade to establishthe hoped-forknowledge societyMany <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave begunattaching particularimportance to therole of scienceand technologyin the service ofdevelopment. Certain<strong>Arab</strong> institutions areshining examplesof this trendthe creation of supportive and protectiveinstitutional frameworks that ensuresustainability, development, evaluation,and oversight. This is because institutionalsociety in the contemporary sense of theword is synonymous with modern society.In the knowledge domain, developedsocieties have hundreds of institutionscapable of accumulating the symbolicand material goods of the knowledgesociety not only at the level of economicproduction but also at that of managementand its various associated social, legal, andother spheres.To build and implement an enablingenvironment in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, we mustpropagate the institutional climate thatnurtures the efforts made to establish thehoped-for knowledge society. The hopeis that these institutions would then goon to embrace the requirements for itsestablishment, such as the creation andoperationalization of a legal mechanismand laws to regulate the institutions that willhave the task of supporting the knowledgeconduit and reinforcing its branching sidechannels.This will help forward the aim ofgeneralising, propagating, producing, andpatronising knowledge, whether in termsof human resources or of technologicalmeans. Laws and regulations must assumethe role of protection, and provide theinstitutions with their legitimacy so thatthey may strengthen and elaborate theirown regulatory mechanisms. This clarifiesthe boundaries and parameters of theirwork, as it does their relationship with theinstitutional network of the knowledgesociety.The achievement of transparencydepends on building institutions and theirregulations, in that institutions contributeto oversight, accountability, and the ruleof law. They also contribute to a degree ofdecentralization and effectiveness in theperformance of their defining tasks, in thatnetworking and subsidiary creation leadto a strengthening of the mechanism ofinstitutionalization, which is synonymouswith modernization. Through networking,institutions come to possess, in theirturn, the power to access the contacts ofother institutions at home and abroad.This is particularly true when they haveencompassed the networked spacesprovided by the revolution in informationtechnology. This generates an environmentthat stimulates acculturation, sharing, andlearning, and offers opportunities fortaking calculated risks, namely, institutionalaction in its responsible, rational form thatis based on calculations of interest andreturn on investment.The subject of supportive, regulatorylegislation for efforts to inaugurate theknowledge society ramifies and growsas the issues related to its establishmentexpand and proliferate. The <strong>Arab</strong> worldnot only lacks an institutional perspectiveon knowledge; it also lacks many of therequirements of institutionalism, such asregulations and legislation specific to it.The delineation and development of theseconstitutes a basic requirement for theentire endeavour.PIONEERING INSTITUTIONSAND SHINING EXAMPLESDespite the lack of vision and institutionalpractice and despite the weakness ofthe legislative framework within whichto promote the advancement of theknowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> world,we find many illuminating institutionalattempts aimed at embracing, catalysing,and propagating knowledge initiatives.Many <strong>Arab</strong> countries have begun attachingparticular importance to the role ofscience and technology in the service ofdevelopment. Certain <strong>Arab</strong> institutionsthat try to participate in the building ofa knowledge society are shining examplesof this trend; space permits us to mentiononly a small number of them here. InJordan, for example, there is the PrincessBasma Centre for Youth Resources,which was founded in 2004. It is the firstsuch institution to specialise in youthprogrammes and is known regionally forits vitality and creative and empoweringcurricula. The Centre launched the84 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


first INTEL computer club; INTELis considered a pioneer in its attentionto information technology and its usein development. This centre is likewiseconsidered the essential partner to theInternational Youth Foundation (IYF).In Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia we should mention,among a number of examples, Mawhiba(Talent), the initiative of the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and His Men Foundation for Patronageof the Gifted, whose basic mission is todiscover and sponsor those with talent. Ithas held a large number of lectures andseminars in the field of developing talent invarious regions of Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, publishesthe magazine Mawhiba, and has translatedmany books on the subject into <strong>Arab</strong>ic. Ithas established a division to support Saudiinventors that has helped more than twohundred, introducing them to investorsand issuing patents for their inventions.The foundation is working on setting upan invention incubator to develop andcommercialise Saudi inventions. To thisend, the foundation holds marketingsessions which bring together the inventorand relevant agencies from the privateand public sector. The foundation alsosupports artistic and cultural creativity outof conviction as to its importance as afacet of knowledge.In the UAE, among the most importantinitiatives in support of knowledge andcreativity has been the establishment in2007 of the Mohammed bin Rashid AlMaktoum Foundation, a personal initiativeof His Highness Sheikh Mohammed binRashid Al Maktoum, vice-president, primeminister, and ruler of the UAE, whoallocated the sum of ten billion dollars as aknowledge endowment. The foundation’sgoals can be summarised as follows: todevelop knowledge and human potential inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region and to use those potentialsin the creation of a new generation ofleaders able to support comprehensivedevelopment efforts all over the <strong>Arab</strong>world. A second initiative, “Dubai Giving,”is an extension of the first endowment.In cooperation with the Mohammed binRashid Al Maktoum Foundation, “Elaf,”BOX 2-2<strong>Towards</strong> <strong>Productive</strong> Intercommunication for <strong>Knowledge</strong>:Translation in the Age of al-Ma’munThe Mohammed bin Rashid AlMaktoum Foundation is translating anumber of the masterworks of worldscience and culture, at the rate of onebook per day, thus calling to mindthe Golden Age of the <strong>Arab</strong>s duringthe reign of the caliph al-Ma’mun—aperiod characterised by its interestin translation, by its openness, andby the ability and willingness of the<strong>Arab</strong>s to communicate with thethe first <strong>Arab</strong> electronic newspaper, plansto launch a knowledge page on its site. Thefoundation has also launched academicscholarships for studying abroad, such asthe “Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumScholarship Programme”, which fallsunder the knowledge and education sector.The programme offers scholarships to thetop universities of the world for qualified<strong>Arab</strong> students. 24In Qatar, the mission of the QatarFoundation includes preparing youngpeople in Qatar and the region to face thechallenges of an ever-changing world. 25The Foundation also aims to advancethe State of Qatar to the point at whichit can assume a leading role in educatingfor innovation and scientific research. TheFoundation works on three axes: education,sciences and research, and society. At itsEducation City, the Foundation providessupport for a select group of institutionsknown for the excellence of theirprogrammes, covering stages from earlychildhood to university and higher studies,and that offer integrated programmesfocussing, in the first place, on buildingcapabilities and developing character. Inthe realm of the sciences and research,the Science and Technology Oasis, whichcost more than three hundred millionUS dollars to construct, is regarded as aresearch and development centre in basicfields, such as medicine, bio-technology,ICT, environmental sciences, particlescience, and nano technology. The QatarFoundation’s research division cooperatescultures of the rest of the world. Thispioneering experiment may assist <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge societies towards widerintercommunication with other humansocieties. It may also help in creatinga greater openness towards worldsciences and scholarship in such a wayas to enrich the existing <strong>Arab</strong> reserveof knowledge and the establishment ofthe hoped-for knowledge society.In Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, theinitiative of the King‘Abd al-‘Aziz andHis Men Foundationfor Patronage of theGifted has establisheda division to supportSaudi inventorsThe mission of theQatar Foundationincludes preparingyoung people to facethe challenges of anever-changing worldARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS85


Oman’s WorldStudies Instituteaims to undertakestudies on local andglobal economicissues, focusing onthe <strong>Arab</strong> worldThe new BibliothecaAlexandrina isworking hard torevive the spiritof openness andresearch whichcharacterised itsancient counterpartwith its partners in leading a process ofembedding the mainstays of this researchenvironment in order to built technologicaland innovative capacity in Qatar and createearly solutions for the difficulties andchallenges faced by the country in the areasof health, climate change, clean energy,and others. Research is also part and parcelof the academic programmes of eachuniversity branch present in the EducationCity, the intention being to make a realityof the linkage between innovation and theeducational process and to direct both toserve the needs of society. The Sciencesand Technology Oasis also undertakesto commercialise new knowledge andinventions via support programmes thatmake it possible to convert researchprojects into marketable products. TheQatar Foundation also seeks to link itsprogrammes to the service of the society,in fulfilment of the principle of knowledgeas a road to development.Oman’s World Studies Institute wasfounded in 2005 as a non-profit nongovernmentalorganisation. The Instituteaims to undertake studies on local and globaleconomic issues, focusing on the <strong>Arab</strong>world. The Institute is the representativein the region for the Fraser Institute forEconomic Freedoms network.In October, 2008, Egypt’s <strong>Arab</strong>Academy for Science and Technologysigned a cooperation agreement withthe Egyptian Fund for Science andTechnological Development (2008 budget,one hundred million Egyptian pounds), toreinforce cooperation between the two. Itaims to offer patronage to <strong>Arab</strong> inventors,providing them with an appropriateclimate, and directing the results of theirscientific and technological researchtowards the service of <strong>Arab</strong> societies. Theagreement covers exchange of expertise,arbitration for technological projects,and the provision of services in supportof networking and cooperation amongrelevant <strong>Arab</strong> institutions to supportscience and technology and catalysethem in the service of the economic,social, and environmental developmentfor <strong>Arab</strong> society. 26 The new BibliothecaAlexandrina is working hard to revive thespirit of openness and research whichcharacterised its ancient counterpart. Itis not only a library, but a cultural centrewhich brings together a library capableof housing millions of books, an internetarchive, six specialised collections, aplanetarium, and a discovery hall toacquaint children with science, in additionto a panoramic mural of civilisation, ninepermanent galleries, seven academicresearch centres, and ‘Vista,” a virtualinteractive system for science andtechnology applications.In the countries of the Maghreb, wefind, to name but a few examples, theIslamic Foundation for Education, Science,and Culture in Morocco, an institutionfounded in 1979 to coordinate thespecialised agencies of the Organisationof the Islamic Conference in those threefields and that organisation’s membernations. Recently it has taken an interest ina number of strategies for the developmentof bio-technology in the Islamic world(2003), for water resource management(2003), for developing university education(2006), and for cultural solidarity in theservice of civilisation and developmentissues for Muslims.Outside the orbit of these institutions,a number of other activities have beenundertaken, such as the dedication ofprizes and the holding of exhibitions, all ofwhich point to the importance a numberof <strong>Arab</strong> countries attach to catalyzing, inexpedient fashion, the establishment ofthe knowledge society. In Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, thefoundation of King Abd al-Aziz, Mawhiba,with participation by the Saudi AramcoCorporation, organised the first Saudiinnovation exhibition, “Ibtikar 2008,” inMarch 2008, under the slogan “Innovationin the Service of Development.” With theparticipation of sixty-three inventors andan estimated twenty-two thousand visitorsof all ages, the exhibition displayedits selection of over sixty medical andelectronic inventions. The exhibitionorganised basic prizes for boys and girls86 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


from the ages of thirteen to twenty-fiveand certificates of appreciation to thoseunder twelve. Among the goals of “Ibtikar2008” were developing inventions andnational innovations, highlighting them,evaluating them, and investing in them onan individual basis, with the participationof the public and private sectors. Italso strove to provide guidance, helpknowledge and technology take root andinvest in them, and transform innovationsinto products with an economic return, allof this paving the way for the realisationof comprehensive development in Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia. 27In November, 2008, Qatar begancelebrating Academic Excellence Daywith the designation of six prizes for highschool graduates, university graduates,holders of doctorates, outstanding teachers,outstanding schools, and scientific researchfor secondary students. 28The Kuwaiti Science Club organised thefirst international exhibition for inventorsin the Middle East in October, 2007. TheKuwaiti Office for Patronage of Inventors,adjunct to the Kuwaiti Science Club, doesfollow-up on Kuwaiti youth, fosteringtheir talents and helping them register andenforce patents. A number of <strong>Arab</strong> andinternational science agencies took part inthis exhibition, helping many inventors toget acquainted with each other and withthe investors; this was especially importantin view of the fact that marketing is theone problem common to all inventorsaround the world. This exhibition invitedKuwaiti investors to offer support fundsto the inventors by acquainting themselveswith the inventions and choosing those ofuse for manufacture. 29The Syrian Ministry of Economyand Development announced a contestfor the best young inventor for 2008 tobe chosen from among university andinstitute students, as part of a programmefor the dissemination of the culture ofintellectual property and the promotionof creativity and invention. Prizes of over30,000 Syrian liras were earmarked for thecompetition. 30Our review of institutional initiativesreveals actions that truly aspire to strengtheninstitutionalism and fortify the supportingenvironment for the knowledge society.At the same time, however, these actionsplace us in uncharted territory: they neithercover all the domains of knowledge, nordo they reflect a clear policy for doing so.They are, rather, an avant-garde actionin dire need of oversight, consolidation,and expansion so that together they mayindeed contribute to propelling us into theknowledge society.These laudable efforts, despite theirimportant role in spurring and providingfinancial support for contributors to thefield, are disorganised and uncoordinated.Indeed, some of them overlap and repeatthe work of others, leading to a wasteof effort and of the meagre resourcesavailable. Here again, we call for opennessand interaction in order to profit from theexperiences of others. Many countries thathave made progress on the knowledgefront have taken competitiveness intoconsideration in this domain and haveworked on drafting treaties and strategicinitiatives to prepare an appropriateinstitutional atmosphere for the knowledgesociety. In March, 2000, European leadersput forward an agreement known as theLisbon Treaty which aims at makingthe European Union more competitiveand dynamic. The initiative comprisedmany policies and focused on creatingnew job opportunities, bringing together2,010 policy initiatives aimed at utilizingthe possibilities of information andcommunications technology to promoteadditional innovation and productivity inEurope. 31LEGISLATION AS THE WAY TOSUPPORT INSTITUTIONALISMEstablishing the oversight institutionsthat support efforts to establish theknowledge society requires carefullyconfigured regulations and legislation.In a knowledge society, the value ofinstitutions increases in proportion toReview ofinstitutionalinitiatives revealsactions that trulyaspire to strengtheninstitutionalism andfortify the supportingenvironment for theknowledge society.However, theseactions place us inuncharted territory:they neither coverall the domains ofknowledge, nor dothey reflect a clearpolicy for doing soEstablishing theoversight institutionsthat supportefforts to establishthe knowledgesociety requirescarefully configuredregulations andlegislationARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS87


BOX 2-3The communications market in the European Union was completelyderegulated in 1998. From that time on, a rapprochement ofcommunications technology and broadcasting via digitalizationin the European Union forced the redrawing of organisationalborders to include “all internet communications and services” in anew organisational framework which came into force in July, 2003.In less than five years this framework was reviewed and broughtup to date.Principal Goals of the Organisational Framework for 2003:Decreasing organisational burdens on companies that provideservices to the information societyMaking sure that all clients, including those with disabilities,have the right to all basic services at reasonable prices(telephone, fax, internet access)Encouraging competition through deregulation of the marketand of the monopoly by some national companies that offerservices like high-speed internetThe reorganisation that the European Commission launchedat the end of 2007 aims at simplifying and systematizing laws byestablishing a single unified European agency to undertake theseregulatory tasks.The European Union is determined to guarantee that citizensand companies benefit from the knowledge society. In 2006 theCommission worked to limit the unwarranted rise in prices for theuse of mobile telephones during travel in other E.U. countries, andit reduced what are known as ‘roaming’ charges by more than sixtyper cent in 2007, followed by further reductions in 2008 and <strong>2009</strong>.In the long range, it gives priority to eradicating the “digitalSource: the website of the European Commission: Europe’s Information Societyhttp//ec.europa.eu//information_society/Europe/i2010/ict_and_Lisbon/index_en.htmThe Legal Framework for the European Uniongap.” The E.U. also has numerous initiatives of providing highspeed broadband connections, expanding e-commerce and businessservices to companies, putting public services on the web, andsupporting competence and the competitive potential of all sectorsof industry and service.There are three priorities:Providing companies and citizens access to a large group ofhigh-quality, moderately priced services and utilities of thecommunications infrastructureProviding every citizen the skills necessary to live and work inan information societyProviding life-long access to learning as a fundamental part ofthe European social modelThe organisational authority is an inseparable part of theorganisational framework of electronic communications in theEuropean Union and it takes on its shoulders the reform processwhich must be implemented before the end of <strong>2009</strong>.As for the national organisational authorities, among theirfundamental tasks are:Encouraging competition in the domain of electroniccommunications networks and servicesGuaranteeing users the benefit of the greatest degree ofchoice, price, and qualityEncouraging investment in infrastructure development andencouraging innovationEncouraging the active use of wireless and digitalizingresources<strong>Arab</strong> legislationremains, forthe most part,insufficient toaddress thequestions andissues of theknowledge societythe legal framework that endows themwith the foundations that guarantee theircontinuity and make them viable in society.The task of legislation is also to provideinstitutions with the tools that allow forself-scrutiny and accountability and thusimpart transparency.The reality, however, is that <strong>Arab</strong>legislation remains, for the most part,insufficient to address the questionsand issues of the knowledge society,whether by protecting them, as in thecase of property rights, or by supportingthem, or in drafting guidelines fortheir continuity and development. Forexample, <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ positions varywidely as regards the law of freedomof information published by PrivacyInternational. Some of them findthemselves in the list of countries withan inferior level of laws guaranteeingthis freedom; a large number fall intothe category of countries that have notmade laws governing information; andthree <strong>Arab</strong> countries are still waiting toimplement these laws, laws which havecome to be taken for granted in free anddeveloped countries.It is incumbent on us to make use ofthis aspect of the experience of moredeveloped countries. In Europe, theLegal Framework for the InformationSociety (LEFIS), was established by theEuropean Union as an internationalresearch project under the “Sixth Frame”programme. The project has more thansixty members, including academic andresearch institutions, companies, lawyers,and European Union public administrationexperts.LEFIS proposes standards forinformation technology and communicationsin schools and law faculties, promotes thestudy of laws and by-laws, and practicesin applied arts centres. The project hasalso applied itself to devising teaching88 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


solutions that allow use of the availableacademic resources on-line. A furthergoal is to draft legal policies arising fromdiscussions that have sprung up around theEuropean Union. The aim of the projectis to formulate and implement a plan foreducational infrastructure as well as forresearch in the legal field to effectivelyaddress the needs of the knowledge andinformation society. Based on previousinitiatives subsidised by the EuropeanUnion, it can be expected that this projectwill lead to an improvement in legaleducation and succeed in adapting it tothe new social, political, and institutionalclimate. Legal education will thus cometo include electronic, social, economic,and ethical dimensions as well as policymaking.32The Free <strong>Knowledge</strong> Institute, a nongovernmentalorganisation, believes that“by promoting the use of free knowledgein the fields of Technology, Education,Culture, and Science more individualsand organisations will profit from thebenefits of sharing knowledge.” Theinstitute supports ‘free knowledge’ inall its forms in the fields of informationtechnology, and educational, cultural,and scientific materials, so that it maybe used, studied, modified, and freelydistributed. The institute’s basic goal is tosupport equal opportunity, prosperity, andthe collaborative ethic in creativity andknowledge exchange. Among the institute’smost important initiatives is SELF, fundedby the European Commission, whichhas drawn up a programme to encouragecreativity, cooperation, exchange ofacademic materials, and ongoing training.It gives special importance to free andopen programmes so that all who wishto may contribute by presenting andsharing knowledge without restrictions,drawing inspiration from the example ofWikipedia. 33The European Union has alsoundertaken the drafting of a legalframework to regulate the climate inwhich such institutions operate, to providethe environments and freedoms necessaryto the establishment of the knowledgesociety, and to facilitate its movementand its development. This frameworkis periodically reviewed to help it staycurrent with the continuous changes in theknowledge revolution.We live in the age of the “fifth freedom,”that is, the freedom of movement ofknowledge between countries. Thisexpression was coined by the EuropeanUnion in 2006 and under its rubric it setaside approximately twelve billion eurosto subsidise creativity and technology. 34It follows that, among <strong>Arab</strong> countries,too, this concept must be applied in theexchange of expertise in the knowledgefields.Our examination of European examplesreveals the fragility and marginality of theinstitutionalisation currently in place inmany <strong>Arab</strong> countries and in the regionas a whole. <strong>Arab</strong> institutions of scientificresearch are like isolated islands lackingeverything that is needed for collaborativework aimed at raising levels of scholarshipand creativity, be that between the <strong>Arab</strong>institutes themselves, or between themand scientific research institutes knownaround the world for their productivityand creativity.This impels us to consider thegeneralisation and prioritizing ofinstitutionalism as a way of accessing theknowledge society.ON THE NEED FOR ANALTERNATIVE INDEX:A PROJECT IN CRITIQUEAND TRANSCENDENCEAn analysis of the enabling environmentof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge demonstrates thatan alternative methodology is neededfor studying the state of knowledgeand measuring knowledge performancein <strong>Arab</strong> countries. However, this canonly come about throughº the use of anew index that monitors, as one of itschief indicators, the various freedomsto which this chapter is devoted, to wit,freedom of thought and expression,<strong>Arab</strong> institutions ofscientific research arelike isolated islandslacking everythingthat is needed forcollaborative workaimed at raisinglevels of scholarshipand creativityAn analysis ofthe enablingenvironment of<strong>Arab</strong> knowledgedemonstratesthat an alternativemethodologyis needed forstudying the stateof knowledgeand measuringknowledgeperformance in<strong>Arab</strong> countriesARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS89


The desired<strong>Arab</strong> index willtranscend thetraditional methodsof measuring theproduction ofknowledge viaindicators imposedfrom on high,seeking, instead, tomeasure knowledgeproduction from aninternal perspectiveand the political, economic, and socialfreedoms. It must do this in additionto monitoring institutionalization andenabling and encouraging legislation, aswell as measuring actual progress towardsthe knowledge society. These freedomsprovide the climate needed to build thevarious branches and types of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge and the institutions that supportthem, as well as the laws and regulationsin force and their implementation. It isto be hoped that the desired <strong>Arab</strong> indexwill transcend the traditional methods ofmeasuring the production of knowledgevia indicators imposed from on high,seeking, instead, to measure knowledgeproduction from an internal perspective.It should search for evidence ofenvironments that act as catalysts to theuse and production of knowledge contentand that boost good governance througha method suited to the production ofknowledge under the umbrella of thesefreedoms. It is an index that would dependprincipally on participation within a broadspace of freedoms, and aim to encourageand utilise indigenous resources and thespread of democracy in producing anddisseminating knowledge and creativityinstead of importing knowledge fromindustrial countries.The alternative index might alsoexplore scientific knowledge environmentsand scientific research in creative waysto motivate scientists in research anddevelopment groups in an atmosphereof academic freedom and freedom ofthought and expression. The index mightalso be broad enough to measure the levelof cooperation between scientific andresearch institutions on the one hand andthe industrial sector on the other. It wouldalso monitor the extent of participation inthe production of knowledge via digitalmedia (<strong>Arab</strong> content in Wikipedia, <strong>Arab</strong>sites in the worldwide web) and <strong>Arab</strong>publications (the number of independentnewspapers, for example, and the numberof detained journalists and bloggers) and itwould evaluate the state of social freedoms(gender freedom, freedom of marginalisedclasses and the poor, freedom of religiouspractice).The above is just a summary of the broadoutlines of such an index, and in particularfor one linked to freedoms. It suggests astarting point for the observation of<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge environments from aninternal point of view that comprehendsthe interaction between freedoms andknowledge and sustainable development.It would observe knowledge from thevantage point of <strong>Arab</strong> reality itself andnot according to indicators derivedfrom industrial countries. This wouldpave the way for the construction ofan alternative index to monitor <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge environments and synthesisewhat may perhaps be considered thenucleus of a project for <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeaccomplishment.PEERING INTO THEFUTURE: TRAJECTORIESOF THE ENABLINGENVIRONMENTIt is possible to peer into the future ofknowledge-enabling environments inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world in light of the diagnosispresented in this chapter by pausingbefore three possible future trajectories.The first is pessimistic. It assumesthat the state of knowledge-enablingenvironments will remain as it is, withthe continued imposition of restrictionsthat rein in freedom of opinion, thought,creativity, social participation, andintellectual property. Slight improvementsin knowledge performance and a partialimprovement, possibly superficial, inthe state of freedoms, may occur butwill not necessarily lead to an advanced,competitive economic structure based onsophisticated local knowledge industries.On the contrary, the situation will worsen,especially in view of the global economiccrisis, with the continued squandering ofnatural and human resources, includingan additional brain drain and loss ofpromising scientific and university talents.The <strong>Arab</strong> world will remain, according90 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


to this trajectory, a consumer, not aproducer, of knowledge.The second trajectory presents a realisticoutlook that contains a degree of hope. Thistrajectory would take proper advantage ofthe slight opening to economic freedomsin the <strong>Arab</strong> world and give it a little pushfor the sake of an enhancement of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance, while trying tofind vistas for “new levels of freedom”that the world economic crisis may openthrough new possibilities for the use of<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge (see the section devoted tothe economic crisis in the preamble). Thisrealistic trajectory requires an enlightenedleadership aware of the impediments that acontinued flow of <strong>Arab</strong> resources abroadentails, especially in the light of currentglobal economic conditions. Under such aleadership, <strong>Arab</strong> investments in two basicdomains would be encouraged. Top prioritywould go to a heavy investment in <strong>Arab</strong>human capital. This would occur throughsupport of creative initiatives in education,establishing and operating endowments forresearch and scholarships, and expandingscience prizes as a sophisticated means ofencouraging individuals to participate inscientific research, as is done elsewherein the world, even by mega-corporations.These would be over and above anopening to global knowledge networksand support for the trend towards thedemocratisation of knowledge ratherthan its monopolisation. Second prioritywould go to investment in promotingknowledge-based industries, such as thepharmaceutical industry, software, andinformation technology, and expandingthem by making the greatest possibleuse of the flexibility available in the lawson intellectual property and by workingtogether with other developing countries.This would lead to a boost for nationalknowledge industries as they integrateinto global economies, while maintainingthe priorities of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, andwithout submitting to the dictates of thedeveloped world.Nevertheless, this trajectory does notremove the fundamental impedimentthat hampers <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge, namely,the restrictions imposed on the freedomof thought and expression irrespective ofhow the <strong>Arab</strong>s may flourish economically.Even if this trajectory leads to someeconomic success, 35 that success will runinto the ceiling of restrictions on freedomof thought and expression and perhapsthe ceiling of cultural restrictions, fromwhich liberation can be expected, at best,only in the long term.Finally, the most desirable trajectory isthe optimistic scenario which shows a leapforward in vision and leadership in the<strong>Arab</strong> world and a consequent expansionin political freedom to complementeconomic freedoms. This would comeabout as a result of an awareness of thedanger of repressing freedom of thoughtand expression. It would happen whenattention is paid to the implementation ofcompetitiveness, freedom of intellectualproperty, the enrichment of intellectual life,scientific research, and creativity, and therealisation of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge unity, basedon a climate headed towards democracy inits broad sense, including the democracyof politics, business, and knowledge. Inthis healthy climate, cultural and socialfreedoms would be realised successively,and <strong>Arab</strong> countries would cooperate,particularly in view of the global economiccrisis and the coordination of efforts itrequires of developing countries.The ideal solution is to release all thesefreedoms. This is in harmony with humanrights and will bring about equality and socialjustice. If the <strong>Arab</strong>s direct their attentionexclusively towards economic freedoms,the basis of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge-enablingenvironments will remain incomplete andfar from realisation. A knowledge modelbuilt on a limited number of freedomswill lead to the production of only certainforms of knowledge, not to a knowledgesociety. The likeliness of the success ofsuch a knowledge model and its longevity,not to mention its ability to bridge theknowledge gap, remains questionable, bothon the <strong>Arab</strong> and the global level.The most desirabletrajectory is theoptimistic scenariowhich shows a leapforward in visionand leadership inthe <strong>Arab</strong> worldand a consequentexpansion inpolitical freedomto complementeconomic freedomsARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS91


End Notes1The index divides the <strong>Arab</strong> states into five groups according to their degree of press freedom (good, satisfactory,noticeable problems, difficult, very serious) based on a sliding scale according to which the higher the level ofpress freedom the lower the value on the index.2http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf.3Calculations were made according to Table 3 in the Democracy Index, 2008, published by the investigations divisionof the Economist. http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021195552/graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.4This applies also to the Governance Index issued by the World Bank, which consists of several indicators, the mostsignificant of which are political stability, absence of violence and terrorism, efficacy of governance, quality ofinstitutional performance, freedom of expression and accountability, the rule of law, and control of corruption. SeeGovernance Index, World Bank, 2008, covering the years 1996-2007. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/worldmap.asp#.5This section of the <strong>Report</strong> draws primarily on the background paper prepared for the <strong>Report</strong> by Naomi Saqr, “TheImpact of Media Laws on <strong>Arab</strong> Digital and Print Content,” in English.6See www.heritage.org/index.7See http://www.freetheworld.com/2008/EconomicFreedomoftheWorld2008.pdf.8See http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/<strong>Arab</strong>WorldCompetitiveness<strong>Report</strong>/index.htm.9See http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DB09_landlocked.pdf.10Components of the Index are: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, size of government, monetaryfreedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom.11It should be taken into consideration that some of the freedoms, such as monetary freedom, were based on theaverage rate of inflation from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2007.12Statistics for 2008 include seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countries, namely, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Tunisia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen.13The Heritage Index reveals conflicting results, showing a sharp decline in Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE from 2003-<strong>2009</strong>.14The index relies on only thirty-nine indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, given the paucity of data and the use of 2006data for the 2008 report.15Evaluation is made on the basis of data available to the public and on opinion polls, according to a comprehensiveannual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum in cooperation with its network of institutes (the researchinstitutes and business organisations in the countries covered by the report), and in <strong>2009</strong> information wasgathered from more than 12,000 business executives (see World Economic Forum, 2008b).16See Statistical Annex, Table 5.17Despite the rise in per capita income as an absolute figure in these petroleum countries in the period from 2005-2007, there was a decline in the rate of growth of GDPs during the same period.18See the section of this chapter entitled “Pioneering institutions and shining examples,” which is devoted to effortsand initiatives aimed at the establishment of knowledge-nurturing institutions.19The index is calculated as an average of three components: first, adult literacy rate, second the likelihood of notsurviving up to the age of forty, and third, the average percentage of the population that does not have reliableaccess to water and the percentage of children who are underweight for their age. To examine the index for humanpoverty, 2008, see the website for human development: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_En_Tables.pdf.20The list consists of Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen, and Comoros. Somalia shouldperhaps be added to the list, despite the lack of supporting data (Statistical Annex, Table 2).21The term ‘freedom of intellectual property’ in the sense of emancipation from restrictions on intellectual creativitywas used by Naglaa Rizq in her book Intellectual Property and <strong>Knowledge</strong> Creation in the <strong>Arab</strong> World: the PoliticalEconomy of <strong>Knowledge</strong> and Development, Edward Elgar Publishers, forthcoming 2010. This section of the chapterrelies heavily on the background paper for the <strong>Report</strong> by Muhammad al-Sa‘id and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic.22This is according to the third paragraph of the patent ordinance of 1970. For further detail, see (Noronha, 2006).23Examples of TRIPS flexibilities include early use, compulsory licensing, and government use of patents in some92 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


specific cases.These flexibilities have been provided for the sake of public welfare such as the fair and just use ofintellectual property for purposes of education.24The website Dar Al Hayat, “The Mohammed bin Rashid Foundation and Elaf launch “Ma’rifa” electronicwebsite”.http://www.daralhayat.com/science_tech/02-<strong>2009</strong>/Article-<strong>2009</strong>0213-+7067573f-c0a8-10ed-0095-ef1792de150d/story. html, on 14 February, <strong>2009</strong>.25See the Qatar Foundation’s website: http://www.qf.edu.qa/output/page40.asp.26“Cooperation Agreement to Assure ‘Freedom of <strong>Knowledge</strong> Movement’ and a Conference on Investing in <strong>Arab</strong>Inventors,” http://www.mawhopon.net/ver_ar/news.php?news_id=3971 on 16 March, <strong>2009</strong>.27“Grounding the Culture of Invention in the Society: Prizes Distributed at Inventors’ Exhibition,” http://www.sec.gov.qa/content/resources/detail/19079 on 16 March, <strong>2009</strong>.28The Qatar initiative to develop education website, March <strong>2009</strong>: “Sheikha Al Hamud: Honoring high-achievers is afeature of a developed society,” http://www.sec.gov.qa/content/resources/detail/19079 on 10 March, <strong>2009</strong>.29“Kuwait hosts the first regional inventors’ exhibition,” http://www.mawhopon.net/ver_ar/news.php?news_id=2757 on 16 March, <strong>2009</strong>.30”The Syrian Ministry of Trade announces a contest for the best young inventor for 2008…”http://www.mawhopon.net/ver_ar/news.php?news_id=3195 on 16 March, <strong>2009</strong>.31European Commission website: “2010 in the context of information and communications technology and theLisbon Strategy,”http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/ict_and_lisbon/index_en.htm, on March16, <strong>2009</strong>.32LEFIS, http://www.ittig.cnr.it, on March 10, <strong>2009</strong>.33For more information on the institute, see the website: http://www.freeknowledge.eu/34The first four freedoms are: the free mobility of humans, capital, services, and products among countries of theEuropean Union.35In view of the continuing restrictions of associated freedoms, and particularly political freedom, some observers areplacing their bets on economic freedom alone as the lever most likely to raise <strong>Arab</strong> developmental and knowledgeperformance, alluding to the possibility of the <strong>Arab</strong> region repeating the achievements of certain countries in Eastand South Asia and of China. Such a bet is beset by risks and pitfalls. A large body of literature exists that offersa different assessment of the experience of these Asian countries. In light of the clear differences in the regionaland global political situations of each area, and the clear difference between them in terms of economic and socialmake-up and systems of knowledge and production, such comparisons and bets are fraught with difficulty.ARAB KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTS93


CHAPTER THREEEDUCATION AND THE FORMATIONOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL


CHAPTER THREEEDUCATION AND THE FORMATIONOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITALIntroductionFrom our discussion of an empoweringenvironment and the part it plays in thepreparations for entrance into the knowledgesociety we turn to a survey of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgecapital. We shall take as our starting point inthis crucial area an examination of the state ofeducation in <strong>Arab</strong> societies aimed at analysingwhat and how their educational systemscontribute to knowledge and developmentand to diagnosing the flaws that impede theability of these systems to broaden the scope ofknowledge in <strong>Arab</strong> societies. The various levelsand outputs of education form the central baseof the knowledge society. An assessment of itspresent state in the <strong>Arab</strong> region should thenlead us directly to the sources of the knowledgegap between it and the rest of the world.To consider education in the <strong>Arab</strong> nation interms of its achievements and its relationship tothe knowledge society is to broach the challengesconfronting the educational systems in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries. Theses challendges includeilliteracy, appropriateness of educationalsystems to serve development plans, scienceinstruction with greater openness to the fruitsof contemporary scientific knowledge inits various specializations, the relationshipbetween education and the market (the needto link educational systems to the developmentrequirements of <strong>Arab</strong> societies), and therelationship between education, unemployment,and job opportunities (placing education atthe service of production and the expansionof choices). Following an inspection of theseconventional challenges, we will proceed to thenewer challenges facing those who see educationas an underpinning for and mainstay of theknowledge society. In this context, issues suchas the technical utilisation of modern media,quality standards, and long-distance learningbecome additional indicators of the large andmultifaceted gap in our educational systems.These new challenges to education and theformation of a knowledge society have helpedto crystallise in a general way new problematicslinked to the tasks now assigned to theeducational process in its various phases inview of the substantial discoveries of new andvaried knowledge media, such as informationtechnologies, in a world evolving at unaccustomedspeed.Most <strong>Arab</strong> countries face multi-layeredproblems in their educational systems, problemsfurther aggravated by the many innovationsintroduced by the revolution in informationtechnology. The demands are manifold andblend the challenges of the past with those of thepresent and future. In view of the difficulty ofthe subject and the many ways of approachingit, we have chosen to examine the role ofeducation in the creation of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgecapital. This approach will help us, firstly, inassessing the modes of knowledge accumulationthat currently exist at the different educationallevels and, secondly, in pinpointing the flawsand shortcomings that keep our educationalsystems from performing their central function offostering the necessary conditions for entry intothe knowledge society.Modern societies have charged theireducational systems with the task ofdisseminating knowledge among the broaderpublic, a responsibility formerly restrictedto the family, the religious establishment,masters of trades and, for the privileged few,a handful of tutors. Despite the rise of rivalinstitutions, educational institutions around theworld have maintained their pivotal role in thedissemination of knowledge and the formationof the human energies that form the backboneof the knowledge society. Moreover, instructionhas long since expanded from teaching theThe challenges facingeducation in the<strong>Arab</strong> nation revolvearound a set of axesthat include illiteracy,appropriateness ofeducational systemsto serve developmentplans, and greateropenness to the fruitsof contemporaryscientific knowledgeIn their educationalsystems, most <strong>Arab</strong>countries face multilayeredproblemsaggravated by themany innovationsintroduced bythe revolutionin informationtechnologyEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL97


In the last quarterof a century, <strong>Arab</strong>states have achievedremarkable progresson all indicatorsused to gauge thedissemination ofknowledge amongtheir people, fromlower illiteracy ratesto higher numbers ofuniversity graduatesAchievements shouldnot blind us to thefailures that haveprevented many<strong>Arab</strong> countries fromemerging into theknowledge societybasic skills of reading, writing, and arithmeticand inculcating the essential skills of a tradeto include the development of analytical andcritical abilities, organisational and decisionmakingskills, the powers of creativity andinnovation, and other higher behavioural andmental competencies. Nor is the knowledge thatan educational system is presumed to impartlimited anymore to the ability to answer thequestion, “What do you know?” Educationalsystems are now expected to equip students toanswer such questions as, “Do you know howto do such and such?” “Where and how doyou find such and such information?” “Howdo you assess the value of the knowledge youhave obtained?” and “How can this knowledgebe put to use?” It is through competencies ofthis sort that individuals become knowledgeablein varying degrees and ways. Thus they becomepersons aware of the underlying substance andintrinsic value of things and of how to dealwith them, educators capable of contributingto the dissemination of knowledge, and activeplayers in their environment and society throughtheir ability to take decisions and espouse viewson the basis of available knowledge, as opposedto superstitions, traditions, prejudices, randomimprovisation, or personal whim.“When all have access to the lights of knowledge,the time of democracy will have come.”- Victor Hugo (circa 1840)“An ignorant people is more tractable than aneducated one.”- Egyptian ruler Muhammad Sa‘id Pasha, son of Mohammed ‘Ali Pasha(circa 1860)THE GENERAL STATE OFKNOWLEDGE AS PROVIDEDTHROUGH EDUCATION INTHE ARAB COUNTRIESIn the last quarter of a century, <strong>Arab</strong> stateshave achieved remarkable progress on allindicators used to gauge the disseminationof knowledge among their people, fromlower illiteracy rates to higher numbers ofuniversity graduates. Taking the three majoreducation indicators used by the WorldBank to assess a country’s preparednessto compete in the knowledge economy–adult 1 literacy rates, secondary schoolenrolment rates, and enrolment in tertiaryeducation–the progress these countrieshave achieved becomes readily apparent.Whereas in 1980 the adult literacy rateacross the <strong>Arab</strong> region was approximately55 per cent for males and 25 per cent forfemales, by 2005 it had climbed to 82 percent and 62 per cent respectively. 2 In 1980,the gross enrolment ratios in all levels andtypes of secondary schooling stood at amedian of approximately 57 per cent formales and 38 per cent for females. In 2006,they had reached 70 per cent for males and65 per cent for females. 3 In 1980, tertiaryenrolment exceeded 25 per cent for malesand 20 per cent for females in Lebanon only(41 per cent and 21 per cent respectively).The medians were 8 per cent and 4.6 percent respectively and higher education wasnon-existent or virtually non-existent in athird of <strong>Arab</strong> countries (tertiary enrolmentwas less than 5 per cent). By 2005, onlythree <strong>Arab</strong> countries had tertiary enrolmentrates below 5 per cent and the median hadrisen to 18 per cent for males and 29 percent for females. 4Figure 3.1 presents the education andhuman resources 5 index for seventeen <strong>Arab</strong>countries from the most recent periodof available statistics and the comparisonof these results with the 1995 levels. Theindices are based on the World Bank’s<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology(KAM). 6 The figure throws into reliefthe huge discrepancies between thesecountries, some of which have progressedsignificantly since the mid-1990s, whileothers have declined in comparison withother countries in the world. 7 It also revealsthat very few <strong>Arab</strong> countries belong to theupper half of the world’s countries on thisindex (a score of 5 or more).Nevertheless, these achievementsshould not blind us to the failures thathave prevented many <strong>Arab</strong> countries fromemerging into the knowledge society. Howcan they even see the light at the end ofthis tunnel when more than 60 million oftheir people, two thirds of them women,98 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 3-1Education and human resources index for <strong>Arab</strong> Countries(most recent statistical period compared to 1995).76543210In the <strong>Arab</strong> world,more than 60 millionpeople, two thirdsof them women,are illiterate, andsome nine millionschool-age childrenare out of schoolMost recent period 1995Source: World Bank, KAM, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspare illiterate, and when some nine millionschool-age children are out of school, mostof these in the very countries that havefailed to solve the illiteracy problem? 8How can these countries possibly builda knowledge economy if the rate of uppersecondary school enrolment is less than55 per cent for both males and females ata time when this rate exceeds 80 per centin industrialised developed nations andthe countries of Central Asia? Indeed, the<strong>Arab</strong> region lags behind most of the restof the world in the three above-mentionedvariables, ranking sixth out of the eightregions of the world and placing higherthan South and West Asia and Sub-SaharanAfrica only. 9THE NEED TO DRAW ANACCURATE PICTURE OFKNOWLEDGE CAPITALTo produce a clear and accurate portrait ofthe knowledge capital of any society onemust look beyond the quantifiable variablesmentioned above. These indices and thecriteria used to calculate them provide onlya preliminary idea of this capital. Whereasilliterates, for example, are alike in theirinability to access written knowledge,however diverse the material foundationsof this knowledge, literate people differgreatly in knowledge and skills, especiallyif they have persisted in their studiesbeyond the level of compulsory schooling.As we know, public educational systemsaround the world begin to bifurcate withthe end of basic education, which is to sayfrom the upper secondary school level.Consequently, it is possible to imagine thatpeople might possess a glut of certain typesof knowledge and of a paucity of othertypes of knowledge due to the differencesbetween the curricula used in the differentbranches of secondary education and in thedifferent specialisations at the tertiary level.Moreover, completed levels of educationand official graduation certificates do notnecessarily reflect the true quality of anindividual’s knowledge and skills.MEASURING A SOCIETY’SKNOWLEDGE CAPITALOne way to broach the question ofknowledge capital in a society is toobserve how knowledge is distributedamong older generations and then toCompleted levelsof education andofficial graduationcertificates do notnecessarily reflectthe true qualityof an individual’sknowledge and skillsEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL99


<strong>Knowledge</strong> is morethan the informationacquired at school.It extends to theinformation andknow-how acquiredthrough experiencein the economicallyproductive workplace,as well as from lifeQuantitatively, themore education isuniversalised acrosssociety and the higherthe average levelof schooling, thegreater the abilityof the membersof that society toparticipate in theknowledge society;the qualitative sideof the equation isfar more difficulttrack the opportunities for knowledgeacquisition available to the youngergenerations through the educationalsystem. “<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital” refers to thesum of epistemological skills possessedby the individuals of a community. Itcovers knowledge in the various fields oflearning, notably languages and literature,maths and sciences, technology, health andenvironment, the arts, the humanities andsociology, and philosophy among others.It also includes various mental skills suchas the ability to acquire information andto learn independently, analytic abilitiesand rational processing, the ability toevaluate (which involves critical thought)and apply information and know-how tosolve theoretical or practical problems,combinatorial and synthesising skills,planning and organisational abilities, thecapacity to make projections for the future,the ability to acclimatise to change andnew givens, the ability to take advantageof opportunities for renovation, creativityand innovation, and other such higherintellectual skills. The concept furtherincludes knowledge-based human andsocial competencies, 10 foremost amongwhich are communicative skills, the abilityto form constructive and cooperativerelations with others, the ability to work aspart of a team and to participate effectivelyin public affairs, and leadership, guidanceand managerial skills.Measuring the knowledge capital of themembers of a community poses an immensechallenge to researchers and strategists inhuman resource development. <strong>Knowledge</strong>is considerably more than the informationindividuals acquire at their desks at school.It extends to the information and knowhowacquired through experience inthe economically productive workplace,as well as from life experience–theinformal activities one engages in and theinteractions with others that lead to varioustypes of awareness about diverse aspectsof life. In the context of the process ofassessing total national wealth, in general,and intellectual capital, in particular, somescholars (Bontis, 2004) attempted tomeasure “national human capital” by usingindices that are so obviously disparate as torender their use in deducing a meaningfulindicator difficult. 11To avoid confusing the issues andlosing sight of the distinct characterof knowledge capital acquired througheducation, the approach of this reportto “national human knowledge capital”will rely solely on the direct relationshipbetween the individual, the institutionsof learning, and the learning process.This focus on what formal educationalinstitutions offer and what studentsgain from them is also determined bythe absence of reliable data on theopportunities available to individuals in<strong>Arab</strong> societies to acquire knowledge outsideof their formal educational systems. Wewill also deconstruct the equation into itsquantitative and qualitative components,examine these separately, and then bringthem together in common conclusions.Quantitatively, we can presume thatthe more education, in its various levels, isuniversalised across society and the higherthe average level of schooling, the greaterthe ability of the members of that societyto participate in the knowledge society. Thebest objective gauge for this criterion is thelevel of schooling attained by those whoare currently not enrolled in educationalinstitutions. As for those who are still ofschool age or still enrolled in educationalinstitutions, more than one indicator willhave to be brought into play to determinethe level of formal schooling that theseindividuals may ultimately attain. Examplesof such indicators are enrolment rates ateach educational stage and average schoollife expectancy.The qualitative side of the equation isfar more difficult, as there are no standingagencies for monitoring the knowledgepossessed by different sectors of society,the sources of this knowledge, and therole that the systems for formal education,training, and continuous learning systemsplay in shaping it. We will, therefore, haveto use various approaches in order toobtain an overall, if only initial, estimate100 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of the qualitative knowledge capital thata society’s educational system can ensure.Every society has the right to ask itseducational system: What is the qualityof the knowledge that will be gained byrecipients in the various educational levels?Does the education system truly createknowledge capital and equip us to competein the knowledge society?The selection of knowledge to betaught in formal educational institutionsderives from a society’s project for theappropriate rearing of its emerginggenerations. It generally takes the formof what are usually termed educationalcurricula, together with their particulartracks or streams, pedagogic methods,and means of assessing whether studentshave attained the desired results. Thechain of selections (some of which areideological in nature) begins with settingthe amount of time to be allocated to eachsubject–mother tongue, foreign languages,maths, humanities, pure sciences, the arts,and so on–at the pre-university levels.But the more crucial gauge in this area iswhether the recipients have obtained theknowledge, skills, and attitudes expectedof them at these levels.KNOWLEDGE CAPITALFORMATION BY CHILDRENEnrolment in basic education is the firststep in formal education towards thecreation of national knowledge capital.To participate in the knowledge societyan individual must possess a range ofknowledge, intellectual skills, and attitudesthat can only be obtained throughcontinuous schooling for, according tomost experts, a period of at least nineyears, or what is commonly referred toas “basic education.” Accordingly, thisreport has analysed four complementaryindicators for evaluating the opportunitiesto create knowledge capital in children:primary school enrolment rates, numbersof children outside school, enrolmentrates in the upper stage of basic education,and average school life expectancy rates.BOX 3-1The Aims of Education for AllThe World Education Forum, held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000, in response tothe call of UN organisations led by UNESCO, produced a framework for actionentitled “Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments.” It provides forcollective international commitment to the attainment of the following goals:1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care andeducation;2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children have access to and complete free andcompulsory primary education of good quality;3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are metthrough equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes;4. Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015,especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing educationfor all adults;5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2015;6. Improving every aspect of the quality of education.The UN General Assembly incorporated goals 2 and 5 into the MillenniumDevelopment Goals, thereby entering them into the agendas of all UN developmentorganisations.For the qualitative aspect of the formationof knowledge capital in children we willsurvey the different types of knowledgethey come into contact with and the levelsof competence they are expected to attainin each. How, then, do the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesstand with regard to the foregoing?QUANTITATIVE INDICATORSThe statistics on net primary schoolenrolment rates show that only four<strong>Arab</strong> countries approach the saturationpoint (95 per cent and above) accordingto this criterion, eight countries rangebetween 80 per cent and 94 per cent,and six–Djibouti, Mauritania, Oman,Palestine, Yemen (and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia) 12 –fall below this, with Djibouti showing arate of less than 40 per cent. We shouldnote, too, that only two countries (Bahrainand Tunisia) have attained the saturationpoint for female enrolment. These figuresclearly reflect large disparities among <strong>Arab</strong>states. Gross enrolment ratios, meanwhile,reveal the inflation in enrolment figuresarising from such unhealthy phenomenaas high repetition rates and the packingof classrooms with students beyond thereasonable limit for the designated agegroup of a class. Enrolment rates areinflated by more than 10 per cent in sixThe statistics onnet primary schoolenrolment ratesshow that onlyfour <strong>Arab</strong> countriesapproach thesaturation point (95per cent and above)EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL101


Although thelaws in most <strong>Arab</strong>countries providefor compulsoryeducation up to atleast the end of theintermediate level,only eight countrieshave attainedgross enrolmentratios meeting orapproaching theexpected rate of morethan 95 per cent<strong>Arab</strong> countries with Mauritania at the topwith 21 per cent. 13Available statistics also indicate thatsome nine million children in the <strong>Arab</strong>region are out of school. Most of these arein Sudan, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Somalia, Yemen,Iraq, and Morocco. But even those countrieswith a reputation for good performance ineducation, such as Lebanon and Jordan,are not immune to this phenomenon.Although the laws in most <strong>Arab</strong>countries provide for compulsoryeducation up to at least the end of theintermediate level, 14 only eight countrieshave attained gross enrolment ratiosmeeting or approaching the expected rateof more than 95 per cent through theactive application of this provision. Sevencountries lag well behind (with enrolmentrates of less than 70 per cent): Iraq,Morocco, Yemen, the Comoros, Djibouti,Mauritania, and Sudan. There are noprecise statistics for Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia andSomalia. Five countries–Jordan, Kuwait,Lebanon, Oman, and Syria–approach theexpected level (with enrolment rates ofbetween 85 per cent and 94 per cent). 15Lastly, relying on data from theUNESCO Institute for Statistics, we canrank <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the basis of schoollife expectancy 16 for children enrolled inbasic education into the four followingcategories: 17A. Countries in which the average numberof school years extends to the start oftertiary education. The countries in thiscategory are Bahrain, Tunisia, Jordan,Libya, Lebanon, and Palestine.B. Countries in which the overall averageof school years is equivalent to the endor close to the end of secondary school.Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, theUAE, and Oman fall into this category.C. Countries in which enrolled childrencan generally expect not to exceed theupper stage of basic education: Iraq,Morocco, Yemen, and the Comoros.D. Countries in which enrolled childrencan only expect to complete primaryeducation or a little more: Mauritania,Djibouti, and Sudan.On the basis of the data available onthe four preceding indicators, we canclassify <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to thefour following categories in terms oftheir ability to ensure opportunities forthe formation of basic knowledge capitalamong new generations of children(between 6 and 14 years of age)(see Table3-1):A. Countries that can ensure to a highdegree that the opportunities areavailable to their children to obtain thefundamental knowledge necessary toparticipate in the knowledge society.These countries (for which the fourindices average out to 85 per cent ormore) are Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria,Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, andLibya.B. Countries that can ensure suchopportunities to a considerableextent, but must exert additional effortsto guarantee that no child remainsexcluded from the avenue leading tothe acquisition of this knowledge. Withoverall averages of between 70 percent and 84 per cent, these countriesare Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon, Oman,Morocco, and Iraq (as well as Syria andSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia).C. Two countries that must exert intensiveefforts in order to equip a greaternumber of children to participate inthe knowledge society: Yemen andMauritania (with average scores that fallbetween 55 per cent and 69 per cent).D. Countries with a questionable ability toprovide sufficient numbers of childrenopportunities to access the knowledgesociety within the foreseeable future,if educational opportunities remain intheir present state. With average scoresof less than 55 per cent, these countriesare the Comoros, Sudan, Djibouti (andSomalia).Figure 3-2, which plots the opportunitiesfor basic knowledge capital creation inchildren in <strong>Arab</strong> countries in relation toper capita GDP, depicts a moderately loosecorrelation between these two variables.As can be seen, financial capacities exceed102 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TABLE 3-1CountryOpportunities for basic knowledge capital formation inchildren through education in 2005 (per cent)AEnrolmentrateBNet enrolmentrate in primaryeducationCGross enrolmentratio in upper stageof basic education(adjusted * )DRatio ofexpectedschool yearsto age 18 **Averagescore(A+B+C+D)/4Libya .. .. 100 91.9 ..Bahrain 99 98 97 80.2 93.6Tunisia 97 96 99.8 73.7 91.6Algeria 98 95 100 66.5 89.9Qatar 98 94 94.2 67.2 88.4Egypt 96 94 91.4 65.9 86.8Jordan 94 90 87.7 72.4 86.0UAE 95 88 90.5 62.4 84.0Kuwait 89 83 84.9 68.9 81.5OccupiedPalestinian80 76 93.3 70.9 80.1TerritoriesLebanon 83 82 82.1 70.1 79.3Syria .. 95 85.8 .. ..Oman 77 74 87.7 64.2 75.7Morocco 88 88 64.4 51.6 73.0Iraq 89 89 54.1 49.3 70.4Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 75 78 58.8 .. ..Yemen 75 75 47.6 43.9 60.4Mauritania 80 79 25.2 39.4 55.9Comoros 55 .. 38.3 43.9 ..Sudan 44 .. 43.9 25.4 ..Djibouti 38 38 25.2 19.2 30.1Somalia .. .. .. .. ..Tunisia, Algeria,Jordan, and Egypthave managedto ensure highopportunities forthe creation ofknowledge capitalin children, in spiteof their limitedfinancial capacitiesSource: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre; figures in columns C and D and average score are provided by Ramzi Salama/<strong>Report</strong> core team member.*Base averages reduced by 6.7 per cent (average over 100 per cent in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in question) to correct for errors in the calculationof gross enrolment figures, which may exceed 100 per cent.**It may be supposed for the sake of argument that the gross school life expectancy of a given age cohort may, under ideal circumstances,approach eighteen years, as is expected in some countries of the world, such as Ireland and Norway. On the other hand, it may beconsidered overoptimistic to hope to approach the twenty years that is expected for Australia and New Zealand. The figure of eighteenyears has therefore been taken as a maximum for the calculation of the expected figure for all <strong>Arab</strong> countries.potential achievement in Kuwait, Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, Oman, Djibouti, Sudan, and theComoros, whereas anticipated achievementexceeds relative financial capacities inBahrain, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt,Jordan, Syria, and Yemen, regardless ofthe calculated equation. 18 In these terms,Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia and Oman clearly lag wellbehind the norm, whereas countries suchas Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt havemanaged to ensure high opportunitiesfor the creation of knowledge capital inchildren, in spite of their limited financialcapacities.EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL103


FIGURE 3-2: 19Basic knowledge capital formation opportunities for childrenin <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP100<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital formation opportunities for children(percentage of possible maximum)9080706050403020EgyptSyriaIraqYemenMauritaniaComorosSudanDjiboutiAlgeriaJordanLebanonMoroccoTunisiaLibyaOmanSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaBahrain R 2 =0.4552QatarUAE R 2 =0.6398Kuwait0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Per capita share of GDP in dollarsApart from <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage and maths,the knowledge capitalthat <strong>Arab</strong> countriesimpart to thosewho have enrolledin or completedbasic educationvaries, in terms ofquantity at leastQUALITATIVE INDICATORSTime allocated to school subjects inbasic educationA study on the time allocated to schoolsubjects in basic education 20 in <strong>Arab</strong>countries during the last decade showsconsiderable variation between thesecountries in the ratios of class timeallotted to religious education andforeign language instruction, a moderatevariation in the class time dedicated toscience and technology, social studies,the arts, and physical education, andgeneral conformity in the amounts oftime allotted to <strong>Arab</strong>ic language 21 andmaths instruction. It follows that, apartfrom <strong>Arab</strong>ic language and maths, theknowledge capital that <strong>Arab</strong> countriessought to impart to those who haveenrolled in or completed basic educationduring this period varies, in terms ofquantity at least.The average ratio of class time allottedto <strong>Arab</strong>ic language instruction (28.5 percent at the primary level and 26.4 percent in total basic school education) issomewhat lower than the internationalaverage for the time allotted to instructionin the mother tongue (up to approximately32 per cent in primary school education)(International Association for theEvaluation of Educational Achievement,2003). Classes allotted to Islamic religiousinstruction average about 12 per cent ofthe total in the <strong>Arab</strong> region as a whole, incontrast to the global rate of about 5 percent among countries whose educationalcurricula feature religious educationinstruction (Majallat Mustaqbaliyyat,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, 2003). The quota for Islamicreligious instruction reaches 28 per centin Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, which is followed byYemen (20 per cent), Sudan (18 per cent),and Oman (17 per cent). In Tunisia andAlgeria, the time ratio for Islamic religiousinstruction is around the global average.104 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Virtually the only area in which <strong>Arab</strong>countries conform to the rest of the worldis that of the ratio of class time accordedto maths instruction (about 16 per cent)(UNDP, 2007a, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). In scienceand technology instruction, includinginformation and communicationstechnology, <strong>Arab</strong> countries as a wholedepart moderately from the global norm.However, whereas the average ratio ofclass time accorded to science instruction,alone, in the <strong>Arab</strong> region (10.5 per cent) issomewhat lower than the global average of11.7, 22 it is markedly lower in Mauritania,Egypt, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Yemen, Sudan, andTunisia. The rest of the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesapproach the global average in this regard(UNDP, 2007a, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Noticeable differences between <strong>Arab</strong>countries emerge with regard to the ratioof class time dedicated to social studies,arts, and physical education. Nevertheless,the general averages in these areas rival theinternational norms (three hours per weekfor both social studies and the arts and twohours per week for physical education).In foreign language instruction at theschool level of basic education there islittle conformity among <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, and Mauritaniahave long been accustomed to allocatingrelatively large blocks of class time (fromsix to eight periods out of thirty-fiveperiods per week) to this item and Qatar,Kuwait, the UAE, and Jordan have recentlyintroduced it into their curricula withsignificant emphasis. On the other hand,in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq,Egypt, Oman, and Sudan, foreign languageinstruction is absent or near absent fromtheir curricula.One is also struck by the total absence ofcomputer technology instruction in manycountries and by the scarcity of countriesthat have introduced this subject into theirprimary school curricula. We also observe aconsiderable amount of class time devotedto extra-curricular activities in Egypt, andto political education in Syria.Due to certain peculiarities of <strong>Arab</strong>education systems, the time allotted forinstruction in most subjects is relativelylow in the majority of <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Time allocations for the various subjectsshould be well balanced, so that no subjectis given time at the expense of another thatmay be regarded as basic for the formationof the growing child’s knowledge capital.It also stands to reason that the total classtime required of basic education in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries–an average of 802 hoursper year, consisting of thirty-three weeksat the primary level, and an average of911 hours per year, consisting of thirtythreeweeks each at the upper level ofbasic education–is not sufficient to forma knowledge capital solid and robustenough to allow the individual to reap theoptimal advantage from higher levels oflearning and to actively participate in theknowledge society. This shortcoming is atits most evident in all the Gulf countries(with the exception of Oman under its newsystem of education), Syria, Iraq, Libya,and Tunisia. 23 Indeed, one UNESCOreport observes that the median numberof annual hours allocated to primaryeducation in <strong>Arab</strong> countries is lower thanthe levels recommended by numerousinternational organisations and forums,which is between 850 and 1,000 hours peryear. The report adds that if we considerthe amount of time actually dedicatedto instruction, children in many <strong>Arab</strong>countries receive less than 70 per cent ofthe time allotted for their formal education(UNESCO, 2008a).Quality of knowledge acquiredthrough basic educationThe results of a 2003 study on theperformance of eighth-graders in mathsand sciences (UNDP, 2007a, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic),in which ten <strong>Arab</strong> countries took part, 24aroused considerable dismay in <strong>Arab</strong>educational and political circles. In maths,the students from <strong>Arab</strong> countries thatparticipated in this study ranked noticeablylower than the overall internationalaverage. They were in the company ofstudents from ten other countries, mostlyThe total class timerequired of basiceducation in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries is notsufficient to form aknowledge capitalthat would allow theindividual to activelyparticipate in theknowledge societyChildren in many<strong>Arab</strong> countriesreceive less than 70per cent of the timeallotted for theirformal educationEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL105


<strong>Arab</strong> educationalcurricula in generalare almost entirelylacking in activitiesaimed at developinglearners’ abilities tocollect, organise,sift, and analyseinformationBOX 3-2The Sultanate of Oman has recentlymade radical changes in its preuniversitypublic education plans. It hasintroduced the new Basic Educationsystem, which consists of ten years intwo phases, the first covering grades oneto four and the second grades five toten. Basic education is then followed bythe Secondary Education phase whichextends over two years and is dividedinto Arts and Science tracks. Omanhas also introduced the principle ofcoeducation in the first phase of basiceducation. These reforms were putinto effect in the 1998-1999 academicyear with an eye to their gradual rolloutacross the country, as material andhuman resources permit.The newly adopted educationplan marked a clear break with itspredecessor by adding four weeks tothe school year, which is now 180 days,and spreading the educational subjectsover forty-minute long classes perweek, bringing the weekly and annualtimes allocated to instruction up tointernational levels. The Basic Educationcurriculum has introduced classes forfrom sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Thirtycountries ranked significantly higherthan the international average. Thesewere mostly the advanced industrialisedcountries of Western and Eastern Europe,North America, Asia and the Pacific andthey also included Malaysia, which came intwelfth, and Israel, which came in twentythird.Only 10 per cent of Jordanianparticipants, 8 per cent of students inEgypt, 6 per cent of Lebanese, and 5 percent of Palestinian participants achievedhigh scores; figures for the rest of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries were even lower. Globally, 23 percent of participants in the study achievedhigh scores, with higher rates yet in thosecountries that ranked the highest. In otherwords, the knowledge measured by themaths test is possessed by a scant minorityof <strong>Arab</strong> students and absent among theoverwhelming majority of them.<strong>Arab</strong> countries also ranked at thebottom (coming in at between thirtyeighthand fifty-first place out of fifty-twocountries) in the science test. Again, theOman’s New Plan for Educationthe instruction of computer skills andaugmented classroom time allocatedto maths, sciences, and social studiesto levels equivalent to or greater thaninternational norms. English languageinstruction has been introduced intothe curriculum, starting in the firstgrade of basic education at an averageof five classes per week. New teachingand self-learning methods have beenadopted with the aim of developinglearners’ mental, practical, and life-skillsfaculties. The new plan retains, to alarge extent, the prominence of Islamicstudies and <strong>Arab</strong>ic language instruction,while it reduces the number of physicaleducation courses in favour of maths.In the secondary school science track,the number of social science classeshas been reduced in order to augmentthe hours allocated to earth- and lifesciences.The progress of this experimentshould be monitored with an eye toassessing its impact on the formationof knowledge capital among newgenerations of Omani youths.results were significantly lower than theinternational average, with the exceptionof Jordan which, with results equivalent tothe global average, ranked thirtieth. About21 per cent of Jordanian students achievedhigh scores, while only about 10 per centof Egyptian and Palestinian participantsand even fewer participants from the otherparticipating <strong>Arab</strong> countries matchedthis performance. 25 <strong>Arab</strong> countries haveperformed poorly in other internationalstudies on maths, science, and readingacquisition. 26<strong>Arab</strong> students continued to performpoorly in maths and sciences in similarinternational studies conducted in 2007.In the studies of eighth-graders, <strong>Arab</strong>countries were among the bottom finalistsin maths (between thirtieth and fifty-firstout of fifty-one participating countries) 27and sciences (between twenty-secondand fiftieth out of fifty-one participatingcountries). 28 In the equivalent tests forfourth-graders, <strong>Arab</strong> countries came inbetween thirty-first and thirty-eighth placeout of thirty-eight countries in maths, 29and between thirty-third and thirty-eighthplace out of thirty-eight participatingcountries in science. 30 No country camenear to approaching the internationalaverages apart from Dubai/UAE, whichranked first among all <strong>Arab</strong> countries inthe four tests (UNDP, 2007d, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). 31These studies have shown that while,with the exception of a few details, thescience and maths curricula in countriessuch as Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, andBahrain are largely the same as those inthe rest of the world, <strong>Arab</strong> educationalcurricula in general are almost entirelylacking in activities aimed at developinglearners’ abilities to collect, organise, sift,and analyse information. They also failto teach how to interpret the phenomenasuggested by the information, fullyprobing all possible ramifications andpossibilities, and other similar skills forthe handling of information and naturalphenomena. The acquisition of such skillsis intimately connected to the developmentof the higher mental faculties individuals106 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


must possess if they aspire to participatein the knowledge society. The lowperformance expectations with regard tolanguage acquisition is also striking, judgingby the fact that the curricula of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries in question defer until later yearswhat is taught earlier in other countries.Moreover, the few hours allotted per weekto instruction in foreign languages andvarious other subjects such as arts, socialstudies, and physical education offer littleassurance of their proper acquisition.Science and technology instruction andforeign language instruction seem fatedto get the shortest end of the stick in thedistribution of class time. It is little wonder,therefore, that school graduates of basiceducation come away with a paucity ofknow-how in these subjects and that this,in turn, leads to a general disinclinationamong youth to specialise in the sciencesin later phases of the educational process.Generating sufficient and balancedknowledge capital in <strong>Arab</strong> childrenrequires increasing the number of annualhours of instruction and weekly periodsto appropriate levels and reviewing howthese are distributed among the variouscurricular subjects, as Oman has recentlydone (see Box 3-2). It also requiresan overhaul of the curricula and thepedagogic approach so as to ensure thatlearners can obtain the required knowledgeand develop their higher mental faculties.To this end, every country must ask thefollowing questions: “What knowledgedo we really want our school graduates ofbasic education to have acquired?” “Willthis knowledge truly equip our childrento meet the demands of the knowledgeeconomy and to participate effectively inthe knowledge society?” “Will the time setaside for the acquisition of each knowledgecategory and the methods of instructionactually lead to the learners’ acquisitionof the designated knowledge?” Certainly,the answers to such questions must lead togreater receptiveness to progressive <strong>Arab</strong>and international experiences in thesefields, and this, in turn, should reinforcethe principle of openness to others inthe development of the <strong>Arab</strong> projectfor knowledge capital creation througheducation.Basic education is a crucial phase in theintellectual formation of the members of<strong>Arab</strong> societies. Many will leave the formaleducational system at the end of this phase,which generally coincides with the end ofcompulsory education, in order to enterthe labor market or vocational training. Theremainder will follow the various streams ofgeneral and technical secondary educationand receive different types of instructiondepending on the particular stream. Gapsin knowledge formation at the level ofbasic education may not, therefore, be filledby what is offered at the more advancededucational levels or through practical lifeexperience. How can people with suchgaps, lacking the fundamentals that allowthem to comprehend the informationthey encounter or to deal with problemsthat require certain types of awareness,analytical skills, and decision-makingcapacities, participate in the knowledgesociety? Clearly, all <strong>Arab</strong> countries withoutexception must upgrade the various qualitycomponents of their educational systemsin order to bring the performance of theirstudents up to international averages.KNOWLEDGE CAPITALFORMATION BY YOUTHQUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONSThe literacy rate among youth (ages 15 to24) has attained the saturation point (95per cent or higher) in ten <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Four others (with literacy rates for this agegroup between 85 per cent and 94 per cent)have approached this point while a furtherthree (with rates from 66 per cent to 80 percent) fall well below it. 32 The gender parityindex, 33 in this regard, is above 95 per centfor half the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, whereas it isstill relatively low (under 0.90) in Egypt,Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen.Available figures on upper secondaryschool enrolment indicate that four <strong>Arab</strong>states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, and Qatar)Generating sufficientand balancedknowledge capitalin <strong>Arab</strong> childrenrequires increasingthe number of annualhours of instructionand weekly periodsto appropriate levelsEvery <strong>Arab</strong> countrymust ask suchquestions as: “Whatknowledge do wereally want ourschool graduatesof basic educationto have acquired?”“Will this knowledgetruly equip them tomeet the demandsof the knowledgeeconomy?”EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL107


