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USA - USSR (RUSSIA) IN THE ARMS CONTROL OFSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS -SALT I TOSTART II TREATIES WITH A SPECIALREFERENCE TO THE INF TREATYTHESIS SUBMITTED TO THE PONDICHERRY UNIVERSITYFOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OFBYKALPANA CHITTARANJANUNDER THE GUIDANCE OFPROFESSOR SOLOMON OABRIELSchool of Inttrnnt~onal Studies Pondichrrry Univrrs~tySCHOOL OF IWTERWATIOMAL STUDIESPONDICHERRY UNlVBRSlTYPONDICHERRY 605 014

DedicatedTo All ThoseWho Are InvolvedIn The Negotiation,D i s a m Reduction antiEliddon of Weaams of Mass Destruction.

Contents

(i)(ii)(iii) - (vi)CBAPrBnONETWOTHREEPOURFIVESALT-I (1972) and SALT-I1(1979) TREATIES 96 - 162INF TREATY (1987) 183 - 221START-I (1901) and START-I1(1993) TREATIES 222 - 281CONCLUSION 282 - 330BIBLIOGRAPHYAPPENDICES

Cer lif ica tes

Prof. 8owwn OABRIEL,SCHOOL OF INTCRNATIONAL STUDIES,POIIDICRERRY UNIVERSITY,POIIDICREXRY - 605 014.Thir is to certify that this thesis entitled"USA-USSR (RUSSIA) IN TRB ARMS CONTROL OF BTRATBGIC IUCLUR11APOIS -- SALT-I TO START-11 TREATIES lITR A SPECIALOEFEBERCC TO THE IN? TREATY submitted to the PondicherryUniversity in partial fulfilment of the requirements for theaward of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in InternationalBtudier, ie a record of the rerearch work done by Mies,KALPAIA CBITTARARJAI, under my Supervision and Guidance, andthis theris has not formed the basis for the award of anydegree/diplomr/certificate or similar title to any one inany University/Institution before.Also certified that the thesis represents theindependent and original work done by her, during the periodNovember 1989 to April 1994, under my supervision andguidance.(Prof. 80LOLION GABRIEL)Pllce: Pondicherry h n , Srhmi of ?trr-4' )?dl 'jtldlSPONDICHEKRY UIVIVERSITY(1)

ULPAIA CBIRARAIJANPh.D. RSBSARCR SCROLAR,PONDICRBRRY UNIVERSITY,POIIDICRBRRY - 605 014.DECLARATIONI hereby declarr that the tberir rntitlrd " UIA-0888 (RU88IA) IN TEE ARM8 CONTROL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEARlBAP0NI -- SALT-I TO ITART-I1 TRBATIBB WIT0 A BPBCIALRSFSBMCB TO TUB IN? TREATY eubmitted to the PondicherryUaiverrity ia partial fulfilment of the reguirementr for theaward of the dagrre of Doctor of Philorophy in IntarnationalStudies in r record of rerearch work done eolrly by me underthe Buprrvirioa and Guidrncs of Dr. Iolomon Oabriel,Professor and Dean (i/c), School of International Studies,Pondicherry Univereity, Ponlicherry, and that it has notformed the baeis for the award of any degree/diplomr/certificate or other similar work to any one in anyUaivrrsitg/ Inetitution before./Place:Poadicherry,Date: 14- 4- 1441

Preface

MLFACEThe tventieth century ha4 had it4 baik thake 06dramatic invcntionr and ditcoveried. Anong the gktatect o(thtbe @it& 4ueety 44nk tkat 06 the dibcovecy od the potency04 nucttar power and the invention 06 nuclcah weapont. It4dcrtructivcnetb and awebome potency wab amply demonbthatcdin Hirobkina and Nagacahi on 6th and 9th Augurt 1945,A number od majoe b f h ~ f ~ gnucteak i ~ accocd4 wehetigned between the USA and USSR IRubtial between 1972 to1793. The pucpobe 06 thid 4tudy ic to examine the coCebthat thtbt t4Cati~b had on the k~duction andlok elimination06 ctcategic nucteac weapon6 potreb4ed by thebe two nucteaeyiant4.Thic had been done to dtudy the hypothesib that US- USSR ctkatcyic am4 accocdb weke tigned ducing a pekiod 06detente between them, to being down the level 06 ovekkitla4pCCtb that thcde weapon4 con~titutcd ab weLC a4 to bcinydown the heavy 6inanciaC bukdcn tkat 6ottowed thedevctopment and maintenance 04 thebe weapons.White undertaking thid btudg, I ceceiuedinvaluabtt hetp in tecmb 06 advice, encoukagement, matehiatsand cpending-066 06 theic vatuabte time in hetping me to

urdrrbtand :he irtalcacicb, complcxitirc and dimcrbionr 06the btudy, by a rumbth 04 individualb and Lnrtitutionc,Though it i d puitt impobbiblt to lib: alt buck pcoplr andirbtitutionb who pkovided me iaith buck help, I wibh toacknoulcdge and crpkerb my bincrkt thankblgkatitudt to tkclottouiag,I am thanklut to Pko/ebbok Sotomon Oabkitl whobuptkvibed my wohk, 6401 beginning to end, with hi, uibdom,countel and patience. I thank Ma. N. KaLbhnan, whocncoukaged mt tvthy bttp 06 the way, ab Long ab he was inthe School, I thank Ma, L. Perm Shrkhaka, Lectuheh, School06 Inttanationat Studirc, Pondichehky Univehbity doh hibcncoukgement. I alto thank Pao(, K.S, Mathria 06 theDcpa&tnent 06 Hibtohy, Pondichehhy Univehbity.At thib junctuhe, I take thib oppohtunity to thankny pakentb, wko wehe uehy patient and undehbtandiny with me,tkcoughout the pekiod 06 thib ctudy. The helped me in evehyiaay pocbible and at40 phovidtd me with the mean4 to cattyout the ~tbeahch. I bhatf eveh hemain indebted and y44teduLto them. I thank ry Aunt, Mkc Rita Dhaamaaaj and my UncLe,MI Abet VILIWZ~~ 04 Madtab, (04 altowing mt to rtay withthtr tvckytimt 1 nttdrd to bt in Madhad, and 605 taeatirg me(ivl

tikc a daughtea, rktia hoube @a4 a boat awg (aom home, Inthir connection, my deep thank6 go out to my Aunt, MI4 A u 4 ~Sctvauyagu o( Madkab, too.My bpeciaf thankc go out to Pao(cooa M.8. Yak o(the Department 06 Pofiticaf Science, Krkata Univtcbitg andebpeciatty to DL. S. Jacob Otokgc, Readea, Depoatment 06Potiticr, Hydeaabad Centaat Univeatity, 6oa theihcncoukagmcnt, I acknowtedge with gaatitude, the hctpkendeked to me by Pao(. M. Gopatak.tithnan 06 the NoathEabtehn Hiff Univekbity, Shittony, Meyhataya. I thank MaYatua4 Singh, Pa, Ofen Joknlon, 0a.David Haaaeff, Da.Jobtapk PtaCkoottam and many otheat who weae patient andkind enough to antwek my quekieb.Foe the btudy, 1 ubed phimaay and decondacy tauhcemattcialc avaitabte at vakioud tibcaaied in India.In thitconnection, bpeciat mention mubt be made 06 the AmeaicanStudiec Receaach Centae, Hydeaabad, the Ameaican CentaeLibkoaitb tituated at Modaab, New Dethi and Calcutta, atafbo the fibkakiec 06 Pondicheaay Univeatity, Pondicheaayand Jauahaatat Nchau Univeatity, New Delhi. I place onkecoad my appktciation 06 the btai6 menbeet 06 thebetibar.tiec, Speciat fltntion mubt be made 05 Mc. Gceta Yayac,Regionat 066ice4, USEFI Madhab who helped me in many Wagb.( ~ 1

My thankt yo out to the many laiendb and reCativc4uho hetped me in uakiout uay4. I thank Mc. Vu4#8 DrvL, 404being an immcsbe bOUkCt 06 encoukagrmrnt to me. Htklkiendbhip, thkough thick and thin ha4 made me believe inthe goodnet4 01 humanity when I had btalted to doubt it,1 thank Yk. tanniappan, Mk. Muaufian and Yk.Yuc4ph04 the Schoot 06 Inttknational Studit(, PondichekkyUnivtktity (04 theie untiting bekviceb t0Waldd me,Finatty, I ptace on aecokd the dine sekviceb 06RANK Computt4t, in the typing 06 this thebib, ebpeciattyY4t.P. Cataimany, 0. Mageth, and Mk. M. Vattathan,Pondiche~ey Unive~bity,KALPANA CHITTARANJAN

Chapter One

USA - 0888 IN THE ARMS CONTROL OF STRATEOICNUCLEAR WEAPONS (1989 - 1868)1"Communism is Dead." "The Soviet Empire comer to an end."Thin wan how newmpapern proclaimed in bold headlines 811overthe world the day that leaders of eleven republic8 ofthe former USSR rigned an agreement at Alma Ata, duringwhich the formal proclamation of a Commonwealth ofIndependent Stater (CIS) was made. That date wan December21, lBBl, which signalled the end of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics, a significantly powerful andiniportnntcountry, which had been in existence for seventy four years.USAand USSR (now called the CIS) had been superpowers andtho emergence of both these countries re such, soon afterWorld War I1 ended, virtually divided the world into abipolarone - making other countrisr decide for themrelveswhether to ally with the USA or USSR or remainneutral/non-aligned. Tho two ruperpowerr reprenentmd two completelydifferent forms of ideology - while one represented'Capitrlism' (USA), the other etood for 'Communism'(USSR).The relationship obtained between the USA and USSR soonafter the end of World War 11, started the 'Cold War'whichended with the dinintegration of the USSR in December 1991.1 The Telegraph (Calcutta edition), 22 December 1991.

A Profile of tbe United Stater of AmriarThe USA ie a union of fifty 8trtrs. It1# outlyingtrrritoriee include those of Puerto Rico, Guam, VirginIslands, American Samoa and the Panama Canal Zone, Itlr2total land are& is 9396700 Km , with a populrtion of216500000 (1971). The 48 conterminour Btater have an rrraaof 7827700 km , the 'Continental United States' (whichaincludes Alrrka), 8346500 km or 40 % of the area of theNorth American continent. The conterminous United Statesface the Atlantic Ocean on the East, the Gulf of Mexicotho South-Enrt, and the Pacific Ocean on tho Wert. At thewidest partr, it ir 4500 km from East to Weet and 2575 kmfrom North to South. The United States has a 6440 kminternational border with Canada and a 3220 km frontier withMexico, while Alaska facer Russia across the Bering Straits.The archipelago which forms the State of Hawaii is in the2Northern Pacific.The 'Declaration of Independence' of the thirteen Stateswhich the American Union then coneisted was adopted byCongrerr on 4 July 1776.onofOn 30 lovembor 1782, Great Britainrcknowledgrd the independence of the USA and on 3 September2. The Rev Carton Bncyclo~aedir (Carton Publishere,London, Vol.No.19, 1885), p.77.

1783, the Treaty of Peace was concluded and war ratified by3the USA on 14 January 1784. The USA followed 1 policy ofirolation and high tariff barrier.after 1828 and the MonroeDoctrine, (which war firrt enunciated by Prerident Monroeand which stated that the European countries would be bannedfrom further expansion in the Americas), but joined theFirst World War in 1917, under President Woodrow lilron.Hi8'Fourteen Pointr' which were contained in an addrere tothe United States Congress on 8 January 1918, formed thebast8 for the Armirtice with Germany on 11 November 1018.One of hi8 14 point8 included the 'establishment of a Leagueof Nations,' to be bared at Geneva. The League of Nationsfunctioned from 1920 to 1939 and it was the forerunner ofthe United Nations Organization. However, the AmericanSenate did not allow the USA to be a member of the League ofNations. The 'Great Economic Depresrion', which started in1929, saw the country successfully being able to weatherthe storm. At the start of the Second WorJd War in 1939,the USAmaintained a neutral stand but their joining wasprecipitated and became imperative with the Japanese airattack of the US naval air-bale at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, on7 December 1941. The help rendered to the Allied forces in3. John Paxton (ed. ), The Stateeman's Year Book, 1989-BQ,(Yacaillan, London, 1989), p.1372.

terms of men, machinery and other resources of the USAWorld War I1 helped a great deal in the final outcome of4victory for the Allied forces.Tbe form of government of the USA is based on theconstitution of 17 September 1787. The government of thenation is composed of three coordinate branches - theexecutive, the legislature and the judiciary, The NationalGovernment ha8 authority in matters of general taxation,treaties and other dealings with foreign powers, foreign andinter-statecommerce, bankruptcy, postal service, coinage,weightr and measures, patents and copyright, the armedforces and crimes against the USA. It also has solelegislative authority over the District of Columbia andpossession of the USA.The Fifth Article of the Constitution provides that Congreseinthemay, on a two-thirds vote of both Houses, propore amendment8to the constitution, or on the application of the legisla-tives of two-thirds of all the States, call a convention forproposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid asper the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures ofthree-fourths of the total States, or by conventions bythree-fouths thereof, whichever mode of ratification may4. Supra, p.78.be

propored by Congress. The President ir Coaaander-in-Chiefof the Any, Ravy and Air Force, and of the militia, when inthe services of the Union.The Vice President is ex-officioPrerident of the Senate, and in the care of the removal ofthe Prerident or of his death, resignation or inabilitydircharge the powers and duties of his office, he becomer5the Prerident for the remainder of the tern. All treatiesare to be ratified by the Senate and the appointment of highofficialr of the Government are to be confirmed by theSenate.A PROFILE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICSUpto 12 March 1917, the major portion of the territory whichbecame the USSR had previously constituted the RussianEmpire. It war governed as an autocracy under the Czar, withthe aid of minirters reeponsible to himself and a StateDuma, with limited legislative powers, elected by provinciala6se~blies chosen by indirect election8 on6franchise,toa restrictedOn 8 Yarch 1917, a revolution broke out. The Duma parties,on 12 Yarch 1917, set up r Provincial Committee of the State............................................................5. John Paxton (ad. ), The Stateeman's Year Book, 1089-80,(Yacmillan, London, 1@88), pp.1380-1381.

-8 while factory workmen and the insurgent g~rrisson ofPetrogrrd elected r Council (Soviet) of Workers' andSoldiers' Deputies,Soviets were also formed by the workmenin.other towns, in the Army and Navy and as time went on, bythe peasantry.The Clcar abdicated on 15 March 1917, and theProvincirl Committee, by agreement with the PetrogrrdSoviet, appointed r provimional government and on 14September 1917, proclaimed r republic.However, n politicalstruggle went on between the supporters of the ProvisionrlCommittee - the Mensheviks rnd the Socialist Revolutionaries- the Bolsheviks, who advocated the assumption of power bythe Soviets. The Bolsheviks organized an insurrectionthrough a Militrry-Revolutionary Committee of the PetrogradSoviet when they had won mrjorities in the Sovietr ofprincipal cities rnd of the armed forces on severalthefronts.On 17 November 1917, the Committee arrested the ProvisionalGovernment and transferred power to the Second All-RussianCongrers of Soviets.They elected a new government known asthe Council of People's Commissars, which was herded by V.I.Lenin.On 25 January 1918, the Third All-Russian Congress ofSoviets issued a 'Declarrtion of Rights of the Toiling andExploited People, ' which proclaimed Russia r 'Republic ofSoviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasantst Deputies'. On

10 July 1918, tbe fiftb Congress adopted a Constitution forthe Russian Soviet Pederrl Socialist Republic (RSFSR),tbe course of the civil war, other Soviet Republic8 were met7up in tbe Ukraine,Beloruesia and Trrnscaucasia. They firstentered into treaty relations with the RSFSR and then, in1921, joined with it in a closely integrated Union.The total area of the Soviet Union in April 1989 was 22. 4 msq.kms. The census population of 17 January 1979 was 262.4m.The Soviet social structure was officially described asconsisting of two friendly social classes-workers andcollectivr farm paarrntry - and r rocirl rtratum,the intelli-gentsa, who were engaged in mental rather than manual labour.The Union of Soviet socialist Republics was formed by theunion of RSPSR, the Ukrrnirn Soviet Socialirt Republicthe Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Treatythe Union was adopted by the first Soviet Congress ofUSSR on 30 December 1922.InandoftheThe rest of the republics thatconrtituted the USSR joined the Union in stager.The SovietUnion was a socialist state of the whole people (1977constitution), the political units of which were the Soviets"f People's Deputies. All central and local authority wasrested on these Soviets.

