THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF BENIN KINGDOM, c.1440 - 1897

The question has, however, not arisen as to why Benin is referred to as a state and not‘stateless’? The argument of John Iliffe throws some light on the problematic concept of thestate in precolonial Africa. According to him, “in the West African forest and its neighbouringgrasslands, state formation was slower, and many societies remained stateless whenEuropeans first described them.” 17 He points out that stateless societies were diverse, and thatthe most numerous stateless people in Africa belonged to the language group later known asIgbo, in the south-east of present-day Nigeria. 18 Iliffe classified the kingdom of Benin as an“important forest state of the period.” 19 In the case of Benin, he argues that the evidence thatthe kingdom grew from earlier villages and micro-states is especially clear from the 10,000kilometres of earth boundaries built by their founders in early second millennium. 20 Theargument supports the theory of the state as an institution. On the one hand, this means thatthe state could collapse if it can no longer perform its functions as an institution. On the otherhand, conduct of the state can always be conditioned by the social structure.The history of the precolonial state in Africa has been the subject of debate amongscholars. The main issue in the debate is whether such states had their origins in conquest oremerged through peaceful development in a process of integration of different groups orcommunities. One of the most critical comparative problems in this issue is the study of therole and place of the military in the emergence of the state in Africa. This is because in thecase of the kingdom of Benin, and perhaps in most other precolonial African states, the role ofthe military was probably the enhancement of state power through aggression on other states,external defence and internal security. Perhaps, most fundamental of all was the role of themilitary in the state’s drive to assure its revenue base, in particular, the payment of tribute,taxes, collection of tolls, and war booty.It is not possible in this study to examine all the factors contributing to the use of themilitary for revenue drive in precolonial African states and societies. Scholars who haveattempted case studies, 21 recognise the state as essentially an organisation of legitimatecoercive force, in which the military establishment became a function of state power. Theearliest of the several general histories of Africa which emphasised state-building or state17 John Iliffe, 1995, Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.76.18 ibid., pp.76-77.19 ibid., p.77.20 ibid.21 See Richard L. Roberts, 1987, Warriors, Merchants, and Slaves: The State and the Economy in the MiddleNiger Valley 1700-1914. Stanford University Press; John Reid, 1986, “Warrior Aristocrats in Crisis: ThePolitical Effects of the Transition from the Slave Trade to Palm Oil Commerce in the Nineteenth CenturyKingdom of Dahomey,” PhD thesis, University of Stirling, Scotland; Joseph P. Smaldone, 1977, Warfare in theSokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Thomas6