While <strong>Arab</strong> countriesvary greatly in theirtertiary educationenrolment rates,none have attainedthe saturation pointBOX 3-3As countries in the <strong>Arab</strong> world beganto deregulate their economies inthe 1990s, governments introducedlegislation permitting the local andforeign private sectors to setup highereducational institutions. The result hasbeen an unprecedented boom in thenumbers of these institutions, whetherestablished as non-profit or commercialorganisations.It is impossible to draw an accurateportrait of this phenomenon due tothe lack of a complete database on thenumbers and types of these institutionsand their affiliations, curricula, andenrolment figures. However, theavailable information suggests that theyremain marginal in terms of studentnumbers. Given the stagnation ingross tertiary educational enrolmentratios between 1999 and 2005, itappears that the added educationalopportunities furnished by old and newestablishments (more than 1.5 millionopportunities) have not stimulated a risein enrolment rates, but rather absorbedthe population growth in the categoryof youths who complete secondaryschool.The establishment of branchesof foreign universities and higherhave gross enrolment ratios (90 per centor above) approaching saturation point.Nine countries (with ratios of less than 65per cent) lag far behind: Algeria, Yemen,Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Comoros, Sudan,Mauritania, and Djibouti. 34 Seven othersrank in between (with rates between 65 percent and 90 per cent). We observe that inthirteen countries the gender parity indexis in favour of females, which suggests, inpart, that males tend to drop out beforethis level. The gender parity index issignificantly lower only in Djibouti, Iraq,and Yemen. 35Proceeding from the assumption thatthe young adults of today are the childrenwho attended school between the ages ofnine and nineteen, with an average ageof fourteen, we calculated the school lifeexpectancy for the current generation ofyouth as it stood in 1992. According tothe available data, 36 the rate of school lifeexpectancy for the entire sector of today’sThe Growing Numbers of Universities in the <strong>Arab</strong> Regioneducational institutes with foreignaffiliations is a manifestation of theglobalisation of higher education. Itis premature to determine the actualeffect these institutions will have—whether they will diminish or enhancethe quality of higher education,whether they will merely reproduceoutworn educational programmes,curricula and services, or whether theywill introduce and stimulate innovationin these concerns. UNESCO hasapproached this phenomenon fromthe standpoint of the right of students,their guardians, and the whole of societyto quality higher education suited tothe needs of national development.In 2005, it elaborated “Guidelines onQuality Provision in Cross-borderHigher Education,” in cooperationwith the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development.The guidelines urge these institutes,regardless of their affiliation or meansof delivering educational services,to conform to the national qualitystandards in both the providers’ homecountries and in the recipient countries,so as to prevent the commercialisationof higher education from leading to asacrifice of quality.young adults, whether or not they are stillin school, comes to an overall average ofeight school years (nine for males andseven for females) across the board in the<strong>Arab</strong> region, which is one year less thanthe school phase of basic education. Ofcourse, there are considerable disparitiesamong <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Average schoollife expectancy in Libya and Bahrain, forexample, extends to the tertiary educationalphase, whereas it stops short of the endof primary school in Mauritania, Sudan,and Yemen. 37 On the whole, therefore, thecurrent generation of youth (ages 15 to24) in the <strong>Arab</strong> world has a relatively lowschool life expectancy, even if considerablenumbers of them are still pursuing theirstudies in upper secondary and tertiaryeducational institutions.While <strong>Arab</strong> countries vary greatly intheir tertiary education enrolment rates,none have attained the saturation point.Libya ranks the highest, with 56 per cent,followed by Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan(from 46 to 40 per cent); and then by Egypt,Bahrain, Tunisia, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia (from35 to 29 per cent). The rates then continueto plunge from 23 per cent and 15 per centin the UAE, Algeria, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman,Iraq, and Syria, while access to this levelof education remains the privilege of onlya select few in Morocco, Yemen, Sudan,Mauritania, Djibouti, and the Comoros (allof which have enrolment rates under 11per cent). 38 The apparent disinclination ofmales to pursue tertiary education in Qatar,Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain, in whichthe gender parity index falls between 3.30and 2.40 (in favour of females), as well asin Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Tunisia, and Algeria, inwhich this index is between 1.46 and 1.26,partially accounts for the <strong>Arab</strong> region’s lowranking in tertiary education enrolmentcompared to other regions in the world.That twelve countries show enrolmentrates below the average of the <strong>Arab</strong> regionas a whole (22 per cent) also helps explainthis ranking. 39On the basis of available data on thefour above-mentioned indices (see Table3-2), <strong>Arab</strong> countries fall into the following108 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TABLE 3-2Opportunities for the formation of knowledge capital byyouth (ages 15-24) in <strong>Arab</strong> countries, 2005 (per cent)CountryALiteracyrateBGrossenrolmentratio in uppersecondaryeducationCGrossenrolmentRatio intertiaryeducation(adjusted * )DRate ofSchool LifeExpectancy(up to 18 ** )Average score(A+B+C+D)/4Libya 99 94 70 72 84Bahrain 100 98 41 78 79Jordan 99 76 50 67 73Lebanon .. 72 58 67 ..Qatar 97 96 24 67 71OccupiedPalestinian99 70 51 .. ..TerritoriesUAE 97 78 29 61 66Kuwait 99 99 24 .. ..Egypt 85 77 44 56 66Tunisia 95 68 38 56 64Oman 98 79 23 44 61Algeria 92 58 26 56 58Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 97 .. 36 44 ..Syria 93 32 19 56 50Iraq .. 32 20 56 ..Yemen 79 40 11 28 40Morocco 74 34 14 33 39Comoros 89 27 3 .. ..Mauritania 66 20 4 22 28Sudan .. 25 8 22 ..Djibouti .. 16 3 .. ..Somalia .. .. .. .. ..Only two <strong>Arab</strong>countries largelyensure opportunitiesfor youth to obtainthe advancedknowledge forparticipating in theknowledge society:Libya and BahrainSource: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre; figures in columns C and D and “Average score” were composed by Ramzi Salama, <strong>Report</strong> core teammember.*As a percentage of the 80 per cent that forms a reasonable goal reached by some industrialised countries.**As a percentage of the eighteen years that constitute the reasonable maximum.four categories in terms of their abilityto ensure advanced knowledge capitalformation in young adults (ages 15 to24): 40A. Two countries largely ensureopportunities for youth to obtain theadvanced knowledge for participatingB.in the knowledge society: Libya andBahrain (79 per cent to 84 per cent);Eight countries ensure a reasonablelevel of opportunity: Jordan, Qatar,the UAE, Egypt, Tunisia, (Lebanon,Palestine, and Kuwait) (64 per cent to73 per cent);EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL109


FIGURE 3-390Advanced knowledge capital formation opportunities for <strong>Arab</strong> youthagainst per capita GDP<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital formation opportunities for youth(percentage of potential maximum)80706050403020100EgyptSyriaJordanLebanonAlgeriaIraqYemenMoroccoComorosSudan MauritaniaDjiboutiTunisiaLibyaOmanBahrainSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaQatarUAER 2 =0.572KuwaitR 2 =0.7640 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Per capita GDP in dollarsThere is a consensus,internationally andin the <strong>Arab</strong> region,that secondaryeducation, whethergeneral or technical,plays a key role inthe formation of theknowledge capitalC. Three countries need to exert additionaleffort to create a critical mass of youthsufficiently equipped to participate inthe knowledge society: Oman, Algeria,and (Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia) (50 per cent to 61per cent);D. Nine countries have questionablepotential for ensuring opportunities fora sufficient number of youth to enterthe knowledge society in the foreseeablefuture: Syria, Yemen, Morocco,Mauritania, (Iraq, the Comoros, Sudan,Djibouti, and Somalia) (under 50 percent).Figure 3-3 plots the opportunities foradvanced knowledge capital formationin <strong>Arab</strong> youth in ratio to per capitaGDP. Again we find a moderately loosecorrelation between the two variables, asevidenced by the distance of some of thecountries located away from the curveof the exponential equation and by themultiple crests of the polynomial equation.Whereas achievements in this area exceedfinancial capacities in Bahrain, Libya,Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen, thereverse is the case for the majority of poornations, such as Djibouti, Mauritania,Sudan, and Morocco, as well as for themajority of relatively wealthy nations, suchas Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Oman, Kuwait, and theUAE.QUALITATIVE INDICATORSThere is a consensus, internationally and inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region, that secondary education,whether general or technical, plays a key rolein the formation of the knowledge capitalneeded to progress toward the knowledgesociety. To what extent does secondaryeducation in <strong>Arab</strong> countries contribute tothe formation of the qualitative cognitionneeded to equip youths to participateeffectively in the knowledge society?110 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


General secondary education andthe formation of knowledge capitalby youth<strong>Arab</strong> countries have gone to great pains todevelop general and technical secondaryschool programmes and curricula, andthey have made some effort at streamingthis level of education (UNESCO, 2003,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). However, an analysis ofauthorised secondary school curricula in<strong>Arab</strong> countries during the last decade of thetwentieth century 41 reveals that these fallconsiderably short of official aspirations inall but a few pioneering instances, such asBahrain and Oman. Countries influencedby the French educational system havedivided their general secondary educationinto three or four streams or tracks, whilethe remaining countries have adopted two–arts and sciences. Libya is the exceptionwith six. 42 One positive point to whichwe should draw attention is that curriculafor the science branches in most <strong>Arab</strong>countries contain courses allocated to socialsciences and, similarly, most curricula forthe arts and humanities branches containsome science courses. As result, earlystreaming does not mean that those whochoose one branch will remain unexposedto the subject matter in the other, evenif the proportion of classes allocated tosocial studies in the science track is insome cases quite low. 43 Available data onsecondary education shows that the artstracks have higher intakes than the sciencetracks. When more than two tracks exist,as in Lebanon, Libya, and the countriesof the Maghreb, enrolment figures in thetracks that, according to some at least,may require more academic effort, suchas literature and basic sciences, decline infavour of social sciences and life sciences,which seem closer to the applied than tothe theoretical sciences. 44Several issues require attention in <strong>Arab</strong>secondary school curricula. One is that inmany countries social studies are largelylimited to geography, with little or noattention accorded to sociology, economics,or even history. With regard to the latter,the tendency is to home in on certainhistorical eras and to pass over others. Wealso note the rare appearance of philosophyin <strong>Arab</strong> secondary school curricula, apartfrom those influenced by the Frenchsystem. 45 Good philosophy instructionat the secondary school level is ofunquestionable importance. It contributesto the refinement of the personalityof learners, hones their intellectualcompetencies, and expands their worldview, all of which are especially importantin adolescence, that especially crucial phasein an individual’s intellectual, psychological,and social development (UNESCO, 2007).Rare, too, is the inclusion in each trackof optional subjects, which give studentsappropriate opportunities to discoverand develop their own inclinations andabilities. Nor do curricula provide coursesaimed at developing self-study capacities,such as research, information analysis,and processing skills, or communicativeskills, life and community participationskills, and other such knowledge andknow-how that directly equip learners toparticipate intelligently and effectively inthe knowledge society. The absence ofcertain subjects from the curricula in thisphase undoubtedly reflects specific socialand ideological choices. However, it isalso the case that the low overall weeklyperiods and annual number of schoolhours in some countries 46 compared to theinternational norms makes it difficult tointroduce optional courses, independentlearning courses, and other such beneficialitems into this educational phase. 47Technical secondary education andthe formation of knowledge capitalby youthThe practice in technical secondaryeducation differs little from that in itsgeneral counterpart in that it places greateremphasis on the acquisition of the practicalskills needed for the performance of aspecialised vocation than on the formationof technicians capable of adjusting tochanging job requirements.<strong>Arab</strong> countries havegone to great pains todevelop general andtechnical secondaryschool programmesand curricula, andthey have madesome effort atstreaming this level ofeducation, but thesefall considerably shortof official aspirationsin all but a fewpioneering instancesIn many <strong>Arab</strong>countries, socialstudies are largelylimited to geography,with little or noattention accorded tosociology, economics,or even historyand, in the latter,the tendency is tohome in on certainhistorical eras andto pass over othersEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL111


BOX 3-4The Commission for the Deliberation ofEducational Content was establishedat the request of French PresidentFrancois Mitterrand with the purposeof revising the knowledge impartedby the educational system andensuring the unity and coherence ofthis knowledge. The commission,composed of prominent figures fromthe French intelligentsia and world ofeducation, submitted a report in 1989,recommending a series of generalprinciples that it deemed applicableanywhere at the present time. Amongthese principles are, firstly, the needto periodically review curricula inorder to introduce content requiredby scientific advancements and socialchange and, secondly, the need to givepriority among instruction and learningprocesses to methods of thinking thatare applicable to diverse domains,such as empirical, analytical, critical,deductive and historical thinking, overthe types of knowledge that are availableoutside the educational system or thatare accessible through other means. Athird principle is the need to strive forflexibility, gradualism, and horizontalcohesion and integration in educationalcontent on the basis of a cleareducational philosophy that explainswhy such knowledge is required andhow it should be acquired, includingthe amount of time that should beallocated to its instruction. Suchjustifications and conditions should reston the findings of research and studiesrevealing the methods that are mostconducive to learner acquisition of therequired knowledge. A fourth principleis the need to diversify methods ofdelivering the curricular content andperiodically to assess learners’ progressin terms of the curricular aims. Fifthis the need to transcend the artificialantithesis between theoretical andpractical knowledge by striving to mergethe acquisition of applied skills with theacquisition of theoretical or abstractAvailable statistics since 1970 indicatethat technical education has been unable toattract sufficient numbers of <strong>Arab</strong> youths.Until the end of the twentieth centurythe exceptions to this rule were Egypt,Tunisia, 49 Bahrain, and Djibouti, joinedlater by Jordan and Lebanon. Only afterThe knowledge students should acquire:the contemporary French approachknowledge, and the need to transcendthe divide between the sciences andhumanities by reinforcing awarenessof their overlapping dimensions in thevarious subjects taught.In a study conducted at the requestof UNESCO, Edgar Morin 48 definedseven types of knowledge that learnersshould derive from the educationalsystem. These are:1. Awareness of the nature ofknowledge and how to obtain it,the difficulties involved and therisks of error and illusion;2. Development of the naturalinclination to contextualise andcategorise information, andstrengthening the ways ofcomprehending the relationshipsbetween the whole and the parts;3. Awareness of the unity ofmankind, physically, intellectually,sociologically, and culturally;4. Awareness of the unity of theplanet earth and the humanspecies and the difficulties bothhave experienced and continue toencounter;5.6.7.How to confront the uncertaintiesscientific advancement hascreated in all aspects of life and howto accept uncertainty where there isno means of attaining certainty;An understanding of socialphenomena with an eye to thosedimensions that can fosterunderstanding between peoples;Awareness of the ethical dimensionso as to develop the consciousnessthat a person is an individual, amember of society, and a memberof the human species, that therelationship between the individualand society must be organised onthe bases of democracy and respectfor rights, and that the relationshipbetween societies must beorganised on the bases of mutualunderstanding and membership ina single human species.the beginning of the twenty-first centurydid Syria, Iraq, and Algeria follow suit,albeit to a lesser extent. 50One could say that, during the lastthree decades of the twentieth century, theeducational systems in the <strong>Arab</strong> region wereable to create a critical mass of technicianscapable of meeting the demands of thelabor market in only Egypt, Tunisia,Bahrain, and Lebanon. As a result, <strong>Arab</strong>countries made do with under-qualifiedlocal labor or imported expertise,whether from other <strong>Arab</strong> countries orabroad. 51 Nevertheless, with the turn ofthe twenty-first century, there has beennoticeable improvement. Enrolment intechnical secondary education has reachedacceptable levels in about half the <strong>Arab</strong>countries, 52 which can now boast of, or arewell on their way to forming, a critical massof young technicians with the knowledgeand know-how to meet the demands of theknowledge economy, if not the knowledgesociety. 53THE ROLE OF HIGHEREDUCATION IN THEFORMATION OF KNOWLEDGECAPITALQuantitative indicatorsThere is no consensus over universallyapplicable criteria for ideal or preferableratios for the distribution of studentsbetween higher technical and universityeducation. To develop such criteria onewould have to have an accurate pictureof the (generally domestic) needs of thejob market for technical or universityqualifications. The globalisation andopening up of labor markets, and theconsequent occupational mobilityand migration, have compounded thedifficulties in identifying these needs.The available data on the intake at thetertiary educational level in <strong>Arab</strong> countries 54show that from under 1 per cent to around31 per cent join the vocational stream.The countries can be categorised intothree groups in this respect. The first, with112 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


elatively high enrolment rates of between31 per cent and around 20 per cent,includes (from highest to lowest) Djibouti,Libya, Tunisia, Oman, and Algeria. Thesecond, in the middle range of 17 percent down to 10 per cent, includes Iraq,Morocco, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia,Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Lastly, with thelowest enrolment rates in the vocationaltrack, come Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania,Qatar, and Kuwait.Consequently, at a median of 84 percent, intake in higher education is heavilyconcentrated in the universities at theundergraduate phase. Only a very smallproportion of students continue to thepost-graduate phase. The median is 1 percent, with some noticeably higher rates inTunisia (7 per cent); Morocco, Iraq, Syria(5 per cent), and Algeria (4 per cent). Whilefemale enrolment exists at all three highereducational levels, it exceeds 40 per cent inonly three countries (Tunisia 55 per cent,Algeria 44 per cent, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 40per cent).There are many reasons why the youngare reluctant to enter the vocational stream.Prime among them is the low regard thatsociety has for this branch of learning.Students, therefore, flock to universityprogrammes, with the aim of obtainingthe prestige of a degree and title, even ifthey end up in jobs that do not require auniversity education and have very little todo with the specialisation engraved on theircertificates. This is a clear manifestation ofthe squandering and misuse of resources,a phenomenon that runs counter therequirements for creating a diverse humanresource capital capable of meeting theneeds of comprehensive, integrated, andsustained development.The second phenomenon that needsto be urgently addressed is the very lowenrolment rates in graduate studies.In order to strike a balance betweenhigher educational institutions’ task oftransmitting knowledge and the task ofdeveloping and renewing this knowledgethrough its various uses, graduate studiesmust be expanded, especially at the doctoralBOX 3-5Expansion in General and TechnicalSecondary Education in Bahrain and itsImpact on Female EnrolmentBahrain has scored a series ofachievements in education that haveraised it to level of the vanguard of <strong>Arab</strong>countries in this domain. Its experiencemerits attention. Bahrain boasts oneof the lowest ratios of children outof school, the highest level of netenrolment in primary education, thebest enrolment rates in secondaryeducation as a whole, and gender parity.It has nearly reached the saturationpoint in enrolment rates at the uppersecondary education level, and it hasthe highest enrolment rate in technicalsecondary education among both <strong>Arab</strong>and Asian countries.Secondary education enrolmentrates in Bahrain have risen steadily from1999 to 2006. It is clear that this growthis due to the noticeable increase in theenrolment, depicted in the graph below,of young women (f.) and men (m.) in thetechnical and vocational programmes.This increase is much higher than therise in the gross enrolment rate at thiseducational level, whether taking intoaccount all programmes combined oronly the general secondary schoolprogrammes.20018016014012010080level. In developed societies, doctoraldegree-holders account for 1.3 per centThis quantitative development isundoubtedly connected with thestructural reform of secondaryeducation that Bahrain put into effectin the last decade. In addition todiversifying the programmes oftechnical secondary education andproviding an element of flexibility inthese programmes, the avenue is nowopen to enrol in corresponding highereducational programmes, therebyoffering a horizon for technicalsecondary school graduates to continuetheir studies and progress further intheir vocational choice.Some characteristics of Bahrainisociety may have played a part in thisdual development (the rise in technicalsecondary school enrolment and the risein female enrolment in this educationalbranch). Bahrain is an urban society.With a per capita income lower thanthat of other small Gulf countries,it depends more on its own peoplethan on imported labor to keep life’swheels turning and promote economicdevelopment.Development in general and technical secondary schoolenrolment in Bahrain, 1999 to 2006 (100=1999)1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, 13 March <strong>2009</strong>.Enrolment technicalprogrammes (f.)Enrolment technicalprogrammes (m.)Gross enrolmentratio (f.)Gross enrolmentratio (m.)Enrolment allprogrammesEnrolment generalprogrammesEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL113


BOX 3-6Higher education in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionsuffers a considerable shortage ofteachers. In 2005, the student-teacherratio was 25:1, compared to the globalaverage of 16:1. The <strong>Arab</strong> studentteacherratio is the highest among allregions of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. Taking the globalaverage as the norm, we find that, in2005, the <strong>Arab</strong> region needed some154,000 additional members in itseducational staffs. This signifies thatthe higher education system in the<strong>Arab</strong> region does not ensure sufficienthuman resources with higher academicqualifications, especially doctoraldegrees, to meet the needs of itsteaching staffs autonomously. 56The shortage is more severe in somecountries than in others. The studentteacherratio is at least double the globalaverage in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, andPalestine, and one-and-a-half timesthe global average in Jordan, Bahrain,Mauritania, Libya, the UAE, and Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia. Only in Lebanon, Qatar, Oman,Djibouti, Kuwait, Tunisia, and Moroccodoes the student-teacher ratio fall closeto the global average. However, dueto its growing higher education intakerates, Lebanon, alone, currently appearsto be self-sufficient in staffing itsuniversities, in spite of deficiencies insome specialisations such as maths. 57High student-teacher ratios aredetrimental to the instruction andlearning processes and to theproductivity of institutions andacademic staff members. The moreclass numbers swell the lower thepotential for teacher-student interactionand the higher the risks of drop-out andrepetition which, in turn, exacerbateovercrowding and further delaygraduation. Another adverse effectof high student-teacher ratios is thatteaching staff become so encumberedby the tasks of instruction, whether dueto too many students in the classroomAvailable data showslarge discrepanciesbetween <strong>Arab</strong>countries in theintake rates in thevarious fields ofhigher educationMore PhDs Needed as University Teachersor to too heavy a teaching load, thatthey have no time for scholasticresearch and creativity. In addition, itreduces the available time for the typesof tandem activities that enrich thelearning process and it increases thelikelihood of demotivation, which canprove disruptive to the learning process.All such phenomena are detrimental tothe quality of the knowledge capitalthat students acquire.In addition, many of the staffmembers engaged in higher educationalinstitutes in the <strong>Arab</strong> world areinappropriately qualified. Accordingto a regional study carried out tenyears ago (Subhi al-Qasim, 1998, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic,) no more than 60 per centof tertiary education staff memberspossess a doctorate, although the ratiois somewhat higher in the fields ofscience and technology. 58 Moreover,fully-fledged “professors” account foronly 16 per cent of the staff. In order toqualify for a professorship one must, inaddition to possessing a doctorate, havepublished valuable articles in seriousand reputable academic periodicals.In sum, most higher educationsystems in the <strong>Arab</strong> region do notfurnish teaching staffs with thenecessary specifications. If they havea sufficient number of PhD holders 59 ,these may still not meet the requiredcompetency. If they do meet therequired competency, circumstancesmay not be conducive to their furtherresearch or their participation inacademic life at the international level,or they may find themselves drowningbeneath too heavy a teaching load, withthe result that in a few years they willeither grow academically jaded, leavethe educational system for private sectoremployment, or emigrate. The majorityof staff members without PhDs willfind their academic dynamism depletedwithin an even shorter time.of all relevant age brackets, which meansa minimum overall higher education intakeof over 50 per cent, a graduate level intakeof at least 10 per cent, and no less than 2per cent to 3 per cent intake in doctoralprogrammes. 55Tertiary education and theformation of the specialisedknowledge capital needed to meetdevelopment needsDistribution of undergraduate andgraduate students by disciplineIt is difficult to produce credible universallyapplicable criteria for the preferred balanceof enrolment rates between the diversehigher educational specialisations. Everycountry has its own economic, political, andsocial structures, and its particular financialcapacities, which determine to a large extentits needs for the types of highly qualifiedexpertise produced at the higher educationlevel. Still, it is generally acknowledged thatevery society requires sufficient numbers ofexperts in education, health, engineering,management, and other fields in order torun its institutional machinery and meet itsservice and developmental needs in thesefields. In addition, every society needsspecialists in all fields to undertake thetasks of development.In general, there are no specificplans in <strong>Arab</strong> universities for steeringstudents and setting intake guidelines forthe various disciplines in terms of theirrelationship with the domestic and foreignlabor markets. Many <strong>Arab</strong> countries haveexpanded their university systems, openingnew branches and universities in many oftheir cities, but not in accordance withany comprehensive ordering of the actualneeds of these countries. If anything, thishas compounded the problems of highereducation. Moreover, many countries havemerely cloned their universities, with littlethought for the relationship between theuniversity and its immediate environment.This begs the question as to the limitationsinherent in the type of expansion that failsto embrace the quality of the complexrelationship between the university and itsdesignated functions within a particularcommunity from the standpoints ofinternal coherence, openness to theimmediate environment, and escape fromthe “ivory tower.”114 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Available data shows large discrepanciesbetween <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the intake ratesin the various fields of higher education. 60Whereas education degree programmesattract between 1 per cent and 4 per centof students at the tertiary level in Algeria,Bahrain, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco,and Tunisia (and these are extremely lowratios by any standard), rates climb toaround 20 per cent or more in Iraq (19 percent), Jordan (20 per cent), Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia(24 per cent), Palestine (27 per cent), andOman (30 per cent). These higher figuresmay indicate over-enrolment in educationdegree programmes in these countries atthe expense of other disciplines. Perhapssomewhere midway between the twoobserved extremes would strike a balancein the intake levels between the variousfields of higher education. 61Turning to those engaged in the diversefields of medicine, including specialistsfrom other <strong>Arab</strong> countries and abroad,the available figures for <strong>Arab</strong> countries 62indicate that Lebanon, Qatar, Jordan, andthe UAE have acceptable numbers ofdoctors, whereas the others range betweenthose that need to exert greater effort inorder to raise the ratio of doctors per 1,000people to a level midway between the globalaverage and the European rate (which is thehighest in the world), and those countriesthat need to work intensively in order toattain the global average. Interestingly,there is a surfeit of dentists in Jordan,Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, Syria. Onealso notes that Jordan is unique for a largesurplus in pharmacists, with a pharmacistper 300 persons or per 50 families. One isparticularly struck by the huge variationbetween <strong>Arab</strong> countries in all indicatorsin this profession. One would be hardput to come up with a single explanationfor the disparity. Perhaps the most salientfactor that would account for this situationis the failure of educational systems tosteer sufficient numbers of students intothis vital field with an appropriate balancebetween its diverse specialisations.In spite of the lack of abundant dataon enrolment rates in medicine and healthsciences, we can affirm that the overall ratiosare quite low. 63 We can therefore concludethat at the current rates of enrolment inmedicine and health care sciences, <strong>Arab</strong>countries will not in the future be able toensure highly qualified human resourcesin medicine and healthcare vocations innumbers sufficient to meet the healthneeds of <strong>Arab</strong> societies, most of whichare desperately short, in comparison withinternational averages, of specialistsThe picture with regard to engineeringis less grim than those of education andhealth. Still, apart from Iraq and Libya,<strong>Arab</strong> oil-exporting countries do not havehigher enrolment rates in their schoolsof engineering than other <strong>Arab</strong> countries,in spite of their greater need for engineers,not only in the field of petroleum andpetroleum derivatives, but in everyother field of engineering, owing to theabundance of revenues available forfunding major construction projects.That these countries resort to importedlabor is proof of the inability of theireducational systems, including theirsystems of higher education, to respondto their developmental needs for highlyqualified human capital.Nor can it be doubted that many<strong>Arab</strong> countries have a shortage in studentenrolment in the pure, life, and appliedsciences and maths in favour of theschools of literature, social sciences, law,and business administration. 64 Moreover,the job market is not sufficiently diverseand plentiful to absorb most liberal artsgraduates, whereas the need for specialistsin science and technology is at least as greatas the need for specialists in education,health, and engineering, assuming thatthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries aspire to generatethe knowledge human capital capableof closing the scientific and digital gapbetween them and the industriallydeveloped world. This is precisely thetalent that the higher educational systemsin the <strong>Arab</strong> region are not supplying.The agricultural sciences require aspecial study due to the lack of availabledata on many <strong>Arab</strong> countries, their diverseMany <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave opened newbranches anduniversities in manyof their cities, but notin accordance withany comprehensiveordering of theactual needs ofthese countriesMany <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave a shortage instudent enrolmentin the pure, life andapplied sciences andmaths in favour of theschools of literature,social sciences,law, and businessadministrationEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL115


The available dataon the fields ofeducation, medicineand health sciences,engineering, andother fields suggesta shortage ofspecialised humancapital capableof meeting therequirements neededby <strong>Arab</strong> societiesThousands ofgraduates pourout of their highereducationalinstitutes with noreal employmentopportunities whiletheir domesticlabor marketslack graduates inmany importantspecialisationsneeds, and the consequent lack of criteriafor determining, for example, theirrelative need for agricultural engineersfor areas that can be utilised for plant orlivestock production, or their need forveterinarians and the like. In view of thegreat differences between <strong>Arab</strong> countriesin such matters, each country should beconsidered individually in terms of itsspecialisation needs. That said, the availableinformation on schools of agriculture in<strong>Arab</strong> countries indicates that they offerinsufficient diversification to cover theirneeds for the diverse specialisations inagriculture and food production, and thatthey occupy a marginal position amonghigher educational institutions. Suchinformation leads one to believe thatagricultural production, in all its forms, isbased on traditional know-how rather thanmodern scientific knowledge.In general, one can only speculateas to whether higher education in <strong>Arab</strong>countries can truly ensure the knowledgecapital needed to respond to the diverserequirements of development and theneeds of the labor market. Certainly, theavailable data on the fields of education,medicine and health sciences, engineering,and other fields suggest a shortage ofspecialised human capital capable ofmeeting the requirements needed by <strong>Arab</strong>societies to approach issues with a highdegree of intellectual acumen and to takedecisions based on in-depth knowledgeof the issue at hand. This is especiallytrue when they are compared to modernindustrialised countries in this regard.Furthermore, the imbalance in thedistribution of graduates over the variousspecialisations, 65 of which the socialsciences, law, and business administrationhold the virtually uncontested lead,suggests, in spite of the importance ofthese sciences, that the higher educationsystems are not conducive to thegeneration of the diverse types of qualifiedhuman capital <strong>Arab</strong> countries need tomanage and to develop their societies.Thousands of graduates pour out of theirhigher educational institutes with no realemployment opportunities while theirdomestic labor markets lack graduates inmany important specialisations.Qualifications of graduatesRare is the information from independentand reliable sources on the qualificationsof graduates from any educational levelin <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Generally, the availableinformation is restricted to the gradesawarded to students on the required subjectsin the curricula of the programmes fromwhich they graduated, which, in turn, begsmany questions as to how and on whatbasis these grades are awarded (UNDP,2007b, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Perhaps the best project in this domainis that conducted by the UNDP RegionalBureau for <strong>Arab</strong> states in cooperationwith the UNESCO Regional Bureau forEducation in the <strong>Arab</strong> states. The projectstudied large samples of graduates frombusiness administration and computerscience university programmes in many<strong>Arab</strong> countries on the basis of standardisedtests. Table 3-3 shows the total results forstudents tested in business administrationin <strong>Arab</strong> universities. Table 3-4 shows theresults for the computer science test. Bothtables compare the results with those oftheir counterparts in universities in theUSA.If we lump the grade rankings intothree categories, we find that businessadministration students from <strong>Arab</strong>countries on the point of graduating rangeas follows: 41 per cent failed or performedpoorly, which is a very high ratio by anystandard; 47 per cent had acceptable orgood marks; and 12 per cent rated verygood or excellent. In the USA, 15 per centof those tested performed poorly (aboutthree times less than their counterparts in<strong>Arab</strong> countries) and none failed, 61 percent had pass or good marks, and 24 percent (or more than double) ranked verygood or excellent.Thus, while there do exist students in<strong>Arab</strong> countries in the higher performancecategories, they are exceptions to the116 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TABLE 3-3Comparison of overall results of students in <strong>Arab</strong> countries andstudents in USA on the business administration test 66Grade categories Ranking Ratio of students in<strong>Arab</strong> countries(per cent)Ratio of studentsin the US(per cent)120-130 Fail 15 0131-140 Poor 26 15141-150 Pass 28 22151-160 Good 19 39161-170 Very good 9 10171-200 Excellent 3 14Total 100 100Source: UNESCO Regional Bureau report (Salamé and El-Murr, 2005)rule. The vast majority (about 70 per centcompared with 37 per cent of their USAcounterparts) are clustered in the lowerrankings. This extremely high figure raisesgrave questions concerning the quality ofthe human resource capital coming out ofhigher educational institutions in the <strong>Arab</strong>world. As to the specifics, students in the<strong>Arab</strong> states are more or less on a par withtheir counterparts in the USA in a singlecomponent in the business administrationprogramme: economics. They do notcome off at all well in any of the othercomponents–accounting, management,statistics, finance, marketing, legal affairsand international business administration–all of which constitute essential appliedknowledge needed to participate in theknowledge economy.The available data also points to tellingdiscrepancies in how students from thedifferent participating universitiesperformed. None of the students fromthe participating universities in Lebanon,Jordan, Palestine, Yemen, and Algeriaattained the general average observedamong the students from the universitiesin the USA. Nor was this average attainedby 75 per cent of students from otheruniversities in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, 67Sudan, and Morocco. Only the studentsfrom a single university in Morocco cameclose to rivalling their USA counterparts. 68In Table 3-4, showing the results of thecomputer science test, we find the samepercentages of failed marks for both thestudents from the <strong>Arab</strong> region and thosefrom the USA (15 per cent of each group).The divergence begins from the poorranking upwards, with results in favourof the USA students. Whereas the vastmajority of students from <strong>Arab</strong> countriesare split between the lower grade category,with 48 per cent receiving failed or poormarks, and the middle category, with 47per cent receiving pass or good marks,TABLE 3-4Comparison of overall results of students in <strong>Arab</strong> countriesand students in USA on the computer science test. 69Grade categories Ranking Ratio of studentsin <strong>Arab</strong> countries(per cent)Ratio of studentsin the USA (percent)120-130 Fail 15 15131-140 Poor 33 23141-150 Pass 32 19151-160 Good 15 23161-170 Very good 4 12171-200 Excellent 1 8Total 100 100Source: UNESCO Regional Bureau report (Salamé and El-Murr, 2005)While there do existstudents in <strong>Arab</strong>countries in thehigher performancecategories, theyare the exceptionsto the ruleEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL117


Literacy ratesamong adults havenot reached thesaturation point (95per cent and above)in any <strong>Arab</strong> stateThe available datashows steadyprogress in theaverage number ofyears of schoolingcompleted in all<strong>Arab</strong> statesBOX 3-7The internet site of Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia’sMinistry of Economy and Planning 76provides precise statistics on theeducation level of the Saudi people. Onthe basis of this data, we have calculatedthe level of education of the latter asan illustration of how the same may bedone in other countries. Each individualwas given a mark according to his levelof education, starting from zero forilliterate and ending with eight for adoctoral degree graduate, according tothe scale of educational levels attainedby adults. 77According to the findings, theaverage educational level of Saudiscurrently employed is the secondaryschool level (with a mark of 3.97), whichis not bad from the perspectives of theknowledge economy and knowledgesociety. The average level of educationamong Saudis not employed, most ofwhom are women (79 per cent), is justleaving only 5 per cent at the top end ofthe scale, students from the USA range asfollows: 38 per cent with grades of failedor poor, 42 per cent with grades of passor good, and 20 per cent with grades ofvery good or excellent (four times the ratioamong students of <strong>Arab</strong> countries in thiscategory). It follows that the <strong>Arab</strong> highereducational institutes under study havea 50 per cent success rate of producingacceptable levels of knowledge in computerscience. But this is not good enough togenerate a critical mass of highly skilledhuman resources capable of engaging inthe processes of development, renewal,innovation and other such activities thatwould propel <strong>Arab</strong> countries toward theknowledge economy.KNOWLEDGE CAPITALACQUIRED BY ADULTSTHROUGH EDUCATION 70Literacy rates among adults have notreached the saturation point (95 per centand above) in any <strong>Arab</strong> state. 71 However,they do approach this level (with rates ofbetween 85 per cent and 94 per cent) inThe Educational Level of Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iansa little beyond primary school (2.13),which suggests deficiencies in meetingthe requirements of a knowledgesociety. Thus, the overall rate ofschooling among Saudi adults is 2.95,or the equivalent of the intermediarylevel. 78It is clear from these findings thatthe higher a person’s educational level inSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia the greater the likelihoodof his participation in the country’seconomic life. Therefore, even thoughthe general level of education in Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia falls short of the minimal levelfor creating a knowledge society, wecould say that the forces active in thedevelopmental fields in society haveattained the required educational level, 79while the educational level of more thanhalf of Saudi adults, especially women,is clearly too low to enable them toparticipate in the knowledge society.eight countries, and have attained lowerrates (from 70 per cent to 84 per cent) ineight others. They remain poor (from 54per cent to 65 per cent) in five countries.There is a noticeable discrepancy betweenmales and females in these rates. It isabout 20 per cent in favour of malesoverall in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, with the highestdiscrepancy (38 per cent) in Yemen. Theonly exceptions to the gender discrepancy(with differences of 5 per cent or less) areQatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain.The average number of years ofschooling completed is consideredthe best indicator of the quantitativeknowledge capital acquired by adultsthrough the educational system. However,to calculate this indicator requiresaccurate information on the school gradereached by every member of a society.UN organisations involved in populationstudies use a clear scale of completedlevels of education among adults 72 for thispurpose. Although countries have used thescale for their comprehensive and interimcensuses, <strong>Arab</strong> countries rarely publishthis data. Therefore, two approaches havebeen brought into play in order to estimatethe knowledge level of adults. The firstrelies on past school life expectancy rates,since the adults of today are the childrenwho entered the school system nineteenor more years ago. Accordingly, the rateof school life expectancy was calculatedfor the period from 1990 (those born in1984 at the latest) working backwards to1970 (beginning with those born in 1958),which is to say as far back as statistics areavailable. This approach thus coveredadults who, in 2008, were between aminimum of twenty-five and a maximumof fifty years of age.The available data 73 shows steadyprogress in this rate in all <strong>Arab</strong> statesfor which statistical data is available. Themedian school life expectancy rates in<strong>Arab</strong> states ranged from the primarylevel to the intermediate level, withdiscrepancies favouring males, except forin Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain in recentperiods, when the discrepancies favoured118 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


females. According to this data, too, theoverall school life expectancy for today’sadults in the <strong>Arab</strong> region as a whole waseight years (nine for males and seven forfemales), or the equivalent of completingthe year before the end of basic education.Nevertheless, there is considerable variationfrom one country to the next. The rate forthe youngest adults is the higher educationlevel in Bahrain and Libya, whereas it isonly the end of primary school for theircounterparts in Mauritania, Sudan, andYemen.The second approach for estimatingthe level of education of adults agedtwenty-five to fifty is to follow theenrolment figures of these sectors in thevarious levels of education from 1970 to2005. 74 According to the findings of thisapproach, <strong>Arab</strong> countries have workedhard to eradicate illiteracy. Some 50 percent of those who had formerly beenincluded in the statistics on illiteracycan, at least, read and write today. Thefindings of seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countries forwhich statistical data is available 75 showgreat strides forward in the educationallevels from one age bracket to the nextamong adults in virtually all <strong>Arab</strong> states,in spite of large discrepancies from onecountry to the next and within the variousage brackets. According to these findings,the median level of education of the agegroup that is today fifty years old is 2.5(less than end of the intermediate level),whereas that of the group that is todaytwenty-five years old is 4.0 (the secondaryschool level). This is equivalent to fiveyears more schooling than the older agegroup.Due to population growth, the youngerthe age-bracket the more weight it shouldcarry when assessing the overall level ofeducation of adults aged 25 to 50 in <strong>Arab</strong>countries. Taking approximations of therelative weights of these age-brackets, themedian educational level for them is 3.2,or a little higher than the intermediatelevel. Nevertheless, <strong>Arab</strong> countries varyconsiderably with respect to this average, 80which can range from as high as secondaryeducation, as in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar,and Kuwait, or even slightly higher, as inLibya, to below the end of the primarylevel, as in Djibouti and Somalia. At leasthalf the countries concerned, however, arein the vicinity of the intermediate level ofeducation. 81Thus the knowledge level attainedthrough the educational systems byadults in <strong>Arab</strong> countries–particularlyTABLE 3-5Estimated knowledge capital acquired througheducation among adults (25 to 50 years)in <strong>Arab</strong> countries in 2008 (per cent)CountryLiteracy Ratein 2005ASchool ٍ lifeexpectancy rateamong adults(aged 25 to 50 * )BAverage score(A + B)/2Kuwait 94 51 73Libya 86 57 72Bahrain 88 55 72Qatar 89 52 71Jordan 91 47 69Lebanon 86 52 69UAE 89 45 67OccupiedPalestinianTerritories92 .. ..Syria 82 44 63Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 84 38 61Egypt 71 48 60Tunisia 76 43 60Oman 83 35 59Algeria 74 43 59Iraq 74 40 57Comoros 73 .. ..Morocco 54 32 43Djibouti 65 21 43Sudan 61 .. ..Yemen 56 .. ..Mauritania 55 .. ..Somalia .. 19 ..Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics; Data Centre; figures in columns B and “Average score” were assembled by RamziSalama, <strong>Report</strong> core team member.*As a percentage of 7.33, or eighteen years of study, taken as a reasonable maximum, as above.EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL119


Eight <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave a critical mass ofadults who possessa relatively sufficientknowledge capitalto enable them toparticipate in theknowledge society.Seven other countrieslack this critical massthe generations of the primary vitalforces in society, which is to say the agegroups between twenty-five and fifty,which account for the largest numbersof adults–averages something close tothe end of the basic education level, withevident discrepancies in favour of males,in general. On the basis of discrepanciesin the region, we can categorise individualcountries as follows (see Table 3-5):A. No <strong>Arab</strong> country can boast theability to produce a clear majority ofinhabitants above the age of twentyfivewith high levels of education (i.e.,with a literacy plus educational levelindex higher than or in the vicinity of84 per cent 82 ).B. Countries that have a critical massof adults who possess a relativelysufficient knowledge capital (a literacyplus education level index of between67 per cent and 73 per cent) to enablethem to participate in the knowledgesociety. Eight countries fall into thiscategory: Kuwait, Libya, Bahrain,Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, the UAE, andPalestine.C. Countries that have a minimal levelof adults capable of participatingin the knowledge society (i.e., witha literacy plus education level indexbetween 50 per cent and 66 per cent),yet that simultaneously contain largenumbers of adults who lack this ability(especially females). There are sevencountries in this category: Syria, Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, Egypt, Tunisia, Oman, Algeria,and Iraq.D. Countries that lack a sufficient mass ofadults capable of participating in theknowledge society (i.e., with a literacyplus education level index of lessthan 50 per cent). In other words, theability to participate in the knowledgesociety is restricted to a predominantlymale elite that varies in size from onecountry to the next. There are sevencountries in this category: Morocco andDjibouti (to which can be added theComoros, Sudan, Yemen, Mauritania,and Somalia, for which sufficient dataare unavailable).Figure 3-4 illustrates the adult knowledgecapital formed through education in <strong>Arab</strong>states with respect to per capita GDP, againdepicting a moderately loose relationshipbetween these two variables. As can beseen, most <strong>Arab</strong> countries cluster aroundthe exponential curve, the exceptionsbeing Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria,which show educational accomplishmentsamong adults exceeding these countries’current financial capacities, and the UAE,Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Oman, and Morocco, whichFIGURE 3-4<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital acquired through education byadults (percentage of possible maximum)Adult knowledge capital acquired through educationin <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP807060504030SyriaEgyptIraqComorosJordanLebanonAlgeriaDjiboutiMoroccoSudanMauritaniaYemenTunisiaLibyaOmanBahrainSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaPer capita share of GDP in dollarsR 2 = 0.6571KuwaitQatarUAE200 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000120 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


show educational accomplishments amongadults below these countries’ currentfinancial capacities.KNOWLEDGE CAPITALREQUIRED FORPARTICIPATION IN THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYQUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONSTable 3-6 lists the <strong>Arab</strong> states in order ofhow they rank on the scale of total actualor estimated quantitative componentsof the knowledge society for each of thethree major strata: children, youth, andadults. The table makes palpable the hugediscrepancies between <strong>Arab</strong> societies intheir respective abilities to supply thequantitative knowledge capital needed tofacilitate participation in the knowledgesociety.All three age strata of citizens in Libyaand Bahrain are making steady stridestowards the degree of excellence (anoverall grade of 84 per cent and above)that characterises countries capable ofengaging confidently in the knowledgesociety. Qatar and Jordan, however, (withoverall grades of above 75 per cent)possess only a reasonable quantity of theknowledge capital needed to participatein the knowledge society among adultsand ensure the acquisition of that capitalamong the emerging generations of youthand children. Lebanon, Kuwait, the UAE,Tunisia, Palestine, Egypt, and Algeria (withoverall grades of between 69 per centand 74 per cent) follow in terms of theirprogress toward qualifying for participatingin the knowledge society, while Yemen andthe Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti,(and Somalia) show themselves unable torealise the minimal level of quantitativecomponents among all age sectors ofsociety to attain this end. With overallmarks of less than 50 per cent, participationin the knowledge society in these countriesis restricted to small elites. The rest of the<strong>Arab</strong> states fall in varying degrees betweenthese two poles in terms of their ability toTABLE 3-6Summary of estimated quantitative capital obtainedthrough education for the different age strataof <strong>Arab</strong> societies in 2005 (per cent)CountryExpected knowledgecapital acquisitionamong ChildrenA<strong>Knowledge</strong>capitalamong youthBestablish a critical mass of people able toparticipate in the knowledge society. Thuswe find Oman, Syria, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, andIraq in the middle of the scale (with totalsof between 58 per cent and 66 per cent)and Morocco (with an overall score of 52per cent) at the lowest degree of ability.<strong>Knowledge</strong>capital amongadultsCAveragescore(A + B + C)/3Libya *(94) 80 72 82Bahrain 94 80 72 82Qatar 88 72 71 77Jordan 86 74 69 76Lebanon 79 (73) 69 74Kuwait 82 (66) 73 74UAE 84 67 67 73Tunisia 92 65 60 72OccupiedPalestinianTerritories80 (70) (65) 72Egypt 87 66 60 71Algeria 90 58 59 69Oman 76 62 59 66Syria (78) 50 63 64Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia (65) (54) 61 60Iraq 70 (45) 57 58Morocco 73 39 43 52Yemen 60 40 (34) 45Comoros (46) (34) (50) 43Mauritania 56 29 (33) 39Sudan (38) (29) (39) 35Djibouti 30 (24) 43 32Somalia .. .. .. ..*Numbers between brackets are estimates based on incomplete statistical data.Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics; Data Centre. Figures were assembled by Ramzi Salama, <strong>Report</strong> core team member.EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL121


Most <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave been unable toensure openings atthe upper secondaryand the varioustertiary educationphases in quantitiessufficient to keeppace with populationgrowth ratesFor the most part children are clearlymore fortunate than preceding generationswith respect to the potential for obtainingthe requirements necessary to participatein the knowledge society. However,the situation is not so clear cut whenwe come to the prospects of youth inknowledge formation when compared toadults. Although youth are, indeed, morefortunate than adults in this regard inhalf the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, it is impossibleto believe that statistical error or themethods of estimating certain figurescan explain why the reverse should be thecase in the other half of the countries.The countries in which this phenomenonmanifests itself most clearly are Kuwait,Syria, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Iraq, Morocco,the Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan, andDjibouti. Undoubtedly, the particularcircumstances of each of these countriesaccount for this. The upheavals that Iraqhas experienced since 1990 have reducedthe opportunities available to youthsat their particular educational levels.The rest of these countries, apart fromKuwait, have evidently been unable toensure openings at the upper secondaryand the various tertiary education phasesin quantities sufficient to keep pace withpopulation growth rates among youthand the rising numbers of graduates frombasic education. In Kuwait, the reluctanceof youths, especially males, to proceed totertiary education (as evidenced by only a10 per cent enrolment rate in this level in2005) is one of the primary causes of thedecline in the opportunities for Kuwaitiyouth in terms their preparedness for theknowledge economy and society.Figure 3-5 depicts the knowledgecapital created or expected to be createdthrough formal education for the variousage strata in relation to the per capita GDP.That there is a strong directly proportionalcorrelation between these two variables isevidenced by how most countries cluster inthe vicinity of the exponential curve. Theexceptions are Libya, Lebanon, Jordan,and Egypt, which have made educationalFIGURE 3-5Actual (or expected) knowledge capital formed through educationamong different age groups in <strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP90<strong>Knowledge</strong> capital among different age groups(percentage of potential maximum)807060504030LebanonEgyptSyriaIraqJordanMoroccoYemenComorosMauritaniaSudanDjiboutiTunisiaAlgeriaLibyaBahrain R 2 =0.6031QatarKuwaitUAER 2 =0.8159OmanSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia200 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Per capita share of GDP in dollars122 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


inroads well beyond their current financialcapacities, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Djibouti,and Sudan, where the reverse applies to aremarkable extent.It should be borne in mind that eachcountry has particular characteristics andcircumstances of its own even if it ranksthe same as others. This applies particularlyto the countries at the upper end of thescale. For example, the degree and focusof efforts the UAE must expend to liftits national knowledge capital to the levelof the knowledge society is not the sameas that required in Jordan or Lebanon.Likewise, the degree and focus of effortsrequired in Kuwait and Tunisia are not thesame as those required in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia andSyria. As for the countries at the lower endof the scale, they must take urgent andcomprehensive measures covering all agegroups and the majority of the indices.QUALITATIVE DIMENSIONSAll indicators for which statistical evidenceis available point to an overall decline inthe quality of the knowledge capital inall areas in the <strong>Arab</strong> region. This shouldnot be taken to mean that <strong>Arab</strong> states aretotally deficient in quality or that thereare not scattered islands of excellenceand distinguished elites. These do exist invarying degrees from one country to thenext and one field of specialisation to thenext. Frequently, however, they are theexception that proves the rule.For example, the number of class hoursallocated to maths in basic education is ona par with that in other countries for thissubject that is so essential to the formationof knowledge capital. Yet, we find at thesame time that <strong>Arab</strong> students do not, asa whole, fare well in the internationalstandardised tests that measure their mathsacquisition. In like manner, <strong>Arab</strong> countriesgenerally allocate a sufficient amount ofclasses to physical education, yet rarelydo their athletes win high medals in theOlympics or other such athletic competitionsthat demand outstanding performance.Some students perform extremely wellin standardised tests in computer scienceand business administration; however, themajority end up at the lower end of thegrade scale in the selfsame tests. Enrolmentrates in secondary and higher educationalinstitutes are climbing, but in most casesthe students flock to educational streamsand specialisations that already have morethan their fill of graduates while othertracks and specialisations are plagued byglaring shortages.In sum, <strong>Arab</strong> educational systems arenot functioning well in the creation ofcritical masses of the qualitative knowledgecapital <strong>Arab</strong> societies need to enter surefootedlyinto the knowledge economy andto participate effectively in the knowledgesociety.INVESTING IN THEFORMATION OF HUMANKNOWLEDGE CAPITALTHROUGH EDUCATIONThe creation of human knowledge capitalrequires interplay between many diversefactors. Foremost among these are the timedevoted to teaching and learning, the natureof the curricula and the competencieslearners are expected to acquire from thevarious types of educational programmes.Also critical are the expectations of thosein charge of education and instructiontowards learners in terms of learning andperformance, the opportunities availableto learners to increase their knowledge,the quality of the instruction providedby the human resources responsiblefor instruction, and the policies, plans,programmes, and practices founded onreliable pedagogical knowledge. Such arethe considerations that are brought to bearin the formulation, operation, revision,and development of the instructional/educational process.Ensuring the requirements of qualityknowledge capital creation and itsuniversalisation across the widest possiblecohorts of children, youths, and adultsthrough formal education and continuinglearning processes requires effectiveCapital creationacross the widestpossible cohorts ofchildren, youths,and adults, requireseffective governmentsupervision andenormous financialresources that aresometimes beyondthe means ofnations and canonly be ensured atappropriate levels incountries with a highnational incomeThe available datafor the <strong>Arab</strong> regionreveals considerabledisparity between<strong>Arab</strong> countries in theirlevels of spendingon educationEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL123


Statistical analysesshow a definite, ifvariable, correlationbetween per capitalevel of nationalwealth, and thevarious indicesof quantitativehuman knowledgecapital formationthrough educationgovernment supervision and enormousfinancial resources. Not infrequently thesesometimes lie beyond the means of nationsand can only be ensured at appropriatelevels in countries with a high nationalincome.Spending on educationThe available data for the <strong>Arab</strong> regionreveals considerable disparity between<strong>Arab</strong> countries in their levels of spendingon education. 83 Whereas Djibouti, Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, Tunisia, and Morocco allocatedhigh proportions of their national budgets(from 20.8 per cent to 27.6 per cent) andhigh ratios of GDP (between 6.5 per centand 8.7 per cent) to the different stages ofeducation over the last five years at least,other countries for which statistics areavailable (with the exception of Kuwait)have spent from the equivalent of 4.7per cent of GDP (Egypt) to as little as1.7 per cent (UAE). If the educationallocations in Qatar and the UAE aresufficient given these countries’ relativelyhigh gross domestic product, and Kuwaitis munificent in terms of what it spendson education, the outlays on education inEgypt and Mauritania appear insufficientto ensure an educational system capableof meeting the challenges of the twentyfirstcentury. Egypt has neverthelessscored tangible quantitative achievementsin education. And if the level of publicallocations for education in Lebanon ismodest by all recognised standards, onemust also bear in mind the contributionsmade by Lebanese civil society throughthe proliferation of private and parochialschooling at all educational stages.One justification for the relatively lowoutlays on education in countries such asEgypt and Mauritania is the need of thesecountries to spend large sums of money ondeveloping the infrastructure necessary tomeet the demands of their large populationincreases, on expanding the various socialand utility services to minimal levelsof availability and reliability, and othersuch essentials. Another factor that mayaccount for low educational outlays islimited government revenues with respectto gross national income and, hence, thelimited amounts of funds available forpublic expenditure. Still, one is struck bythe inversely proportional relationship, inthese countries, between public expenditureon education with respect to GDP and theoverall indicators of knowledge capitalformation through education. Nothingcould be more indicative of the intensivefiscal management efforts being exertedby the less wealthy nations to catch upwith and enhance their prospects forhuman capital formation, even if theresults are not necessarily commensurateto the efforts expended due to the paucityof available public financial resources aswell as to other educational and socialfactors.National income and the formationof quantitative knowledge capitalStatistical analyses show a definite, ifvariable, correlation between per capitaincome (which is to say the level ofnational wealth), and the various indicesof quantitative human knowledge capitalformation through education. The figureswe have included above illustrate thecorrelations between some of these indicesand per capita GDP in <strong>Arab</strong> states.From more detailed analyses we findthat the loosest relationship is betweenper capita national income and primaryand higher educational enrolment. Theuniversalisation or partial universalisationof primary education in <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshas reached such a degree as to havedivorced enrolment rates at this level fromnational wealth. Exceptions are Djibouti,which suffers acute shortfall in enrolment,and Oman and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, in whichenrolment rates are not commensuratewith per capita GDP. Tertiary educationenrolment rates follow a polynomialtrendline that peaks away from per capitaGDP in numerous places, showingvarious inversely proportionate relations.Consider, for example, that middle-income124 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 3-6aMaths performance of eighth-year students in<strong>Arab</strong> countries against per capita GDP.480Student performance in mathematics460DubaiLebanon440Jordan420Tunisia400 SyriaBahrainAlgeria Egypt380Morocco OmanR 2 = 0.1135360Kuwait340Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaR 2 = 0.4171320Qatar3000 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Per capita share of GDP in dollarsFIGURE 3-6bMath performance of eighth-year students in <strong>Arab</strong> countriesagainst per capita GDP (excluding Dubai).Student performance in mathematics (minus Dubai)460Lebanon440Jordan420Tunisia400 SyriaBahrainAlgeria Egypt380MoroccoOman360Kuwait340R 2 = 0.4571320Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaR 2 = 0.6754Qatar3000 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Per capita share of GDP in dollarscountries, such as Libya, Lebanon, Jordan,and Egypt, attain high enrolment rates atthe tertiary educational level, whereas suchrates dwindle to disturbing levels in suchrelatively wealthy countries as Kuwait,Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. On the otherhand, there is a much closer relationshipbetween per capita income and upperEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL125


FIGURE 3-7Science performance of eighth-year students in <strong>Arab</strong> countriesagainst per capita GDP (excluding Dubai).Student science performance, excluding Dubai500480JordanBahrain460SyriaTunisia440420LebanonOmanKuwaitAlgeriaEgypt400MoroccoSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaR 2 = 0.1404380R 2 = 0.3145360340320Qatar3000 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000Financial prosperityexplains only someof the differencesbetween <strong>Arab</strong> statesin the quantitativedimensions ofnational knowledgecapital and seemsto have an inverserelationship–albeitmoderate–withthe qualitativeperformanceof studentsPer capita GDP in US dollarssecondary level enrolment. Here enrolmentrates at this level have, indeed, become anindicator of a society’s wealth: the lowerthe secondary enrolment rate, the poorerthe society; the more prevalent attendanceis at this level of education, the wealthierthe society.Most other indicators have moderatelyclose relations with per capita income.Some are virtually linear, as is the casewith the relationship with gross enrolmentrates, total secondary education enrolmentrates at both the lower and upper levels,and the total knowledge capital amongadults. Others tend toward a polynomialpattern, as is the case with the relationshipwith enrolment rates at the upper stageof basic education and the total scoreson the opportunities for the formationof knowledge capital among children andyouths. The relationship between literacyand per capita income is virtually linear;less so, however, than the relationshipbetween per capita income and overallsecondary education enrolment, as awhole, and upper secondary education, inparticular.National income and qualitativecapital formationIf we consider education quality indicators,such as eighth graders’ performance inmaths, in connection with per capita GDP,the results reveal an inverse relationshipbetween national prosperity and studentperformance (see Figure 3-6a). On theother hand, if we exclude the studentsfrom Dubai/UAE from the equation, 84the inverse relationship grows morepronounced, with the peaks in thepolynomial curve becoming less jagged,as can be seen in Figure 3-6b. The sameapplies with regard to the relationshipbetween national prosperity and eighthgraderperformance in sciences (seeFigure 3-7), albeit the inverse relationshipis less acute in this case. 85EDUCATIONAL REFORMEFFORTSFinancial prosperity explains only someof the differences between <strong>Arab</strong> states inthe quantitative dimensions of nationalknowledge capital and seems to have an126 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


BOX 3-8The Contribution of Non-Public Schoolsto Education in the <strong>Arab</strong> RegionLocally and foreign affiliated parochial and private schools occupy arespectably sizeable realm in the pre-university educational galaxy inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region. They ensure most of the educational opportunitiesin the pre-elementary phase in the majority of <strong>Arab</strong> countries, morethan 60 per cent of school opportunities at the primary stage in two<strong>Arab</strong> states, and more than 20 per cent of these opportunities in atleast four other states. In most other countries, they are concentrated,to large extent, at this level. Non-governmental schools are alsoprominent at the intermediate and secondary education levels inat least nine <strong>Arab</strong> states. Indeed, in such countries as Bahrain, theComoros, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Qatar, theUAE (and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia), it seems as though these institutions areindispensable for ensuring schooling opportunities for adolescentsand young adults. 86One is naturally inclined to ask the question as to whether nonpublicinstitutes actually contribute added value to the formation ofknowledge capital in the <strong>Arab</strong> region. If they do, then what exactlyis this added value that public schools do not provide? What arethe achievements of private schools that government schools fail toattain? What factors account for the possible differences betweenthese two types of education providers?Perhaps the most salient contribution of non-public providersis that they alleviate the burden of ensuring education for allmembers of the public from the shoulders of the national budget.However, these providers have also created a glimmering image forthemselves–sometimes merited, sometimes not–that extends thescope of parents’ and students’ expectations from these institutionsto international horizons.The more prestigious schools accomplish this by adoptinga curriculum that generally uses a foreign tongue as the primarylanguage of instruction and that raises performance expectationsby setting achievement standards at the ability to pass foreign andinternationally recognised proficiency tests. Frequently, too, theircurricula and course cycles are geared to equip their students to enterinternationally reputed universities. They also enable professionalcontact with the world abroad through continual exposure to thelatest developments in pedagogy and educational technology andby arranging for their teaching staff to participate in internationallycertified educational training courses and professional developmentworkshops. Furthermore, by introducing elements of generaluniversal culture into the heart of the local culture, treating themas though they were fundamental components of human culture,they lend an extra international dimension to the educational servicethey deliver.Certainly, the socio-economic and scholastic selectivity manyof these institutions practice accounts, to a considerable extent,for the success rates of their students. It also explains their abilityto impose their higher achievement expectations on students. Yetthese institutes could not have imposed such conditions if they didnot thrive in an environment that permits freedom of movement,initiative, originality, and innovation in all their activities. Thisis precisely what public schools generally lack, restricted as theyare by the general political climate, government bureaucracy, thedominance of quantity over quality, and the fixation with having totreat all government schools and their staffs in like manner. Such arethe factors that tend to choke off all attempts to excel and departfrom the norm.Non-public schools generally control quality education, thequality of their teaching and other working staff, through the marginof administrative and financial independence that they enjoy. Theycan attract whatever attested expertise they wish, whether for thepurposes of administration, instruction, training, or provision ofeducational support services. They can offer their students the beststate-of-the-art educational equipment and media their budgets canafford. Nevertheless, the non-public providers that truly contributeto the development of education in theory and practice, and thatdo raise their student performance levels to international standards,are not necessarily the rule. Indeed, the reality is that they are morein the nature of “islands of excellence” scattered here and therein a sea of sometimes good, sometimes questionable institutions.Despite this, even the more mediocre providers frequently givethe impression that they offer an added value to <strong>Arab</strong> society, notnecessarily because of their actual contribution but because of howfar public schools lag behind the development train.inverse relationship – albeit moderate – withthe qualitative performance of students.Therefore, there must be other aspects thataccount for the differences between thesecountries in knowledge performance. Isperformance connected, for example, inany way to educational reforms recentlyundertaken by <strong>Arab</strong> countries?In fact, <strong>Arab</strong> states from the Gulf to theAtlantic have experienced great surges ofdomestic educational development effortsbacked by the technical and financialsupport provided by the internationalcommunity as embodied in suchinternational organisations as UNESCO,the UNDP, and the World Bank, by suchinfluential regional organisations as theEU, or by means of bilateral cooperationprogrammes, among the most importantof which are the French, German,British, US, and Japanese cooperationprogrammes. Most of the recent publiceducation development drives arosefrom the framework of the first WorldConference on Education for All (held inJomtien, Thailand, in 1990), which definedsix goals to be met by 2000. As most <strong>Arab</strong>countries failed to attain these goals by thattime, they reaffirmed their commitment tothem in the <strong>Arab</strong> Regional Conference onEducation for All held in Cairo in 2000,and then in the World Education Forumheld in Dakar later that year, in the hopeof achieving them by 2015 at the latest. 87EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL127


BOX 3-9Human Capital Formation to Meet theNeeds of Instruction and PedagogyEducation systems need highly qualifiedhuman resources to design pedagogicalpolicies, plans, and programmes; toadminister pedagogical and educationalaffairs and run teaching institutions;and to provide the instructional andpedagogical support services neededto generate human capital amongforthcoming generations in sufficientquantities and of the required quality.All the relevant literature on thesubject in <strong>Arab</strong>ic or other languagesconfirms that the various types ofhuman resources for education mustbe prepared at the university level. 89The statistics published by theUNESCO Institute for Statisticson teacher qualifications are notsufficient to determine whethereducational systems are truly equippedwith sufficient human resourcescapable of turning the wheels of thepedagogical process. These statisticsfail to take into account the type ofthe teachers’ degrees (the educationallevel completed), the nature of theirqualifications (scholastic or specialisingin education), and the quality of thatqualification (the instruments thatauthenticate its worth); this greatlyreduces the possibility of meaningfulcomparative studies betweencountries. 90 We should thereforeask whether the higher educationsystems in this region ensure a supplyof teachers and other educationspecialists in sufficient numbers to feedthe education sector with the highlyqualified human resources it needs.Simulation exercises indicate thateducation systems, in general, mustallocate no less than 5 per cent ofevery adult age bracket to the purposesof providing for the basic needs ofthese systems. 91 Applying this figureto the enrolment rates in tertiarylevel education degree programmes(hypothetically the twenty to twentyfourage bracket) in <strong>Arab</strong> countries,the deficiencies in the preparationof teachers and others responsiblefor the educational process becomereadily apparent for most of the<strong>Arab</strong> countries for which statistics areavailable, as does the need to rectifythe flaws. Undoubtedly, most of theother countries must suffer shortagessimilar to those observed in thecountries for which there are availabledata. According to the simulationexercises, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan,Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria,and Tunisia are quite short ofcompetent educators and hence mustgreatly expand the enrolment levelsin education and teacher trainingprogrammes at the tertiary level.But even in countries that show animbalance in favour of educationand teaching training programmescompared to enrolment rates in otherhigher education specialisations, asis the case in Palestine, Jordan, andSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, this imbalance does notnecessarily ensure the provision of thenecessary numbers or the differenttypes of qualifications at the qualitythat the education system needs.A recent evaluation of universityprogrammes in pedagogy in differentspecialisations, at different levels andin various <strong>Arab</strong> states (Salamé andEl-Murr, 2005), reveals that theseprogrammes, as a whole, lack most ofthe quality components, from inputs(programme design) and processes(i.e., using modern resources andmodern information technologies toenhance the learning process and themonitoring of student progress) tooutputs (quality of graduates, especiallyas pertains to their acquisition of thehigher mental competencies). Theprogrammes also lack quality assurancecomponents, from benchmarks andeffective mechanisms for assessinglearner acquisition and performance toannual monitoring and periodic reviewsystems for assessing the programmesthemselves and monitoring thecareers of students after graduation.Furthermore, the study concludes, thepersons in charge of these programmesare devoid of a culture of awarenessof and dedication to quality and of theneed constantly to upgrade the qualityof the educational services they provideand to plan, follow up, and adjust.Social pressures resulting from mountingnumbers of students completing basicand, hence, secondary education inmany <strong>Arab</strong> countries have given rise to adrive specifically aimed at the reform oftechnical and higher education. This drivetook shape at an international conferencesponsored by UNESCO in 1998, whichwas preceded by a regional conference onthe subject held in Beirut that year.The World Bank report, The RoadNot Travelled–Education Reform in theMiddle East and North Africa (World Bank,2007b) observes that, over the previousfifty years, the thirteen <strong>Arab</strong> states thatcomprise the subjects of its study havedrawn up extensive plans for reformingtheir educational systems at all their levelsand for all their types of education. Itestimated an average of 2.5 such plans percountry during this period with an averageof twenty-five measures per plan.But in spite of the efforts undertakenin <strong>Arab</strong> countries since the 1990s (1990to 2005), 88 it appears that many of themhave fallen short of realising the goals ofEducation for All (UNESCO, 2008a) andfrom meeting global standards with regardto occupational, technical, and highereducation. Certainly significant progresshas been made in the quantitative indicesfor education–in enrolment rates and inothers; however, such indices have reachedthe saturation point in very few countries.Meanwhile, the qualitative indicators place<strong>Arab</strong> countries well behind not only theindustrialised developed nations but alsoa large group of other nations in Asiaand Latin America, which have madeenormous strides in the quality of theireducational services and have obtainedresults equal or close to those of theadvanced industrialised nations.The World Bank report cites differencesbetween <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the basisof a compound index that combinesmeasurements of enrolment at alleducational levels, gender parity, primaryeducation efficiency, and the quality ofeducation as evidenced by adult literacy ratesand results in international standardisedtests such as those mentioned earlier inthis chapter. Naturally, the differencesare most pronounced between the betterperforming countries, such as Jordan and128 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Kuwait, and the worst performers such asMorocco, Iraq, Yemen, and Djibouti.The report describes the performanceof <strong>Arab</strong> states in terms of three “buildingblocks” which are subsumed beneaththe headings “engineering” (consistingof physical resources, finance andadministration, curricula and teachingmethods), “incentives” (which coverevaluation and monitoring, motivationand rewards, and information), and“public accountability.” It suggests thatthe most successful countries, suchas Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon, haveeducation systems that feature a goodmix of engineering, incentives, and publicaccountability. Indeed, it demonstrates thatwith such a mix, education systems canperform acceptably even in environmentsmarred by violence and instability as is thecase in Palestine and as was formerly for aprotracted period the case in Lebanon.On the basis of the foregoing, theWorld Bank report maintains that theway forward is for countries to make thetransition from engineering inputs toengineering for results, from hierarchicalcontrol to incentive-compatible contracts,and from accountability to the state tobroader public participation in educationalaffairs. In addition, it urges <strong>Arab</strong> states tosynchronise human capital accumulationwith labor demand both within eachindividual <strong>Arab</strong> state and within the <strong>Arab</strong>region as a whole and, more generally, totailor education to the needs of economicdevelopment and the generation oflarge numbers of job opportunities soas to optimise the economic returns oninvestment in education.Perhaps the lack of extensive publicdebate in <strong>Arab</strong> countries, together andindividually, on the nature, goals, andchallenges of education reform, and thedearth of published studies, research,and documents on these issues havecaused reform efforts to turn in onthemselves, exposing them to the dangersof oversimplification. This has givenrise to the tendency to handle reform asthough it were merely a matter of applyingready-made formulas. In fact, authenticreform entails setting in motion asocietal dynamic that is associated withthe unleashing of the forces of innovativethought, experimentation, evaluation,rectification and renewed initiative, therebygenerating a new and vigorous educationalculture that pervades all facets of theeducational system and all aspects of itsrelationship to the needs of comprehensiveintegrated development (‘Adnan al-Amin,et al, 2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). In all events, it isclear that the <strong>Arab</strong> states, in general,do not have the critical mass needed tosustain the impetus of efforts aimed atelevating their educational systems to thestandards achieved by developed nations.Undoubtedly the fault for this shortcomingcan be traced to levels of responsibility,from the leaders of educational thoughtand education planners to teachers andinstructors at all phases of the educationprocess, via education and schooladministrators and all others in charge ofproviding educational services, especiallythose concerned with quality assurance.An example of a societal dynamicpromising for reform occurred inMorocco in 1998-2000. In this period,the organs and energies of civil societywere galvanised into action, generatingthe impetus that launched the NationalCharter of Education and Training (1999),or the so-called “Education Law,” that laidout the fundamental pillars for reform atall levels and in all branches of educationin the kingdom. The experience wasremarkable in spite of the hurdles that havecontinually obstructed the implementationof the agreed-upon principles by dint ofthe sheer number of difficulties and thefact that some of these have been left toaccumulate for so long and have becomeso intractable as to defy solution evenafter years of work. A similar movementoccurred in Lebanon from 1995 to 1997,although in this case it was restricted to thereform of the public education curricula.In all other countries, officials in chargeof the education systems and educationexperts formed the primary and soleThe lack of extensivepublic debate in <strong>Arab</strong>countries has givenrise to the tendencyto handle reform asthough it were merelya matter of applyingready-made formulas<strong>Arab</strong> educationaldevelopment driveshave, as a rule,remained stuck inthe rut of expansion,as opposed toreform, which is whyimprovement hasoccurred only in thequantitative indicatorsEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL129