The econollic foundation of the USSR was the socialist systemof economy and the rocialirt ornerrhip of the mean8 ofproduction. There were two forms of socialist property:firrt - state property (property of the whole people);recond, - cooperative and collective farm (kolkhoz) property(property of individual collective farms and property ofcooperative arrociationa). The land, mineral deposits,raters, foreetr, mills, factories, mines railways, water andair trlnsport, brnkr, means of communication, state farms(rovkhozy),as well re the municipal enterpri~e~ andprincipal dwelling house properties in the cities andindustrial localities, were state property, but the landoccupied by collective farmers were secured to them inperpetuity on condition that they used it in accordance withthe lavs of the country. The members of the kolkhozy couldhave small plots of land attached to their dwellin~s fortheir own use. Peasants unwilling to enter a kolkhoz couldretain their individual farms, but they were not allowedemploy hired labour.The USSR conrirted of fifteen Union Republicr, eachinhabited by a aajor nationality which gave its name to therepublic. These were divided into 129 territories andregion8 which were sub-divided again into 3228 districtr,2186 townr, 665 urban districts and 4014 urban settlementstheto

(1 January 1988). Within the districtr, there were 42654rural Soviets, (usually arch including r number ofvillages). The territories and regions rlro included anumber of smaller nationalities, forming their own self-governing units - 20 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republice,88 Autonomour Regions and 10 Autonomous Areas.The highest legislative organ was the Supreme Soviet ofUSSR. It consisted of two chambers with equal legielrtiverights, elected for r term of five years: the Council ofthe Union and Council of Nrtionalities.DAWN OF TRE NUCLEAR ERAIf the first half of the 20th Century belonged to nuclearscientists the 19th Century undoubtedly belonged to thecbeairts. It wrs they (chemiots) who set the pace for thediscovery of the structure of matter and predicted itsbehaviour. They drew the outlines of modern atomic theory,constructed the periodic table of the elements anddiscovered rAdiation. John Drlton, a Urncheater rcientist,who, beside8 being involved in chemistry, rleo dabbled inmetaorologp, mathemrticr, opticr rnd phyrior.theHa iormulatsd8. For r detailed mrke-up of the 15 Soviet Republicr:Armenir, Azerbhi Jan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia,KAzakhartrn, Kirghizir, Lativir, Lithurnia, Yoldrvir,Russia,Trdshikistrn,Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekbirtrn,See m, Ro.11, March 12, 1990, pp.16-33.

a table of atomic weight8 to explain the behrviour ofand hi8 hlrpotberer about atomic weight8 were noongar18confirmedby experiments in electrolysis carried out by the Englishcherirtr, Rwphry Drvy and Yichael Farrdry. The nextmentous advance war the periodic table. Classificationwar first propored by French geologist, Alexandra deChancourtoir (1882) and tbe Englirh chemirt John ANewland8(1865). The Rurrian Chemirt, Dimitri Mendelrev, portulated rperiodic trble in 1889, bared on an arrangement of knownelement organieed according to recurring similarity in theirchemical propertier. His periodic table gave clues aboutelements not yet direovered; it suggerted hypothrrerrboutinner structure and behaviour of atom8 and provided rnexplorrtory and explrnatory tool that hrd #cientirtr gobeyond the speculative rumination8 of Dalton,During the Second World War, American scientiets feared9Germra acientirtr might produce an atomic weapon for theFor a clear understanding of German wartime efforts atmaking the rtom bomb, see David Irving, The Deetructionof Dresden (London, William Kimber,lB63) and David ~rvTng,The German Atomic Bonk The History of Nuclear Reeearchin I r z i-rnir ,- imon L Sc huXer,-1 967).POrtbrtofthe British effortr, read Margaret Growing, Britrin andAtomic Energy, 1939-45, (London, Yacmillan 8 Co. Ltd.,19641. The important Yand report is printed from pp.394-436,. the conciurions on the- atomic- bomb are at p;398.The beat rccount of US wartime effortr on the making offar

Third Beicb, They therefore organised a massive researcheffort code-named "The Yanhattan Project". As part of thiseffort, Arthur Cwpton, a Nobel Laureate, organized acentralized research effort 4t Chicago, one of the centersof US nuclear research, and code-named it 'YetallurgicalLaboratory' or 'Yet Lab' for short, and war its Director,The Yet lab's chief task was to find out whether a chainreactionwas possible. Towards this end, he invited EnricoPerml, a fellow Nobel Laureate in Physics, who had beenteaching at Columbia University, to lead the project,Feral's group used unused football facilities at StaggField, Chicago. It was in this place that physicists,cheaists, graduate students and craftsmen laboured insecrecy to achieve a self-sustaining chain reaction. On 2December 1942, CP-I (Chicago Pile Number One) went critical:it achieved a chain reaction. It was on this day when Iself-sustaining chain reaction was achieved that the worldcan be said to have entered the 'Atomic Age,'American scientists and engineers built two uranium type andone plutonium type atomic bombs between December 1942 andJuly 1845. Two billion dollar8 were spent on tho nuclearcommunity rho worked in total secrecy to construct anenormous isotope-eeparation plant at Oak-Ridge, Tennessee; abomb laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and a plutonium-

production plant at Ilanford, Washington. In the summer Of1842, the entire atomic project ras centralized under tbeArmy Corps of Engineers. The Corps appointed Brigadier-General Leslie Groves to take charge of what W.8 nor oodenamedthe 'Manhattan Engineering District' - for short, ME0or the Yanhattan Project.It rrs mrinlp due to Grove's forceful personality andadequate funding that the Manhattan Project moved forward in1942. The scientirts were turing from pre-science and theexperimental laboratory rtager of research to the phasedominated by engineering considerations aimed at building abomb; J. Robert Oppenheimer, a prominent theoreticalphysicist from Berkeley, recommended to Groves that bombresearch be concentrated in one location, preferably in anirolated ground since the work would be in the area ofordinance, with tight security controls to prevent sabotagernd the leakage of secret data. In November 1942, the twomen selected an isolated mensa near r town called LosAlamor, north-erst of Santa Fe, New Mexico. It was soonafter this that Groves chose Oppenheimer to be theScientific head of the Lor Alamos project. Despite thedifficulties of the Los Alamos site and the barrack-likeatmosphere imposed by the army, Oppenheimer was able torecruit a brilliant set of individuals.

Opprnheinr and Kenneth Bainbridge, technical orchestratorof the test explOoiOD8 began searching for tort rite8 inlate 1944, for the exploSi0n of the first atom boab in theworld, code-named 'Trinity'. A remote derert which warabout seventy miles west of Alamorgordo in Southern NewMexico, a valley known a8 the Jomada de Muerto, was finallychosen by the two men for this purpose. The test shot tookplace on the dawn of 16 July 1945. In the first secondafter detonation, an intense light was produced. At thecore of the explosion, temperatures reached ten thousandtimes the temperature at the surface of the sun, A hundredfeet below the boab, a hundred billion atmospheres ofpressure hit the ground, the radioactive debris fused thematerial at ground- zero into ceramic-like green berdr,which were later known as "Trinitite", The successfultesting and explosion of the world's first atom bomb provedthat the Manhattan Project team was successful in developingan building a bomb that had previosly been possible only intheory.Nuclear Era in Action: By 8 Yay 1945, the Allied forces hadachieved 'Victory in Europe,'and completely overwhelmed anddefeated Nazi Germany. However, the Japanese had notsurrendered to the Allies till then. To bring World War I1to a swift end and bring about a victory in Japan, the U8

Prerident, Barry Truman, took the decision to ure the atombombs developed by scientists involved ia the ManhattanProject. Torardr this end, on 6 August 1845, the 'BnolaGay', r 8-20 Superfortrels, commanded by Colonel PaulTibbetr, USAAC, carried a 9000-pound uranium type atomicbonb, codenamed ' Little Boy' took-off from the crpturedisland of Tinlan. The bomb was droped from a height of 7000feet above Hirorhima and it was detonated at a height of1850 feet above the city. A second plutonium-type atombomb, code-named 'Pat Man' war detonated over Nrgasaki on 9August 1945. A UN Report prepared by twelve experts andreleased on 23 October 1967, by the then Secretary General,U Thant, discussed the effects of the atomic attack onHiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 in one of its sections. Thereport stated that there were varying estimates of thecarualitier in Hiroshima and Naga8aki and it ha# proveddifficult to estimate the exact number of exposed people whomay have died after escaping from the city, In Hiroshima,destruction was concentric around the centre of a spreadingcity whose populrtion was about 300000. By compari~n withHiroshima, Nagrsrki was r narrow city surrounded by hill8and open to the sea in only one direction with a populationof 87000. The ismediate effects of the explosion were thosame, but the area of devrstation and destruction by fire

differed with the different layout of the citier. About4SOOO of the fatal casualities in Hiroshima died on the dayof the explomion and rome 30000 during the followingmonths ar a result of traumatic wounds, burns andeffects.fourradiationAvailable ertimates are that 78000 were killed and84000 injured in Nagasaki. In addition, there were10thousands missing in both towns .The report went on to state that apart from theeffects to which ionizing radiation had onthe immediatevictim8 of the explosion, the survivors were also exposed tothe hazards of radiation - both in terms of latentdiseaseoccurring in the indivudual (somatic effects) and of changesin hereditary material (genetic effects).A study of the survivors of the nuclear explosions overHiroshima and Nagasaki shows that leaukamia (a direareassociated with the malignant over-production of whiteblood-cells) can undoubtedly result from a single (acute)dose of radiation. The incidence of leaukamia in thesurvivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were observed to beincreasing in 1948. It reached a peak in 1950-52. Acontinuing study of the survivors of the two Japanese10. Keesings Research Report - 7, Disarmament-Negotiationand Treatier - 1946-1971, (Charles Scribner's Sonr -New York, 1972), pp.26-27.

dlsarterr has alro suggested an increared incidence forother kinds of ulignant cancer, particularly cancer ofthyroid. Indications were strong that a significantly highproportion of the babies born to women who were pregnanatwhen exposed to the explosion, and who survived, had headssmaller than average size and that some of these sufferedsevere mental retardation. The study noted that radiationfrom nuclear explosion can cause genetic mutations andchromosome anamolies which might lead to serious physical11and mental disabilitier in future generations.During a conversation I had with Professor N. Krishnan,Visiting Dean, School of International Studies, PondicherryUniversity, he observed that atomic power could be usedtwo purposes - one - that would be beneficial for humankind,- two - for the destruction of all living species on earth,theHe also stated, "It is upto us, the humans in charge of thispotentex-forpower, to see to it that it is used for the welfare-nd advancement of civilization rather than for its12destruction. "11. Ibid., OD. cit.12. Conversation with Professor N. Krishnan, ex-VisitingDean of 819, Pondicherry University, on 23 November1989.

RELATIOM8 BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR FROM 1845 TO lB68IA Determinant Factor of US-USSR Relations: The USA andUSSR, two important countrier of tho world, emerged asinfluential countries ~omp&ratively recently,While the USAbar been an independent nation for a little over two hundredand fifteen yerrr, the USSR, in its basic form as theRusrian State, becrme a Soviet Republic only in 1917. AsSergei Rogov hrr noted, both countrier were created as aresult of revolutions directed against their respectiveforms of political and social order. However, therevolutions of the USA and USSR were very different.The outcome had defined the future of these countries, aswell. While the USA chose democracy and free enterprise,the USSR chose socialism. The character of American-Sovietrelrtions had mainly been determined by this factor, over13the years.That this idealogical conflict had become an importantdetermining factor in US-Soviet relations has been admittedmany US politicrl scientists, included George Kennan, whostated that, "That first and most fundamental of these13. Sergei Rogov, Is a New Model of Soviet-AmericanRelatioar Porrible? (Novorti Prerr Agmcy, Morcow,1989), pp. 8-9.

source# of conflict war, of course, the idealogicalcctamitment of the Bolshevik Communirt leadership. It wasthe unifestrtion of a form of hostility Americans had neverpreviously encountered.Americans had known, of course, thephenomenon of war, ar r siturtion defined and recognizedinternational war... But what American statesmrn now sawthemrelver faced with, in the person of the new RussianCommunist regime, was something quite different: a governingpower in another great country, which had not even dreamedof declaring war, formally, on the United Strtes butbywhichwas nevertheless committed, by its deepest beliefs and byits very view of its place in history, to a programmeaimedat the overthrow of the entire political and eocial syrtemtraditional to American society - committed, that is, to aprogramme calculated to inflict upon the society of theUnited States a damage more monstrous in the eyes of mostAmericans than any they might expect to suffer from even theworst of purely military defeat8 at the hands of the14traditional sort of enemy." There was eurpicion andmistrust by both rides on the other country's intentiontowards it,14. Georee Kennan, The Nuclear Delurion: Soviet-AmericanRelationr in the Atomic Age, (Pantheon Books,~New York,1982), pp.17-18.

This war felt even wre-SO by those Who believed that, likeL. Killm," Bolrhevirn ir a greater danger than the (German)militarism(which) at least stood for law and order whileBolahevim ctandr only for dertruction of life and property.Bolshevism constitutes a real world danger and shouldliterally be stamped out. In principle, it knows nogeographical boundariee or national units... Bolshevismno longer a Rurrian problem but one which endanger815humanity ."The Origin of Cold War Between USA and USSR:isFor many yearsAfter World War 11, the relationship obtained between themajor powers, i.e., the USA and USSR went through variousphases - that of cold war, detente, 060-detente Andduringand after the dismemberment of the USSR - that of post-coldwar. The nuclear arms relationship between them was markedby calculation and miscalculation, many alarms, speedups,relative stabilization, much unease and constantuncertainitier, with the whole periodicrlly subjected -especially during US presidential campaigns - to mieleadingmiscile gape and security gaps.- -- - - --15. L.Killen, The Rusrian Bureau: A Case Study inlilsonian DiPlomacy, (The University Prere of Kentucky,1083), p.70.

t the end of World War 11, the seeming agreement betweenthe Soviet Union and the United States concerning thepostwar order in Europe initially cemented Soviet-Americanrelations.However, as the real disagreements on that ordercould not be papered over, the relationship started tounravel soon after the Yalta meet. As Vojtech Mastny says,"The crtalyrt for the East-West conflict was Eastern Europe,where Stalin's quest for absolute security (implying therbrolute insecurity of all other stater) generated American16concern about the limits of Soviet aspirations,"The post Vorld War I1 relations between USA and USSR can bedescribed by the two expressions 'Cold War' and 'Detente'.Cold War can be described as a "state of hostility betweencountries expressed in economic, political or subversive17action but short of 'hot war' or a 'shooting war'." Theterm was first used by Bernard Baruch, an AmericanIinancler, in Aprll 1847 and made popular by Walter Lippman.Though the exact period of 'Cold War' cannot bepinpointedwitb accuracy because of conflicting time periods given byvarious social scientists, they are all agreed tht it16. Vojtecb,,Mamtny, "Europe in US-USSR Relationr: A ToplcrlLegacy, Problem8 of Communism, Jan-Peb 1888, p.28.17. The Pontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (Collin8Publicrtionr, London, 1879), p.86.

started in 1945, that is, after the end of the SecondWorldWar. The other tern 'detente,' is used to describerelations obtained between the USA and USSR especiallythe latter half of the 1960s onwards and is "thefromreductionof tenrion in relation8 between States and consequent18reduction of the possibilities of WAR"The progress of American-Soviet conflict over the politicalfuture of Eastern Europe, during and after the SecondWorldWar, was a major factor for the origin and cause of ColdWar, The immediate cause of the split in the wartimealliance was "the dropping of the iron-curtain by theSoviets around Eastern Europe and the determination of19world's eole atomic power to penetrate that curtain."The non-recognition of the governments of Rumania, Bulgaria,and Hungary at the Potsdam Conference by the United Statesresulted in a "complete impasse and might be said to havebeen the beginning of the Cold War between the United Stater20and Russia." According to Norman Graebner, "After morethantwenty years of Cold War, the quest for understanding18. Ibid., OD. Cit., P.166.19. Walter LaPeber, Americ8,Russia and the Cold War,1945-46(John riley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1907), pp.1-2,20. Pleet Admiral William Leahy, I Was There, (McGraw-HillBook Co., New York, 195O), p.416.the

aises one fundamental and still unanmwered question: whydidthe United States, after 1939, permit the conquest ofEastern Eurojm by Nazi forces, presumably forever, withscarcely a stir, but refused after 1944, to acknowledgeprimary Russian interest or right of hegemony in the sameregion on the heels of a closely-won Russian victory againstthe German invader? When scholars have answered thatquestion fully the historical debate over the Cold War21origins will be largely resolved." It is also believedthat "Poland, more than any other issue, gave rise to the22 --Cold War," This point has been reemphasized by Adam Ulam,who states thatl'The Cold War began just as had World War 11,with Poland providing the immediate cause of the23conflict."However, perhaps the most critical question is why,anybetween1941 and 1945, United States policy moved from a posture onnon-involvement in Eastern Europe questions to specificoppositions to Soviet actions in these countries.For it is21. Norman Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the ContinuingDebate." Journal of Conflict Rerolution, XIII, March1969, p.131.22. Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War XI, (PenguinBook, London, 1970), p.97.23. Adam 8. ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. The Historyof Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, (Frederick A,Praeger, New York, 1968). p.378,

during there years that the United States first becameinvolved in conflict over Eastern Europe and the phenomenonwhich would later be called the Cold War, had its origins.USA-USSR RELATIONS (1945-1968)A few of the major events that took place between USA andUSSR, upto 1968 beginning from the post World War I1 period,follows. George Marshall, an American General andStatesman, was the US Secretary of State when he made aspeech on 5 June 1947, at Harvard, proposing an American-aidprogramme for the recovery of the war-ravaged European24economy. His plan was accepted only by West Europeancountries, the representatives of which met at Paris in July1947. This was known as the Marshall Plan. The UnitedStates Congress voted the first of four annual grant6 of theEuropean Recovery Programme (ERP), on 3 April 1948. Underthe Marshall Plan, the total contribution to the ERP and theMutual Security Agency (USA), which took over the work ofthe European Cooperation Administration in 1951, between theperiod April 1948 to June 1953, to eighteen European25countries and to Indonesia, amounted to 14727 million.24. Ihid., 0p.Cit.25. Thd Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (FontanaCollinr Publicrtionr, London, 1979), p.313.

out of this, Britain received 3104 million, Italy 1678million and Germany 1473 million. From the very inceptionof the Marshall Plan, the USSR and the Eastern Europeancountries which followed the Communist idealogy opposed itand did not take part in it.While addressing the US Congress on 12 March 1047, USPresident Harry S. Truman made an important foreign policydoctrine, known a8 the Truman Doctrine.He stated that, "Itmust be the policy of the USA to support free peoples whoare resisting subjection by armed minorities or outside26pressures." This was stated at a time when the tensionbetween the USSR and the Western World began to grow andmarked a departure from the usual US policy of nautralityduring peace time.It also marked the beginning of a numberof subsequent US economic and military aid programmes and animportant phase in the 'Cold War'. President Truman'srequest to the US Congress netted $ 400 million, to helpGreece and Turkey in their fight against the Communist0n8laught.On 1 Yay, 1960, the Soviet air-defence missiles in CentralUSSR, brought down a US U-2 'Spy' aircraft, which was26. Ibid., 0p.Cit.

piloted by P. Gary Powers, This incident, during the termof Nikita Khruschev, General Secretary of the USSR andPresident Dwight Eisenhower of the USA, precipitated acri8itI between the two countrier.On 17 April 1961, about 1400 Cuban American exilos (who werecovertly organized and supported by the Central IntelligenceAgency of the USA), attempted an invasion of the Bay of Pigs(situated on the north-east coast of Cuba), in an attempt tooverthrow Pidel Castro's Marxist revolutionary regime,Fidel Castro had come to power by overthrowing the regime ofFulgenico Batista, the Cuban General and Dictator, in 1959.However, the invader6 were defeated because they did notrecisve the expected air and naval support from the USA.The Cuban Missile Crisis which almost brought the world tothe brink of Third World War occurred in 1962. The USA,under President John F. Kennedy, was successful in forcingthe USSR, under Nikita Khruschev, to bring down anddismantly the rocket sites that were in the process of beingbuilt in Cuba. This incident was instrumental in bringingabout the downfall of Khruschev.The Berlin Wall, which commenced building on 12 August 1961,by the East German Government, sought to seal-off EastBerlin from the Western-occupied part of Berlin and to

preventEast German illegal emigrants to cross over to theVest. This infamous Wrll, however, has since beendemoliebed and East Germany itself has merged with WestGermany to form a unified Germany.The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is anorganization which wa8 established on 4 April 1949, by atreaty.This treaty was signed by twelve countries, namely:Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the USA.Greece and Turkey joined it on 18 February 1952 and WestGermany on 9 May 1955. This organization was formed by thefounders in their firm belief of a common political andcultural heritage of the Atlantic and was set-up to protectWestern Europe against the threat of Soviet aggression.Article V of the Treaty states that an "armed attack againstone or more parties shall be considered an attack against27all,"The Warsaw military alliance was signed as a Communistreaction and reply to the formation of NATO. The Warsaw28Pact was signed at Varsaw on 14 May 1955, as a treaty of27. Roger Parkinson, Encyclopaedia of Modern War,Publishing Ltd.,(Granado28. Ibid.

friendship, mutual assistance and cooperrtion Mong thecounttie8 of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Ceechoslovrkir,Pst Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.In case of war,the Soviet High Command was to supervise operations amongthe forces of the other Pact members countries, Albanialeft the Pact in September 1968.However, with the recentdrvelopents in Earntern Europe, it wa8 but natural thatPact would be dissolved and disbanded (a8 it has outlinedthe purpoee for which it was formed). This took placeofficially in the early part of 1991.James A Huston pointed out that, "Now, after forty years ofCold War in which the United States has had to face onecrisis after another in dealing with the Soviet Union andthe Communist world, perhaps it would not be out of order tosuggest where the United States may have gone vrong in a29number of policy decisions." He then went on to suggestsome of these policy decisions, which he felt were mistakeo,the consequencestheof which were still felt, to a certaindegree, during the Cold War. These wrong decisions andmistakes, as correctly pointed out by him and many otherpolitical rnrlysts were: Withdrawal from the Elbe before a29. Jarnet A Hurton, ItPifteen Great Mistakes of the ColdWar, World Affairr, American Peace Society, WashingtonD.C., Vo1.151, Summer 1988, p.35.

settlement of the Polish question; isolation of Berlin;Berlin Airlift; failure to recognize tbe People's Republicof China at the outset; renunciation of Korea, Hungary(1956); Suez (1856); the U-2 affair (Yay 1960); the Bay ofPige; intervention in the Dominican Republic (1886);Withdrawal of logistic facilities from France (1866); andmilitary intervention in Vietnam.BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS ACCORDSSIGNED BETWEEN USA AND USSR (1859-1969)Wars, whether fought in the B.C. or A.D. era, have alwaysresulted in misery, wanton destruction and a terrible priceto be paid in terms of human lives and materialtheresources.Over the past 5500 years of recorded history, there ha8 been14500 wars fought, in the course of which millions have loattheir lives. As the years went by, the war weapons grewmore and more sophisticated in their destructive ability andpotential to claim human lives. In Europe alone, aboutthree million vere killed in wars fought in the 17thCentury, five million in the 18th Century and about eixmillion in the 19th Century. However, the 20th century hasvitnersed death and destruction on a magnified scale neverseen before. Rikhi Jaipal has stated that, "The history ofhuman conflict in the past ha8 shown that wars werestartedeither for material gain in the shape of a living space,

erourcer or trade, or by some compelling spiritual drivefor freedom or lor conversion of other peoples to one's own30faith." Re further went on to state that the pressuresarising due to population explosion or lack ofhaveresourcesforced people to take up arm8 agianlt those who areexpected to sacrifice, i.e,, the stronger people with armsbut without resources figbt against thooe with resource8 butwitbout arms. In many instances, it has been the wealthyand strong nations that have embarked on aggression, tosustain or improve their living standards throughacquisition of more territory and resources after beingcertain of their military superiority over their intendedvictims.In the First World War, conventional weapons alonetook a toll of ten million lives - while it (the number of31deaths) was even greater for the Second World War. Warsof any type, fought for whatever cause, with weapons of anymake, rite or deeign can only lead to the inevitabler18ultof death and destruction, for victor and vanquished alike.-The Advent of Nuclear Weapons on Humankind:The nuclear eradawned in the twentieth century with the testing of the30. Rikhi Jaipal, Nuclear Arms and the Human Race (AlliedPublishers, N. Delhi, 1886), p.7.31. Vadim Kortunove, The Policy of Nuclear Adventurism -Threat to World Peace, (Sterling Publiehere, New Delb1987), pp.11-12.

orld'8 first nuclear device on 16 July 1945, at~lbmrgardo, Ier Mexico, USA.At 0815 hours, on 6 Augurt1945, 'Little Boy,' a uranium atom bomb was dropped atHiroshima, Japan, and 'Fat Man' a plutonium bomb wardetonated over Nagaraki, Japan by the USA, on B Augurt 1845,32.with deadly calamitous results. The Japanese surrenderedto the Allies soon after, bringing the Second World War to aclose.Thus, the USA was the first country to test, uee andstock nuclear weapons and it continued to be so until 1949,when Tars News Agency announced on 25 September of that rameyear that the USSR was in possession on an atomic weapon33its own.The leap from conventional to nuclear weapon6 is a vorysignificant step. Human-beings, now, for the llrst time,had the means of threatening not only the exietence ofindividuals or societies but they vary concept of thecontinuation of civilization and the survival of their own34species. The difference between conventional and nuclear32. Valentin Pabin. (Gen-ed.), The Laet Nucloar Explosion:A Historical Survey, (Novorti Prerr Agency, Morcow,19831, p.33.of34. Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (ads.), Internatlo&Arm8 Control Iasues and Agroementn. (Stanford-e8r,California, 1984), p.173.

wapoos is tbat while the former derivetbeir destructiveforce or yield froa a chemical reaction ( i byrearranging tbe atoms within wlecules), the latter (fissionweapons) generate energy by rplitting the rtoa itself.Whena free neutron (a kind of atomic wrticle) enters, thenuceus of an atom of plutonium - 239, uranium - 235,nucleur is fragmented and energy is released. lben thenucleur splits, or fissions, some of its neutrons scatterand cause similar reactions in other atoms. In a nuclearbomb, a critical mass of fissionable material isthecoapactedSo tbat in r chain reaction millions of atoms are fragmentedin a few thousandths of a second, creating an explosion.tbir process, energy released is enormous.ByA8 an example, apound of plutonium or uranfua,completely fissioned, produceran yield whichKilotonoes (kt).is equivalent to 8000 tonass of TNT orThe device dropped on Nagasaki on B August1045, bad a destructive force equivalent to 20 kt, butweighed only 5 tonner. The yield-to-weight ration of thlrdevice was 20000 toooer/5 tonnes, or 4000.Tbr conventionalrxplotives ured in World Iar I1 had an yield-to-weight ratio35of approrlutely 1. Thir should, therefore, give an ideaof the ugoitudr and dimnrion of the nuclear weapon.With the developent of tbe furion bonb in the early 1950s,95. Ibid., Op.Cit., 99.173-174.

h.Va been tested with yields upto 60mt,(1 mega-tonne = 1 million tonnes), which is four thousand times morepowerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Mechanicalproblems limit the size and yield of fission bombs butfusion bombs can be of practically unlimited size andpowerbecause one needs to create very high temperatures andpressures to cause an explosion - preventing a spontaneous36reaction is not a problem.EFFEnS AND IMPACT OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR USE ON HUMANKINDNuclear weapons have totally changed tbe nature of war.bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was 10000 times as powerful asa conventional high explosive weapon of the same size.some of today's thermonuclear weapons pack as much as athousand times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb.Rikhi Jaipal stated that at the height of USA and USSR'snuclear gamemanship, the two countries had well over 50000nuclear warheads already mounted on their delivery vehicles,which were in a position of firing againstTheYetpre-determinedenemy targets. The explosive potential of their strategicarsenals alone was the equivalent of 750400 Hiroshimas orabout 11200 megatonnes and that of the intermediate rangeand tactical weapons would amount to another 6000 megatonnes.36. Rikhi Jaipal, Nuclear Arms and the Human Race (AlliedPublishers, N. Delhi, 1986), p.229.

The energy Of a nuclear bomb is released .in r aE$ dmctionof a second in the form of high energy prrtielw (mand fission fragments) and radiation (X-rayr). 4 -1of super heated air is created, expanding faster than tll,speed of sound, enveloping the surrounding area in firscrushing objects with a powerful blast wave.a one megatonne weapon (that is, one withThe blast fmthe explorfvapower of a million tonne6 of TNT), would smash ordinar)brick buildings, nearly five miles away from the detonation.Atthat distance, winds of over a 100 miles an hour wouldsurge through the debris, turning much of it into lethalflying shrapnel.The thermal radiation from a one megatonncto bomb would start mass fires in an area of over a hundredsquare miles. On a clear day, exposed skin would beseverely burnt at a distance of eight miles.In a city, thcthousands of fires sparked by the initial flash could,coalesce into a gigantic fire storm burning for hoursincinerating everything within its perimeter. Such afirestorm obliterated much of Hiroshima. For those withinthe firestorm, the chances of survival could be slightancevenwith well-constructed shelters. The fires would createclouds of toxic fumes and consume much of the availableoxygen, general temperature levels could rise well aboveboiling and hurricane-force winds sweeping inward toward the

fire would prevent escrpe. A nuclear detonation alsocreates deadly prompt radiation in the form of X-rays andneutrons. For large-yield weapons, this radiation would notbe a major source of fatalities because lethal thermal andblast effects would extend further out from the point ofdetonation than lethal prompt radiation. The most seriousradiation effects would come later from the radioactivefall-out from bombs detonated on or near the ground. A onemegatonneblast at ground-level would raise as much as amillion tonnes of dust and debris, creating an enormousradioactive cloud. During the next few hours and days, thisradioactive material would fall slowly back to the earth,possibly in a thick black rain. This deadly fallout wouldcontnminntc thousands of squnrc miles downwind from thoblast with lethal levels of radiation. Although theradiation would decay over time, radiation levels wouldremain lethal for weeks preventing those in shelters fromcoming out for food and water. The area could not be safelyreoccupied for months, and significant radioactivity wouldremain for many years. An air-burst weapon would alsoproduce delayed radioactivity, but in this case, more of itwould travel into the upper regions of the atmosphere andslowly fall to earth, worldwide, over a period of weeks andyears, producing lower-levels of long-level radioactivity.Depending on the dose, the effects of radiation can range

from dizeinesr to death, Moderate doses of radiation impairthe immune rystem, creating a condition similar to AIDS andleaving the victim vulnerabl~ to dinrarer that would beuncontrolled after an attack. Severe doses of radiationlead to massive irreversible cell damage and death. Overthe long term, the unseen damage that radiation causes togenetic material can drastically increase the risk of cancerand birth defects. These hidden genetic defects would bepresent for generations. The levels of radioactivity fromindividual fall-out patterns are additive. Consequently, ina general nuclear war, involving thousands of weapons, alarge fraction of the United States, the errtwhile SovietUnion, and their rllier and neighbourn would be covered withlethal levels of radioactivity. With most of the countrydevastated or highly radioactive, there would be nowhere foraurvivorn to go for help.The use of even a small fraction of the thousands ofweapons held by the two powers (USA and Russia) could leavemost of the cities of the northern hemisphere ravaged byblast and fire. The devastation of the fragile network ofsociety would add further to the dieartor and suffering,Host medical facilities would be destroyed, as would thefuel supplies necessary to keep tranportation moving andPeople rupplied with food, Not only,would medical attention

e unavailable but survivors would likely face widespreadepidemics and famine as secondary effects.There are many other secondary effects that are still notwell understood. In recent years, studies have indicatedthat a large-scale nuclear war that burned most urban areasmight also lead to a catastrophic nuclear winter, withsevere but largely unpredictable effects on the ecologythe entire globe. Similarly, a major nuclear war mightdestroy the ozone layer that protects life from ultra-violetradiation.The likelihood and severity of these secondaryeffects are still highly uncertain. The fact that theseeffects have only recently been recognized suggests thatthere may well be other very serious effects of a large-scale nuclear war that havenot yet been identified.However, what is known with certainty is enough; one nuclearweapon can destroy a city and each of the two powerspossessed about 25000 nuclear weapons, of which roughly halfwerecapable of striking the territory of the other power.An all-out war involving these weapons would clearly be "thegreatest catastrophe in the history by many orders of37magnitude," in the words of General David Jones, formerChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA.37. Quoted from Arms Control and National Securit : AnIntroduction, (Arms Control Association, Wasiingtoii;D.C., 1989), p.9-of

The jump from conventional to nuclear weapons representedquantum leap for the following reasons: The enormous energyreleased by nuclear weapons spreads destruction on rnunprecedented scale. While conventional bombs destroysolely as a result of blast, nuclear weapons producesimultaneously blast, intense thermal radiation, short andlong-lived radioactive particles and a variety ofenvironmental effects which were not previously associated38with explosives.Arms Race and Its Costs:In 1939, shortly before the SecondWorld War, the US military budget was 1.4 billion dollars.At the height of its involvement in Vietnam (1964-1973), itsmilitary allocations rose from 52.1 billion dollars in 1065to 80 billion dollars in 1968. In the mid 1970~~ per capitamilitaryexpenditures in the country were five times theirlevel before the World War. During the last year of theCarter presidency (1080), the military allocations cameclose to 160 billion dollars. The rate of the growth of USmilitary spending had reached an unprecedented high duringRonald Reagan's presidency in the White House. Militaryspending in 1981 stood at about 100 billion dollars and in38. Keesing's Research Report - 7, Disarmament-Negotiationsand Treaties, 1946-1971, (Charles Scribner's Sons, NewYork, 1072), p. 26-27.a

fiscal 1987, the nilitary budget went upto 291.9billiondollars. For fiscal 1988, the administration had requested312 billion dollars, In fiscal year 1985 alone, the USadministration spent 27 per cent of the federal budget or1100 dollars per capita, for military purposes. Themilitary budget kept rising at the expense of cuts in39civilian programmes.Arms manufacturers use a long-establi~hed system of argumentto substantiate the need for manufacturing their deathweapons. The war industry experience a real boom whenfighting and war starts somewhere. Arms must be used ifprofits are to remain steady. This logic explains therelationship between war industries and their respectivecountries' foreign policies. Arms manufacturers and theirrepresentatives in the government encourage wars and armedconflicts all over the world. As international tensionsmount, the shares of munition companies go up in price dueto the increased demand for their goods and their capitalturnover is thus, accelerated. The budget of a given statenot only reflects its present policies but predetermines itsfuture policies as well. According to estimates, in 1985,39. Andrei Krutskikh, US Militarism,(Allied Publishers, NewDelhi, 1987), p.11.

the world spend over 800 billion dollars on the manufactureof arms and the upkeep of military personnel. This was ata time when some 800 million people in the developingworldwere suffering from starvation and almost just as many couldneither read nor write. The rate of infant mortality wasalmost six time that of the industrialized nations. Closeto 300000 children in Asia, Africa and Latin America had no40opportunity of going to school, Economic forces influencearms-control and arms procurement in many ways.On the onehand, they may fuel arms races and operate against armscontrol, drawing upon the belief that militaryexpendituresprovide jobs, promote industrial development and technology,and stimulate growth. However, they can also promote arms-control. Reducing the burden and dangers of arms are aclassic objective of arms control.Economic measurement canreveal what these burdens are, and what benefits, in thesense of better living standards for society at large, mightbe available through arms control, Economic analysis helpsto extend the conception of national security by emphazizingthat economic as well as military strength is important to acountry's well-being. Through economic measures agovernment can smooth the transition from military andcivilian production, and economic techniques of measurement40. Ibid., Op.Cit., p.16-17.

and analysis can help to verify compliance with arms controlagreements. Favourable trade arrangements have beenpolitically linked to the outcome of arms-controlnegotiations, and economic sanctions have been suggesteda means of discouraging violations.asCountries could achievede facto arms-control by agreeing to reduce their military41expenditures.The most commonly used single measure of the size of anational government's military economy is its total annualmilitary expenditure. Not all governments include the sameactivities and programmes under their military budgets but atotal of all countries' defence expenditures will yield anapproximate measure of world military costs. This totalgrew very rapidly through the 1960~~even after correctionfor inflation (See Table I). In the 1970~~ the growthtapered off. It averaged about 4 per cent for the sameperiod. By the beginning of the 1080s, this total was closeto 500 billion (in 1978) dollars a year, about equal to thetotal income of the poorest half of the world's population.As awesome as the sum may seem, it does not reflect fullmilitary costs, in either budgetary or broader economic41. Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (ads.), InternationalArms Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity Press, California, 1984), p.56.

terms.Defence budgets frequently do not include Ouch cortras veterans' benefit, which can be quite subrtantirl, orinterest charges on national debts incurred by militaryspending in past years.figure in budgetary outlays at all.Other military related costs do notFor example, there is aloss of income by draftees who are serving in the armedforces at less than market wages (assuming that otheremployment is possible) and a loss on tax-revenues onproperties used for military purposes. Military budgets,do, however, provide some non-war related expenditures;these include many forms of education and medical care andthe public works and disaster relief often provided bymilitary. Moreover, some aspects of military budgets suchas the tax money to support retired military personnel,economically indistinguishable from any other form of public4 2assistance.Military expenditures are frequently discussed as a portionof gross national product (GNP), a measure that sums up thevalue of an economy's total output of goods and services.In the mid 19606, world military expenditures representedabout 7 to 8 per cent of world GNP but fell to about 4.9 percent of world GNP by 1978. Compared to past figures, thesetheare

numbers are relatively high.The corresponding percentagesin 1913 and in the early 19306, before. World Wars I and I143respectively, were around 3 to 3.5 percent.AS the ratio of military expenditures to GNP is an often-cited measure, it is also well to note its limitations,First,there is no logical reasons to assume that as worldeconomic production expands, threats to the security ofcountries and therefore military expenditures, shouldgrowin proportion, During the 19608, the world GNP doubled,while the portion of that product spent on militaryoutlaysdeclined, although very slowly. This apparent declineshould not blind us to the fact that actual arms expendi-tures grew substantially alongside the steady growth in GNP.Second, the ratio of defence-spending to GNP is not always areliable measure of its burden on the economy. An economywith a high per capita income (eg., the US - about $ 10000)can more easily bear a defence-burden than an economy with alow per capita income, eg., Indonesia - $ 260). In thepoorer country, even a small drain of resources away fromthe civilian economy bites into the necessities of life.addition to the ratio of defence spending to GNP, economistscan also evaluate the military economy by such measures43. SIPRI Yearbook "World Armaments and Disaraments,"=, (SIPRI: Stockholm, 1970), p.27.Inas

the manpower employed in defence and defence-relatedactivities. The regular armed forces of the world comprimeabout 24 million people, to which total one can addborder guards and other para-military forces that aresignificant in some countries.theThe result would still notinclude reservists, who serve for a short period every year,44or the many civilians employed in defence ministries.A fourth measure of the dimensions of the militaryis the amount of research and development (R 8 D)economyresourcesdevoted to it. In 1972, the UN estimated that military R 8 Dconstituted over 40 per cent of all R 8 Dl but in lD80, a UNpanel of experts found that this percentage had fallendrastically. It estimated that the world annually spentabout 150 billion on R 8 D of which about 35 billion wentfor military R & D and concluded that in many countries,defence R 8 D expenditures were in fact growing less rapidly45than R & D expenditures generally. Even so, the absolutedfigures are enormous, and defence, although it absorbsonlyabot 4.5. per cent of the world GNP, absorbs close to a44. Colt D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.), InternationalArms Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity Press, California, 19841, p.173.45. Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament andDevelopment, Report of the Group of GovernmentalExperts on the Relationship Uetween Disarmament andDevelopment. A/36/356(1981), pp.60-62.

quarter of all R & D expenditures. some of this researchhaa ride benefits for the rest of the economy; much,however, does not.A relatively few, usually economically advanced countriesaccount for the bulk of arms spending. In the early 19708,the US and the USSR were alone responsible for over 56 percent of the global total. Their allies in' NATO and theWarsaw military pact plus China, brought the portionrepresented by the major powers to over 86 per cent. Thesecountriel #till largely determinr tha dimrnaionr of ovrrallmilitary spending, but their relative role has beendecreasing. By 1980, the share of the two major countrieswas down to 48 per cent and the share, including China, wasdown to 78 per cent. These percentages reflect the factthat the major growth in military spending has moved to thedeveloping world. In the early 19706, developing countriesspend only about 67 billion (in 1978 dollars) or 18 per centof the world's total - and the proportion falls below 8 percent if China is excluded. By 1980, these same countrieswere spending 114 billion or 25 per cent of the world'stotal; even without China, the figure is 16 per cent. Thisgrowth has been greatest in the Middle East. The members ofthe Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

tripled their arms expenditures during the 1970s while their46GNPs doubled in real terms.The US Military Budgets: With an annual GNP of about 2.5trillion, some 27 per cent of the world's total, the USranks either first or second in the world in the resourcesit devotes to military programmes.Its budget for nationaldefence includes the Department of Defence, foreign militaryassistance, atomic energy for military purposes, and a47relatively minor group of other defence-related activites.(The American and Soviet budgets are shown, correctedinflation, in Table 111).Under the traditional definition of the military budget,current US defence-spending accounts for about 6.5 perof the country's GNP.forcentOf the five million federal employeesin 1980, 2.1 million federal employees were active-dutymilitary personnel and nearly one million were defence-related civilians.It has been roughly estimated that as ofthe early 1980s about another 2.2 million jobs in US privateindustry were defence related. Adding that total to the 3.146, Based on US Arms Control or Disarmament Agency, WbrldMilitary Expenditure or Arms Transfer, 1970-1979,(Washington, D.C., March 1992), p.47,47. Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.), InternationalArms Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity press: California, 1984), p. 173.

million in government-defence jobs, we find that about oneperson in eighteen in the US is working in the military48sector of the economy.Military RBD is by far the largest portion of total govern-ment expenditures.In the early 1980s, federal outlays wereabout 20 billion for defence R 8 D and about 5 billion forspace research, compared to about 15 billionresearch.for civilianIn short, about 50 per cent of the government'sresearch funds go to defence. The total becomes even higher49if space research is considered space-related.The Soviet Military Budget:In 1977, the Soviet GNP wasapproximately 860 billion dollars, For that year, mostWestern estimates of Soviet defence expenditures fallbetween 103 billion and 115 billion dollars, This meansthat the Soviet Union devoted somewhere between 12 and 14per cent of its national income to defence, a ratio muchhigher than the global average and twice that of the UnitedStates. From this investment, the Soviets obtained roughlythe same level of military capability as the UnitedStates.48. Data derived from 'Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates, 1981, p.243. The Estimate of Private IndustryDefence Jobs is that projected for 1981. 'Department ofDefence Report, Fiscal Year 1981, pea-7 (Jan.29, 1980).