BOX 3-10The Lebanese Association for Educational Studies:a model for national and pan-<strong>Arab</strong> networking for the development of educational knowledgeThe Lebanese Association for Educational Studies (LAES)was founded in 1995 with the aim of developing pedagogicalknowledge. The decision to form the association was inspired bythree considerations: the quantitative and qualitative decline in theeducational knowledge produced by governmental agencies, the factthat the educational knowledge produced in universities remainslocked up in these universities, and the fact that the huge shortage ofeducational knowledge compels officials to take their decisions onthe basis of the pressures of the moment and of narrow interests,and not on the basis of acquiring knowledge.LAES is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation with norepresentative capacity for employees or specialists in education. Itestablished itself in this manner in order to avoid any dependencyon the government, any commercial taint, and any need to act inthe manner of a syndicate or lobby, so as to be able to enjoy fulland unrestricted academic freedom. Its membership is restricted touniversity professors endowed with the qualities of the impartial andobjective scholar.It was not long before the LAES developed into a point for contactand exchange among scholars from diverse disciplines, Lebaneseinstitutions that had remained remote from one another for historicalreasons, and parallel global cultures (<strong>Arab</strong>ophone, Francophone,and Anglophone). As these diverse elements participated in studycircles and joint research projects, prejudices evaporated, mindsopened to fresh approaches and diverse perspectives, and the generalscope of thought broadened. The added knowledge value from thisnetworking was palpable.Soon the LAES and its publications became a resource forscholars, researchers, and others, both from Lebanon and abroad,interested in information on the state of education and pedagogyin Lebanon. In addition, the activities of this association began toattract the attention of people engaged in the educational sector.One of the conferences it organised drew around 500 participants,and had it not been for the confines of the venue there could havebeen more.“Providing a network” for Lebanese academicians had not beenexplicitly mentioned in the aims of LAES. However, the phrase“enhancing the educational academic community” was used in orderto sum up the association’s desire to strengthen the type of scholasticinterplay aimed at the advancement of educational knowledge bycompiling a body of literature consisting of tests, criteria standards,and analytic and assessment approaches and methodologies to helpensure objectivity and quality in study and research, and applyingthis literature and making its findings available through publicationand conferences. In the process, LAES has become, at the Lebanesenational level, a nucleus of the educational academic community.Another of the association’s aims was to “engage with similarorganisations in other <strong>Arab</strong> countries.” However, due to the dearthof such organisations, LAES’s activities in this regard have beenconfined to cooperation with a single “similar” organisation, theKuwaiti Society for the Advancement of <strong>Arab</strong> Children. The jointactivities undertaken in the context of this cooperation includeda study circle on “The Reform of General Education in <strong>Arab</strong>Countries” (papers and discussions appeared in book form in 2005)and a study on The Psychological Conditions of Children and Youth inLebanon after the July 2006 War (2008).LAES also engaged in academic activities with a broader <strong>Arab</strong>scope in cooperation with faculties of education, Lebanese-basedUNESCO committees, universities, ministries, and individualscholars. Such activities included conferences and workshops allof whose proceedings have been published, an example being theconference on “Teacher Preparation in the <strong>Arab</strong> Countries” (2001).The association also conducted a major study on a topic that isnow of the highest priority in higher educational circumstances.Incorporating an extensive survey in 2003 to which 157 <strong>Arab</strong>universities responded, the results of the study were publishedin 2005 with the title, Quality Assurance in <strong>Arab</strong> Universities, anddistributed widely in the <strong>Arab</strong> world. Such a large-scale effort couldnot have succeeded had it not been for the cooperation and supportLAES received from the Federation of <strong>Arab</strong> Universities and theUNESCO bureau in Beirut.Faced by the poor level of networking on educational knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> region, the sense that education specialists in eachcountry are in the dark about what is happening in their field in othercountries, and the near certainty that the lack of networking andthe mutual ignorance are detrimental to <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge productionin every <strong>Arab</strong> country, LAES had another inspiration. This was tocreate a database on all the books, articles, theses, and studies oneducation published in <strong>Arab</strong> countries and to make it available toall on a website, the <strong>Arab</strong> Educational Information Network (www.shamaanet.org).LAES hopes that all other scholars, organisations, and institutionsthat share its belief that networking, information exchange, andthe creation of a robust educational academic community form aprerequisite to the development of educational knowledge in <strong>Arab</strong>states and a fundamental pillar for their educational revival willsupport its efforts.(Based on a contribution by ‘Adnan al-Amin, General Secretary, LAES)agents of the reform processes. As theseprocesses did not provide for widespreadgrassroots participation, the diverse sectorsof society could not be brought to embracethe reform aims and hence be mobilisedtowards the realisation of their aims. 92Unfortunately, the reform initiatives thatwere launched in Lebanon and Moroccoalso proved unsustainable. In these cases,follow-through proved weaker than hopedfor, and, as a result, these initiatives failedto fully mature, yielding only partial results,as can be seen in the indicators discussedin this chapter.<strong>Arab</strong> educational development driveshave, as a rule, remained stuck in the rut ofexpansion, as opposed to reform, whichis why improvement has occurred only inthe quantitative indicators. In most cases,educational systems in <strong>Arab</strong> countries have130 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


emained encumbered by the prevailingeducational cultures in these countries.Apart from smatterings of importedliterature on desirable systems and preferredpractices, modern and innovative ideas oneducation remain alien to the prevailingcultures. The wheels of educational reformthus become mired down, hampering theachievement of saturation in quantitativegoals and obstructing tangible progresstowards the realisation of qualitative goals(Naila al-Sellini, Rafi‘a Ghubash and Fathial-Zayyat, background papers for this<strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).CONCLUSIONEducational systems occupy a crucialplace in the formation of knowledgecapital in modern societies, which havebecome dependent more on “scientific”knowledge than on inherited “traditional”knowledge for the pursuit of their interestsand advancement of their welfare. Expertsagree that the ability to understand theway things work and approach themwith a minimum degree of intelligence,the ability to manage one’s personal,health, financial, and other affairs, and theability to participate effectively in society,economically, socially, politically, culturally,and environmentally are contingent uponpossessing a well-rounded basketful ofbasic knowledge. This can only be acquiredby attending educational institutions for aperiod of no less than nine or ten years.While half the <strong>Arab</strong> countries haveattained enrolment rates approaching thesaturation point for the present generationof children, the other half continue to lagbehind. Simultaneously, available indicatorsdemonstrate that the quantitative inroadsachieved remain unaccompanied bycorresponding qualitative inroads. Theperformance of <strong>Arab</strong> students, fromcountries that have universalised basiceducation to countries that are still troubledby elitism at this phase, rarely rivals that oftheir counterparts elsewhere in the world.In addition, the problem of children outof school remains rampant and severelyplagues about a third of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries,jeopardising their prospects for enteringthe knowledge society with any degree ofconfidence in the foreseeable future.Meanwhile, it is sufficient to note thatthe formal education of a huge percentageof youth–over 40 per cent in seven<strong>Arab</strong> countries–does not extend beyondthe level of basic education, hamperingthese countries’ ability to engage in theknowledge economy, which requirestheoretical and technical knowledgethat can be acquired only in educationalphases higher than basic education. Buteven among the numbers that do crossthe threshold beyond the basic level, theknowledge capital they acquire may satisfytheir personal intellectual propensitieswhile not necessarily coinciding with therequirements a society bent on making thetransition to the knowledge economy. This isan economy that is heavily dependent uponspecialised sciences, modern technologies,and the information and communicationsrevolution, as well as upon openness to thelatest advances in knowledge, sustained andconstructive interaction between countriesand societies, and intensive networkingbetween individuals and institutions.Yet, while at least some higher educationinstitutions in <strong>Arab</strong> countries do notprevent some of their most outstandingtalents from excelling, <strong>Arab</strong> societies brimwith fine minds and gifted individuals whodo not have the opportunities to growand fulfil their potential. The absenceof such opportunities forms an obstacleto generating a critical mass of highlyqualified human capital with the power tocreate, innovate, and renew and the skillsand competencies it takes to steer theprocesses of sustained development that<strong>Arab</strong> societies so desperately need.With regard to adults, since thebeginning of contemporary modernism inthe last quarter of the twentieth century,the education systems in most <strong>Arab</strong>countries have largely failed to create thecohesive, homogeneous, and highly skilledhuman knowledge capital needed to formthe knowledge society and to participateThe performanceof <strong>Arab</strong> students,from countries thathave universalisedbasic education tocountries that arestill troubled byelitism at this phase,rarely rivals that oftheir counterpartselsewhere inthe world<strong>Arab</strong> societies brimwith fine minds andgifted individualswho do not havethe opportunitiesto grow and fulfiltheir potentialEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL131


Clearly, the “lightsof knowledge” havenot reached all in the<strong>Arab</strong> region duringthe last quarterof the twentiethcentury. Ratherthey have remainedthe preserve of anelite – a relativelyextensive one insome countries and aconsiderably narrowerone in otherseffectively in the knowledge economy.What improvement has been achieved inschool life rates between 1970 and 2000 hasbeen sluggish. In addition, with only a fewexceptions, female school life expectancycontinues to lag behind that of males,albeit in varying degrees from one countryto the next. The overall portrait of adultknowledge capital in each <strong>Arab</strong> countrytoday gives the impression of “a homespread across many houses”: some of theyounger adults possess a solid knowledgecapital, others do not; the older adults, onthe whole, are poorer in their knowledgeassets than younger ones; female adults,both young and old, have less knowledgecapital than males, at levels, moreover, thatoften plunge to zero or next to zero due tothe rampant illiteracy among elder femaleadults. Clearly, the “lights of knowledge”have not reached all in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionduring the last quarter of the twentiethcentury. Rather they have remained thepreserve of an elite–a relatively extensiveone in some countries and a considerablynarrower one in others.The mediocre situation regardingknowledge capital among adults in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries and the worrying situationregarding availability of opportunitiesfor the formation of knowledge capitalin children and youth in around half the<strong>Arab</strong> countries may have their roots in thelimited financial resources at the disposalof these countries. Yet, painstakingstudy of the circumstances surroundingknowledge capital formation througheducation shows that <strong>Arab</strong> countries, ingeneral, have not been tight-fisted in theirspending on education, but rather havebeen clearly deficient in their attention tothe factors conducive to the better qualityand efficacy of education. Progress towardsthis end begins when educators and thegeneral public reach the conviction thatit is impossible to form solid knowledgecapital without dedicating sufficient timeto the instruction and learning processes.Thereafter curricula based on a wellgroundededucational philosophy must bedesigned, as well as a clearly defined visionof the type of citizen that should be formedand the requirements for their formation,inclusive of the properties of the humanresources involved in this process. Theformative process, in turn, will requirepromoting among all concerned with theeducational process, including learners,a culture conductive to productivity,achievement and quality; a culture ofresponsibility and accountability, and aculture based on information acquisitionand exchange and the taking of decisionsbased on reliable knowledge.To compound the grimness of thesituation, all major education and trainingreform projects have failed to accomplishtheir objectives and overcome the flawsexisting in the various structures andinstitutions of the education systems.Moreover, a closer look at individual<strong>Arab</strong> countries reveals their isolation andgreat variation in terms of performanceand on the ground reality, these hugedifferences being well recorded on allthe human development indices. Whathappens in Morocco, Oman, Libya, orBahrain in human resources creationhas nothing whatsoever to do with whathappens in any other country. If some<strong>Arab</strong> governments are allowed even aglimpse at the experiments undertaken inother <strong>Arab</strong> countries, it is via internationaland regional organisations and thenthey rarely attempt to benefit fromthese experiments. Equally rare are theirattempts to coordinate with each other,even minimally, on the formulation ofeducational policies and plans. The sameapplies to the academic communitiesinvolved with education in these countries,who have failed–except for rare occasionstoset up networks to promote interactionand the exchange of expertise in spite ofthe perpetual calls for such action in viewof the demands of globalisation, one ofthe most important components of whichis effective networking between individualsand institutions.The problems that this chapter hasbrought to the fore in the course of itsexamination of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge capital132 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


eveal the breadth of the gap that continues to separate the state of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgecapital from the advances in knowledge and the ongoing knowledge revolution elsewherein today’s world. We can sense how wide this gap is when we realise that <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgecapital as shaped at the various phases of the education process still provides evidencethat our educational system, in spite of the many efforts dedicated to alleviating itscritical condition, is still a long way from serving the society of knowledge, freedom, anddevelopment.The poor quality of education almost across the board in <strong>Arab</strong> countries and, indeed,the quantitative deficiencies in many of them, reveal that our dream of using educationas the avenue to becoming masters of nature and of our fate–the great dream of the<strong>Arab</strong> Renaissance–remains thwarted. Some of the obstacles have been inherited from thepast, but others are rooted in our failure to properly manage our problems in educationand turn them to the service of our aspirations for a knowledge society and to realisecomprehensive human development.Before defining the general outlines of a strategy for entering the world of knowledge,we will turn first, in the following chapter, to the current situation and the horizonsof information and communications technology in <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance. Notonly is ICT intimately connected with education and training, it opens the avenues tothe economy, the media, and the various other realms that require information for theconstruction and operation of their projects.Some of the obstacleshave been inheritedfrom the past, butothers are rooted inour failure to properlymanage our problemsin education and turnthem to the serviceof our aspirationsfor a knowledgesociety and to realisecomprehensivehuman developmentEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL133


End Notes1“Adult” is defined here as of fifteen years or older.2See Statistical Annex, Table 9.3See Statistical Annex, Table 10.4See Statistical Annex, Table 11.5It should be borne in mind that this index takes into account only the three above-mentioned educationindicators, namely, the adult literacy rate, secondary enrolment (in its lower and upper stages), and tertiaryenrolment. Index values run from zero to ten and show the position of the country relative to all other countriesappearing on the index. Thus, the index for the highest 10 per cent of countries falls between nine and ten, thenext 10 per cent between eight and nine, and so on.6See Statistical Annex, Table 12.7A decline in the value of the education index does not necessarily mean a decline in the absolute values forthe education indicators entered to create the index. Rather it implies that the relative position of the countryin question according to the education indicators has declined, or in other words that it has either indeedwitnessed a decline in the indicator in question or that those indicators have risen for that country but to a lesserdegree than those of other countries that are jockeying for their place on the scale.8See Statistical Annex, Table 13.9The <strong>Arab</strong> region always seems to rank no higher than sixth among the world’s regions on the commonly usedindicators (see for example Statistical Annex, Tables 14 and 15).10It is important to distinguish knowledge-based human and social skills from human and social behaviourinfluenced by factors connected to individual makeup, such as personal motives, personality traits, and otherelements that shape personal identity.11Bontis adopted an approach in the regard whose most important applications are to be found amongcommercial and industrial firms primarily concerned with innovation and which advocate attention to intellectualcapital as a leading component of a company’s wealth, alongside its material and financial wealth. Theintellectual capital of a company consists primarily of its human capital (and the knowledge and know-how itpossesses) and its structural capital (the organisational structures, databases, internal processes and externalrelations). For further information see, in addition to Bontis’s writings above, the following works, as well as theJournal of Intellectual Capital and World Bank documents on the subject:- Edvinsson, Leif, and Malone, Michael (1997). Intellectual Capital: realizing your company’s true value byfinding its hidden brainpower. Harper Business, New York.- Stewart, Thomas (1997). Intellectual Capital: the new wealth of organisations. Doubleday/Currency, New York.- Harris, Louise (2000). “A Theory of Intellectual Capital” in Advances in Developing Human Resources, vol. 2,no. 1, pp.22-37.- Litschka, Michael, Markom, Andreas and Schunder, Susanne (2005). “Measuring and Analyzing IntellectualAssets: An Integrative Approach” in Journal of Intellectual Capital, vol. 7, no.2, pp. 160-173.12There are no precise statistics available for Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia on this matter; however, application of the availabledata allows us to allocate this country a place as given within brackets. We have used the same method to placeother countries when the available data permits.13See Statistical Annex, Table 16.14Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia are the exceptions to the general rule regarding compulsory education which isrestricted to elementary school. Even this remains unapplied, as is the case with other <strong>Arab</strong> countries in whichcompulsory education officially extends to the end of the intermediate level. In the Sultanate of Oman there is nodefined duration for compulsory education.15See Statistical Annex, Table 17.16This indicator refers to the total number of years children of a certain age can expect to spend in formaleducation from the primary to the tertiary levels, presuming that the overall enrolment rates in a country remainconstant over the course of a given year. The upper limit in this indicator is 20 years, or the number of years itgenerally takes to complete formal education with a PhD. This indicator does not factor in repetition rates (whichare generally high in Sudan and in <strong>Arab</strong> countries influenced by the French system such as Mauritania, Morocco,Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon) or the education drives some nations occasionally undertake leading to surgesin post-elementary school enrolment rates. However, it remains a valid tool for drawing comparisons between134 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


countries and providing a picture of their relative progress with respect to the general level of education that agiven generation of children can obtain, other factors being equal.17See Statistical Annex Table 17. Note that Syria, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia and Somalia are not listed due to the lack ofstatistical data sufficient to calculate this indicator.18The blue curve represents the exponential relationship between the two variables, the other line shows thepolynomial relationship between them. Palestine and Somalia are not included in this or similar figures due tothe lack of available data on per capita GDP in Palestine and the state of education in Somalia.19Figures 3-2 through 3-7 were assembled by Ramzi Salama, <strong>Report</strong> core team member, from data available atthe UNESCO Institute for Statistics.20Identified as the most prevalent form educational phase in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, it consists of nine years of primaryand intermediate education. Calculations have therefore been made on this basis, even for countries that use adifferent system, as is the case with the Jordanian system and the new system in Oman.21See Statistical Annex, Table 18, which excludes Palestine and Somalia, due to the lack of data, and the Comorosand Djibouti, which are special cases due to the virtual absence of <strong>Arab</strong>ic language instruction in their curricula.22It should be borne in mind that a one per cent difference in the amount of time allocated to a subject isequivalent to about 100 class hours in the basic education phase. This is not inconsiderable.23See Statistical Annex, Table 19.24These countries, in order of their results, were Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Palestine, Morocco,Syria, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and Yemen.25These countries, in order of their results, were Jordan, Bahrain, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia,Morocco, Lebanon, and Yemen.26Kuwait and Morocco took part in the international study on fourth-grader reading skills, ranking thirty-fifthand thirty-sixth out of the thirty-seven participating countries or regions. Their average scores were verylow compared to the overall global average (see the report by the International Association for EducationalAchievement, PIRLS, 2003). Jordan, Tunisia, and Qatar participated in the study on maths, science, and readingacquisition conducted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development . In maths they rankedfifty-second, fifty-fourth, and fifty-sixth respectively out of fifty-seven participating countries; in science theyranked forty-fourth, fifty-fourth, and fifty-sixth out of fifty-seven; and in reading they placed at forty-seventh,fifty-second, and fifty-fourth out of fifty-six participating countries. In all areas, their results were far below theglobal averages.27These countries, in the order of their widely differing results, are Dubai/UAE, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Bahrain,Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Kuwait, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and Qatar.28These countries, in order of their widely divergent results, are Dubai/UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, Tunisia, Oman,Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Morocco, and Qatar.29These countries, in order of their widely divergent results, are Dubai/UAE, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait,Qatar, and Yemen.30These countries, in order of their divergent results, are Dubai/UAE, Algeria, Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, andYemen.31The above tests were conducted in the participating countries with the support of the UNDP regional office for<strong>Arab</strong> countries. We took the results of the three participating regions of Canada as representative of a singlecountry.32See Statistical Annex Table 20. Statistical data is lacking for five countries: Lebanon (which likely belongs to thefirst category), Djibouti, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan (which most likely fall into the third category).33Given as the ratio of females to males.34In addition to Somalia, for which there are no accurate statistics. Statistical data on this point is also lacking forSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia.35See Statistical Annex, Table 20.36See Table 3-2.37To these we can add the Comoros, Djibouti, and Somalia, for which we have no precise statistical data.38No statistical data are available for Somalia.39See Statistical Annex, Table 11.EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL135


40Accurate statistics are not available for the countries between brackets. However, the congruence of the datajustifies their appearance as shown.41As mentioned earlier, our purpose in analysing curricula data from the 1990s, which is to say before somecountries introduced curriculum reforms, was to gain insight into how the educational system was preparingthose who, today, stand at the threshold of their independent occupational and social careers. Few countrieshave upgraded their curricula since that time. Morocco and Oman are among those that have, but their reformsin this regard are too recent to judge in terms of efficacy.42The Libyan system requires specialization at a very early age, following the end of basic education. From thispoint, students are streamed at the secondary level of education into one of six branches, three in the artsand humanities (literature and media, social sciences, and economy) and three in the sciences (basic sciences,engineering, and life sciences). These streams feed into similar specialisations in tertiary education.43This analysis is based on the data on secondary educational tracks available in the World Data on Educationdata base, published by UNESCO International Bureau of Education, Geneva:http://www.ibe.unesco.org/Countries/WDE/2006/index.html.44For example, among the applicants for the terminal year of general secondary education in Lebanon in 2008,7.8 per cent applied to arts and humanities, 11.9 per cent to general sciences, 32.9 per cent to life sciences,and 47.4 per cent to social sciences and economy. In this context, it is important to note that the Confederationof British Industry recently (11 August 2008) sounded the alarm that only 7 per cent of British sixteen-year oldsopt for a triple science GCSE (secondary school programme) covering physics, chemistry and biology and thatsuch a low rate threatens the future of British industry. See, for example, the following web page (accessed on22 August 2008): http://www.inthenews.co.uk/news/science/bright-kids-should-study-triple-science-$1235850.htm.45Interested readers may find it useful to examine the philosophy curricula adopted in Morocco and Lebanon.46See Statistical Annex, Table 21.47One can not help but be impressed by the great attention prominent French intellectuals and the Frenchgovernment itself, even at the presidential level, devote to the question of the knowledge that should be taught,in general and at the secondary educational level in particular. The subject is under constant debate, and theconcern also manifests itself in the attention accorded to it by periodicals, the numbers of intellectuals andeducators who contribute to the discussions, and the relevant web pages and forums on the internet. For furtherinformation see:- Bourdieu, Pierre et Gros, François (1989). “Rapport pour un enseignement de l’avenir.” (This report wasproduced by a special committee formed at the request of the French president with the purpose ofdelineating “the primary orientations for the gradual transition to educational content needed to keep pacewith the evolution of science and society.”- Domenach, Jean-Marie (1989). Ce Qu’il Faut Enseigner: pour un nouvel enseignement général dans lesecondaire, Éditions du Seuil, Paris.- Isambert-Jamati, Viviane (1990). Les Savoirs Scolaires. Enjeux Sociaux des Contenus d’Enseignement et deLeurs Réformes. Éditions Universitaires, Paris.- Morin, Edgar (1999). Les Sept Savoirs Nécessaires à l’Éducation du Futur. Éditions du Seuil/UNESCO, Paris.- Sciences Humaines, 2001.”Quels Savoirs Enseigner?” , Mensuel No. 121, Novembre 2001. Presses SorbonneNouvelle, Paris.48Morin, Edgar (1999). Les Sept Savoirs Nécessaires à l’Éducation du Futur, Editions du Seuil/UNESCO, Paris.49Tunisia has experienced a downturn in interest in the technical stream in recent years.50See Statistic Annex, Table 22. Djibouti has been excluded from this analysis because the total enrolment insecondary and tertiary education during this period is marginal.51By way of comparison, during the same period in Eastern European countries, for example, more than 70 percent of students followed the technical secondary school track (see Majallat Mustaqbaliyyat, March 2001, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic).52These countries are Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan.53Available data on some countries indicate an imbalance in the distribution of technical secondary studentsacross the major specialisations, these being business administration and information systems, industry,agriculture, tourism, and health and human services. The imbalance favours business administration and136 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


information systems. The available data includes, for example, that pertaining to the tracks of candidates for thegeneral secondary school entrance exam in Jordan (see the Jordanian Ministry of Education website).54See Statistical Annex, Table 23.55For example, available statistics on the qualifications of adults in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia indicate that it would take88,000 more doctoral level graduates, or three times the current number of PhD holders, for this country to rivaldeveloped countries in this area. Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia compensates for this shortage through imported expertise, amongwhich are more than 16,000 PhD holders and 40,000 MA holders (source: statistics on the Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ianMinistry of Economy and Planning website: www.mep.gov.sa, on 17 February <strong>2009</strong>).56For example, in 2004, Algeria’s Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research announced that Algerianeeded 24,400 new teachers in order to meet the needs of the country’s universities over the next four years(Algeria’s Al-Watan newspaper, 16 July 2004).57This was the opinion of academic officials from the Lebanese University and private Lebanese universities at thebeginning of the 2008-<strong>2009</strong> academic year.58According to a UNESCO study on higher education in Iraq in 2003, only 28.2 per cent of the country’s universityteaching staff possessed doctoral degrees. This ratio is extremely low by any standard.59Experts agree that a higher education system cannot fulfil its function unless at least 70 per cent of teachingstaff have doctoral qualifications (with a sufficient diversity in their disciplines and specialisations). In addition,the staff members must not be so encumbered with teaching responsibilities as to be prevented permanentlyfrom engaging in research connected with the subjects they teach, towards which end they should receive allpossible support and facilities (library, Internet access, opportunities to take part in conferences, etc.) so thatthey can remain in close contact with the latest developments in their fields.60See Statistical Annex, Table 24.61Each country’s needs for qualified educators can be estimated accurately on the basis of actual enrolmentfigures or projected enrolment figures at the various phases of education. However, this requires making certainassumptions with regard to enrolment rates at each level, numbers of students per class, teacher course load,educational support services to be provided by the educational system, and other such variables. Indeed, this isgenerally the practice in planning processes for human resources for the education sector.62See Statistical Annex, Table 25.63Libya may be the only exception to this rule. According to the available information from Libyan official sources,there is a surfeit of students enrolled in these disciplines. Higher Education officials in Libya say that about 28per cent of first year university students enrol in health disciplines, especially human medicine, because this fieldis open to secondary school graduates who have completed the required tracks that feed into these disciplines.No additional qualifications are required and there are no upper limits to student numbers.64See Statistical Annex, Table 24.65See Statistical Annex, Table 26.66The results listed in this table reflect the performance of 623 students from twelve universities in the followingnine <strong>Arab</strong> states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco.67We should also note the considerable variation in the performance of students from the relevant university inEgypt, who ranged from the lowest to the highest grades on the scale. This contrasts with the performance ofstudents from one of the universities in Lebanon and the universities concerned in Yemen, Jordan, and Algeria,who were clustered at in the lower grade categories. Only one university in Morocco and another in Lebanontested above the lower end of the scale.68As these tests were held in specific <strong>Arab</strong> universities, we can not generalise from their results to all universitiesin these countries or to all states.69The results listed in this table reflect the performance of 295 students from seven universities in the following six<strong>Arab</strong> states: Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco.70The term “adult” in this chapter refers to members of society who are aged twenty-five and over, asdistinguished from youth (ages 15 to 24) and children (ages 6 to 14). However, because of the lack of detailedstatistics on the literacy of adults as defined here, statistics on this issue refer solely to all persons of majorityage, which is to say both youth and adults, following the practice of UNESCO.71See Statistical Annex, Table 9.72The scale cites nine degrees of learning: illiterate, literate, primary level, intermediate level, general secondaryEDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL137


level or the equivalent, post-secondary level lower than the bachelor degree level, the bachelor degree level, thepre-doctorate graduate level, the doctorate level.73See Statistical Annex, Table 27.74The calculation of primary school enrolment rates was used as a springboard for the calculation of the rest ofthe rates. It was estimated that half of those not enrolled at this level were illiterate and the other half literate.Then, it was assumed that those not in secondary school five years after this level had completed only theprimary level, that those not in higher education after an additional five years had completed secondary school,and that those enrolled in higher education had completed the first university phase. This approach naturallytends to inflate somewhat the actual level of schooling attained.75See Statistical Annex, Table 28.76http://www.mep.gov.sa, on 17 February <strong>2009</strong>.77This scale is divided into nine levels of schooling: illiterate, literate, primary level, intermediate level, generalsecondary level or the equivalent, post-secondary level lower than the bachelor degree level, bachelor degreelevel, pre-doctorate graduate level, doctorate level.78It is useful to observe, here, that the average level of education among imported labor in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia (ofwhom 86 per cent are male) is 2.58, or between the primary and intermediate levels. If we grant for the sake ofargument that the knowledge society requires skills of at least the secondary school level, the imported labor inSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia that meets this criteria, if large in numbers (967,380), makes up only 31 per cent of the total (33per cent of these are male and 21 per cent female). Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of foreign workers(of whom there are 2,125,554) range from the illiterate and literate levels (12.5 per cent and 29.3 per centrespectively) to the primary and intermediate school levels (12.3 per cent and 14.6 per cent respectively). Thismajority makes up the uneducated manual labor and semiskilled labor force in the country.79Note that this measurement is purely quantitative and has no bearing on the actual quality of the knowledgecapital individuals have acquired. The data mentioned earlier in this chapter on the ratios of class time allocatedto the various items on the basic and secondary school curricula indicate that the highly idiosyncratic approachto the formation of human resources in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia may not equip these resources to participate effectively inthe knowledge economy as it is understood in the context of globalisation.80See the second to the last column in Table 28. Note that we used an overall average of 2.5 per cent annualpopulation growth for the entire region. It follows that these results should be considered provisional until thenecessary data is available to be able to calculate the actual educational capital for adults in the manner usedfor Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ian citizens mentioned in Box 3-7.81Note that this approach has led to results very close to the results from the calculation of the actual averageeducational level attained by adults in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia.82The scale consists of six grades, each consisting of 16.66 per cent of the total. Thus the highest grade (from84 per cent to 100 per cent) is excellent in terms of the ability to participate in the knowledge society. Thisis equivalent to the level attained by advanced industrialised countries, which is a literacy rate above 95 percent and an average school life expectancy of no less than 13 out of 18 possible years. The second grade(between 67 per cent and 83 per cent) is good and the third (between 50 per cent and 66 per cent) is the lowestacceptable level. Grades lower than these point to various degrees of inability to participate in the knowledgesociety.83See Statistical Annex, Table 29.84The performance of the students from Dubai is an exceptional case that merits closer study. However, it isnoteworthy that Dubai citizens account for only about 25 per cent of the total number of students in theemirate’s schools, that more than 80 per cent of the total number of students are enrolled in private schools inwhich 95 per cent of the student body are non-citizens, and that non-citizens make up 40 per cent of studentsenrolled in government schools. See Dubai Statistics Centre website http://www.dsc.gov.ae/DSC/Pages/Statistics%20Data.aspx?Category_Id=0226 (accessed on 19 January <strong>2009</strong>). See also Box 3-8, which featuresan analysis of the contribution of non-public schools to education in <strong>Arab</strong> countries.85The average performance of Bahraini students in maths and sciences is a remarkable exception to that ofstudents from the other Gulf countries.86See Statistical Annex, Table 30.87See Box 3-1: “The Aims of Education for All.”88Apart from Iraq and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia which undertook extensive reforms recently.138 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


89Finland, for example, whose students perform very well in comparative international scholastic achievementtests, has made it obligatory since 1979 that all candidates for teaching posts in all phases of the educationsystem and for other posts of responsibility in the educational process have at least a Masters degree ineducation.90For instance, a UNESCO report observes that teachers in seven <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the whole meet nationalcriteria for the qualifications necessary to practice the teaching profession, whereas everyone is perfectly awarethat in many of the countries concerned the said qualifications start at a secondary school degree, which by nomeans can ensure the optimum performance of educational tasks. Moreover, even a Bachelor’s degree shouldnot be considered sufficient qualification unless it is linked with a teacher education qualification of a sufficientduration and that meets internationally recognised quality standards.91In the simulation, it was assumed that if about 50 per cent of a certain age group enrols in higher education,then 10 per cent of it should join the faculties of education (which train the teachers and other educationspecialists for the various educational levels). However, given the severe shortages in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, as awhole, in this domain, and the ascertainable need of their education systems for highly qualified staff, an evenhigher proportion of enrolment in this stream of higher education is needed.92The quantitative data treated previously indicate that Bahrain and Libya are the only two <strong>Arab</strong> countries thathave managed to attract large numbers from diverse sectors of their populations into employment in theeducational system. All other initiatives aimed at qualitative development, such as those set into motion inQatar, Oman, and the UAE, have yet to bear fruit.EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL139


CHAPTER FOURINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONSTECHNOLOGIES IN THEARAB COUNTRIES:THE PILLARS AND TOOLSOF KNOWLEDGE


CHAPTER FOURINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONSTECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARABCOUNTRIES: THE PILLARS ANDTOOLS OF KNOWLEDGEIntroductionOver recent decades, unprecedented globaladvancement has occurred in the production,exchange, and processing of information, aswell as its analysis and use. The impact of thisadvance may exceed that brought about by theIndustrial Revolution, since the infrastructuresof information and communications technologies(ICTs), their equipment and their software, havecome to play the role of society’s nervous system.ICTs are valuable tools for the circulation andadaptation of knowledge, as well as beingamong the forms of human knowledge that arethe most dynamic, have the most far-reachingeffects, and are the most embedded in the fabricof modern life. They present many opportunitiesand challenges and mandate the formulation ofspecific strategies. In addition, they demand thededication of human and material resources atthe national level and the improvement ofmechanisms for cooperation at the <strong>Arab</strong>,regional, and international levels to ensure idealdiffusion and utilisation.Information technology (ICT) represents oneof the main pillars for the establishment of aknowledge society. It represents the key means todeploy and circulate knowledge, in addition to itsrole in developing, supporting, facilitating, andspeeding up scientific and cultural research of thewidest possible scope.The <strong>Arab</strong> countries have made noteworthyprogress in most of the pivotal aspects of ICTand in particular in infrastructures, whereinvestment is ongoing. In 2008, they recordedlevels of development in technological performanceexceeding those observed in all other regions ofthe world. 1 Four <strong>Arab</strong> countries have been listedamong the top fifty most ready to utilise ICT,all of them Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)countries (the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, andKuwait, occupying twenty-eighth, thirty-seventh,thirty-ninth, and fiftieth ranks respectively)(World Economic Forum, 2008b).However, scrutiny of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgelandscape reveals that the digital gap remainsand is acute. Investigation of <strong>Arab</strong>ic digitalcontent, which is a guide to the utilisationand production of knowledge in <strong>Arab</strong>ic,demonstrates that the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and theirsocieties fall short according to most criteria(UNESCWA, 2008). As long as steps arenot taken on various levels in the domain oftechnology policy and legislation, and as long asmany issues related to <strong>Arab</strong>ic language usageon the net are not settled, the state of <strong>Arab</strong>icknowledge content will never pass an extremelylow threshold but will continue to draw uponother, random sources for content and seeksuccour from past tradition, both good andbad.Performance also varies from one <strong>Arab</strong>state to another. The disparity that we witnesstoday in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ utilisation of newtechnologies and in the use and production of<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content also affects sections ofsociety within each one. This promises furtherfragmentation and extremism until such timethese countries lay the basis for equal access totechnology and its potential.No <strong>Arab</strong> countries will be able to emergefrom the current embryonic stage in dealing withtechnology and contributing to its developmentunless they open themselves up to those partiesthat, to the extent possible to them, are activeand relevant. Similarly, they must orientthemselves to the indigenisation, adaptation, andreformulation of the production of technologicalknowledge, thus enabling more enlightened andcreative utilisation of the available tools ofThe impact ofthe advancesin informationproduction,exchange, andprocessing mayexceed that broughtabout by theIndustrial RevolutionThe <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave madenoteworthy progressin most of the pivotalaspects of ICT. In2008, they recordedlevels of developmentin technologicalperformanceexceeding thoseobserved in all otherregions of the worldINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES143


Over the last tenyears the <strong>Arab</strong>countries havestarted to lay downICT infrastructures.All indicators reflectnoticeable disparityin their attemptto access thesetechnologiesSome <strong>Arab</strong> countriesthat enjoy highGNPs occupy a highposition on the ICTindex. However, thisposition remainslower than that ofother countries inthe world that enjoycomparable GNPstechnology. There is of course a major role forthe government and private sectors and for theorganisations of civil society in reaching thisgoal. Yet the roles of all these will remain limitedwithout a deeper understanding of the crisis ofknowledge content–digital or otherwise–within<strong>Arab</strong> societies.While necessary material costs may affectopportunities and limit them to particulargroups, successive ICT revolutions and ongoingcost reductions will power the diffusion ofknowledge among wide sections of society,provided that such advances in technologyare accompanied by accelerated production ofcontent and its utilisation in new applications.This, however, will require improved utilisationof time and better deployment of resources ifthe knowledge gap and the wealth gap thatdivide the world’s peoples and the social groupswithin a single society are not to become morepronounced.ICT IN THE ARAB COUNTRIESOver the last ten years the <strong>Arab</strong>countries have started to lay down ICTinfrastructures. All indicators reflectnoticeable disparity in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’performance in their attempt to accessthese technologies.The World Bank’s ICT index, whichis based on progress in acquisition oftelephone lines, computers, and theinternet, 2 is the most evolved knowledgeeconomy index indicator for eleven <strong>Arab</strong>countries. This index shows that six of thesecountries are substantially ready to adoptthe knowledge economy. Only one <strong>Arab</strong>state—Jordan—scores lower on the ICTindex than on any of the other knowledgeeconomy indices. For comparison, for fourcountries it is the economic incentives andinstitutional regime index or the innovationsystem index that holds this position, whilefor eight it is the education and humanresources index that does so.Eleven <strong>Arab</strong> countries witnessed arise in their score on the ICT index incomparison with 1995. In the case ofSudan, this score rose from 1.2 in 1995 to3.8 in 2008, one the highest growth ratesin the <strong>Arab</strong> region. With respect to the sixcountries that witnessed a decline in theirscores, and with the exception of Djiboutiwhere the score fell by 1.7, the decline didnot exceed 0.3. 3As Figure 4-1, and Table (a-1) in theStatistical Annex (ICT), indicate, some<strong>Arab</strong> countries that enjoy high GNPsthanks to their natural wealth occupy ahigh position on the ICT index. However,this position remains lower than that ofother countries in the world that enjoycomparable GNPs. On the basis ofinternational indicators in the area of ICTinfrastructure, there are some groundsfor optimism and hope in terms of theacquisition of a range of ICTs in thefuture. The following paragraphs presenta picture of the advancement achievedin the distribution of computers andaccess to the internet–an advancementconsidered to have a tangible effect on theproduction and diffusion of knowledge.On the other hand, the spread of fixedand mobile telephones is deemed to beless of an indication of, and to have lesserimpact on, the production and diffusionof knowledge (see Part B of the StatisticalAnnex/ICT). Much of this is attributableto the fact that the telephone networksavailable to most citizens of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries are of traditional forms and donot enable access to digital content or theutilisation of modern communicationstechnologies. Certain further obstaclesmay hinder the utilisation of suchtechnologies even when they are present. 4Part C of the Statistical Annex/ICTpresents a comparative categorisation ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to a numberof indicators that reflect ICT plans andinitiatives under implementation.THE SPREAD OF COMPUTERSAND THE INTERNETThe emergence and spread of thepersonal computer in the second half ofthe 1980s laid the foundations for majortransformations in the relationship betweentechnology and its users with regard to144 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 4-1ICT index values for <strong>Arab</strong> countries and selected groups of non-<strong>Arab</strong> countries(1995, most recent statistics with + and – change values)ICT Index (1-10)109876543210-1-2Latin AmericaLebanonSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaWorldUpper middle incomeKuwaitBahrainQatarUAEHigh incomeYemenLow incomeMauritaniaAlgeriaEgyptSyriaSudanMoroccoLower middle incomeOmanTunisiaJordanMost Recent1995changeDjiboutiSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assesssment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.FIGURE 4-2Number of computers per 1,000 inhabitants, <strong>Arab</strong> region, and selected groups of non-<strong>Arab</strong> countriesNumber of computers per 1000 inhabitants4003503002502001501000AlgeriaMauritaniaYemenDjiboutiMoroccoEgyptSyriaOmanTunisiaJordanSudanLebanonUAEBahrainQatarKuwaitSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaLow income countriesLower middle income countriesLatin AmericaEurope and Central AsiaUpper middle income countriesWorldSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assesssment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspaccess to information and knowledgeresources stored in various media. Figure4-2 makes clear that in most of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries the number of computers perperson is less than the global average. Withthe exception of Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia and Kuwait,the average number of computers per1000 inhabitants in all <strong>Arab</strong> countries fallsbelow the world average, approaching it inBahrain and Qatar, but falling perceptiblybelow it in Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Tunisia,and Oman. In the other <strong>Arab</strong> countriesIn most of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries the numberof computers perperson is less thanthe global averageINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES145


FIGURE 4-3Internet users - <strong>Arab</strong> world, world, and selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> country groups by per capita GDPInternet users per 1,000 inhabitants1000900800700600500400300200WorldR 2 = 0.6939R 2 = 0.782210000 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000Per Capita GDP in dollarsWorld Country groups <strong>Arab</strong> countriesSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assesssment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspIn the <strong>Arab</strong> worldas a whole, internetusage has noticeablyproliferated in thelast five years(Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Djibouti, Yemen,Mauritania, and Algeria) it is substantiallylower than the world average.In the <strong>Arab</strong> world as a whole, internetusage has noticeably proliferated in thelast five years. However, rates of internetuse in most of these countries are stillless than the prevailing global rates oftwenty-one per cent of the population.With the exception of four <strong>Arab</strong> countries–Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE–rates of internet usage in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionare lower than the world average. Thepopulation of a number of <strong>Arab</strong> countries–among them Egypt and Algeria, whichtogether represent one third of the totalpopulation of the <strong>Arab</strong> region–uses theinternet at rates lower than those prevailingin lower middle income countries.The proliferation of personalcomputers in <strong>Arab</strong> countries, as in others,is dependent on the costs of obtainingthem–which continue to go down–and onthe dissemination of the skills necessary touse them among groups of users– whichcontinue to grow. Some <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave participated in programmes thataim to make low-cost computersavailable. Available information indicateshow important it is to expand suchprogrammes and encourage cooperationbetween concerned internationalparties–manufacturers and internationalorganisations–and concerned public andprivate sector parties in the <strong>Arab</strong> World,with the goal of arriving at designs betterfitted to local requirements. Computerassembly workshops have spread in some<strong>Arab</strong> countries and personal computersare available on the local market at lowercost than imported models. Given that alocal assembly industry permits a broaderdiffusion of computer technology, itis worthwhile for relevant governmentbodies to offer it support, to setregional quality standards for computerproduction to safeguard the interests ofconsumers, and gradually to raise thelevel of production so that the industrycan respond in an on-going fashion totechnological development.Figure 4-3 shows clearly how thenumber of internet users grows hand inhand with per capita GDP in the world’s146 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


countries and the <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Thecircles show the world average and averagerates of internet use for some regionalgroupings based on income and accordingto their position on the scale of theHuman Development Index (HDI). Thisfigure suggests that the increase in averageper capita income in the <strong>Arab</strong> region maynot have stimulated internet use to theextent that comparable increases in averageper capita income have done globally. Thismust be due to the extent to which digitalcontent in <strong>Arab</strong>ic meets the requirementsof the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ citizens andinstitutions. It is also worth pointingout here the low level of internet use bybusinesses in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and thesmall number of schools able to accessthe net. Despite some of these countriesbeing in the top third of countries inthe world with respect to a number ofICT indicators–such as mobile phonepenetration, numbers of computers, andcosts of internet access–the <strong>Arab</strong> countrywith the highest levels of internet useplaces only thirty-eighth with respect tointernet use by businesses (see StatisticalAnnex/ICT).Figure 4-4 shows the existence of adouble divide in internet bandwidth 5between the <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the onehand and between them and higher middleincome countries on the other. In general,communications networks capable ofaccessing internet services in <strong>Arab</strong>countries are still of low specification. Forexample, internet users in a number ofadvanced countries like the US, Canada,the UK, Singapore, and Japan can accessinternet services at speeds that reach orexceed one billion kilobits (kb) per second.By comparison, in most <strong>Arab</strong> countriesthe connection speeds of the networksin use range from 128kb to 1024kb persecond.The cost of internet access influencesthe nature of internet use, especially in lightof the rise in cost of basic commodities andthe fall in real income. Figure 4-5 depicts thecost of internet access in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesfor which data is available as well as theworld average and that of some groupsSome <strong>Arab</strong> countriesare in the top thirdof countries in theworld with respectto a number of ICTindicators, but the<strong>Arab</strong> country withthe highest levels ofinternet use ranksonly thirty-eighth withrespect to internetuse by businessesFIGURE 4-4Bandwidth of global internet access for the <strong>Arab</strong> world and selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> country groupsBandwidth (bit per person)19001800170016001500140013001200110010009008007006005004003002001000QatarUAEBahrainKuwaitMoroccoOmanLebanonTunisiaJordanDjiboutiEgyptSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaMauritaniaSudanAlgeriaSyriaYemenUpper middle income countriesLower middle income countriesLow income countriesWorldSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES147


FIGURE 4-5Price basket for internet (in US dollars per month) in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries,worldwide, and in selected non-<strong>Arab</strong> groups of countries by incomePrice Basket for Internet (US $/month)706050403020100SudanMauritaniaDjiboutiBahrainMoroccoKuwaitSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaQatarOmanSyriaUAETunisiaJordanYemenLebanonAlgeriaEgyptLow income countriesWorldLower middle income countriesHigh income countriesUpper middle income countriesSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspInternet access costsin Egypt are lowerthan in any other<strong>Arab</strong> country, andlower even thanthose prevailing inthe advanced nationsof countries for comparison. It showsthat the cost of internet access in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries is lower than the averagevalue for all the world’s countries. Onlythree <strong>Arab</strong> countries–Sudan, Mauritania,and Djibouti–have a noticeably highercost than the world average, and theseare countries that have only made modestprogress, even with respect to the other<strong>Arab</strong> countries, in obtaining ICTs. Internetaccess costs in Egypt are lower than in anyother <strong>Arab</strong> country, and lower even thanthose prevailing in the advanced nations.Another matter worthy of attention is thedrop in internet access costs in Yemenin comparison with its peers in the lowincome group of nations. The cost ofaccess in ten <strong>Arab</strong> countries is muchless than the average cost among thehigher middle income nations. In sixFIGURE 4-6Language access to internet and ratio of speakers to total internet users9080Percentage7060504030Percentage of all internet usersInternet access by language20100EnglishChineseSpanishJapaneseFrenchGerman<strong>Arab</strong>icPortugeseKoreanItalianTop ten languagesOther languagesSource: Internet World Stats website in January <strong>2009</strong>.148 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


<strong>Arab</strong> countries–Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon,Yemen, Jordan, and Tunisia–this cost isless than half the world average.The fall in the price of internet access,particularly in high population countriessuch as Egypt, indicates policies thatencourage internet use. However, it isnecessary to go further than these policiesin confronting the difficulties which broadswathes of <strong>Arab</strong> society undoubtedly facein utilising technology applications. Thismeans giving attention to developing<strong>Arab</strong>ic content and acquiring technologyable to process it. It is also necessary toadopt creative approaches that makeinteraction with computers and the neteasier for the illiterate and those lackingcomputer skills using touch-sensitivescreens and user-friendly software. 6On a reading of the data presentedin the preceding paragraphs (Figure 4-1’spresentation of the ICT index from theWorld Bank database and the data indicatingan expansion in internet use in some <strong>Arab</strong>countries), we find some improvement inthe indigenisation of knowledge tools andtechnologies. However, the data neitherput these matters in context, nor revealtheir actual contribution to the productiveemployment of these technologies.THE ARABIC LANGUAGE ANDTHE INTERNETThe number of those using the internetin <strong>Arab</strong>ic approached 60 million at thebeginning of 2008. That is, the access of<strong>Arab</strong>ic speakers to the internet is close to17 per cent of the population of the <strong>Arab</strong>countries. 7 This proportion falls belowthe world average which is close to 22per cent. <strong>Arab</strong>ic also has one of the lowestpenetration rates among the top-ten groupof world languages on the net. While itis close to the internet penetration rateof Chinese speakers, the number ofChinese web pages tips the balance infavour of the latter language. As for <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage penetration in comparison withHebrew, the latter comes out on top withalmost 66 per cent penetration, placingit in the ranks of the languages ofadvanced nations such as Japan (73.8 percent) and Germany (63.5 per cent).The number of <strong>Arab</strong>ic speakers usingthe net is close to 4.1 per cent of all internetusers globally. In terms of global internetuse, this puts <strong>Arab</strong>ic in seventh placeamong the world’s top ten languages, andis close to the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ proportionof the world’s population (see Figure 4-6).Table 4-1 gives a picture of the place of<strong>Arab</strong>ic among the world’s top ten languagesin terms of numbers of speakers, its rateof growth on the internet between 2000TABLE 4-1Top tenlanguagesTop ten languages used on the net(number of internet users by language)Worldpopulationfor thislanguage2007(millions)Growthof thislanguageon the net2000-2008(%)Internetpenetrationbylanguage(%)Internetusers bylanguage(millions)Internetusers as apercentageof worldusers(%)English 2039 203.5 21.1 430.8 29.4Chinese 1365 755.1 20.2 276.2 18.9Spanish 452 405.3 27.6 124.7 8.5Japanese 127 99.7 73.8 94 6.4French 410 458.7 16.6 68.1 4.7German 96 121.0 63.5 61.2 4.2<strong>Arab</strong>ic 357 2063.7 16.8 59.9 4.1Portuguese 240 668.0 24.3 58.2 4.0Korean 73 82.9 47.9 34.8 2.4Italian 58 162.9 59.7 34.7 2.4Top tenlanguages5218 278.3 23.8 1242.7 84.9Otherlanguages1458 580.4 15.2 221.0 15.1Total 6676 305.5 21.9 1463.6 100.0Notes:1) These statistics were updated in June 2008.2) Internet penetration is the ratio between the total of internet users speaking a language and theestimated total population speaking that language.3) Data derived from publications of the International Telecommunications Union, the ComputerIndustry Almanac, Nielsen Net Ratings, and other reliable sources.4) World population information comes from the U.S. Census Bureau.For definitions and help in obtaining details on a number of languages see the website ofSite Surfing GuideExample for data interpretation: there are around 125 million Spanish-speaking users of the internetand this number represents close to 9 per cent of world internet use. Of all those who speak Spanish(some 452 million people), 27.6 per cent use the internet. During the period 2001-2007, the number ofSpanish speakers using the internet increased by 405 per cent.Source: Website of Internet World Stats in January <strong>2009</strong><strong>Arab</strong>ic has one of thelowest penetrationrates among the toptengroup of worldlanguages on the netINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES149


The growth ratein <strong>Arab</strong>ic-speakinginternet users (2064per cent in the period2000-2008) is thehighest among thetop ten languageson the net<strong>Arab</strong>ic digitalcontent is restrictedto limited areas,most of which aredisconnected fromthe reality and needsof <strong>Arab</strong> societiesand 2008, and the number of internetusers who speak the language and theirproportion of total internet users. The factthat the growth rate in <strong>Arab</strong>ic-speakinginternet users (2064 per cent in the period2000-2008) is the highest among the topten languages on the net is one of thepositive trends displayed in the table. Incomparison with the other languages, thegrowth rate for <strong>Arab</strong>ic speakers is manytimes more than that for Chinese (755 percent) over the same period (see Figure 4-7).This acceleration in internet use promisesgreater possibilities for success inpromoting applications of technology invarious fields. This should contribute to arevival in <strong>Arab</strong>ic knowledge performancein general.Despite <strong>Arab</strong>ic’s accelerating growthon the internet over the last few years,its presence on the net remains belowexpected level in terms of the number of itsspeakers. The efforts expended in creating<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content are also restrictedto limited areas, most of which aredisconnected from the reality and needs of<strong>Arab</strong> societies and fail to enrich knowledgerelated to social or economic development.Certainly, the domination of somesubjects and meagre treatment of othersdirectly related to pressing developmentalissues and current cultural affairs is out ofkeeping with the challenges of a highlycompetitive world; in such a world,marginalisation is the fate of cultures thatfail to reproduce themselves adequatelythrough the creation of knowledge anddevise new forms for its utilisation. If<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content is to be upgraded,national and regional policies aimed atenabling creative intercommunication andinteraction with the world and contributingto it in a critical spirit that affirms the <strong>Arab</strong>region’s capacity to assimilate, indigenise,and cultivate and, indeed, create knowledgeare called for.While the proportion of <strong>Arab</strong>icspeakingusers of the internet is not muchless than the average of its global use,available data do not permit distinctionsbetween kinds of internet use. Detailedstudies must be undertaken to revealthe ways in which <strong>Arab</strong>ic speakers usethe internet in comparison with others.In preparation for the launching ofinitiatives aimed at developing <strong>Arab</strong>icdigital content, studies of the content ofsites visited would also be useful to reachan understanding of the kinds of digitalcontent that have the biggest circulationamong <strong>Arab</strong>ic-speaking user sectors. Somerecent statistics 8 reveal a total number of<strong>Arab</strong>ic-only web pages of approximatelyforty million out of forty billion pages,or one thousandth of the total. Thisproportion clearly shows the low volumeFIGURE 4-7Growth of languages on the internet 2000-20082500Percentage Growth2000150010005000EnglishChineseSpanishJapaneseFrenchGerman<strong>Arab</strong>icPortugeseKoreanItalianTop ten languagesOther languagesSource: Internet World Stats website in January <strong>2009</strong>.150 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of <strong>Arab</strong>ic content and its low rate ofcreation relative to other countries andlanguages.On the other hand, the statisticsindicate that the picture has begun tochange, albeit extremely slowly. Although<strong>Arab</strong>ic content on the net remains stable,the number of <strong>Arab</strong>ic sites and pages hasgrown markedly larger. The number ofweb pages containing content in <strong>Arab</strong>ic–including those written in both <strong>Arab</strong>icand English–has risen from 114 millionpages in 2005 to 189 million pages in2006, an increase of 65.8 per cent. Thecorresponding increase in the numberof English language pages is 63 per cent.The number of <strong>Arab</strong>ic language pages isexpected to reach 5.1 billion in 2012, onthe basis of a rise to 80 per cent growth inthe years to 2010 and 60 per cent growthsubsequently.It is no exaggeration to say that thefuture of <strong>Arab</strong>ic depends on the extentof its use on global information networks.This will require great effort on thetechnical level to obtain all the necessarycapabilities to deal with the language itself.Ambitious targets on the national levelare also called for so that institutionsin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries–governmentministries, universities, schools, civilsociety organisations–use <strong>Arab</strong>ic intheir operations. In this way, <strong>Arab</strong>ic willbecome a language for the circulation andproduction of the various branches ofknowledge, as it was during the flowering of<strong>Arab</strong>-Islamic civilisation. (‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin‘Uthman al-Tuwayjiri, 2008, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Internet use and the spread of <strong>Arab</strong>ic onthe net present interrelated opportunitiesand challenges that call for unconventionalapproaches to broaden its user base andraise its status (see Chapter 1). Favourablepolicies and initiatives must be adopted;regional and international partnershipsmust be entered into. Digital contentrelated to the <strong>Arab</strong> countries should alsobe produced and distributed in foreignlanguages. 9 As the following paragraphs inthe section on <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content makeclear, creating advanced search engines,automatic translation systems, smartprocessing of scripts, semantic searching,and the deployment of interactive websitesto facilitate learning are among the toolsneeded to ensure the spread of a languageon the net.ANTICIPATED ADVANCESIN ICTOver the last few years key technologieshave converged so as to secure on asingle platform kinds of services–such asinternet access, video and audio telephony,and radio and television broadcasting–thatwere previously only available separately.In the last two decades great progress hasbeen made in providing plentiful and upto date information on the internet and viathe search engines operating on it. Itis now possible, by networking computersin educational institutions and researchinstitutes across the globe, to runsoftware that requires the supercomputingcapabilities used in models and simulationsof physical and natural processes.Microprocessor evolution is expectedto continue in the short term on the basisof many current technologies that areall subject to incremental improvementsaimed at limited performance upgrade.This development will help to increase thepower of personal computers and lessentheir cost. 10 This implies the continueddominance of the personal computer inaccessing knowledge resources. Use ofmulti-core processors will allow highperformance computing without a markedincrease in energy consumption. Currentprocessor design tends towardssimplification of the internal structurethrough use of multiple cores and parallelprogramming. Utilisation of the gains madeby microprocessor development requiresnew solutions for memory access, crosscorecommunication, and greater reliability.The term “next generation networks”describes all the anticipated keytechnologies in the backbone and accessnetworks expected to come into generaluse during the next five years. These willThe number of webpages containingcontent in <strong>Arab</strong>ichas risen from 114million pages in 2005to 189 million pagesin 2006, an increaseof 65.8 per centIt is no exaggerationto say that the futureof <strong>Arab</strong>ic dependson the extent ofits use on globalinformation networksINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES151


During the comingdecade thetechnology of thesemantic web, whichaims to make the webmachine readable andenable computersto “understand andabsorb” data priorto processing it, isexpected to becomemore elaboratedThe acquisitionof the semanticweb technologyshould be a priorityfor <strong>Arab</strong> researchand developmentprogrammes thataim toward a moreintelligent andcoordinated utilisationof forthcoming ICTswith regard to <strong>Arab</strong>icdigital contentpermit the transmission of various kinds ofdata packet, as is the case currently for theinternet. Since these networks are built ontop of internet protocols, this will facilitatecommunication between different kinds ofnetwork and allow users to get access todifferent kinds of content via any means–computer, mobile telephone, and similardevices–and at any time, irrespective ofthe quantity of data over the range of thedifferent varieties of digital content.Next generation networks will permitthe securing of new services such ascommunication via multimedia, includinginstant messaging, video-calls, and videotransfer on the net. Next generationnetworks also possess features superiorto those of their predecessors in termsof information security and the use ofmore flexible and extensive data storageand computing structures on the network.Other features of the next generationnetworks are ease in securing servicesthat conform to user requirements andbehaviours and ease in searching andaccessing knowledge content.In many concerned institutions,research and development activity istending towards the production of moreeffective versions of search engines, whichcurrently often return unwanted resultsto the user. This will enhance internetperformance in general for all its users andwill enable, in particular, the expected searchengines to gain a better “understanding”of the content of web pages and sites.Searching the web will focus on content,structure, and user ends. To a great extentthis will be achieved by relying on markingup pages with semantic tags related to thecontent. During the coming decade thetechnology of the semantic web, 11 whichaims to make the web machine readableand enable computers to “understandand absorb” data prior to processing it,is expected to become more elaborated.This should make the acquisition of suchtechnology a priority for <strong>Arab</strong> researchand development programmes that aimtoward a more intelligent and coordinatedutilisation of forthcoming ICTs withregard to <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content (Nawwaral-‘Awwa, background paper for the<strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). 12On the software level, the trend forcollaborative software developmentoutside the monopoly imposed by majorcompanies is expected to continue.Freeware, or open source software, isanticipated to present a serious challengeto proprietary commercial products interms of cost, speed of evolution, andreliability.Expected advancement in networks,infrastructures, and software over thenext few years will lead to the availabilityof a wider group of ICT applications,such as e-commerce, on the internet andto improved conditions for cooperationin various arenas including engineeringdesign, distributed industrial manufacturingprocesses, and networked research anddevelopment activity. The most prominentexample of the benefits that will accrueto users of next generation networks willbe apparent in easier and more effectiveaccess to distance learning and continuingeducation services, with the possibilityof tailoring educational programmesto suit the learner’s requirements andprevious qualifications. These serviceswill come to rely to a greater extent onvirtual reality applications and artificialintelligence software. Ideal utilisation ofthe coming technologies, particularly nextgeneration network technologies, requiresdevelopment of the communicationsinfrastructure towards a unified formatfor the transmission of data in its variousforms together. 13 Once this is done, itwill be possible to offer such services atlower cost and in broader scope, which willgenerate the revenues and opportunitiesto develop these services and offer moreof them, and in the long run achievenumerous economic and social gains.However, this is subject to the provision offavourable policies that permit competitionin introducing the new technologiesand that channel this competition in theinterests of the consumer. Regional andinternational cooperation aimed at the152 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


exchange of future technology servicesor at partnership in providing them willhelp to add value due to the migration tonext generation networks and services.These, in turn, will realise comprehensiveeconomic and social benefits that willextend in a cycle affecting all functions andsectors of society. In order to reach thisgoal, it is necessary to support researchactivity aimed at developing applicationsdedicated to spreading <strong>Arab</strong>ic languageuse on the network. Coordination between<strong>Arab</strong> countries and benefiting from thelessons of countries and institutions thathave made earlier progress in utilising anddeveloping modern technologies is calledfor.Advancement in the developmentand deployment of technologies thatensure improved confidentiality of datatransmission is expected to continue.However, such an advance will not beenough to limit the practices of certaincountries and institutions in exploitingtheir technological superiority to eavesdropand breach data confidentiality andprivacy.The future of ICT presents valuableopportunities to deploy innovative meansto acquire, produce, and distributeknowledge which will enrich <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge accumulation. It is expectedthat the cost of internet access inperipheral regions will continue to fall.The convergence of ICT and the mediawill also accelerate with the deploymentof broadband network infrastructure.This will expand the opportunities andoptions available to citizens to obtainmedia, education, and health services andto communicate with their governmentsand with local and external markets.In addition, the business sector willbe energised, and marginalised ruraland urban groups will be developed.Nevertheless, this increase in opportunityis dependent on to the application of clearpolicies that make the massive investmentrequired by communications technologycompatible with guarantees of the socialright of all citizen groups to benefit, aswell as support for the participation ofwomen and guarantees of freedom ofexpression.TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONSAND ARABIC DIGITALCONTENTREGULATORY FRAMEWORKSSince the end of the last decade,most <strong>Arab</strong> countries have begun toinstitutionalise ICT through policyformulation, infrastructure, institutionbuilding, and the enactment of lawsand regulations related to the utilisationof these technologies. Egypt, Tunisia,Jordan, and the UAE are consideredthe pioneers in these endeavours. Egyptcreated a ministry for communication andinformation technology in 1999. It laidthe foundations for a national plan aimedat setting the bases for the informationsociety in Egypt through coordinationbetween the pertinent governmentagencies and in partnership with privatesector institutions. Tunisia made markedefforts in the second half of the lastdecade aimed at developing and expandingthe communications infrastructure andhuman capacity, and at creating databasesto improve, in particular, the performanceof government institutions. An initiativeembracing ICT was launched in Jordanin 2000 to boost ICT exports and attractdirect foreign investment. The UAEstands out among its <strong>Arab</strong> peers in theimplementation of numerous activities thathave come to fruition in an impressivelyshort time. It therefore occupies advancedpositions in world rankings, and the topspot among <strong>Arab</strong> countries according tomany ICT indicators.The <strong>Arab</strong> countries have finalisedpolicies, strategies, and action plansconcerning ICT and its utilisation inaccordance with the decisions of theSummits on the Information Societyof 2003 and 2005 and the working planderiving from them. Initiatives have beentaken that seek to make the informationSince the end ofthe last decade,most <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave begun toinstitutionalise ICTthrough policyformulation,infrastructure,institution building,and the enactmentof laws andregulations relatedto the utilisation ofthese technologiesThe UAE has cometo occupy advancedpositions in worldrankings and the topspot among <strong>Arab</strong>countries accordingto many ICT indicatorsINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES153


Strategic decisionstaken in many <strong>Arab</strong>countries havegiven the greatestshare of attentionto infrastructureissues and legislationand have not givenequivalent attentionto issues relatedto applications,digital content, anddevelopment of theuse of the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage on the netSecuring lowcost computers isconsidered one of theessential conditionsfor the broadestpossible disseminationof technologyand access toinformation andknowledge sourcessociety a reality and lay the ground for thedevelopment of national capacity to utiliseICT in numerous fields. Organisations havebeen founded charged with formulatingnational strategies and programmes for theutilisation of ICT applications, particularlyin the areas of government services,business, and education.Apart from a few isolated bright spots,however, strategic planning for the ICTsector by <strong>Arab</strong> countries and creation ofthe legal framework needed to regulate itsutilisation has taken place relatively slowly,as this chapter makes plain. A second lookat these strategies and laws is obviouslycalled for. This is not only due to the speedof development of these technologies,but because these strategies and lawshave ignored, or not used the necessarycare when dealing with, a number of keyissues without which it is not possible tomake ideal use of technology applications.Strategic decisions taken in many <strong>Arab</strong>countries have given the greatest shareof attention to infrastructure issues andlegislation and have not given equivalentattention to issues related to applications,digital content, and development of theuse of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language on the net.THE ICT SECTOR INTHE ARAB COUNTRIESThe technology sector in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries has witnessed considerablegrowth, the telecommunications branchproviding the lion’s share. The liberalisationof the telecoms sector has resulted in theemergence of large companies, some ofwhich have become active in the regional<strong>Arab</strong> and international arenas. However,the contribution of these companiesin most <strong>Arab</strong> countries to knowledgeproduction remains weak, even in termsof the content related to their operations.There is some evidence indicating a trendfor some companies in this sector to offergrants directed at economic and socialdevelopment. Once the foundations,institutions, and supporting legislationare in place, this sector will help toproduce digital content, especially thatrelated to their own marketing, as is doneby similar companies elsewhere. It isnoticeable that most <strong>Arab</strong> countries havecreated institutions to incubate, direct,and disseminate ICT. What they offer,however, is in its early stages. The existenceof sponsoring institutions is reckoned anecessity if the successful utilisation andexpansion of usage levels of technologyis to be guaranteed, provided this isaccompanied by legislation and practicesthat grant extensive freedom of use ofthese technologies.HARDWARE PRODUCTIONOR ASSEMBLYActivities connected with ICT are limitedto the production or assembly of hardwarefor personal computers and other ICTrelated devices on the one hand, andsoftware production on the other. Some<strong>Arab</strong> countries–Egypt and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia inparticular–have witnessed tangible privatesector investment in setting up assemblylines, generally for low-specificationcomputers. Securing low cost computers isconsidered one of the essential conditionsfor the broadest possible dissemination oftechnology and access to information andknowledge sources. To achieve this there isno alternative to the reliance on new formsof cooperative initiative. The “Computerfor $100” initiative recently launchedby the UNDP in cooperation with theMassachusetts Institute of Technologysecures a starting point to enable limitedincome sections of society to purchasecomputers. Nevertheless, securing $100 tobuy a computer still remains an impossiblegoal for tens of millions of students andother <strong>Arab</strong> citizens who could–andought to–benefit from such projects.Hence, to make such initiatives succeed,particularly in the high-population, lowincome<strong>Arab</strong> countries, partnershipsbetween government, the private sector,and civil society organisations are essential.The Saudi project “A Computer in EveryHome” provides, in principle, an example154 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of national partnerships aimed at similarends. 14 However, it will also be necessaryto reduce the cost of securing thecomputers produced within this projectto a much greater extent so that theybecome available to those with middle andlow incomes.THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRYSince the end of the last century, thesoftware industry has grown within theenvironment and economics of theinternet. Control of the software marketby multinational companies has made itdifficult for local market requirements toprovide a base for the introduction of asoftware industry. In many cases, this hasbeen made possible by exploitation ofqualified human resources in developingcountries like India. In developing countriesin general, the role of government islimited to facilitating the operation ofmultinational companies through thecreation of legal frameworks favourableto the protection of their software frompiracy and securing a climate that allows itswidest possible distribution.The software industry is still embryonicin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in comparison withother countries or with what it ought tobe. One news report 15 even describesthe state of the software industry in the<strong>Arab</strong> countries as pitiable, pointing to thecontinued absence of the <strong>Arab</strong>s from theworld software map despite the availabilityof material and human capabilities andthe tangible returns that this industry–which has revived the economies ofmany countries–could achieve. Thereare promising opportunities to makereturns on the local and regional marketsby meeting, in the first place, <strong>Arab</strong>icsoftware requirements. The world marketsare also brimming with opportunities.Computers are not the sole focus of thesoftware industry. Indeed, they accountfor a declining share of its attention due tothe increasing proliferation of computercomponents in a broad spectrumof products and applications acrosstelecommunications, defence, security,transportation, and media, in additionto growing product lines of office anddomestic devices intended for general usein sectors like tourism, banking, and theengineering industries.Lack of awareness of its importanceand of the returns it could generate is a keyimpediment to an <strong>Arab</strong> software industry.Hence investments directed at the nationalsoftware industry are limited, while readymade,and even arabized, software isimported from abroad. However a numberof <strong>Arab</strong> countries including Egypt andJordan have over the last few years begun totake steps to activate software manufactureand guarantee accessories supply. Included,for example, within Egypt’s ICT strategyare items designed to support exportorientedsoftware manufacture. Egypt hasalso created a body devoted to developingthe ICT industry. The number of dedicatedsoftware houses in Egypt is estimated inthe hundreds. Sources indicate that thesecompanies have, since the beginningof the decade, exported software worthhundreds of millions of dollars annually.The volume of their sales was expected toreach $500 million in 2005. Statistics goingback to 2005 report that up to 25,000software engineers work in the sector.Egyptian universities are also estimated toproduce approximately 20,000 graduatesspecialised in the software field every year.However statistics from the beginning ofthe current decade indicate that returnsper programmer from software industrieselsewhere in the world are several timesgreater than those achieved by Egyptianprogrammers. Per programmer returns inEgypt reach $10,000 per year, which is lessthan that generated by a programmer inIndia ($15,000), and many times less thanthat generated by programmers in Ireland($38,000) or Israel ($140,000). 16In Jordan, local universities andinternational companies have entered intopartnership to cooperate in softwareproduction. In 2006, one of the pioneeringprogrammes in this field 17 developed plansthat aim to attract direct foreign investmentControl of thesoftware marketby multinationalcompanies has madeit difficult for localmarket requirementsto provide a base forthe introduction ofa software industryThe software industryis still embryonic inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countriesin comparison withother countriesor with what itought to beINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES155


In general, the <strong>Arab</strong>countries are clearlyunderdevelopedin their use oftechnologyapplications toprovide education,health, andgovernment servicesand in their utilisationin media and businessLow-population<strong>Arab</strong> countrieswith high capacityresources could–withappropriate policiesand practices–enjoyrates of technologyapplication utilisationequivalent toor exceedingthose currentlyenjoyed by someadvanced nationsvalued at $170 million in the field of softwaredevelopment, create thousands of jobopportunities in that sector, and generatelocal returns valued at $500 million.One solution put forward to stimulatethe <strong>Arab</strong> software industry is the designof regional projects to generate demandfor industry products that aim to spreadessential applications in fields such asgovernment services, education, business,and healthcare. An incubator systemprimarily concerned with creating andsupporting small businesses active in thevarious areas of the software industry isa possibility. It is worth pointing out herethat expenditure on such projects does nothave to equal expenditure on readymadesoftware imports, if the projects areflexibly run and expertly managed.ICT APPLICATIONSAND BUILDING THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYICT applications fulfil a tremendouslyimportant role in the production andreconstruction of knowledge in <strong>Arab</strong>countries. Although some advance has beenmade in the utilisation of this technology,the <strong>Arab</strong> scene is not at all encouraging.The <strong>Arab</strong> countries in general, with theexception of GCC members, are clearlyunderdeveloped in their use of technologyapplications to provide education, health,and government services and in theirutilisation in media and business. Indeed,advanced applications, in the field ofhealthcare in particular, are almost totallyabsent in all <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Accelerating advances in applicationsof ICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries are expectedto cause gradual transformations within agrowing number of sectors, the businesssector chief among them. In the majorityof cases this is likely to come about inresponse to external trends and pressuresrather than as a result of internal initiatives.Business administration and marketing viae-commerce systems on the internet areproliferating and becoming more secure inmany of the world’s countries. The trendtowards electronic transaction systems willextend to other sectors including educationand distance working.Utilisation of ICT applications willcertainly require the creation andconsolidation of new rules to regulatethem, control their quality, and guaranteethe general deployment of their benefits.Despite this technology offering solutionsthat will strengthen demand for itsapplications, technological solutions arenot enough on their own. They do notguarantee the rights and duties of users whocome with disparate tastes and aims and donot necessarily guarantee the enrichment ofknowledge. Closely linking technologicalsolutions to updated regulations isimperative in order to produce knowledgecontent in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, particularly in the areaof knowledge dissemination via educationand training and by the generation of newjob opportunities in fields connected withknowledge production and utilisation. Thespread of new standards that ensure theupgrading of the knowledge archive interms of its quality and range is also vital.Low-population <strong>Arab</strong> countries withhigh capacity resources could–were theyto put in place appropriate policies andpractices–enjoy rates of technologyapplication utilisation equivalent to orexceeding those currently enjoyed bysome advanced nations. This would helpimprove ICT utilisation in the other <strong>Arab</strong>countries.E-GOVERNMENT SERVICESOver the last decade, the computerisationof the functions of government has beenlimited to spreadsheets and use of thecomputer as a high-spec typewriter fordocument retrieval and manipulating andstoring statistical data. E-governmentservices made their appearance in theworld with the beginning of the spreadof the internet. 18 These services generallyaim at two goals: facilitating the needsof citizens and improving the efficiencyof government processes via dedicatedwebsites on the internet. Sites are classified156 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TABLE 4-2Readiness of <strong>Arab</strong> countries to adopt e-government applicationsCountryIndex2005Index2008Ranking2005Ranking2008Change in ranking2005, 2008UAE 0.572 0.630 42 32 10Bahrain 0.528 0.572 53 42 11Jordan 0.464 0.548 68 50 18Qatar 0.490 0.531 62 53 9Kuwait 0.443 0.520 75 57 18Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 0.411 0.494 80 70 10Lebanon 0.456 0.484 71 74 -3Egypt 0.379 0.477 99 79 20Oman 0.341 0.469 112 84 28Syria 0.287 0.361 132 119 13Libya .. 0.355 .. 120 ..Algeria 0.324 0.352 123 121 2Tunisia 0.331 0.346 121 124 -3Morocco 0.277 0.294 138 140 -2Iraq 0.333 0.269 118 151 -33Djibouti 0.238 0.228 149 157 -8Sudan 0.237 0.219 150 161 -11Yemen 0.213 0.214 154 164 -10Mauritania 0.172 0.203 164 168 -4Comoros 0.197 0.190 155 170 -15World 0.427 0.451 .. .. ..Source: United Nations, 2008Review of sites thathave been updated tooffer e-governmentservices in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries overthe last few yearsreveals that most ofthem remain at theinformational stageTABLE 4-3Readiness to adopt e-goverment applications in some comparable countriesCountryIndex2005Index2008Ranking2005Ranking2008Change in ranking2005, 2008Cyprus 0.587 0.602 37 35 2Turkey 0.496 0.483 60 76 -16Azerbaijan 0.377 0.461 101 89 12Source: United Nations, 2008into groups according to the nature of theservices provided, such as informational,one-way interactive or two-way interactive.The last of these extends to include sitesthat handle financial transactions and sitesthat allow networking with other sites. Areview of sites that have been updated tooffer e-government services in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries over the last few years reveals thatmost of them remain at the informationalstage.Table 4-2 presents the values of theindicator that measures the state ofreadiness of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries to adoptINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES157