In 1982, total Soviet military manpower, which can beestimated reasonably well, was 3.67 million or about 1.4the p ~p~lati~n, compared to about one per cent in the United50States and 0.4 per cent in the world as a whole,Extension of the Soviet figure to allow for civilian defenceofficials or for employment analogous to defenceemployment is so uncertain as nto be worthwhile.THE NEED FOR ARMS CONTROL (DEFINTION, AIMS, OBJECTIVES)ofindustryAS has been shown in the foregoing passages, arms-control isan absolute necessity and a must that all countries shouldfollow in their own interests. Arms control should beachieved in all categories of weapons-whether conventional,non-conventional, nuclear, biological or chemical. It isobvious that arms control should be main tained forachieving the twin basic, main objectives of : (a) Reducingthe danger that stockpiling of any category of weapons posesto the survival of the human species in the world; (b)Decreasing the defence outlay and allocation of a country'sbudget, so that much-needed monetary resources are divertedfor other essential needs of citizens like populationcontrol, total-literacy, job-opportunities and the like.50. Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (ads.), InternationalArms Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity Press, California, 1984), p.173.

Beginning in the late 19508, particularly in the Westernworld,the terms "arms controlt' and "disarmament" acquiredtechnical meanings. Though the two terms are used ratherloosely in both official and private writings, it is helpfulto clarify their meanings. Disarmament involves thereduction or the elimination of armaments or armed forces.Arms control or arms limitation involves limitations onnumber or types of armaments; arms control also encompassesmeasures designed to reduce the danger of accidental warto reduce concern about surprise attack, Although the termsare generally used in an international setting, they canalso be applied to the unilateral actions of countries.Postwer negotiations have concerned both arms controldisarmament, but most of the agreements actuallyhave technically been measures of arms control.theorandachievedAs has been pointed out by Dennis Mennos, "While arms-control controls weapons, disarmament disarms nations, i.e.,5 1deprives thee of the means for waging war." Arms controllooks at the political differences and conflicts betweennations as the root for war, recognises that some oftheseare perhaps impossible to resolve, and attempts to enhance51. Dennis Yennos, World at Risk : The Debate Over ArmsControl, (YcFarland 8 Co., North Carolina, 1986), p.3.

stability between rival nations and to make war less likelyby constraining and not elimination military forces andweapons.~t is widely agreed by classical texts arms controltheoriststhat arms control should reduce the risk of theoutbreak of war, reduce the likely damage should war occur5 2and reduce the burden of peacetime defence preparation.Thua, it ban be clearly seen that though complete andgeneral disarmament is not possible, genuine attempts can bemade by countries towards the arms control of all theirdiffereqt categories of weapons.USA AND USSR IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL STRATEGIC ARMSACCORDS (PRIOR TO THE SINGING OF THE SALT-I TREATY)The USA and the USSR have been involved in the signing ofbilateral and multilateral arms-control agreements whichhave a bearing on the strategic nuclear front.The Antarctic Treatx: This multilateral treaty, wasby the governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium,France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR,signedChile,and USA on 1 December 1959. The US ratification was52. For an example, See Thomas C Schelling and MortonHalperin, Strategy and Arms Control, (The 20th CenturyFund, HewUK

deposited on 18 August 1960 and the treaty came into effect53from 23 June 1961. There are 14 articles in the treaty.The Antarctic Treaty resulted from the InternationalGeophysical Year of 1957-58, a joint scientific effort bytwelve nations collaborating in the study of the earth andits cosmic environment. All twelve sponsoring nationsratified the accord and an additional eleven states havesince deposited instruments of ratification. The treatyprovides that the Antarctic continent shall be used forpurposes only. It prohibits any measures of amilitary nature (such as the establishment of military basesand fortifications and the carrying out of militaryexercises and the testing of any type of weapon. The treatyalso prohibits any nuclear explosions or the dumping ofnuclear waste in Antarctica. To ensure treaty compliance,all contracting parties have the right to designateobservers over any and all parts of the cb'ntinent, includingthe right of aerial observation, and inspection. TheAntarctic Treaty recognizes that the Antarctic continent isthe only place on earth that is fairly undisturbed in allits pristine glory as compared with the other continents of53. Dennis Uennos, World at Risk -The Debate Over ArmsControl, (McFarland & Co., North Carolina, 1986), p.44.

the world. So long as the Antarctic is left untouched bythe military and nuclear estsbliehments of the world thereis hope that at least one part of the world will remaincomparatively undisturbed by humankind and their efforts at'civilizing' every corner of the earth.Eetablishment of a Direct Communications Line Treaty orLine' Treaty.'HotThis treaty wao a bilateral one between the USA and USSR andwas signed on 20 June 1963 at Geneva. It entered into forcefrom that day onwards. During the Cuban missile crisis of1962, the leaders of the USA and USSR found that they couldnot communicate with each other without serious delay. Twomonths after the crisis, the Eighteen Nation DisarmamentCommittee (ENDC) presented a working paper on 'Measures toReduce the Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation orFailure of Communication.' In it, the USA proposed theestablishment of direct communication links betweenWashington and Moscow as one of several collateral measuresoutside the framework of a broader disarmament agreement,They announced in April 1963 that they were willing tonegotiate a separate agreement on a direct communicationslink.

on 20 June 1963, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wassigned between the USA and the USSR, which then came intoforce, This memorandum, commonly known as the 'Hot Line'Agreement, was designed to allow the superpowers to clarifytheir intentions in case of accident, miscalculation ormisunderstanding and thus to prevent an unintended war. Thecommunications link is not by telephone but by teletype.The WOU, together with its Annexe, provides for theestablishment of telegraph and teleprinter equipment atterminal stations in each capital. The agreement specifiedthat any message, other than servicing messages, had to betransmitted promptly to the Head of Government. Messagescan be transmitted iq, English or Russian. To ensureprivacy, the messages are encoded. Under the agreement, theUSA provides the encoding equipment to Russia, whichreimburses the former.The Hot Line was certainly used during the Middle East warsand crises in June 1967, in September-October 1970 and inthe October 1973 War. It has probably been used at othertimes as well; the full extent of its use is classifiedinformation, The initial agreement specified severalalternate cable routes. Later, the two countries agreed toimprove the link by adding satellite communication circuits.The 'Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on Measures to

Improve Us-USSR Direct Communications Link1 was signedentered into force on 30 September 1971.andAlthough there arestrong incentives to use the Hot Line during a crisisneither of the two agreements actually requires its use.an additional agreement, the two countries undertook tonotify each other in certain situations that might havepresented a risk of nuclear war.InThe 'Agreement on Measuresto Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between theUSA and USSR, was signed and entered into force on 30September 1971. It required either party to notify theother of any accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclearIweapon and of the detection of unidentified objects by itsmissile warning systems, The two governments alsoundertook to maintain and improve the organizational andtechnical arrangements by which they guard againstaccidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and tonotify each other beforehand of any missile launches plannedto pass beyond one country's national territory in thedirection of another country. They agreed to try, byreducing the possibility of nuclear incidents to reducepossibility of misinterpretation.theThe countries were to usethe Hot Line to transmit urgent information and requests.Underlying this entire category of agreement was theprinciple that countries have a shared interest in

containingcrises and that communicating is one successfulway to do so. The same idea had encouraged similaragreements in other contexts. For example, France and theerstwhile Soviet Union had their own Hot Line. Theyconcluded an agreement in 1976 to prevent accidental nuclearwar,with provisions essentially the same as those of the1971 US-USSR accord, Likewise, in 1972 and 1973, the USAand USSR concluded agreements intended to preventon or over the high seas.incidentsIn these arrangments, as pointedout by Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy, the two countriesagreed to avoid the collisions that could arise from such54surveillance. Now that the Soviet Union hasdisintegrated, the dangers of nuclear warfare erupting mayhave diminished to a certain extent but the Hot Line Treatyis an important treaty, in that, before pressing the nuclearbutton irretrievably, one nuclear power's leader is in aposition to find out over the Hot Line about the otherpower's intention, before taking the all-importantdecision to push the nuclear button.terribleAnother eventuality isthat in a fast-changing world, the situation in Russiachange and again begin a perceived threat to the Wert andthe rest of the world.-54, Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.), InternationalArme Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity Press, California, 1984), p.173.can

Limited Test Ban TrertpThis treaty, known as the 'Treaty Banning Nuclear WeaponTests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,'was signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963 and entered into forceon 10 October 1963, after the US ratification was depositedon the same day. It was a multilateral treaty and thesignatories included the governments of USA, USSR and GreatBritain, There are five articles to the treaty, Its termsprohibit nuclear weapons testing or other nuclear explosionsin the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. Whilenot banning tests underground, the treaty prohibits nuclearexplosions in this environment also if such tests are likelyto cause radioactive debris to be present outside theterritorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction orcontrol the explosions are conducted. Admittedly, the LTBTis a limited treaty, not the all-inclusive or comprehensivenuclear test ban that arms control activists have beenseeking through the years, By prohibiting nuclear testingin certain environments only, the LTBT appears to legitimizenuclear testing in others, However, this criticism ignoresthe LTBTts contributions in the area of radioactivecontamination. Nearly 1000 underground tests have beenconducted since the treaty came into being. Were it not forthe prohibition of atmospheric testing in the LTBT, the vast

majority of the underground tests would have been carriedout in the atmosphere. When the USA, USSR, and UK set outin 1955 to resolve the issue of nuclear testing, they didnot have 6 limited treaty in mind as the outcome of theirefforts. Though there was mutual suspicion and distrust thatcharacterized their relations, deep-seated differences onthe key issue of verification and pressures from theirmilitary establishments for continued testing to perfectweapons then under development, the three powersin earnest for a complete cessation of all nuclearnegotiatedtesting,However, they could come up with only a limited agreement.It was either limit nuclear testing to the areas thatbe earily verified,or allow a11 testing to continuecoulduncons-trained, resulting in increased worldwide contamination ofthe envir~nment~perhaps with catastrophic results for animaland plant life. In the end,common interest prevailed,whichwas also accelerated by large scale public demonstrations inEurope and the USA in support of a nuclear test ban and byurgent appeals from numerous religious heads and scientists.The LTBT is of unlimited duration and open for signatureall countries, regardless of whether they possess nuclearweapons.France and China are the two notable exceptions tothis treaty. Until all nuclear possessing countries limitthemselves to the provisions of tho LTBT, the world couldto

ecome a dangerous place to live in, due to the nucleartesting of non-LTBT members in environments that coulddamage the ecology and environmental balance. This treaty,as it is popularly known, is of 'limited' success only.The Outer Space Treatz: This Un sponeored multilateraltreaty, was signed simultaneously at Washington, London andMOSCOW on 27 January 1967. It came into force on 10 October1967 when the US ratification was deposited on that sameday. There are seventeen articles in the treaty.Impetus for the 'Outer Space Treaty' came from an address byPresident Eisenhower before the UN General Assembly on 22September 1960. The President proposed that the principlesof the Antarctic Treaty be applied also to outer space andcelestial bodies, a proposal endorsed three years later bythe Soviet Union. The treaty was known as "Treaty onPrinciples Governing the Activities of States in theExploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon andother Celestial Bodies'. The Senate gave unanimous consentto the treaty's ratification (25 April 1967), despite theabsence of specific verification provisions in the languageof the treaty, The capabilities of the US epace trackingSystems, it was judged, would be able to detect illegallaunching or unauthorized devices in orbit.

The substance Of the arms control provisions of the OuterSpace Treaty is in Article IV. In it, the signatory statespledge not to place in orbit around the earth any objectcarrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons ofmass destruction, not to install such weapons on celestialbodies, not to station them in outer space in any manner.The moon and other celestial bodies are to be usedexclusively for peaceful purposes, and the establishment onthem of military bases, installations and fortifications, aswell as the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct ofmilitary exercises are strictly prohibited. As is customarywith all UN sponsored arms-control accords, the Outer SpaceTreaty was opened for signatures to all countries. Ninetycountries have signed and an additional twenty one countrieshave declared themselves bound by the treaty's provisions.This treaty loses its importance when it is no secret thatpowerful technologically - advanced countries like the USAsend secret space-shuttle flights on military missions. Itthen becomes difficult to ascertain whether the treaty'sprovisions are being violated.Latin American Free Zone Treatx: The "Treaty for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," has apreamble and thirty-one articles, and was signed on 14February 1967. There are two additional protocols and the

treaty entered into force for the USA on 12 May 1971 thoughit was a bignatory to the treaty in April 1068. The treatycame into force on 22 April 1968. It currently is in effectfor twenty four Latin Amorican countries, banning nuclearweapons from their territories in an area inhabited by morethan 200 million people. The treaty consists of threeinstruments: the treaty proper (which is open for signatureto Latin American countries only) and two protocols.Protocol I is applicable to non Latin countries that havepossessions in the nuclear free zone; Protocol I1 applies toall powers that already possess nuclear weapons.The basic obligations of the treaty are contained inArticle I. Under its provisioins, the Latin Americancountries undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposesthe nuclear material and facilities uder their jurisdictionand to prevent in their respective territories "the testing,use, manufacture, production or acquisition of any nuclearweapons, directly or indirectly." The "receipt, storage,installation, deployment and any form of possession of anynuclear weapons," are also banned. Other provisions of thetreaty deal with verification, Parties undertake tonegotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)for application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclearactivities and a Latin agency (the Agency for the

prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), especiallycreated is empowered to perform inspections to confirmtreaty compliance.All Latin American countries are partyto the basic agreement except Cuba. Argentina has signedthe treaty but has yet to ratify it.Protocol I calls on all countries outside the treaty zone toapply the denuclearization pr0~iSi0nS of the treaty to theirterritories in their zone. All four countries having suchterritories have signed - the UK, the Netherlands,Franceand the USA. All except France have ratified. In Protocol11, nuclear weapon countries undertake to respect theirdenuclearization status of the zone and not to use orthreaten to use nuclear weapons against the contractingparties.to Protocol 11.France, the UK, USA, USSR and China have adheredHowever, this treaty cannot be said to havedenuclearized the Latin American Zone completely ascountries like Brazil harbour nuclear ambitions.Treaty on - the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) :This treaty was signed at Washington, London, Moscow, on 1July 1968, and entered into forte on 5 March 1970, whenUS ratification instrument was deposited on that day.theThereare 21 articles to this multilateral treaty. A total of 62Countries signed the accord in July 1968. The NPT has

esrentially one main goal: to prevent the spread of nuclearweapons, vertically and horizontally, A secondary goal isto promote the peaceful1 uses of nuclear energy. Towardattainment of these goals, the nuclear weapon countries makethree pledges in the treaty: (1) Not to transfer nuclearweapons or other nuclear explosives to have not nations;(2) To reduce progressively and eventually eliminate allnuclear weapons in their own arsenals; (3) To make availableto non-nuclear countries the benefits from the peacefulapplication of nuclear explosions. On their part,the nuclearhave-nots pledge not to receive the transfer of nuclearweapons or other nuclear expLosive devices and not, tomanufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear implements of war.Ostensibly, peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not beingmisused for military gain, since the adoption of the NPT, byits members. There is one area, however, in which the NPTis vulnerable to criticism. In Article VI of the treaty,the nuclear countries pledge to reduce progressively theirnuclear weapons and eventually to eliminate them. The factthat they have been unable to do so frustrates the nonnuclear countries.127 countries are party to the treaty. The list ofsignatories did not include both France and

China,(which, however, have now become members of thetreaty), both of which were nuclear weapon countries, aswell as countries known to harbour nuclearfacilities oraspirations and Prominent among these were Argentina,Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. The NPTis scheduled to remain in force until 1995, at which time aconference will be convened at New York to decide whetherthe treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or be55extended for an additional fixed period.In October 1964, after predicting that the costs ofdeveloping usable nuclear weapons would go down dramaticallyas the technology became simpler, Robert McNamara, the thenSecretary of Defence, drew a painfully bleak future: "Youcan imagine the danger that the world would face if 10, 20or 30 nations possessed nuclear weapons instead of the fourthat possess them today .... The danger to otherincreases geometrically with the increase in the numbernations possessing these warheads, and therefore, it isnationspolicy of our Government to act to deter the diffusion (the)5 6proliferation of nuclear weapons."ofthe55. Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds.), InternationalArms Control - Issues and Agreements. (StanfordUniversity Press, California, 1984), p.173.56. New York Times, 7 October 1964.

one of the difficulties in adjusting the thought of aworldresplendent with all shades and varieties of new nuclearcountries is that when the imagination evoked by RobertMcNamara actually begins to catalogue the potential horrorsof such world - accidental or unauthorized use of suchweapons, nuclear blackmail, the possibility that a thirdcountry could provoke a nuclear conflict between the largerpowers, it becomes difficult to go beyond the worst possibleconsequences of proliferation. As William B Bader hasrighlty pointed out, "Nuclear proliferation has joinedgovernment waste and regional poverty as something that57every responsible American leader is against."The established 'nuclear powers felt the need to stopcontrol the spread of nuclear weapons as they understood thedevastating and horrific consequences of nuclear warfare.As things have turned out today, they have been unable tostop the spread of more and more countries acquiring thetechnology required for building nuclear weapons. It is anestablished fact that once a certain type of technology isdeveloped in a country, it (technology) won't take longother countries to possess the knowledge that went intoandforthe57. William B., Bader, The United States and the Spread ofNuclear Weapons, (Pegasus, New York, 1B85), pp.11-12.

making of that technology. It is, therrfore, natural thattoday many countries are known to possess the knowledge formaking nuclear weapons. South Africa is a case in point.president F.1. DeClerk confirmed in March 1983 that SouthAfrica had built Six nuclear weapons around this time,Though, according to him, the weapons have now beendismantled, his announcement only brought out into the openwhat the world had always suspected - that South Africapossessed the knowledge and were capable of producingnuclear weapons. It smirks of arrogance on the part of thenuclear club to assume that other non nuclear countries willbe prevented, by the terms of the NPT, from acquiringnuclear knowledge and producing nuclear weapons, On theotherhand, it is vital for developing countries tounderstand that not abiding by the terms of the NPT is onlya futile exercise and one that goes against nationalinterest, This is due to the fact that not only does thedeveloping country have to spend precious finance that couldhave been better used for developmental purposes but alsothat nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. Bypossessing such a weapon, since it is only a developingcountry it will be able to make only a small weapon,presumably to act as a deterrent to its immediateneighbours. Were it ever to be used, however, not only will

the population of the neighbouring country be annihilatedbut the country that used it will certianly feel thedevastating after efforts of such an action. The basicprinciplethat underlines nuclear weapons is that they canonly deter, not defend.The recent action of North Korea inwithdrawing from the NPT in March 1993, on the grounds of,according to them, "war-like joint exercises by US forceswith South Korea" is a dangerous step. It increases thechances of regional instability. Any threat of nuclearwarfare affects the whole world, in a vital way. It istherefore, imperative that not only horizontal proliferationis prevented, vertical proliferation, too, should go.Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of NuclearWeapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabedand in the Subsoil thereof.This treaty was signed at Washington, London and Moscow on11 February 1971 and came into effect on 18 May 1972 with USratification.The treaty has 21 articles.The Sea-bed Treaty grew out of the worldwide concern thatthe militarization of the Sea-bed environment could causeunprecedented damages to mankind. Therefore, the commoninterest required a multilateral accord that would preventnuclear conflict and the introduction of nuclear weaponsinto this area, hitherto free of them. This treaty required

four years of hard bargaining to bring it to a conclusion.TWO issues caused difficulty: the definition of whatconstituteda CO~ntry'~sea-bed and verification. In itsfinal form, the treaty adopted a twelve-mile limit to definethe sea-bed area and agreed on a compromise verificationprovision. The negotiations were conducted within variousUN forums. The treaty's final draft was approved by theGeneral Assembly and a total of 87 nations are party oftreaty, including USA, Russia and the UK.The Sea-bed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nucleartheweapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction on thesea-bed, the ocean floor and its subsoil. Also prohibitedare structures, launching installations,or other facilities,specifically designed for storing, testing or using suchweapons. The controlling term is "emplacement", aprobibitionthat does not cover such objects as submarinesor other submersibles, which are capable of moving aboutthe water on their own, but which may temporarilythe ocean bottom.inrest onReview conferences on the Sea-bed Treaty are held at fiveYear intervals to evaluate the continued need for the treatyand its overall compliance record. The Sea-bed Treaty hasbeen succesrful in preventing tests on the sea-bed, thusPreventing more large scale destruction and havoc on the

environment than already present. It is, however, es~entialthat the term nem~lacement" is changed to include submarinesand other submersibles that move about the water on theirown, i.e., temporarily rest on the ocean bottom.Conclusion: The mid-twentieth century saw the emergence anddominance of two countries on the world scene - the twosuperpowers being the United States of America and the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics. From the beginning, it wasclear that though each country had enormous resources - bothin terms of natural and human - apart from being among thetop five largest countries in terms of area - the politicalaims and objectives of these countries were different.While the USA believed in Capitalism, free enterprise anddemocracy, the USSR set out to become the leader incommunirm, a stat-controlled economy and the power of theproletariat over the courgeoisie. The two countries hadbeen allies during the latter stages of the Second World Warbut it soon became apparent at the end of it that both theUSA and USSR were heading for a showdown. At the end of theWar, it was Stalin's aim and policy to bring as manycountries and areas in Eastern Europe under the USSR's swayand domination. These countries would be the satellites ofthe USSR reflecting that country's idealogy. However, itWas the policy of the USA to halt the spread of Communism,

especially into entering the countries of Western Europe, byeupporting such countries with financial aid under theMarshall Plan and the Truman Plan, and also to help themmilitarily, by the formation of NATO.gp the end of World War 11, another very important eventtook place, which changed the course of relations betweencountries forever - the use of the world's first atomicbombs, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, on 6 and 9August 1945, by the USA. The USA had developed these bombsthrough its sponsorship of the 'Manhattan Project,' It wasfor the first time that weapons of mass-destruction werebeing used. Soon thereafter, the USSR also acquired nuclearcapability and the 1950s and early 1960s also saw thecountries of Great Britain, France and China becomingnuclear powers.It soon became clear, however, that a nuclear race andbuild-up began between the USA and the USSR in nuclearweapons, horizontally, at a very rapid rate. They now hadnuclear weapon stockpiles that could not only blow eachcountry out of this earth, if used, but the living worlditself, out of exiitence. Both the nuclear and non-nuclearcountries felt a need for certain safeguards and precautionsto be taken in the area of strategic nuclear weapons, and

thus between 1959 to 1968, there were a number ofmultilrteral rrms accords signed in this area, the mostimportant of these being the Non-Proliferation Treaty,Arms control has become very essential and necessary becausenot only do the production and stocking of weapon6 consumeprecious money that could be put to better use on thedomestic front but a160 that these nuclear weapons have theability and capability to mass-destroy.Finally, the relationship obtained between the USA and theUSSR between 1945 to lB68 show phases of Cold war andDetente. However, tricky the situation became between them,especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the worldalmost saw a head-on confrontation between these two powers,it must be noted, that with the advantage of hindsight,these two powers acted in a responsible manner, as befittingcountries who, between them, held the largest nuclearstockpile in the world.

11. REVIEW OF LITERATUREThe books and articles written on strategic arms control aremainly from the US perspective. In the following pages areview of this literature is provided.US PERSPECTIVE57POWER AND MADNESS: THE LOGIC OF NUCLEAR COERCIONThe book is a logical treatise on the phenomenon of coercivepower.Working deductively, Rhodes refines and expands theclassical model of nuclear deterrence by looseningtraditionalbut overly restrictive assumptions of rationalbehaviour. In doing so, he reverses some of classicaldeterrence theory's most important conclusions. He reasonsthat nuclear deterrent power need not - and in an era ofmutualvulnerability does not - rest on the existence ofoptions for rationally waging nuclear war. This, hesuggests, means that the US can abandon its tasks ofattempting to create iimited and controllable nuclearoptions that could be rationally executed.57. Edward Rhodes, Power and Madness: The Logic of NuclearCoercion, (Columbia, New York, 1989).

58pOUHDATION FOR THE FUTUREhis book, brought Out by the Arms Control Association in asingle volume, is one of the best guides to the intricaciesof the ABY debate and the ABY treaty itself. It providesthe tools for understanding the complexities of the treatyand also for projecting its future role.59ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY : AN INTRODUCTIONhis book surveys the history and issues of nuclear andconventional arms control, from World war 11 to thebeginning of the Bush Administration.Among the topics thebook covers, are on the goals of arms control, itsaccomplishments till then, the verificationof the armscontrol agreements, US and Soviet compliance records onexisting arms control agreements and the key arms controlissues which faced the Bush Administration.DETENTE AND CONFRONTATION:60FROM NIXON TO REAGANAMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSIn this study, Garthoff analyses the historicaldevelopmentof American - Soviet relations from 1969 through58. The Arms Control Association, Foundation for the Future,(ACA, lashington, D.C., 1990).59. The Arao Control Association, Arms Control and NationalSecurity: An Introduction, (ACA, Washington, D.C., 1989).60. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American- Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, (The BrookingsInstitution, Washington, D.C., 1985).

1984, taking into account both the broader context of worldpolitics and internal political considerations anddevelopPlents.61GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICYvill democratization, perestroika and glasnost survive? Canand should America help Gorbachev in his programme ofchange? This book looks into Russia's foreign policyStalin as also of Gorbacbev's political strategicof systems renewal.afterpolitics62MORTAL RIVALS: SUPERPOWER RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO REAGANThis book is a combination of a personal memoir,contemporary history and political analysis from theperspective of first hand experience. The author describeshow Richard Nixon came to office and the persistent echo ofd,etente through the administrations of GeraldCarter and Ronald Reagan.Ford, Jimmy61. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.),Gorbachev'sRussia and American Foreign Policy, (Westview, Colorado,1988).62. lilliaa G. Byland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations. from Nixon to Reagan, (Random House, New York, 1987).

630RIGIN8 OF mTAINNENT : A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONIn this book Larson tries to answer the question, "Was thecontaiamentpolicy cause or consequence of US shift inperception?" From 1944 to 1947, the American view of theSoviet Union as a difficult but trustworthy ally wasreplaced by the image of a totalitarian state bent onunlimited subversion and conquest and henc! the need toanswer the above question.64REAGAR AND GORBACREVThe book is an interim report gbout an episode in thehistory of Soviet-American relations that ended in mid-October 1986, when the two leaders met in Iceland.with anincumbent American Administration.65THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S SOVIET POLICYThe first part of the book looks at the postwar periodIt dealsfromthe perspective of major actors i e changing63. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: APsycholoaical Explrnation.(Princeton, New Jersey, 1985).64. Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, Reagan gndGorbachev, (Vintage Books, New York, 1987).65. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), The Making of America'sSoviet P~licy, (Yale, Michigan, 1984).

structure of public opinion, Congress, presidency andexecutivebranch) and the second part focuses on the majorissues in the relations hi^ (i.e., nuclear issues,crisismanagement and prevention, trade and economics and socialissues) and how tbey have been managed over time.66RETHINKING US-SOVIET RELATIONSThe book examines US-Soviet relations from a variety ofperspectives - $eoPolitical, historical, philosophical -and constitutes an important contribution to currentacademic thinking over the Cold War and its aftermath.THE TURN: FROM COLD WAR TO A NEW ERA, THE UNITED STATES AND67THE SOVIET UNION - 1983-1990This is the gripping narrative history of the passage of theUSAand the Soviet Union from the Cold War to the hopefulnew era (post-cold war).He makes the reader a bebind-the--scenes spectator as US and Soviet leaders took the measureof each other and slowly set about their historic task.66. George Liska, Rethinking US - Soviet Relations,(Blackwell, Oxford, 1987).67. Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era,the United States and the Soviet Union - 1983-1990,(Poseidon Press, New York, 1991).

- 68THE COLD RAE IS OVERgyland examines the tense costly fifty year powerbetweenstrugglethe Communist World and the Vest - a struggle thatbegan with the Hitler-Stalin pact Of 1938. He traces thecold War through its various stages of confrontation,containment and conciliation and explains why, abruptly, inthe mid 1980s, the conflict began to diminish. and the worldbegan to change.OUT OF THE COLD: NEW THINKING FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN AND6 9DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURYThis book explains that the Cold War had increased thethreat of nuclear destruction, distracted US attentionpressing domestic problems, and compromised itsfromtraditionaldemocratic values. It also led to huge defense expenditures- over $ two trillion in an eight-year period alone.YcNamara, explores what US responses should be, sums upcosts and benefits of a thaw in US - Soviet relations, andopens the debate on American post Cold Var future.the68. Villiam G. Byland, The Cold War is Over, (Random, NewYork, 1990).69. Robert S. YcNamara, Out of the Cold: New Thinking forAmericrn Foreign and Defense Policy in the 21stCenturx, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1989).

TEE NECESSARY PEACE : NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUPERPOWER70RELATIONSThe fundamental purpose of the book was to assert and defendthe proposition that the truly revolutionary impact ofnuclear weapons on international re1,ations and, morespecifically US-Soviet relationships, had been theirstabilizing and tranquilizing effect. Both dreadfullyfearful of the outcome of a nuclear war betweensuperpowers had treated one another with an extremethem, thecautionwhich had made war between them far less likely than wouldhave been the case in the absence of nuclear weapons.Theresultof this phenomenon was the "necessary peace", whichhad become more ending and stable as time went by andweapons became more lethal. Part I (2 Chapters)describedthe concurrent situation and Part I1 looked at what theauthor viewed as those trends currently on the horizonthatwere mostlikely to have an impact on the dynamics of astable system.7 1NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETSThis book is from the perspective of an INF TreatyNegotiator.-70. Donald M. Snow, The Necessary Peace: Nuclear Weaponsand Buperwwer Relations, (Lexington Books,Massachusetts, 1987).71. lymond F. Smith, Negotiating with the Soviets,(Indiana, 0loomington, 1989).

72DESTINY: FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSThe changes in Soviet leadership, the intensity of Cold iarrhetoric and the urgency of the nuclear threat hadcontributed to the need to a thoughtful analysis of thetroubled US-Soviet relationship. The book met this need byfocusing on the central elements of theprofoundtensions-thecultural differences that had shaped interactionsbetween them since the 19th century.73THE RISE OF NATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNIONThe book was written as the Soviet Union was beginning tobreak apart. It was against the backdrop of economicdisintegration that all fifteen Republics had asserted itssovereignty. In a series of essays under the editorialdirection of the editor, Michael Mandelbaum, five respectedexperts on the Soviet Union describe how the country arrivedat this critical juncture and assessed what was likely tohappen next.72. Mark Garrisson and Abbot Gleason (eds.), SharedDestiny: Fifty Years of Soviet - American ~ela-(Beacon Press, Massachusetts, 1985).73. Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The Rise of Nations in theSoviet Union, (C.F.R.P., New York, 1991).

SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH: SOVIET REALITIES AND AMERICA'S74FUTUREThe book is a significant examination of the constraints onSoviet 'political and economic oppression in the USSRSoviet expansionism and militarism @road.75FROM BIROSAIMA TO GLASNOSTPaul H. Nitze, was a key figure in Washington from theRoosevelt administration, right through to the Reaganadministration.andThe memoirs are a reflection on the issueshe has faced, the decisions he had made, the people he hasknown and the presidencies he has served in his almost fiftyyears inside the top echelons of Washington policycircles.Re discusses the major events of his illustrious career theformationof the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, the BerlinWar crisis, NATO, Vietnam, the SALT Treaties and otherweapons - negotiations treaties of his time.74. Richard Pipes, Survival is not Enough: Soviet Realitiesand America's Future, (Simon & Schuster, New York,1984)75. Paul 8. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden,From Hiroshima to Glasnost, (Grove leidenfeld, NewYork, 1B89).

BLITHER COLD WAR HOR DBTENTB: SOVIET-AMERICAN REUTIONS IN76THE 1980sme essays focused here are on five significant dimensionsof soviet-American relations from a variety of viewpoints -the five dimensions being : liistory of ColdWar; analysesof the Soviet euccession question; the massive complexitiesof Sino-Soviet-American relations; human rights in Soviet-Lmerican relations; and American policies towards theSoviets in the 1980s.77THE REAL WARIn this book, the former chief executive tells the nationhow they can use their political, economic and militarystrength to turn the tide, of what appeared to bethe USlosing out on all these fronts. He details what the UScourse should be in the decades to come,78AYERICAR FOREIGN POLICYThis book is a comprehensive overview of US foreignrelations from 1945 to 1987. ,The author also76. Richard A. Melanson (ed.), Neither Cold War NorDetente: Soviet - American Relations in the 19801s,(Virginia, Charlottesville, 1982).77. Richard Nixon,The Real War,(Warner Books,New York,1980).78. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War3, (CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 1988).

explored the differences between the USA and the Sovietunion and showed how their contrasting national stylescontributed to the foreign policy successes and failures ofeach country.79THE PRESENT DANGERThe book starts with the 'Truman Doctrine' and 'Containment'and ends with what he feels are the challenges facingUSA. He traces the course of US policy from thedetermination to contain the Russians within their expandedempire of 1948 to the.Nixon-Carter policy of strategicretreat, to 1980.80POST-REAGAN AMERICAThe authors try to answer questions like: Will the US beable to construct a new world role for America moreconsistent with its economic needs or will it continue toemphasize, military power at the expense of its standardliving and its international influence? They (authors)place bold alternatives for a post-Reagan America and thebook is a provocative guide to the formulation of US foreignPolicy for the upcoming decade.79. Norman Podboretz, The Present Danger,(Simon & Schuster,New York, 1980).80. Archibald L, Gillies, Jeff Faux, Jerry 1. Sanders,Sherle, R. Schwenninger and Paul F. Walker, Post-ReaganAmerica, (World policy Institute, New York, 1987). -theof

AMERICA AS A VOW POWER:81WILSON TO REAGANA REALIST APPRAISAL FROMhe author provides an overview of US foreign policy fromthe Versailles Conference the Reagan Administration.examinesthe scenarios and problems that resulted from thecontinuing tension in their foreign relations betweenidealistic and moral principles and rtalistic nationalinterests and goals.82DIPLOMAT-IN-CHIEF: THE PEWIDENT AT TEE SUMMITThis is a general observation of US presidents at summits.83NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN US-SOVIET RELATIONSThis book critically examines US attempts to establish anuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and offered newapproaches to dealing with the changing strategicenvironment. The author maintained that the mostHe81. Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A RealistAppraisal from Wilson to Reagan, (Scholarly ResourcesInc., Delaware, 1984).82. Elmer, Plischke, Diplomat-in-Chief: The President at.the Summit, (Praeger, New York, 1986).83. Keith 0. Payne, nuclear Deterrence in US-SovietRelations, (Westvier, Colarado, 1982).

influential theories of nuclear deterrence - 'Assuredvulnarabilit~' or 'Flexible Targeting' were unrealistic,given Soviet foreign policy and attitudes towards nuclearwar, which no long82 adequately met the requirements of USnational security at that time.84THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WARThe author tries to answer certain questions like:Precisely, what was it about the Soviet Union's behaviourthat the American leaders found so threatening? Did the USreally want a sphere of influence in post-war Europe? Whatled the Truman administration to endorse, but thenimmediately back away from a strategy designed to avoidAmerican military involvement in the mainland of Asia? Whydid the US not use nuclear weapons during the decade inwhich it had an effective monopoly over them? Did Americanleaders really believe in the existence of an internationalcommunist monolith? How did Russians or Americans fall intothe habit of not shooting down each others reconnaissancesatellites?84. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long peace: Inquiries into theHistory of the Cold War, (Oxford, New York, 1987).