FIGURE 4-8Availability of e-government services (2006 values)Availability of e-government services(1-7)5.554.543.532.521.51AlgeriaBahrainEgyptJordanKuwaitMauritaniaMoroccoQatarTunisiaU A ELow income countriesLower middle income countriesWorldSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM). http://info.worldbank.org/etolls/kam2/KAM_page5.asp. on 12 December 2008The advanced nationshave accumulated awealth of knowledgeconnected toe-governmentinitiatives becausemajor consulting firmsin these countriesare planning andimplementinge-governmentinitiatives that revolvearound the prioritiesand requirementsof the citizene-government applications in the years2005 and 2008. 19 The table makes clearthat five GCC countries (the UAE, Bahrain,Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia) lead intheir readiness to adopt e-governmentapplications. Jordan and Lebanon alsooccupy advanced positions in this regard.Figure 4-8 gives indicator values for agroup of <strong>Arab</strong> countries pertaining toavailability of e-government servicesas used by the World Bank within the<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology(KAM) framework. 20 It also gives theaverage performance for some selectedgroups of countries. On the basis of thefigure, the <strong>Arab</strong> countries can be dividedinto three classes. In the first are those thatenjoy a high level of e-government services(the UAE and Qatar). These are followedby a second group (Mauritania, Egypt, andBahrain) that have been able to secure amedium level of these services. The thirdgroup (Kuwait and Algeria) provide lowerlevels of e-government services than thesetwo groups.Figure 4-8 reveals that the average valuefor the second group of <strong>Arab</strong> countriesapproaches the global average value on theindicator of availability of e-governmentservices. It also makes clear that for the<strong>Arab</strong> countries for which data is availablethe level of e-government services exceedsthat of the countries with average scoreson the HDI and also exceeds the level ofother groups of countries of the world. 21The advanced nations have accumulateda wealth of knowledge connected toe-government initiatives because majorconsulting firms in these countries areplanning and implementing e-governmentinitiatives and are supported by otherinstitutions devoted to research and softwaredevelopment. These initiatives revolvearound the priorities and requirements ofthe citizen. It is essential to build a similarknowledge framework to put governmentservices in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the samelevel as those of other countries of theworld. This will require the acquisition ofknowledge on a number of levels as well158 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


as the implementation of programmes tomonitor the development of e-governmentservices and the modernisation of theframeworks for government operationsthemselves according to the needs ofadministrative reform.Despite the importance of the ICTinfrastructure, cognitive and behaviouralfactors such as user skills, political will, andthe commitment of leaders in the relevantadministrations have more influence one-government initiatives than technologicalfactors. E-government is a means toreengineer the operation of government,and its initiatives are usually designed withthe purpose of integrating and managinginformation in the best fashion. For thisreason, they are resisted by parties thatoppose administrative reform. Factors thatought to strengthen the proper applicationof e-government programmes include(‘Abd al-Ilah al-Diwahji, 2006, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic):• Responsiveness to citizens’ requirementsand readiness to utilise available servicesin the best possible way.• Adoption of stable strategies to solidifythe link between e-governmentprogrammes and initiatives to developthe working of government andadministrative reform.With regard to initiatives aiming to applymethods of e-government, the governmentshould play a facilitating rather thancontrolling role and sponsor partnershipbetween stakeholders–citizens, theprivate sector, and civil society–to spreade-government applications and improvethe offerings available. Improvementinitiatives usually come from users first.This requires the creation of channels toelicit public opinion via surveys, regularconsultations, and many other meanswhose deployment is facilitated by the newtechnology.ICT AND EDUCATIONICT provides many opportunities to raisethe quality of educational materials andprogrammes, as well as their means ofdelivery and development, in addition tobenefits in administering the educationalprocess. Technological inputs now availableinclude, in the first place, hardware andsoftware for word processing, spreadsheets,and the preparation of slideshows andvideo clips as explanatory aids. On a moreadvanced level, they include use of theinternet for direct communication betweenstudents and their teachers, and betweenschools and official bodies concerned withoverseeing educational activities. 22 On ayet more advanced level, it is possible touse smart programmes to produce studymaterials and to make use of virtual realitytechnology to raise the skills of students ata pace suitable to their capacity to absorband in conformity with other educationalprogrammes they are following.Forthcoming telecommunications deviceswill permit access to “asynchronous”educational content via mobile telephonesor personal digital organisers. Here studentswill be able to reach educational materialsat any time and in any place. Students willalso be able to follow in real time lecturesgiven in universities thousands of milesaway. Native language discussion withthe lecturer will become possible thanksto expected advances in the field ofautomated simultaneous translation.Even though there are no absoluteindicators of the success of ICT in theeducation sector, the results of a numberof studies 23 indicate that its use in curriculahas been of benefit in developing studentproblem-solving skills. Teachers’ use of thetools of information has also had positiveeffects on the outputs of the educationalprocess. The Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD)countries have developed comprehensivepolicies for use of these technologiesin the education sector in the context ofthe transformation towards knowledgesocieties and the knowledge economy.These policies deal with the introductionof technology into the educationsector along main axes that include theeradication of information illiteracy 24 viacontinuing education for all members ofthe workforce on various levels, provisionE-government is ameans to reengineerthe operation ofgovernment, andits initiatives areusually designedwith the purposeof integratingand managinginformation in thebest fashion. Forthis reason, theyare resisted byparties that opposeadministrative reformINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES159


Some <strong>Arab</strong> stateshave taken initiativesto use ICT in thevarious stages ofeducation. Theseefforts, in spite oftheir importance,remain less thanwhat is requiredand possibleBOX 4-1Most open source software is availablefor use by anyone who can accessthe internet and has an acquaintancewith the software field. Open sourcesoftware comprises a range of productswhich are devised, developed, andpublicly deployed free of charge, oncondition that anyone who is able tomake improvements to the source codemakes them freely available. Among thesoftware systems belonging to the opensource array are content authoring anddeployment tools that have significant,direct applications in the various stagesof education. These include the OpenOffice package which contains mostof the applications found in MicrosoftOffice, 26 in addition to contentof ICT infrastructure, securing internetaccess by using broadband networksto make use of the net in classroomsand libraries, providing multimediasystems, and lowering the ratio of pupilsto computers in schools. Programmesdesigned to implement these policies try toprovide opportunities for internet accessto educational institutes in marginalisedurban and rural regions and communitiesand take effective advantage of sourcesavailable on educational websites inregions that enjoy better resources. As forless advanced countries, implementationpolicies are focused on improving pupilto-computerratios and securing contentby linking libraries at acceptable speedover the internet.Developing digital content related toeducational and training programmes isconsidered a high priority for the coming stagefor countries that have made some progressin laying infrastructure. These countriesshould encourage partnerships withpublishers, television channels, museums,and national libraries to develop digitaleducational content. Among modernmethods used in developing content are“learning objects” based on modules andeducational content units that contain aspecific portion of content in the formof texts, pictures, audio recordings, orOpen Source Software and Educational Contentauthoring and deployment tools andblogging software which can be veryeasily utilised in educational activitiesthat require interaction betweenstudents and teacher, and systems todesign study curricula that are of usein building educational content. Opensource systems also include <strong>Arab</strong>icspellcheckers and whiteboards that areof use in giving ideas visual form withintexts. There are also programmes toarabize software and translateoperating manuals and others to designacademic tests that help the teacher tocome up with questions and exams andpermit the design of mental exerciseswith educational applications.video clips; the time required to presenta unit does not go beyond a few minutes.Modules can be linked together to form anintegrated part of the desired curriculum. 25In all of this, reliance on the open sourcemethod leads to tangible developmentin interactive educational materials (seeBox 4-1).Despite the advances achieved throughexpenditure in many of the world’scountries, current levels in the area ofinformation tools in the education sector arenot sufficient to achieve the ends promisedby available technology. Technology is stillused simply to digitise school textbooks,while computerised curricula comprisingdynamic and interactive methods do notfind the support they deserve.As is the case in other areas, technologyis not sufficient to develop the educationalprocess. It must be combined with otherbehavioural, structural, and organisationalfactors to achieve ideal results. Relying onlyon digital indices to measure performanceis also not of value in isolation from aconcern for qualitative effects, despite thedifficulty of coming to grips with these.Some <strong>Arab</strong> states have taken initiativesto use ICT in the various stages ofeducation. However these efforts, in spiteof their importance, remain less than whatis required and possible. Computer-perpupilratios in pre-university educationare still low, and schools generally lackthe ability to access the internet. Bycomparing school access to the internetin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries with that of all thecountries of the world for which dataare available, we find that some <strong>Arab</strong>countries (UAE, Qatar, and Tunisia)placed (at 5, 4.8, and 4.9 respectively)higher than the global score of 3.74, 27while some other countries, such as Egyptand Jordan placed close to the latter (at 3.1and 3.9 respectively), and yet others, suchas Mauritania (at 1.9) , placed in the lowerranks and far below the global averagein this field. However, the internationalcommunity has not made great strideseither to date in securing internet accessfor their schools. The corresponding score160 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


BOX 4-2Evaluating the Performance of Projects to Network Educational InstitutionsThe world’s universities were active throughout the1980s and 1990s in the creation of networks linkingtheir campuses and faculties and in linking theirresearch laboratories with counterparts worldwide.A number of <strong>Arab</strong> countries over the last decadehave created computer networks to link theiruniversities. The dominant pattern in the work ofthese networks is directed at displaying summaryinformation around educational activities andscientific research. Content on many websites ofthese networks and the universities they comprisehas also not been kept up to date.On the other hand, some <strong>Arab</strong> countries 29 arepartners in implementing regional projects andinitiatives aimed at creating a network infrastructurethat links their scientific and research institutionsglobally. Among these is the Consortium of <strong>Arab</strong>Mediterranean Research and Education Networks(CAMREN), which aims to set up the infrastructurefor e-services and applications to assist researchersin the region (Nawwar al-‘Awwa, background paperfor this <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). It is planned that thisproject will allow the utilisation of computingresources available in the partner institutions vianetworked computing applications. Such projectssecure the high computing power necessary toutilise specialist software such as simulation andvirtual reality applications. They help to createnew learning environments based on multimediaapplications, online lectures, and other means toenrich <strong>Arab</strong>ic content on the net and escape thetraditional approaches prevailing in many <strong>Arab</strong>educational institutions.One of the potential benefits of the availabilityof internet services is to make it possible forschools to communicate with each other and withthe government bodies concerned with supportingthem and monitoring their performance. A veryimportant initiative on this level is the endeavourby the Supreme Education Council in Qatar tomonitor the performance of schools that offer basiceducational services on the internet and to publishregular reports that review their progress in a rangeof respects. 30The link betweenICT use and highereducation in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries is weakfor upper-income countries is 5.26. 28 Interms of the immediate future, the currentplans of the <strong>Arab</strong> states for the provisionof computers to schools and through theseof internet access cannot be described asoverly ambitious.The link between ICT use and highereducation in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries is weak.This makes it imperative to providecomputers at low cost, and to orienteducational curricula design in a directionthat stimulates computer and internetuse within the educational process, as isthe case in many countries. The numberof virtual universities in the <strong>Arab</strong> Worldremains low. 31 The first virtual universitywas founded in Syria in the last decade.A virtual university has also been setup in Tunisia. 32 Cairo University incooperation with UNESCO has foundedvirtual faculties. Ain Shams University isalso cooperating with the MediterraneanVirtual University to offer a collectionof study materials via the internet. Thee-academy in Jordan can be considered amodel for virtual universities created in the<strong>Arab</strong> countries. The <strong>Arab</strong> Open Universityadopts some forms of e-learning since ituses multimedia computer resources.ICT also offers valuable opportunitiesfor communication between educationalinstitutions of various levels and withthe bodies concerned with evaluatingtheir performance (see Box 4-2). Suchcommunication has the greatest influencein knowledge dissemination and inperformance evaluation on the national,regional, and international levels.The lessons derived from a review ofglobal trends in exploiting ICT in educationcan be summarised as follows:1. Introduction of wholesale changes toeducational curricula to make it possibleto offer them on the internet.2. Eradication of computer illiteracy forworkers in all aspects of education andeducational administration.3. Provision of schools with appropriatecomputer hardware and internet access,and reliance on open source software atall educational levels.4. Development and deployment of theconcepts, tools, and software of selflearning.5. Strengthening the partnership betweenschool, home, and community byutilising available technology.The number ofvirtual universitiesin the <strong>Arab</strong> Worldremains lowINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES161


In contradiction tothe call to restrict therole of the state inall matters impingingon economic activity,government bodiesin the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesmust play a directrole in facilitatingand organisinge-commerceactivities and findlegal solutions thatallow challengesto be confrontedE-COMMERCEWhile “e-commerce” is a relatively recentterm, use of computers, communicationsnetworks, and what is called electronic datainterchange goes back to the 1960s. Atthat time however, it was restricted to largeinstitutions, companies, and banks usingmainframe computers. Regardless of theproblems that still confront e-commerce,it is expected to continue to proliferateand generate expanded opportunitiesfor trade exchange and competition.These will be followed by attemptsto develop methods of production, expandchoices available to the consumer, andopen up access by small and mediumbusinesses to wider markets.Figure 4-9 sheds light on the growthof internet use by businesses–in mostof the world’s countries (the blue dots)and some <strong>Arab</strong> countries (the largersquares)–when plotted against growth inper capita income. The graph also showsthe position for some groups of countries(the circles). The correlation coefficient,which measures the strength of therelationship between pairs of variablesin such cases, reveals that for most of theworld’s countries there is a marked positivecorrelation between the indicator scoreand per capita income. However, the graphalso shows that the distribution of scoreson the indicator of the extent of businessinternet use for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries doesnot strongly correlate with per capitaincome. 33In contradiction to the call to restrict therole of the state in all matters impinging oneconomic activity, government bodies inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries must play a direct rolein facilitating and organising e-commerceactivities and find legal solutions thatallow challenges to be confronted andthe opportunities they present to beexploited. In this context, the formulationFIGURE 4-9Change in business internet use plotted against per capita incomein some <strong>Arab</strong> countries and worldwide6.5World<strong>Arab</strong> countriesGroup of CountriesExtent of business internet use, indicator value (1-7)6R 2 = 0.67755.554.54Tunisia WorldUAER 2 = 0.1113Egypt JordanMENA3.5 MauritaniaKuwaitQatarBahrain3Morocco2.5Algeria20 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000Per Capita GDP in US $ (PPP)Source: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp162 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of common principles that guarantee thecompliance of e-commerce systems withnational development policies is incumbentupon all <strong>Arab</strong> states. At the same time theyshould adhere to international standardsolutions laid down for the application oftaxation systems and the protection of therights and privacy of citizens.TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONSFOR HEALTHCAREThe reliance on ICT applications byhealth sector agencies is growing. A hostof positive effects have arisen from thisincluding the improved performance andlower cost of equipment, the possibilityof transferring it from one environmentto another, and the speed of informationexchange and data storage. Theseapplications can be classified into groupsincluding:• Administrative and statisticalapplications that institutions suchas hospitals, clinics, and insurancecompanies make use of to keepmedical records. Such applicationshave proliferated in a number of <strong>Arab</strong>countries.• Raising awareness of health matters viamultimedia and the internet. The healthsector is considered among the firstsectors to exploit ICT to produce anddistribute a multitude of documentsvia web pages with the aim of raisingawareness of user groups.• Medical consultation at a distance usingvideo-conferencing in diagnosis andtreatment.• Use of robotics in surgery. A numberof experiments have been undertakento connect hospitals in developingcountries with those in other, advanced,nations, either to perform surgicaloperations or to guide surgical work.There are many examples andobservations that reveal growth in the useof ICT systems related to medical care inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the first three fieldsmentioned above. However the level ofuse differs from one country to anotherand varies within a single country betweenone treatment institution and anotherand between the capital and other cities.Electronic systems may be in broad usein the advanced hospitals in the GCCcountries, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt,but are much less widely used, or totallyabsent, in small hospitals and clinics,particularly in the countryside, where manymedical clinics still resort to traditionalpaper files despite the rapid transitiontowards electronic files in all other fields.The various fields of e-health includetangible knowledge content that mustbe produced and deployed in <strong>Arab</strong>ic,particularly in the domain of awareness.Some e-health applications providefertile ground for the activity of smalllocal businesses, on the one hand, andrelevant professional associations on theother. Partnership between these partiesis expected to lead to the implementationof many laudable initiatives andprogrammes, particularly in relationto endemic diseases and the health ofpregnant women and children. To takethe best possible advantage of suchprogrammes, the available infrastructuremust be upgraded and broadband servicesextended to various rural and peripheralregions, which in most cases suffer fromthe underdevelopment of their healthcaresystems. The ongoing decline in the pricesof computer and wireless network deviceswill make these goals achievable even in themedium and low income <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Systems conducive to the preservation ofpatients’ rights and the improvement ofprofessional practice related to e-healthservices should also be put in place. Inthis context the regional office of theWorld Health Organisation has set out thebasics needed for the launch of e-healthprogrammes. 34TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIALDEVELOPMENTMany local development projectsworldwide testify to the positive role ICTfulfils in setting frameworks, foundingThe various fieldsof e-health includetangible knowledgecontent that mustbe produced anddeployed in <strong>Arab</strong>ic,particularly in thedomain of awarenessSystems conducive tothe preservation ofpatients’ rights andthe improvement ofprofessional practicerelated to e-healthservices should beput in placeINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES163


The experiences ofboth developingand advancedcountries emphasisethe importance ofproviding flexiblesources of fundingto secure loans toset up small businessprojects that relyon ICT within thelocal communitybusinesses, and creating new employmentopportunities. The role of ICT in thisdomain acquires particular importancewithin marginalised local environmentsand communities and those facing crises(see Box 4-3). A prominent lesson to bederived from an analysis of success andfailure in this respect is the importance ofpartnership between parties active withinthe local community, among the mostconspicuous of which are associationsof farmers and agricultural laborers,women’s groups, officials in localgovernment departments and concernedparties in central government, civilsociety organisations, and private sectorinstitutions. Here emphasis has to be placedon the importance of a deep understandingof the specificities of the local communityand the points of strength and weaknessthat characterise each participating oraffected party. For the most part, projectswhere the local community helps toprovide a share of the resources necessaryfor operation–such as a piece of land oruse of a building dedicated to the projectgroups or its administration–are crownedwith success.The experiences of both developingand advanced countries emphasise theimportance of providing flexible sourcesof funding to secure loans to set up smallbusiness projects that rely on ICT withinthe local community. Such flexibility doesnot lead to laxity on the part of borrowers.Such experiences also indicate theimportance of the contribution of womenin the community as trainers and traineesin the ICT domain and of the participationof universities and scientific researchcentres in these projects to providetechnical assistance and help improve andupgrade the technical skills of trainers.One promising application of ICT is itsuse to develop the human resource baseon the national and local levels. Suchprojects remain rare in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries.Some, however, have launched initiativesthat merit study and follow-up. Amongthese is the project of the JordanianNational Centre for Human ResourcesDevelopment (Al-Manar) 35 which collectsThe experiencesof other countriesindicate theimportance of thecontribution ofwomen trainersand trainees in theICT domain and ofthe participationof universitiesand scientificresearch centresin these projectsBOX 4-3ICT and Local Development: Examples from <strong>Arab</strong> countriesThe Smart Communities Project: the SmartCommunities Project was launched by the UNEconomic and Social Commission for Western Asia(ESCWA) at the beginning of the decade and aimsto deploy integrated technological inputs to helpupgrade skills. Skills particularly targeted are thoseleading to opportunities for decent and rewardingjobs for women and young people and subsequentpoverty reduction within local social, economic,and environmental conditions. The project hasbeen implemented at sites in Syria, Yemen, andIraq. All the Smart Community Projects comprisetwo key facilities: a unit to manufacture and marketagricultural and food products using modernstandards of safety and quality and a multifunctiontechnology centre for the local community thatprovides the community with access via computersand the internet to a number of services. Theseinclude professional training, skill acquisition, andcommunity awareness. The achievements of theproject include:• Creation of units that offer training servicesand help to introduce new technology for themanufacture of agricultural and food products,water treatment, utilisation of solar energy, andutilisation of interactive software in vocationaltraining.• Spreading basic ICT skills.• Consolidating the bases for cooperation andnetworking that include municipal councils,community colleges, civil society institutions, andnon-governmental organisations so as to makeit possible to adapt new technological inputs toharmonize with the priorities of the targetedlocations.Syria’s Countryside Net website (reefnet.gov.sy): This project aims to provide information tocitizens in rural areas of benefit in their daily livesvia an internet portal that includes a website foreach of the villages participating in the project. Inthe course of one year websites were set up foreighteen villages participating in this portal, whichhas received more than 30,000 visitors.The Risalah website: an interactive websitedeveloped as an initiative by students at theFaculty of Engineering at Cairo University andthen transformed into the nucleus of a virtualcharitable association that offers social care to thepoor and sick. The activity of this association hasexpanded to encompass more than fifteen Egyptiangovernorates and a number of branches in Cairo.The website provides facilities for the collection anddistribution of donations.164 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


data from various sources and then adapts,standardises, systematises, stores, anddistributes it to interested parties. It alsosponsors the utilisation of its informationarchive to undertake studies and researchand its use in formulating human resourcestrategies. The project also providesopportunities for employers to advertisevacancies for free. The Ministry ofManpower in Oman is working to builda labor force database that collects dataand information with the aim of guidinghuman resource policies by drawing upplans, designing appropriate measures toimplement these policies, and evaluatingtheir effect on economic and socialdevelopment.ICT also presents wide-rangingopportunities of deep impact throughdistance working. Despite the absenceof reliable data, it is expected that theflourishing of business in the GCCcountries will help distance workingopportunities proliferate. This isparticularly clear in the areas of authoring,media, research, translation, web design,and technical consultancy. There iscurrently a golden opportunity to nurturecompanies that promote this kind of work.The proliferation of distance working isanticipated to realise valuable opportunitiesfor women in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, wherethe social environment continues to restricttheir participation in national labormarkets–despite women having achievedadvance levels of vocational and academicqualifications–and so limits opportunitiesfor them to guarantee a decent living.ARABIC DIGITAL CONTENTPRODUCTIONDigital content production offers manyopportunities to move towards theknowledge economy and lessen theknowledge divide among countries andamong the various sectors of society withineach. It is based on three pillars: contentproduction, processing, and deployment.Production accounts for the greatereconomic returns on the global level.Production and utilisation of digital contentare obviously linked to the language ofthe society. The inputs and outputs ofdigital technologies are information, andto make it circulate rapidly and easilywithin the society it must use the society’slanguage. Despite the economic capacityof the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and the size of theirpopulation, they are unable to impose theirrequirements on hardware and softwaremanufacturers. This mandates self-relianceand the creation of formats to enabletechnology to deal with the particularitiesof the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language in line with theneeds of its societies.One ESCWA study (Samir al-‘Ayta,2008, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic) states that the size of themarket for <strong>Arab</strong>ic content on the internetand through books, the press, and thevarious media is around $9 billion annuallyat the beginning of the present decade.This study estimates the annual growthrate for this industry to be between 5and 10 per cent. These estimates werebased on three content areas: media andentertainment, business and trade, andpublic services. There is no doubt thatthe true current figures far outstrip theseestimates, but there are no available dataor recent surveys to rely on to estimate thecurrent size of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic content marketBOX 4-4Business incubators are not new to the<strong>Arab</strong> region. Some <strong>Arab</strong> governmentshave set up incubators to assist in thelaunching of small business enterprises,and some have taken an interest in ICTprojects. Examples of these initiativesare the Jordanian Technology Incubator,which is run by Jordan’s Higher Councilfor Science and Technology and whichspecialises in computer games projectsand publishing audio guides for tourists;the Network of Moroccan Incubators,which collaborates with universities andfaculties of engineering, in particularthe Technology Park of CasablancaUniversity, set up in mid-2004 at a costof more than $100 million; the ElgazalaPole of Communication Technologiesin Tunisia; the Palestine ICT Incubatorset up within the Islamic University inThe proliferation ofdistance working isanticipated to realisevaluable opportunitiesfor women in the<strong>Arab</strong> countries<strong>Arab</strong> countries areunable to imposetheir requirementson hardwareand softwaremanufacturers. Thismandates selfrelianceand thecreation of formatsto enable technologyto deal with theparticularities of the<strong>Arab</strong>ic language inline with the needsof its societiesICT Incubators and <strong>Arab</strong>ic Digital Contentthe West Bank; and the ICT Incubatorin Syria, whose eight projects in 2007were distributed between a numberof content areas. Two of them dealwith <strong>Arab</strong>ic content through projectsfor television and cinema direction inthe culture and entertainment sector,while another project deals with theprovision of services for universitystudents not provided by governmentagencies. However, these incubators donot, it appears, plan to carry throughintegrated projects specifically directedtowards enriching <strong>Arab</strong>ic contentin particular or in responding to theproblems of the presence and utilisationof <strong>Arab</strong>ic on the net. Indeed a numberof their websites do not containinformation in <strong>Arab</strong>ic.INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES165


FIGURE 4-10Paper consumption worldwide and in some <strong>Arab</strong> countriesby per capita GDPWorld countries<strong>Arab</strong> countriesContent creation inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries ismodest in comparisonwith the promisinginternal marketPer Capita Annual Consumptiton of Paper (Kilograms)40035030025020015010050WorldR 2 = 0.44<strong>Arab</strong> CountriesR 2 = 0.858100 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000Per Capita GDP in US $ (PPP)With regard totraditional publishing,consumption rates forwriting and printingpaper in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries are anorder of magnitudelower than thosein the advancedindustrial nations, anddoubly lower whenthe least developed<strong>Arab</strong> countries aretaken into accountSource: http://www.swivel.com/data_sets/columns/1000512 on 18 March <strong>2009</strong>. Per capita GDP data derived from the World Bank database.at the present time.In relation to technical andentertainment content in particular, the<strong>Arab</strong> countries–like many others–have, fordecades, fallen victim to foreign contentcreation. While the public and privatesectors in many countries of the world areplaying a role in resisting this dominance,a number of factors hinder such efforts in<strong>Arab</strong> countries. Among the most prominentof these are the lack of political will andthe weakness of the enabling environment(ESCWA, 2003, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Businessincubators aimed at ICT development andutilisation, when well administered andfurnished with the necessary incentives toproduce and distribute content, are capableof overcoming many of these obstacles(see Box 4-4).It can be said that content creationin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries is modest incomparison with the promising internalmarket, though <strong>Arab</strong>ic-speaking expatriatecommunities around the world are anexception. As mentioned above, a brieflook at the presence of <strong>Arab</strong>ic on theinternet compared with other internationallanguages is enough to reveal the weaknessof <strong>Arab</strong>ic content creation, one of whosecomponents is <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content.With regard to traditional publishing,consumption rates for writing andprinting paper in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries arean order of magnitude lower than thosein the advanced industrial nations, andtwo orders of magnitude lower when theleast developed <strong>Arab</strong> countries are takeninto account. These rates are also markedly166 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 4-11Paper consumption and internet use worldwideand in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries, 2004-2005Internet Users Per Thousand Inhabitants900800700600500400300200100<strong>Arab</strong> CountriesR 2 = 0.6853World countriesWorld<strong>Arab</strong> countriesR 2 = 0.7715Marked effortshave been recentlymade in <strong>Arab</strong>countries to supportthe generationand distributionof <strong>Arab</strong>ic digitalcontent in traditionalmodes and on theinternet, but theyare still insufficientin comparison withthose made byother countries00 50 100 150 200 250 300 350Per Capita Annual Consumption of Paper (Kilograms)Source: http://www.swivel.com/on 18 March <strong>2009</strong>.lower than predicted by the levels of GDPin comparison with other countries of theworld. See Figure 4-10, which plots paperconsumption against per capita GDP formost of the world’s countries (blue dots)and some <strong>Arab</strong> countries (squares). 36Figure 4-11 depicts the correlationbetween paper consumption and internetuse worldwide, revealing the shortfall incontent production, in both its traditionaland digital formats, in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries(ESCWA, 2007, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). The currentsituation is not expected to improve in theabsence of strategies to deal with a wholeseries of inhibiting factors such as lack ofcadres specialised in the production of arange of content, scarcity of resources,limited cooperation to confront these, andthe rarity of research and developmentprogrammes related to the technicalobstacles and other issues that hindercontent production. Marked efforts havebeen recently made in <strong>Arab</strong> countries tosupport the generation and distribution of<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content in traditional modesand on the internet. These efforts, however,are still insufficient in comparison withthose made by other countries. Numerousindicators taken from other fields point tothe fact that the <strong>Arab</strong>ic presence on thenet remains limited compared with that ofother languages.ARABIC LANGUAGE INTERNETCONTENT AND PROBLEMATICSThe production and distribution of <strong>Arab</strong>iccontent are beset by many and variedobstacles which become more severe whenconfronted by the new obstacle of internetpenetration. This is because the distributionof <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content via the internetThe distributionof <strong>Arab</strong>ic digitalcontent via theinternet requiresthe adaptation of anumber of availabletechnologies tomake them <strong>Arab</strong>iccompliantINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES167


A system formachine parsing<strong>Arab</strong>ic sentencesis considered akey requirementfor <strong>Arab</strong>ic tocatch up withsecond generationapplications of naturallanguage processingrequires the adaptation of a number ofavailable technologies to make them <strong>Arab</strong>iccompliant. Technical solutions have to befound too to certain questions, which fallinto two groups, the first connected withthe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language itself, the second withthe preparation of <strong>Arab</strong>ic content forin-depth processing. An example of thefirst group of issues is optical characterrecognition technology for <strong>Arab</strong>ic lettersand for reading from the screen. Thesecond group contains spellchecking andgrammar checking systems. Developingthe software necessary to perform thesetasks is extremely difficult. Automatedgrammar checking for example musthandle the difficulty posed by the excessivelength and flexible word order of <strong>Arab</strong>icsentences when compared to the strictword order of English, for example. Somedifficulties are attributable to the lack of astandard punctuation system and tothe need–for grammar checking–for acoherent system to parse sentences as abasis for error checking. Preparing <strong>Arab</strong>ictexts for deeper processing (preparatoryto indexing or searching for example)requires the development of softwarethat permits morphological analysis,automatic vocalisation, 37 and automatedparsing. A system for machine parsing<strong>Arab</strong>ic sentences is considered a keyrequirement for <strong>Arab</strong>ic to catch up withsecond generation applications of naturallanguage processing. These include systemsfor machine comprehension and narrativestructural analysis of the languages. Some<strong>Arab</strong> and foreign businesses are makingnotable efforts in these fields, but the paceof work and the results achieved remaininsufficient (see Box 4-5).Discussion of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language is notlimited to the generation and unificationof technical terms among groups of thoseworking in ICT but includes everythingconnected to <strong>Arab</strong>ic-language wordBOX 4-5<strong>Arab</strong>ic Language Processing Systems: machine translation, grammar checking, and searchingThe production and deployment of <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content on thenet requires the availability of translation systems to and fromthe main languages. More effective <strong>Arab</strong>ic search engines are alsorequired. Technologies to mine, process, and retrieve content alsorequire automated indexing and summarising systems. 38 In addition,it is essential to develop advanced systems for automatic speechprocessing including automated speech analysis, generation, andrecognition in <strong>Arab</strong>ic. 39Machine translation systems: a number of software systemsfor machine translation to and from <strong>Arab</strong>ic exist. One prominentexample is the Google system. This adopts statistical methods whichmake it impossible for the quality of its translations of texts to gobeyond very modest limits, rendering it unfit for serious translation.There is also software that adopts an overly simple linguistically andlexically based analytical model. Since their launch around threedecades ago, attempts to improve the performance of such machinetranslation systems have failed. Another system developed by an<strong>Arab</strong>ic company is based on a transformational model and relies ona limited base of linguistic rules and lexical data, which limit thepossibilities of improving its performance.Grammar checking: neither of the two grammar checkingsystems in use uses an automated parser, relying instead on a storeof contextual examples. They are thus incapable of recognisinggrammatical errors that occur when the words and syntacticalelements in question are far apart and of adding the syntacticallysignificant final vowels to words, especially in the long sentencesprevalent in <strong>Arab</strong>ic texts. Of the three systems for morphologicalanalysis, two are distinguished by complete linguistic coverage of thewhole of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic lexicon and one of these enjoys a coherentlinguistic foundation which makes it capable of deriving semanticelements from morphological and lexical aspects. Among the faultsof the third system is the errors it generates when dealing with wordswith multiple and compound affixes.<strong>Arab</strong>ic search engines: there are an extremely limited numberof search engines for <strong>Arab</strong>ic texts on the internet. Many of thesites which allow the discovery of <strong>Arab</strong>ic texts are no more thandirectories comprising lists of <strong>Arab</strong>ic website addresses (the portalwww.arabsgate.com is a prime example). The Google <strong>Arab</strong>ic searchengine is reckoned to be the most used <strong>Arab</strong>ic search engine onthe net. In addition to being far from meeting most of the searchrequirements for cultural and educational applications, it also enjoysonly modest success in meeting most of the requirements of theordinary user. This search engine does not take into account thecomplex derivational and morphological formation of <strong>Arab</strong>ic wordsin comparison with the simple formation of English words forwhich the system was designed. It searches for a word as it appearsin the text without paying attention to its lexical lemma, which mayappear in as many as a thousand forms as a result of the affixing ofprefixes and suffixes to the <strong>Arab</strong>ic word. This search engine is alsoincapable of broadening the scope of a search on the basis of theusers search terms. Thus, when the user enters a word like “boy”(fata), “desert” (sahra’), or “tree” (shajara), the search engine will notreturn texts containing the plurals “boys” (fityan), “deserts” (sahara),or “trees” (ashjar). And when searching for a verb, if the user entersa third-person form “[he] condemns” (yudin), Google will not returnother related morphological forms like “[you/she] condemn/s”(tudin), “[we] condemn” (nudin), and “condemners” (mudinun).Adapted from the draft background paper for the <strong>Report</strong> by ‘Abd al-Ilah al-Diwahji, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic168 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


processing and the methods and tools foroperationalization, in-putting, and outputting.With regard to the inputs andoutputs, the <strong>Arab</strong> countries have beenunable, since the 1960s, to rely on a unifiedencoding of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic letters and symbols,even though such encoding is no morethan a method for computers to deal with<strong>Arab</strong>ic. The excessive attention devotedto fonts, which display a wide degree ofvariability from one site to another, to thedetriment of attention to the linguisticcontent of the text, and the refusal toaccept a balanced interplay betweenlanguage and technology have led towide-scale underdevelopment in machineprocessingmethods for <strong>Arab</strong>ic. Similarly,the delay in setting a uniform standard for<strong>Arab</strong>ic letters and vowels is consideredone of the causes of underdevelopmentin research, studies, and applicationsrelated to the language, includingapplications pertaining to linguisticsand the authentication and retrieval ofinformation. As a result, searching forinformation in <strong>Arab</strong>ic using semantickeywords and phonetic approximationremains backward when compared withthe achievements of such applications inother living languages.Upgrading the production anddistribution of <strong>Arab</strong>ic digital contentrequires intensive efforts rather than theusual talk about the dangers of foreigncultural incursion and the importanceof preserving the <strong>Arab</strong> identity. Mediaand entertainment content forms anappropriate entryway for the proliferationof technology and knowledge (see Box4-6); however, it will be necessary fromthe outset to adopt strategies for theproduction and deployment of contentin both its traditional and digital forms(ESCWA, 2007, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave suffered from the absence of suchstrategies and <strong>Arab</strong> attempts at contentproduction have, as a result, conflicted witheach other and have mostly stumbled due tothe lack of specialist cadres, resources, andcooperation, and the weakness of researchand development programmes aimed atBOX 4-6Digital Content in Entertainment and the MediaIn all parts of the world the market inmedia and entertainment materials isfacing sweeping changes characterisedby unprecedented growth in digitalplatforms, be it on the level ofproducts or of services; this growthis also reliant on the convergence ofdisparate industries. Competing inthe new market emerging from thisconvergence are cable TV companies,telecom companies, consumer electronicscompanies, and ICT companies. Themodel used by businesses to provideintegrated products within this market isknown as the “triple play” model sinceaccess to audio and visual applicationsand digital data is achieved through onesubscription. This convergence leadsquite specifically to direct competitionbetween telecom companies andtelevision broadcasters. This requiresthe availability of infrastructures thatenable the utilisation of broadbandtechnologies. Hence it is expectedthat the proliferation of convergentservices will be restricted to the <strong>Arab</strong>countries that have acquired compliantinfrastructures, as is the case with theGulf countries. Among these is Qatarwhere Qtel has launched “triple play”services to enable its customers tosurmounting the technical obstacles facedby various kinds of content production,digital in particular.Proposed strategies must start with aclear vision of the future, define measurablegoals, and include mechanisms to developthe human resources needed to foundand support an <strong>Arab</strong> software industryand stimulate research and developmentactivities in all fields related to content, itsapplications in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, and its use on theinternet. They must lay the foundationsfor the creation of technology incubatorsin the universities and research centres totransform technological innovation intomarketable products and services (see themajor elements of the general workingvision in Chapter 6). Content relatingto education and <strong>Arab</strong>ic culture must begiven priority in the proposed workingstrategy. Laws must be enacted thatsafeguard intellectual property withoutaccess the internet and obtain TVand telephone services via the net.The UAE’s Etisalat is also trying tocombine cable TV services with thetelecommunications operations theyoffer to the consumer. It also offers TVservices via the internet. More than twothirdsof <strong>Arab</strong> satellite TV companieshave websites. Yet it seems that only afew of these companies have strategiesto generate revenues through thesesites. These companies also vary in thedegree to which they have integratedthe material ordinarily broadcast by thesatellite channel with the possibilitiesfor accessing media content and relatedservices via the internet.Technological convergence coupledwith the transformation of entertainmentand media platforms into digital spacepermits broader-scoped knowledgedistribution than previously. However,the utilisation of these two trendsrequires the drawing up of dynamicand comprehensive strategies to traincadres, establish laws and infrastructuressuitable for generating and deploying<strong>Arab</strong>ic digital content, and overcomethe various obstacles to its idealdeployment and utilisation.Upgrading theproduction anddistribution of <strong>Arab</strong>icdigital contentrequires intensiveefforts rather than theusual talk about thedangers of foreigncultural incursionand the importanceof preserving the<strong>Arab</strong> identityINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES169


BOX 4-7Egypt’s Centre for Documentationof Cultural and Natural Heritage(CULTNAT) was created to archivedigitally Egypt’s cultural and naturalheritage. The centre is implementing theEgyptian Cultural Heritage Project, whichincludes drawing up an archaeologicalmap of Egypt and documenting Egypt’sarchitectural, musical, and manuscriptheritage. The project uses multimediasoftware, geographical informationsystems, 3D modelling, and virtualStrategies for digitalcontent shouldassign appropriateimportance to theutilisation anddevelopment of opensource softwaregiven its importancein the distributionof content atexiguous costPreserving Tradition through Digitalizationreality. The centre cooperates with anumber of international organisationsand companies such as UNESCO andUNDP. It is also helping to deploymulti-lingual information system usingthe internet to document the culturaland civilisational heritage of theMediterranean basin countries withinthe scope of a programme sponsored bythe EU and implemented by <strong>Arab</strong> andMediterranean countries.impinging on the opportunities needed toset up small businesses that can play aneffective role in content production anddeployment. One of the first tasks suchbusinesses could fulfil is to digitise the<strong>Arab</strong>ic cultural heritage (see Box 4-7). Thiscould be done in cooperation with thenational libraries and funded by relevantgovernment bodies such as ministries ofculture or by unconditional donationsfrom large private sector institutions.Strategies for digital content shouldassign appropriate importance to theutilisation and development of opensource software given its importance inthe distribution of content at exiguouscost. One feature of much of this softwareis that a large portion of it was originallydesigned to make it easily adaptable tothe requirements of different languagesand modes of utilisation. Its utilisationin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, however, remainslimited to a small number of institutions,some companies offering VOIP telephonyservices, and <strong>Arab</strong>ic blogging sites. Isolatedinitiatives are being taken by websites tocoordinate efforts and offer support toopen source software developers with afocus on arabization (http://arabeyes.com,for example). Other <strong>Arab</strong> initiatives, whichdeserve to be supported to the greatestextent, are also undertaking the arabizationof such software and adding plug-ins toother software to support the <strong>Arab</strong> user.Among the obstacles which preventthe broader deployment of open sourcesoftware is the reluctance of a number of<strong>Arab</strong> governments to use it, in contrastwith the global trend which has seenmany government institutions throughoutthe world adopt this software in orderto remove sensitive government systemsfrom the sway of readymade softwarepackages. 40 The <strong>Arab</strong> governments,however, have submitted in many cases tothe offerings of the world’s large softwarecompanies and, because of the availabilityof technical support packaged up withreadymade products, preferred to rely onthem rather than to embrace open sourcesoftware, even though the latter offersgreater hope of establishing a nationalsoftware industry. This is because opensource requires users to employ in ongoingfashion the technical cadres neededto maintain and modify the software theyuse. In principle this ought not to forma major obstacle. Many <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshave the critical mass of technical cadresto ensure the utilisation of open sourcesoftware. As a group, they have thenecessary human and material resourcesto participate in the development of thesesystems and make ideal use of them.Some <strong>Arab</strong> countries may be more likelycandidates than others to rid themselvesof the phobia of open source software.It seems that Syria, Lebanon, and Egyptinclude a good proportion of Linux OSusers. Promising associations of opensource developers have also been set up inall these countries. 41Ideal deployment and utilisation ofopen source software requires interestedparties in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries–includinggovernment institutions, universities, privatesector institutions, national computerassociations, and networks of open sourcedevelopers–to draw up strategies. Suchstrategies should allow the informationof working groups to set down the rulesand ethics of intra- and extra-muralconduct while seeking enlightenment fromthe policies laid down in this respect onthe global level. 42 They must also offerincentives to workers, particularly inrelation to human capacity development.170 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEAND FUTURE INITIATIVESMaking progress in the field of knowledgedistribution, generation, and utilisationin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries requires thatnational development strategies includeinitiatives that seek to realise an integratedvision of knowledge. They must be guidedon this path by studies that analyse thestrong and weak points in the prevailingeconomic, social, and cultural dynamic,that define the requirements needed torevive and accelerate this dynamic, andthat draw up working plans to developtechnology capacity. These initiativesshould press for improvement to legaland regulatory environments and supportfor backbone networks and the means toaccess them to make best use of ICT. Toachieve sustainable goals in these areas,investment in ICT infrastructure shouldbe encouraged, to ensure its conformitywith next generation technologies and itscompatibility with new applications andservices.Many factors hinder the devising ofsuch policies, strategies, and plans. Amongthe most prominent are the absence ofa unified vision, within the limits of thepossible, on the national and <strong>Arab</strong> levelsto oversee future directions and set theground rules for common action andconstructive interaction within the regionaland global environments. The absence ofsuch a vision leads to a host of difficultiesin drawing up policies for developing ICT.These difficulties are compounded by theaccelerating dynamic towards technologicaladvance on one side and the entanglementof technological development with manyaspects of social development on the other.Many <strong>Arab</strong> countries are confrontingdifficulties that hinder the prioritizationof technological development on a listof development goals crammed withpressing priorities, foremost of which isthe securing of such basic necessitiesof life as food, water, shelter, and socialservices. Drawing up the open policiesrequired, in particular, by the spread anduse of ICT faces major difficulties, one ofthe most important of which may be thehigh level of government control over thistechnology and its development on thepretext of national security.There is no essential differencebetween sector-based developmentpolicies (which include the social servicessectors including education, health, andothers) before and after the deployment ofICT and its expanded application. A primecharacteristic of the current era is theunprecedented involvement of policies fortechnology capacity development withinsector-based policies–something not takeninto account before by the relevant partiesin most <strong>Arab</strong> countries. As long as thisweak spot is not treated by integratingtechnology capacity development policieswith sector-based policies, isolatedprogrammes, fragmented efforts, and theirever-growing negative consequences maybe expected to continue.Initiatives aimed at the indigenisationand development of ICT applicationsalso strengthen, and do not conflict with,economic and social development efforts,except when left exposed to exploitationby hardware promotion as an end initself, and to the achievement of varioustemporary gains. These initiatives must beformulated so as to respond to the needsof development rather than to the desire ofthe promoters of technology equipmentand the government officials who supportthem for rapid material returns. It must alsobe aimed at building capacity on variouslevels, with decision making centres andNGOs concerned with developmentmatters taking priority. 43 Also necessaryare capacity building in integrated form tocover both supply and demand, as well asdeepened technological know-how withreasonable possibilities for exploring thehorizons of technological progress in thefuture.The accelerating march of progress inmany aspects of ICT requires, on the onehand, the creation and support of specialistresearch and development institutes ableto compete with their counterparts in theProgress inknowledgedistribution,generation, andutilisation in the<strong>Arab</strong> countriesrequires that nationaldevelopmentstrategies includeinitiatives that seek torealise an integratedvision of knowledge,guided by studies thatanalyse the strongand weak pointsin the prevailingeconomic, social, andcultural dynamicInitiatives aimed atthe indigenisationand developmentof ICT applicationsstrengthen, and donot conflict with,economic and socialdevelopment effortsINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES171


More research shouldbe directed towardsexploring the effectsof technologicaldevelopment on<strong>Arab</strong>ic and hownew technology willhandle recognition,speech, andsemantics to ensurethe preservationof the languageCooperation between<strong>Arab</strong> nationalinstitutions mustbe strengthened,and theirintercommunicationwith internationalorganisations mustbe activatedadvanced and emerging nations and, onthe other, an effort to probe the expectedeconomic, social, and cultural effects ofthese new technologies. More researchshould be directed towards exploring theeffects of technological developmenton the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language and how newtechnology will handle recognition, speech,and semantics in a way that ensures thepreservation of the language and dedicatesa pivotal role to it in regional developmentand the building of human civilisation. Theproliferation of ICT applications in fieldsclosely connected with scientific research,education, culture, and social servicesis expected to lead to a boost for <strong>Arab</strong>icdigital content on the internet in terms ofits volume and content.<strong>Arab</strong> countries cannot undertake ontheir own the many tasks aimed at utilisingthe continuous and accelerating innovationwithin ICT and thus consolidating therole of knowledge in development onan individual basis, however large theresources available to any one of them.Cooperation between relevant nationalinstitutions must be strengthened,cooperation between the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesand their intercommunication withinternational organisations must beactivated, and the human resourcesneeded to design and implement commoninitiatives in various fields must be secured.Successful acquisition and deployment ofnew technology is today connected to a greatextent with the ability to cooperate withinmultidisciplinary teams in the concernedstate and with partners at the regionaland the global levels. Most production ofnew forms of knowledge does not nowtake place within the walls of a singleinstitution, but is the fruit of cumulativeefforts made by groups belonging tovarious schools of thought which can bein constant touch with each other and withthe various external sources of knowledge.Herein lies the latent importance of ICT.The role it fulfils in facilitating cooperationbetween institutions, wherever they are,and individuals, wherever they work, isa basic factor in the achievement of thegoals of sustainable development invarious domains. It is therefore essentialthat national policies and regional strategiesdesigned to build capacity in thesetechnologies include elements favourableto the success of the new models ofcooperation provided by ICT, such as“virtual research laboratories.” It is possiblethat such research centres will cooperateto carry out research related to specificaspects of a given problem in priority fieldsat the national and regional level. Amongthe most pressing such problems are thoserelated to broader and smarter uses of the<strong>Arab</strong>ic language on the net, developmentof interactive digital content in the variousbranches of knowledge, and broadeningthe scope of <strong>Arab</strong>ic content in the fields ofeducation, 44 scientific research, healthcare,environmental protection, governmentservices, and heritage preservation.It is widely acknowledged that thecreation of an environment favourableto internal and regional cooperationwill generate opportunities to grow anddevelop an active private sector that investsin the means of production of technology,the fields of knowledge related to it, andits applications. It will also open the gatesto <strong>Arab</strong> investments in joint research anddevelopment projects related to technology,its applications, and the services connectedto it. This is especially the case in relationto the knowledge content required andgenerated by such applications. In this,the creation of legal frameworks and lawsthat contain the open and transparentmeasures necessary to ensure the successof applications and enable all sectorsof society to benefit from access totechnology and its applications must begiven special attention, lest the digital andknowledge gap among countries widen,while an improvement in the familiar overallindices serves simply to improve the imageof these countries relative to others. Hereit is necessary to emphasise support forinitiatives designed to gain acceptance forthe open source methodology while at thesame time guaranteeing data privacy andsecurity and protecting intellectual property172 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


within bounds that do not hinder businessgrowth and provision of employment. Inspite of weaknesses–which must be takensuitably seriously–it is possible to outline anumber of strong points that will bolsterthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ attempts to make idealuse of technology and its applications.Among the prominent strong points are:• The enthusiasm of <strong>Arab</strong> politicalleaderships to give impetus totechnological development.• The availability of the necessaryexpertise and reference cadres–thanksto the regional and internationalconferences 45 dedicated to promotingand spreading technology–to ensurethe formation of an <strong>Arab</strong> strategicvision to indigenise and make good useof ICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries.• The investment opportunities madeavailable by oil wealth, and morespecifically those that enable the region’seconomies to make the transformationto knowledge-based economies.• The youthfulness of the human capital,which will without doubt be able tokeep pace with global developments andmeet the ambitions of the peoples ofthe region when employed in projectsto indigenise and develop technologyand knowledge production.CONCLUSIONThe dilemmas of <strong>Arab</strong> development are,as we have said, epistemological in essence.The response to these challenges, althoughrequiring the acquisition of basicallytechnological capabilities, will neverbear fruit if restricted to these alone.In the first place, this requires specificpolitical choices. The efforts directedat the deepening and broadening of thescope of knowledge content in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries demand the optimal use ofavailable technologies within a strategicperspective congruent with comprehensivesustainable development goals aimed atreducing inequality in all its forms. At thesame time, they require affiliation with<strong>Arab</strong> internal, regional, and internationalinitiatives 46 that endeavour to developmodern technologies and adapt and applythem to participate actively in the drawingup of the aims and directions of suchtechnologies. However, none of this willlead to ideal outcomes unless, from athird angle, they are linked to persistentaction to formulate national initiativesthat build, complement, and support thecomponents of the knowledge economyand society. Countries such as Finland,Norway, Ireland, Malaysia, and SouthKorea have recently succeeded in utilisingthe advance in the various branches ofICT and the innovations based on thisadvance. They have achieved this throughnational and sector-based policies andinitiatives aimed at bringing about majorqualitative and integrated transformationsin their own capabilities, rather thanresorting to gradual and piecemealimprovement in their capabilities indisparate directions. At the same time,these countries have introduced wholesalereforms encompassing the institutionalcadres who implement ICT activities andthe innovations arising from them. Theyhave also taken a second look at manyof the legislative, regulatory, and legalframeworks that control these activities,the resources devoted to supporting them,and the approaches followed in takingpivotal decisions in this respect. Theexperiences of these countries also indicatethe necessity of adopting mechanismsthat permit ongoing coordination ofinstitutional capacity within nationalborders in parallel with serious attempts toratify active and effective international andregional alliances to produce the scientificand technological knowledge connectedwith these technologies. These allianceswill, in the end, lead to the utilisation ofthe latest knowledge within new productsand services that can be used to confrontthe competition raging on the worldmarket.The chasm that divides the developing<strong>Arab</strong> countries from the advanced nationsdoes not justify the adoption by theformer of the position of “spectator” andThe dilemmas of<strong>Arab</strong> developmentare epistemological inessence. The responseto these challenges,although requiringthe acquisition ofbasically technologicalcapabilities, will neverbear fruit if restrictedto these aloneThe chasm thatdivides the developing<strong>Arab</strong> countries fromthe advanced nationsdoes not justify theadoption by theformer of the positionof “spectator” andpassive recipient ofwhatever knowledgeis thrown at themINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES173


The possession ofinformation andcommunicationtechnologies bylimited or sociallyisolated groupswill not suffice torealise the benefitsof globalisation anddeter its dangers;rather, it will ensurethe deepening offragmentation,poverty, ignorance,and extremismIt falls on theshoulders of thegovernments of the<strong>Arab</strong> countries andconcerned NGOsto play foundingand creative rolesthat deal with theformulation ofpolicies, strategies,and initiatives forthe production,distribution, andutilisation ofknowledgepassive recipient of whatever knowledgeis tossed to them. Rather, a restructuringand review of numerous conceptsand practices is required so as to makeknowledge production and distributiontake place within these countries andthrough cooperation among them. Therole of the political and intellectualleaderships here is vital, alongside that ofNGOs. When planning these initiativesand the projects they may comprise, itis essential to take into account the evershorter time frame for scientific discoveriesto make it possible to include them ininnovative products and processes. Therailway took 120 years to spread worldwide,while mobile telephone penetrationreached 80 per cent of the populationof certain countries within four years.Anticipated technological evolution, beit on the level of processors, computers,networks, or network technologies, willoffer rare opportunities to acquire anddistribute knowledge, as signalled by pastexperiences in the evolution of othermodern technologies. Current trends areexpected to lead to private sector institutionshaving greater influence over individuals.The former possess greater technologicalknowledge aptitude in addition to superiorcapacities for technological adaptationand learning. The ability of companiesto measure and analyse the behaviourof consumers of their wares or usersof their services using the technologicalresources and expertise in their possessionwill multiply, making the results moreaccurate. 47 This will give various institutionsunprecedentedly comprehensive powersto monitor the behaviour of consumersof their wares, users of their particularservices, and internet users in general.This also applies to potential surveillanceof citizens by government bodies, whichmandates the establishment of nationaland regional institutions concerned withstudying the trends in technologicalevolution, and in particular the changes interms of patterns of use of the internet,the structures and resources available onit, and the pace of content development.There should also be ongoing analysis ofthe risks and challenges posed by internetuse, exploration of the violations it maybe exposed to, and the development ofapproaches, methodologies, and tools toensure that information on the range oflevels is used in conformity with agreedstandards for the protection of humanrights and individual freedom.In the light of globalisation, ownershipof ICT has become a pivotal requirementfor driving the various aspects ofdevelopment. Its use will also lead to areduction in the resources needed to buildscientific and technological capacity andto utilise numerous other technologiesin the various sectors of production bycondensing, and reducing the cost of,many of the measures that traditionalproduction and service activities require.This trend is expected to continue, and evento accelerate and expand. However, thepossession of these technologies by limitedor socially isolated groups will not sufficeto realise the benefits of globalisationand deter its dangers; rather, it will ensurethe deepening of fragmentation, poverty,ignorance, and extremism. For this reason,projects for national development muststrengthen the role of knowledge and thesectors and social and economic activitiesconnected to it so that all sectors ofsociety share in its benefits. The privatesector–and the tripartite partnershipsbetween it, the government sector, andcivil society organisations–is expected tohave a major role in carrying these tasks.In the context of such partnerships, it fallson the shoulders of the governments ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries and concerned NGOsactive in them to play founding and creativeroles that deal with the formulation ofpolicies, strategies, and initiatives for theproduction, distribution, and utilisationof knowledge in areas where the privatesector cannot get involved or with which itshould not perhaps be entrusted.In conclusion, will current and futuretechnologies lead to a decline in thestatus of <strong>Arab</strong> cultural identity? Or willthey provide opportunities that enable its174 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


preservation and the consolidation of its position on the map of human civilisation? Apositive answer is conditional upon the digital presence of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and theircitizens on the current and future internet. When the <strong>Arab</strong> universities, for example, offertheir educational services in electronic form, when the communications infrastructureis designed to conform with multimedia applications, and when all sectors of societyare given access via all platforms, the <strong>Arab</strong> identity will in all probability preserve itsessence, or even make marked gains that will ensure it opportunities for communication,innovation, and progress over the long term. Applications of ICT are expected to bringabout profound and wide-ranging social and economic effects. However the nature andextent of these effects will be determined by the efforts made by the active parties tobuild and support the various kinds and models of <strong>Arab</strong>ic content. If governments andother interested parties fail to generate and distribute knowledge content closely linked tosocial and economic conditions, cultural structures, and the expectations of citizens, thenit is likely that most of these effects will have negative ramifications. The opportunitiesoffered by new technologies are accompanied by risks that mandate enlightenedapproaches which keep pace with accelerated technological evolution and put it to usein the effort towards comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable social and economicdevelopment. Only when this is achieved will the <strong>Arab</strong> countries be able to look forwardto a glowing future in which new technology will play a supportive role in responding tothe region’s chronic crises with its twin swords of knowledge and development.If governments andother interestedparties fail togenerate anddistribute knowledgecontent closelylinked to social andeconomic conditions,cultural structures,and the expectationsof citizens, then it islikely that most ofthese effects will havenegative ramificationsINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES175


End Notes1According to the majority of available indicators, including the World Bank report on <strong>Knowledge</strong> AssessmentMethodology (KAM), published in 2008.2The World Bank’s KAM comprises twelve indicators with respect to the ICT index. Three of these indicators areused to calculate the above mentioned index: fixed and mobile telephones, computers, and the internet. Indexvalues range from zero to ten and express the position of the country relative to that of all other countries forwhich the index has been calculated. The top 10 per cent of countries are those ranked between nine and ten;the next top 10 per cent are those ranked between eight and nine, and so on. A decline in the value of the indexwith regard to a given country does not necessarily mean a decline in the values for the indicators entered tocreate the index. It may simply be a product of the fact that the values of these indicators have risen but to alesser degree than those of other countries that are jockeying for their place on the scale.3Website of the World Bank, database of the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.4<strong>Report</strong>s on the spread of third generation mobile telephone technology in Egypt for example predict that aproportion that may reach 70 per cent of the population will not be able to afford such devices. Other factorsmay lead to slow progress in the introduction of 3G to the <strong>Arab</strong> markets. For example the lack of technologicalpreparedness may open the door to illogical practices and delay the securing of applications and servicessuitable for <strong>Arab</strong> societies. The restrictions imposed by some states, on the pretext of security in many cases, willalso hinder the use of technologies that form key incentives for migration to 3G such as geographical positioningtechnology based on satellite connected systems.5Bandwidth is used as a measure of the rate of data transfer on the internet. It is measured in bits per second.The report uses the measure of bit per person to indicate citizens’ ability to access the net via the nationalinfrastructure and the links it has with the international network by means that include satellites, optical fibrenetworks, and traditional copper wire. While transfer of data across these networks occurs at different speeds,overall bandwidth is a product of the bandwidth characteristic of each medium.6In this context, and as is made clear in the paragraphs dealing with anticipated advances in ICT, cominggenerations of communications technology will provide greater possibilities and opportunities for internet accessfor a broader spectrum of user groups via mobile telephone.7According to the World Population Prospects/2006 revision published in 2007 the population of the <strong>Arab</strong> statesis 328.6 million. However, statistics from the website used to derive information on language use on the netindicate a total number approaching 357 million. This variance does not affect the calculated proportions andhence the deductions and analysis.8Statistics from Madar, the Digital Economy Research Centre in Dubai, Study presented to ESCWA, 2007, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic.9English, Chinese, Spanish, and French.10These processors will also fulfil a pivotal role in adding “smartness” to numerous consumer devices without amarked increase in cost. The processors come in two types: those usually used in computers and specialist onesto control industrial devices and various consumer products.11Among the most prominent uses of semantic web technology are in e-learning and research and development.12Reference in the background paper for the <strong>Report</strong> by Nawwar Al-‘Awwa, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic : Cardoso, Jorge, “SemanticWeb Vision: Where are we?” in IEEE Intelligent Systems, Sept. 2007, pp. 22-7.13For example, it will be essential to combine the various data transfer networks within a single network based ininternet protocols. This will mean, shifting voice telephony services from the telephone network to services basedon internet protocol.14A monthly $25 fee added to the telephone bill for a period of two years (a total of $600) is a condition fortaking part in this project.15Website of Al-Jazirah for Press, Printing, and Distribution, http://www.al-jazirah.com.sa/digimag/03092006/add21.htm on 28 January <strong>2009</strong>.16This paragraph relies on data given in a lecture by Rakan Zarruq of the Department of Computer Engineering atthe University of Damascus and Mahmud ‘Anbar of the Software Industry Forum at the 2005 dialogue forum onthe software industry organised by the Syrian Computer Association.17The REACH programme.18This is counter to the prevailing belief that the concepts and origins of e-government in the advanced nationsarose with the proliferation of the internet in the mid-1990s.19Some sources call this index “e-readiness.” The concept of “e-readiness” provides an objective means tomeasure various factors that enable the adoption of e-government and set a point of reference for governmentsto observe their progress in this field. The assessment mechanism includes hard factors such as measures of thetelecoms infrastructure and other soft factors such as the economic, social, and behavioural level of the country.20Data are not available on the KAM site for a number of <strong>Arab</strong> states such as Syria, Yemen, Comoros, Djibouti,Libya, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia.176 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


21As a result of the nature of composite indices that are relied upon to evaluate the availability of e-governmentservices or the readiness to provide them to citizens and the need for surveys on the ground to define the valueof their component parts, it is necessary to read the trends revealed by these indicator values with a considerableamount of caution and circumspection. It is worth pointing out the variation in values given on “e-GovernmentReadiness Index” developed by UNPAN for Mauritania, for example, in comparison with the scores achieved onthe index of “availability of e-government services” adopted by the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM)for the same states. While the two indices differ from each other, they are without doubt connected in variousaspects, and it would therefore be expected that at least in terms of ranking the states they would conform toeach other within reasonable limits. Yet what can be observed is Mauritania coming in 162nd place out of 182states according to the UNPAN index, with Jordan in eighteenth place and Egypt twentieth for comparison, whilethe KAM index ranks Mauritania above Jordan and Egypt.22Without the knowledge giver and receiver being restricted to the same site.23World Bank, Information for Development Programme (InfoDev), 2005; British Educational Communications andTechnology Agency (BECTA), 2004; and Tinio, 2003.24To this end European states have relied on programmes such as the “European Computer Driving Licence”(ECDL) as a means to make teaching and administrative frameworks in schools acquire the appropriate skills.OECD plans also include subjecting ICT to develop teaching and learning methods.25Joint study on ICT in education, ESCWA and UNESCO regional office in Beirut.26Comprising word processing, spreadsheet, presentation, and drawing software, a calculator, and projectmanagement software.27Based on a country performance assessment scale ranging from one to seven.28World Bank, KAM database, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp on 12 December 2008.29At the time of its inception this project included Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Palestine.30See the website of the Supreme Education Council in Qatar, http://www.english.education.gov.qa/content/general/detail/7117 on 26 January <strong>2009</strong>.31Some sources consider open universities to be virtual universities. This is not necessarily the case, however,though open universities tend to use some of the methods of virtual universities. On this basis, it is possible todeem the <strong>Arab</strong> Open University a virtual university. It was launched in 2002 with headquarters in Kuwait andbranches in Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia.32See the website of the Virtual University of Tunisia, www.uvt.rnu.tn.33If Morocco and Algeria are disregarded, the graph permits the relationship between business internet use andper capita income in the <strong>Arab</strong> states to be represented by a straight line almost parallel to the horizontal axis.This indicates that there is no significant correlation between business internet use and per capita income.34Website of the World Health Organisation, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, http://www.emro.who.int/<strong>Arab</strong>ic on July 2008.35Website of al-‘<strong>Arab</strong> al-Yawm newspaper, http://www.alarabalyawm.net/pages.php?news_id=101464 on 28January <strong>2009</strong>.36This graph shows consumption rates for paper in all its forms. Recent data on consumption of paper exclusivelyfor writing and printing are not available, and this is of greater significance in terms of the various forms ofcontent. However, the quantity of paper used for writing and printing is estimated at half of total consumption.The figure relies on 2004 data.37Unambiguous machine understanding of <strong>Arab</strong>ic texts requires their vocalisation. Naturally, before beingvocalised, the sentences of an <strong>Arab</strong>ic text must be parsed.38One <strong>Arab</strong> company has launched automated indexing and summarising systems, based on purely statisticalfoundations, that summarise the words present, define the subject of the text, and summarise the collectionof sentences that contain significant content. These systems, however, were developed on the basis of outdatedtechnologies, in terms of their use of either statistical linguistic models or analysis of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic narrativestructure.39The Sakhr company has developed an <strong>Arab</strong>ic speech engine. A large US company has also developed an<strong>Arab</strong>ic speech recognition system using a statistical basis. This system has been used to develop an automateddictation (speech to text) system, but the error level remains high and it is in need of automated systems formorphological, syntactical, and lexical processing in order to correct a larger proportion of errors.40The Chinese government has been a frontrunner in the use of open source software on all governmentcomputers. It has developed the Chinese version of the Linux open source operating system through the ChineseLinux Extension (CLE) project. Local government and city councils in many EU cities are also making use of opensource software.41The University of Aleppo has convened two conferences on open source software. These discussed aspectsrelated to the arabization of open source software and means to promote it within <strong>Arab</strong> societies.42E.g., the Taiwanese plan for the introduction of open source.43Building national capacity in a wide series of information and communication technologies represents a keyaim of development policies in all the countries of the world. The attempt to achieve this goal in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesmust be accomplished with an eye to priorities that take into consideration manifest and latent challenges.INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES177


Technology research and development in fields closer to the key concepts and the frontiers of knowledge mustbe undertaken in support of high quality qualifications and in preparation for coming stages that aim to develophardware and software systems and introduce them to regional and international markets. It is necessary atthe same time, however, to focus in the early stages of strategic action to build national capability for the idealutilisation of available technologies.44ICT provides valuable opportunities to improve the efficiency of the educational process in addition to thesupport it offers to e-learning programmes. Networks and virtual incubators could also be created to workin this field. Among the features enjoyed by such solutions to the research and development crisis and theeducation crisis in the <strong>Arab</strong> states are the possibilities they offer for many researchers of <strong>Arab</strong> origin who occupydistinguished positions in universities and laboratories in the advanced nations of the world to participate insuch networks. As previously indicated, the net is overflowing with learning resources, in the form of units andmodules, that can be arabized and exploited to develop interactive curricula.45Among the most prominent of these is the World Summit on the Information Society, which was held in twostages, the first in Geneva in 2003, the second in Tunis in 2005.46There are many institutions within the private, public, and NGO sectors whose areas of operation are distributedacross a series of fields including higher education, scientific research, and technological development andwhich are charged with drawing up programmes and launching regional initiatives in the ICT domain that aim tostimulate the development and growth of this sector and the utilisation of its results to benefit partner nations.There are many examples of such programmes in the EU. These programmes and initiatives mostly handle thelinkage of partner states by regional communications networks or by modernising the backbone networks.International coalitions are also formulating regional policies aimed at finding ideal solutions to the technical oreconomic problems afflicting the partner states or completing national strategies, consolidating the position ofthe region on the global level, cooperating in the use of open source software, developing applications of thesetechnologies in the media, entertainment, and healthcare fields, providing job opportunities, or reducing poverty.47Technological development in the area of data mining technology will permit more detailed and deeperunderstanding of service user behaviour and the prediction of web surfers’ demands.178 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


CHAPTER FIVEARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCHAND INNOVATION


CHAPTER FIVEARAB PERFORMANCE INRESEARCH AND INNOVATIONIntroductionThe term “innovation” is used here in anexpanded sense that embraces both the ideaof “inventiveness,” with its connotationsof scientific and technical ingenuity,and “creativity,” with its associationswith culture and the arts, inspiration,intelligence, emotional sensitivity, and theimagination. This expanded definitionmakes the word that best suited to denotethe subject of the current chapter and meetour goal of widening the significationsof the knowledge society concept and thecentral concepts associated with it currentlycirculating among <strong>Arab</strong>s. This chapterwill not, then, treat only the factors usuallyaddressed with regard to innovation in theknowledge society and will not limit itselfsimply to monitoring the state of innovationin scientific and technical knowledge. Norwill it restrict itself to indicators derivedfrom the social environment such as arecommonly used in reports dealing with theknowledge society. Rather, it will seek tobuild upon these basic elements and developother indicators applicable to the <strong>Arab</strong>world. It draws on research in the humanand social sciences despite the problematicissues thus raised and despite the lackof the detailed data that would facilitatethe study, classification, and formulationindicators. Cultural, imaginative, andsymbolic production also have a role toplay in the analysis, since this chaptersurveys innovation in the art forms that webelieve have contributed to enriching <strong>Arab</strong>sensitivities and developing the aesthetic andaffective values of our societies. Our goal isto provide an overview of how innovationmanifests itself and to diagnose where itis lacking in terms of the current state of<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge.In this chapter, then, we set forth fordiscussion a number of points that willallow us to examine the limitations of thedialectics of absence and aspiration, ofdependency and intimations of independenceand development. Discussion of innovationin the context of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge requiresan interrogation of these dialectics, just asit does the construction of their componentsinto an approximate picture of the currentstatus and future trajectories of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge.INNOVATION AND THEKNOWLEDGE ECONOMYThe <strong>Arab</strong> world lacks a pan-nationalmonitor that could prepare quantitativeand qualitative indices for the <strong>Arab</strong> regionand guarantee the credibility of data onresearch and the dissemination of scienceand innovation within it. Internationalinstitutions similarly suffer from a severeshortage of information from the <strong>Arab</strong>world. Despite persistent follow-up fromthe United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),only six <strong>Arab</strong> countries have providedcomplete and official data on their statuswith regard to the dissemination ofscience and innovation (Kuwait, Algeria,Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Sudan).Six other countries have provided partialinformation (Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Bahrain,Oman, Egypt, Lebanon, and Mauritania)and data remains almost completelylacking for ten <strong>Arab</strong> countries. 1Regardless of precision and currency,the available data indicate that, in all <strong>Arab</strong>The <strong>Arab</strong> worldlacks a pan-nationalmonitor that couldprepare quantitativeand qualitative indicesfor the <strong>Arab</strong> regionand guarantee thecredibility of dataon research andthe disseminationof science andinnovation within itThe available dataindicate that, inall <strong>Arab</strong> countries,performance in thefield of innovation isweak in comparisonto that of the otherpillars of knowledgeARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION181