85TAE TBOWLED DETENTEThe first close study Of the events and processes whichto 'cold peace' (mid 1970's) between USA and Russia. Itpenetrate8 the intricacies of the Russian ideology ofdetente, from its precedents in Leninist theory, to itsimplementation in the post-Stalin regimes of KhrushchevBrezhnev. Weeks examines Russian "institutions andprocesses" obstructing the growth and 'gre?ningt of detente.He probes the Soviet rationale for detente and discusses itsimplications for East-lest relations. The book providespractical measures of mutual advantages for East and Westwithin "cold peace" or passive coexistence. He assesses thealternatives of coexistence versus coextinction.ledandHe weighedthe then advances in strategic arms limitations (among otherissues), against the perspective of the Soviet dialectic andthe then-continuing ideologic struggle between Communist andCapitalistic countries.ENDGAME:86TEE INSIDE STORY OF SALT-11This is the inside story of the climatic phase of SALT, theruspenseful and secrecy-shrouded negotiations that85. Albert L. Weeks, The Troubled Detente, (New YorkUniversity Press, New York, 1976).86. Strobe Tslbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT 11,(Earper and Row, New York, 1979).

produced the most important and one of the mostcontraverrial diplomatic agreements. Talbott takes usbehind the headlines of the then previous two-and-a-halfyears to explain what SALT was, how it came about and whatwas at stake.87THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONSThis collection of essays offers one of the first,efforts to examine the end of the Cold War, its meaningseriousimplications. The book presents the thinking of leadinghistorians, political scientists, policy analysts, andcommentators,andfrom the USA, Great Britain, France, Norwayand the former USSR. Together they discuss such importantissues as the origins of the Cold War, its ideological andgeopolitical sources, the cost of that epic conflict, itswinnersinstitutions,and loosers and its influence on American life andPRESENT HISTORY ON NUCLEAR WAR,88CONTROVERSIESDETENTE AND OTHERThe author's capacity for utter clearheadedness presents theevidence and produces a set of conclusions that are atonce---- - ----87. Michael J. Bogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War: ItsMeaning and ~ m p l i c a t i o n s , ~Cambridge, 1992).88. Theodore Draper, Present History on Nuclear War,Detenteand Other Controversies, (Random, New YOrk, 1983).

prrcti~61 md inescapable. In this book, he takes onpositions held by Kissinger, Brzezinski, Ieinberger, Hardingmd Kirkpatrick., among others.89COLD WAR, COLD PEACE: THE US AND RUSSIA SINCE 1945The author starts with the history Of Cold War between USAmd Russia, i.e. from the Soviet Revolution in 1917 andcontinues upto 1983.PBOM TBUST TO TERROR: THE ONSET OF THE COLD WAR, 194590TO l@50-The span and design of this narrative were set byeventsand not by choice. By 1945, the war was won and hopes werehigh. By the end of 1949, these hopes had crumbled". Itwas during this period that the cornerstones of postwarAmerican foreign policy - The Truman Doctrine, the MarshallPlan, and NATO - were set, and the author sheds new light ontheir origin and impact.89. Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War, Cold Peace: The US andRussia rince 1945, (American Heritage, New York, 1984).90. Herbert Feio, Prom Trust to Terror: The Onset of theCold War, 1945 to 1950, (Norton, New York, 1970).

A GAH8 HIGH 8TIWS: LESSONS LEARNED IN NEGOTIATING9 1WITH THE 80VIET UlsIOlO~t a high-level seminar series sponsored by the RooseveltCentre for American Policies Studies, experienced armscontrol and ~0OImercial negotiators 6s well as other expertsgathered to ansrer key questions like: What have past USnegotiators learned about how the Soviet negotiateparticularly over arms control? Row can the US governmentnegotiate and serve US national interest?How can the US bemore effective in its commercial negotiations with theSoviets? Row can a better understanding of negotiatingtheory help future negotiations?92CONTROLLING TEE BOMB: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE 1980sThe author reviews the history of the nuclearage, tracesthe erosion of the technical barriers to nuclearization,identifiesthose countries most likely to obtain the bomb,and proposes essential policies for the US to follow toattempt both to contain the bombs spread and to deal with anincreasingly nuclearized rorld.-91. Leon Sloss and Y. Scott Davis (eds.), A Game For HighStakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the SovietUnion, (Ballinger, Cambridge, 1986).-92. Lewis A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: WuclearProliferation in the 1980s, (Yale, New York, 1982).

DAIGKB AND SURVIVAL: CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE93p1ur lIFn YEAR8~t is the most comprehensive political history of thenuclear bomb ever written, r major work which encompassesthe event6 from the discovery of fission in ,1938super power summitry of 1988.94ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE POSTURES IN THE 19806to the4The book asks whether it is possible to negotiate an armscontrol agreement that would actually cut back US, USSR'sstrategic arsenal, and how such an arms reduction could beaccomplished.It explores the problem of arms competitionin the 1910s and stresses the need the complete reassessmentof US security interests lest negotiations become curiouslydisconnected from defense policies. The book provides anoverview ofprevious US arms limitations strategies anddescribes the Soviet approach to integratingsecurity with arms control policies.national93. YcGeorge Bundy, Danaer and Survival: Choices About theBomb in the First Fifty Years, (Random, New York, 1988)94. Richard Burt (ad.), Arms Control and Defense Posturesin the 19808, (Vestview/Croom Helm, Colorado, 1982).

Some authors have also looked at the topic under studyfromthe Soviet perspective. A critical review of their work isgiven below :SDI: FIVE YEAR8 ON.95WEAT'S NEXT?The SDI project and its political, legal and strategicaspects had been the subject of intense study byscientistsfrom all over the world including, the Soviet Union. Theproject had provoked heated political debate in theinternational community.The Committee of Soviet Scientistsfor Peace, against the Nuclear Threat, set up a specialworking group in 1983 to deal with the problem. This groupincluded scientists and experts from a number ofof the USSR Academy of Scientists.institutesThe authors of this bookwho were included among there scientists, have studiedstrategic and political consequences of the developmentthe SDI, as well as the legal aspects, in particular,preservation and strengthening of the 1972 ABM Treaty.book gives a brief round-up of the SDI research and examinesthe latest trend in the project's development, prevalentthat time.95. Andrei Kokoshin, Alexi Arbatov, Alexei Vasilyer, SDI:Five Years on. Ihatos next? (Novosti, Yoscow, 1988).theoftheTheat

PROY96TO REYKJAVIKThe author, in this book, gives a detailed accountof theGorbachev-Reagan Summit meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik.~t deals with a broad development of Soviet-Americanrelations as also the nuclear issues prevaleni at that time.97SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVESIn this book, the author tries to show that ever since theCUSSR came into being, the basic direction of its foreignpolicy activities was for the struggle of a world withoutweapons and wars. The book outlines the situation thenprevalent from the Soviet standpoint, and contains briefdescriptions and analyses of Soviet peace initiatives atvarious levels and international fora, in the post - SecondWorld War period.98US MILITARISMUsing the Asia - Pacific region as an example, the authortries to 'expose' the essence of US .military preparationsand analyses the militarist programmes of the Reagan96. Fyodor Burlatsky, From Geneva to Reykjavik, (ProgressPublishers, Moscow, 1987).97. Mibail Shmelyov, Soviet Peace Initiatives, (Allied,New Delhi, 1987).98. Andrei Krutskikh, US Militarism, (Allied, New Delhi,1987).

administration. Be tries to show that the USA wasresponsible for every new spurt in the arms race as wellfor obstructing talks on disarmament.99I1IEIfCE THE THREAT TO PEACEThe book examines the prevalent state and orientation of thearmed forces and military - industrial potential of the USA.It tries to provide an objective picture of the strategicsituation then prevalent, by examining the balance of East -West military strength and the approach of the two sides tointernational detente and the problems of safeguardingconsolidating peace as well as curbing the arms race.100REYKJAVIK, THE ABY TREATY AND SDIWhen Reagan and Gorbachev met at Reykjavik, it was widelybelieved that the START Treaty would be signed there.However, the SDI project and the interpretation of the 1972ABM Treaty impeded the signing of that important armscontrol treaty.asandThe author tries to analyse, in this book,the what and why of things going wrong in Reykjavikprevented the signing of the START Treaty.which99. Whence the Threat to peace, (Military Publishing House,Yoscocr, 1982).100. Colonel Vladimir Chernyshev (Retd.), Reykjavik, the ABMTreaty and SDI, (Novosti, Moscow, 1987).

fhough plenty of material is available on strategic nucleararms control, the major portion, so far, has been from thedarn of the nuclear era to the signing of the SALT I1Treaty, i.e. , from the 1940s to the 1970s. , However, thesigning of the INF Treaty (1987), START I (1991) and STARTI1 (1993) Treaties being of an comparatively recent period,not much comprehensive research has been pone covering thisperiod. The study seeks to fill this gap. Further, betweenthe signing of the INF Treaty, (i.e., between 1987-1993),dramatic events have taken place in the world - the mostmomentous of these being the disintegration of the once -mighty State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,which for about seven-and-a-half decades, had stood as acitadel for Communism in practice.Besides, most of the above mentioned works were coloured byCold War ideologies, especially by writers who werecommitted to Western ideology. It, therefore becomesessential to look into the issues relating to thenegotiations from an angle that is committed neither to theUS nor the Soviet perspective. Most US and Soviet writersof strategic nuclear arms control have either been overtlyor covertly committed, in their writings, to the respectivecountry's interests. The study is pioneering in the sensethat this is for the first time that such a comprehensive

esearch has been undertaken, from 1972 to 1993, which isdevoid of any wrspective.Further, the study for the first time, focuses on both theoverkill aspect, involved in the nuclear arsenal of bothcountries as well as the very heavy financial burdeninvolved in maintaining such huge nuclear arsenals and thecompulsions involved in the signing of the arms controlTreaties and the savings that resulted form such signing.

TABLE 1CASUALTIES AT RIROSEIYA AND NAGASAKIZONE POPULATION DENSITY KILFED INJURED(per sq.mile)RIROSRIYAo to 0.6 mile 31,200 25,800 26,700 3,000*0.6 to 1.6 miles 144,800 22,700 39,600 53,0001.6 to 3.1 miles 80,300 3,500 1,700 20,000Total 256,300 52,000 68,000 76,000Standardized casualty rate : 261,000 (Vulnerable area 9.36sq.miles)NAGASAKIo to 0.6 mile 30,900 25,500 27,300 1,9000.6 to 1.6 miles 27,700 4,400 9,500 8,1001.6 to 3.1 miles 115,200 5,100 1,300 11,000Total 173,800 35,000 38,100 21,000Standardized casualty rate: 1B5,000 (vulnerable area 7.01sq.miles)Source:"The Effects of Nuclear leapons", Compiled 8 Edited bySamual Glosstone and Philip J. Dolan, 3rd Edition.Prepared and Published by United States Department ofDefence in the Energy Research and DevelopmentAdministration - 1977, Washington D.C. p.544. (Table12.09).

TABLE 2[IS NATIMIL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, OUTLAYS, FISCAL YEARS 1986-1989Figures rrs in US $ billion, current pricespEU8OfRlEL0 & MPROCUREMENTR & DOTHERCONSTRUCT 1 ONDODENERGYDEFENCE-RELATED,OTHERNATIONAL DEFENCEEXPENDITURE 273.4NATIONAL DEFENCEEXPENDITURE 302,7(CONSTANT 1989 US$)RATE OF CRARGE(PERCENT) --SOURCE: Nrtionsl Defence Budget Estimates for FY 1918/89,Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence(Controller), APRIL. 1988.

TABLE - 3ANNUAL SOVIET AND US MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1952-80(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1978 COLLARS)...................................................YEAR U.9.A U.S.S.RSOURCE: SIPRI Yearbook,1974,pp.206-7, ed.1981, p.156. (The 1974US numbers have been multiplied by 1.6788 and thecorresponding Soviet numbers by 1.5143 for continuityin sdjustment for inflation).

Chapter Two

SALT I (1972) & SALT I1 (1979) TREATIESBefore one goes into the reasons, causes and effects of whythe Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Treaties (SALT) weresigned, one must also go into the elements that go into themaking of a treaty. One of the important elements in thisregard is that of summit meetings where treaties are usuallysigned between the leaders.THE IMPORTANCE OF SUMMIT MEETINGS:Summit diplomacy is personal negotiations heldface to face between heads of state or governmentof themajor powers in the hope of resolving major conflicts,Theorigin of summit diplomacy can be traced to the Congress ofVienna of 1815. After Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat, thequestion of settling the surrendered lands and redrawing themap of Europe had to be resolved. To decide these, therewere monarchs and plenipotentiaries who had gatheredthereby agreement. The Treaty of Versailles (Peace Plan),concluded at the Paris conference, which was held from 18January 1919, at the conclusion of World War I. It wasrepresented by the Allied countries and their allies.President Wilson of the USA, Prime Minister Lloyd George ofBritain and French statesman, Georges Clemenceau, amongothers, were there, to decide on the treaty's provisions and

eparations. Teheran, the Iranian capital, was the scene ofthe first wartime summit conference from 28 November 1943 to2 December 1943 and was represented by Winston Churchill ofBritain, Franklin Roosevelt of USA and Josef Stalin of theUSSR. Though it was mainly concerned with military matters,the conference also saw the exchange of viers on the futuretreatment of Germany, the post-colonial settlement, thepost-war frontier of Poland and the organization ofinternational security. Yalta, a town iq the Crimea, wasthe scene of the second wartime summit conference mongChurchill, Roosevelt end Stalin, from the 4 to the 11 ofFebruary 1945.Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, Harry S Truman and JosefStalin held a meeting at Potsdam, a town in East Germany,from the 17 of June 1945 to the 2 of July 1945, to determinecertain aspects of post-war control in Germany. The mostimmediate apparent decisions were to demilitarize Germany,put war-criminals on trial, revise German-Polish frontiersand finally, to place the four zones into which Germany wasdivided under the control of the military command of eachoccupying power.In a superpower summit, the superpower countries gather in. adesignated pre-determined place, along with their top andClosest rides. The purpose of the summit meeting is to

thrub out and discuss about problems thrt beset andconfront the Powers and how best these powers can solvethem. It is ale0 to discuss the issues,ideologies anddifferences thrt exist between the powers. It gives theleader of one power a chance to explain to the other thestand he has taken on Various issues and why he has done so.Treaties and accords may or may not be concluded at suchsummits.A eummit is very important in the sense that it gives anopportunity to the COu~trieS to try and understand theother. In a world that faces and goes through regionalconflicts, terrorism and civil strife in almost all parts ofthe globe, it is natural for the weak, small, undevelopedand underdeveloped countries to give them security - asecurity where conditions for peace and stability exist.According to former US President Dwight Eisenhower, "Sincethe days when President Wilson made his European trips toparticipate in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles,many conflicting opinions have been expressed, most often ingeneralities, as to the wisdom of a President of the UnitedStates meeting personally with other heads of government. Itseems to me that conclusions of this kind rarely have valueif they are meant to apply universally and eternally; each

1set of ~ir~\llr8t4n~eS has to provide the answer." Eisenhowerrightly recognised that the importance of summits could notbe written off completely, and that each summit hadto belooked into through its own set of circumstances whichbrought it (Su~it) about in the first glace, before itcould be called a success or failure.The conclusion that follows naturally from the above showthat summits are very important for the treaty makingprocess. Not Only is a summit a place where treaties areusually signed as a result of the dialogue processes set inmotion earlier, but it can also be a place where differencesare resolved amicably, at the highest level, when leaders ofvarious countries meet face-to-face, on a one-to-oneat such eummits.level,Elements Present in a Super~ower Summit: According to DavidD. Newson, the factors that went into the making of asuperpower summit were four primary elements of the process.These elements which went into the adequate preparationsrequired for the holding of a summit between the two powerswere: the timing and circumstances of a decision to hold a1. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White Rouse Years: Mandate forChanae, 1953-1956, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday 8CO*), p.503.

summit, setting the date and location, the issue of2preconditions (if any) and setting the agenda.Other isrues which can be identified as among the decisionsthat have had to be made in the preparation of at least someof the meetings were: how to respond to the domesticforeign pressures for a summit; the division ofresponsibility within the US bureaucracy for the planning,particularly between the Vhite House and the StateDepartment; the channels through which advance discussionswith the Soviets were to take place; the degree ofconsultation with allies; the preparation of agreements forsymbolic signing at a summit; the problem of record keepingand interpretation and at what level the communique was to3be drafted. Certain observations that have emergedregarding the preparation of summit meetings and therelationships of the preparatory steps to the policiessuccesses of the summit include:andandThere did not seem to be asingle point at which the question of whether there shouldbe a summit meeting had been decided. In eachadministration, the decision appeared to have been a matter2. David D Newson, in the forward to Gordon R Weihmillerm d Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Pressof America, Lanham, 1986), p.xi.3. Ibid.

of the evolution of pressures to the point where a summitbecame both a diplomatic and a political necessity. Witheach succeeding administration, the assumption grew thateach president would need at some point, to meet with hisopposite counterpart.absolute.The requirement for a summit becameNewson went on to say that the move toward a summit was aprocess including both formal diplomatic contacts betweenLthe two sides and signals. The possibility of a summitneededto be testedlfloated as an idea/ a speech made hereand there to see what response one got. Answers to suchquestions as: What was the reaction domestically? Bow didthe allies like it and so on. All of this emerged ratherthan being direct. The preparation of summits had twoeffects on the policy process.The planning tended to movethe center of power to the White Rouse because the Presidentwas involved. The fact of the summit created a deadlinethat forced decisions on major policy issues - decisionsthat otherwise might have been postponed.Summits were also domestic political events and thepreparation involvedas much the development of domesticsupport as it did the arrangement with the Soviets.In somecase8, noted by those who had been involved in the process,

politialll, regardless of the the substance of the meetingitself. Efforts to prepare for a summit meeting could givean indication Of the true interest of the other power inhaving such r meeting. While they might agree in principle,their obstructionist tactices in the preparation phase maywell have been designed to force the other to withdraw, andvice versa, 60 the onus of not having a meeting did not fallon them. Apart from all this, the ceremonial aspectscounted too (to a certain extent) - the toasts, speeches,wreath layings - were all part of the substance of a summitmeeting and often involved as much advance negotiation andpreparation as the issues of the meetings themselves.It was symbolic of the course of global politics that, whilesummit meetings before 1960 were multilateral discussionsthat included the principal US allies, all of those sincehad been bilateral meetings emphasizing concrete agreements,The trend of the summit meetings had also moved from aninitial emphasis on multiple international problems to alater emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons, Other aspectsthat merit further examination if one is to have a completepicture of the process of preparation would include: theadvance pass arrangements, security arrangements, thedecision on attendance at the meetings and the drafting ofthe communique.