FIGURE 5-1Innovation system index for the most recent period in comparison to 19958765Most studies oninnovation placethe performance ofscientific researchand research centresat the heart of thedevelopment processand production cycle43210U A EQatarJordanKuwaitOmanLebanonTunisiaEgyptBahrainSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaMoroccoMost Recent 1995AlgeriaSyriaSudanMauritaniaYemenDjiboutiSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp.FIGURE 5-2countries, performance in the field ofinnovation is weak in comparison to thatof the other pillars of knowledge. 2Figure 5-1 shows that the UAE rankshighest among <strong>Arab</strong> countries on theInnovation and developmentFinancialresourcesTechnologyUniversitiesSchoolsVocationaltrainingCreativityProductionSciencesHumanresourcesEconomic and social systems and lawsSource: Estime Programme, 2007. http://www.estime.ird.fr, 2 September 2008innovation system index, followed byQatar and then Jordan. In comparisonto 1995, twelve <strong>Arab</strong> countries showa decrease in their index value for thispillar, and only five <strong>Arab</strong> countries showan increase. Three of these five countriesare in the group of those with a high levelof readiness for the knowledge economy,and two are in the group of those witha medium level of readiness for theknowledge economy. It should be notedthat the innovation system index valueof a number of developing countries rosein 2005 in comparison to 1995. 3 Chinaachieved the highest increase in this value(1.06), followed by Turkey (0.71) and thenMalaysia (0.63). Globally, the ranking ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> region decreased, whereasSoutheast Asia achieved the highestincrease due to the improved levels reachedby India and Sri Lanka (Mohammed Bakir,background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic).Most studies on innovation placethe performance of scientific researchand research centres at the heart of thedevelopment process and productioncycle, as illustrated by Figure 5-2. Thisfigure applies to innovation in scienceand technology more than to innovation182 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 5-3Per capita GDP and the innovation system index1210Innovation Index8642Med HDEgyptMoroccoLow HD SyriaYemenWorldMENAJordanLebanon TunisiaAlgeriaOmanSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaBahrainHi HDUAEKuwaitQatar0SudanMauritaniaDjibouti0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000Gross Domestic ProductSource: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.aspin culture and the human and socialsciences.THE CORRELATION BETWEENGROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTAND INNOVATION IN THEARAB REGIONThe world’s countries can be classifiedaccording to the correlation betweentheir Gross Domestic Product (GDP)and innovation. In Western industrialcountries and those with growing industrialeconomies, this typically is a positivecorrelation, for these countries’ positionson the innovation index rise in step withtheir GDPs. <strong>Arab</strong> countries, however, donot show a positive correlation betweenGDP and innovation. Despite the highGDP in oil-producing <strong>Arab</strong> countries, theirranking on the innovation and scientificresearch index remains low in comparisonto other <strong>Arab</strong> countries with lower incomesbut which are more productive with regardto research and innovation (Figure 5-3).DEMOGRAPHICS AND THECHALLENGE OF INCLUSIONOF YOUTH<strong>Arab</strong> countries face the challenge of apopulation whose youth and adolescents(ten to twenty-four years of age) nowform two thirds of the total and who areexpected to number between 120 and 150million by 2025 (Population ReferenceBureau, 2006). Under ideal circumstances,this high percentage would translate intothe creative energy of a youthful society,yet many of these <strong>Arab</strong> young peoplesuffer from unemployment and a braindrain that includes even professionals andhighly-qualified individuals.In early 2008, experts confirmed that the<strong>Arab</strong> countries were expected to spendmore than $3,000 billion in the followingfew years on construction, development,and infrastructure projects that wouldrequire innovation and reliance on scientificproducts and services and advancedtechnology. Effective employment of thecapacities of youth would alleviate theunemployment crisis in the <strong>Arab</strong> world,Despite the highGDP in oil-producing<strong>Arab</strong> countries,their ranking onthe innovation andscientific researchindex remains lowin comparison toother <strong>Arab</strong> countrieswith lower incomesbut which are moreproductive withregard to researchand innovationARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION183


The extremely lowamounts spentby <strong>Arab</strong> countrieson research anddevelopment havehad a negative impacton <strong>Arab</strong> innovationperformance in bothquantitative andqualitative termsbut the integration of innovation, youth,and accumulated wealth requires innovativepolicies for improving <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance (Zahlan, background paperto the <strong>Report</strong>).SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYPOLICIESDespite the efforts exerted by <strong>Arab</strong>scientists and researchers, the extremelylow amounts spent by <strong>Arab</strong> countrieson research and development have hada negative impact on <strong>Arab</strong> innovationperformance in both quantitative andqualitative terms. Another outcome ofthis situation is the weak impact of thisperformance and the limited applicabilityof its outcomes. In most <strong>Arab</strong> countries,scientific research agencies are attachedto higher education systems rather thanto production and service sectors asthey are in industrial countries. This hascontributed to the creation of a wide gapbetween education and research on theone hand and economic and social needson the other.Science and technology policies requirecultural, social, and economic environmentsthat promote participation in a competitiveeconomy and the presentation ofoutstanding products based upon theoutcomes of scientific research. This is whatwill make a reality of the complementaryrelationship between innovation anddevelopment, allowing innovation to feedthe development process and serve as apermanent source for regeneration andprogress. At the same time, developmentwill embrace innovation and realiseits primary role in both encouragingdevelopment and deriving maximumbenefit from its results. Creating policiesthat support science and technology is thusone of the most important steps that <strong>Arab</strong>countries need to take in order to respondpractically, competently, and seriously tothe challenges of unemployment amongyouth, human capital flight, and theincreasing drain of financial resources toBOX 5-1Official <strong>Arab</strong> Initiatives for Invigorating Research and DevelopmentThe <strong>Arab</strong> Economic and Social Summit, convened in Kuwait from19 to 20 January <strong>2009</strong>, affirmed the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ commitmentto continue working towards economic and social integration, theencouragement of the private sector and civil society institutionsto play a greater role in the advancement of the economyand development; and the initiation of projects that supportinfrastructure and protect the environment, as well as electricity androad network extension projects. The Kuwait declaration grantedparticular importance to improving education, human development,and health, while reducing unemployment and combating poverty.It also granted importance to the development of trade andindustrial cooperation, as well as to the encouragement of youthand the empowerment of women. Among its most importantrecommendations were the following:• Attention to the development of national statistics agencies andthe provision of the detailed data and statistical indices necessaryfor formulating policies and taking appropriate decisions in thefields of development.• Strengthening the role of the private sector and providingeconomic and environmental legislation appropriate for it andremoving obstacles that prevent the private sector from playingan active role in economic development and in working towardseconomic integration.• Pursuing the goal of human development and raising thehuman capacity of <strong>Arab</strong> citizens within the framework of theMillennium Development Goals while expanding the scope ofempowerment of women and youth and increasing their workopportunities.Developing educational and scientific research to keep pace withglobal developments while improving and equipping educationalinstitutions to allow them to perform their missions competently;supporting implementation of the education and scientific researchdevelopment plan approved at the Khartoum and Damascussummits; funding scientific research budgets; strengthening tiesbetween <strong>Arab</strong> research centres; indigenising modern technologies;and making optimal use of the skills of scientists. On a separate front,ministers of higher education and scientific research in the <strong>Arab</strong>world meet every two years to discuss issues of common concern.They have agreed that “the <strong>Arab</strong> world faces a serious challenge inthe fields of higher education, scientific research, and informationtechnology as it enters an era of comprehensive advancement andintegrated knowledge. International and regional circumstances callon us to engage with change from a holistic viewpoint and with anopen mind, for the scope of these cultural challenges is greater thanour capacity to face them.”Although <strong>Arab</strong> ministers agreed on theserecommendations eight years ago, they have yet to be implemented.<strong>Arab</strong> officials continue to insist that scientific research forms acomplement to higher education, whereas Western and newlydeveloped countries have moved beyond this limited understandingto tie research directly to industry, trade, and services.Source: The <strong>Arab</strong> League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organisation, recommendations issued at the meetings held in Abu Dhabi in November 2007 and Sana’a in December 2005. Recommendations of the<strong>Arab</strong> Economic and Social Summit, Kuwait, 19-20 January <strong>2009</strong>.184 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


the import and consumption of readymadetechnical products.ARAB INITIATIVES ANDSTRATEGIESDespite repeated official <strong>Arab</strong> calls tobridge the gap between scientific researchand development projects, theserecommendations have translated onlyweakly into reality (see Box 5-1).National scientific research centres haveoften relinquished, or been distanced from,their responsibility to develop a nationalresearch vision and have left creation oftheir strategic work plans to the politicalleaders of their countries. In several <strong>Arab</strong>countries, however, this orientation beganto change at the beginning of the decade,and a number of research centres havenow laid out a national research vision tiedto development issues. This has occurredin Lebanon (see Box 5-2), Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia,Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Qatar,and the UAE. Yet these efforts remain intheir early stages, and their outcomes andimpact are difficult to assess at present.A review of the most prominentstrategies prioritizing scientific and technicalresearch in some <strong>Arab</strong> countries (The<strong>Arab</strong> League Educational, Cultural, andScientific Organisation, 2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic)leads us to conclude that most haveadopted orientations that respondto the needs of food and watersecurity, sustainable development, andtechnological development. Thesestrategies aim to support innovation andimprove competitiveness in sectors suchas the petrochemical, communications,information, and renewable energyindustries, public health, the medicalsciences, and epidemic control, and thesocial sciences. These orientations reveala real understanding of the prioritiesdemanded by <strong>Arab</strong> circumstances, as wellas close review by <strong>Arab</strong> scientists of newfields and specialisations in the arena ofscience and innovation.Progress in strengthening researchand development policies requires aBOX 5-2A Policy for Science, Technology, and Innovation in LebanonThe Science, Technology, andInnovation Policy (STIP) plan inLebanon is the outcome of threeyears of work by numerous Lebanesescientists and professionals, andinternational experts. The documentsthey produced are marked by bothan objective local vision and regionaland international ambitions for thefuture of technological and researchdevelopment.Experts analysed the strong andweak points of Lebanon’s economic andsocial forces, as well as the challengesfacing them and the opportunitiesavailable to them. This allowed theexperts to determine the needs ofLebanese society and to formulaterecommendations for the prioritiesof scientific research programmes tobe included in the plan. The reportsof specialised work groups wereintegrated into the final plan, whichcalls for a fundamental shift in the workof relevant parties in the private andpublic sectors and in universities. Thecommitment from the state to establishagencies and institutions dedicated todevising science and technology strategies.National polices must be built, in thefirst place, upon the state’s social andeconomic development plans in sucha way as to achieve the greatest possibledegree of partnership between researchand development centres on the one hand,and government and private sectors thatbenefit from their findings on the other.Research and development experiencein Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Lebanon, Jordan, andMorocco has shown that the best policiesare those that are built upon collectiveforecasting and forms of collaborationthat are based on solid information.THE PRODUCTION ANDDISSEMINATION OFSCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGEIn the context of a growing awareness ofeconomic and development challenges, thethree <strong>Arab</strong> Summits held since 2006 have,plan seeks to present a holistic visionthat ties community, economic, andsocial needs to the country’s humancapacities that are capable of creatingsolutions. It focuses on partnershipand consultation among all concernedparties of Lebanese society in bothplanning and implementation.The plan recommends specificinitiatives in a number of scientificfields that have a direct impact onvarious economic and productionsectors, including a noticeable increasein the material and human resourcesallocated for research and the upgradeand development of infrastructure. Inthe mid-range, this approach will leadto obvious economic results. It willdrive the Lebanese economy to becomeknowledge-based and possessed of clearcompetitive advantages on the regionaland international levels through the usemade of the youthful human capitalthat forms Lebanon’s primary naturalwealth.Source: Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy Plan, the National Council for Scientific Research, Lebanon, 2006.National scientificresearch centres havebeen distanced fromtheir responsibility todevelop a nationalresearch vision andhave left creationof their strategicwork plans to thepolitical leaders oftheir countriesARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION185


It has become clearthat the wager ontechnology transfer,so common in thelast century, hasended in failureConstraints onscientific research in<strong>Arab</strong> countries arenot limited to theabsence or weaknessof institutionalstructures or theirlack of staff. Theyalso include theweakness of relevantadministrativearrangements andlegal frameworksfor the first time, approved importantresolutions in the area of the productionand dissemination of scientific knowledge.These resolutions urge <strong>Arab</strong> countries to“cooperate in the field of scientific research,increase expenditure on scientific researchto 2.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product(GDP) within the next ten years, encouragegovernment-private partnerships, andestablish scientific centres of excellence insocially and economically significant fieldssuch as water, desertification, nutrition,the environment, information technology,agriculture, renewable energy, disease,poverty, and peaceful uses of nuclearenergy.” 4 These resolutions were includedin the ten-year plan for scientific researchand development approved by the 2007<strong>Arab</strong> Summit held in Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia.The <strong>Arab</strong>s have an opportunity to jointhe mainstream of scientific research andinnovation, which moves according to itsown laws and mechanisms and does nottarry for those who make no effort. It hasbecome clear that the wager on technologytransfer, so common in the last century,has ended in failure. The production ofknowledge and the mechanisms for itsassimilation depend on, in addition totransfer, an environment that supports theresearcher’s quest for new ideas, and theeconomic and social applications that theyare guaranteed to produce.PARTNERSHIP WITH THEPRIVATE SECTORPartnership between the state, the privatesector, and civil society is necessary forthe development of scientific research andinnovation in any society. Attention mustbe given to the role of the state as a primarypartner in the production and exploitationof local innovation, as experiences in anumber of developed countries and inChina and Malaysia have proven. Thispartnership can take the form of eitherof two intersecting and complementarymodels. The first comprises activepartnership between research anddevelopment institutions and institutionsof higher education, so that universitiesprovide research institutions with humanresources and then research findings areincorporated into educational curricula.The second model is that of activepartnership between industry (economicand social service and production sectors)on the one hand, and research anddevelopment institutions and institutionsof higher education on the other. Sucha partnership works toward defining socialneeds and research priorities, and translatesresearch findings into useful applications.Military research in Western and Asiancountries forms an important sub-field toboth research and development and themarketplace. Important data on this area issometimes made available on expenditure,levels of technological development,and the significance of commercialreturns, as well as the role of technologicaldevelopments in the adjustment of globalmilitary and political balances. Yet <strong>Arab</strong>indices, like international ones, lack precisedata on the extent and orientation ofresearch conducted for security, military,and defence purposes. According to thescarce information available in this field,this research is limited to improvingmilitary performance and to developingadvanced applications of informationtechnology and genetic research with theaim of upholding security, combating crimeand terrorism, and maintaining the regime.Some countries, such as Egypt, Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Morocco,have at various periods establishedmilitary industries locally by building uponimported technologies.THE REALITY OF ARABRESEARCH CENTRESConstraints on scientific research in <strong>Arab</strong>countries are not limited to the absence orweakness of institutional structures ortheir lack of staff. They also include theweakness of relevant administrativearrangements and legal frameworks,and this impacts on the efficiency andeffectiveness of these institutions.186 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 5-4<strong>Arab</strong>-international cooperation in scientific dissemination, 2004Egypt66.0 19.5 14.5JordanLebanonSyriaTunisiaAlgeriaMorocco0%Source: Estime Programme, 2007Although <strong>Arab</strong> countries have public andprivate scientific research institutions andcentres, they are heavily informed by thenotion of technology transfer and do notwork to indigenise existing knowledge so asto allow for innovation and local knowledgeproduction. As a result, these institutionshave not succeeded in determiningsocietal needs and setting researchpriorities, and this in turn has loweredtheir actual impact on higher and technicaleducational curricula. In the context ofthese structural problems, the complaintis increasingly heard that most researchersfail to show interest in publishing anddisseminating their results and thusincreasing their benefit to society. Otherscomplain about the weakness of electroniccommunications with global scientificresearch networks, with a resulting fallingbehind by institutions and researchersin following and benefiting from globaldevelopments.Yet the picture is not all that bleak.Strong points do exist, as do initiativesthat merit attention and a little hope, if notalso a great deal of concern. <strong>Arab</strong> researchcentres are diverse and endow qualifiedindividuals with an appropriate education50.0 25.8 24.254.8 19.4 25.837.1 25.8 37.146.8 6.5 46.840.3 4.8 54.837.0 6.5 56.550% 100%State onlyWithout EUWith EUand a considerable accumulation ofcontemporary experience. These individualsmay become prominent heralds of scienceand innovation if provided with materialand moral support.<strong>Arab</strong> research centres at first focussedon the basic sciences but subsequentlydiversified their programmes to includemedical and agricultural sciences amongother applied specialisations. Duringthe last two decades, human, social, andenvironmental sciences have been added.There is a focus on locally significantspecialisations in some centres, such asBOX 5-3The fourth annual analysis of expenditureon research and development conductedby the consulting firm Booz andCompany showed that the world’slargest companies spent 492 billionUSD on research and development in2007, a noticeable increase of 6.7 percent of compound annual growth ratesince 1999. These companies spent anaverage of 45 per cent of their researchand development expenditure in their<strong>Arab</strong> researchcentres are diverseand endow qualifiedindividuals with anappropriate educationand a considerableaccumulation ofcontemporaryexperience. Theseindividuals maybecome prominentheralds of science andinnovation if providedwith material andmoral supportExpenditure on Research and Developmenthome countries, and invested the restin other countries in order to benefitfrom the latter’s experience and skillsand their proximity to growing markets.The companies that invested more than60 per cent of their funds allocated forresearch and development outside oftheir home countries recorded a betterperformance with regard to returns toshareholders, operating margins, andmarket share.Source: Barry Jaruzelski and Kevin Dehofff, 2008. “Beyond Borders: The Global Innovation 1000,” on the website http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/sb53_08405.pdf, on 17 December 2008.ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION187


Joint researchprojects among <strong>Arab</strong>scientific researchinstitutions workingin similar fieldsremain extremelyrare even withinthe same countryThe largest and mostsignificant proportionof funding for most<strong>Arab</strong> research centrescomes from the stateThe obstacles tofunding and the lackof incentive-drivenwork opportunitiesfor researchers areamong the reasonsfor most <strong>Arab</strong>countries’ weaknessin research. This iscompounded by adearth of research,and the scarcity ofsupport offeredby public andprivate industrypalm tree research in a number of Gulfcountries, agricultural research in Egypt,Syria, Morocco, and Sudan, and linguisticresearch in the Maghreb. Surprisingly, jointresearch projects among <strong>Arab</strong> scientificresearch institutions working in similarfields remain extremely rare even withinthe same country. The joint projectscurrently being implemented focus onpartnerships with Western industrial states(Figure 5-4) and the exchange of scientificvisits and training, especially when fundingis available. This situation results inpersistently weak impact.With regard to the structure of <strong>Arab</strong>research and development centres, theyfunction through ministries of highereducation and scientific research (eightcountries), ministries of education (threecountries), and a ministry of planning (onecountry), in addition to some specialisedministries (agriculture, health, industry).Five <strong>Arab</strong> countries (Lebanon, Kuwait,Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar) show anexception to this trend, having assignedthe task of research and developmentto relatively independent councils andacademies (Nabil ‘Abd al-Majid Salih,2008, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). Egypt currently hasthe largest number of research centres(fourteen specialised government researchcentres, 219 research centres under theauspices of ministries, and 114 centres atuniversities). In Tunisia, there are thirtythreeresearch centres comprising 139laboratories and 643 branch research units.Technological research cities are few andare limited to Egypt, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, andTunisia (UNECA, 2008, in French). Otherserious attempts exist in the <strong>Arab</strong> region,such as the Science and Technology Oasisthat functions under the umbrella of theQatar Foundation and sponsors numerousscientific and developmental studies.The largest and most significantproportion of funding for most <strong>Arab</strong>research centres comes from the state.In Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, forexample, research institutions enjoy closerelations with the public sector and thestate, which in return expects from thema considerable contribution to social andeconomic development programmes.These institutions have recently begun totake an important step toward developingself-evaluation tools, yet they also continueto suffer from centralised decision-makingand their ties to state funding, despite theirincreasing access to bilateral Europeanprogrammes and Euromed programmes.The obstacles to funding and the lack ofincentive-driven work opportunities forresearchers are among the reasons for most<strong>Arab</strong> countries’ weakness in research. Thisis compounded by a dearth of research,and the scarcity of support offered bypublic and private industry.Based on the analysis of the availabledata on research and innovation practicesand outputs, <strong>Arab</strong> countries can beclassified in one of three models: 5Model one: Countries whose researchcentres are characterised by a highlycentralised administration and abureaucratic relationship with the publicsector. The funding for these researchcentres is limited to state contributions, andthey show no diversity in their financial orhuman resources. The missions of theseresearch centres and their programmesare burdened with scientific servicesrequired by public utilities. As such, theircontribution to the production of originalresearch and patents are limited and theydo not include all scientific specialisations(Syria, Libya, Algeria, Sudan).Model two: Countries whose centresare characterised by flexibility in theirrelationship with the public sector anddiversity in their funding sources andhuman resources. Their most significantresearch production, however, remainswithin the institutions that are able todraw international support and buildpartnerships with industry . The institutionswithin this model show promisingdynamism, yet they are also characterisedby the frequently brief tenure of theirexperts and their intensive domestic andinternational travel (Tunisia, Lebanon,Jordan).Model three: Countries whose centres188 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


are characterised by flexibility towards,and sometimes independence from, thepublic sector, as well as by diversity offunding sources, and the ability to attractspecialists from abroad and guarantee therelative stability of national specialists. Asignificant percentage of their scientificproduction comes from universities andprivate centres, and they are able tobenefit from international cooperationprogrammes and from partnerships withservice and industry sectors, as well asfrom independent national support funds(the UAE, Qatar).THE CAPACITY OF RESEARCHCENTRES FOR INNOVATIONDue to the lack of detailed and reliable data,it is difficult to conduct a comprehensiveevaluation of the capacity of scientificresearch institutions for innovation, bothfor the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in general and onan individual country basis. The reportsof the World Economic Forum (WorldEconomic Forum, 2008-<strong>2009</strong>) list anumber of composite indicators thatprovide a preliminary ranking of <strong>Arab</strong>countries on the basis of the quality oftheir research centres’ production and theassimilation of information technologyinto their activities (Tables 5-1 and 5-2).Tables 5-1 and 5-2 above rankfourteen <strong>Arab</strong> countries that containmore than three-quarters of the <strong>Arab</strong>region’s population; Malaysia and Turkeyare added for comparison. The mostconspicuous facts reflected by the data arethe following:• Qatar obtained a relatively acceptableranking on the global level and first placeamong the <strong>Arab</strong> countries (rank, thirty),while four <strong>Arab</strong> countries (Tunisia,Jordan, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and Kuwait)attained middling ranks (forty-second,fifty-first, fifty-second, and fifty-fourthrespectively) with regard to the qualityof their research institutions. Theremaining <strong>Arab</strong> countries covered bythe report placed lower on the list.Malaysian research centres, known forTABLE 5-1CountryThe quality of <strong>Arab</strong> research institutions 6The quality of <strong>Arab</strong> research institutionsRank among 134 countries Rank among <strong>Arab</strong> countriesQatar 30 1Tunisia 42 2Jordan 51 3Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 52 4Kuwait 54 5Oman 59 6UAE 74 7Syria 89 8Morocco 94 9Egypt 96 10Bahrain 100 11Algeria 108 12Turkey 52 ..Malaysia 20 ..Source: The World Economic Forum, 2008bTABLE 5-2CountryRanking of <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the Assimilation ofTechnology index 7 (out of 134 countries)Technology assimilation atthe institutional levelNetworkedreadinessUAE 14 27Qatar 40 29Tunisia 34 38Bahrain 36 37Oman 95 50Kuwait 28 57Jordan 35 44Egypt 63 76Morocco 70 86Syria 87 94Libya 97 101Algeria 128 108Mauritania 79 109Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 44 40Malaysia 21 28Turkey 48 61Sources: World Economic Forum website http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gitr/<strong>2009</strong>/rankings/pdf on 12 June <strong>2009</strong>.ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION189


Theoretically, themore researchersthere are, the higherthe quality andquantity of research.Yet this correlationbetween the numberof researchersand the yields ofscientific researchdoes not hold trueof the <strong>Arab</strong> regionTABLE 5-3their quality, ranked twentieth globally.• The UAE obtained a relatively highranking (fourteen) among the thirtytop nations heading the institutionaltechnology assimilation list, outperformingthe comparison countries(Malaysia and Turkey). Kuwait cametwenty-eighth, surpassing the secondcomparison country (Turkey). Someother <strong>Arab</strong> countries (Tunisia, Jordan,and Bahrain) were close behind, comingin at thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth, andthirty-sixth respectively, while the restof the <strong>Arab</strong> countries lagged behind.UAE and Qatar also recorded relativelyhigh ranking technology preparednessindicator at the global level, occupyingtwenty-seventh and twenty-ninthplace respectively and higher than theremaining <strong>Arab</strong> countries.The number of researchers in the <strong>Arab</strong> region 9CountryResearchers per millioninhabitantsESTIME 2007COMSTECH1998-2007Availability of researchers(out of 134 countries),World Economic Forum2008-<strong>2009</strong>Tunisia 492 1013 10Algeria 170 .. 41Egypt .. .. 47Morocco 166 782 68Jordan 280 1927 39Kuwait .. 69 62Libya .. 361 44Syria .. 29 40Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia .. .. 43Qatar .. 1236 53UAE .. .. 75Oman .. .. 95Bahrain .. .. 94Iraq .. .. ..Lebanon 200 .. ..Sudan .. 263 ..Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. ..World Economic Forum, in English, 2008bWorld Bank Database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>ESTIME, in English 2007COMSTECH, 2007• Most of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries occupiedmedium ranks (from thirtieth to onehundredth) for all indicators, withnoticeable improvement in theindicators of technology assimilationand technological preparedness in the<strong>Arab</strong> Gulf countries (Kuwait, UAE,Qatar, Bahrain, Oman). This points tothe presence of a number of specialfactors in these countries, includingfinancial prosperity and the role ofglobal oil and gas companies inintroducing modern technologies tothe oil-producing <strong>Arab</strong> countries.THE PERFORMANCE OF ARABRESEARCHERSTheoretically, the more researchers thereare, the higher the quality and quantity ofresearch. Yet this correlation between thenumber of researchers and the yields ofscientific research does not hold true ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> region, partly due to the difficultyin defining the role of the researcher there,even within a single country. The conceptand specifications of the researcher’smission vary in the <strong>Arab</strong> region, just asinternational descriptions vary for the fulltimeresearcher and the research professor.Countries need to produce comparableand analysable indicators for these kindsof issues.Teaching staff at <strong>Arab</strong> universities,who constitute the majority of researchersin the <strong>Arab</strong> region, are burdened withteaching duties of twice the scope of thoseof their colleagues in Western universities.It is rare for the actual research activity ofteaching staff in government and mostprivate universities to exceed 5 to 10 percent of their total academic duties, whereasit forms 35-50 per cent of academic dutiesin European and American universities,which consider this high percentage amarker of the practical value of highereducation and of the effective role playedby university professors. 8 The lack ofclear guidelines and incentives for fulltimescientific research and developmentas a profession may explain why most190 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


esearchers prefer to remain in universities,turn to other professions that realise higherreturns, or join the caravan of migrationfrom the <strong>Arab</strong> region.The data available on the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesdemonstrates clearly that the relationshipbetween the quality of research centres andthe number of researchers is not alwayspositive; Tunisia is an exception. Tunisia,Qatar, and Morocco are distinguished bytheir relatively high numbers of scientificresearchers, as shown in Table 5-3.According to World Economic Forumstatistics, Tunisia holds the highest rank forthe number of researchers, both among<strong>Arab</strong> countries and globally, ranking ninthamong 134 countries. Jordan, Algeria,Libya, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia hold acceptableranks (less than forty-fifth), while theremaining countries hold lower ranks.A recent study that relies primarily ongovernment data from ten <strong>Arab</strong> countries(Nabil ‘Abd al-Majid Salih, 2008, in<strong>Arab</strong>ic) shows Egypt as having the highestnumber of full-time researchers (13,941at universities and research centres) andthat these researchers show the greatestdiversity of research interests (agriculture,materials sciences, manufacturing, metals,oil, water, energy, and medicine). In thisstudy, Egypt was followed by Algeria(5,943), Tunisia (5,625), Morocco (4,699),and Jordan (2,223), while the number offull-time researchers was less than 1,000BOX 5-5BOX 5-4Pioneering <strong>Arab</strong> Innovators in Genetic ScienceLihaz al-Ghazali, who works in thepaediatrics department of the medicalschool at Al-Ain University in the UAE,helped establish the first <strong>Arab</strong> medicalcentre for clinical genetics in Dubai andthe <strong>Arab</strong> Centre for Genome Studies,which is dedicated to studying geneticcomposition from the biological andmedical perspectives. Her regionalacademic and medical experience isapparent in her research, which hasuncovered the natural history of manyof the genetic syndromes found inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region. The internationalmedical journal Lancet devoted itsbiographical page on famous doctorsin each of Qatar (789), Kuwait (634),Oman (548), Yemen (486), and Mauritania(411). On the basis of a survey of nine<strong>Arab</strong> countries, women accounted for40 per cent of researchers in Egypt andKuwait, 30 per cent in Algeria and Qatar,and 20 per cent in Morocco and Jordan.Their numbers fell to as low as between14 and 4 per cent in Oman, Yemen, andMauritania.Despite the low percentage of womenamong scientific researchers, female <strong>Arab</strong>researchers have excelled globally innumerous fields. Among them are AlgerianAsya Jabbar, elected to the French Academy,Jordanian Huda al-Zughbi, elected to theThe Ten Commandments for Researchers in Low-income Statesto her in its 25 March 2006 issue, andshe was awarded the 2008 UNESCO-L’OREAL award for the <strong>Arab</strong> region.The statement accompanying this awardpraised the team she supervised forits identification of fifteen regressivegenes and the mapping of seven genes.It stressed the need to know what genesare and the effect on society of geneticdiseases such as haemoglobin disorder,birth defects resulting from regressivegenes, and metabolic disorders, andtheir relation to the high percentage ofconsanguineous marriages in the <strong>Arab</strong>world.The lack of clearguidelines andincentives for fulltimescientificresearch may explainwhy most researchersprefer to remain inuniversities, turn toother professionsthat realise higherreturns, or join thecaravan of migrationfrom the <strong>Arab</strong> regionScientific research shares common academiccharacteristics around the world. These include thecapacity to study the natural world, a commitmentto the concerns of society, acceptance of criticism,productivity, and transparent teamwork based onsolid scientific methodology. In a number of <strong>Arab</strong>countries, success in the profession requires thatscientific researchers additionally meet a number ofother specifications that can be summarised by thefollowing Ten Commandments:• Fully understand the conditions of the countryand society.• Focus on beneficial scientific research, and do notbecome preoccupied with trivial matters.This text draws on Moreno and Gutiérrez, 2008.• Carefully select research projects and methodologies.• Improve communication skills in foreign languages(English is a must).• Build local and regional/international networks ofcooperation.• Commit to involving young researchers in researchprojects, and also to training them.• Write highly competitive research proposals,and submit them in requests for support frominternational institutions.• Publish in respected international journals.• Persistently pursue self-education.• Believe in and be proud of the scientific researchprofession.Despite the lowpercentage of womenamong scientificresearchers, female<strong>Arab</strong> researchers haveexcelled globally innumerous fieldsARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION191


Average expenditureon scientific researchdoes not exceed0.3 per cent ofthe GDP in most<strong>Arab</strong> countriesThe annual shareper <strong>Arab</strong> citizenof expenditure onscientific researchdoes not exceed$10, compared,for instance, to theMalaysian citizen’sannual share of $33American Academy of Sciences, LebaneseRabab Karidiya, elected to the CanadianAcademy of Science, and Iraqi Zuha’Hadid, who has won global awards. Theperformance of female <strong>Arab</strong> researchershas also been distinctive in medical andpublic health research, with femalesappearing in higher numbers than malesin Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman.These indicators are significant in thatthey reflect the development of the roleof <strong>Arab</strong> women in building the field ofresearch and innovation, as well as theirdirect participation in the development ofsocial sectors, particularly by eradicatingsome forms of discrimination and securingequal employment opportunities in a fieldthat requires many years of effort andpersistence.It is clear from the above that the numberof <strong>Arab</strong> countries that have invested humanresources in full-time scientific researchremains limited, and they score lower onthe basis of this criterion than similarcountries around the world. Yet the failureof these statistics to include <strong>Arab</strong> countrieswith extensive research experience and thelack of a unified instrument for surveyingresearchers may have led to anunderestimation of the critical scientificmass that is capable of directing futureresearch and development.SCIENCE RESEARCH FUNDINGIN THE ARAB WORLDAverage <strong>Arab</strong> expenditure on scientificresearch does not exceed 0.3 per cent ofGross Domestic Product (GDP) in most<strong>Arab</strong> countries, exceptions being Tunisia,Morocco, and Libya, whose spendingrates are in excess of 0.7 per cent. 10However, averages reach 3.8 per cent inSweden, 2.68 per cent in the USA, 3.51per cent in Finland, and 3.18 per centin Japan. Rarely is average expenditureon scientific research lower than 1.8 percent of the GDP in the European or theyoung Asian countries. 11 Yet added to thisfunding crisis for government and privateresearch institutions in the <strong>Arab</strong> world arecomplications created by the administrativeand financial systems that most of themdeal with and which make them captiveto bureaucratic routines in approvingexpenditures, equipment procurement,salaries, and bonuses. Some countrieshave additionally placed new restrictionson science-related expenditure such asappropriating a percentage of foreign aidallocated for scientific research projects andimposing taxes on science-related purchasessimilar to those imposed on commercial orconsumer goods. In Egypt and Lebanon,for example, tariff laws and statutes do notdistinguish between consumer goods andresearch materials. Such modest fundingcannot help to improve <strong>Arab</strong> performancein innovation and research. What <strong>Arab</strong>research institutions need most are financialresources to fund the infrastructure ofresearch and development.In contrast to advanced industrial states,funding of scientific research in <strong>Arab</strong>countries depends on a single source—the government. This amounts toapproximately 97 per cent of the fundingavailable for scientific research in the region(Sasson, 2007). In contrast, governmentfunding does not exceed 40 per cent inCanada, 30 per cent in the USA, and is lessthan 20 per cent in Japan. 12To get an idea of the status of <strong>Arab</strong>countries in comparison to developed stateswith regard to the extent of governmentspending on research and development,we provide data that shows that spendingby the private sector in developed states(Britain, France, Germany, and the USA)is nearly twice that by the public sector. In<strong>Arab</strong> countries, the situation is not merelyreversed; the private sector contributionamounts to barely 5 per cent, even thoughtotal spending on research amounted to ameagre 0.2 per cent of GDP in 2002 (AdibKulu, 2006, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic). In the <strong>Arab</strong> world,support for research and developmentprogrammes is generally concentrated indirect government funding and in officialuniversity programmes. There is a clearinability to attract substantial funding fromforeign programmes or the private sector.192 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


<strong>Arab</strong> countries can be ranked in termsof expenditure on scientific research usingthe data shown in Table 5-4 below, whichdemonstrates the following:• Tunisia holds first place among <strong>Arab</strong>countries, with spending on researchand development exceeding 1.3 percent of GDP. Morocco follows, with0.75 per cent spent on research anddevelopment thanks to the allocation ofa significant portion of mobile phonerevenue and that of some agriculturaland industrial production sectors tothis end.• The private sector makes a relativelyactive contribution to funding researchin Oman, Tunisia, Qatar, and Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, with an indicator ranging from3.5 to 3.9 (with 1 being the lowest and7 the highest.)• In the same context, Qatar, Tunisia,Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and Oman held firstplace among <strong>Arab</strong> countries, followedimmediately by the UAE. The rest ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries placed below fiftieth(out of 134 countries).It is worth pointing out the exceptional<strong>Arab</strong> initiative approved by Qatar inmid-September 2008 that calls for theallocation of 2.8 per cent of the generalbudget to support scientific research (LawNumber 24 of 2008 regarding support andregulation of scientific research).When the average per capita share oftotal expenditure on scientific research iscalculated as a measure of a state’s scientificand technological advancement, the resultsfor the <strong>Arab</strong> region are disappointingoverall, despite the significant differencesbetween countries. The annual share per<strong>Arab</strong> citizen of expenditure on scientificresearch does not exceed $10, compared tothe Malaysian citizen’s annual share of $33.Record levels are spent in small Europeancountries such as Ireland and Finland,where annual expenditures on scientificresearch per capita reach $575 and $1,304respectively. 13The availability of only modestgovernment funding may lead to theconsideration of alternative sources andTABLE 5-4CountryExpenditure on research in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionGovernmentPrivate sectorspending as aspendingpercentage of(scale of 1-7)2006 GDP 11Corporatespending onresearch(out of 134 states) 2Oman .. 3.9 44Tunisia 1.3 3.8 38Qatar .. 3.6 35Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia .. 3.5 43UAE .. 3.3 50Morocco 0.75 3.2 69Egypt 0.2* 3.1 57Kuwait 0.18 3.1 93Jordan 0.34 3.1 79Algeria .. 2.8 116Syria .. 2.7 115Bahrain .. 2.6 82Libya 0.7* .. 124Lebanon 3 0.2 .. ..Sudan 0.3 .. ..Sources:1World Bank Database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), on 10 June 20082The World Economic Forum, 2008b3The National Council for Scientific Research, Lebanon*COMSTECH, 2007TABLE 5-5Expenditure on research and development andpercentage contributions from private andpublic sectors in comparison countriesSpending on Percentage PercentageCountryresearch and private sector public sectordevelopment contributions contributions(percentage of GDP) (percentage of GDP) (percentage of GDP)Sweden 3.73 2.79 0.94Japan 3.39 2.62 0.77Finland 3.37 2.46 0.91United States 2.61 1.84 0.77Germany 2.53 1.77 0.76France 2.09 1.34 0.75European Union(27 states)1.84 1.11 0.73China 1.42 1.01 0.41Spain 1.20 0.67 0.53Italy 1.09 0.54 0.55Source: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); the European Statistical Service Groups;UNESCO; the National Institute of Scientific Research (Quebec); Science and Technology Observatory, 2007.ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION193


BOX 5-6Jordan’s “A Professor in Every Factory”Production andservice sectors of<strong>Arab</strong> countriestypically rely onimported, readymadetechnology, onthe basis of turnkeyagreementsThis pioneering project aims to benefit from thewealth of knowledge among academics and tostrengthen the experience of researchers by solvingpractical problems in the industrial sector, creatingopportunities for the formulation of developmentprojects, and strengthening the competitive skillsof small and medium-sized industrial companies.The project selects industrial institutions and thenorganises visits to them by a university professoror researcher, after which a preliminary reportis produced on the technical and administrativeproblems faced by the institutions. The projectsecures the presence of a researcher in eachfactory throughout the academic summer vacationfor at least 10 hours each week. The SupremeSource: Jordan University of Science and Technology http://www.just.edu.jo/fff/intro.htmCouncil of Science and Technology covers 80 percent of the researchers’ costs, and the industrialinstitutions cover the other 20 per cent. The fieldscurrently covered include engineering, businessadministration, agriculture, science, and informationtechnology, though the project is open to any otherfields in which the production sectors may needassistance and will provide them with relevant localexperience. Among the most significant indicators ofthis project’s success is the continued participationof supporting agencies since its launch in 2003.Supporting agencies, convinced of the project’s rolein developing the academic and industrial sectors,have increased in number from four to eleven, whilethe value of support has increased tenfold.Foreign funding maylead to distancingresearchers and theirteams from researchthat is tied to nationalpolicies and prioritiesinvigorate the contributions of the privatesector, whose contributions to scientificresearch have in fact increased recently.However, this increase remains modest,and includes that spent on research anddevelopment within companies. Theprimary reason for this may be thatproduction and service sectors typicallyrely on imported, ready-made technology,on the basis of turn-key agreements.While the World Trade Organisation hasplaced tight restrictions on state support forproduction sectors, spending on researchand development is exempted from theserestrictions.As such, most advanced stateshave approved the allocation of largebudgets for research and development, andhave granted a clear priority to researchprojects that include effective partners inthe production and service sectors. Withinthis context, most industrial states considerspending by production and servicesectors on research and development tobe tax exempt, which creates an additionalincentive for companies to spend in thisfield and thus maintain their competitivestrength in international markets.The reliance of scientific researchcentres on internal resources requires thatthey make efforts–with no guarantee oftheir results–to market their scientific andtechnological services and to offer theirexperience in helping to solve problemsfaced by the industrial, agricultural, andservice sectors in return for financialcompensation. The few research centresaround the world that have been successfulin this approach have not been able tocover more than a small amount of theirannual expenditure. Thus researchers in<strong>Arab</strong> countries strive to obtain foreignfunding for their projects and fail whentheir research falls outside the priorities ofinternational programmes. Typically thetargets set by such programmes are limitedto cooperation and the establishment ofresearch networks among states in theglobal North and South.There is growing interest among mostMediterranean <strong>Arab</strong> countries in benefitingfrom the significant support offeredby Europe as part of the programmeslaunched through the Barcelona Process.Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia submittedthe largest number of research proposalsto the call of the European Union’s SixthFramework Programme for Research andTechnological Development (2002-2006)for proposals and received the highestnumber of acceptances. Yet European-<strong>Arab</strong> scientific partnership remains slowmovingin Palestine, Syria, Lebanon,Jordan, and Algeria (Figure 5-5).Bilateral international support is oftenoffered to fund research centres on thebasis of the political relations between194 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 5-5<strong>Arab</strong> participation in the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006) 14600500400300Number ofprojectsNumber ofcontracts2001000AlgeriaEgyptOccupiedPalestinian TerritoriesJordan Lebanon Morocco Syria TunisiaSource: European Union, Sixth Framework Programme, 2007, www.ec.europa.eu/research/fp6the countries involved. Foreign fundingmay lead to distancing researchers andtheir teams from research that is tiedto national policies and priorities. Thisoften affects the most competent ofresearchers because these are best ableto attract foreign support. Thus theability of the <strong>Arab</strong> world to benefit fromthe experience and efforts of its mostcompetent scientists is decreasing. Opencompetitionprogrammes of internationalsupport prioritise limited social,developmental, and scientific goals, leadingsome <strong>Arab</strong> researchers to avoid them,particularly when they address sensitiveissues such as the manifestations of religiousBOX 5-7In early 2008, Europe decided that the greatestchallenge facing its twenty-seven states lay in itsability to transform itself into the most competitiveand dynamic knowledge economy in the worldby 2010. Following a technology setback at thebeginning of the new millennium as a result ofthe gap imposed by the development of internetsystems and the economic ramifications of theUSD exchange rate, the European Union bouncedback and drew up strategies for competitive growthbased on innovation and supported by competenthuman resources. For two decades, Europe hadstriven for economic, environmental, and socialachievement, while goals accumulated, interestsclashed, and the necessary financial resourcesremained unsecured. Since early 2005, policies havefocussed on growth and employment opportunities,and each state has committed to socially acceptablereform programmes. Intense efforts have beenexerted in scientific research and higher education.The European Growth StrategyThe most significant outcomes of thisapproach are represented in the European Union’sSeventh Framework Programme for Research andTechnological Development (for 2007-2013, with abudget of 53.2 billion euro), the European ResearchCouncil (2006), and the establishment of theEuropean Institute of Innovation and Technology.Investment in research and higher education is oneof the primary entrance points for growth in theknowledge economy, and is fundamental to theunified European budget planned for 2012. Amongother approved initiatives is the facilitation of themovement of researchers between Europeanstates (the ERA-NETS Programme), the fundingof transnational research projects, the establishmentof major centres of excellence, and a focus onresearch that directly reflects social needs, such ascontaining climate change, population ageing, andincurable diseases.Source: European Commission, Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/dc/index.cfm?fuseaction=UserSite.FP6HomePage, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/home_en.htmlThe ability of the<strong>Arab</strong> world to benefitfrom the experienceand efforts of its mostcompetent scientistsis decreasingARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION195


BOX 5-8For the last three decades, theInternational Center for AgriculturalResearch in the Dry Areas, ICARDA,(Aleppo) has been committed toissues such as agricultural researchdevelopment, open exchange of germplasma and data for use in research,protection of intellectual propertyrights including the local knowledgeof farmers, development of humanresources, sustainable use of naturalresources, and lessening the burdenof poverty in dry areas all over thedeveloping world (Western Asia, NorthAfrica, Central Asia, the <strong>Arab</strong>ian Gulf,and the Horn of Africa). ICARDAreceives most of its private budget fromICARDAthe Consultative Group on InternationalAgricultural Research, CGIAR, anda large number of international and<strong>Arab</strong> funds (totaling forty-one in2007), in addition to direct support forprivate projects. ICARDA is run byan independent board of trustees thatincludes a number of prominent figuresfrom developing and newly developedcountries in addition to a directorgeneral. The centre is distinctive in itsbalancing of resources and spendingand in its annual development, as well asin its high percentage of allocations toresearch projects and its ability to drawsupport as an international authority indry region research the world over.Source: The International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), http://www.icarda.cgiar.org/AboutICARDA.htmInternationalCooperation,5%Information,2%Training,1%ResearchSupport, 8%Management,8%Distribution of Budget ItemsUtilisation, 9%ResearchProgrammes67%Source: ICARDA Annual <strong>Report</strong>, 2007, http://www.icarda.cgiar.org/Publications/Annual<strong>Report</strong>/ICARDA_AR2007.pdfThe achievements of<strong>Arab</strong> institutions areconsidered meagreboth by internationalstandards and bytheir own selfevaluationand thatof their societiesfundamentalism, issues related to minorities,and the development of democracy.In light of the above, researchers are—rightly—asking for increased funding fortheir research, while the public sector,pro-active funding agencies, and privateinstitutions are—again rightly— stipulatinggreater impact and more creative anddependable returns. There is no solutionto this problematic other than buildingclear, programmatic partnerships betweenknowledge-producing institutions andresearchers on the one hand and those whobenefit from their research on the other.The achievements of <strong>Arab</strong> institutionsare considered meagre both by internationalstandards and by their own self-evaluationand that of their societies. It can be arguedthat this weakness substantiates the claimthat while financial support comprises aprimary component of scientific research, itdoes not guarantee its quality or usefulness.If the funding of research and the capacityto attract additional funding are part ofthe basic enterprise constituting scientificknowledge and inventiveness, they are tiedultimately, at the institutional and humanresources levels, to the assured presence ofthe following:• Scientific research institutions that arecredible and transparent in theiradministration and enjoy good relationshipswith the higher education system andthe economic and social sectors. Theseinstitutions must be actively involved insolving development problems.• The institutions should be administratedby decentralised bodies that includeexperts and figures drawn from varioussectors of society and known for theirdistinction and credibility.• Flexible financial systems must be approvedand must be subject to close monitoring byindependent agencies. This is in additionto systems for accountability, oversight,and on-going evaluation.• The institutions should have the abilityto take initiative and to represent thescientific community at national andinternational events through innovativeprogrammes and projects that havepositive, short-term local impact in thecontext of regional and global scientificconcerns.THE OUTPUTS OF ARABSCIENTIFIC RESEARCHWhile the outputs of research andinnovation are numerous, peer-reviewedpublications and patents are the mostcommon and expressive indicators ofscientific activity. Among the manyglobal databases on the quantity and typeof scientific articles published in peerreviewedjournals the most prominent areFrance’s Pascal (CNRS-INIST) databaseand the Science Citation Index (SCI)database published by the Thomson196 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Institute in the USA. By analysing thequantitative indicators for <strong>Arab</strong> scientificpublications contained in these databases,as well as those in the World Bank’s KAM2008 indicators and the studies of theStanding Committee on Scientific andTechnical Cooperation (COMSTECH), anumber of significant facts can be gleanedon what the <strong>Arab</strong> world has and has notaccomplished. The most significant ofthese is that Egypt, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Tunisia,and Morocco lead the <strong>Arab</strong> countries inscientific publishing.The total number of scientific articlespublished in sixteen <strong>Arab</strong> countries in2005 was 4,859. 15 Egypt held first placewith 34 per cent of the total number ofpublications, followed by Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaand Tunisia with 11.8 per cent, while thepercentages held by Morocco, Algeria,Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, and the UAEranged from 4.7 to 9 per cent. As such,and following a lengthy <strong>Arab</strong> absence fromscientific publishing that has only recentlycome to an end, <strong>Arab</strong>s now account for1.1 per cent of global scientific publishing(TWAS, 2005).Since the mid-1990s, <strong>Arab</strong> scientificpublishing has recorded a clearly risingtrend in Egypt and the Maghreb, and toTABLE 5-6Number of scientific publications in selected<strong>Arab</strong> Countries 16CountryNumber of scientificpublications, 2005 1lesser degrees in the Mashreq (eastern) andthe <strong>Arab</strong>ian Gulf countriesstates (FigureScientific publications per1,000 global publications 2Egypt 1658 2.83Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 575 ..Tunisia 571 0.80Morocco 443 0.87Algeria 350 0.49Jordan 275 0.55Lebanon 234 0.35Kuwait 233 ..UAE 229 ..Oman 111 ..Syria 77 0.11Sudan 43 ..Bahrain 29 ..Qatar 19 ..Yemen 10 ..Mauritania 2 ..Sources:1The World Bank, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology, KAM, 20082Thompson Reuters, Scientific Citation Index, http://scientific.thompson.com/products/co. on 30 August 2008FIGURE 5-6Number of scientific papers published in the <strong>Arab</strong> region2500200015001000500Mashreq (eastern)<strong>Arab</strong> CountriesGulfCountriesMaghrebCountriesEgypt<strong>Arab</strong>s now accountfor 1.1 per centof global scientificpublishing01985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Source: UNESCO, 2008bARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION197


FIGURE 5-7Published scientific articles according to specialisation (1998-2007), based on Table 5-7Energy Sciences47%Public Health and Biology7%Engineering andIndustrial Sciences7%Basic Sciences15%Environmentand Agriculture24%Source: COMSTECH, 2007TABLE 5-7Number of scientific articles published in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, 1998-2007CountryEnvironmentand agricultureNumber of scientific articles published from 1998-2007Public healthand biologyBasicsciencesEnergySciencesEngineering andIndustrial SciencesTotalNumber of articlesper one millioninhabitants (2005)Egypt 827 205 720 2276 245 4273 50.9Jordan 474 113 202 523 113 1425 177.3Morocco 366 78 317 614 69 1444 39.1Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 352 111 183 846 182 1674 72.3Tunisia 264 95 179 622 56 1216 146.2Kuwait 240 56 70 216 81 663 267.2Algeria 206 20 190 737 67 1220 27.1Syria 183 30 25 92 9 339 12.8Lebanon 160 158 83 201 53 655 347.3Oman 145 20 52 152 39 408 117.2Sudan 62 29 3 32 4 130 4.4Libya 31 8 10 39 9 97 14.7United <strong>Arab</strong> Emirates 29 6 5 39 8 87 66.3Bahrain 26 7 7 54 16 110 189.7Iraq 26 3 8 57 13 107 3.8Qatar 24 7 16 50 6 103 226.2Yemen 18 6 2 24 7 57 2.7Mauritania 18 6 2 6 .. 32 7.5Occupied PalestinianTerritories12 2 4 13 4 35 17.3Comoros 4 .. .. .. .. 4 8.2Djibouti 2 .. .. .. .. 2 6.3Somalia 1 .. .. .. .. 1 0.3Total 3470 960 2078 6593 981 14082 ..Source: COMSTECH, 2007198 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


5-6). A tabulation of all the <strong>Arab</strong> peerreviewedscientific publications in fortysevenscientific and technical specialisationspublished over the last ten years (1998-2007)reveals a total of 14,000 articles (Figure5-7 and Table 5-7), while Turkey alonepublished 9,800 studies during the sameperiod. Close inspection of the contentof these scientific publications allowsus to categorise it into five research foci.Energy studies comprise a high percentageof these publications, followed by theagricultural and environmental sciencesand then the basic sciences. Engineeringand industrial science publications are on apar numerically with those of public healthand biology.GLOBAL ENGAGEMENTTABLE 5-8<strong>Arab</strong>-international cooperation in scientific publishingTunisia Egypt LebanonRank Country % Country % Country %1 France 77.0 United States 27.9 France 37.02 United States 5.7 Germany 14.9 United States 32.33 Germany 4.1 Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 12.4 United Kingdom 10.14 Italy 3.7 Japan 10.3 Canada 6.95 Belgium 3.6 United Kingdom 8.6 Bahrain 4.56 Canada 3.6 Canada 5.3 Italy 3.87 United Kingdom 3.1 Italy 4.1 Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 3.28 Morocco 2.2 Belgium 3.1 Germany ..9 Spain 2.1 France 2.9 Australia ..10 Algeria 1.5 Spain 2.2 Egypt ..Source: Thomson Reuters and the Science and Technology Observatory (Observatoire des Sciences et Technologie - OST,Quebec, Canada), 2007In contrast to the above, there are alsopositive signs that attract attention, themost striking of which is the increasein joint publications between <strong>Arab</strong>researchers and their peers in Europeancountries and North America. A study ofthree <strong>Arab</strong> countries known for their abilityto cooperate with foreign programmes(Table 5-8) shows that France is Tunisia’sFIGURE 5-80.60.50.40.30.2Scientific impact of <strong>Arab</strong> publications 17primary scientific partner. Egypt has aconspicuous scientific partnership withthe USA, and shows reasonable degrees ofscientific partnership with Germany, Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia, Japan, and Britain. The percentagesof Lebanon’s research partnerships withFrance and the USA are similar. Thesepartnerships can perhaps be interpreted asLebanonSyriaEgyptMoroccoAlgeriaTunisiaThere are positivesigns in the areaof <strong>Arab</strong> scientificresearch, the moststriking of which isthe increase in jointpublications between<strong>Arab</strong> researchersand their peers inEuropean countriesand North America0.1Jordan01992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006Source: Thomson Reuters, Science Citation Index, 2007, and ESTIME Programme, 2008ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION199


A review of theperiod from 2002to 2006 showsthat, out of thirteen<strong>Arab</strong> countries,Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia hadthe highest averagenumber of patentsissued, at 14.8 peryear, followed byKuwait and Egypt,and then the UAE,Lebanon, and JordanIn order to registerand protect theirpatents in preparationfor marketing themto production sectorsand turning them intohigh-quality products,goods, or services,<strong>Arab</strong> researchers areforced to seek outfictitious partnershipswith foreign scientificinstitutionsan outcome of the historical and culturalrelations between Lebanon and theMaghreb on the one hand and France onthe other, in addition to Lebanon’s recenteconomic relations with the USA. <strong>Arab</strong>-<strong>Arab</strong> relationships are noticeably weakwith the exception of a few successfulpartnerships such as those between Egyptand Lebanon on the one hand and Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia on the other, as a well as to a lesserdegree between countries in the Maghreb.To clarify further the scientific value andimportance of <strong>Arab</strong> scientific publications,the Science Citation Index (SCI) lists onlya relatively limited number of citations forstudies by <strong>Arab</strong> researchers in comparisonto those published from other regions ofthe world. Whereas the average citationof a single paper from the USA is 3.82,and from South Korea 1.51, the averagenumber of citations from the <strong>Arab</strong> regionranges from 0.99 for Lebanon and 0.60 forEgypt, and goes as low as 0.01 for other<strong>Arab</strong> countries.Similarly, the indicator of the scientificimpact of articles published by <strong>Arab</strong>researchers has also brought low resultssince the early 1990s, approaching 0.5 onlyin rare cases, most notably in Lebanon,which has shown some distinction in thisregard since 2000. The global average forthe indicator, in comparison, is between0.8 and 1.0 (Figure 5-8).<strong>Arab</strong> science periodicals not includedin international databases number no morethan 500, about a third of which arepublished by Egyptian universities andresearch centres and the rest of which aredistributed among Morocco, Jordan, andIraq. 18 <strong>Arab</strong> science journals suffer fromfundamental problems such as irregularpublishing, lack of objective peer reviewof the articles accepted for publication,and resort to the unedited publicationof the proceedings of conferences andseminars. Additionally, some of theseperiodicals are not regarded as crediblefor academic promotion purposes, whichmakes many researchers and academicsprefer to publish in international, peerreviewedjournals.The situation is similar with patents,which are another vital indicator ofinnovative performance and one thatmore accurately reflects the capacity ofscientific research to produce innovativeoutcomes than does the status of <strong>Arab</strong>scientific publishing. The number ofpatents registered with national institutionsis minimal, but in any case nationalinstitutions do not have the jurisdictionto protect rights internationally. Althoughcomprehensive statistics are not available,a recent study (Nabil ‘Abd al-Majid Salih,2008, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic) notes that Egypt andMorocco lead the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in thisregard, with a total of 500 registeredpatents per year, whereas the six othercountries covered by the study produceless than fifty patents annually. Numbersare available for the patents registered withthe United States Patent and TrademarkOffice (USPTO) during 2005 and 2006 foronly seven countries (Figure 5-9). Saudi<strong>Arab</strong>ia stands out among these countrieswith thirty-seven patents, followed bythe UAE, Egypt, and Kuwait (around tenpatents each). 19A review of the period from 2002to 2006 shows that, out of thirteen <strong>Arab</strong>countries, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia had the highestaverage number of patents issued, at14.8 per year, followed by Kuwait andEgypt, and then the UAE, Lebanon, andJordan. The rest of the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesaveraged less than one patent per year. Forcomparison, the annual average of patentsissued during the same period in Turkeywas 18.6, in Malaysia it was 74.4, in Ireland170.8, and in Finland 854.8. 20In the same context, the utility patentsindicator does not differentiate theachievements of oil-producing from thoseof other <strong>Arab</strong> countries, with Kuwait,Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, Jordan, and Egypt at theforefront. In contrast, the ranking of theother eight countries fell to seventy andbelow out of 134 countries. Most <strong>Arab</strong>researchers are challenged by the exorbitantcosts associated with registering patentswith American and European institutions,and are forced to seek out fictitious200 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


partnerships with foreign scientificinstitutions in order to register and protecttheir patents in preparation for marketingthem to production sectors and turningthem into high-quality products, goods, orservices.Analysis of the outcomes of <strong>Arab</strong>scientific research shows weak yields formost indicators in comparison to otherregions of the world. Despite the relativelyhigh GNPs of some countries of the <strong>Arab</strong>region, <strong>Arab</strong> innovative, scientific, andresearch performance is not faring wellin comparison to that taking place in therest of the world. The picture grows morenegative still when attention is turned tothe output of scientific research in termsof publications and patents, as well aswith regard to the number of researchersworking to produce it and the estimatedvalue of <strong>Arab</strong> spending on research anddevelopment.For example, it is clear that no positivecorrelation exists between the numberof researchers in the <strong>Arab</strong> region andthe number of scientific publicationsproduced there. The number of scientificpapers published per 100 researchers eachyear was only two in four countries, was sixand thirty-eight in two further countries,and was around 100 in Kuwait. If thetotal number of <strong>Arab</strong> university teachingstaff is calculated at 180,000 doctorateholdinguniversity professors, and if weadd around 30,000 researchers workingfull-time in specialised centres, then theacademic-scientific corps working in <strong>Arab</strong>research and development is estimatedat 210,000 researchers. Yet this corpsproduces only 5,000 academic papersper year, equalling twenty-four scientificpapers per 1,000 university professors andfull-time researchers. 21Data related to national income ofseventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countries show that <strong>Arab</strong>GDP was $1,042 billion in 2006, and yetannual gross expenditure on scientificresearch did not exceed two billion USD, anaverage of 0.2 per cent. This expenditureproduced only 38 invention patents and5,000 scientific papers, meaning thatTABLE 5-9StatePatents registration with the USPTOby seven <strong>Arab</strong> countriesAverage annualNumber of patentsnumber of patents(2005-2006) 1 Utility patents(out of 134(2002-2006) 2 countries) 3Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 37 14.8 51UAE 11 4.6 132Egypt 11 5.6 70Kuwait 10 5.6 37Syria 3 0.8 80Oman 1 0.2 121Jordan 1 1.4 63Bahrain 0 0 90Qatar .. 0.4 124Algeria .. 0.4 89Tunisia .. 0.6 130Morocco .. 0.8 82Lebanon .. 2.8 ..Source: 1 USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov, on 29 August 2008; 2 World Bank Database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology(KAM), 2008, on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>; 3 The World Economic Forum, 2008bthe cost of one scientific paper came toaround $400,000. This estimated cost forthe production of a scientific paper orpatent is clearly exorbitant, and weakensthe trust of society and its productionsectors in <strong>Arab</strong> research programmes andtheir researchers. In comparison, Malaysiaspends on research and development 22.5per cent of gross <strong>Arab</strong> expenditure, whileFinland spends 1.75 times as much as the<strong>Arab</strong> region and registers 855 inventionpatents at the cost of $4.1 million each,equalling 8 per cent of the cost of onepatented <strong>Arab</strong> invention.SOCIAL SCIENCE POLICIESAND ARTISTIC INNOVATIONHere we shall attempt to broaden thesignifications generally given the conceptof the knowledge society, based on therequirements for the development ofknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> nation. It would,after all, be unreasonable for indicators,many of which do not encapsulate theNo positivecorrelation existsbetween the numberof researchers inthe <strong>Arab</strong> regionand the number ofscientific publicationsproduced thereARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION201


Social scienceresearch holds aspecial significancein the <strong>Arab</strong> researchand innovation scenebecause it addresseslocal issues thatdirectly touch on theconcerns and realitiesof <strong>Arab</strong> citizensDespite theproliferation ofcolleges of social andhuman sciences, aswell as public andprivate researchcentres, socialscience remainsthe “poor cousin”of <strong>Arab</strong> researchand is not paidsufficient attentionin knowledge reportson the <strong>Arab</strong> nationvarious dimensions of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesociety, to remain the unchangingfoundation for such development, orfor quantitative criteria to be the soledeciding factor for all knowledge and allsocieties. The significance of this attemptwill be obvious from the fact that effortsaimed at analysing the conditions of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance and identifying itsgaps require that we pay close attention tothe existing vestiges of its earlier forms,despite the methodological quandaries andother issues that this poses.This section brings research in thehuman and social sciences together witheverything that is generally classified inthe broadest sense as culture, includingthe products of what we have grownaccustomed to calling artistic innovation(novels, the fine arts, cinema, and soforth). This combined perspective, webelieve, allows us to view knowledge froman angle commensurate with the nature ofthe output in circulation in contemporary<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge circles. It also will allowus to examine at close quarters the limitednature of existing innovation and thelegitimacy of the aspiration to discovermeans of knowledge production thatcorrespond to the various forms ofsymbolic production and epistemologicalactivity currently present in society andwhich express its aspirations. It will alsoallow us an opportunity to consider waysof raising this vital knowledge componentto a higher plane.SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCHSocial science research holds a specialsignificance in the <strong>Arab</strong> research andinnovation scene because it addresses localissues that directly touch on the concernsand realities of <strong>Arab</strong> citizens. Yet despitethe proliferation of colleges of social andhuman sciences, as well as public and privateresearch centres, social science remains the“poor cousin” of <strong>Arab</strong> research and isnot paid sufficient attention in knowledgereports on the <strong>Arab</strong> nation. This stems inpart from the difficulty in determining thescope of social and human science researchin the <strong>Arab</strong> region. Yet the available datasuggest a weakness in production anddissemination, and in quantity and inquality, compared to research in basic andapplied sciences. Maghreb countries showthe highest output of social and humansciences research, whereas Egypt andthe Mashreq (eastern) <strong>Arab</strong> countries arecharacterised by relative stagnation in thisfield (El Kenz, 2005, in French). Takingthe total number of projects supported inall fields in Lebanon, for example, we findthat support for projects in human andsocial science research did not exceed 9 percent at the American University in Beirutand 5 per cent at the National Councilfor Scientific Research. 22 The situationis comparable in most <strong>Arab</strong> countries.The reason for this may not lie in a lackof financial or human resources, or in theabsence of research priorities tied to thedaily concerns of members of society, butin weak academic incentives for researchersand university professors especially in thefields of the human and social sciences.Researchers in the social sciencesprefer to conduct their research outsidethe frameworks usually relied upon byresearchers in basic and applied sciences,and outside of government institutions.This may allow for productive research inthorny social issues. Although universitiescontinue to play a primary role in socialscience research in the Maghreb, Syria,Libya, and Lebanon, more than 80 percent of social science research is producedthrough research centres or consultativeagencies outside of universities, especiallyin Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt, and tosome degree in the countries of the Gulf.The interests of researchers in thesocial and human sciences focus mostlyon literature, law, and history, followedby sociology and then economics andpolitical science. The ranking of the humansciences in published studies supported byWestern funding agencies has changed,in that publications in political science,economics, history, and Islamic studieshave increased, but those in sociology202 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


and anthropology have decreased (Hanafi,2008). The topics addressed in the socialand human sciences in the <strong>Arab</strong> regioninclude development, democracy, socialtransformations, migration, governance,gender, violence, and Islamic movements.These studies have replaced studies ofsocial class and the problematics of humansociety.THE ARABIC LANGUAGE ANDINNOVATIONOne of the most important signs ofdevelopment in <strong>Arab</strong> social and humanscience research is that the numberof <strong>Arab</strong>ic-language publications in theMaghreb increased by 60 per cent between1980 and 2007, while French-languagepublications formed only 30 per cent. Thisimprovement did not include basic andapplied science research, which continuedto rely upon foreign languages (Figure5-9). Among 34,000 papers published byresearchers in the Maghreb during the lastdecade, French was the most commonlyused language, out-ranking <strong>Arab</strong>ic (Figure5-10). As for the Mashreq (eastern)<strong>Arab</strong> countries, with the exception ofFIGURE 5-9Percentage of <strong>Arab</strong>ic language-use in research paperspublished in the Maghreb, 1980-2007Climate changeWomenModern historyPolitical crisisAgricultureCitiesBerber languageDemocratic associationsSource: Waast et al., 2007, in French.InstitutionsCultural life1Lebanon and Palestine, the overwhelmingmajority of research papers in the humansciences were published in <strong>Arab</strong>ic, whichexplains the dearth of <strong>Arab</strong> social science0.80.60.40.2In <strong>Arab</strong>ic0AndalusiaLawHistoryLiteratureCommercial lawLiberation movementsEducationPolitical partiesCultural heritageSystems and lawsIn FrenchFIGURE 5-10Languages used in human and social science research publicationsin the Maghreb, 2007Spanish20%English15%Other Languages3%French42%Among 34,000papers published byresearchers in theMaghreb duringthe last decade,French was themost commonlyused language,out-ranking <strong>Arab</strong>ic<strong>Arab</strong>ic20%Source: ESTIME Programme, 2007ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION203


Most <strong>Arab</strong>ic-languageperiodicals in thesocial sciences are ofextremely poor qualityby global standards,are highly local innature, and do notadhere to neutralpeer-review methodsIf we distributed allthe books publishedevery year among thepopulation, for every11,950 <strong>Arab</strong> citizensthere would be onebook, whereas therewould be one bookfor every 491 Britishcitizens and every713 Spanish citizenspublications in global databases. A surveyof twenty-two journals published during2007 in the USA, Canada, and Europe,four of which were specialised in the <strong>Arab</strong>region, showed that only two studies werepublished by <strong>Arab</strong> researchers residingin <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Yet most <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguageperiodicals in the social sciencesare of extremely poor quality by globalstandards, are highly local in nature, and donot adhere to neutral peer-review methods(Hanafi, 2008).In summary, the development ofthe human and social sciences in the<strong>Arab</strong> world remains dependent on thefostering of an enabling environment forknowledge that guarantees the freedom ofexpression and the flow of informationand strengthens the political participationof both citizens and researchers. Whileit is true that some <strong>Arab</strong> countries haveseen promising activity in human andsocial science research, it is also true thatthis improvement remains much weakerthan the development of research in thebasic sciences and technology. It is alsoironic that while Western agencies showincreased interest in social sciences in the<strong>Arab</strong> world and offer direct and generousfunding for it, such interest is absent among<strong>Arab</strong> governments and institutions. Thusthe increasing marginalisation of socialscience research drives serious researcherstowards increasing dependence on foreignprogrammes and funding.LITERARY AND ARTISTICINNOVATIONArtistic and literary production occupiesa knowledge space that is intimatelylinked to reality. It constitutes theoreticalactivity based on the employment of theimagination to create symbolic worldsimbued with open-ended and creativeresonance. It reformulates an imaginaryreality that may not bow to digital systems orpositivist logic, but which rather constructsadditional spaces that enrich the mindand the soul. The knowledge society forwhich we aim must go beyond quantifiablescientific knowledge to embrace creativeknowledge in all its literary, artistic, andcultural forms. Unlike the sciences andtechnology, artistic innovation contributesto enriching the symbolic existenceof humankind. Despite differences indefinitions, concepts, processes, andresults, creative knowledge forms a primarycomponent of contemporary humanknowledge and an element of regenerationfor its concepts and tools. While the effectof a painting, piece of music, novel, poem,or play cannot be quantitatively measured,a statistical measure of the number ofliterary writers, musicians, and theatreprofessionals provides a general idea ofthe scope of cultural activity, although itfails to capture the human and aestheticdimensions of creative production.Contemporary studies of how conceptsare passed on within widely separated fieldsof knowledge have shown that conceptssignificantly increase in value as they aretransferred from one field of knowledgeto another.<strong>Arab</strong> cultural production faces numerouschallenges related to the climate of freedomand stability, the need for sustainedinstitutional and financial support, and theneed to raise the awareness of the public(see Chapter 2). Among its most prominentchallenges are the limited publicationof books in proportion to the <strong>Arab</strong>icreadingpopulation and the weak quality ofthese books, and, more significantly, theextremely limited base of actual readersamong the <strong>Arab</strong>ic-reading population.On average, the individual <strong>Arab</strong> readsvery little annually. The first <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Report</strong>on Cultural Development, published bythe <strong>Arab</strong> Thought Foundation, states that“if we distributed all the books publishedevery year among the population, for every11,950 <strong>Arab</strong> citizens there would be onebook, whereas there would be one bookfor every 491 British citizens and every 713Spanish citizens. This means that the <strong>Arab</strong>citizen’s share in published books equals4 per cent of the British citizen’s shareand 5 per cent of the Spanish citizen’s”(Mu’assasat al-Fikr al-’<strong>Arab</strong>i, 2008, in204 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


<strong>Arab</strong>ic). Aversion to reading is connectedto a high illiteracy rate, low purchasingpower, low quality of education, and thelack of cultural development plans, allof which facilitate the spread of easier,simpler, and less costly commercial mediawhose knowledge content becomes centralto mainstream culture.As for <strong>Arab</strong> architecture, it faces theproblem of the relationship between localarchitectural heritage and contemporaryarchitectural concepts and technologies.And yet the experiences of innovativearchitects have been a success whenthey have been able to strengthen therelationship between heritage and theproduction, industry, and technologymarkets. In contrast, certain attemptsto transfer or copy architectural modelsthat do not take <strong>Arab</strong> particularities intoconsideration have failed.In contrast, the cinema scene is bothlively and full of variety. <strong>Arab</strong> cinema hasa lengthy history that began in the earlytwentieth century in Egypt, which stillremains the leader of <strong>Arab</strong> cinematicproduction today. <strong>Arab</strong> interest in cinemahas expanded since then, however, toinclude Morocco, Lebanon, and someGulf countries, which now have advancedcinema production studios. <strong>Arab</strong> cinematicBOX 5-9As set forth in his book Building with the People, 23Hasan Fathi’s view of the relation betweenarchitecture and the human led him to establishan alternative form of architecture that rejectsthe copying of Western buildings. In Egyptianrural architecture he found artistic, technical, andenvironmental solutions for facilitating daily life andmaintaining a relationship with the land.The second half of the twentieth century ismarked by the pioneering experience of the lateRahbani brothers, Asi and Mansur, which culminatedin their collaboration with the enchanting voice ofFairuz, imprinted in the imagination of successivegenerations as an accompaniment to their joys,sorrows, rituals, and longings. The Rahbani schoolhas had a radical impact on Lebanese art in itsreliance on short songs, subtle vocal expression, andhigh-level orchestral and theatrical performance,TABLE 5-10CountryFairuz and the Rahbani brothersproductions participate in internationalfestivals even as some <strong>Arab</strong> countriescontinue to ban public movie theatres.A telling sign that cultural and artisticinnovation is opening up in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldis the growing number of cinema screensand audiences. Data on cinema audiencesshows that Egypt, Bahrain, and Moroccotake the lead with regard to the seven<strong>Arab</strong> countries for which detailed data isavailable in both the number of viewersand their ratio to the number of cinemas(Figure 5-10). In so far as film-making is a<strong>Arab</strong> Innovators in Architecture and MusicSizes of cinema audiences and numbersof cinema screens, 2004-2005Size of audience(in millions)The works of Rif‘at Chadirji are characterisedby a deep theoretical and practical assimilation oflocal roots of expression and their translation intothe technical terms of modernity. Chadirji has alsomade theoretical and critical contributions throughhis writings that address debates in the field ofarchitecture and has established an annual award forpioneering <strong>Arab</strong> architects.as well as inspiring poetic images and a revival ofLebanese rural heritage in compositions that varyfrom the romantic and traditional to the modern.After performing hundreds of their songs and scoresof musical plays every year, and after exploring newvocal horizons with her son Ziyad, Fairuz remainsan innovator today. She shines in the hearts ofher public, remaining at the heart of public taste,despite the shifts in generations, technologies, andartistic preferences.CinemascreensNumber of cinemagoers (in thousands)per cinema screenEgypt 26.8 250 107.2Bahrain 1.3 26 48.1Morocco 3.8 115 33.2United <strong>Arab</strong> Emirates 6.3 202 31.4Lebanon 2.1 87 24.1Tunisia 0.3 29 10.3Algeria 0.7 69 10.1Source: The European Audiovisual Observatory, www.obs.coe.int, 15 December 2008A telling sign thatcultural and artisticinnovation isopening up in the<strong>Arab</strong> world is thegrowing numberof cinema screensand audiencesARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION205