A BRIEF I&OS AT US-USSR SUYYIT MEETINGS: (WIT VORLD WARTO lW8)I1Before we come to why the SALT Treaties were signed, here isbrief look at the superpower summits held so far, betweenthe USA m d USSR, prior to the signing of these, treaties andalso a brief look at the summits held upto 1980.m e first US-Soviet bilateral summit, held in 1958 in theUS denoted a thaw after more than a decadeeof chilling ColdWar. The meeting between President Dwight Eisenhower anduikita Khrushchev from 25 September to 27 September 1959,gave rise to a new term in the lexicon of world diplomacy,'Camp David' spirit helped in lowering temperatures in thechequered history of love-hate relationship between the twoonce-mighty powers of the world. However, the whole processof detente nose-dived in less than half a year and anothersummit was planned between the same leaders. On the eve oftbe summit, a US plane that took-off from Rawalpindi,Pakistan, was shot down in the heart of Soviet land on 1 May1960, at a time when Moscow was holding its traditional MayDay Parade. The summit was cancelled due to this incident.At the Vienna summit from 3 to 4 June 1961, PresidentKennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev met. Though it didmot lead to any substantial result, the two leaders were

mainlt ~ a l d in meacluring the strength and mood~pposite side.of theThe third superpower summit saw a change ofleadership at both the mite House and the Kremlin.RichardNixon was the new incumbent and Leonid Brezhnev hadsucceeded Khrushchev.The summit took place in Moscow from22 Yay to 30 1972. This heralded substantial changes inthe rigid approaches by the two powers. They signed thefamous ABY (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty and agreed upon anumber of measures Concerning the SALT I Treaty,Washingtonwas the venue for the fourth summit where the same twoleaders met and signed ten documents which denoted thetransition forin confrontation and cold warto cooperationbased on mutual benefits. This summit began on 18 June 1973and successfully concluded on 25 June 1973. The fifthsummit took place at the Soviet capital, Moscow, and itthe third meeting between Wixon and Brezhnev.wasThe summitcommenced on 27 June and ended on 3 July 1974. A majoragreementsigned by the two sides pertained to the limita-tion of underground nuclear weapon tests.The sixth summit which was called at a veryshort noticetook place in the Soviet Far-East city of Vladivostok.Brezhnev and his counterpart, Gerald Ford, reaffirmedtheirdesire to sign s long term strategic offensive armslimitation agreement.The seventh summit took place at

Vienna, frol the 1 to the 18 of June 1979, betweenand US President Jimmy Garter.BrezhnevThe second Strategic Arms~imitrtion Talks Treaty mas signed during this summit.4gowever, it had not been ratified by the US Senate.A CLOSER LOOK AT SUMMIT MEETINGS BETWEEN USA AND USSRLEADING TO THE SIGNING OF THE SALT I TREATY (GENEVA, JULY1955 TO GLISSBOBO, JUNE 1967)The summits preceding the signing of the historic SALT ITreaty are important because they give us in idea aboutfactors leading to the USA and USSR signing the firstimportant bilateral strategic arms accord treaty.theThe onsetof the Cold War, according to Elmer Plischke, gave rise to aset of four basic requirements by the USA for tangibleevidence of better intentions on the part of Soviet leaders5before any summit would receive serious attention. Thesepreconditions specified the following: abandonment of theMarxist principle of world revolution; cessation ofaggressive action; adherence to the principles of the UnitedNations Charter; and fulfillment of internationalagreements. However, some of these requirements were notfollowed by the USSR.In the same way, the USA too, did not4. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 30 Hay 1988.5. Elmer Plischke, Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy ofthe President of the United States, (College Park,University of Maryland, 1938), g.81.

follw tbe basic requiremento laid out by the USSR as a signthat their intentions were serious.Inspite of theseeetbaoks, summit did take place between the two countries.The Geneva Conference of Beads of Government, 18-23 juiy1955:The principals to the summit were the USA represented bypresident Eisenhower (Conference Chairman) and Secretary ofState Dulles, the UK represented by Prime Minister Eden andForeign Secretary Macmillian, France represented byPremierFaure and Foreign Minister Pinay and the USSR represented byPremier Bulganin (nominal Head of Delegation),CPSU FirstSecretary Khruschev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense6Minister Marshal Zhukov.7There were no formal agreements after the summit.However,there was a final Communique in the form of a directive tothe foreign ministers to undertake negotiations onissuesdiscussed at the summit in Geneva, in October, which8subsequently failed,6. . Gordon B leihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits,(University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.124.7. - Ibid.

Khrwchchev raid about the summit, in his memoirs that, "Wereturn to YOSCOw from Geneva knowing that we hadn't achievedany coacrete results.But we were encouraged, realizing nowthat our enemies probably feared us as much as we fearedthem.. . . The Geneva meeting was an important breakthroughfor us on our diplomatic front. We had establishedourselves as able to hold our own in the international9arena." Eisenhower, did in retrospect, evaluate the summit10as a "limited success." Due to the Cold War tensionsprevailing at that time, the very fact that the two leaderswere meeting proved that it was a limited success. However,in terms of substantial results, the summit was notsuccess.Khrushchevte State Visit and Camp David Meeting: 15-27September 1959:aThe principals at the Camp David discussions were the USArepresented by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon,Secretary of State Herter, Ambassador Lodge, Fay Kohler9. Nikita Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers, With Introduction,Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw,trans. and ed.. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Little Brown &10. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White House Years : Mandatefor Chanpre. 1953-1056, (Garden City, New York,Doubleday & Co., 1B63), p.530.

(~epoty Assistant Secretary of State of European Affairs)and by the USSR, rho Were represented by Premier Rhrushchev,Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Ambassador Menshikov, Soldatov(Chief American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).The heads of the two respective countries were helpedtheir respective foreign Yinisters. The issues anddiscussions focused on the German problem resulting inagreement to resume talks on Berlin without time constraintsimposed by the Soviet Union. Disarmament (control andinspection), trade and credit and nuclear tests ban, were11the other issues. A joint communique affirmingconstructive efforts toward generalbydisarmament, peacefulresolutions of international problems, renewal of Berlin,negotiations and invitation for the US Presidentto visitthe Soviet Union. Eisenhower consented to an East-West12summit conference. Though Khruschev's visit did not endin any concrete results by way of treaties being signed,least the line of communications between the world'smost powerful rivals of that era, was still open.attwo11. Gordon R Weihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits,(University Press of America, Lanham, 1986), p.128.12. See White House (Gettysburg, Pa.), press release dated27 September 1959, in Department of State Bulletin,Vo1.41, No.1049, (12 October, 1959), pp.499-500.

the Parir Haads Of Government Conference, 16-17 May, 1~60:The Paris Beads of Government Conference from 16-17 Yay 1960could not take Place as scheduled because of the refusal ofpresidentEisenhower to apologize to Khruschev on thedowning of the 0-2 espionage plane. A western Communique13was released in Paris on 17 May 1960.The Vienna summit: 3-4 June 1961: The principals were theCUSA represented by President Kennedy and the USSR by Premiermrushchev and the issues discussed were nuclear tests ban,disarmament, Germany and Laos. The communique issued on 4June 1961 affirmed mutual support for a neutral and14independent Laos and effective cease-fire.The Glaosboro Discussions : 23-25 June 1967The principals were the USA represented byPresidentJohnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of DefenseMcNamara, Ambassador Thomson, while, for the USSR,representation was by Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister--13. See White House, (Paris.), release dated 17 May 1960,in De~artment of State Bulletin, Vo1.42, No.1093, (6June IOBO),14. See White &use (Vienna) press release dated 4 June1901 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.44, No.1148,(26 June 1961), p.g99.

Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The iseues discussed werethe Middle East, (Six-Day War); Soviet insistence on promptIsraeli withdrawal; Vietnam Var; US withdrawal; Non-proliferation; general agreement on the importance of this15issue. There were no formal agreements signed on theabove issues and also no communiques. There were only16statements issued, by the President of the USA and the17leader of the USSR delegation, Premier Kosygin. Thoughnothing was achieved in the way of agreements or treaties,at least the two heads of government emphasized the needdiscuss the matters further.STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOLLOWED BY USA AND USSR FROM 1945 TO1968 (US STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FROM PRESIDENTS TRUMAN TOJOHNSON)toSTRATEGYBroadly speaking, strategy refers to the art of formulatingobjectives to means or resources. Strategy is developed at15. Gordon R Weihmiller 8 Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits,(University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.137.16. See President's Report to the Nation, Vashington25 June 1967, White House Press Release dated 25 June1967 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.57, No.1463,(10 ~ u l ~17. Statement by Premier Kosygin at his News Conference atUS IiQs, 25 June 1967 - Department of State Bulletin,Vo1.57, ~0.1463, (10 July 1967), p.38, Unofficialtranslation.

several levels. National strategy relates to overallnational objectivee and measures, For example,at thislevel, strategy would deal with the relat,ive priority ofnational ~ecurity and other national objectives, such asimprovingeducation or providing social welfare, economicgrowth and full employment. It would also deal withcmbining the various m ans of promoting nationalas Leon Sloes has pointed out, as wag of example,national security including defence, diplomacy,18and arms control.security,promotingtrade aidDefense strategy reconciles defense objectives andcommitments with available and projected defense resources.~t this level, strategy begins with a definition ofnational objectives and an assessment of the role ofmilitary power in meeting those objectives. It alsoinvolves priorities and tradeoffs.As an example, how muchtotal defense effort should be devoted to the defense ofEurope, Asia or sea lanes?In addition, defense strategy isconcerned with striking a balance between various militaryinstruments:nuclear and non-nuclear forces; strategic andnon-strategic forces; ground, sea and air forces: Defense18. Leon Sloss, "The Strategic Perspective," in Ashton BDavid N Schvartz, ed., Ballistic Missile Defense,(Vaohington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1B84),p.25,

st rate^ mustalso thke into account decisions about therelative importance of developing newtypes of weaponssystems, oodernizing existing forces, and ensuring thereadiness of currently deployed forces.also concerned with selecting the best waygiven military objective.Defense strategy isto achieve aExsmple: strategists have debatedfor years the capabilities required to deter nuclear attack.TO really understand the need for the reason the SALTTreaties were eventually signed we must go into theevolution of strategic nuclear weapons in the nucleararesenal of both the USA and USSR.The Strategic Triad:The USA and the Soviet Union had largestrategic arsenals, known as the strategic triad, i.e.,three types of systems for delivering nuclear weapons orwarheads to their targets: intercontinental ballisticmissiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBMs); and strategic bombers. Each survivable force ofthis triad had distinct characteritics of nuclear weaponssystems that affect their performance, which, as describedby the Arms Control Association are: controllability,19promptness, penetrability, accuracy and yield.19. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction,(Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, 1989),p.98.

~ntercontinental Ballistic Missiles CICBYsl: ICBMS arelandbased multi stage rockets, capable of propelling nuclear~arheads Over intercontinental distances (i.e., more than5500 kilometers). An ICBM can deliver several powerful~arheads with exceptional accuracy to intercontinentaltargets in under thirty minutes. The development ofmultiple independently targetable entry vehicle (MIRV)technology in the late 1960s allows each missile to carry anumber of warheads that can be targeted under separate aimpoints. These characteristics enable ICBMs to carry outtime urgent, i.e., counterforce (military) targets and makeICBMS potential first strike weapons. nigh accuracy alsomakes ICBMs potentially useful as war fighting weapons inspecialized or limited options attacks. ICBMs are currentlydeployed in massive concrete and steel silos just below theearth's surface. Unlike bombers, ICBMs cannot be recalled.Thus, launching ICBMa on warning of an attack, which mightbe a false alarm would precipitate a general nuclearexchange. Their potential vulnerability as fixed targetsincreases the liklihood that ICBMs may be used prematurelyfor fear of losing them to an attacker's weapons. To reducetheir vulnerability, ICBMs can be deployed in a mobile mode.strategic Bombers: Strategic bombers are long range air-Craft ckpable of carrying nuclear weapons over

intercontinental distances and then returning to an overseasrecovery base. Bombs were the first means of deliveringnuclear weapons and the United States of America, at onestage, relied upon strategic bombers as delivery vehiclesfor almost 40 per cent of its total strategic nucleararsenal while the Soviet Union had about 9 per cent in thiscategory. Bomber survivability is determined in thereadiness of the force. Bombers on the ground are extremelyvulnerable to attack. Bombers have more flexi-bility thanmissiles, because they can be recalled and operate underfail-safe procedures whereby they automati-cally return tobase unless they receive additional instruc-tions within afixed time period. Strategic bombers take many hours toperform intercontinental missions. Large subsonic bombersare also vulnerable to air defenses. Bombs can carry alarge number of accurate weapons with high yields. Oncethey penetrate air defenses, bombers are, in principle,capable of seeking out and destroying undamaged hard andmobile targets, but, at least, in the case of hardenedsilos, most of the missiles in them would presumably havebeen fired by the time the bomber or their air-launchedCruise missiles (ALCMs) arrive. .Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs): SLBMs areSimilar to ICas but are launched from submarines. The US

Q ~ force W with 6-5300 warbeads carried about 40 per centthe US strate~ic nuclear arsenals while Soviet SLYBScarried slightly more than 30 per cent oftheir strategicnuclear rarheada. SLBMs are inherently the most survivableandthus the most rtrbilizir leg of the strrtegic triad.Deployed on submarines which patrol vast ocean rrearr,are difficult to locate and destroy,SLBYSAs a consequence, theyare considered e~~ellent second-strike weapons which addboth deterrence and stability. For the same reanon thatsubaarines and SLBYs are relatively invulnerable,command authorities may have difficulty communicating.tonationalCruise Missiles: Both superpowers had deployed a new classof strategic weapons: long range cruise missiles on aircraftand at sea.Cruise missiles are small, pilotless aircraft,powered by miniature jet-engines and capable of flyinglongdistances, terrain hugging missions. With modern guidancesystems keyed to the terrain they are overflying, cruisemissiles can strike targets with great accuracy.Futurecruise missiles rill have reduced detectability(stea1thtechnology) and increased speeds which will make themless vulnerable to air defenm systems.evenMoreover, the smallsize, large projected numbers, and relative ease ofProduction of cruise missilea make their verificationmoredifficult than other delivery systems. Tbese cruise

,issiler prooed their mettle during the Perrian Gulf war1991, when it war used by the US forces to bomb vital Iraqiforcer.- The Truman AdainiBtration (1945-1952) - US Nuclear ~ono~olpCollective Security:Immediately after lorld War 11, the lest adopted the p61icyof 'Collective Security'. The idea was that peace couldbest be assured if all countries acted together to Opposeany threatened or actual aggression. For it to beeffective, the parties to a collective security system hadto have a shared definition of aggression, a common willrespond to aggression, and finally, the means to implementthat response.In this case, several great powers had to bewilling and able to act in concert against any aggressor.Given these prerequisites, collective security wasto work effectively in a world characterized byor by multiple alliance structures.intounlikelybipolarityThe United Nations was founded upon the theory of collectivesecurity and was dominated by the countries tbat had wonlorld War 11. Their alliance, forged by the common need todefeat the Axis powers and now esrential to collectiveSecurity, war quickly undermined by c~petition between thetwo emerging rupcrporers; the USA and the USSR. AS pointed

10rightly by Colt Blacker and Gloria Duffp, the port warunity finally collrpsed under the rtrrin of the Cold War.BY 1947, the USA had, in effect, abandoned collectivesecurity in favour of what c w to be known aslcontainment.' Prerldent Truman felt that Cormunirt idsologycommitted the 8Oviet Union to a continual effort to erprndthe revolution, md this aggression had to be wt andcontained at every point of attempted expaneion. Bowever,tbe theoryof Collective security envisaged r multipolarworld with common 8ecurity interests. The Truman Doctrinethough, envisaged a bipolar world with directly competinginterests. The USA supported the formation of a Westernmilitary(NATO),alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisationcomprised by the USA, Canada and most countriec inleatern Europe. The Soviet Union responded in the 19508 by21forming tbe Warsaw Pact, an alliance of the Communistcountries of Eastern Europe.Tbe USA and the Soviet Union~intrined an uneasy alliance during World War 11. At theend of the Vrr, the USA withdrew its forcer from Europ anddumobilisedits troops, while the Soviet Union retained an20. Colt D Blacker and Gloria Duffy, ads., InternationalArms Control-Irruer and Arrwmentr, (California,Stanford University Presr, 2 edition, 1984), pp.190-200.21. Vitb the callapra of Coollunin in Eartern Europe, tbeVarmam Pact has since been dirbrnded.117

iucnre military establishment and set about installingupp pet regins in Eastern Europe. Pro-Soviet Communistparties emerged as potent forces in WesternEurope, and it was feared that Greece, Turkey, Iran and westBerlin right be absorbed into the Soviet sphere. Againntthis background, there war a growing consensus in the USAthat the Soviet Union represented a clear and imrediatethreat to the security of the Vest.The Truman administration believed that atomic weapons couldplay a critical role in the evolving confrontation withSoviet Union. The US monopoly on these avesome weapons ofmrss destruction seemed an immediate and direct way tocompensatethefor Soviet conventional military superiority inEurope. To deter Soviet aggression and even compel theSoviet Union to act in a manner acceptable to the lest, the22USA began deploying nuclear-armed bombers in Europe. TheSoviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in August1949, several years earlier than most US observers brdexpected.Spurred by the Soviet accomplishment, the USAundertook a crash programme to develop the hydrogen ortherronuclerr bomb. The "A" bomb was successfully tested in22. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction,(~ashington, D.C., Arms Control A8Socibtion, NEB),P. 19.

1952 with a tiold Which WAS a thousand tiwr greater thanthe boob that dertroyed Birosbira. The US monopoly on thereweapons 1aot.donly until the firrt Soviet thermonuclrartost in 1953. The US arms COmPetitiOn bad now begun inearnest. The USA remained far ahead for more than r decade- in its capability to deliver nuclear weapons againnt theSoviet Union.The first truly US intercoatinental bomber,the 8-36, was introduced in 1948, and by the endof theTruun Administrrtion, the USA had nearly 600 aircraftcapable of delivering atomic bombs ngainrt the Soviet Unionfrom the US or European bases.The Eisenborer Administration: 1953-1960 - "MassiveRetrliatiod*The Cold War was at its height when President DwightEisenhower took office in 1953. The USA was embroiled incostly land war in Korea against North Korern and Chineeeforces and renred a growing threat from the Soviet UnloaEurop and around the world.ainIn 1954, Secrrtary of State,John Poster Dulles announced that any attack on the UnitedStater of America or its Allire would be net "10 r unner23and at a place of our orn choosing." The implicatton rrs23. Quoted in fbid., OP.Clt., p.21.

that ADI CO..uoirt wrerrion, whether direct or throughproxire, could well result in massive retaliation - a largescale nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. ~t the 81.0tiw, tbe USA began to integrate nuclear weaponsinto it8forcer deployed in the USA, at sea, and on the territory ofallied aAtiOn8.~ h Advent s of Intercontinental Ballistic Ylssiler:In 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the USA by orbitingSputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. RapidSoviet success in developing nuclear weapons had been widelydismissed as something of a fluke which was highly dependenton espionage. The launch of Sputnik suggested that Soviettechnical capabilities had been underestimated and that theSoviet Union would soon be able to develop land-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles(1CBYs) capable ofdelivering nuclear weapons against the USA. Fears grew thatthe USA would be threatened by a missile gap. In response,the USA undertook a crash programme to develop and deployits orrn ICBMs AS well as SLBYs. As a stop-gap measure, IRmissile8 were deployed in England, Italy and Turkey between1957 and 1963. By 1959, the USA began to deploy ICBMs atVadenberg Air Force Base in California. In 1960, the USAllunched tho first pol~ris ballistic missile rubmarine.

m e derelopent of ballistic missiles gave a new characterto nuclear mariare. Previously, nuclear weapons bad been~arried by bomber aircraft which took many hours to reachtheir targets. Deployed on ICBMs, nuclear weapons couldtravel continent to continent in 30 minutes. , Dsployedsubmarines in mid-ocean, SLBMs, in mid-ocean, SLBus mightstrike in even less time. Fears of a surprise Sovietmissile attack, designed to destroy US strategic boebers andeffectively disarm the country, led the Eisenhoweradministration to develop and test a plrn to maintain somebombers on continuous airborne alert.The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1960 - MutualVulnerability:The Cuban Missile Crisis: When President John F. Kennedycame to power in January 1961, US-Soviet relations were in apoor state. The Bay of Pigs disaster and the Sovieterection of the Berlin Wall dividing East and West Berlinincreased US-Soviet tensions during Kennedy'sonfirst year.US-Soviet relations suffered a severe strrin in the postwarperiod when, in October 1982, US aerial reconnaissancePhotographs revealed that the Soviet Union was secretlybuilding bases to deploy mdium range nuclear missilesCuba.To demonstrate American resolve in the face of ain

threat which va8 jwt 90 mile away tram Florida, Kennedy08 nuclear forces on increared alert. For reventense days, the world watched the rtandofi between Kennedya d rhnuhchev. US naval forces blockaded Cuba while theleader6 of the two 6UpcrPOwers negotiated. In exchange fora Mviet conitnent to withdraw their missiles, the USApledged not to invade Cuba and indicated informally thatintermediate range US nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italywould be withdrawn. This sobering brush with nuclear warfocused the world's attention on the risks of the arms race.The Missile Gap: President Kennedy had campaigned in 1960against Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation butalso had argued for a substantial build-up in ICBMs, largelyon the grounds of an alleged missile gap between the USA andSoviet forces. By 1961, however, newly orbitedreconnaissance satellites revealed that the Soviet ICBMforce was in fact much smaller than US forces. But theUnited States of America went ahead with plans to deploy alarge force of Minuteman ICBMs. Tbe USA and the SovietUnion were also starting to deploy submarines capable oflaunching long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Submarinerwould enrure that both sides would have an invulnerableretaliatory deterrent.