<strong>Arab</strong> societies arefilled with examplesof distinguishedliterary and artisticexpression of thehighest standards,but these continue tobe disproportionatelysmall in comparisonto the size of the<strong>Arab</strong> world and therange of its naturaland human capacitiesThe delivery ofcreative productsto the people andtheir disseminationthroughout the<strong>Arab</strong> world remainrestricted by thelimited nature of itsfreedoms and themeagreness of itsopening up to andcommunicativenesswith both insideand outsidemass art, the flourishing of a commercial,consumer-oriented cinema sets the patternfor public taste, and it is a pattern that, inthis case, makes no contribution to thedevelopment of the cinema as an art form.Films recorded on video and compactdisc in violation of intellectual propertylaws have contributed significantly to thedecreasing percentage of the public thatattend <strong>Arab</strong> cinemas.The issue of freedom of expressionarises more often in the fields of culturaland artistic innovation than it does in thepure sciences, due to the latter’s directconnection to political issues, to the public,and to people of all social and culturallevels, as well as to the ease and speedof its dissemination and the possibilityof its transmission through the modernmedia. The danger lies in the possibilityof innovators adapting to the intellectuallimits placed upon them by modern media,and in persecution. “Exile” literatureand music flourish as a result becauseinnovators are drawn abroad; they migrateto the broad spaces of freedom in order toexpress their innovation honestly, daringly,and distinctively. Although <strong>Arab</strong> societiesare filled with examples of distinguishedliterary and artistic expression of thehighest standards, these continue to bedisproportionately small in comparison tothe size of the <strong>Arab</strong> world and the rangeof its natural and human capacities. Thedelivery of creative products to the peopleand their dissemination throughout the<strong>Arab</strong> world remain restricted by the limitednature of its freedoms and the meagrenessof its opening up to and communicativenesswith both inside and outside.THE INNOVATION GAP ANDITS INDICATORS IN THECURRENT STATE OF ARABKNOWLEDGETHE INNOVATION GAPAwareness of and interest in investmentin research and innovation as pillars ofknowledge have increased in <strong>Arab</strong> countriessince the early 1980s. <strong>Arab</strong> scientificresearch centres have made consistent andnoticeable progress in all specialisations,and whereas in the mid-twentieth centuryonly Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Lebanonhad research centres and institutions, nowmost <strong>Arab</strong> countries have them. When<strong>Arab</strong>s were once entirely absent from theglobal arena of scientific publishing, theirpublications now constitute up to 1.1 percent of the world’s total (TWAS, 2005).This presence, even though modest, isa step in the right direction. Most peerreviewedscientific publications come froma small number of <strong>Arab</strong> countries, Egyptat their head, and a significant portion ofit consists of joint scientific publicationsbetween <strong>Arab</strong> researchers and researchersfrom Europe and the USA.According to UNESCO’s definition,“scientific research and developmentincludes all innovative activities carried outaccording to a methodology and systematicprocedures with the aim of enriching thestore of human knowledge, which embracesknowledge of man, of nature, of culture,and of society, and makes use of this storeof knowledge in pioneering applicationsto serve holistic human development.” Itis now widely accepted that the concept ofscience encompasses the natural sciences,engineering, agriculture, medicine,technology, the social and human sciences,and a society’s cultural heritage (UNESCO,2005, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).The primary mission of the sciencesis to find solutions to problems facedby humankind. Advanced technologiesmeanwhile drive the process of change,while innovation is the true indicator ofa shift to the stage of effective impact inthe areas of social action and production.Policies in many countries have mandatedscientific research as a means of producinginnovation and developing the production,service, environment, and public healthsectors. Yet innovation is not to bemeasured only in terms of the outcomesof research, for it is an active processcharacterised by dynamism and openness,and its sustainability depends on its ability206 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


to attract a number of invested partners atall stages.Available data show a large increase inthe number of universities, colleges, andinstitutes, as well as scientific researchcentres and institutions of variousspecialisations and capacities. Thesedata also show a growing number ofresearchers, technicians, engineers, andarchitects working in scientific endeavours,as well as a slight increase in spending onscientific research in countries such asQatar, Tunisia, Morocco, and some of theGulf Cooperation Council countries thathave begun to invest greater interest in theknowledge sector. Yet despite the positivedevelopments made on the research andinnovation pillar index in some <strong>Arab</strong>countries over recent years, especially inquantitative terms, performance remainsthe weakest point in current <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge, and the scientific researchand innovation gap between the <strong>Arab</strong>region and the rest of the advanced worldremains the clearest, deepest, and mostdangerous.The <strong>Arab</strong> world’s spending on scientificresearch in relation to <strong>Arab</strong> GNP isthe global lowest, and its research anddevelopment institutions have weak tiesto production cycles. The developmentimpact of <strong>Arab</strong> scientific research is outof proportion in its weakness to theannual <strong>Arab</strong> expenditure of two billionUSD, which from 2002 to 2006 producedonly about 38 invention patents, 14.8 ofwhich were from Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and 5,000scientific papers. 24 Expenditure in the<strong>Arab</strong> world on scientific research hoveredat around 0.2 per cent of GDP and waslimited almost entirely to the governmentsector; the private sector played almost norole in this regard, for its view of scientificresearch remains limited to its potentialeconomic significance. In developed statesin contrast, the matter is entirely different,with an average spending of 2.5 per centof GDP on research and development,and with 80 per cent of funding comingfrom the private sector (Al-Mu’assasa al-’<strong>Arab</strong>iyya lil-’Ulum Wal-Tiknulujya, 2008,in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).Rates of <strong>Arab</strong> human capital flight andmigration of skills are among the highestworldwide. A total of 45 per cent of <strong>Arab</strong>students who study abroad do not return totheir home countries after obtaining theiruniversity degrees because of the <strong>Arab</strong>political and intellectual environment thatrepels innovation and creative individuals.The irony is that <strong>Arab</strong> countries celebratethe achievements of successful <strong>Arab</strong>migrants more than they do success storiesat home.These facts on <strong>Arab</strong> innovativeperformance confirm that it is impossibleto remain silent over the need to changethese circumstances if our goal is toimprove <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance anddevelop a positive connection to the globalknowledge arena. The greatest challengesfacing the <strong>Arab</strong> countries with regard toknowledge include the following:• Modernising the environment andstructures of innovation.• Possession of scientific knowledge andproduction of advanced technology,cultural knowledge, and knowledgein the area of the human sciencesthrough more generous investment inresearch and development and throughsetting policies for the indigenisationof science and the creation of anatmosphere conducive to innovationand innovators.• Realisation of partnerships betweengovernment, private research centres,and institutions that benefit from theoutcomes of innovation, with the goalof improving scientific research andemploying its applications in ways thatsupport production and developmentcycles.FLIGHT OF HUMAN CAPITALThe flight of human capital forms animportant component of the flow ofknowledge in the age of globalisation, andis affected by both the push and the pullelements of its enabling environments.The attitudes of countries toward humanDespite the positivedevelopments madeon the researchand innovationpillar index in some<strong>Arab</strong> countries,“innovation” remainsthe weakest pointin current <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge statusA total of 45 per centof <strong>Arab</strong> studentswho study abroaddo not return totheir home countriesafter obtainingtheir universitydegrees because ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> politicaland intellectualenvironment thatrepels innovation andcreative individualsARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION207


Human capitalis among <strong>Arab</strong>countries’ majorexports, possiblyequalling oil andgas in valueBOX 5-10<strong>Arab</strong> human capital flight createsan opportunity not only to obtainfinancial resources, but also to transferknowledge via migrants. This is the goalof the TOKTEN programme launchedby the UNDP in 1977, in an attemptto turn “brain drain” into “brain gain.”The TOKTEN programme began bysurveying <strong>Arab</strong> human capital foundabroad, developing a database ofinformation on these professionals’academic and practical experience,establishing a network of directrelations between them and their homecountries, and supporting the costs oftheir travel home for limited periods.TOKTEN is an arm of internationaltechnical cooperation relations thataims to lessen the negative effects ofhuman capital flight. It is characterisedby an open attitude to home societiesand relies on the ties of sharedlanguage and tradition, the feelings thatmigrants hold for their homelands, andtheir desire to return favours to them,especially since most of these migrantswere raised in their homelands andcompleted their education in them. Thecapital flight has changed over time, forthe need for skills, experience, and humanresources has grown considerably during thelast ten years all over the world, including inEurope and the USA, which are no longercapable of generating sufficient skills locallyand thus have begun to search for themelsewhere, and particularly in developingcountries. These global orientationsstrengthen the notion of “stealing” humancapital, including those <strong>Arab</strong> humanintellectual assets that are prepared tomigrate to countries of the North.The <strong>Arab</strong> region is considered one ofthe most active in terms of the export ofhighly qualified human capital equippedwith university degrees. Indeed, humancapital is among its major exports, possiblyequalling oil and gas in value. The little dataavailable on this indicates that 45 per centof <strong>Arab</strong> students who study abroad do notreturn to their home countries, that 34 percent of skilled doctors in Britain are <strong>Arab</strong>s,and that the <strong>Arab</strong> world has contributed<strong>Knowledge</strong> Transfer via Migrant ScientistsSource: Muhammad ‘Arif, background paper for the <strong>Report</strong>, in <strong>Arab</strong>icnumber of experts who have servedtheir countries through the programmeover the last decade is over 4,000; theyhave also offered consultative servicesto government agencies and the privatesector, and some of them have returnedto live in their home countries. Lebanonand Palestine are the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesthat have benefited most from thisprogramme.Other networks like TOKTENexist that connect scientific andintellectual communities abroad withtheir home countries, some of whichwere established by <strong>Arab</strong> scientificand academic communities abroad,such as the network of Maghrebresearchers living in France (Migrationet Recherche) and the <strong>Arab</strong> Scientistsand Technologists Abroad network.With UNDP-support, the PalestinianMinistry of Planning and InternationalCooperation launched in the 1990s thePalestinian Scientists and TechnologistsAbroad (PALESTA) network, and thishas developed a database on 1,200Palestinian diaspora scientists.31 per cent of the skilled migration fromdeveloping states to the West, including50 per cent of doctors, 23 per cent ofengineers, and 15 per cent of scientists(Zahlan, 2004). 25The data in Table 5-11 differentiatestwo groupings of <strong>Arab</strong> countries on thebasis of their ability to attract or repelnational skills and talents. 26 According tothe official indictor for measuring humancapital flight, the first group, which scoredbetween 3.5 and 7 points and includes sixoil-producing Gulf countries and Tunisia,are the countries capable of holding onto innovative national human capital. Thesecond group includes six <strong>Arab</strong> countries,including Algeria and Egypt, that areincapable of persuading human scientificcapital to remain in its home country. Five<strong>Arab</strong> countries that are not included in thetable suffer from chronic human capitalflight due to their political and securitycrises and the deterioration of their livingconditions. These are Lebanon, Sudan,Iraq, Yemen, and Palestine.Opinions concerning the desirability ofhuman capital flight from the <strong>Arab</strong> regionvary; some consider it a curse, othersa blessing. Human capital flight offersemployment opportunities to universitygraduates whom domestic markets cannotabsorb, and secures important financialresources that range between 5 and 10per cent of the GDP of some <strong>Arab</strong>countries. The financial remittances sentby <strong>Arab</strong> migrants are considered amongthe most important factors contributing todevelopment and the provision of foreigncurrency in a large number of impoverished<strong>Arab</strong> countries. The total sum of financialremittances sent to the <strong>Arab</strong> region in 2006was over 25 billion USD. 27Finally, attention must be drawn tothe movement of <strong>Arab</strong> skills and humancapital within the <strong>Arab</strong> world. Thisphenomenon is new to <strong>Arab</strong> intellectuallife and can be viewed in the context ofinter-<strong>Arab</strong> cooperation, allowing us tospeak of a circulation of human capitalrather than human capital flight. Thefinancial incentives and stable political208 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


and security conditions offered by oilproducing<strong>Arab</strong> countries have becomea pull factor for <strong>Arab</strong> and global humancapital that competes with the attractionsof Western states. Moreover, these oilproducingcountries are in close geographicproximity to a number of <strong>Arab</strong> countriesthat are incapable of holding on to theirhuman capital. The circulation of <strong>Arab</strong>human capital has in recent years helped todevelop Gulf universities and knowledgebasedand research institutions that in turnhave helped to improve <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. The circulation of <strong>Arab</strong>human capital is an alternative in the fieldof knowledge to the flight of humancapital from the <strong>Arab</strong> region. For the sakeof objectivity, it must be acknowledged thatthe movement of scientists within the <strong>Arab</strong>world is, overall, a positive phenomenon:it does not deplete the store of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge but maintains it and contributesto its circulation and development.TABLE 5-11CountryHuman capital flight index 28Human capital flight(scale of 1-7)Most migrationSyria 2.3Egypt 2.3Mauritania 2.4Algeria 2.4Jordan 2.8Morocco 3.1Oman 3.9Tunisia 3.9Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 4.6Bahrain 4.7Kuwait 5.4UAE 5.6Qatar 5.7Least migrationSource: World Bank, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), 2008THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMICIMPACT OF INNOVATIONProduction in the fields of knowledge,science, and technology is not sufficientto guarantee the application of thatBOX 5-11Among the <strong>Arab</strong> examples of successful cooperationbetween scientists and the industrial sector in<strong>Arab</strong> Gulf countries are the partnerships betweenKing Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology(KACST) and pharmaceutical companies, andbetween Aramco and Saudi academic institutionsand universities (120 projects in 2002), as well asthe cooperation between Sultan Qaboos Universityand the Muscat <strong>Knowledge</strong> Oasis, between theKuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) andthe Kuwaiti oil company, among Zayed University,IBM corporation, and the Innovation Centre in theDubai Internet City (Smart Square), and amongUAE University and several petroleum companiesand aluminium factories.As part of its cooperation with the <strong>Arab</strong> Scienceand Technology Foundation in al-Shariqa, AbdulLatif Jamil Limited, a Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ian company,production to the relevant economicsectors. The transfer of knowledge froman innovator to a beneficiary consists ofmany complicated stages. These includethe assimilation of new developments andtheir positioning within frameworks thatCorporate Funding of Research and Developmenthas offered since 2005 competitive funding forprojects proposed by <strong>Arab</strong> researchers workingin technological research and development. Thevalue of support offered annually to each projectis $50,000, totalling a sum of a million dollars offunding a year for research in the medical sciences,engineering, and other related applied sciences.Intellectual property rights and patents ensuingfrom this research follow specific programmeregulations. To date, funding has been provided forfifty-three projects, and cooperation between theinstitute and the company has been ongoing forfour years. In addition, a third of the Abdul Latifgrants are to be allocated for research proposals thatput forth solutions to problems faced by the poor,which supports the idea adopted by this report, thatknowledge should be used for development.The movement ofscientists withinthe <strong>Arab</strong> world is,overall, a positivephenomenon: it doesnot deplete the storeof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgebut maintains itand contributes toits circulation anddevelopmentSource: The <strong>Arab</strong> Science and Technology Foundation/the Abdul Latif Jamil Grant for Funding Scientific Research and Innovation in Technology in the <strong>Arab</strong> World,http://www.astf.net/site/arabic/zone/zone.asp?ogzid=10195; King Abdel Aziz City for Science and Technology, http://www.kacst.edu.sa/ar/default_ar.aspx; KuwaitInstitute for Scientific Research, http://www.kisr.edu.kw/default.aspx?pageId=104.ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION209


TABLE 5-12Trade in technological productsCountrySupply chainpresence(scale of 1-7), 12007Hi-tech exportsas a percentage ofall manufacturedexports, 2005 1Total trade inmanufactured goods(percentage of GDP), 12005Venturecapitalavailability(scale of 1-7) 2Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 4.3 1.3 20.8 3.7Kuwait 3.4 1.0 19.0 3.8UAE 3.9 10.2 74.7 4.3Qatar 3.9 1.2 25.5 4.1Bahrain 3.5 2.0 25.5 4.0Oman 4.4 2.2 .. 4.1During the last twodecades, the <strong>Arab</strong>world investedapproximately$4,000 billion ingross fixed capitalformation and morethan $1,000 billionin human resources,without these majorinvestments leadingto growth at thesame rates in the GNPAlgeria 2.6 1.0 15.6 2.2Egypt 3.9 0.6 14.7 3.4Tunisia 4.4 4.9 63.2 3.8Morocco 3.8 10.1 37.7 3.0Syria 3.9 1.0 22.2 2.5Lebanon .. 2.4 32.9 ..Jordan 3.9 5.2 72.0 3.4Mauritania 2.8 .. 18.9 2.2Malaysia 5.0 54.7 151.0 4.2Turkey 4.3 1.5 38.6 2.5Sources: 1 World Bank, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), 2008, on 10 June 2008; 2 The World Economic Forum, 2008b.facilitate their adjustment and applicationto new innovative fields that ultimatelyform the practical measure of the social andeconomic impact of acquired knowledge.The ability of countries to earn economicand social returns on knowledge in generalis measured by the Competitive IndustrialPerformance index, which focuses,according to the United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organisation (UNIDO)on four indicators: manufacturing valueadded per capita; manufacturing exportsper capita; share of medium- and hightechactivities in manufacturing valueadded; and the share of medium- and hightechproducts in manufactured exports(UNIDO, 2003).One <strong>Arab</strong> expert estimates that, duringthe last two decades, the <strong>Arab</strong> worldinvested approximately $4,000 billion ingross fixed capital formation and morethan $1,000 billion in human resources,without these major investments leadingto growth at the same rates in the GNP(Zahlan, 2004).Reviewing the <strong>Arab</strong> WorldCompetitiveness <strong>Report</strong> 2007 and the2008 World Bank indices, we see noticeableimprovement by Gulf countries on theglobal competitiveness index. The <strong>Arab</strong>World Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong> placedthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries within three groups,the third of which comprised fortystates worldwide with innovation-driveneconomies that are in the third stage ofdevelopment and which included four<strong>Arab</strong> countries (UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, andBahrain). The second group, comprisingcountries with efficiency-driven economies,included five <strong>Arab</strong> countries (Tunisia,Oman, Jordan, Libya, and Algeria), withEgypt, Syria, Morocco, and Mauritaniaholding various ranks in the first group,which comprises countries with factor-210 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


driven economies that are in the first stageof development (World Economic Forum,2007, in <strong>Arab</strong>ic).The readiness of <strong>Arab</strong> productionand service institutions for innovation ismeasured by a number of indicators (Table5-12) that can be analysed as follows.• The percentage of GDP made up ofmanufactured exports is declining inmost <strong>Arab</strong> countries when comparedwith otherwise similar countries, withthe exception of the UAE, where suchexports account for 75 per cent of alltrade, and Jordan and Tunisia, where itcomprises 72 per cent and 63 per centrespectively. Perhaps the reasons forthe success of these countries is theincreased number of free industrialzones and preferential trade partnershipagreements with European Unioncountries, the USA, and some Asianemerging economies .• According to World Bank statistics, theUAE rated highest for hi-tech exportsas a percentage of all manufacturedexports (10.2 per cent), followed byMorocco (10.1 per cent) and Jordan(5.2 per cent).• Most <strong>Arab</strong> countries score positiveyet average rankings with regard totheir supply chain presence via theirengagement with the post-extractionstages of materials or their production,including the design and marketing ofproducts and the provision of postsaleservices. This is due to the growingconviction in the private sector that thecompetency of production institutionsin assimilating new technologiesmust improve in order to maintaincompetitive positions in local andglobal markets.• The position of most <strong>Arab</strong> countrieshovers around the mid-point on the“venture capital availability” index, 29with positive exceptions in the UAE,Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. This midpointranking indicates the persistenceof cautious policies among investors in<strong>Arab</strong> countries and their hesitancy toinvest in new, innovative projects. Somesigns of change are, however, beginningto appear, as manifested in initiativessponsored by newly developed Gulfcountries to bring together innovative<strong>Arab</strong> researchers and venture capitalistsin the region to fund the shift frominnovative projects to production.THE DISSEMINATIONOF KNOWLEDGE ANDINNOVATIONOutside of educational institutions, <strong>Arab</strong>countries have made only modest effortsto transfer knowledge to the general publicor to transfer either locally produced orimported knowledge to the productionand service sectors. The mechanismsof knowledge transfer remain limited innumber and type, and even more so inimpact on mainstream society. Among themost prominent mechanisms that haveproved their viability and positive impactfor the transfer of knowledge in newlydeveloped and industrialised states alike arethe following: industrial and technologicalcities; joint programmes between scientificresearch institutions and production sectors;business incubators; business developmentcentres; specialised centres of excellence;houses of expertise; standardisationbodies; quality assurance certificates;general and specialised scientific media andinformation diffusion centres; internationaltrade points; export promotion centres;industrial subcontracting centres; andexhibitions, seminars, and conferences,in addition to well-qualified and capablechambers of commerce and industry, andprofessional unions.There is insufficient information onthese mechanisms in <strong>Arab</strong> countries toallow a study of their development overtime, especially with regard to efficiencyand effectiveness. Nevertheless, a numberof signs demonstrate a growing interest insuch things, such as the organisation of anumber of global technology exhibitions,organised by production or importcompanies, especially in the Gulf countriesor Egypt, as well as major projects forOutside ofeducationalinstitutions, <strong>Arab</strong>countries have madeonly modest efforts totransfer knowledgeto the general publicor to transfer eitherlocally produced orimported knowledgeto the productionand service sectorsWith the exceptionof the UAE, thepercentage ofGDP made up ofmanufactured exportsis declining in most<strong>Arab</strong> countrieswhen comparedwith otherwisesimilar countriesARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION211


It is ironic thatalthough the <strong>Arab</strong>world contains awealth of skilledprofessionals andhuman capital,it is incapable ofdeploying thiswealth optimallyin production anddevelopmentIf a generalplan to improve<strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance is to beproposed, the startingpoint lies in a movefrom the currentmajor dependence onnatural resources andan attempt instead tobuild a new economythe construction of industrial cities thatfocus on the establishment of industrialinfrastructure. However, these do notinclude the required mechanisms to select,transfer, and indigenise technology.In the Maghreb and some Gulfcountries, there are signs that some nationalcompanies and institutions are becomingconvinced of the importance of investingin innovation by focusing on the training ofspecialised human resources, transferringand indigenising technology, and relying onlocal expertise. Thus in recent years, someGulf countries have established strategicpartnerships with a number of the world’sbest universities with the aim of establishingbranches in the Gulf. Examples includethe King Abdullah University of Scienceand Technology, Education City in Qatar,and the Dubai <strong>Knowledge</strong> Village. Thesepartnerships include the establishmentof specialised departments for scientificresearch in advanced fields of knowledge,as well as establishing research partnershipsto form a “coalition of great minds, grandideas, and daring ambitions, as a forumfor thinkers from the East and West thatwill allow them to overcome the limits ofgeography, culture, and specialisation” inscientific research. While it is still early tojudge these initiatives and their impact onthe production of knowledge in the region,these are truly innovative initiatives, and itis hoped that they will include specific andrealistic mechanisms for guaranteeing theirsustainability, transferring the knowledgeproduced within them to the <strong>Arab</strong> world,and indigenising this knowledge in <strong>Arab</strong>institutions and society.BOOSTING ARAB RESEARCHAND INNOVATIONPERFORMANCEThe innovation pillar forms a major weakpoint in <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance.It is ironic that although the <strong>Arab</strong> worldcontains a wealth of skilled professionalsand human capital, it is incapableof deploying this wealth optimally inproduction and development. This ironyposes questions that can no longer beignored: How has it been possible to makea relative quantitative breakthrough inthe higher education system without thatreflecting positively on innovative researchactivities? How is it possible to conceiveof innovation without accumulatingknowledge through scientific research?How can policies be devised for sustainabledevelopment, social security, and increasedcompetitiveness without building on targetorientedscientific research programmes?How can scientific knowledge be built upwithout linking it to <strong>Arab</strong> and global storesof knowledge? How should we thinkabout the preceding questions in light ofthe gaps in data, statistics, and indicators?How is it possible to be content to benefitfrom information and communicationstechnologies without contributing to theirproduction and development? How canwe think about a qualitative breakthroughin research and development withoutestablishing an effective partnershipbetween the public and private sectors andamong the constituencies of society, bothmen and women?Perhaps no convincing answers to thesequestions exist, but it is time that they wereposed and thought given to them. If ageneral plan to improve <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance is to be proposed, the startingpoint lies in a move from the current majordependence on natural resources and anattempt instead to build a new economy.This would be based on knowledge andrely on the following pillars:• A large repertoire of human andintellectual capital based on a cultureof competency and quality; a critical,capable, and proactive approach tothinking, and the capacity to deal withthe complicated demands of a societythat is growing increasingly dependenton knowledge.• An efficient institutional systemcharacterised by clearly defined andinnovative mechanisms that functionin effective and enabling environmentscapable of achieving knowledge growthand sustainable social development.212 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


• Real and deep-rooted development in<strong>Arab</strong> education and scientific research,including a sufficient store of investmentto guarantee quality education, thelocal production of knowledge, theassimilation and indigenisation ofimported knowledge, and the rise of aculture that encourages innovation andinitiative.• Planning for the gradual transfer to aneconomy based on knowledge. This isa long-term ambition that requires anew, innovative, initiative-taking <strong>Arab</strong>mindset based on a positive approachto dealing with information and itstechnologies, highly competitiveskills, professionalism in labor andproduction, and commitment toprofessional ethics.Any strategy for improving <strong>Arab</strong>innovation and research performance mustfollow two parallel approaches. One is theshort- and mid-term rationalization approachthat requires infusing key economic sectorswith high-level technology, with the goal ofgenerating added values to their outputsand absorbing imported innovations. Theother is the long-term innovative approachthat revolves around indigenising new andadvanced technology and then partneringin its local production. This strategy mustdraw on the general development goals ofeach <strong>Arab</strong> state, be accompanied by <strong>Arab</strong>cooperation in knowledge, and form alinked extension of the global knowledgestore (see Chapter 6).If scientific research and innovationsuffer from a lack of funding in the <strong>Arab</strong>region, the time has come for the <strong>Arab</strong>private sector to provide it, not only asa national duty but as a necessity if theregion is to be propelled in the directionof globalism. Numerous other methodsexist for the funding of innovation. Forexample, one of the possible means ofsecuring additional resources for scientificand innovative activity is to impose a feeof no more than one US cent per cellularphone call to be drawn automatically byoperating companies and transferred to ajoint fund to support scientific research.The goal of this direct participationin funding scientific research, howevermodest it may be, would be to achievean added value that would contribute toimproving <strong>Arab</strong> innovative performance.A research and innovation strategyrequires the ordering of priorities in away that addresses the concerns shared bymost <strong>Arab</strong> countries and which faithfullyreflects the consensus of <strong>Arab</strong> and globalliterature in this field. Improving innovationperformance, like improving knowledgeperformance, requires a political decision.This must be supported by vision and willthat move in the direction of an openingup to democracy, political reform, andthe liberation of intellectual and academicfreedoms that will raise to internationallevels the standard of work in centres ofknowledge production and innovation, bethey universities or research centres.Such institutions are the engines ofnational growth. They are bastions ofcritical thought and research, and theyguarantee the creation of hi-tech companies.They also guarantee the generation of theproducts and ideas upon which society’ssecurity and progress depend. Theseinstitutions develop human resources thatare distinctive in their professionalismand leadership, and which are capableof taking wise decisions. In contrast tocompanies, computers, factories, airplanes,and advanced service sectors, one cannotimport universities or scientific centres ofexcellence, for such institutions can onlybe developed through an accumulative andinteractive process between society and itshuman forces, reinforced by far-reachingvision, and in an open environment ofprofessional commitment and high ethicalstandards.In the final chapter of this report weseek to develop a general vision for theknowledge society and its establishment,including measures that will help in shiftingthe proposed vision from the level ofaspiration to that of a search for channelsand procedures necessary to facilitate itsachievement.Improving innovationperformance, likeimproving knowledgeperformance, requiresa political decisionsupported by visionand will that movein the directionof an openingup to democracy,political reform,and the liberationof intellectual andacademic freedomsARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION213


End Notes1UNESCO Institute for Statistics online database, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?<strong>Report</strong>Id=143, on 13 January <strong>2009</strong>.2As categorised by the World Bank’s KAM, one of the most widely referred to and up-to-date indices. Accordingto KAM, the four pillars of knowledge are innovation, education, information technology, and the knowledgeenvironment/economic incentive regime. Index values range from zero to ten and express the relative positionof the country in question compared to all other countries for which the index has been calculated. A decline inthe value of the index with regard to a given country does not necessarily mean a decline in the values for theindicators entered to create the index. It may simply be a product of the fact that the values of these indicatorshave risen to a lesser degree than those of other countries that are jockeying for their place on the scale.3The innovation system consists of three variables: royalty payments, patents granted by the US Patent andTrademark Office (USPTO), and number of scientific and technical journal publications.4Resolutions of the 2007 <strong>Arab</strong> Summit, held in Riyadh.5Classification and analysis by Mu‘in Hamza, <strong>Report</strong> core team member.6“The quality of scientific research institutions” is based on the ability of researchers to publish peer-reviewedscientific articles in international journals, to transfer the results of their research to production sectors, topreserve the environment and protect public health, to establish effective partnerships with various socialsectors, and to attract funding from international programmes.7“Technology assimilation and technology readiness”: the capacity of a private or public productive establishmentto make the most benefit from the outputs of research and invention. The indicator likewise reflects the presenceof an atmosphere conducive to research, the availability of specialised human assets, and the material andacademic incentives that lead to innovation and invention.8The numbers in this paragraph are the estimates of <strong>Report</strong> core team member Mu‘in Hamza, and derive fromuniversity bylaws and the evaluation instruments for full-time professors in most <strong>Arab</strong> countries.9As mentioned earlier, discrepancies exist among different international data sets. Such discrepancies may beattributable to differences in the definition of the term “researcher.”10Website of the Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH) of theOrganisation of the Islamic Conference, http://www.comstech.org/links/posters.htm, on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>.11World Bank, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM) database, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_pages5.asp, on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.12Statistical Institute, UNESCO, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.asp on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>.13Analysis and calculation by Mu‘in Hamza, <strong>Report</strong> core team member, based on data from COMSTECH and KAM.14The Sixth Framework Programme is the European Union’s programme for research and technologicaldevelopment. It consists of initiatives undertaken by the EU to fund and promote research.15These include basic and applied, but not human and social sciences.16A significant proportion of research published in some <strong>Arab</strong>s countries is the work of researchers from other<strong>Arab</strong> or non-<strong>Arab</strong> countries. The reason for this is either the authors’ residence in these countries or the fact thatthe incentives and facilities they offer are superior to that offered in the authors’ home countries. As such, thenumbers in this chart may give an exaggerated picture of the reality in some states, including those of the Gulf,and an underestimation of other states, such as Egypt and Iraq. The publication of scientific periodicals wasstopped in Iraq during the decade of economic sanctions of 1991 to 2002, forcing Iraqi researchers either not topublish or to publish outside Iraq.17The scientific impact indicator reflects the value of scientific articles and their social impact.18Estimate of <strong>Report</strong> core team member Mu’in Hamza, based on a number of sources of information on <strong>Arab</strong>scientific publications from universities, research centres, and some private agencies that are repeated in most<strong>Arab</strong> studies without mention of a specific reference due to the lack of reliable statistics.19The numbers for patents registered with the USPTO found in the World Bank KAM indices may differ from thosefound in the national databases of various countries that are used in some regional studies.20The World Bank, KAM, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp, on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.21These results were calculated based on data found in various chapters of the <strong>Report</strong>.22The National Council for Scientific Research, http://www.cnrs.edu.lb, on 12 December 200823This book was later re-published under the title Architecture for the Poor: An Experiment in Rural Egypt.24World Bank, KAM database, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp on 25 December 2008.25Studies published by <strong>Arab</strong> research centres (the League of <strong>Arab</strong> Countries, the conferences of <strong>Arab</strong> ministersconcerned with human capital and its flight, and the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies) show that the countriesthat draw the most human capital are <strong>Arab</strong> Gulf countries, some European countries (France, Germany, Spain,Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland), the USA, Canada, and Australia. Scientifically qualified <strong>Arab</strong> human capitalthat migrates to the USA, Britain, and Canada forms 75% of all migrants, and the annual percentage of <strong>Arab</strong>university graduates who migrate is 25%. Global estimates suggest that the <strong>Arab</strong> countries suffer annual losses214 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of $1.57 billion due to human capital flight.26The human capital flight indicator is to be found amongst the data in the World Bank’s KAM database.27The figure of $25 million is taken from World Bank data and includes <strong>Arab</strong>s working in all fields includingscientific research. More research is needed on the circumstances of <strong>Arab</strong>s working in the field of research andinnovation and the impact of their work, including their remittances, to <strong>Arab</strong> countries versus the economic,social, and scientific costs of their education and training and the resultant real cost of <strong>Arab</strong> human capitalflight.28The human capital flight index scores on a scale of 1 to 7 the responses of survey participants on their opinionsas to whether the human capital and talent of a given country has migrated to seek better opportunities (1) ortypically stays in its home country (7).29Since the indicator runs from one to seven, the mid-point is 3.5.ARAB PERFORMANCE IN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION215


CHAPTER SIXBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYIN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN


CHAPTER SIXBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD:A VISION AND A PLANIntroductionIn this chapter we aim to bring a set of elementstogether into a working plan based on theprinciples and action mechanisms required toclose the knowledge gap in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries,bringing their people into the knowledge societyas participants in knowledge production. It istrue that the analysis of the preceding chaptershas revealed the existence of some progress incertain aspects of the knowledge society. It has,however, also highlighted many gaps which mustbe dealt with seriously and resolutely. At thispoint, we will seek to put together a vision anda programme of action designed to make acontribution to filling the gaps in the landscapeof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge.We do not wish to confront the knowledgegap by complacently repeating suggestions forself-reliance or dependence on the past andour existing knowledge reserves; the knowledgerevolution requires us to transcend such reactions,for <strong>Arab</strong> society faces a major challenge in the fieldof knowledge, and concerted efforts are called forif we are to build the knowledge society.If knowledge is to be acquired and asociety built around it, if it is to be deployedin the service of development and progress,certain demands must be met. In this chapter,we will content ourselves with sketching ageneral architecture of our vision and makingproposals intended to assist in closing theknowledge gap in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Thisarchitecture will allow us to construct a body ofelements related to the enabling environmentand the indigenisation of knowledge, as wellas to assemble recent data that clarify therequirements for innovation in the field ofknowledge, so that the best may be extractedto serve human development.This proposed <strong>Arab</strong> plan is the result of theinvestigation and diagnosis we have undertakenin the <strong>Report</strong>. We do not claim that thedemands and priorities we will put forward areeither comprehensive or exhaustive, nor do weclaim to hold a monopoly over the truth or theright answers in this field. We do intend to setdown comprehensible and motivating markersto indicate the route.As we have stated in the other chapters ofthe <strong>Report</strong>, the right to knowledge shouldbe considered the cornerstone of humandevelopment. This right requires the generalisationof the benefits of knowledge and of participationin its reproduction according to the needs of oursocieties, and it is within this context that the bodyof elements of the proposed plan take form. Theplan’s higher aim is to spur public debate andpositive movement towards a knowledge societybuilt on solid foundations and under the firmcontrol of <strong>Arab</strong> society through the partnershipof its various components. Thereafter thestrategies and mechanisms formulated and rankedby consensus can be adopted.THE ARAB KNOWLEDGE GAP:DEFICITS AND HOLESIn the <strong>Report</strong> we have identified the natureof the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge gap and highlighteda body of data and conclusions, the mostimportant of which are:• An understanding of the definingcharacteristics of the knowledgesociety, which is under continuousformulation, by an investigation ofits most prominent components andproblematics. In the first and secondchapters, the <strong>Report</strong> has attempted tosurvey the difficulties of the subject andlay the groundwork for their solution byinvestigating the environments that assistThe demandsand priorities putforward are neithercomprehensive norexhaustive, nor dothey claim to hold amonopoly over thetruth or the rightanswers in this field.The programmeintends to set downcomprehensible andmotivating markersto indicate the routeThe plan’s higheraim is to spur publicdebate and positivemovement towardsa knowledgesociety built onsolid foundationsand under the firmcontrol of <strong>Arab</strong>society throughthe partnership ofvarious sectorsBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN219


The most conspicuousfeature of theknowledge societyis its relationshipto networking andnetworks, whichplay prominentroles in the variousaspects of the life ofmodern societiesThe <strong>Report</strong> couldnever have addressedthe reality ofknowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> world withoutlinking the right toknowledge to theright to development<strong>Knowledge</strong> isfreedom anddevelopmentand there can beneither knowledgenor developmentwithout freedomin the birth and formation of the knowledgesociety.In its theoretical framework, the<strong>Report</strong> aims to survey the poles thatdefine the boundaries of the knowledgesociety. It summarises these as three–technology, economy, and society–andhighlights the interconnection andinteraction among them. The report alsopoints to the most conspicuous featureof the knowledge society, which is itsrelationship to networking and networks,which play prominent roles in thevarious aspects of the life of modernsocieties. Chapter 1 also endeavours toformulate an operational definition tohelp formulate specific choices as toindicators and indices for the knowledgesociety appropriate to <strong>Arab</strong> aspirations.Chapter 1 also aims to construct thegeneral theoretical frames of referencefor the indicators, classifying the featuresascribed to the knowledge society intotwo broad orders. The first of these isrelated to philosophical positivism andits quantitative predilections based ontechnological determinism. The secondis the modernising and liberal trendcontained in the systems of theinternational human rights conventions.The chapter puts forward a synthesis ofa sample of new questions and challengesraised globally and in our <strong>Arab</strong> nation,which we assume is not isolated fromthe changes underway elsewhere at thebeginning of the twenty-first century,with its defining revolutions in andtransformations of knowledge. Theseinclude those related to the question ofidentity, political participation, gender, andthe development of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language.Likewise, the chapter raises the need for anew code of ethics equal to the demandsof this task and prioritizing humankind,and outlines the features of <strong>Arab</strong> solidarityand cooperation, in addition to the valuesof openness to, and intercommunicationwith, humanity at large.The <strong>Report</strong> could never have addressedthe reality of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldwithout linking the right to knowledgeto the right to development. These twoform the underpinnings of the conceptsin question. Equally, this chapter sketchesthe major features of the knowledgesociety, to provide a framework for thediagnosis and study of our own situation.Based on this framework, this situationshould be reconstructed in the light oflocal specificities linked to <strong>Arab</strong> realityand the efforts required to indigenise themechanisms of the knowledge societyin the service of the hoped-for <strong>Arab</strong>development project.Chapter 2 concerns itself with adiscussion of the enabling environmentrequired in order to put the knowledgesociety in place. Such a discussion isa necessity given that the differentmanifestations of the knowledge societyin the contemporary world have rootsand foundations that are essential to itsexistence. The chapter goes on to addressthe issue of relationship of knowledge tofreedom, starting from the assumption thatknowledge is freedom and developmentand that there can be neither knowledgenor development without freedom. Thislink does not, however, imply that thetwo are mechanically and inseparablybound. The chapter also goes beyond thiscontroversial diagnosis and surveys thegeneral conditions that help to build theknowledge society. These are to be foundin environments that assist in bridging theknowledge gap. These call for politicaland institutional, and equally cultural andintellectual, reform, in addition to reform ofthe media and renewal of communicationsand ICT platforms.<strong>Arab</strong> societies cannot cross thethresholds of the knowledge societyand launch themselves into knowledgeproduction and creation withoutnurturing environments and supportinginstitutions. The experiences of statesthat have entered the knowledge societybefore us affirm this necessity. Hencethe <strong>Arab</strong> societies are called upon toprepare the ground appropriately forthe possession of knowledge and theabsorption of its innovations and benefits.220 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


This can only come about through theallocation of the necessary financial,human, and institutional resources, plusthe development of a convincing vision ofthe role of knowledge today in achievingcomprehensive development. Appropriateenvironments, institutions, laws, policies,and manpower are all requisites for theproduction of knowledge that contributesto human welfare.• An attempt was made throughoutthe following chapters of the reportto survey and synthesise the evidenceof the most important indices andindicators of the knowledge society inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world in relation to education,the condition of ICT, and innovation.Taken together, these chapters seek toaddress two issues. The first concernsthe synthesis of the reality of <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge performance in these fieldsand the question of how to approachthe large gaps that exist between what ishappening there in our own region versusthe accumulated experience of societiesthat have entered the knowledge societybefore us. The second is comprised ofthe need to understand the deficits andformulate the proposals that will help usto enter that same society, with all thebaggage we have gathered during thesecond half of the twentieth century andthe beginning of the third millennium,and with all the aspirations that motivateus today to improve our position on thenew world maps of knowledge.Chapter 3, which is devoted toeducation, reviews the knowledge capitalaccumulated by educational institutions inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries today in an attempt tocomprehend its quantitative and qualitativedimensions at the various levels and stagesof education. This capital is organised bygeneration (children, youth, and adults)and an analysis is offered of the structureof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge capital and the gapsthat differentiate it from modernknowledge capital, which has integratedthe educational innovations that the newmechanisms, laboratories, and technologyare starting to provide. The same chapteralso ponders the defects that typicallyaccompany educational reform projectsin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and highlights someof the limitations and uncertainties of the<strong>Arab</strong> educational scene.Chapter 3 also puts forward an analysisof the formation of knowledge capitalthrough education. While most <strong>Arab</strong>societies have recorded a number oftangible achievements on the quantitativelevel in terms of educational opportunitiesfor children and of gender parity, thequalitative performance of the childrenof the <strong>Arab</strong> countries as a whole is rarelycomparable to that of their peers in therest of the world. Large portions of theyouth generation–more than 35 percent in nine <strong>Arab</strong> countries–have notprogressed beyond basic education. It istherefore difficult for them to engage withthe knowledge-based economy, whichdemands theoretical and technologicalknowledge that can only be acquired atpost-basic educational stages. Nor doesthe knowledge makeup acquired by manyyoung people during secondary andhigher education necessarily conformto the demands of the transition to aknowledge economy that is essentiallydependent on the specialised sciences,modern technologies, communicationsrevolutions, and openness to the advancesmade by knowledge. This situation formsan obstacle to the formation of even thelowest estimated critical mass of highperformance human capital capable ofdiscovering, creating, and innovating,and of leading the processes of ongoingdevelopment needed by <strong>Arab</strong> societies.The <strong>Report</strong> confirms that the lightof knowledge does not fall on all adultsequally. Rather, it remains in all the<strong>Arab</strong> countries the prerogative of anelite, broader at times and narrower atmany others. Today, the large variationin knowledge capital acquired througheducation appears not only amongcountries themselves, but also within each<strong>Arab</strong> country individually, between menand women, and between younger andolder adults. Such divisions are also to beMost <strong>Arab</strong> societieshave recorded anumber of tangibleachievements on thequantitative level interms of educationalopportunities forchildren and ofgender parity, butthe qualitativeperformance of thechildren of the <strong>Arab</strong>states as a whole israrely comparable tothat of their peers inthe rest of the worldThe light ofknowledge doesnot fall on all adultsequally. Rather, itremains in all the<strong>Arab</strong> states theprerogative of anelite, broader attimes and narrowerat many othersBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN221


A review of nationalplans in the <strong>Arab</strong>states, particularlythose with middleand low incomes,clearly revealsobstacles thatprevent the inclusionof technologicaldevelopment ashigh priorityAn ideal utilisationof ICT in buildingthe <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesociety lies beyondthe capabilities of theindividual <strong>Arab</strong> statesfound between the city and the country andamong the economic segments of society.Chapter 4 deals with ICT as a centralpillar of the knowledge society. It devotesattention to the state of this technology inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries as revealed by the dataavailable in international reports, despitethe major weaknesses of these. Thechapter aims to address the demand forthe revitalisation of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languageto make it the nurturing vehicle requiredif the issue of <strong>Arab</strong>ic knowledge anddigital content are to be taken truly inhand, and one capable of formulating newsymbols that will facilitate the operationsof the digital industry and help to create<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge horizons that can dealcollaboratively and advantageously withnew knowledge systems. The chapterreveals the general importance of ICTin the health, economic, social andknowledge fields. It highlights the deficitsand gaps that exist in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesand formulates a set of proposals andinitiatives that will help to raise ICTin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries from its currentlevel to one capable of operationalizingknowledge through institutions capable ofensuring that it is exploited to the utmostin the <strong>Arab</strong> countries’ various areas ofproductive activity.The <strong>Report</strong> makes clear that one ofthe chief features of the current era isthe unprecedented interrelationshipbetween the development of technologicalcapabilities and the various aspectsof economic and social development.However, a review of national plans inthe <strong>Arab</strong> states, particularly those withmiddle and low incomes, clearly revealsobstacles that prevent the inclusionof technological development as highpriority. The open policies required forthe effective deployment and utilisationof ICT confront major obstacles arisingin many cases from excessive governmentcontrol and the complex relationship oftechnological development to many otherissues. The <strong>Report</strong> affirms the necessityof focusing more research on the effectsof technological progress on the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage and how new technologies maydeal with it in terms of recognition, speech,and semantics, so as to preserve it andenshrine its role as a vehicle for culture, anaxis for development, and a building blockof human civilisation.The chapter explains that an idealutilisation of ICT in building the <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge society lies beyond thecapabilities of the individual <strong>Arab</strong> states.Cooperation among concerned institutionsmust be strengthened on all levels. Successin acquiring and deploying moderntechnologies is dependent on the ability ofmulti-specialist teams to cooperate withineach <strong>Arab</strong> country and with regional andglobal partners. National policies andregional initiatives designed within thisframe must take account of the toolsprovided by ICT, such as virtual researchlabs and open source methodologies.Chapter 5 deals with innovation inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world, starting with a review ofthe concept of innovation that expandsthe indicators developed by certaininternational reports in this respect. Thechapter conducts its review accordingto three major axes. The first relates topolicy for innovation in scientific andtechnological knowledge. Highlightingthe innovation gap in these arenas andclarifying the limitations of existing<strong>Arab</strong> research centres, it contends thatthe latter are incapable of participatingactively in building the knowledge societyor of coordinating and cooperatingeither among themselves or with leadinginternational institutions in this respect.The second axis treats the specifics of <strong>Arab</strong>creativity in the arts, literature, humanities,and social sciences from a new perspective,making clear that the concept of creativitygoes beyond the concept of inventiveness,which is linked to technology and itstools and underlining the contribution ofimagination and thought to the creationof realms and concepts that enrich thelife of the emotions and fertilise the mind.The third axis of the chapter discusses thequestion of revitalising <strong>Arab</strong> performancein innovation and puts forward a set of222 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


proposals intended to give impetus toinnovation and link it to production.The chapter highlights the fact that<strong>Arab</strong> research will never gain a noteworthyposition in the third millennium as longas it remains outside the global contextof research and innovation. Scientific andtechnological discoveries are acceleratingand proliferating within a broad spectrumof specialisations and applications. Thismakes it impossible for any of the world’scountries, whatever their human andmaterial resources, to pursue them all atthe same time. Thus the global trend isto establish major societal and scientificgroupings and engage with them, to expandnetworking for scientific research, and toform partnerships for the implementationof projects and exploitation of theiroutputs.The chapter also takes it as a given that,in the face of the plethora of requirementsto achieve a qualitative breakthrough on thelevel of research and innovation, seriouspolitical decision-making capable ofengaging with the march of research andcreativity is a fundamental principle thatmust be openly adopted at the level of thestate, and indeed at the <strong>Arab</strong> regional level,in active partnership with the institutionsand sectors of society.• Throughout, the <strong>Report</strong> hasconsistently highlighted the importance ofthe epistemological intercommunicationwith the self and with the world. Suchintercommunication will help to build tonew reality of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldthat draws on both its own reserves ofknowledge and the gains in knowledge tobe derived from contemporary knowledgerevolutions.The <strong>Report</strong> considers that a positiveopenness to the knowledge revolution, andthe benefits arising from it in the fieldsof development and the expansion ofpeople’s options for decent lives, are anessential foundation for the project of thetransfer, indigenisation, and innovation ofknowledge. There is also an assumptionthat the existing <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge deficitwill lead to our continuing generalbackwardness. For this reason, the <strong>Report</strong>is insistent that the principle ofintercommunication with the rest ofthe world must be an inherent featureof all aspects of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong>world, including education, technology,and general culture. It must be stressedthat the defence of intercommunicationmeans neither dependence nor selectivity.Equally it does not mean borrowing. Atits most basic, it is a desire and aspirationto prepare the means to bring into being aknowledge-enabling environment and theindigenisation and creation of knowledge.This must occur through the assimilationof contemporary knowledge values andtheir development in the interests of the<strong>Arab</strong> individual, in order to support hisdignity and realise his well-being.THE KNOWLEDGE GAP CANBE OVERCOMEThe chapters of the <strong>Report</strong> reveal importantaspects of the reality of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance. They also examine the generalprinciples that have guided the chiefpositions and conclusions resulting fromthis analysis. Having tried to identify thegeneral features of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgegap–be it in terms of the enablingenvironment or the actual productionand deployment of knowledge–we maynow formulate a strategy that will helpus to narrow and close this gap in sucha way as to enable the <strong>Arab</strong>s to join theknowledge society, and to do so in positivefashion.“In the twenty-first century, classification willbe on the basis of information: societies withknowledge and others without.”His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum.<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge underdevelopment,observable in the areas of both acquisitionand production, widens the existingknowledge gap. As is the case with theother peoples of the world, the <strong>Arab</strong>s overthe course of their history have built upa vast stock of knowledge that expressesSerious politicaldecision-makingcapable of engagingwith the march ofresearch and creativityis a fundamentalprinciple that mustbe openly adopted atthe level of the state,and indeed at the<strong>Arab</strong> regional level,in active partnershipwith the institutionsand sectors of societyThe <strong>Report</strong> is insistentthat the principle ofintercommunicationwith the rest of theworld must be aninherent feature of allaspects of knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> world,including education,technology, andgeneral cultureBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN223


The positiveachievements inthe <strong>Arab</strong> region areconstrained by manysocietal, cultural, andpolitical restrictions,most of which canbe ascribed to thelimitations placedon freedom in itsbroadest sensetheir ways of life and their skills in workand production. The existence of aknowledge gap today means that, despitethis, <strong>Arab</strong> societies have been unable toaccess the gains made by technologicalprogress, and unable to indigenise newmedia and mechanisms capable of takingadvantage of new forms of knowledge inthe development field. This lack extendsto the social and cultural milieus. Despitethe many cultural bright spots in the <strong>Arab</strong>region in its modern era, this achievementmust seem modest and timid in comparisonwith the achievements of other regionsof the world. At the same time, it isconstrained by many societal, cultural,and political restrictions, most of whichcan be ascribed to the limitations placedon freedom in its broadest sense and onproductive intercommunication with theself and with the world.Careful observation of the state ofknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> world, as set forthin the report, calls us to speed up thepreparation of the appropriate means toconsolidate the foundations for buildingthe knowledge society. In particular, theacceleration in the rates of global progress intechnology, culture, economy, and societycalls on us to engage, without hesitation,in an attempt to seize the reins ofknowledge. This means providing it withenabling environments, supporting itsgeneral diffusion–through advantageouspartnerships–and making available itstools and technologies, with the aim ofeffectively deploying them in the serviceof human development and the defeatof the aspects of underdevelopmentprevailing in our societies.The new possibilities for permanenthuman development furnished by theBOX 6-1The only way to participate in the battle over the <strong>Arab</strong> present isthrough our shared endeavour to defeat the crisis in our thinkingand our reality. We are suffering from a crisis of underdevelopmentand of dependence. It is a crisis of knowledge, of development, ofgovernance, of stark divisions between levels of wealth, civilisation,living standards, democracy, and culture, a crisis in the relationshipbetween political society and civil society and a crisis of exploitativeforeign hegemony over our life potentials and the bases for oursocial, cultural, and national development. In the end, it is a crisis ofthought resulting from these interrelated crises and of our lack of acomprehensive strategic vision to change and renew reality.This is not to deny the efforts, achievements, and innovations inthe different intellectual, social, productive, literary and artistic fieldsto which hundreds of <strong>Arab</strong> cultural figures have contributed. I amtalking here about the prevailing structures in our thought, reality,and institutions generally [...]We will only transcend our backwardness and dependencethrough a rationalist critique and historical vision of the roots ofthis backwardness and dependence as they exist both in our thoughtand our reality.We will only transcend our backwardness and dependence bytaking intellectual ownership of the facts of the new scientificrevolution–the information revolution–without waiting to completeour belated, limited, and abortive attempts to take intellectualownership of earlier scientific revolutions.We will only transcend our backwardness and dependencethrough a comprehensive development project for the <strong>Arab</strong> nationwith economic, social, educational, cultural, media, and moraldimensions, a project that rational and critically incorporates our<strong>Arab</strong> and Islamic heritage and adds to it, and that rationally andcritically takes account of the facts of our present era as well, andbrings something new to it.Source: Mahmud Amin al-‘Alim, in Qadaya Fikriyya no. 15, 16 July 1995.Rationalist Critique and Historical VisionWe will transcend the past, attain liberation, and achieve progressby being conscious of the facts of our reality and trying, withconsideration and respect for the difference and diversity of ourparticularities and specific conditions, to forge unity without at thesame time closing ourselves off to the world around us in the nameof national unity and identity. Our identity is not a self-sufficient,readymade essence but a continuous process and a project ever opento renewal. Thus we must remain open to the world, so as to enrichand deepen our identity and to participate as an active player [...]We must remove the fetters on the freedom to think, criticise, anddiffer, and to form various popular and community bodies andorganisations that provide outlets for the vital, productive, andcreative actors in society, be they women or men, and give themthe legal right to participate in fateful decisions, to oversee theirimplementation, and to defend their interests and rights.Authority does not trump society; the political does not trumpthe ideological; the ideological does not trump the epistemological;nor are we making from the epistemological an elitist, condescendingenlightenment divorced from the spirit of rational, objective criticismand the desire for change and revitalisation.When all is said and done, the issue is not simply an ideologicalproject for renaissance–many indeed are projects like this in ourlives and recent history. The issue, rather, is one of a strategic,foundational, theoretical, epistemological vision deriving from thefacts of our reality and age and their needs and challenges, a visionarmed with knowledge and a conscious popular collective will onthe level of the <strong>Arab</strong> nation as a whole and on that of each <strong>Arab</strong>country individually.It is not a utopia but a necessity innate within the availablepossibilities, one that is waiting only for the consciousness, will,organisation, and initiative at the heart of our civil societies to makeit a reality.224 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


knowledge society must be considered tobe one of the greatest incentives to closingthe knowledge gap. Currently available ICT,for example, provides the opportunity todiffuse forms of knowledge that will helpto build an economy based on knowledge,an education for all linked to the differentstages of life, and technologies in manyfields such as medicine, treatment, andagriculture. All of the latter are knowledgemechanisms that cannot be divorcedfrom the prospects for comprehensivedevelopment, with all the latter’s promisesof well-being for humanity.A PROPOSED VISION FORBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETYConfronting the complex knowledge gapin the <strong>Arab</strong> world requires a vision thatcomprises key features for work and action.This proposed vision should build onexisting achievements in order to narrowthis gap, since some <strong>Arab</strong> societies haveindeed taken steps towards joining theknowledge society.This proposed plan, whose generalfeatures we shall attempt to formulate,should be in harmony with theunderstanding of the knowledge society aswe envision it, going beyond technologicaldeterminism to bring to the forefront theoverall human dimension, and othersassociated with aspiration, will, criticism,and history; in this way, we shall avoidreductionist, positivist perceptions thatseek to standardise human knowledge.Before sketching the major featuresof this plan, let us stress that it is bothbased on defined principles and also is aform of long-term action and initiativewhose central aim is in harmony with the<strong>Report</strong>’s conception of the aims of theknowledge society to build overall humandevelopment.This vision is a structure identifiedthrough doing and translated throughaction. Before any of this, however, it isan aspiration. It is an initiative intendedto observe the reality of knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> region and aimed at the formulationof strategies that will help to indigenisethat knowledge and equip the <strong>Arab</strong>s toreach the threshold at which innovationand creation begin. At its deepest level, thisvision falls under the rubric of efforts aimedat intercommunication and indigenisation,and subsequently of production andinnovation. These efforts form theaxes of the vision, for its goal is afurther expansion of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeperformance in pursuit of the desiredaim of a knowledge development thatwill place us at the threshold of social andeconomic development. The desire forsuch development formed the cornerstonefor our initial deliberations on the topic ofthe knowledge society.The general spirit of this proposedplan resides in a set of pre-requisites andprinciples. It also includes major fronts andaxes for action. It explains priorities for theaction and movement needed to preparefor the steps which, we assume, willtranslate its features, and which, we hope,will help to sketch out the landmarksmarking the route to the knowledgesociety.PRINCIPLES ANDFOUNDATIONS FORMOVEMENT TOWARDSTHE CONSTRUCTION OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETY INTHE ARAB WORLDThe proposed vision is based on threemajor foundations, to be understood asforming an interrelated whole, as follows:BROADENING THE SCOPE OFFREEDOMThe <strong>Report</strong> has highlighted the fact thatfreedom and knowledge are inseparable, asare knowledge and development, in spite ofthe many forms that this linkage takes. As aconsequence, when we make the principleof freedom a requirement for action,we aim also to defend another duality,namely the inseparability of freedom andConfronting thecomplex knowledgegap in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldrequires a visionthat comprises keyfeatures for work andaction. The proposedvision should build onexisting achievementsin order to narrowthis gap, since some<strong>Arab</strong> societies haveindeed taken stepstowards joining theknowledge societyFreedom andknowledge areinseparable, as areknowledge anddevelopment, in spiteof the many formsthat this linkage takesBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN225


One of the keyfoundations of thevision necessitatespermanent positiveinteraction betweenthe strategiesand mechanismsof the drive fordevelopment andaction to establish theknowledge societyin the <strong>Arab</strong> regioncreativity and innovation. Accordingly,freedom in all its manifestations is aprinciple central to knowledge and a pillarthat must be in place if we are to reachthe threshold for the realisation of humanwelfare. Hence to call for an expansion ofthe scope of freedoms and a reduction ofthe restrictions and limits upon them isto call for <strong>Arab</strong> society to equip itself toengage with the knowledge society.‘Freedom’ here has a meaning far widerthan that of its political or economicsignifications. Freedom, in the context ofbeing one of the foundations for the buildingof the knowledge society, is a horizon thatequips society to participate collectivelyin building the path to knowledge andengaging in the production, deployment,and expansion of the <strong>Arab</strong> individual’sgains in overall human development.POSITIVE INTERACTION WITHTHE GROWING NEEDS OFSOCIETYStarting with the organic connectionbetween knowledge and the developmentalneeds of <strong>Arab</strong> societies–whether in theeconomic, social, or cultural developmentspheres–one of the key foundationsof our vision decrees the necessity ofpermanent positive interaction betweenthe strategies and mechanisms of the drivefor development and action to establishthe knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.This permanent interaction built on theaccurate identification of developmentalneeds places the efforts to establish theknowledge society within their correctframework. That framework consists ofwhich is that of support and agitation forhuman development and of expansion ofFIGURE 6-1Mechanism for movement towards the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge societyProposed axes of actionDeployment inthe service ofhumandevelopmentProvisionofenablingenvironmentsTransferandindigenisationof knowledgeEstablishment of a close relationship betweentransfer, development, and production of knowledgeon the one hand and the production of goods andservices and cultural production on the other.Partnering with youth in building the knowledgesociety (as contributors and beneficiaries). On-goingacademic and vocational training.Freedoms and the rule of law; legislation andregulations; nurturing and supportive institutions;developmental policies; encouragementand celebration of innovation;material requirements.Revitalisation of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic Language (includingtranslation); education and vocational training systems;curricularisation and institutionalisation of knowledgeand technology transfer; establishment and supportof the role of scientific research and investigation;reward for and recognition of indigenouslyproduced knowledge.The<strong>Knowledge</strong>SocietyComplementarity tothe developmentneeds of societyFreedomOpenness andintercommunicationFoundations and Pillars226 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


the <strong>Arab</strong> individual’s options to reach thebetter conditions that she or he deserves.This continuing positive interaction betweendevelopment and knowledge will alsoinevitably lead to more accurate targetingof the efforts to set up the knowledgesociety and to the rational use of theavailable energies, and in consequence togreater benefit being derived from them.There is no benefit in a science which hasno use, or in knowledge which does notcorrespond with the needs of the societyin which it has been nurtured. Clearly, itis essential to provide the appropriatemechanisms, and these can be providedand will operate, as we envisage, only inthe presence of a genuine political will anda climate of freedom.OPENNESS ANDINTERCOMMUNICATIONWhile the first pillar invokes the demandfor freedom as a central principle in allactivities aiming at the revival of knowledgein our society, and the second rests on theinitiation of action derived from the realityof the needs of human development in<strong>Arab</strong> society, the third comprises twoother positions that complete the above.The first relates to openness, the secondto intercommunication as a central tenetin the field of knowledge.The word “openness” stands in opposition to“closure,” which is synonymous with stasis.Transcending the flaws in knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> world requires arming oneself with theprinciple of openness to the achievementsand lessons of contemporary knowledge.‘Intercommunication’ alludes to jointaction oriented to the absorption of thebenefits and revolutions of knowledgewithout giving excessive approval to theout-dated reserve of heritage. We in the<strong>Arab</strong> world are required to support ourold epistemological reserve and generalpopular culture with that built up by thecontemporary revolutions in knowledge.If we fail to do this, we shall continueto talk about an intellectual reserve thatpreoccupies itself fruitlessly in dealingBOX 6-2When one faces the future, seeking topull the present towards it and give itan upward and efficacious trajectory,ambition would seem to be an essentialquality. At the instant the self takes itsaspirations seriously, transforms theminto a practical project, and insists onshifting them from imagination toreality, it is transformed into an entitywith ambition that places its presenton the line between success and failure.What ambition adds to aspiration thenThe Legitimacy of Ambitionwith facts that the passage of time mayhave caused to lose their relevance andthat fall into the category of antiquarianknowledge. While this may providesustenance for the memory and thesoul, it may not enable us to understandwhat is happening in the world and toabsorb innovations in knowledge, orhelp us to achieve comprehensive humandevelopment.Intercommunication, as we understandit, is a process of partnership andreconciliation with the world and theself so that our own knowledge canbe reconstructed in the light of therevolutions in knowledge and sciences asthey occur in the modern world. We see itas a process of partnership and interactionbecause it constitutes one of the means fortransfer and indigenisation that lead to theknowledge society, as well as contributingto the production and innovation ofknowledge.PROPOSED AXES OF ACTIONFOR THE CREATION OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYResponding to the chief currentrequirements in the arena of knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> world, the proposed visiondepends on three major axes. Theseencompass the provision of the necessaryenabling environments, the transfer andindigenisation of knowledge, and theis the will to action, and not merelysome specific form of desire. I meanthat desire–however strong, profound,burning, or fixed on lofty goals for anear or distant future–does not on itsown create ambition. Thus ambitionis aspiration borne by a practical willinsistent on its realisation. For withoutaspiration–that is desire directed towardsa possible ideal or, at least, towards astate better than that existing–there isno ambition in the first place.Source: Nasif Nassar, 2008. Al-Dhat wal-Hudur (Self and Presence). Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, pp.548-9.The word “openness”stands in oppositionto “closure,” whichis synonymous withstasis. This meansthat transcending theflaws in knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> worldrequires armingoneself with theprinciple of opennessto the achievementsand lessons ofcontemporaryknowledgeBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN227


Freedom andinstitutionalisationare complementaryIn the <strong>Arab</strong> world,the transfer andindigenisation ofknowledge are ahistorical processthat requires staminaand a will to workon numerous frontsdeployment of knowledge at the serviceof sustainable human development andthe well-being and dignity of the individual<strong>Arab</strong>. Fundamental to each of these axesare specific sector-based programmesconnected to the propulsion of oursocieties towards seizing ownership ofthe knowledge society. It must be stressedhere that the axes are composite, based onresults and conclusions of the observationof the state of knowledge in its variousdomains as formulated within the <strong>Report</strong>.THE FIRST AXIS: THECREATION OF ENABLINGENVIRONMENTSThe construction of the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgesociety mandates first the preparationof appropriate enabling environments.This is because such a society is nurturedand developed in the shadow of theseenvironments, which embrace theexpansion of the scope of freedoms, theestablishment of nurturing institutions,and the shaping of legal systems to givebacking to the props and vision of theknowledge society. This also mandatesthe creation of incentives and initiativesto help revitalise spaces for innovation,by fostering traditions that celebrateinnovation and innovative people.The enabling environment is onecondition for the achievement of theknowledge society. Without it, thecontinuity and development of any resultsachieved cannot be guaranteed.Institutions and legislation are thus thebasic guarantee for all areas of innovationin the knowledge arena. Provision of aclimate of freedom also equips actors inthe field of knowledge to give and innovatemore. Freedom and institutionalisationare complementary. The impoverishmentin the sphere of innovation in scientificresearch in the <strong>Arab</strong> world reflects theabsence of the institutions that shouldfurnish the conditions necessary to implantthe mechanisms of innovation in ourcountries. While in knowledge societiestoday we speak about laboratories andjoint research workshops mediated bythe new forms of ICT, the few, isolated,collective scientific laboratories in ouruniversities have yet to reach the levelof institutionalisation that would ensurethat the means, tools, and incentives ofresearch become permanent. Equally,existing relationships of cooperationamong <strong>Arab</strong> universities reveal the absenceof any clear plan for fruitful cooperationcapable of halting the waste of capacitiesarising from the ongoing brain-drain of<strong>Arab</strong> researchers and experts.By way of example, the enablingenvironment for ICT requires concern formost basic forms of human capital, due toits importance in terms of technical andadministrative skills and knowledge, inaddition to its role in education, scientificresearch, and technology.THE SECOND AXIS:THE TRANSFER ANDINDIGENISATION OFKNOWLEDGEEntering the knowledge society cannotbe achieved without the transfer ofits tools and technologies and theirdiffusion through the various structuresof society. In the <strong>Arab</strong> world, the transferand indigenisation of knowledge are ahistorical process that requires staminaand a will to work on numerous fronts.The development of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language,the revitalisation of <strong>Arab</strong> thought,and the adoption of the historical andcomparative pre-requisites of modernthought can be considered prioritiesin the process of indigenisation andimplantation and in preparing societyto learn from the achievements of theknowledge society. To development ofthe <strong>Arab</strong>ic language it will be necessaryto pay greater attention to translation,for example. Here the cross-fertilisationrequired by the knowledge society occursbetween languages, innovations, andmodes and methods of thought—henceits importance as a process of interactionthat reinforces intercommunication228 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


and the distribution of the benefits ofknowledge. Translation contributes to thedevelopment of indigenised intellectualproduction and opens it to the possibilityof looking at phenomena and reality fromnew angles.Indigenisation is not, therefore, simplytransfer. It is a composite operationthat combines transfer, translation,education, training, and all activitiesthat transform what is transferred froman imported action into a well rootedaction. New environments give this actionother features that make it conformwith and appropriate to existing needs.Indigenisation, without exaggeration, is away of qualifying ourselves to reproduce,and also to engage with, the circles inwhich innovation occurs, for innovationis contingent on indigenisation, andindigenisation is contingent on the enablingenvironment. Equally, reform of therules of language, reform of educationalsystems, and synthesis of the gains of ICTall represent key mechanisms on the axisof indigenisation. All of the foregoingis to come into being within a definedvision and as a result of a defined action,a vision that seeks to make knowledge acontributor to human development.Indigenisation is a very complex processthat calls for the establishment of newstructures in the social milieu and massivematerial resources, in addition to new skillsand new patterns of labor. All of thesemandate the nurturing of new mentalitiescapable of adapting to new mechanismsof labor and production. It followsthat in the medium and long term, thebreaking of frozen patterns of labor andtheir replacement with new rhythms ofintercommunication and achievement areguaranteed. This implies that the subjectshould not be viewed from a perspectivefrom which transfer is seen as sufficient andwhich ignores the importance of tailoringwhat is being transferred to its new milieu.The process of adaptation can occur onlyif means are found that keep pace withand are responsive to the requirements andplatforms of the knowledge society.THE THIRD AXIS:DEPLOYMENT OF KNOWLEDGEThis axis follows the realisation ofenablement and indigenisation. It is relatedto the deployment of knowledge and itstechnologies in society, the economy, andthe various areas of life. It means linkingthe new knowledge gained with the arenasof production and progress in society,for new forms of knowledge enable usto build the new economies, which havealready begun to form spaces for variouskinds of labor and production and toaccumulate innumerable material andmoral goods. Deployment is reflectedin societal development and contributesto the participation by different societalgroups, particularly youth, in the advantagesoffered by the expansion and innovationgenerated by the mechanisms of the newknowledge technologies in the field oflabor and production. When deploymentof these knowledge mechanisms begins inthe economies that now dominate today’sworld, it becomes possible for our ownsocieties, through their economic actors,to engage with, for example, the economicnetworks, electronic markets, and methodsof financial intercourse required by today’snew global economy. By this means, weshall become able to join the transnationaleconomic cycle through the media madeavailable by ICT, with all their advantagesand disadvantages.AXES AND BASES:INTERSECTION ANDINTERACTIONThe axes that we have listed as separateentities should be considered as interrelatedand interactive, and not as discrete areas.Rather, these axes intersect as they formand coalesce. As between enablement,indigenisation, and deployment, enablementcommunicates, indigenisation consolidates,and deployment expands. The outcomesof all these processes is that the peopleof the knowledge society are nurtured andnew entrepreneurship and commoditiesIndigenisation is notsimply transfer. It is acomposite operationthat combinestransfer, translation,education, training,and all activities thattransform what istransferred from animported action intoan implanted actionIndigenisation is away of qualifyingourselves toreproduce, and alsoto engage with,the circles in whichinnovation occurs,for innovation iscontingent onindigenisation, andindigenisation iscontingent on theenabling environmentBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN229


Priorities are subjectto a great degreeof flexibility sincethey are open tonumerous possibilitiesand could be adjustedto different realities.They are measuresthat start from theacceptance of thegeneral vision setout above, andattempt to findroutes to modifythem based on thevaried environmentsof <strong>Arab</strong> realityIt is no longerpossible for today’ssocieties to draw updevelopment planswithout reference tothe knowledge gainsin various activitiesand practices on thelocal, regional, orinternational levelsare born. The rhythm of labor in theknowledge society is fast and continuous.If we are conscious that the challengesfacing us in the <strong>Arab</strong> world pertainingto the knowledge society are major andcomplex, then taking the road of theaforementioned axes and engaging withthem is also included among these complexactivities. Hence our insistence on theintersection, interrelation, and interactionamong them.ASPECTS OF ACTION TOWARDSBUILDING THE COMPONENTSOF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYWe now move on to identify a set ofsuggested actions and sketch the broadoutlines for adopting and translating thepreceding vision and ambition. From thestart of our presentation of the axis ofpriorities we have affirmed that what weare putting forward remains bound to therequirements of current <strong>Arab</strong> reality in theknowledge arena as it has been propoundedin the preceding chapters of the <strong>Report</strong>.Here we aim to formulate precisesuggestions, capable of application whenthe will is available and the resolve becomesfirm enough to undertake this move.It is difficult to rank these issues inorder of importance, by virtue of thedifferent positions of the <strong>Arab</strong> countrieson the scale measuring their masteryof the systems and foundations of theknowledge society. We have thereforedecided to set them down according tothe timeframes realistically needed fortheir application and the absorption of thefeatures necessary to build up momentum.There are three timeframes:Immediate, covering the current andpresent.Medium-term, which covers atimescale determined by the facts ofeach country individually, according toits specifics and the ways it deals with theinnovations and tools of the knowledgerevolution.Long-term, which looks to thehorizon of ongoing and long-term activityfor the consolidation of the values andmechanisms of the knowledge society.The ongoing nature of the task hasbeen alluded to in discussing a number ofthe axes in recognition of the interactivenature of these goals and the necessity ofrenewal and review.Needless to say, this chronologicalelucidation does not exclude intersection,interrelation, and reformulation so asto equip actors to find the appropriateprogrammatic formulas and the suitableand appropriate ordering of priorities foraction. Priorities, thus, are subject to a greatdegree of flexibility since they are opento numerous possibilities and their pacecould, as we have explained, be tuned todifferent situations. They are measures thatstart from the acceptance of the generalvision set out above, and attempt to findroutes to modify them based on the variedenvironments of <strong>Arab</strong> reality. Thus any ofthese elements and actions can be dealtwith either on the level of the single stateor the region, or on the level of the <strong>Arab</strong>world as a whole, in a way that suits thatstate of the region’s level of knowledgeperformance.ACTION IN THE AREA OF THEENABLING ENVIRONMENTWe take as a starting point for theprogramme of suggested actions a sketchof the major features of the field whichis supposed to form the incubatorappropriate to the knowledge society.We consider that, in the immediate term,the preparation of this environmentrequires facing up to the <strong>Arab</strong> presentby, in particular, expanding the sphere ofgeneral freedoms and reviewing existingdevelopment plans to find ways toharmonise them with the demands of theknowledge society.These two steps have specialsignificance, for freedom is the hoistby which knowledge and developmentare raised. Also, when formulatingdevelopment plans or reviewing those thatexist, it should be borne in mind that it is230 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE 6-2Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldEnabling environmentsImmediateactionMedium-termactionLong-termactionInstitution of public freedomsReview of regulations and legislationReview of developmentplans to ensure compatibilityReview of educational policiesReview of general cultural policiesRevival of the <strong>Arab</strong>ic languageAllocation of sustainablefinancial resourcesOn-going assessment of statusof enabling environmentsContinuousContinuousContinuousEstablishment of nurturing institutionsContinuousno longer possible for today’s societies todraw up such plans without reference tothe knowledge gains in various activitiesand practices on the local, regional, orinternational levels.In the medium term, the proposedpriorities are related to educational andcultural policies, and also to institutionsand legislative frameworks. Preparingan environment to make and frame theknowledge society requires a re-examinationof all related policies, including generalcultural policies and existing educationalpolicies. It also calls for a review of thereality of the institutions and legislativeframeworks consistent with efforts aimedat supporting entry into the knowledgesociety. When we know that <strong>Arab</strong> culturein general is suffering from the dominanceof certain stagnant forms of thought andbased upon perceptual styles ill-suited tothe requirements of the age, the need forplans that take into account the prevailingand dominant cultural reality in the <strong>Arab</strong>region becomes apparent. Hence, the needto expand the circles of enlightenment andto form spaces for free thought continuesto call for mechanisms for their diffusionand generalisation within <strong>Arab</strong> societies.Certainly, this is no easy task. Nevertheless,it is possible to orient the channels,institutions, and platforms that practicecultural work so that they formulate,diffuse, and generalise new intellectualvalues. Educational institutions, forexample, play a central role in this respect.We have, therefore, linked cultural policyto educational policy in our review due tothe profundity of the relationship betweenthem.Preparing organisations, institutions,and laws to support and embrace motiontowards the knowledge society is apriority capable of furnishing the enablingenvironment with frameworks for actionthat are independent of the involvementPreparingorganisations,institutions, andlaws to supportand embracemotion towards theknowledge societyis a priority capableof furnishing theenabling environmentwith frameworksfor action that areindependent ofthe involvementof individuals andcreate accumulationBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN231


If we admit thatlanguage is avehicle–as well as amedium–for cultureand knowledge, thenwe must considerthe development ofthe <strong>Arab</strong>ic languageas of high priorityin the area ofpreparing an enablingenvironment for theknowledge societyWe connectindigenisation withthe principle ofinscribing local,specific, andintrinsic character,so that transferredinformation becomespart of the structureof the society towhich it has beentransferredof individuals and create accumulation.The institutional nature of knowledge actssidelines transient characteristics, and grantsthem the solidity that allows them to gatherand develop successes as they proceed.To the overviews we have mentioned,we can add that regarding the priorityof developing the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language. Thisintersects with both educational andcultural policies. The development of the<strong>Arab</strong>ic language and the upgrading of itsformal aspects and grammar has becomean urgent matter, especially in light ofthe upheavals being experienced in theICT field, where an operational languagehas formed that is composed of a setof symbols related to instruments anddevices of the highest precision. This hasled to the creation of a language within thelanguage. It has also led to the wideningof the existing linguistic divide betweenour language and the new forms ofknowledge and their technologies. If weadmit that language is a vehicle–as well asa medium–for culture and knowledge andthat the linguistic actor has the capacityto build an operational language thatproduces knowledge and can share in itscreation, then we must give developmentof the <strong>Arab</strong>ic language high priority in thepreparations for an enabling environmentfor the knowledge society.We add to this the necessity forimmediate, medium, and long term actionin two matters of the utmost priority.The first is related to the allocation ofsustainable financial resources, and thesecond concerns the need for ongoingassessment of the state of the enablingenvironment, and even the state ofknowledge in its various dimensionsand elements. Action in these areaswill enjoy special significance becausefinancial resources are the foundationstone of the plans necessary to allowthe enabling environment to take offand realise success for its programmes.The second point addresses the needfor ongoing review and assessment toreveal the degree of progress in theenabling environment and the degree ofsuccess of the framework provided bythese environments and of building theinstitutions that ensure the transfer andindigenisation of knowledge.ACTION IN THE FIELDOF TRANSFER ANDINDIGENISATION OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYWe should point out here that the wordindigenisation has a range of synonyms.There are synonyms that employgeographical, agricultural, or psychologicalmetaphors such as transfer, implantation,or absorption. Each of these ascribes tothe signification of indigenisation a specificmeaning, or variety of meanings, whichexpand its general semantics, particularlywhen what is intended, in the context of thepresent <strong>Report</strong>, is an allusion to material andalso other, symbolic, elements. “Materialelements” here refers to the platforms andtools, while “symbolic elements” refersto pure information transferred from theenvironment where it originated to otherspaces for reproduction.No one should think that the issueis purely mechanical. We connectindigenisation with the principle ofinscribing local, specific, and intrinsiccharacter both during and after the processof indigenisation, so that transferredinformation becomes part of the structureof the society to which it has beentransferred and it does not remain simplya piece of information that has beencopied and is alien to its new environment.Indigenisation is the absorption andtesting of what is transferred. In theproposed strategy, it is a composite andongoing act. It is an act and an activity thatwe assume launches itself immediately andtakes on specific forms over the mediumterm. However, it is not an act that ceaseswhen knowledge assumes a productiveand creative presence within <strong>Arab</strong> society.Rather, it continues as a realisation ofthe principle of intercommunicationwith the self and with the world. Beforereviewing, therefore, some diachronic232 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


priorities in the area of movement towardsindigenisation of knowledge, we confirmthat openness and intercommunicationtogether form the major principle inthe field of indigenisation, given thatintercommunication depends on openness,and openness aims to prepare the apparatusappropriate for the transcendence ofexisting limitations. Hence, the use of allmeans conducive to support of this choiceand that stimulate transfer will help speedup the pace of indigenisation. Creating,for example, research centres, opennessto global sources of knowledge, andconcern with training and qualificationsare all key steps on the road to implantingthe elements that will set in motionthe development of knowledge in oursociety. The steps we have just indicatedmay perhaps fall under the rubric of theframework of immediate action. They alsoimpinge on the medium-term context, andare priorities for the long term, which isto say for the transitional periods requiredto close the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge gap in all itsdimensions and fields.The implantation of ICT mechanismsand the expansion of ICT usage levels forma groundbreaking and exemplary step inthis regard. The reform of individuals’mental perspectives, which is linked to thereform of education and the developmentof culture in society, also forms anessential means for the consolidation ofindigenisation. The knowledge revolutionsin today’s world rest on significantprecedents in terms of the conceptionof man and nature. In our <strong>Arab</strong> culture,we still lack these precedents. Thisserves to entrench the knowledge gapand make the paths of indigenisationmore complex. Indigenisation, forexample, can happen through reformof education, and likewise requiresThe knowledgerevolutions intoday’s worldrest on significantprecedents in termsof the conceptionof man and nature.In our <strong>Arab</strong> culture,we still lack theseprecedents. Thisserves to entrenchthe knowledge gapand make the pathsof indigenisationmore complexFIGURE 6-3Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldTransfer and indigenisation of knowledgeSupporting and establishing centresfor research and developmentTranslationImmediateactionMedium-termactionContinuousLong-termactionDevelopment and reformof educationAttention to academic andvocational trainingContinuousContinuousOpening to the insideOpening to the outside(global sources of knowledge)ContinuousOrganisation of internalknowledge sourcesICT development, transfer, and useInstigation of knowledge transferContinuousContinuousDirect support for knowledge productionContinuousBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN233


The major challengelies in changingthe generalculture of societyand the prioritiesof officialdomthroughout the <strong>Arab</strong>world, so that there isa universal convictionthat building solidknowledge capitalrequires the creationof learning curriculain accordance witha solid educationalphilosophy anda clear visionBOX 6-3Science is not the sum of knowledgeand results acquired and transportedfrom one place to another. Rather it isthe effort for indigenisation that springsfrom the need of society itself; it is aspirit and a method, i.e., standards,values, and interactions. It is not to bepossessed by derivation, borrowing,transportation, or purchase, but byeffort, the effort to implant, indigenise,and deploy, taking into considerationlocal environmental and societal needsand the possession of the ability toformulate scientific, technological,and national policies. Science andtechnology have a structural systemicdimension whereby they interact withthe promotion of translation, whichgives <strong>Arab</strong> thought the opportunity forcultural cross-pollination through whichto reformulate itself in light of the gainsand achievements of modern knowledge.Thinking about knowledgeindigenisation in the <strong>Arab</strong> world calls forwork on two levels: the institutional, whichis included in the framework of theenabling environment, and the systemic,which takes into consideration the variousdimensions of society. We thus face aproject on the level of society as a whole,and not a project specific to a particularsector or interest. Given that the currentpicture of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performanceis characterised by the absence of acomprehensive perspective, this sort ofaction will benefit us by linking together thedifferent components of the knowledgefield. Indigenisation the spirit of the newinitiative, expanded reliance on ICT, andthe building of institutions of creativityand innovation will serve as hoists to raisethe level of knowledge, skills, technologies,and the various material and non-materialresources that, we assume, will multiplywithin a knowledge society that aimsto overcome the challenges of humandevelopment.Some <strong>Arab</strong> countries of limited financialThe Indigenisation of Sciencethe surrounding environment, and sothe measure of their progress is the levelof self control that this environmentachieves [...]Science and technology are notcommodities that can be exchanged andimported. They are, before anythingelse, the organisational process ofindigenisation that implants traditionsof creation and innovation in thesystems and institutions of society, fortechnological progress does not lie inthe acquisition of imported hardware,but in the creation of local skills thatcan secure an industrial efflorescencewith deep roots in society.Source: Salim Yafut, Makanat al-‘Ilm fi al-Thaqafa al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya (The Place of Science in <strong>Arab</strong> Culture), Dar al-Tali‘a, Beirut,pp.39-41.means will undoubtedly find it difficultto make a rapid transition towards theknowledge society. Quantitative expansionin some fields of knowledge requires notonly the availability of large financial andmaterial resources; the major challenge islatent in the availability of qualified humanresources capable of developing policies,strategies, plans, and educational curricula,implementing these, and evaluating them.The need to place investment in humaneducational resources at the top of thepriorities for action throughout the <strong>Arab</strong>world is consequently obvious.The above must be accompanied byattention to the quality of education andits outcomes and to ensuring its qualityat its various stages. In this context, weenvisage that attention should be given toensuring quality in higher education and itsfit with societal needs, given that it formsthe main locomotive for responding to therequirements of the knowledge economyand in securing comprehensive integrateddevelopment.The major challenge here lies inchanging the general culture of society andthe priorities of officialdom throughoutthe <strong>Arab</strong> world, so that there is auniversal conviction that building solidknowledge capital requires the creationof learning curricula in accordance witha solid educational philosophy and a clearvision. The consolidation of a cultureof productivity, efficiency, and quality, aculture of responsibility and accountability,and a culture of information and decisionmakingbased on reliable knowledge are allparticularly important in this regard.Confronting these challenges willundoubtedly require the reinforcementof intercommunication and cooperationamong <strong>Arab</strong> states to a much greater extentthan is now the case through relevantregional and international organisations.These states are still working in isolation,each failing to take advantage of theexpertise of the others and only rarelyturning to the examples of successfulpractices dotted here and there on the<strong>Arab</strong> educational scene.234 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


ACTION TO DEPLOYKNOWLEDGEAction on the axis of knowledgedeployment–with its various fields andactivities–is linked to action on the twoprevious axes, of enablement and ofindigenisation. Perhaps this division is anoutcome of methodological necessity,for enablement is indigenisation andindigenisation is deployment. The processof building knowledge and a knowledgesociety in the <strong>Arab</strong> world is composedin interrelated fashion of the three axesunder discussion. We should not expectindigenisation to bring about deployment;rather, we should practice deploymentthrough indigenisation. Similarly, theenabling environment lets us achieveindigenisation. However, division of thecomposite and inteactive project in theproposed plan is included within theimplementing mechanisms, which weassume will be continuous.Perhaps the acts of enablement,indigenisation, and deployment takentogether absorb other linked processes,even though they may occur, collectively orindividually, according to a methodologyof separation.There is an element that regulates thedifferent actions. This is related to theprinciple of openness to the knowledgegains of the age, intercommunication withits achievements, and preparation of thematerial, institutional, and educationalapparatus to qualify our societies to closeknowledge gaps and enter the newknowledge society.In the sense of this axis, the word“deployment” means the use of newmechanisms, information, and approachesto work, deriving from the knowledgerevolution in the economy and society. Itsresonances, however, may fall short ofcomprehending the entirety of the taskwith which it is charged. From thisfollows our insistence that what is meantWe should notexpect indigenisationto bring aboutdeployment; rather,we should practicedeployment throughindigenisationFIGURE 6-4Priorities for action to build the elements of the knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> world<strong>Knowledge</strong> deploymentImmediateactionMedium-termactionLong-termactionEstablishment of a relationshipbetween production (services andgoods) and knowledgeContinuous linkage toeconomic and socialdevelopment plansContinuous linkage to the needsand applications of developmentin its various aspectsContinuous development ofeducation and academic andvocational trainingContinuous measurementof progress (assessmentand review system)ContinuousContinuousContinuousContinuousContinuousBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN235


Deployment is linkedto the creation andreproduction ofmethods capableof turning theknowledge societyand economy ina direction thatconfronts the needsand satisfies thegrowing desiresof peopleby deployment transcends the merelymechanical and imitative use of tools toassist knowledge and the service economy.It is linked to the creation and reproductionof methods capable of turning theknowledge society and economy in adirection that confronts the needs andsatisfies the growing desires of peoplein a world marked increasingly by thephenomena of consumption. In responseto these desires, the rhythm of productionis rising, and companies, entrepreneurs,and minds are in competition to createmarkets that follow particular cycles inorder to accommodate the increase inproduction.Most of the actions in this axis aresplit between the medium and long termand operate in the field of planning andimplementation with regard to economic,social, and cultural development,the strengthening of ties betweenproduction and knowledge, and the fieldsof academic and vocational training. Here,aim is to make us capable of successfullydeploying the fruits of the knowledgesociety and economy in the service ofhuman development in its broadest sense.One of the most important of thesegoals is the establishment of a strongrelationship between production andsociety’s developmental needs on the onehand, and knowledge on the other, sinceit is no longer possible for new modes ofthe service and commodity economy todevelop—in societies whose needs andaspirations are developing at break-neckspeed—without being based on gains inknowledge. Economic movements in thetourism sectors, in market creation, ande-commerce, for example, have beguntoday to create economic, social,managerial, and financial spaces whoselaws and prospects of liberalisation wecannot yet regulate. There must, therefore,be greater deployment of these methodsand mechanisms if we are to empowerourselves to enter the new fields of theknowledge society and economy, with allthe horizons that this opens for work anddevelopment.A further action whose effect willlikewise be felt over the long term withregard to knowledge deployment is thestrengthening of channels of supportfor criticality in <strong>Arab</strong>ic culture. Theachievements of the new knowledge andthe new methods for the deployment ofA further actionwhose effect will befelt over the longterm with regardto knowledgedeployment is thestrengthening ofchannels of supportfor criticality in<strong>Arab</strong>ic cultureBOX 6-4Scientific Progress and Social ProgressIt cannot be denied that any society can onlyovercome poverty, ignorance, and disease by meansof the acquisition of modern science, hence sciencehas basically come to mean the increase in thereturns of human labor [...]There is [...] a real question posed by the scientificrevolution’s relationship with the social revolution:is the first conditional on the second–as asserted byMarxists and other social scientists? Or is the firstcapable of suppressing the second–as hoped by theconservative and liberal leaders of the West?This is a major problem, but an accidental one,if that is the right expression. The political andsocial revolution removes the barriers and obstacleswithout itself solving the tangible existing problems.Revolution does not make the poor rich, educate theignorant, or cure the sick, but it opens the way to thescience that alone can undertake these tasks.Revolution distributes inherited good: sciencealone creates new good. Revolution generalises preformedculture: modern science alone expands thehorizons of knowledge and increases the numberof specialisations. It is true, therefore, that in allcircumstances and conditions, scientific progressand social progress are in balance. However, in thelight of current global conditions, what is the useof saying that science will in the long term solveall human difficulties? Today’s world is dividedinto cultural and national blocs, and debate musttherefore be confined to the scope of each bloc.With respect to the <strong>Arab</strong> bloc the question posedis, what is the role of modern science in the <strong>Arab</strong>conception of the present and the future–bearing inmind that this general formulation comprises manysubsidiary issues, most important among which arethe role of science in <strong>Arab</strong> society and thought,the share of the <strong>Arab</strong>s in scientific progress in thepast and present, the contribution of science to thesolution of <strong>Arab</strong> problems, and the current <strong>Arab</strong>concern for science.Source: ‘Abdalla al-‘Urawi, Thaqafatuna fi Daw’ al-Tarikh (Our Culture in the Light of History), <strong>Arab</strong> Cultural Centre, Beirut, 1983, pp.116-17.236 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


knowledge technologies and their methodscreate many of the positive aspects of ourage. These have reduced the stagnation ofknowledge that dominates many aspects oflife and thought in <strong>Arab</strong> reality. We assumethat the new plans in the programmesof education and cultural media will intheir turn engage in practices that enablethe consolidation of new traditions ofthought, work, and production.The priorities for action on thedeployment axis are to be carried throughwith an awareness of the difficulty ofreaching the goal of human development.Actions in this field are to be directedtowards the expansion of levels of<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance and itsgeneralisation to the various productiveand developmental sectors. They are also tobe directed to opening up of theformulation of social and economicdevelopment plans using the means andtools provided by today’s knowledgerevolutions. Human development strategiesrequire a multiplication of efforts, deepenedintercommunication and openness, aninflow of resources, institution building,and the spread of a culture of rationality andsuccess at work, in the family, at school anduniversity, within factories and onworksites.TOWARDS A NEWMECHANISM TO MEASUREARAB KNOWLEDGESince we are suggesting work along anumber of lines and directions, we cannotignore the importance of finding a practicalmechanism to measure progress towardsthe knowledge society that helps society asa whole. Such a mechanism would assistdecision makers and specialists to recognisethe stages of knowledge acquisition thathave already been traversed and identify thegaps in them, so as to reach a more precisedefinition of markers of progress. Withinthis context, finding an integrated systemto monitor the reality of knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> world today is a basic need. Indeed,in the <strong>Arab</strong> present, it forms the first steptowards a revival in <strong>Arab</strong>ic knowledgeperformance and the acquisition of theprinciples of innovation, since programmescannot be devised without measuring thegaps and knowing the degrees ofimbalance that prevail in the various fieldsof knowledge.THE ARAB KNOWLEDGEINDEXThere is no way to revive knowledgewithout a careful and objective check ofthe range of defects and gaps that havebegun to broaden in the absence of aclear plan to overcome knowledge flawsin our society. We call, therefore, forthe creation of a new index designed togive a more accurate picture of the stateof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge by transcending thetraditional perspective of measuringknowledge production on the basis ofindices that do not conform to the realityof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge. We conceive of theproposed index as being distinguishedby its exhaustive investigation of thestate of information in circulation andby its formulation of indicators able tocollate and interpret the various relevantinteractions existing within the conditionsof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge.Creating such an index will requirecollective work in which the variousconcerned societal bodies shouldparticipate. Should this be the case, the newindex will emerge from the very core of<strong>Arab</strong> reality and agreement will be achievedon adopting it in analysis and approachand, consequently, on the formulation andapplication of policies and plans.The index is a central step inpreparations for the building of the <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge society, in that the foundationswill be laid, the data compiled, and theindices devised in the framework ofintercommunication with the self and itsknowledge conditions, without ignoringthe benefit of previous experiences in thisfield. This is because the creation of aproposed <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge index doesnot mean forsaking the gains built up byWe call for thecreation of a newindex designed togive a more accuratepicture of the stateof <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgeThe index isconsidered acentral step inpreparations for thebuilding of the <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge society:the foundations willbe laid, the datacompiled, and theindices devised inthe framework ofintercommunicationwith the self andits knowledgeconditions, withoutignoring thebenefit of previousexperiences inthis fieldBUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLD: A VISION AND A PLAN237


The variousproposals includedin this vision andrelated to theestablishment of theknowledge society inthe <strong>Arab</strong> world are inalignment with thespirit and choices ofhuman developmentexperiences prior to ours so much as itmeans building an index that responds tothe requirements of <strong>Arab</strong> reality and seeksto give knowledge a status that will equip itto act as the locomotive for renaissance anddevelopment. This suggestion should not beconsidered utopian, albeit utopias have theirsignificance. Rather, it is included within theplans to help overcome the <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgegap through a step by step process ofconstruction that assumes that an <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge index is only a first step on along path.CONCLUSIONThe various proposals included in thisvision and related to the establishment ofthe knowledge society in the <strong>Arab</strong> worldare in alignment with the spirit and choicesof human development. At the same time,mention must be made of expanding thesignifications of the features associatedwith the knowledge society. Those linkedto the containment of technologicaldeterminism and of the transformationof ICT into a replacement for themechanisms of critical knowledge andhistorical investigation, which evokes boththe total human dimension and historicalspecificities, are of particular importancehere. In the measures for action that wehave laid out in general fashion in theprevious pages, we have been content topoint to the major landmarks on the pathleading to the highway of the knowledgesociety.From time to time, along the three axeswhose priorities for action we have beenconcerned to expound, we have pausedto consider examples drawn from certainkey sectors without going into detail. The<strong>Report</strong> considers that current knowledgeperformance has in common sharedrequirements, which may be subsumedunder the major heading of the knowledgegap, which we consider to be dissimilarin the different parts of the <strong>Arab</strong> world.This calls for greater understanding of the<strong>Arab</strong> knowledge reality in each countryseparately in order to sketch the specificfeatures in advance of the kind of actionrequired according to the size and natureof the gap.In the vision and plan proposed here, wehave been content to remain at the generaland common level. We have identified thedemand for a comprehensive perspectiveon the knowledge society. We have alsosketched the essential requirements forintegration with the knowledge society,namely, human and material resources,working tools, and horizons to which toaspire. The centre of gravity of this reporthas been the defence of the principle of“intercommunication” through partnershipand productive and creative integration.The <strong>Report</strong>’s vision has been translatedinto an achievable proposal andincludes markers along the route tointercommunication, a route that will leadto integration into spaces of knowledgethat fly the flag of humanity and humanintelligence in the name of partnershipand creativity.“A nd I say that life is indeeddarkness save when there is urge,And all urge is blind save whenthere is knowledge,And all knowledge is vain savewhen there is work...”GIBRAN KHALIL GIBRAN238 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


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ANNEX 1. LIST OF BACKGROUNDPAPERS (AUTHOR NAME;PAPER TITLE)IN ARABIC:• ‘Abd al-Fadil, Mahmud – In‘ikasat al-Azma al-Maliyya al-‘Alamiyya ‘ala al-Iqtisadat wal-Mujtama‘at al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya: Al-Khasa’ir wal-Furas (The Ramificationsof the World Financial Crisis for <strong>Arab</strong>Economies and Societies: Losses andOpportunities).• ‘Ali, Nabil – Furas al-Isham al-Ma‘rifial-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i: Nathra Mustaqbaliyya(Opportunities for <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>Contributions: A Look at the Future).• ‘Ali, Sa‘id Isma‘il – Mawqi‘ al-Ta‘limfi Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa bil-Mashriqal-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i (The Role of Education inthe <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society in the <strong>Arab</strong>Mashriq).• ‘Arif, Muhammad – Harakat al-Kafa’atal-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya al-Iqlimiyya wal-Dawliyya(The Regional and InternationalMobility of <strong>Arab</strong> Trained Professionals).• Afaya, Nur al-Din – Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifawa-Ishkalat al-Huwiyya wal-‘Awlama(The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society and theProblematics of Identity andGlobalization).• Al-‘Awwa, Nawwar – MustaqbalTaqniyyat al-Ma‘lumat wal-Ittisalat fial-‘Alam al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i (The Future of ICTin the <strong>Arab</strong> World).• Al-Ayoubi, Zalpha – Al-Waqt al-Mukhassas li-Ta’lim kul min al-Mawadal-Ta’limiyya Fi Manaheg Marahel al-Ta’lim al-’am ma Qabl al-Jame’, fi al-Duwal al-’<strong>Arab</strong>iyya (Time Allocated forEach School Subject in the Curricula ofPublic Education Systems in the <strong>Arab</strong>Countries).• Al-‘Azmeh, ‘Aziz – Al-Ma‘rifa, Mujtama‘al-Ma‘rifa, al-Hurriyyat (<strong>Knowledge</strong>,the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society, Freedoms).• Al-Dawway, ‘Abd al-Razzaq – Afkar minAjl Mudawwana Jadida li-AkhlaqiyyatMujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa (Thoughts on aNew Code of Ethics for the <strong>Knowledge</strong>Society).• Al-Diwahji, ‘Abd al-Ilah – Ada’ al-Buldan al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya fi al-Tatbiqat al-Ma‘lumatiyya (The Performance of the<strong>Arab</strong> Countries in ICT Applications).• Al-Musaddaq, Ruqayya – al-Mar’a al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya wa Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa (<strong>Arab</strong>Women and the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society).• Al-Sa‘id, Muhammad and Ahmad ‘Abdal-Latif – Itahat al-Ma‘rifa wa-Tashri‘atHimayat al-Milkiyya al-Fikriyya fi al-Watan al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i: Al-Tawajjuhat wal-Tahaddiyat (Access to <strong>Knowledge</strong> andLegislation on the Protection ofIntellectual Property in the <strong>Arab</strong> World:Trends and Challenges).• Al-Sellini, Naila – Islah al-Ta‘lim fiDuwal al-Maghrib (Educational Reformin the Maghrib Countries).• Al-Sharif, Hasan (a) – Al-Mardudal-Mujtama‘i wal-Iqtisadi lil-Ma‘rifa(The Social and Economic Return on<strong>Knowledge</strong>).• ––– (b) – Intaj wa-Nashr al-Ma‘rifaal-‘Ilmiyya (The Production andPublication of Scientific <strong>Knowledge</strong>).• Al-Wafi, al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i – Marja‘iyyat Mujtama‘al-Ma‘rifa (Frames of Reference for the<strong>Knowledge</strong> Society).• Bakir, Mohammed – Qiyas wa-Tahlil al-Ma‘rifa fi al-Duwal al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya Ihsa’iyyan(The Measurement and Analysisof <strong>Knowledge</strong> in the <strong>Arab</strong> Countries, aStatistical Approach).• Bin ‘Abd al-‘Ali, ‘Abd al-Salam –Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa, al-Fada’at al-Iftiradiyya wa-‘Asr al-Taqniyya (The<strong>Knowledge</strong> Society, Virtual Spaces andANNEX 1. LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS (AUTHOR NAME; PAPER TITLE)251


the Age of Technology).• Binsa‘id, Idris – Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa:Min Mujtama‘ al-I‘lam ila Mujtama‘atal-Ma‘rifa (The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society:From the Media Society to <strong>Knowledge</strong>Societies).• Diyab, Asif and ‘Amr al-Armanazi –Malamih ‘Amma li-Barnamaj Nuhudbil-Wad‘ al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i al-Rahin lil-‘Ulum wal-Thaqafa wal-Ibtikar (General Featuresof a Programme to Improve the Current<strong>Arab</strong> Situation in the Sciences, Culture,and Creativity).• Fahs, Hani (a) – Al-‘Asabiyyat ‘A’iqanMa‘rifiyyan (Fanaticism as an Obstacleto <strong>Knowledge</strong>).• ––– (b) – Al-Nuhud al-Ma‘rifi al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>ibayn Darurat al-Wifaq wa-Mashhadal-Shiqaq (The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>Renaissance between the Need forAgreement and a Landscape ofDivision.• Firjani, Nadir (a) – Al-Taghayyur fi al-Siyaq al-Mujtama‘i lil-Ma‘rifa mundhual-‘Am 2003 (Change in the SocialContext of <strong>Knowledge</strong> since 2003).• ––– (b) – Al-Taghayyur fi Ma‘alimNasaq Iktisab al-Ma‘rifa mundhu al-‘Am 2003 (The Change in the Featuresof <strong>Knowledge</strong> Acquisition Systemssince 2003).• Ghubash, Rafi‘a ‘Ubayd and FathiMustafa al-Zayyat – Qadaya Tatwiral-Ta‘lim bayna Ta‘addud al-Mubadarat wa-‘Ajz al-Aliyyat (Issuesin the Development of Education:Multiple Initiatives and IneffectiveInstruments).• Hanafi, Sari – Dawr Abhath al-‘Ulumal-Ijtima‘iyya fi al-Duwal al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya fial-Ibtikarat al-‘Ilmiyya wal-Tanmiya al-Tiknulujiyya (The Role of Social ScienceResearch in Scientific Innovation andTechnological Development in the<strong>Arab</strong> World).• Huwaydi, Fahmi – Al-Tatarruf wa-Atharuhu ‘ala Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa(Extremism and Its Effect on the<strong>Knowledge</strong> Society).• ‘Imara, Muhammad – Turathuna wa-Ma‘arif al-‘Asr (Our Heritage and the<strong>Knowledge</strong> of the Age).• Kallab, Ilham – Al-Ma‘rifa al-Ibda‘iyya(Creative <strong>Knowledge</strong>).• Kubursi, ‘Atif (a) – Al-Iqtisad al-Jadid(The New Economy).• ––– (b) – Iqtisad al-Ma‘rifa al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>i:Al-Ada’ al-Hali wa-Nazra ‘ala al-Mustaqbal (The <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong>Economy: Current Performance and aLook to the Future).• Labib, al-Tahir – Tatwir al-Thaqafa al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya: I‘tibarat Asasiyya (Developing<strong>Arab</strong> Culture: FundamentalConsiderations)• Lebanese Association for EducationalStudies, The – Taqwim Intaj al-Ma‘rifaal-Tarbawiyya fi al-Duwal al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya:Tatbiq ‘ala Madmun ‘Ayyina min al-Adabiyyat al-Tarbawiyya al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyyaal-Sadira fi al-‘Am 2007 (Evaluation ofEducational <strong>Knowledge</strong> Production inthe <strong>Arab</strong> Countries: A Content Analysisof a Sample of <strong>Arab</strong>ic EducationalLiterature Published in 2007).• Tarabishi, George – Al-Turath wa al-Tanmiyya al-Ma’refiyya (Heritage and<strong>Knowledge</strong> Development).• Yaqtin, Sa‘id (a) – Min al-Ma‘rifa ilaMujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa (From <strong>Knowledge</strong>to the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society).• ––– (b) – Al-Lugha al-‘<strong>Arab</strong>iyya wa-Tahaddiyat Mujtama‘ al-Ma‘rifa (The<strong>Arab</strong>ic Language and the Challenges ofthe <strong>Knowledge</strong> Society).IN ENGLISH:• Sakr, Naomi – The Impact of MediaLaws on <strong>Arab</strong> Digital and PrintContent.• Waked, Dina – Competition Law andits Impact on <strong>Knowledge</strong> Creation inthe <strong>Arab</strong> World.• Zahlan, A.B. – Some Observations onScience Policy in the <strong>Arab</strong> World.252 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


ANNEX 2. PROJECT FOR ADATABASE ON KNOWLEDGEIN THE ARAB REGIONOver and above its inadequacies, theavailable data on knowledge in the<strong>Arab</strong> region is characterised by beingwidely scattered, difficult to obtain, andunavailable in aggregated form at theregional level or at that of groups of<strong>Arab</strong> countries. Because of the weaknessor absence of coordination betweenproducers of such data, or between themand users of the data, the data varies inits methodological underpinnings, itschronological attribution, its classification,and other specifications. For the mostpart, knowledge data in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesis prepared in a fashion similar to that innon-<strong>Arab</strong> countries without any attemptto draw up definitions, methodologies,and measurements that conform to thereality of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.These factors set major constraints to thepossibility of using available knowledgedata for comparative purposes amongthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries and for preparingmeasurements and analyses that serve theknowledge economy in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.The vital role played by statistical datain the knowledge economy demands thatthe shortcomings in the data on knowledgefor the <strong>Arab</strong> region -- its fragmentation,its methodological unsuitability, and theweakness in the coordination of efforts tomake it available -- be dealt with. The beststep to achieve this at present may be to setup an integrated database on knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> region that is subject toongoing update and development and thatopens up prospects for cooperation anddevelopment. Creating and maintainingsuch a database could play an importantrole in strengthening interest in knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> region, stimulate debate anddialogue among concerned parties, andprovide a scientific basis for pertinentdecision-making and for follow-up on thesedecisions. The current trend towards thepublication of periodic <strong>Arab</strong> knowledgereports strengthens the importance of thementioned database. It is expected thatthese reports will, on the one hand, greatlybenefit from the proposed database andwill participate, on the other, in supportingthe database through the data theygather, synthesize, and analyse, and themeasurements, comparisons, and analysesthey draw from these data.In addition to the role of the proposeddatabase in facilitating the acquisition anduse of knowledge data, it is proposed thatit play the supplementary roles of creatingopportunities for dialogue betweenproducers and consumers of knowledgedata, and equally among producers ofthis data, so as to serve the developmentof knowledge data regarding the <strong>Arab</strong>countries and its linkage with other data.From another perspective, it is proposedthat the suggested database participate increating an awareness of the significanceof this data and of the role it can playin drawing up and implementing policiesfor knowledge development and instrengthening capacity for their productionand use. Nevertheless, the present proposalgoes beyond the traditional constructof a statistical database to encompassvarious other tasks and activities for thedevelopment of knowledge data in the<strong>Arab</strong> region, the outcome of which willbe an advanced database providing ahighly effective service to producers andconsumers of these data.The most important beneficiaries of theproposed database project are producersand users of knowledge data on the <strong>Arab</strong>ANNEX 2. PROJECT FOR A DATABASE ON KNOWLEDGE IN THE ARAB REGION253


egional and international levels and onthe level of the government, private, andforeign sectors. In particular, it is proposedthat the database be oriented towardsresearchers in the fields of knowledge,academics, policy makers, decision makers,those working in the media, and statisticiansworking to gather, develop, and publishknowledge data.The most important goals of theproposed database project can besummarised as follows:• The assembly, standardisation, andpresentation of the knowledge dataabout the <strong>Arab</strong> countries providedby various national, regional, andinternational sources. This is to bedone in an up-to-date and user-friendlyfashion that conforms to the needs ofusers and producers of this data.• Participation in the provision of newdata on knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesby carrying out statistical surveys orpolls on the key issues connected toknowledge.• Participation in the publication ofknowledge data on the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesvia a website, compact discs, pamphlets,posters, and briefs to the media andothers.• Participation in the development ofknowledge data on the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesvia the development of concepts,methods of data collection, statisticalclassifications, formulae to prepareindicators and indices, and other issuescompatible with the reality and needsof the <strong>Arab</strong> countries.• Participation in the cementation ofcooperation between producers ofknowledge data on the <strong>Arab</strong> countries,and between them and users of thisdata, to increase availability and fosterthe capacity to benefit from what isavailable.To achieve the above goals, the proposedproject is committed to the following tasksand principles:• The contents of the database and itsmanner of operation will be definedin light of the needs of users andpreparers of knowledge data for the<strong>Arab</strong> countries, and by making useof the expertise and wide knowledgerelated to the reality of these data andthe prospects of their development.• In addition to data on the level ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries, the databasewill undertake the preparation andpresentation of aggregated data onthe <strong>Arab</strong> regional level, or on thelevel of groups of <strong>Arab</strong> countries.The database will also include detaileddata to show the disparity amonggeographical regions, among economicactivities and sectors, and among thesocial, economic, and other segmentsof the population. The database willalso emphasize the preparation of timeseries data thus making possible thecomparison and analysis of changesthrough time.• The database will devote particularattention to the specificities of the<strong>Arab</strong> region and, in particular, mattersconnected to the use of the <strong>Arab</strong>iclanguage for knowledge purposes andcultural and artistic aspects peculiar tothe <strong>Arab</strong> region.• In addition to data, the database willcontain illustrative figures and maps,forecasts, and methodological indicesbased on statistical references andsources.• The database project aims to identifythe gaps in knowledge data and statisticspertaining to the <strong>Arab</strong> countries interms of availability, up-to-dateness,detail, methodology, effectiveness inexpressing the knowledge reality, andother factors. This is with the aim ofdefining the steps required to raise thelevel of these data and statistics. Toachieve this, the project may make useof researchers or research teams, holdmeetings, or take other steps to servethis goal.• The database will be put online and willtake an interactive and user-friendlyform that will provide users with thepossibility of downloading data andcreating explanatory diagrams. It will254 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


include search engines, hyperlinks torelevant websites, and other advancedwebsite features.• Initially, <strong>Arab</strong>ic and English will beused, with other languages to be addedsubsequently.• The database will be periodicallyupdated, and its contents developedand expanded in ongoing fashion.• Access to and utilisation of thedatabase and participation in itsinteractive features will be open to allwith the exception of some specificportals where access will be restrictedto specific groups who will be issuedpasswords.• Within the database website, a specialarea will be created for the <strong>Arab</strong><strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s that will containthe published reports, their backgroundpapers, feedback from the discussionsand opinions of database users, andnews related to the reports. This areawill also contain a special section withaccess restricted to those preparing the<strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s and thosedirectly concerned with them. Workin progress, guidelines, the minutes ofmeetings, announcements, and othermaterial of use for those mentionedabove during the preparatory stages ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s will beplaced in this area.• A portal for dialogue, cooperation,coordination, and learning concerningknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> world will beprovided within the database’s website.• The database project will hold trainingworkshops and meetings of expertsand form working teams for producersand users of knowledge data to servethe goals of the project.• Statistical professional best practice,neutrality, and impartiality will befollowed in collecting, classifying, andpresenting data as in all aspects of thedatabase, with the aim of ensuringthat it is characterised by objectivity,accuracy, and efficiency.• The project will seek to cooperate withparties interested in data and indicatorsrelated to knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region.The most important of these bodiesare, on the national level, the nationalstatistical agencies, on the regional level,the Economic and Social Commissionfor Western Asia (ESCWA), and, onthe international level, UN agenciesand the World Bank.The founding and sustainabilityof the proposed database require theprovision of the services of specialistsin statistics and ICT. This is on the basisof fulltime employment, part-time work,or on a project basis. This also requiresthe provision of computer hardware andsoftware, connection to the internet, a basefor those working on the database andits equipment, and facilities for holdingmeetings and workshops. Advantage shouldalso be taken of the experience of relateddatabases such as those of the World Bank’s<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology,the UNDP’s Higher Education Project,the UNDP’s Programme on Governancein the <strong>Arab</strong> Region (POGAR), as wellas others at regional institutions such asthe Mohammed bin Rashid Al MaktoumFoundation on account of its particularinterest in knowledge as embodied inthe <strong>Arab</strong> <strong>Knowledge</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s, which itwill publish, and in its activities relatedto writing, translation, publishing, studyopportunities, and others.ANNEX 2. PROJECT FOR A DATABASE ON KNOWLEDGE IN THE ARAB REGION255


ANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARABCOUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY(BASED ON THE METHODOLOGY OFTHE WORLD BANK)*The World Bank uses the <strong>Knowledge</strong>Assessment Methodology with the objectof measuring and analysing the knowledgeeconomy. This methodology is based on thesupposition that the knowledge economycomprises four pillars: economic incentiveand institutional regime, education andhuman resources, the innovation system,and ICT. The methodology currentlycomprises a total of eighty-three indicatorsthat are constantly being updated on theWorld Bank’s website. 1According to this methodology, theknowledge economy is quantified bymeans of a numerical index known asthe <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index (KEI).This is calculated from the data of twelveindicators, three of which form a singlepillar. Table A-1 presents these indicatorsand their values with regard to the <strong>Arab</strong>countries. To calculate the index, thevalues of the indicators are transformedinto normalised values. The normalisedvalue for an indicator for a specific countryTABLE A-1CountryIndicators of the knowledge economy index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesEconomic Incentive andInstitutional RegimeTariffandnon-tariffbarriersRegulatoryQualityRuleofLawInnovation SystemRoyalty Patentand ApplicationsLicense Fees GrantedPayments By the USand Patent andReceipts Trademark($ per Office perperson) million peopleScientificandTechnicalJournalArticlesEducation and HumanResourcesAdultLiteracyRate(% ofthoseover15)SecondaryEnrolment(%)TertiaryEnrolment(%)Information andCommunication TechnologyTelephonesper1000peopleComputersper1000peopleAlgeria 68.8 -0.6 -0.6 .. 0.0 10.7 69.9 83.2 21.4 494 11 58Bahrain 80.8 0.7 0.6 .. 0.0 45.6 86.5 101.2 33.1 1301 169 213Djibouti 28.2 -0.9 -0.8 .. 0.0 0.0 .. 22.8 2.2 69 24 13Egypt 66 -0.4 0.0 4.3 0.1 22.8 71.4 86.2 34.8 325 38 68Iraq 15.6 -1.4 -1.9 .. 0.0 40.0 74.1 45.2 12.1 432 56 35Jordan 74.8 0.4 0.5 .. 0.3 50.8 91.1 87.4 39.9 419 57 119Kuwait 81 0.5 0.8 0.0 2.4 91.9 93.3 88.7 18.8 1140 237 276Lebanon 77.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.8 58.3 86.5 81.4 46.3 554 115 196Libya 39.6 -1.0 -0.6 .. 0.0 27.4 84.0 98.5 .. 174 .. 36Mauritania 70.2 -0.2 -0.4 .. 0.0 0.8 .. 20.8 3.2 256 14 7Morocco 62.6 -0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 14.7 52.3 49.2 11.4 455 25 153Oman 83.6 0.8 0.7 .. 0.1 44.3 81.4 88.6 18.3 623 47 111Qatar 70.8 0.5 0.9 .. 0.5 32.2 89.0 96.6 18.7 1135 171 269Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 76.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 24.9 82.9 94.2 29.2 740 354 70Sudan .. -1.2 -1.3 .. 0.0 1.3 60.9 32.7 .. 69 90 77Syria 54 -1.2 -0.6 .. 0.0 4.1 80.8 67.3 .. 307 42 58Tunisia 71.8 0.2 0.4 2.2 0.1 56.9 74.3 83.3 30.1 692 57 95UAE 80.4 0.8 0.7 .. 1.2 55.8 88.7 85.7 23.2 1273 116 308Yemen 66.4 -0.7 -1.0 .. 0.0 0.6 54.1 45.6 9.4 135 15 9Internetusersper1000peopleANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY257


is arrived at by specifying the country’sranking on the index. Thus the bestperforming country appears in first place,the next best performing country in secondplace and so on. The normalised value foran indicator for a particular country isequal to the number of countries rankedlower than that country divided by the totalnumber of countries multiplied by ten.The index for each pillar is calculated onthe basis of its being the simple arithmeticmean of the normalised values of the threeTABLE A-2<strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countries compared to other countriesCountryEconomicIncentives andInstitutionalRegimeInnovationSystemEducationand HumanResourcesInformation andCommunicationTechnology<strong>Knowledge</strong>EconomyIndexDifferencebetween thehighest andlowest pillarKEI value among 135 countries of the worldAlgeria 2.6 3.5 3.7 3.2 3.3 1.1Bahrain 6.9 4.3 5.8 7.2 6.1 2.9Djibouti 1.2 1.4 0.5 1.7 1.2 1.2Egypt 3.6 4.5 4.4 3.5 4.0 1.0Iraq 0.3 4.2 2.4 3.6 2.6 3.9Jordan 5.8 5.7 5.5 4.6 5.4 1.2Kuwait 7.0 5.0 5.1 7.3 6.1 2.3Lebanon 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.8 5.0 1.1Libya 1.5 3.9 5.6 2.5 3.4 4.1Mauritania 4.0 1.8 0.7 1.9 2.1 3.2Morocco 3.9 3.7 2.0 4.2 3.4 2.2Oman 7.4 5.1 4.2 4.9 5.4 3.1Qatar 6.0 5.8 5.3 7.1 6.0 1.8Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5.4 4.0 5.0 5.9 5.1 1.9Sudan 0.7 2.0 1.3 3.5 1.9 2.8Syria 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.5 2.9 1.9Tunisia 5.3 4.6 4.1 5.0 4.7 1.2UAE 7.0 6.8 4.6 7.1 6.4 2.5Yemen 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 0.1Ranking among 135 countriesAlgeria 109 91 94 99 96 18Bahrain 48 76 53 38 48 38Djibouti 123 134 132 118 132 16Egypt 91 71 80 93 83 22Iraq 135 78 106 89 108 57Jordan 55 55 57 73 62 18Kuwait 43 66 66 36 47 30Lebanon 69 68 72 62 68 10Libya 120 83 56 106 93 64Mauritania 83 125 129 115 116 46Morocco 87 88 109 78 92 31Oman 37 65 87 66 63 50Qatar 52 54 61 43 49 18Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 61 80 71 57 67 23Sudan 131 122 120 96 120 35Syria 118 94 100 95 104 24Tunisia 65 69 88 65 72 23UAE 45 43 77 42 43 35Yemen 116 126 114 116 122 12258 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


indicators that make up the pillar. The KEIis then calculated on the basis of its beingequal to the simple arithmetic mean of theindex values for the four pillars. The valueof each index falls in the range 0-10 andis an expression of the relative positionof a country in comparison with all thecountries whose index is calculated. Onthis basis, the index values of the top 10per cent of countries fall in the range 9-10,the index values of the second highest 10per cent of countries fall in the range 8-9,and so on.INDICATORS AND INDICES OFTHE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYFOR THE ARAB COUNTRIESData for the indicators of the <strong>Knowledge</strong>Assessment Methodology are currentlyavailable with respect to 140 countries,including seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> countries. Forthe purposes of the present report, data forthe indicators has been made available fortwo other <strong>Arab</strong> countries, Iraq and Libya,and the data for Sudan is rounded out, tomake a total of nineteen <strong>Arab</strong> countriesfor which it is possible to calculate theKEI and the indices of its four pillars.The three <strong>Arab</strong> countries for which theminimum level of data needed to calculatethe indices is not available are Palestine,Somalia, and Comoros. Table A-2 presentsthe KEI values, the index values of itspillars, and the relative position for each<strong>Arab</strong> country globally. 2divisions within each <strong>Arab</strong> country, thepresentation of variation with respect toeach <strong>Arab</strong> country will be limited to thatbetween the indices of the four pillarswithin the country. From the final columnof Table A-2, it is to be noted that, forseven <strong>Arab</strong> countries (Jordan, Lebanon,Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Djibouti, andYemen) the index values for these pillarsare close together, with the differencebetween the highest and lowest not beinggreater than 1.2. In contrast, seven other<strong>Arab</strong> countries (Bahrain, Iraq, Libya,Mauritania, Oman, Sudan, and the UAE)display a relatively large variation, of notless than 2.5, in the index values for thepillars. The reason for this high levelof variation in the case of five of thesecountries goes back to the EconomicIncentive and Institutional Regime pillarwhose index is higher than that of the otherthree pillars with respect to Mauritania andOman, while it is lower than the otherthree with respect to Iraq, Libya, andSudan. Given that each of the four pillarsof knowledge forms an essential elementfor achieving the knowledge economy, itis necessary to achieve a balance betweenthe levels of the pillars within one country,since underdevelopment in one of thepillars forms an obstacle to performanceby the other three pillars of their role inFIGURE A-1The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesVARIATION IN THEKNOWLEDGE ECONOMYAMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIESAND IN COMPARISON WITHOTHER COUNTRIESVariation in the knowledge economy withregard to the <strong>Arab</strong> countries is visible onthree main levels: within the individual<strong>Arab</strong> country, among the <strong>Arab</strong> countries,and between the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and thecountries of the world. Given the lack ofsufficient data to calculate the KEI at thelevel of the geographic or demographicANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY76543210Source: World Bank databas, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM).UAEKuwaitBahrainQatarJordanOmanSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaLebanonTunisiaEgyptMoroccoLibyaAlgeriaSyriaIraqMauritaniaSudanYemenDjibouti259


the knowledge economy. On this basis,one of the priorities for the developmentof the knowledge economy within each<strong>Arab</strong> country is to pinpoint its weakestpillar and then work to develop it to closethe gap between the four pillars.Within the <strong>Arab</strong> region, there isrelatively large variation between the <strong>Arab</strong>countries with respect to the KEI. TableA-2 and Figure A-1 indicate that the KEIfor the <strong>Arab</strong> countries ranges from 6.4 forthe UAE to 1.2 for Djibouti. Thus the <strong>Arab</strong>TABLE A-3Economic performance and KEI indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriescompared with the world’s geographic regionsIndicator or index<strong>Arab</strong>region *MiddleEast andNorthAfricaAfricaEast Asiaand thePacificEuropeandCentralAsiaThe G7group ofnationsLatinAmericaSouthAsiaWesternEuropeTheWorldNumberof regionshigher thanthe <strong>Arab</strong>regionOverall economic performanceAnnual GDP growth (%) 5.7 5.1 4.9 5.9 6.9 1.9 3.9 5.5 2.7 4.9 2Human Development Index 0.73 0.76 0.51 0.8 0.8 0.95 0.77 0.6 0.94 0.74 6Economic Incentives andInstitutional RegimeTariff and non-tariff barriers 65 70 68 77 80 84 74 49 85 74 7Regulatory Quality -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.1 1.3 -0.1 -0.4 1.4 0.1 6Rule of Law -0.2 0.1 -0.5 0.3 -0.3 1.4 -0.4 -0.4 1.6 0 4Innovation SystemRoyalty and License Fees Paymentsand Receipts ($ per person)Scientific and Technical JournalArticles per million peoplePatent Applications Granted by theUS PTO per million people1 23 6 258 22 240 15 0 645 127 731 86 6 234 107 591 21 5 634 160 50.3 10.0 0.1 44.6 1.2 146.5 0.9 0.1 77.6 22 6Education and Human ResourcesAdult Literacy (%) 78 80 59 93 98 100 87 60 99 85 6Overall enrolment insecondary education (%)72 79 38 82 91 103 81 51 107 76 6Overall post-secondaryeducation enrolment (%)21 26 5 43 47 63 29 7 62 34 6Information and CommunicationTechnologyTelephones per 1000 people 557 682 174 823 804 1407 596 115 1542 705 6Computers per 1000 people 91 137 36 274 142 585 84 13 492 183 5Internet users per 1000 people 114 152 30 314 207 522 164 29 521 210 6Indices for the pillarsEconomic Incentives andInstitutional Regime3.8 4.6 2.8 5.7 5.4 8.2 4.7 2.7 8.7 5.2 6Innovation System 4.4 6.8 5.3 8.8 6.9 9.9 6.5 7.2 8.7 8.8 8Education and Human Resources 3.4 3.8 1.5 5.3 6.7 8.6 4.3 1.9 8.0 4.4 6Information andCommunication Technology5.1 5.9 2.6 7.0 6.4 8.8 5.3 1.8 8.9 6.5 6<strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index 4.2 5.3 3.0 6.7 6.3 8.9 5.2 3.4 8.6 6.2 6* The <strong>Arab</strong> region overlaps the Middle East and North Africa region and the Africa region as eighteen <strong>Arab</strong> countries fall within the Middle East and North Africa region, while the other four <strong>Arab</strong> countries – Mauritania,Somalia, Sudan, and Comoros – fall within the Africa region.260 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


countries’ rankings among the countries ofthe world vary from forty-third place forthe UAE to 132 nd place for Djibouti–whichis fourth from bottom among the world’scountries.When the countries of the world aredivided into four quartiles by KEI, it is tobe noted that not one <strong>Arab</strong> country appearsin the top quartile–that among countrieswhose KEI is 7.5 or more. In fact, no<strong>Arab</strong> country appears in the top 35 percent. Eight <strong>Arab</strong> countries fall within thesecond highest quartile–countries whoseKEI ranges from 5.0 to 7.5–and these arethe six Gulf Cooperation Council statesand Jordan and Lebanon. Seven <strong>Arab</strong>countries fall in the third quartile withKEI scores of 2.5 to 5.0: Tunisia, Egypt,Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Iraq.The Occupied Palestinian Territories, in allprobability, also come within this group.The remaining <strong>Arab</strong> countries comewithin the bottom quartile of the world’scountries in terms of the knowledgeeconomy, with index scores of less than2.5, and these countries are Mauritania,Sudan, Yemen, and Djibouti. Somalia andComoros would also be expected to comewithin this group.Regarding the variation betweenthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries and the rest of theworld’s countries, Table A-3 comprises,for the twelve indicators of the KEI andfor two indicators of overall economicperformance, a comparison of the <strong>Arab</strong>region as a whole with the world’s eightgeographic regions. From the last columnof the table, it is noted that the <strong>Arab</strong> regionscores lower than seven of these eightregions with respect to two indicators,scores lower than six of these regionswith respect to eleven indicators, scoreslower than five regions with respect to twoindicators, and scores lower than four withrespect to one indicator. The sole indicatorfor which the <strong>Arab</strong> region performs betterthan half of the world’s geographic regionsis the annual rate of GDP growth, whereit achieved the third highest level afterthe East Asia and Pacific region and theEurope and Central Asia region. The highFIGURE A-2Normalised values for indicators concerning knowledgefor the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, the G7, and the worldComputers per1000 peopleTelephone per1000 peopleTertiary Enrolment(% gross)Secondary Enrolment(% gross)Internet Users per1000 peopleAdult Literacy Rate(% age 15 and above)Average Annual Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) Growth10Poverty Indexlevel of this indicator goes back in largepart to the rise in world crude oil prices.Figure A-2 presents a comparisonof the normalised values of the aboveindicators between the <strong>Arab</strong> region, theworld as a whole, and the G7 group ofnations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,Japan, UK, and US). This last groupwas chosen because it comprises thecountries with the highest levels withinthe knowledge economy. The figure showsthat the <strong>Arab</strong> region falls below the worldmedian on all indicators with the exceptionof annual GDP growth rate. It also showsthat the gap between the <strong>Arab</strong> region andthe world median is particularly markedfor the indicator on tariff and non-tariffbarriers and for the three indicators of theInnovation System.With respect to the pillars ofknowledge, it is to be noted, from FigureA-3, that the <strong>Arab</strong> region comes lowerthan almost all other regions of theworld on the Innovation System index.Regarding the indices of the other pillarsof the knowledge society, there are onlytwo regions, South Asia–which includes0Patent Applications Grantedby the USPTO Per Million Population<strong>Arab</strong> Countries G7 WorldSource: World Bank databas, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM).Tariff & Nontariff BarriersRegulatory QualityRule of LawRoyalty and License FeesPayments and ReceiptsScientific and Technical Journal ArticlesPer Million PopulationANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY261


FIGURE A-3Index values for the pillars of the knowledge economyfor the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, the G7, and the worldInformation andCommunicationTechnologyEconomic Incentive and Institutional RegimeEducation and Human Resources<strong>Arab</strong> Countries G7 WorldSource: World Bank databas, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM).FIGURE A-476543210UAEKuwait100Innovation SystemBangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, andPakistan – and Africa, on a lower level thanthe <strong>Arab</strong> region. Figure A-3 clearly showsthe depressed levels of the pillars of theknowledge economy in the <strong>Arab</strong> countrieswith respect to the average for the world’scountries as a whole and for the G7 groupof nations. This low performance isThe latest KEI compared to 1995QatarBahrainJordanOmanSaudi <strong>Arab</strong>iaLebanonMost Recent 1995Source: World Bank databas, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM).TunisiaEgyptMoroccoAlgeriaSyriaMauritaniaSudanYemenDjiboutiespecially pronounced for the InnovationSystem pillar.THE EVOLUTION OF THEKNOWLEDGE ECONOMY IN THEARAB COUNTRIES SINCE 1995Figure A-4 compares KEI values forthe most recent period for which data isavailable with 1995 levels for the <strong>Arab</strong>countries for which this index is availablefor both periods (see Statistical Annex,Table 4). The <strong>Arab</strong> countries are rankedin the figure according to the most recentindex value. It is to be noted that the KEIscore has risen for nine of the seventeen<strong>Arab</strong> countries included in the comparison.Oman and Tunisia achieved the highestincrease, the KEI score for each increasingby 0.6. On the other hand, the KEIscores of seven <strong>Arab</strong> countries fell back.Djibouti stands out with its score fallingfrom 2.7 in 1995 to 1.2 according to themost recent data. It should be pointed outhere that a drop in the value of a particularindicator, and consequently in the value ofa particular pillar or of the KEI, from onetime period to another, does not necessarilymean a drop in the absolute score for theindicator. Rather it means that the relativeposition of the country for this indicatorhas fallen. Such a drop may occur evenwhen the indicator value has risen, if theproportional increase is less than theproportional increases achieved by othercountries that are contending with thiscountry in terms of ranking.THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THEINDICATORS AND INDICES OFTHE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYFOR THE ARAB COUNTRIESThe indicators and indices of theknowledge economy were designed tomake international comparisons thatconform to the reality of the world’scountries as a whole, and in particular fromthe perspective of the availability of data.On this basis, these indicators and indicesdo not take into account the specificities262 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and suffer frommany shortcomings when applied to thesecountries. The most important of thesefollow.• Certain dimensions of knowledgedeemed significant with respect to the<strong>Arab</strong> countries, such as the arts, culture,literature, and translation, are not partof the indicators and indices of theknowledge economy.• The knowledge economy indicatorsconcentrate on the quantitative anddo not lend sufficient importanceto the qualitative. The educationindicators, for example, concentrateon the numbers of students enrolledin education but do not deal with thequalitative requirements of educationin terms of qualified teachers, purposebuiltbuildings and science labs, thesuitability of curricula and the extentof their implementation, and the fitbetween the specialisations of graduatesand the requirements of the knowledgeeconomy.• Many of the indicators pay attentionto the provision of the inputs andenvironments required to achieveknowledge, but not to its outputs. Thatis, they are biased towards the supplyside in terms of the requirement forachieving the knowledge society anddo not devote enough attention to thesocial and economic fruits of knowledgeand to other aspects that are reflectedin the life of society. Provision of ICTequipment and infrastructure, such astelephones, computers, the internet,and television, does not necessarilymean that these will contribute to thegeneration of knowledge. Indeed theymay encourage time-wasting in futileactivities at the expense of those relatedto knowledge. Similarly, increasedresearch and development does notnecessarily imply that the latter is putto use for the generation of economicreturns and benefits to society.• Some indicators included within the<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodologydo not express the variable targeted formeasurement. For example, the indicatoron the number of patents granted bythe US Patent and Trademark Officedoes not express the actual numberof patents, because it does not includepatents granted by national patent andtrademark offices or by internationaloffices outside the US.STATISTICAL DATA ONKNOWLEDGE IN THE ARABCOUNTRIESThe data related to knowledge indicators inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries very often suffer fromgaps, inaccuracy, datedness, or irrelevence.These shortcomings in the data make itimpossible or difficult to make accuratecomparisons, to identify the factors linkedto the points of strength and weakness inthe state of knowledge, and to perform indepthand in-detail analyses. These negativeeffects are particularly concentrated in theindices and countries which suffer to ahigh degree from the scarcity or datednessof the available data or from its weakcapacity to express what is to be measured,while at the same time these very indicesand countries are the ones most in need ofdevelopment based on accurate statisticalmeasurement and analysis.The importance of statistical data inrelation to knowledge is not limited to thepurposes of measurement and analysis forwhich they have been used in this report.Rather, these data form one of the majorelements of knowledge, particularly inthose areas susceptible to quantitativeassessment, such as the economy,sociology, medicine, and engineering, sinceit plays a vital role in coming to know andanalyse reality, in predicting the future, andin decision-making.AVAILABILITY OFKNOWLEDGE DATA FOR THEARAB COUNTRIESTo become familiar with the scope ofknowledge data available in the <strong>Arab</strong>countries, we will use here the data of theANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY263


TABLE A-4Availability of knowledge indicators for the <strong>Arab</strong> countriesincluded by the World BankKind of indicatorNumber ofindicatorsAvailability of index indicatorsfor latest period in 19 <strong>Arab</strong>countriesNumber ofcountries(country/indicator)Availabilityrate (%)Number of <strong>Arab</strong> countrieslacking data for the index in17 <strong>Arab</strong> countriesLatest period 1995Overall economicperformanceEconomic Incentive andInstitutional Regime Index9 16.1 85 .. ..19 16.9 89 1 8Innovation System Index 24 11.4 60 11 9Education and HumanResources Index19 14.1 74 4* 0ICT Index 12 14.8 78 0 0All <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy83 14.3 75 11 13Indicators* The four countries that lack data for the index of the Education and Human Resources pillar for the latest period but did not lack such data in 1995 are Djibouti,Mauritania, Sudan, and Syria.World Bank’s <strong>Knowledge</strong> AssessmentMethodology indicators in view of theirclear features and the effort spent incollecting and updating them. According tothe latest release of indicators, the numberof indicators to have been calculated foreach <strong>Arab</strong> country ranges from thirtyfourto seventy-eight out of a total ofeighty-three indicators, with an averageof 61.2 indicators for each <strong>Arab</strong> country,in comparison with 74.0 indicators forthe non-<strong>Arab</strong> countries. There are four<strong>Arab</strong> countries for which data is availablefor fewer than fifty indicators, nine <strong>Arab</strong>countries for which data is available forfifty to seventy indicators, and only six<strong>Arab</strong> countries for which data is availablefor more than seventy of the indicators.This is with respect to the nineteen <strong>Arab</strong>countries where it has been possibleto calculate the KEI; the remaining<strong>Arab</strong> countries–Palestine, Somalia, andComoros–suffer greater shortcomings inthe data.On the level of the pillars of theknowledge economy, Table A-4 showsthat the pillar most lacking in data is theInnovation System, where the averagenumber of <strong>Arab</strong> countries for which thedata for the indicators of this pillar isavailable amounts to 11.4 out of nineteencountries. That is, the percentage of dataavailable for this pillar reaches only 60 percent. It is worth pointing out that of theindices of the knowledge economy, this, attwenty-four, consists of the largest numberof indicators, in comparison with twelve tonineteen indicators for the remainingpillars. This demonstrates the significanceof this pillar in the <strong>Knowledge</strong> AssessmentMethodology. The index for which data ismost available is the Economic Incentiveand Institutional Regime pillar, for whichthe data availability rate reaches 89 per cent.SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE DATAON THE ARAB COUNTRIESSources of data about knowledge areeither national or foreign. The foreignsources are represented by internationalorganisations; foremost among these arethe UN organisations, the World Bank,research centres such as the American264 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Freedom House and Heritage Institute,government offices such as the US Patentand Trademark Office, and other bodies.These bodies undertake the preparation ofknowledge data by gathering and collatingdata available from other sources or bycarrying out surveys or polls or on thebasis of their administrative records.The chief national sources forknowledge data in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries arethe specialist statistical bureaux attachedto government departments. At theforefront of these bodies is the nationalcentral statistical agency of the state whichprovides technical oversight and works tocoordinate statistical activity within thestate. Statistical departments are also usuallyto be found in some state agencies relevantto knowledge, such as the educationalinstitutions, institutions concerned withICT, and agencies that regulate industrialactivity, foreign trade, investment, andintellectual property rights. The privatesector in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries plays a limitedrole in the provision of knowledge data,although this role is starting to grow in someinstitutions operating in fields connectedwith knowledge, such as the privateuniversities, mobile phone companies, andbanks. The foreign sector also contributesto the provision of data concerningknowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, especiallyin the Gulf countries where this sector isactive in education, commerce, technologytransfer, ICT, finance, and others.It is possible to divide sources ofknowledge data into two main kinds onthe basis of how they gather this data:administrative data and statistical surveydata. By administrative data is meantthe data extracted from the records ofthe bodies that provide services, suchas educational institutions, phone andinternet companies, banks, and the agenciesconcerned with regulation of trade,industry, property rights, and others. Themost significant feature of administrativedata is its availability in detailed form andfor time periods that may extend manyyears into the past. However this data, beinga by-product of undelimited specificationsand unsorted with regard to its relevanceto knowledge, may not be expressive. It isfrequently not ready for use and statisticalprocessing and tabulation may be requiredin order to render it of use. Administrativedata from some agencies also overlaps withdata from other agencies or is incompleteand limited to the activity of the specificagency.<strong>Knowledge</strong> data extracted fromstatistical surveys includes the data fromperiodic sector-based surveys, such asthose of industrial, service, and financialinstitutions that are implementedseasonally or annually, comprehensivecensuses such as population, residential,and economic institution censuses, opinionpolls, and specialist statistical surveys. Inthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries, statistical surveys andpublications devoted to knowledge are rare,with the exception of the basic attempts ofsome <strong>Arab</strong> countries to gather and publishdata related to science and technology,which for the most part concentrate onthe numbers of those working in researchand development activity and expenditureon these activities. In comparison withdata extracted from administrative records,knowledge data extracted from statisticalsurveys is distinguished by its greaterconformity to the requirements of the datausers, having been designed to serve these.However, collection of such data requiresthe devotion of financial resources andthe availability of statistical expertise andother requirements which make most of itavailable only for limited time periods andfor limited areas of knowledge.The sources of data for the knowledgeindicators in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries differaccording to the indicator. Data for someindicators is available from a number ofsources, while at the same time data forother indicators is available from onlyone source or not available at all. It is ofcourse preferable for data for an indicatorto be available from more than one source,provided that such data are mutuallycomplementary and consistent. However,data for the same indicator from differentsources are often mutually inconsistent orANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY265


even contradictory. For example, data forthe indicator on enrolment in a specificstage of education extracted from therecords of the educational institutions maynot be consistent with those extracted fromfamily surveys because of the difference inthe time period, the beginning or end ofthe school year, how enrolment is defined,the coverage of those enrolled, and othermethodological factors.In general then, there are severeshortcomings in knowledge data withinthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries, because interest incollecting these data remains recent. Atthe time when these data are becomingrelatively available with respect to somefields of knowledge, such as educationand communications, they remain almostnon-existent in other fields, such as thoseconnected to research and development,the publishing industry, patents, literaryand artistic production, the media,and translation. In the face of theseshortcomings in knowledge data aboutthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries, it was decided, for thepurposes of the present <strong>Report</strong>, to conducta statistical survey to examine the opinionsof those concerned with knowledge.Implementation was, however, postponedbecause of the delay such a survey wouldcause to publication of the <strong>Report</strong>, andbecause postponement may be beneficialin light of the increasing fine-tuning ofthe diagnosis of the reality of knowledgein the <strong>Arab</strong> countries, of the priorities andsubjects on which data should be gathered,and of the best formulations for gatheringand tabulating this data that the current<strong>Report</strong> sets out.266 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Endnotes* This annex was prepared by Mohammed H. Bakir in the third quarter of 2008.1World Bank website (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page3.asp?default=1.2The values given in the table differ slightly from the values shown on the World Bank website. This is becausethe addition of data concerning Iraq, Libya, and Sudan alters the total number of countries included, and inconsequence their rankings, which means a change to the normalised values of the indicators.ANNEX 3. MEASUREMENT OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES’ KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY267


STATISTICAL ANNEX


STATISTICAL ANNEXGENERAL INDICATORSTable 1: Total population, population growth, and proportion of children in the <strong>Arab</strong> regionCountry Total population 2007(millions)Population growthrate 2005-2015(predicted) (%)Proportion of the totalpopulation under 15years old 2005 (%)Algeria 33.8 1.5 29.6Bahrain 0.7 1.7 26.3Djibouti 0.8 1.7 38.5Egypt 75.4 1.7 33.3Iraq 28.9 2.2 41.5Jordan 5.9 2.2 37.2Kuwait 2.8 2.2 23.8Lebanon 4.0 1.0 28.6Libya 6.1 1.9 30.3Mauritania 3.1 2.4 40.3Morocco 31.2 1.2 30.3Occupied Palestinian Territories 4.0 3.1 45.9Oman 2.5 1.9 33.8Qatar 0.8 2.0 21.7Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 24.7 2.2 34.5Somalia 8.6 2.9 44.1Sudan 38.5 2.2 40.7Syria 19.9 2.2 36.6Tunisia 10.3 1.0 26.0UAE 4.3 2.5 19.8Yemen 22.3 2.9 45.9<strong>Arab</strong> Countries 328.6 2.0 33.7Source: World Population Prospects 2006 Revision, published 2007. http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX271


Table 2: Human Development IndicesCountryHumanDevelopmentIndex value2006HumanPovertyIndex(%)GDP2005(US$billions)GDP Percapita 2006(PurchasingPower ParityUS$)Adultilliteracy rate(% aged 15and above1999-2006)Genderempowermentmeasure(value)Genderempowermentmeasure(rank)Algeria 0.748 18.1 102.3 7426 25.4 0.312 105Bahrain 0.902 8.3 12.9 34516 11.7 0.627 35Comoros 0.572 21.2 0.4 1152 25.8 .. ..Djibouti 0.513 26.5 0.7 1965 .. .. ..Egypt 0.716 20.0 89.4 4953 28.6 0.283 107Iraq .. 22.6 .. .. 25.9 .. ..Jordan 0.769 6.1 12.7 4654 7.3 .. ..Kuwait 0.912 .. 80.8 46638 6.7 .. ..Lebanon 0.796 8.5 21.9 9757 .. .. ..Libya 0.840 13.6 38.8 13362 13.8 .. ..Mauritania 0.557 35.9 1.9 1890 44.8 .. ..Morocco 0.646 31.8 51.6 3915 45.3 0.316 104Occupied PalestinianTerritories0.731 6.7 4.0 .. 7.6 .. ..Oman 0.839 15.0 24.3 * 20999 16.3 0.434 89Qatar 0.899 7.2 42.5 72969 10.2 0.380 99Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 0.835 12.5 309.8 22053 15.7 0.297 106Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 0.526 34.3 27.5 1887 39.1 .. ..Syria 0.736 13.0 26.3 4225 17.5 .. ..Tunisia 0.762 16.1 28.7 6958 23.1 .. ..UAE 0.903 7.8 129.7 49116 10.2 0.698 24Yemen 0.567 36.6 15.1 2262 42.7 0.136 108<strong>Arab</strong> Countries 0.713 .. 1043.4 7760 28.2 .. ..* 2004 dataSource: UN, Statistical update of the tables of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2007-2008, Fighting Climate Change: human solidarity in a divided world. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf and http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf on 13 April <strong>2009</strong>.272 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 3: Economic IndicatorsCountryAnnualGDPgrowth2007(%)Inflationrate2007(%)Net foreigndirect investment(US$ millions)2004 2007Overallsurplus/deficitin budget2006 (US$millions)Militaryexpenditure(% of GDP)2007Balanceof trade2006(US$millions)Populationliving withoutelectricity2006(millions)Algeria 3 3.7 882 1665 15039 2.9 34060 0.6Bahrain 8 a 3.4 b 865 1756 1471 3.6 3138 0.0Djibouti 4 5.0 b 39 195 .. 4.2 c -294 ..Egypt 7 11.0 2157 11578 -8512 2.8 -8438 1.5Iraq .. .. 300 448 .. .. 6380 22Jordan 6 5.4 b 816 1835 -626 5.3 -5004 0.0Kuwait 10 a 5.0 b 24 123 23514 4.8 44284 0.0Lebanon 2 4.1 1993 2845 -3238 4.5 -5755 0.0Libya 7 6.7 b 357 2541 19415 2.0 24306 0.2Mauritania 2 7.3 392 153 968 3.6 199 ..Morocco 2 2.0 895 2577 -1253 4.5 -9396 4.5Occupied PalestinianTerritories-3 .. 49 21 .. .. .. ..Oman 6 a 5.5 b 229 2377 1450 11.9 11274 0.1Qatar 6 a 13.8 b 1199 1138 641 .. 15617 0.2Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 3 4.1 b 1942 24318 74763 8.2 149116 0.8Somalia .. .. -5 141 .. .. .. ..Sudan 10 8.0 1511 2436 -690 2.3 c -847 25.4Syria 7 7.0 b 275 885 -1698 5.1 -2240 1.9Tunisia 6 3.1 639 1618 -512 1.6 -2589 0.1UAE 8 a 11.0 b 10004 13253 19732 2.0 48877 0.4Yemen 4 12.5 b 144 464 174 7.0 2595 13.2(a) Figures from 2005. (b) Estimated inflation rate for 2007. (c) Figures from 2006.Sources:Column 1: World Bank, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Column 2: IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/download.aspx on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Columns 3 and 4: UNCTAD database, http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?<strong>Report</strong>Id=1254.Column 5: <strong>Arab</strong> Monetary Fund, 2008 http://www.amf.org.ae/pages/XlsToHtmlViewer.aspx?filename=uploads/Docs/ECONOMIC%20DEPT/Eco_Ind/INDFRM08.xls on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Column 6: UNDP, Office of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong>, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Column 7: OAPEC, Annual Statistical <strong>Report</strong> 2007, http://www.oapecorg.org/publications/ASR/A%20S%20R%202007.pdf on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Column 8: UNDP, Office of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong>, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX273


Table 4: World Bank <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index* (most recent compared to 1995)Country or region Most recent period 1995 Change<strong>Arab</strong> countriesAlgeria 3.25 2.90 0.35Bahrain 6.02 6.89 -0.87Djibouti 1.15 2.65 -1.50Egypt 4.03 4.20 -0.17Jordan 5.53 5.08 0.45Kuwait 6.01 5.71 0.30Lebanon 4.86 4.99 -0.13Mauritania 2.35 1.79 0.56Morocco 3.45 3.68 -0.23Oman 5.37 4.71 0.66Qatar 6.15 5.81 0.34Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5.15 4.66 0.49Sudan .. 1.40 ..Syria 2.90 3.04 -0.14Tunisia 4.73 4.10 0.63UAE 6.66 6.22 0.44Yemen 1.80 1.83 -0.03Neighbouring and comparison countriesIran 3.39 3.15 0.24Turkey 5.61 5.41 0.20Israel 8.22 8.45 -0.23Cyprus 7.55 7.49 0.06Malaysia 6.06 6.03 0.03India 3.12 3.14 -0.02China 4.35 3.43 0.92Top-ranking countriesDenmark 9.58 9.59 -0.01Sweden 9.52 9.48 0.04Finland 9.37 9.56 -0.19Holland 9.32 9.49 -0.17Canada 9.21 9.23 -0.02US 9.08 9.50 -0.42UK 9.09 9.39 -0.30Geographic regions of the worldMiddle East and North Africa 5.38 5.48 -0.10Africa 2.80 3.13 -0.33East Asia and the Pacific 6.59 7.05 -0.46Europe and Central Asia 6.35 6.06 0.29G7 8.76 9.07 -0.31Latin America 5.07 5.40 -0.33South Asia 2.53 2.57 -0.04Income levelHigh-income states 8.31 8.61 -0.30Upper-middle-income states 6.21 6.11 0.10Lower-middle-income states 4.10 4.18 -0.08Low-income states 2.08 2.29 -0.21World 8.01 8.18 -0.17Source: World Bank database, <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page6.asp on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.* The <strong>Knowledge</strong> Economy Index is calculated from twelve indicators. Values are on a scale of 0-10; the top 10 per cent of states score in the range 9-10, the next highest10 per cent of states score in the range 8-9 and so on.274 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


KNOWLEDGE PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTSTable 5: Relationship of <strong>Arab</strong> market competitiveness with knowledge production 2008CountryIntensityof localcompetition(1)Extent ofmarketdominance(2)Effectivenessof antitrustpolicy(3)Compoundscore(4)Comprehensivenessof competition laws(legislation)(5)Independence ofthe competitionagencies(institutions)(6)Algeria 4.2 3.9 3.1 3.7 15 2Bahrain 5.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. ..Egypt 4.6 3.4 3.3 3.8 13 1Iraq .. .. .. .. .. ..Jordan 5.6 4.6 4.5 4.9 23 2Kuwait 5.1 4.1 3.6 4.3 .. ..Lebanon .. .. .. .. .. ..Libya 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.7 .. ..Mauritania 4.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 .. ..Morocco 4.6 3.9 4.2 4.2 17 1Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. .. ..Oman 4.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 .. ..Qatar 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.6 .. 1Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5.2 4.4 4.3 4.6 20 3Somalia .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria 5.1 3.7 3.8 4.2 .. 2Tunisia 5.4 4.8 5.0 5.0 14 3UAE 5.6 4.6 4.1 4.8 .. ..Yemen .. .. .. .. .. 1Sources:Columns 1-3: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong> 2008/<strong>2009</strong> and <strong>Arab</strong> Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong>, http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htmand http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/<strong>Arab</strong>%20World%20Competitiveness%20<strong>Report</strong>/index.htm on 12 February <strong>2009</strong>.Column 4: Simple Average of columns 1-3.Column 5: Keith Hylton created this index for the Antitrust World <strong>Report</strong>s (http://antitrustworldwiki.com). The results for the indicator are calculated by measuring thebreadth of the overall competition law on a positive scale of 0-30.Column 6: The ratings on this index are based on the results of the analyses in the background paper by Deena Waked (in English). A rating of 1 indicates fully dependent,2 indicates semi-independent, and 3 indicates fully independent.STATISTICAL ANNEX275


Table 6: Worldwide governance indicators in the <strong>Arab</strong> region and comparison countries 2007CountryVoiceandaccountabilityPoliticalstability andabsence ofviolenceGovernmenteffectivenessRegulatoryqualityRuleof lawControlofcorruptionAlgeria -1.01 -1.18 -0.52 -0.66 -0.72 -0.47Bahrain -0.82 -0.28 0.41 0.89 0.66 0.60Djibouti -1.06 -0.05 -0.98 -0.80 -0.51 -0.48Egypt -1.24 -0.77 -0.44 -0.31 -0.13 -0.58Iraq -1.29 -2.82 -1.68 -1.35 -1.89 -1.39Jordan -0.64 -0.29 0.27 0.35 0.51 0.32Kuwait -0.46 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.69 0.49Lebanon -0.45 -2.09 -0.61 -0.21 -0.66 -0.65Libya -1.94 0.47 -1.07 -0.98 -0.62 -0.83Mauritania -0.75 -0.33 -0.68 -0.36 -0.60 -0.50Morocco -0.62 -0.52 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.24Occupied PalestinianTerritories-1.28 -2.07 -1.24 -1.38 -0.84 -0.77Oman -1.03 0.76 0.38 0.63 0.73 0.62Qatar -0.64 0.81 0.06 0.55 0.89 1.00Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia -1.59 -0.59 -0.18 -0.10 0.27 -0.10Somalia -1.89 -3.01 -2.35 -2.72 -2.64 -1.87Sudan -1.73 -2.30 -1.18 -1.25 -1.46 -1.25Syria -1.77 -0.61 -0.88 -1.22 -0.55 -0.88Tunisia -1.22 0.10 0.46 0.15 0.32 0.08UAE -0.89 0.76 0.86 0.70 0.66 1.00Yemen -1.06 -1.48 -1.02 -0.71 -0.94 -0.62India 0.38 -1.01 0.03 -0.22 0.10 -0.39South Korea 0.66 0.45 1.26 0.88 0.82 0.36Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 2007: (Voice & Accountability - Political Stability & Absence of Violence - Government Effectiveness -RegulatoryQuality - Rule of Law - Control of Corruption).http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp on 14 February <strong>2009</strong>.276 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 7: Press Freedom Index in the <strong>Arab</strong> region 2008CountryRanking(among 173 states)Press freedomindexKuwait 61 12.63Lebanon 66 14.00UAE 69 14.50Qatar 74 15.50Comoros 89 20.00Bahrain 96 21.17Mauritania 105 23.88Algeria 121 31.33Morocco 122 32.25Oman 123 32.67Jordan 128 36.00Djibouti 134 41.50Sudan 135 42.00Tunisia 143 48.10Egypt 146 50.25Somalia 153 58.00Yemen 155 59.00Iraq 158 59.38Syria 159 59.63Libya 160 61.50Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 161 61.75Occupied Palestinian Territories 163 66.88Remark: The lower the value of a state’s press freedom index, the better the situation for press freedom.Source: <strong>Report</strong>ers without Borders, <strong>Report</strong> on Worldwide Freedom of the Press 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025 on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX277


Table 8: World Bank Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime Index * (most recent compared to 1995)Country or region Most recent period 1995 Change<strong>Arab</strong> countriesAlgeria 2.53 1.87 0.66Bahrain 6.84 7.22 -0.38Djibouti 1.19 4.00 -2.81Egypt 3.57 3.71 -0.14Jordan 5.77 5.49 0.28Kuwait 7.01 5.64 1.37Lebanon 4.70 4.36 0.34Mauritania 3.89 1.68 2.21Morocco 3.80 4.53 -0.73Oman 7.32 6.46 0.86Qatar 5.99 5.75 0.24Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5.39 4.57 0.82Sudan 0.61 0.53 0.08Tunisia 5.26 4.44 0.82UAE 6.95 7.14 -0.19Yemen 1.72 1.78 -0.06Neighbouring and comparison countriesIran 1.18 0.79 0.39Turkey 7.02 6.40 0.62Israel 8.16 8.85 -0.69Cyprus 7.77 8.39 -0.62Malaysia 6.18 7.21 -1.03India 3.67 3.48 0.19China 4.01 3.31 0.70Top-ranking countriesDenmark 9.66 9.57 0.09Sweden 9.18 8.84 0.34Finland 9.47 9.43 0.04Holland 9.18 9.50 -0.32Canada 9.42 8.41 1.01US 9.16 9.20 -0.04UK 9.28 9.40 -0.12Geographic regions of the worldMiddle East and North Africa 4.63 4.40 0.23Africa 2.80 2.61 0.19East Asia and the Pacific 5.71 5.90 -0.19Europe and Central Asia 5.44 4.22 1.22G7 8.24 8.76 -0.52Latin America 4.70 5.15 -0.45South Asia 2.72 2.67 0.05Western Europe 8.69 8.90 -0.21Income LevelHigh-income states 8.03 8.70 -0.67Upper middle-income states 5.78 5.57 0.21Lower middle-income states 3.41 3.26 0.15Low-income states 1.88 1.95 -0.07World 5.18 4.87 0.31Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology),http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page6.asp on 14 February <strong>2009</strong>.* The index value falls on a scale of 0-10 and is calculated from three key indicators: Tariff and non-tariff barriers, regulatory quality, and rule of law. The top 10 per cent of states score in therange 9-10, the next highest 10 per cent of states score in the range 8-9 and so on.278 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


EDUCATIONTable 9: Adult literacy rates by gender in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 1980 and 2005CountryMale(%)1980 (or closest three years) 2005 (or closest three years)Female(%)Total(%)Genderparityindex **Male(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderparityindexAlgeria 55 24 39 0.44 83 64 74 0.77Bahrain 80 60 72 0.75 90 85 88 0.94Comoros 56 40 48 0.71 79 68 73 0.86Djibouti 45 18 31 0.40 .. .. 65 ..Egypt 54 25 40 0.46 83 59 71 0.71Iraq 55 25 40 0.45 84* 64* 74* 0.76Jordan 82 54 69 0.66 95 87 91 0.92Kuwait 73 59 68 0.81 95 93 94 0.98Lebanon 91 82 86 0.90 .. .. 86 ..Libya 73 31 54 0.42 94 77 86 0.82Mauritania 41 19 30 0.46 63 47 55 0.75Morocco 42 16 29 0.38 67 41 54 0.61Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. 97 87 92 0.90Oman .. .. .. .. 88 75 83 0.85Qatar 72 65 70 0.90 89 89 89 1.00Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 60 32 48 0.53 88 77 84 0.88Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 43 17 30 0.40 71* 52* 61* 0.73Syria 72 34 54 0.47 89 75 82 0.84Tunisia 61 32 46 0.52 85 67 76 0.79UAE 72 64 70 0.89 90 88 89 0.98Yemen .. .. .. .. 75 37 56 0.49<strong>Arab</strong> Countries 55 25 40 0.45 82 62 73 0.76** Ratio of women to men.* 2000 DataSource: Database of the UNESCO Institute for StatisticsSTATISTICAL ANNEX279


Table 10: Gross enrolment ratio in secondary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> states by gender, 1980 and 20061980 (or closest three years) 2006 (or closest three years)CountryMale(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderparityindexMale(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderparityindexAlgeria 40 26 33 0.65 80 86 83 1.08Bahrain 70 58 64 0.83 100 104 102 1.04Comoros .. .. 22 .. 40 30 35 0.75Djibouti 15 9 12 0.60 27 18 22 0.67Egypt 61 39 51 0.64 91 85 88 0.93Iraq 76 38 57 0.50 54 36 45 0.67Jordan 62 56 59 0.90 88 90 89 1.02Kuwait 84 80 28 0.95 87 91 89 1.05Lebanon 61 57 59 0.93 77 86 81 1.12Libya 89 63 76 0.71 86 101 94 1.17Mauritania .. .. 11 .. 27 23 25 0.85Morocco 32 20 26 0.63 53 45 56 0.85Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. 90 95 92 1.06Oman 17 6 12 0.35 91 88 90 0.97Qatar 65 68 66 1.05 105 102 103 0.97Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 36 23 30 0.64 .. .. 94 ..Somalia 13 5 9 0.38 .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. 16 .. 35 32 33 0.91Syria 57 35 46 0.61 73 71 72 0.97Tunisia 34 20 27 0.59 81 89 85 1.10UAE 55 49 52 0.89 91 94 92 1.03Yemen .. .. .. .. 61 30 46 0.49<strong>Arab</strong> Countries 57 38 .. 0.67 70 65 68 0.93Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.280 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 11: Gross enrolment ratios in tertiary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> states by gender, 1980 and 2005CountryMale(%)1980 (or closest three years) 2005 (or closest three years)Female(%)Total(%)GenderparityindexMale(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderparityindexAlgeria 9 3 6 0.33 19 24 21 1.26Bahrain 5 5 5 1.00 20 48 33 2.40Comoros < 1 < 1 < 1 .. 3 2 2 0.67Djibouti < 1 < 1 < 1 .. 2 2 2 1.00Egypt 21 11 16 0.52 .. .. 35 ..Iraq 12 6 9 0.50 20 12 16 0.60Jordan 14 13 13 0.93 39 41 40 1.05Kuwait 9 15 11 1.67 10 29 19 2.90Lebanon 41 21 30 0.51 44 49 46 1.11Libya 11 4 8 0.36 53 58 56 1.09Mauritania 4 2 3 0.50 5 2 3 0.40Morocco 9 3 6 0.33 13 10 11 0.77Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. 40 42 41 1.05Oman < 1 < 1 < 1 .. 18 19 18 1.06Qatar 6 17 10 2.83 10 33 19 3.30Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 9 5 7 0.56 24 35 29 1.46Somalia 1


Table 12: World Bank Education and Human Resources Index * (KAM) (most recent compared to 1995)Country or region Most recent period 1995 Change<strong>Arab</strong> countriesAlgeria 3.64 3.50 0.14Bahrain 5.82 6.32 -0.50Djibouti 0.49 0.78 -0.29Egypt 4.35 4.31 0.04Jordan 5.49 4.50 0.99Kuwait 4.87 4.61 0.26Lebanon 4.76 5.84 -1.08Mauritania 0.94 1.11 -0.17Morocco 2.00 2.44 -0.44Oman 4.30 3.13 1.17Qatar 5.29 5.55 -0.26Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 4.87 3.86 1.01Sudan .. 1.59 ..Syria 2.91 3.31 -0.40Tunisia 4.10 3.50 0.60UAE 4.78 4.27 0.51Yemen 1.83 1.54 0.29Neighbouring and comparison countriesIran 3.89 4.44 -0.55Turkey 4.38 4.42 -0.04Israel 6.72 7.39 -0.67Cyprus 6.45 6.09 0.36Malaysia 4.14 4.16 -0.02India 2.26 2.56 -0.30China 4.11 3.62 0.49Top-ranking countriesDenmark 9.80 9.61 0.19Sweden 9.40 9.59 -0.19Finland 9.78 9.74 0.04Holland 9.26 9.69 -0.43Canada 9.26 9.69 -0.43US 8.77 9.42 -0.65UK 8.54 9.69 -1.15Geographic regions of the worldMiddle East and North Africa 3.69 3.97 -0.28Africa 1.46 1.68 -0.22Europe and Central Asia 6.74 6.65 0.09G7 8.73 9.09 -0.36Latin America 4.39 4.64 -0.25South Asia 1.89 2.14 -0.25Western Europe 8.16 8.61 -0.45Income LevelHigh income states 7.60 7.81 -0.21Upper middle income states 5.89 5.76 0.13Lower middle income states 3.61 4.02 -0.41Low income states 1.71 1.87 -0.16World 4.16 4.82 -0.66Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page6.asp on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.* The index value falls on a scale of 0-10 and is calculated from three key indicators: adult literacy rate, secondary enrolment, and tertiary enrolment. The top 10 per cent of states score in therange 9-10, the next highest 10 per cent of states score in the range 8-9 and so on.282 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 13: Adult illiterate population and children (of primary school age)out of school in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries by gender 2007 (or closest two years)Number of illiteratesNumber of children out of schoolMale(000s)Female(000s)Total(000s)GenderparityindexMale(000s)Female(000s)Total(000s)GenderparityindexAlgeria 1918 4057 5974 2.12 61 88 149 1.44Bahrain 32 31 63 0.97 0.283 0.137 0.420 0.48Comoros 48 74 122 1.54 .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. .. 27 29 56 1.07Egypt 6256 10567 16824 1.69 10 222 232 22.20Iraq .. .. .. .. 109 398 508 3.65Jordan 87 219 305 2.52 34 26 60 0.76Kuwait 66 56 122 0.85 5 7 13 1.40Lebanon 94 215 309 2.29 37 37 74 1.00Libya 124 445 569 3.59 .. .. .. ..Mauritania 346 486 832 1.40 51 38 89 0.75Morocco 3349 6467 9816 1.93 157 237 395 1.51Occupied PalestinianTerritories31 104 136 3.35 56 52 108 0.93Oman 108 166 274 1.54 46 41 87 0.89Qatar 29 18 47 0.62 0.700 0.454 1 0.65Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 1032 1441 2473 1.40 245 252 497 1.03Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria 663 1505 2168 2.27 .. .. .. ..Tunisia 529 1205 1733 2.28 21 14 35 0.67UAE 249 78 328 0.31 2 3 5 1.50Yemen 1414 3667 5081 2.59 275 632 906 2.30Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/ on 1 June <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX283


Table 14: Regional literacy rates and gross enrolment in primary and the upper stage of basiceducation 2007 (or the closest two years) in the <strong>Arab</strong> region and the other regions of the worldRegionLiteracy rate(%)Gross enrolment ratio inprimary education (%)Gross enrolment ratio inthe upper stage of basiceducation (%)Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female TotalNorth America andWestern EuropeCentral and EasternEurope99 99 99 101 101 101 104 103 10399 96 98 98 96 97 90 89 89Latin America and theCaribbean92 91 91 120 116 118 100 104 102Central Asia 99 98 99 101 99 100 96 93 95East Asia and the Pacific 96 91 93 110 108 109 92 92 92<strong>Arab</strong> countries 82 62 73 102 92 97 85 77 81South and West Asia 75 54 64 111 105 108 70 62 66Sub-Saharan Africa 71 54 62 101 89 95 43 34 38Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/ on 25 February <strong>2009</strong>.Table 15: Ratios of gross enrolment in upper secondary and tertiary education and average school lifeexpectancy in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and the other regions of the world 2006 (or the closest two years)RegionGross enrolment ratio in uppersecondary education(%)Gross enrolment ratio intertiary education(%)Male Female Total Male Female TotalSchool lifeexpectancy(years)North America and WesternEurope98 98 98 60 80 70 15.8Central and Eastern Europe 88 83 85 53 66 60 12.8Latin America and the Caribbean 70 79 74 29 34 31 13.1Central Asia 87 81 84 24 26 25 11.1East Asia and the Pacific 58 59 58 25 24 25 11.0<strong>Arab</strong> countries 55 53 54 22 22 22 10.1South and West Asia 43 35 39 12 9 11 8.3Sub-Saharan Africa 27 21 24 6 4 5 7.3Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/ on 25 February <strong>2009</strong>.284 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 16: Net and gross enrolment in primary education andproportion of over-age pupils for this stage 2006CountryNet enrolment rate(%)Gross enrolment ratio(%)Over-age enrolment ratio(%)Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female TotalAlgeria 96 94 95 114 106 110 17 11 14Bahrain 98 98 98 120 119 120 8 6 7Comoros .. .. .. 91 80 85 .. .. ..Djibouti 42 34 38 49 39 44 7 5 6Egypt 96 92 94 107 100 103 10 8 9Iraq 95 82 89 109 90 99 14 8 11Jordan 89 90 90 96 98 97 2 2 2Kuwait 84 83 83 97 96 96 8 7 7Lebanon 82 82 82 96 93 94 10 8 9Libya .. .. .. 113 108 110 .. .. ..Mauritania 78 82 79 99 104 102 20 21 21Morocco 91 85 88 112 100 106 21 14 18Occupied PalestinianTerritories76 76 76 82 83 83 2 2 2Oman 73 75 74 82 83 82 5 4 5Qatar 93 94 94 105 104 105 4 3 4Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 77 79 78 91 91 91 .. .. ..Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. 71 61 66 .. .. ..Syria 97 92 95 129 123 126 7 6 7Tunisia 96 97 96 110 107 108 13 9 11UAE 88 88 88 104 103 104 4 3 4Yemen 85 65 75 100 74 87 14 9 12Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.STATISTICAL ANNEX285


Table 17: Gross enrolment ratios in upper stage of basic education by gender, average schoollife expectancy, and number of years of compulsory education around the year 2005CountryGross enrolment in the upper stage of basiceducation (%)Male Female TotalYears ofcompulsoryeducation 1Average schoollife expectancy(years)Algeria 111 105 108 9 12.0Bahrain 104 104 104 9 14.4Comoros 47 35 41 8 7.9Djibouti 32 22 27 10 3.5Egypt 102 95 98 9 11.9Iraq 70 45 58 6 8.9Jordan 94 95 94 10 13.0Kuwait 91 92 91 9 12.4Lebanon 85 92 88 6 12.6Libya 117 115 116 9 16.5Mauritania 29 26 27 9 7.1Morocco 70 58 69 9 9.3Occupied PalestinianTerritories98 102 100 .. 12.8Oman 96 92 94 (10) 2 11.6Qatar 103 100 101 12 12.1Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia .. .. 63 6 ..Somalia .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 49 45 47 8 4.6Syria 95 89 92 9 ..Tunisia 107 106 107 11 13.3UAE 97 96 97 9 11.2Yemen 67 34 51 9 7.9Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.1International Bureau of Education (2006), International database on education, Geneva, UNESCO-International Bureau of Education2Oman does not have compulsory education, but the new education law envisages a ten-year basic education stage.286 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 18: Lessons in basic education devoted to each subject as a proportion of all lessons (per cent)CountryIslamiceducation<strong>Arab</strong>iclanguageForeignlanguages Mathematics Science SocialstudiesArtsPhysicaleducationAlgeria 5 30 14 19 10 7 9 6Bahrain 8 26 13 18 11 9 7 8Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Egypt 9 38 9 17 8 7 8 6Iraq 11 26 8 16 13 11 7 7Jordan 10 27 10 16 15 9 7 6Kuwait 12 25 16 14 12 5 10 8Lebanon 0 20 22 16 15 11 10 6Libya 12 23 4 20 13 9 10 9Mauritania 10 24 18 18 4 11 11 3Morocco 10 25 19 18 10 5 9 5Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Oman 17 26 9 17 11 7 7 6Qatar 15 25 17 15 10 6 5 6Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 28 26 4 14 9 9 4 6Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 18 28 9 17 9 4 9 4Syria 8 29 8 16 10 10 10 8Tunisia 5 28 24 14 9 8 5 6UAE 13 24 16 17 11 7 7 6Yemen 20 26 5 17 9 9 5 5Average 11.7 26.4 12.5 16.6 10.5 8.0 7.8 6.2Standard deviation 6.4 3.7 6.1 1.7 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.5Source: Compiled by Ramzi Salamah, member of the <strong>Report</strong>’s core team, on the basis of data from the International Database on Education, publications of UNESCO’sInternational Bureau of Education, Geneva, 2006.STATISTICAL ANNEX287


Table 19: Time devoted to education in the two stages of basic education in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesCountryNumber ofschool weeksper yearPrimary educationAverage numberof periodsper weekAverageannual hoursof educationIntermediate educationAverage numberof periodsper weekAverageannual hoursof educationAlgeria 30 27 810 32 955Bahrain 31 28 789 30 850Comoros .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. .. ..Egypt 34 37 944 39 995Iraq 36 33 891 33 891Jordan 37 30 819 36 999Kuwait 34 32 808 31 791Lebanon 34 30 810 35 1050Libya 30 28 651 36 837Mauritania 36 30 1080 30 1080Morocco 33 28 924 32 1056Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. ..Oman 32 30 640 30 640Qatar 30 33 660 36 792Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 30 30 664 34 765Somalia .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 42 29 812 39 1106Syria 32 32 768 35 925Tunisia 30 28 825 30 900UAE 30 34 680 35 788Yemen 36 32 864 36 972Average 33 31 802 34 911Source: Compiled by Ramzi Salamah, member of the <strong>Report</strong>’s core team, on the basis of data from the International Database on Education, publications of UNESCO’sInternational Bureau of Education, Geneva, 2006.288 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 20: Literacy rates among young people (15-24 years of age) andgross enrolment in upper secondary education by gender 2005Literacy ratesGross enrolment inupper secondary educationCountryMale(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderParityIndexMale(%)Female(%)Total(%)GenderParityIndexAlgeria 94 90 92 0.95 50 67 58 1.34Bahrain 100 100 100 1.00 93 103 98 1.11Comoros 91 86 89 0.95 30 24 27 0.80Djibouti .. .. .. .. 19 12 16 0.63Egypt 90 80 85 0.89 79 75 77 0.95Iraq .. .. .. .. 38 26 32 0.68Jordan 99 99 99 1.00 74 77 76 1.04Kuwait 99 98 99 0.99 91 107 99 1.18Lebanon .. .. .. .. 68 76 72 1.12Libya 100 98 99 0.98 78 111 94 1.42Mauritania 70 62 66 0.89 21 19 20 0.90Morocco 83 64 74 0.77 37 32 34 0.86Occupied PalestinianTerritories99 99 99 1.00 66 74 70 1.12Oman 99 98 98 0.99 79 79 79 1.00Qatar 96 98 97 1.02 93 99 96 1.06Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 98 96 97 0.98 .. .. .. ..Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. 25 25 25 1.00Syria 95 91 93 0.96 32 32 32 1.00Tunisia 97 94 95 0.97 61 75 68 1.23UAE 98 96 97 0.98 75 81 78 1.08Yemen 93 64 79 0.69 54 25 40 0.46Source: Database of UNESCO Institute for Statistics.STATISTICAL ANNEX289


Table 21: Time devoted to secondary education in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesHumanities TrackScience TrackCountryAverage number ofperiods per weekAverage annualhours of educationAverage number ofperiods per weekAverage annualhours of educationAlgeria 30 895 31 930Bahrain 26 663 26 672Comoros .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. .. ..Egypt 41 944 39 995Iraq 33 882 33 900Jordan 31 870 32 879Kuwait 31 791 31 791Lebanon 35 1050 35 1050Libya 38 863 39 870Mauritania 30 1092 32 1152Morocco 29 946 31 1012Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. ..Oman 35 747 35 747Qatar 36 660 36 792Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 34 773 36 803Somalia .. .. .. ..Sudan 38 812 39 1106Syria 33 889 34 907Tunisia 39 889 39 885UAE 35 788 35 788Yemen 36 872 36 972Average 34 857 34 903Source: Compiled by Ramzi Salamah, member of the <strong>Report</strong>’s core team, on the basis of data from the International Database on Education, publications of UNESCO’sInternational Bureau of Education, Geneva, 2006.290 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 22: Evolution of enrolment rates in vocational and technical secondaryeducation in the <strong>Arab</strong> states from 1970 till 2005 (per cent)Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Algeria 19.7 2.5 .. 3.7 7.1 5.8 .. 21.3Bahrain 6.8 .. 10.6 20.4 .. 13.0 37.7 48.2Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti 44.0 28.1 .. 26.7 .. 14.7 29.2 18.7Egypt 19.0 17.4 21.6 .. 18.6 .. .. ..Iraq 3.1 .. 5.5 10.5 .. 8.6 19.6 23.4Jordan 3.0 3.9 5.3 9.2 24.8 23.2 25.1 17.5Kuwait 2.9 1.2 0.2 0.4 .. 1.0 3.6 9.0Lebanon 1.6 .. 10.9 .. .. .. 26.7 26.3Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Morocco 2.3 .. 1.3 2.2 1.4 6.9 14.5 12.0Occupied Palestinian Territories .. .. 6.0 .. 2.4 0.9 .. ..Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Qatar 5.1 3.7 2.8 3.1 2.9 1.7 3.2 2.0Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 1.9 .. 1.5 2.0 2.8 1.7 .. ..Somalia 3.1 5.7 17.6 .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria 3.2 4.5 4.3 6.4 7.3 .. 39.8 28.2Tunisia 11.1 .. 27.3 19.0 .. .. .. 6.4UAE 9.9 .. .. 1.0 .. 1.3 1.9 1.3Yemen .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.STATISTICAL ANNEX291


Table 23: Enrolment in tertiary education by level of study around 2005 (per cent)Technical Education Bachelor’s Degree PostgraduateCountryCommonrateRatio offemalesCommonrateRatio offemalesCommonrateRatio offemalesAlgeria 19 30 77 64 4 44Bahrain 8 52 92 69 0 30Comoros .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti 31 48 69 39 0 ..Egypt 4 .. 95 .. 1 ..Iraq 17 22 78 39 5 35Jordan 11 61 88 49 1 28Kuwait 0 0 98 71 2 37Lebanon 15 47 84 54 1 35Libya 26 50 72 52 2 38Mauritania 4 13 96 25 0 ..Morocco 17 45 77 46 5 32Occupied Palestinian Territories 10 49 90 50 0 ..Oman 20 41 79 54 1 22Qatar 3 87 97 68 1 39Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 14 21 84 65 2 40Somalia .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria 12 47 83 .. 5 ..Tunisia 23 26 70 68 7 55UAE .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen 15 13 85 22 0 31Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.292 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 24: Student enrolment rates in tertiary education by field of specialisation 2005 (per cent)CountryEducationMedicineandhealthsciencesEngineeringMathematicsand pureand appliedsciencesSocialsciences, law,and businessadministrationAgricultureLiteratureandartsOther /notspecifiedAlgeria 1 .. 9 8 36 .. 14 32Bahrain 3 8 8 9 53 .. 9 11Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti .. .. 2 9 31 .. 5 55Egypt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100Iraq 19 .. 18 5 21 .. 14 23Jordan 20 11 12 11 26 2 16 4Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100Lebanon 3 9 12 12 42 1 18 3Libya 12 .. 20 10 18 .. 18 22Mauritania 4 .. .. 6 20 .. 13 57Morocco 2 4 5 17 51 1 20 1Occupied PalestinianTerritories27 .. 7 11 32 .. 14 9Oman 30 3 9 11 20 .. 8 18Qatar 12 .. 4 14 46 .. 6 18Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 24 5 3 14 15 .. 32 6Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Tunisia 1 .. 8 18 22 .. 18 33UAE .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Yemen .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.STATISTICAL ANNEX293


Table 25: Number of specialists in the health fields in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 2005 (per thousand people)Country Physicians NursesRegisteredMidwivesDentists PharmacistsLaboratoryTechniciansHealthAdministrationGeneralHealthAlgeria 1.13 1.99 0.24 0.31 0.20 0.28 1.93 0.29Bahrain 1.09 4.04 0.76 0.46 0.62 0.65 2.30 2.13Comoros 0.15 0.61 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.34 0.08Djibouti 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.33 0.25Egypt 0.54 1.98 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.27 0.07 0.18Iraq 0.66 1.25 0.07 0.44 0.53 0.47 1.33 0.97Jordan 2.03 2.94 0.30 1.29 3.14 1.00 3.15 1.60Kuwait 1.53 3.91 .. 0.29 0.31 .. .. ..Lebanon 3.25 1.18 .. 1.21 0.95 .. .. ..Libya 1.29 3.60 .. 0.14 0.25 .. .. ..Mauritania 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.35 0.16Morocco 0.51 0.72 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.05 0.20 0.06Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Oman 1.32 3.50 0.01 0.19 0.53 0.36 1.33 0.49Qatar 2.22 4.94 .. 0.37 0.90 .. .. ..Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 1.37 2.97 .. 0.17 0.22 .. .. 1.57Somalia 0.04 0.19 .. 0.00 0.00 .. .. ..Sudan 0.22 0.51 0.40 0.03 0.10 0.09 1.03 0.50Syria 1.40 1.94 .. 0.72 0.52 .. .. ..Tunisia 1.34 2.58 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.40 1.61 1.18UAE 2.02 4.18 .. 0.33 0.38 .. .. ..Yemen 0.33 0.64 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.53 0.55World 1.23 2.56 .. 0.29 .. .. .. ..Europe 3.20 7.43 .. 0.52 .. .. .. ..Source: Statistics of the World Health Organisation, 2007, http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2007/en/index.html on 14 March <strong>2009</strong>.294 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 26: Distribution of graduates of tertiary education by field of specialisation around 2005CountryEducation(%)Medicineandhealthsciences(%)Engineering(%)Maths andpure andappliedsciences(%)Socialsciences,law, andbusinessadministration(%)Agriculture(%)Literatureand arts(%)Other / notspecified(%)NumberofgraduatesBahrain 8 10 10 10 40 .. 9 14 3184Djibouti 0 0 0 0 14 .. 8 .. 280Egypt .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 342902Iraq 16 10 26 4 20 3 10 10 87849Jordan 16 11 9 19 28 2 10 4 42294Lebanon 5 11 13 8 44 0 16 3 25700Mauritania 0 0 0 5 17 0 12 66 2602Morocco 12 5 6 9 31 1 18 18 48162OccupiedPalestinianTerritories23 7 9 12 32 0 17 0 12567Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8280Qatar 32 4 5 11 38 0 10 0 1386Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 28 5 3 16 13 0 30 5 82659Tunisia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 56559Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.STATISTICAL ANNEX295


Table 27: School life expectancy in the <strong>Arab</strong> states from 1970 to 1990 (in years)Country1970 1975 1980 1985 1990Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female TotalAlgeria 7.7 4.5 6.2 8 5 7 9.8 6.8 8.3 10.9 8.3 9.6 11 9 10Bahrain 10.5 7.6 9.1 9.1 8.2 8.7 11.2 9.7 10.5 13.1 13.7 13.5 13 14 14Comoros 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Egypt 7.7 4.5 6.2 8 5 7 9 6 8 10 7 9 11 8 10Iraq 8.4 3.5 6.0 11.0 5.5 8.4 12.2 9.1 10.8 12.0 8.7 10.4 11 8 10Jordan 8 6 7 9.2 7.6 8.4 9.4 9.0 9.2 10 10 10 12 13 12Kuwait 10.4 8.3 9.4 10.6 9.5 10.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Lebanon 8 6 7 9.2 7.6 8.4 9.4 9.0 9.2 10 10 10 12 12 12Libya 10.8 5.6 8.4 13.0 10.1 11.6 13.4 11.1 12.3 .. .. .. 13 12 13Mauritania 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 3 4Morocco 5 3 4 5.8 3.2 4.5 8.1 4.8 6.4 8 5 6 8 5 6OccupiedPalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 8 8Qatar 9.0 10.3 9.7 9.7 11.6 10.3 10.6 11.4 10.9 11.8 13.2 12.6 12 13 12Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5.2 2.1 3.7 6.6 3.8 5.3 7.2 4.8 6.0 8.2 6.2 7.2 8 7 8Somalia 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 4 4Syria 10.1 5.1 7.7 10.8 6.7 9.0 11.4 8.0 9.7 11.9 9.3 10.7 11 9 10Tunisia 7.7 4.5 6.2 8 5 7 9.8 6.8 8.4 12.0 9.6 10.9 11 10 10UAE 8 9.5 9 9.0 10.3 9.7 9.7 11.6 10.3 10.6 11.4 10.9 11 12 11Yemen 3 1 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 3 5Source: Database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics with extrapolations (Ramzi Salamah).296 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 28: Estimated educational level of people aged 25-50 in the <strong>Arab</strong> states 2005CountryAged25Aged30Aged35Aged40Aged45Aged50WeightedAverageAlgeria 3.9 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.1 3.13 10Bahrain 4.6 4.4 4.0 4.4 3.2 2.8 4.00 2Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Djibouti 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.56 16Egypt 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.8 3.55 6Iraq 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.94 12Jordan 4.7 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.7 3.43 7Kuwait 4.5 3.5 3.1 4.2 3.9 3.1 3.76 5Lebanon 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.3 2.9 3.83 3Libya 5.1 4.9 4.3 3.5 3.6 3.1 4.20 1Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Morocco 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.33 15Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Oman 3.8 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.5 1.1 2.56 14Qatar 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.81 4Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.76 13Somalia 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.37 17Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..Syria 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.9 3.20 9Tunisia 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.3 2.3 3.12 11UAE 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.31 8Yemen .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..RankSource: These indicators were calculated on the basis of data available in the database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics with extrapolations. The figures are to be interpreted as follows:1 = literacy; 2 = completion of primary education; 3 = completion of the upper stage of basic education; 4 = completion of the upper stage of secondary education; 5 = completion of abachelor’s degree (see the body of the text for further explanation.)STATISTICAL ANNEX297


Table 29: Government expenditure on education in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries in the five years 2002-2006CountryExpenditure as a proportion ofGDP(%)Expenditure as a proportion oftotal government expenditure(%)Algeria .. ..Bahrain .. ..Comoros .. 24.1Djibouti 8.7 22.4Egypt 4.7 15.1Iraq .. ..Jordan .. ..Kuwait 5.4 13.5Lebanon 2.6 12.0Libya .. ..Mauritania 3.1 9.2Morocco 6.5 27.1Occupied Palestinian Territories .. ..Oman 4.0 24.7Qatar 2.7 19.6Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 7.2 27.6Somalia .. ..Sudan .. ..Syria .. ..Tunisia 7.1 20.8UAE 1.7 25.4Yemen .. ..Source: Based on data from the database of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.298 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 30: Enrolment rates in non-government schools at pre-universityeducational stages in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries 2005 (per cent)CountryPre-primaryeducationPrimaryeducationUpper stageof basiceducationGeneralsecondaryeducationTechnicalsecondaryeducationAlgeria .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0Bahrain 99.4 23.7 17.9 26.0 0.0Comoros 62.2 10.0 37.5 49.4 0.0Djibouti 83.5 14.7 21.5 33.9 2.2Egypt 30.1 7.3 .. .. ..Iraq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Jordan .. 30.4 .. 10.8 2.3Kuwait 37.4 33.0 28.0 .. ..Lebanon 77.3 65.8 56.5 46.7 57.5Libya .. .. .. .. ..Mauritania 77.8 8.0 10.9 16.3 0.0Morocco .. 6.6 3.9 5.4 16.0Occupied PalestinianTerritories99.8 8.7 4.4 3.5 7.3Oman .. 4.6 1.3 .. ..Qatar 94.2 45.3 33.6 31.2 0.0Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia .. .. .. .. ..Somalia .. .. .. .. ..Sudan 71.0 5.3 6.2 15.8 0.0Syria 74.3 4.4 4.0 6.5 0.0Tunisia .. 1.1 3.3 7.8 0.0UAE 75.4 61.1 45.4 37.8 0.0Yemen 49.0 2.3 2.3 2.0 0.0Source: Based on data available in the database of UNESCO Institute for Statistics on 25 February <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX299


Table 31: Number of students from some <strong>Arab</strong> countries in theUS before and after the events of September 2001Country 2000-2001 2006-2007 Change (%)Algeria 220 145 -34Bahrain 562 392 -30Comoros 38 39 3Djibouti 8 14 75Egypt 2255 1664 -26Iraq 155 262 69Jordan 2187 1726 -21Kuwait 3045 1633 -46Lebanon 2005 1852 -8Libya 39 93 138Mauritania 73 64 -12Morocco 1917 1202 -37Occupied Palestinian Territories 237 361 52Oman 702 254 -64Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 5273 7886 50Somalia 96 78 -19Sudan 366 321 -12Syria 713 462 -35Tunisia 385 274 -29UAE 2659 885 -67Yemen 411 248 -40<strong>Arab</strong> countries 23346 19855 -15Source: Institute of International Education, 2007. http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/page/113118/ on 1 June <strong>2009</strong>.300 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


RESEARCH AND INNOVATIONTable 32: Number of patents granted in the US in 2007 and spending on research and developmentCountryNumber of patents granted tocitizens of the state in 2007Research and developmentexpenditure as a proportion of GDP(%)Algeria .. ..Bahrain 0 ..Djibouti .. 0.34Egypt 11 0.19Iraq 0 ..Jordan 1 ..Kuwait 10 0.20Lebanon .. ..Libya .. ..Mauritania .. ..Morocco .. 0.62Occupied Palestinian Territories .. ..Oman 1 ..Qatar .. ..Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 37 ..Somalia .. ..Sudan .. 0.33Syria 3 ..Tunisia .. 0.63UAE 11 ..Yemen .. ..Korea 7264 2.64Chile 27 0.61Source: US Patent and Trademark Office, 2007. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm. Statistics of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong>, UNDP, 2008. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ on 25 February <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX301


Table 33: World Bank Innovation System Index* (most recent compared to 1995)Country or region Most recent period 1995 Change<strong>Arab</strong> countriesAlgeria 3.48 3.33 0.15Bahrain 4.20 6.74 -2.54Djibouti 1.29 2.47 -1.18Egypt 4.55 5.02 -0.47Jordan 5.66 6.09 -0.43Kuwait 5.05 5.44 -0.39Lebanon 4.69 4.19 0.50Mauritania 1.75 1.87 -0.12Morocco 3.67 4.78 -1.11Oman 4.95 5.38 -0.43Qatar 5.77 4.70 1.07Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 4.04 4.96 -0.92Sudan 1.97 2.23 -0.26Syria 3.44 2.97 0.47Tunisia 4.58 4.20 0.38UAE 6.74 6.49 0.25Neighbouring and comparison countriesIran 3.02 2.83 0.19Israel 9.34 9.20 0.14Cyprus 7.65 7.50 0.15Malaysia 6.83 6.20 0.63India 3.97 3.65 0.32China 5.12 4.06 1.06Top-ranking countriesDenmark 9.57 9.53 0.04Sweden 9.79 9.75 0.04Finland 9.66 9.31 0.35Holland 9.48 9.53 -0.05Canada 9.43 9.32 0.11US 9.45 9.56 -0.11UK 9.18 9.36 -0.18Geographic regions of the worldMiddle East and North Africa 4.31 4.64 -0.33Africa 8.44 8.87 -0.43East Asia and the Pacific 6.88 6.82 0.06Europe and Central Asia 9.19 9.29 -0.10G7 5.94 6.05 -0.11Latin America 7.22 7.43 -0.21South Asia 3.34 3.01 0.33Western Europe 9.23 9.19 0.04Income levelsHigh- income states 9.05 9.22 -0.17Upper middle-income states 6.76 6.69 0.07Lower middle-income states 4.95 5.11 -0.16Low-income states 2.63 2.90 -0.27World 8.01 8.18 -0.17Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology ), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page6.asp on 14 February <strong>2009</strong>.* The index value falls on a scale of 0-10 and is calculated from three key indicators: Total royalty payments and receipts in US$ per person, number of patent applicationsgranted by the US Patent and Trademark Office per million people, and the number of scientific and technical journal articles published per million people. The top 10 percent of states score in the range 9-10, the next highest 10 per cent of states score in the range 8-9 and so on.302 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table 34: Indicators on research and development activity andinnovation in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries and other country groupsThe <strong>Arab</strong> countries 1and other countrygroupsNumber ofresearchers working inthe fields of researchand development(per million ofpopulation)Expenditure onresearch anddevelopmentas a proportionof GDP (%)Royalty and licensefees paymentsand receipts(US$ per person)Patentsapplicationsgranted to residents(per million people)1990-2005 2000-2005 2005 2000-2005Kuwait .. 0.2 0.0 ..Qatar .. .. .. ..UAE .. .. .. ..Bahrain .. .. .. ..Libya 361 .. 0.0 ..Oman .. .. .. ..Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia .. .. 0.0 ..Jordan 1927 .. .. ..Lebanon .. .. 0.0 ..Tunisia 1013 0.6 1.4 ..Algeria .. .. .. 1Occupied PalestinianTerritories.. .. .. ..Syria 29 .. .. 2Egypt 493 0.2 1.9 1Morocco .. 0.6 0.4 1Comoros .. .. .. ..Mauritania .. .. .. ..Sudan .. 0.3 0.0 ..Djibouti .. .. .. ..Yemen .. .. .. ..Developing countries .. 1.0 .. ..Least developed countries .. .. 0.2 ..East Asia and the Pacific 722 1.6 1.7 ..Latin America and theCaribbean256 0.6 1.1 ..South Asia 119 0.7 .. ..Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. 0.3 ..OECD states 3096 2.4 104.2 239High HDI states 3035 2.4 75.8 189Medium HDI states .. 0.8 0.3 ..Low HDI states .. .. 0.2 ..High income states 3781 2.4 125.3 286Medium income states 725 0.8 1.0 ..Low income states .. 0.7 .. ..World .. 2.3 21.6 22*<strong>Arab</strong> Countries .. .. 0.9 ..* World Bank database of the <strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology (KAM) on 17 February <strong>2009</strong>.1Within this table, the <strong>Arab</strong> countries are given in order of their Human Development Index as given in the UNDP’s Human Development <strong>Report</strong> for 2007-2008.Source: Statistics of the Human Development <strong>Report</strong> 2007-2008STATISTICAL ANNEX303


Table 35: World Bank indicators for the Innovation System IndexForeign Direct Investment Outflows as % of GDPForeign Direct Investment Inflows as % of GDPRoyalty and License Fees Payments (US$ millions)Royalty and License Fees Payments (US$ per person)Royalty and License Fees Receipts (US$ millions)Royalty and License Fees Receipts (US$ per person)Total Royalty Payments and Receipts (US$ millions)Total Royalty Payments and Receipts (US$ per person)Science and Engineering Enrolment Ratio (%)Science Enrolment Ratio (%)Researchers in R&DResearchers in R&D per million peopleTotal Expenditure for R&D as a percentage of GDPManufacturing Trade as a percentage of GDPUniversity-Company Research Collaboration (1-7) *Scientific and Technical Journal ArticlesScientific and Technical Journal Articles per million peopleAvailability of Venture Capital (1-7)Patents Granted by US Patent and Trademark OfficePatents Granted by US Patent and Trademark Office per million peopleHigh-Tech Exports as a percentage of Manufacturing ExportsPrivate Sector Spending on R&D (1-7)Firm-Level Technology Absorption (1-7)Value Chain Presence (1-7)Source: Website of the World Bank (KAM), www. worldbank.org/kam.* This is based on the statistical score on a 1-7 scale of a large sample group in a particular country responding to one of the questions connected with the indicator to be measured.304 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY(a) The Information and Communication Technology IndexTable a-1: World Bank ICT Index (most recent compared with 1995)Country or region Most recent period 1995 Change<strong>Arab</strong> countriesUAE 8.18 6.99 1.19Qatar 7.56 7.24 0.32Bahrain 7.22 7.30 -0.08Kuwait 7.13 7.16 -0.03Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 6.29 5.26 1.03Lebanon 5.27 5.56 -0.29Jordan 5.21 4.25 0.96Tunisia 5.00 4.27 0.73Oman 4.90 3.85 1.05Morocco 4.32 2.96 1.36Sudan 3.84 1.22 2.62Syria 3.68 3.58 0.10Egypt 3.66 3.75 -0.09Algeria 3.37 2.91 0.46Mauritania 2.80 2.50 0.30Yemen 1.99 2.02 -0.03Djibouti 1.63 3.36 -1.73Neighbouring and comparison countriesIran 5.48 4.56 0.92Turkey 5.38 5.87 -0.49Israel 8.64 8.37 0.27Cyprus 8.32 7.97 0.35Malaysia 7.08 6.57 0.51India 2.59 2.87 -0.28China 4.16 2.74 1.42Top-ranking countriesDenmark 9.28 9.63 -0.35Sweden 9.69 9.73 -0.04Finland 8.56 9.75 -1.19Holland 9.36 9.24 0.12Canada 8.74 9.49 -0.75US 8.93 9.83 -0.90UK 9.38 9.10 0.28Geographic regions of the worldMiddle East and North Africa 5.97 6.13 -0.16Africa 2.65 3.58 -0.93East Asia and the Pacific 6.94 7.83 -0.89Europe and Central Asia 6.33 6.55 -0.22G7 8.89 9.14 -0.25Latin America 5.23 5.77 -0.54South Asia 2.17 2.45 -0.28Western Europe 8.80 9.22 -0.42Income levelsHigh-income states 8.58 8.72 -0.14Upper middle-income states 6.41 6.40 0.01Lower middle-income states 4.43 4.35 0.08Low-income states 2.10 2.46 -0.36World 6.34 7.36 -1.02Remark: The table includes data from only seventeen <strong>Arab</strong> states.* The index value falls on a scale of 0-10 and is calculated from three key indicators: number of telephone lines per thousand of the population, number of computers per thousand of thepopulation, and number of internet users per thousand of the population. The top 10 per cent of states score in the range 9-10, the next highest 10 per cent of states score in the range 8-9and so on.Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page6.asp on 13 February <strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX305


(b) The growth of fixed and mobile telephone lines in the <strong>Arab</strong> statesFigure b-1 illustrates how the average total number of telephone lines (fixed and mobile) per thousand peoplegrows in line with per capita GDP. It makes it clear that the population of most of the high-income <strong>Arab</strong> statespossess fewer telephone lines than their counterparts in the other states of the world that enjoy similar per capitaincomes, when measured as per the indicator itself (i.e., purchasing power parity). Despite telephone ownershiprates in seven <strong>Arab</strong> states exceeding or approximating the world average, mobile telephone ownership rates in theremaining <strong>Arab</strong> states are less than the world average.The spread of fixed telephone lines per thousand people has recorded marked growth in line with per capitaincome evaluated in purchasing power parity. Figure b-2 demonstrates that the relationship between the increasedproliferation of fixed telephone lines and the increase in individual income is approximately linear. However, it isnotable that the spread of these lines is increasing at a slower rate in the <strong>Arab</strong> states than worldwide. Hence, thenumber of fixed telephone lines per thousand people exceeds or approximates the world average in only six <strong>Arab</strong>states. This reflects negatively on the capacity of the remaining <strong>Arab</strong> states to access the internet, particularly giventhe expectation that in the near and medium term access to the internet will continue to rely on fixed telephonelines.Figure b-3 gives a picture of the clear increase in mobile phone ownership as individual income increases. Thefigure reveals the direct relationship between increasing proliferation of mobile phones and increasing per capitaincome in the <strong>Arab</strong> states and globally. However the curve that depicts mobile phone growth against per capitaincome growth in all but seven of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries falls below the curve representing the other countries of theworld. This means that personal income growth in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries has not been matched by growth in mobilephone proliferation similar to that in the rest of the world.Nonetheless, it may be non-technical obstacles that prevent the wider proliferation of next-generation mobilephone services. In some <strong>Arab</strong> countries, many people will not be able to meet the rising costs. 1 Other factors are alsoexpected to lead to some delay in the introduction of third-generation services to the <strong>Arab</strong> markets. These include,FIGURE b-1Growth in average total number of telephone lines (fixed and mobile) per thousand people plottedagainst per capita income for the world’s states, some <strong>Arab</strong> states, and selected groups of statesNumber of telephone lines (fixed and mobile) perthousand inhabitants2,0001,8001,6001,4001,2001,000800600400200<strong>Arab</strong> states World states Groups of states<strong>Arab</strong> statesWorldR 2 = 0.9021R 2 = 0.915600 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000Per Capita GDP (in dollars of PPP)Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology)306 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


FIGURE b-2Growth in average number of fixed telephone lines per thousand people plotted against percapita income for the world’s states, some <strong>Arab</strong> states, and selected groups of states800<strong>Arab</strong> states World states Groups of states700R 2 = 0.849Number of fixed telephone lines perthousand inhabitants600500400300200100World<strong>Arab</strong> statesR 2 = 0.502300 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000Per Capita GDP (in dollars of PPP)Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology)FIGURE b-3Growth in average number of mobile phone lines per thousand of population plotted againstper capita income for the world’s states, some <strong>Arab</strong> states, and selected groups of states1400<strong>Arab</strong> states World states Groups of statesNumber of mobile telephone linesper thousand inhabitants, 200512001000800600400200World<strong>Arab</strong> statesR 2 = 0.7849R 2 = 0.798600 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000Per Capita GDP (in dollars of PPP)Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology)STATISTICAL ANNEX307


for example, technological under-preparation that may open the door to futile practices and delay the widespreadprovision of services that conform to the tastes and behaviours of <strong>Arab</strong> societies. There is time enough, however,to avoid such pitfalls given that it is expected that onerous costs will remain a barrier until competition between theservice companies leads to a marked drop in prices. Likewise, the rise in demand for 3G lines will depend as muchon the removal of restrictions imposed by most <strong>Arab</strong> states on the use of certain services that form key incentivesto migrate to third-generation (3G), such as the Global Positioning System, considered one of the main drivingforces behind the spread of 3G networks around the world thanks to its ability to provide users with satellite-linkeddigital maps, as it will on the quality standards that are applied in the operation of these networks. 2(c) Classification of the <strong>Arab</strong> states according to selected indicatorsIt is no easy matter to classify the <strong>Arab</strong> states into groups according to the efforts they have expended and theresults they have achieved in their attempt to obtain and utilise ICT in building the knowledge economy. The datanecessary for undertaking a serious and objective evaluation are scarce and the methodologies of categorisationthat have been devised are numerous. Many of these methodologies are based on simplistic assumptions and leadto conflicting results. The various elements that go to make up the design of a particular indicator are frequentlyhandled as if they all have equal or similar effects when it comes to obtaining technology or spreading its use, whichputs limits on the accuracy of the results of the evaluation. Many of the indicators are basically designed to measurethe trend to purchase the goods and services linked to technology more than to measure how far it is utilised forthe production and dissemination of knowledge. Most are largely quantitative and numerical rather than qualitativeand descriptive and do not deal with how intensively and efficiently modes of technology are used to close theknowledge gap. To a great extent, they fail to measure knowledge content. Thus they do not permit an accuratediagnosis of the knowledge crisis in the <strong>Arab</strong> states or allow solutions to be drawn up.Tables c-1 and c-2 present the “basic” indicators related to the proliferation of telephones and computers,use of the internet, bandwidth, and access costs in the <strong>Arab</strong> states for which data is available. They make it clearthat the infrastructure provided and the material resources available do not necessarily correlate with usage. Moremeaningful methods of classification may be those that permit the evaluation of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries on the basisof the data available on the steps they have taken to formulate strategies and draw up plans aimed at developingtheir technological capabilities. According to such methodologies, states like the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar leadthe <strong>Arab</strong> countries, since they have abundant and integrated policies, strategies, plans, and projects for ICT whichare implemented with some alacrity. This is undoubtedly helped by their low populations, the availability of therequired resources, and the intensive follow-up at the highest decision-making levels to remove obstacles as theyoccur. The second group comprises states like Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia which have policies, strategies,plans, and programmes to sponsor and promote ICT, but whose implementation is slow because of obstaclesof a largely bureaucratic nature or because of the lack of resources that can be allotted to the technology sector,as in Jordan and Egypt. States such as Kuwait, Oman, Syria, and Lebanon, which have succeeded in laying downICT policies and strategies, but where the implementation plans and the programmes deriving from them remainincomplete, belong to the third group. The fourth group includes states such as Iraq, the Occupied PalestinianTerritories, Yemen, and Djibouti that are suffering from difficult conditions represented by political crises, securitydisturbances, or severe lack of resources, which limit the role of governments in the implementation of ICTpolicies and strategies.The Networked Readiness Index, which is monitored by the World Economic Forum, is connected to criterialinked to ICT policies and strategies. It expresses the extent of government commitment to develop this technologyand to allocate the necessary support to it (see Table c-3). On the basis of this categorisation, the UAE comesfirst out of the <strong>Arab</strong> states and in twenty-seventh place out of 134 states of the world. It is followed by Qatarin twenty-ninth place, then by Bahrain, Tunisia, and Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia in thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, and fortiethplace respectively. The bottom three places for the <strong>Arab</strong> states included in the report went to Libya, Algeria, andMauritania in 101 st , 108 th , and 109 th place respectively.According to indicators of the World Economic Forum’s report on ICT 3 , the UAE comes top of the <strong>Arab</strong> statescovered by the report with respect to the first three indicators, although it fares less well on the encouragement of308 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


competition between the internet service providers (ISPs). Egypt is ahead of the remaining <strong>Arab</strong> states covered bythis report in terms of this fourth indicator. Qatar, Tunisia, and Bahrain also rank high among the world’s stateswith respect to these indicators (see Table c-4).The Global Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong> published by the World Economic Forum gives a similar picture of theperformance of the <strong>Arab</strong> states with respect to a number of other indicators connected to technology and itsuse. As Table c-5 makes clear, Qatar, Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia, and the UAE occupy high positions in the ranking of worldstates, and subsequently the top positions among the <strong>Arab</strong> states, on the basis of pillars including “TechnologicalReadiness” and “Innovation.” The other <strong>Arab</strong> states (for which the <strong>Report</strong> provides data) are ranked lower. Kuwait,Tunisia, Bahrain, and Oman, for example, occupy thirty-fifth, thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, and thirty-eighth placerespectively out of the 134 states covered by the report. These are followed by Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Egyptin positions between forty-eighth (Jordan) and eighty-first (Egypt). The remaining <strong>Arab</strong> states covered by theGlobal Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong> – Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania – occupy lower positions in terms of technologicalreadiness, with their positions falling between ninety-first (Libya) and 131 st (Mauritania).To sum up, investigation of the current state of ICT in the <strong>Arab</strong> countries shows them to be lagging behind theother countries of the world in some respects and keeping up with them in others. Available data also indicates theadvance of some Gulf states over the rest of the <strong>Arab</strong> states, and over much of the rest of the world. However,the criteria used to measure both the lag and the progress have shortcomings.Table c-1: Classification of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to some indicators of ICT infrastructure<strong>Arab</strong> countriesNumber of computersper thousand ofpopulation 2005Mobile telephonelines per thousand ofpopulation 2006Fixed telephone linesper thousand ofpopulation 2006Algeria 10 630 90Bahrain 180 1220 260Djibouti 20 50 10Egypt 40 240 150Jordan 70 780 110Kuwait 240 940 200Lebanon 100 270 170Mauritania 30 350 10Morocco 20 520 40Oman 50 710 110Qatar 180 1120 280Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 140 830 170Sudan 110 120 20Syria 40 240 170Tunisia 60 720 130UAE 260 1300 310Yemen 20 90 50Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology/KAM) on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>STATISTICAL ANNEX309


Table c-2: Classification of the <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to internet use, access cost, and bandwidth<strong>Arab</strong> countriesNumber of internet usersper thousand of population2006Price basket for internet(US$ per month)2005International internetbandwidth (bits per person)2005Algeria 70 9.41 4.98Bahrain 210 30.23 579.43Djibouti 10 41.11 56.74Egypt 80 4.97 49.40Jordan 140 11.14 57.94Kuwait 310 22.22 347.87Lebanon 230 10.00 81.08Mauritania 30 54.25 14.66Morocco 200 26.8 235.35Oman 130 14.53 194.39Qatar 350 16.48 953.44Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 200 21.33 33.29Sudan 90 65.51 5.58Syria 80 13.97 0.90Tunisia 130 12.38 74.78UAE 400 13.07 923.20Yemen 10 10.93 0.32Source: World Bank database (<strong>Knowledge</strong> Assessment Methodology /KAM) on 10 June <strong>2009</strong>Table c-3: Ranking of some <strong>Arab</strong> countries according to Networked Readiness Index (2008/<strong>2009</strong>)<strong>Arab</strong> countriesWorld ranking(among 134 countries)Networked ReadinessIndexUAE 27 4.76Qatar 29 4.68Bahrain 37 4.38Tunisia 38 4.34Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 40 4.29Jordan 44 4.19Oman 50 4.08Kuwait 57 3.98Egypt 76 3.76Morocco 86 3.59Syria 94 3.41Libya 101 3.28Algeria 108 3.14Mauritania 109 3.12Source: Website of the World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gitr/<strong>2009</strong>/rankings.pdf on 12 March <strong>2009</strong>.310 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


Table c-4: Ranking of a group of <strong>Arab</strong> countries according tosome criteria related to ICT policy for 2008/<strong>2009</strong>Importance of ICT togovernment’s visionof the futureLaws dedicated to theguidance and regulationof ICT investmentGovernmentprioritization of ICTQuality of competitionin the ISP sectorUAE 1 5.86 UAE 1 5.13 UAE 1 6.05 Egypt 1 5.34Qatar 2 5.66 Tunisia 2 4.87 Tunisia 2 5.80 Jordan 2 5.30Tunisia 3 5.45 Qatar 3 4.82 Qatar 3 5.55 Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 3 4.86Jordan 4 5.04 Bahrain 4 4.59 Jordan 4 5.52 Tunisia 4 4.84Bahrain 5 5.03 Oman 5 4.34 Bahrain 5 5.42 Bahrain 5 4.37Oman 6 4.97 Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 6 4.31 Egypt 6 5.18 Kuwait 6 4.27Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 7 4.81 Jordan 7 4.05 Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 7 5.17 Morocco 7 4.09Egypt 8 4.45 Egypt 8 3.86 Oman 8 5.02 UAE 8 3.85Mauritania 9 4.16 Morocco 9 3.12 Mauritania 9 4.91 Oman 9 3.82Syria 10 4.02 Kuwait 10 3.09 Syria 10 4.51 Algeria 10 3.59Morocco 11 3.93 Mauritania 11 2.67 Libya 11 4.40 Libya 11 3.43Algeria 12 3.68 Libya 12 2.39 Algeria 12 4.37 Qatar 12 3.41Kuwait 13 3.61 Syria 13 2.37 Kuwait 13 4.28 Syria 13 3.38Libya 14 3.32 Algeria 14 2.32 Morocco 14 4.14 Mauritania 14 3.17Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology <strong>Report</strong> 2008-<strong>2009</strong>.Table c-5: The Global Competitiveness Index and rank for some<strong>Arab</strong> states with respect to selected pillars, 2008/<strong>2009</strong><strong>Arab</strong> countriesGlobalcompetitivenessindexPillar oftechnologicalreadinessPillar ofinnovationPillar ofinfrastructurePillar of healthand primaryeducationRank 1 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank ScoreQatar 26 4.8 37 4.3 29 3.8 35 4.5 18 6.2Saudi <strong>Arab</strong>ia 27 4.7 51 3.7 34 3.7 41 4.4 51 5.7UAE 31 4.7 28 4.6 46 3.4 14 5.7 36 5.9Kuwait 35 4.6 50 3.7 71 3.1 49 4.2 75 5.3Tunisia 36 4.6 52 3.7 27 3.9 34 4.6 27 6.1Bahrain 37 4.6 39 4.3 75 3.0 28 4.8 45 5.8Oman 38 4.6 68 3.3 44 3.5 32 4.6 80 5.3Jordan 48 4.4 57 3.6 51 3.4 44 4.3 56 5.7Morocco 73 4.1 78 3.2 78 3.0 70 3.5 71 5.4Syria 78 4.0 107 2.6 84 3.0 74 3.3 70 5.4Egypt 81 4.0 84 3.0 67 3.2 60 3.7 88 5.2Libya 91 3.9 98 2.8 100 2.8 112 2.5 103 4.6Algeria 99 3.7 114 2.5 113 2.7 84 3.0 76 5.3Mauritania 131 3.1 102 2.7 125 2.5 127 2.1 114 4.11With respect to the 134 countries of the world covered by the report.Source: The Global Competitiveness <strong>Report</strong> 2008-<strong>2009</strong>.STATISTICAL ANNEX311


End Notes1For example a news report, from Egypt, indicates that a proportion approaching 70 per cent of the people using the mobile phone services offered bythe Mobinil company (which estimates its customer base at around 18 million, that is nearly 13 million Egyptian mobile users), will be unable to meetthe costs of the full package of 3G services. It estimates that 20 per cent will be able to make partial use of these services and that only 10 per centwill be able to afford the whole package. Mobinil has offered some 3G services on its network and announced that it would launch the full packagein September 2008. From “35 Millions Confront New Technologies ... 3G Mobiles ...”, Al-Hayat newspaper, Cairo, 19 August 2008.2“Research and Studies of the ‘ICTTA’ in Damascus...”, Al-Hayat newspaper, Damascus, 2 May 2008.3This includes four indicators to measure the government prioritisation of ICT, the laws devoted to guiding and regulating ICT use, the importance ofICT to government vision of the future, and quality of competition in the ISP sector.312 ARAB KNOWLEDGE REPORT <strong>2009</strong>


United Nations Development ProgrammeJointly sponsored by the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and the UnitedNations Development Programme / Regional Bureau for <strong>Arab</strong> States, this <strong>Report</strong> is the first ina series that address the state of knowledge in the <strong>Arab</strong> region with the view of knowledge asa primary avenue for renaissance and human development.The <strong>Report</strong> uses the concept of “knowledge” to embrace all forms of a society’sepistemological and cultural asset. It is viewed as a major organising principal of holistic humandevelopment, aiming to expand the choices and opportunities available to the individual <strong>Arab</strong>to enjoy freedom and an honorable life. <strong>Knowledge</strong>, in terms of its acquisition, production,indigenisation, and deployment, thus becomes a tool and goal that affects all levels of societyequally and involves all fields, from the scientific, artistic, cultural, and traditional to accumulatedsocietal experience.From this perspective, the <strong>Report</strong> discusses the broad features and key components of theknowledge society and the knowledge economy, and reviews the gap that divides the region fromthe advanced world. The report highlights many deficits in the various areas of knowledge,while stressing the pressing need for freedom as an essential prerequisite for establishing theknowledge society.Emphasising the triadic relationship among development, freedom, and knowledge, the<strong>Report</strong> views the upgrading of <strong>Arab</strong> knowledge performance as a gateway to the reform ofthe <strong>Arab</strong> development situation. Stressing the urgent need for action towards establishingthe knowledge society, and out of a belief in the right to knowledge and a conviction that itsdissemination is a societal responsibility, the <strong>Report</strong> also calls for better deployment of the <strong>Arab</strong>knowledge repertoire and for a productive intercommunication with the full range of globalknowledge.The <strong>Report</strong> concludes by putting forward a vision and a suggested action plan entailing a setof elements, practical mechanisms, and constructive action required to bridge the knowledgegap between the <strong>Arab</strong>s and the outside world on the one hand, and within the <strong>Arab</strong> countries onthe other, to keep pace with the ever-growing knowledge society and knowledge economy. The<strong>Report</strong> does not claim that the proposed plans are either comprehensive or exhaustive, nor doesit claim to hold a monopoly over the truth or all the right answers in this field. The suggestedprogramme does, however, set down open horizons and motivating markers of the desiredknowledge routes that lead towards renaissance and comprehensive human development.

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