~lerible B~BDO~JJ~ M d Assured Dertruction: mile in theearly 19608 the USA remained far ahead of the Soviet Unionin the number and quality of nuclerr forcer, thedestructive power of nuclear weapon8ensured*at even with fewer weapon6 the Soviet Union had theupacity to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the*st. As the Soviet capability to attack or retaliateagainrt US territory grew, the Eisenhower'sadministrationpolicy of 'Ya88iVe Retaliation', which, in' a11 probability,wuld have led to general nuclear war and the wholeraledestruction of both the USA and the Soviet Union, becameless credible. The threat to launch an all-out rttack inresponse to non-nuclear conflicts did not seem to manystrategic analysts to provide a credible deterrent to suchactions.The Soviet Union might have been tempted to callthe US bluff. Moreover, events of the 1950s bad rhown thatnuclear ruperiority could not prevent Communist-supporteduprisings in the Third World.Kennedy believed that the USArelied too heavily on nuclear weapons and that thechallenge8 of the 1960s would require more sophirticatedresPonse8 with greater emphasis on conventional forcer,Counter-inrurgency teams, and economic and developmental

~ennodr, thus, Proposed tbe replacement of massiveretaliati~n with a strategy of deterrence through'Flexible~~sponse', which would involve "a range of appropriateresponses, conventional and nuclear, to a 11 levels of24aggression or throats of aggression." To allow for morenon-nuclear options, the Kennedy administration strengthenedconventional forces. Kennedy also carried out thedeployment, planned by Eisenhower, of sme 7000 tactical orbattlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. The new strategyaimedto provide a more credible alternative to a masriveretaliation against a Soviet conventional or limited nuclearattack. Some argued that more advanced technology, both inmissile guidance systems and in capabilities for monitoringdeployments and activities in the Soviet Union, wouldprecisionmakeattack on enemy military targets possible with aminimal level of civilian causalities or other collateraldamage.Critics of flexible rerponse, however, did not believenuclear warfare could be controlled or its damageconstrained in any meaningful wag. Even the limited use ofnuclear weapon8 on the battlefield in response to rConventional attack by tbe Soviet Union would almost24. Ibid., Op.Cit., pp.23-24.

e8mlrte rapid19 to an exchange of weapons betweenthe ruprporers and then to uncontrolled #enerr1 nuclearwar and mutual destruction.NEEDTALKS 011 STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIOI:be rcronyan SALT, which expands to Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks, wrs coined by Robert Martin, who wre inthe Bureau of Political Military Affairs in the Statebpartmnt of the USA.He was then r member of thePolitical Section of the United States North Atlantic TreatyOrganization Mission in Brussels. Though the term warresisted by some Washington officials for r while, it(theacrongma SALT) was finally adopted when the CIA was25organizing Its filing system rround the tars 'SALT.The talks were launched because there was r mutual needrolemnire the parity principle.toTo put it differently, SALTtalk8 were atartad to eetablieh an rcceptrnce by eachof the othor'a rbility to inflict unrcceptrhlerideretributionin rerponro to r nuclear attack - which arsuaee here thatneither ride would initiate a first rtrike if the other'rretaliatory capability was strong enough to survive it825. John Mewhouse, Cold Dawn : The Story of SALT,(Iarbiagton, Pergason-Brareey'r, l980), p.54.

i8p.ct.nor, 8utul deterrence rerts on the lwlrene88 byeach ride of the other's second rtrike capability.~rms-control over the years had gained increasing importancein relatioar between the USA and the Soviet Union and forvery good rerronr.The two powers had been rivals since theclosing days of World War 11, and their rivalry badreachedalmost every region of the world. As a result, profound dis-trust and a mutual fear, if not hatred, characterized theirrelationship. The arms race was an expression of their deeppolitical differences.The danger was tbat the rrms race,fueled by continuing conflict would at some time spill overinto a nuclear war. One way each side had tried to avoidsuch a cataclysmic end was to build up its nuclear forces asa defense; the other was to meet and negotiate agreementstbat reduced the chances of war breaking out. As rightly26pointed out by J.W. Spanier, since the basic conflictbould not be resolved and nuclear weapons were unlikely tobe rbolisbd, the next best tactic, therefore,was to managethe nuclear rrms balance by instituting arms control,In the 19708, thew negotiations shifted to each side'sstrategic iorcer. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks rtood at26. Jobn 1 Bpmirr, American Poreitn Policy since World War- XI, (Irrhington, D.C., C.Q. Prftm, 1988), p.203.126

the center of detente. It mainly had the followingobjectives, the first of wbicb was to make the arms race.ore predictable by establishing the numbers of strategicweapons for each side. It was hoped that rucb knowledgewould reduce the anxietp of the arms race; uncertainty andthe fear that the opponent migbt be gaining superiority inmilitary strength fueled competition. The Soviet Union hadbegun a steady, large-scale military build-up in strategicand conventional weapons after the Cuban ai8sile crisis. Bytbe time Nixon became Pretident, the Soviet8 had overtakenthe US in number of deployed missiles, and the miraileproduction continued. A new arms race, therefore, waslikely, unless mutually acceptable ceilings on missilescould be negotiated. Indeed, given the anti-military eoodin the USA following the Vietnam War and congressionalhostility to increased defense spending, the pressure on theRixon adminirtration to negotiate an agreement was intense.The alternative would be a missile gap in favour of theSoviet Union.SALT'S recond objective was to ensure parity. Theassumption mar that if the two sides had approximately thesame number of warheads and bombs neither ride could launch1 crippling ride on the other. More specifically, parityw.8 a condition in which no matter who struck firrt, the

attaed side would atill have the capability to retaliateand destroy the aggressor. When each power posrersedmistilet with Single warheads, even with reasonably accuratewarheads, r 2:l superior it^ was needed to launch adevastating first strike. Short of such a superiority, theUSA and USSR would each have retained a sufficientretaliatory capability to assure the continuation ofdeterrence.Another objective of SALT was to reduce threats to eachaide's deterrent forces. By the early 1970s, the deterrentbalance wrs threatened not only by the continuing Sovietquantitative rtrategic growth but also by te~bn010gi~alinnovations that were widely believed in the USA to beundermining the stability of American-Soviet deterrence.One matter of concern was the development of r new defensiveweapon. The Soviet Union had deployed ABYs around Yoscovand were thought to be working on a second generation ABMfor possible nrtionwide deployment. If ABYa could shootdown enough incoming American ICBMs and reduce thedestruction inflicted on the Soviet Union to what they feltwas an acceptable level of a few million crrualties, theABYs would undermine US deterrence, which depended upon it8capacity to impose aseured destruction. In turn, thisdefensive weapon rtimulated the USA to improve its offensive

~cbnolOgY, rwcificall~ the develomnt of the MIRVS. MIRVis an ICBM with multiple warheads that wn 8eparate inflight, cbrnge trajectory, and fly independently to assignedmd disperred targets. The advantage of MIRV was that thelarge number of warheads would be able to overcome anybfense, meaning that the USA would still be able to destroyQaviet rociety in a retaliatory blow.MIRVs a180 threatened to dertabilize the deterrentABMbalance.It war one thing for the USA and Soviet Union to possess~issiles with single warheads, even if these warberds werereasonably accurate.If side A had 1000 missiles and side B1400, B still did not have the 2:l superiority it wasassumed necessary to destroy A'a missiles. But if bothpossessed the same number of missiles - let us assume 1000 -but A's missile could carry 10 warberds and B'a could carryonly 3, the ratio of warheads would be greater than 3:l.This mould permit A#trike to disarm the latter.with only 200 missiles to launch a firrtMultiplying the wrrbeads andproviding them with greater accuracy thus undermined themtability of the nuclear balance because it placed a premiumoa attack. lbicbever ride got in the first blow wasto win because it might have been able to prevent anylikelymajorretaliation. Tbir war a potentially dangerous rituation.men both rider possesred such counterforce weapons,their

mutual fear of a preventive war, and especially of Ipreemptive strike during a Crisis would have made bothjittery.Each would fear that if the other struck first, itwould be unable to retaliate with sufficient force todestroy the otber; the very vulnerability of the opponent'sforces, therefore, provided an incentive to attackfirst.uch would then feel that it had to either use the nuclearweapons or else it would loce them.Finally, SALT I was necessary for detente.On the one hand,a failure to arrive at an agreement or at least to continuethe SALT dirlogue was bound to have a deteriorating effecton their overall political relationship. On the other hand,only a relaxrtion of tensions could provide the diplomaticatmosphere that would enable the two nuclear giants toarrive at an arms agreeaent that would leave themfeeling.ore secure, sanctify the etrategic parity between tbem, andavoid new costly offensive and defensive arms racer.SALT,in brief, becrae a symbol of detente. With it, detenteseemed to blossom; without it, detente reeaed to fade.Succerr or failure to achieve a SALT agreement, therefore,according to John Spanier, became the barometer of27detente.n. ~bia., 09. cc".

TBE ma BmITt MAY 22-30 1972: TRE SIGHING OP SALT ITBEATT and the INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGICOPP~SIVE ARMSAccording to Kissinger, President Nixon entered the White~ouse convinced like his predecessors, particularlyEisenhower, that a summit meeting with the soviet Unioncould only succeed if it was well-prepared.He said, "Hi8original intention was to use the prospect of a summit onlywhen it could be a means to extract 'important Soviet28~~ncessions."Inthe account given by Gordon leihmiller and Dusko Doder,the firstSoviet feeler about the prospects for a Bummitmeeting was raised by Ambassador Dabrynin in talks withKissinger on 20 January 1970, but Kissinger refused, statingthat the timing was not yet right. The two met again inApril and Dobrynin floated the possibility of a meeting whenPremier Kosygin attended the opening session of the UnitedRations in New York; but this was again rejected. Otherexchanges continued and on 23 June, Dobrlnin suggestedthatthe tw leaders might want to discuss developments in theMiddle East, China and Soutbeart Asia, as well re EuropeanSecurity. Purther exchanges about the poseibilities of a28. Wary A fiesinger, White Bouee Years, (Boston, LittleB m a 8 Co., 1979), p.552.

meeting later in the year continued until September 25, whenthe Soviets suggested postponing further talks onsummitprospects until the following pear. A month later, onOctober 22, Dobrynin and Poreiga Minister Gromyko met withNixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers, who had not29previously been invol7ed in the sumit discussions.Gromyko appeared amenable to the idea of a summit but wantedto see a settlement on the Berlin problem first.Efforts toresolve tbat lingering problem were undertaken in January1971, in talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin, in Washingtonand were directly linked to the prospects for a summityear, by the Soviet Ambassador.tbatAlso, in Jlnuary, PreridentNixon initiated back channel communications with Moscow inan effort to resolve differences and break deadlocks instrategic arms limitation talks.Throughout the spring of 1971 summit prospects werealternately connected with progrecs on SALT, the Berlinsituation, and Vietnam. It appeared that both tides werenow trying the carrot-and-stick routine, with the summitthe balance. Another effort was ude on June 8 to coos toan agreemeat on a date for the summit as Kirringer and29. Cordon R Ieibmiller and Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits,(Lanham, University Presr of America, 1986), pp.55-56.thein

Dobrpin m t atkvid, but again, the details of timingwere put off. Shortly after, as given in the account ofSO~acob Bean, in earl9 July, Kissinger was off on his secrettrip to Chin. resulting in President Nixon's suboequentannouncement that he would visit China in February 1972.Moscow's interest in a US-Soviet summit suddenly peaked.10 August 1971, the President received a formal invitationto virit Moscow for talks in Yay or June of 1972.OnAfter thedetails were arranged, a joint anriouncenent of the trip wasmade in Moscow and Washington on October 12.Though the reception in Moscow mas chilly andnotwithstanding the various tirades against the bombingmining of North Vietnam's harbours, the summit was asuccess, as exemplified most notably in two agreements: the'Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems', which limitedeach country to the construction of two systems: and the'Interim Agreementandon Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms,' which mtated that neither country would startconstruction of additional land bared ICBY launchers alter 1July 1072, thus freezing their levels to the numbersdeployed and under construction at the time. The Protocol30. Jacob Bean, Multiple Exposure: An American Ambarsador'sUniaue Perrpsctire on Eailt-lest Issues, (Mew York,1.V. norton & Co., 1078), pp.260-63.

to the Inter Agreement further specified, inter alia, thatthe USA was limited to 710 SLBY launchers on 44 modernsubmarines, and the Soviet Union to 950 launchers on 82wdern submarines, along with 4 provision for trade-offs onreplacement for SLBYs on older type submarines.This agreement, later dubbed SALT I, was the culmination ofa long Process. Three years earlier, President Nixon baddecided to resume the efforts initiated by President Johnsonat the Glassboro summit for formal strategic arms limitationtalks with the Soviets, rnd these commenced in November of1969 at Helsinki. They continued for the next two-and-ahalfyears in Vienna and Geneva under the direction ofAmbassador Gerard C Smith, Director of the Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, and his Soviet counterpart, DeputyForeign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who was assisted byColonel General Ogarkov, first Deputy Chief of the GeneralStaff of the Armed Forces.According to Raymond Garthoff, throughout the early stagesof the negotiations, delegations consisting of about tenpsople on each ride, conducted meetings twice weekly,followed by inform1 rerrionr. Subsequently, the 08 rldetook to preparing YtYCONs (*menoranda of converrations*)numbering over five hundred in tbe two-and-a-quarter year

pried.The Mencons were dispatched to the SALT communityin Iashington, ~0nSi~ting of about fifty government experts,~ s t l y in the Dcplrtments of State and Defense, as well 1s31in the Ans Control lad Disarmament Agency. NationalQecurity Advisor Kissinger, kept track of their progressthrough meetingsof the Verification Panel, tbe rroup hechaired to review the inspection or policing arrangemeate,and significant problems were occasionally brought to theattention Of the National Security Cohncil. Then, inaddition(and as Pre~i~~Slg noted), President Nixon begantbe back channel correspondence with Kosygin in January1971, which mas supplemented by the Kissinger - Dobrynintalks. After the 24th Party Congress in April 1971,Brezhnev began to replace Kosygin as the Kremlin's chief8pokesman and by 1972 became the recepient of the32backchannel cwmunications.In sum, then, as pointed out by Raymond L Carthoif, therewere four different levels of arms control discussions goingOn at the same time: formal plenary and informal resrionsbetween the SALT terms: tbe Kissinger-Dobrynintalks; and31. B.ymond L Garthoff, "Regotiating SALT", The Wilron9urterl~, (Autumn 1977), p.78.32. Ibid., p. 80, and Gartboff, "Negotiating mitb theRueriaas : Some Lessons from SALT," InternationrlSecurity, Vol.1, 10.4, (Spring 19771, p.6.

33the hack-channel between Washington and uoscow.~mbasrrdor Smith nor Secretary Rogers was informd ofNeitherback channel, waver, until the day before President~ixon's announcement of Yay 20 that an agreement hadthebeenreached with the Soviet Union to separate the ABY treatyfrom related progress on offensive weapons limitations, ineffect, a major break through in the deadlockednegotiations.The fact that the SALT negotiations were proceeding at all,let alone making significant progress, dates back tofundaaental agracaent between the two rides in 1968 oncommon objectives and conceptual framework to be employed34during the process. The emphasis of the main objectivewas on the need for strategic stability, and that requiredlimitation of offensive weapons if deterrence was to beeffective for eitber side. It was agreed that neither rideshould be allowed a military advantage, and agreements wouldbe based on parity in nuclear weaponry.thattheIt war also agreedfurther measurer were required to reduce the risk ofnuclear war from aiscalculation or accident.34. For details, see Lyndon Baines Johnson, Tbe Vanta ePoint : krs~~ctives of the Presidency.-(New York, blt,Rinehart, and Winston, 1871), p.485-90.

joint announCeMnt in Moscow and Vashington on 12October 1971 of agreement to bold tbe summit meting in nay1972 put additional pressures on the SALT negotiators tocwe to ten8 with rwaining issues.By the time the rummitthere mere three such outstanding problems:distance permitted between tbe two ABY systems that would beallowed; what increases in size or volume, if any, wouldpermitted for ICBM8 and tbeir silos; and what SLBYr to count( e l tbe SLBMs on new versus older submarines).Resolution of these matters became the principalPresident Niron and Kissinger at tbe summit meeting.Tbebetack ofThe USPresident would negotiate directly with General SecretaryBrezhnev on tbese details, a task, as be stated in bia35memoirs, was befitting the leaders of the two countries.Tbe summit put prersures on the negotiationsagreementsto finalizein t in for rignature by the principals, whichresulted in sore bartily concluded SALT documents. The SLBYportionof the Interim Agreement, contained in the Protocolto that agreement, bas been cited m rt often a8 an example;it apparently had to be done over after rignature and signedagain by the leaderr a day or two later.35. Picbard M BW Iiron, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (NewTork, Grorset a d Dunlap, 1978), p.211.

Among the other agreements signed, which covered suchmattersas environmental Protection, wdical science rrdtechnology, and Prevention of incidents at sea, the oreentitled'Basic Principle~ of Relations Between the Unitedstates of America and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics' was of spacial significance to Yoscow. Sovietinterest in such an agreement was initially raised tyAmbassador Dobrynin in his talks with Kissinger !nWashington, and its consummation at the summit was construe$in Moscow as symbolizing US recognition of the SovietUnicnas a coequal superpower. Although this agreement rrsgenerally devoid of operative content, Kissinger observed36that:... the fundamental achievement was to sketchthe outline on which coexistence between thedemocracies and the Soviet system must bebased. SALT embodied our conviction that awidely spiraling nuclear arms race was in nocountry's interest and enhanced no one'rsecurity; the "Basic principles" gave atleast verbal expression to tbe necessity ofresponsible political conduct. The twoelements reinforced each other; theysymbolized our conviction that a relaxationof tensions could not be based exclusively onarms control; the ultimate test would berestrained international behaviour,36. Benry A Kissinger, White Rouse Years, (Boston, Little,Brwn and Co., 1979), pp.1253-$4.

A joiat cawunique was released on Yay 29. It was all butc~plete before the summit took place, as Kissinger andmbrynin bad started work on it in Wrshington.only one UjOr rrea of disagreement to be settled rndThere wasthatconcerned tbe Yiddle hat. Tbe Soviets wanted a rtrongstatement on joint efforts to &chieve peace in the region;but, unwilling to open the door to further Sovietinvolvement andinfluence in the Middle East, Kissingerwould agree only to a bland strtement on tbat mrtter.lrter attributed President Srdrt's expulsion of Sovietadvisers in July of tbat year to Moscow's inability to37achieve more for its Arab client state at the summit.HeUpon the President's return to Washington on 1 June, heimmediately reported to Congress tbrt " the foundation hasbeen laid for r new relationship between the tvo most38 - -powerful nations in the world."737. Ibid., Op.Cit., p.1248.38. President Nixon's Address to Congress on 1 June 1972,"The Moscow Summit : Nev Opportunities in US-SovietRelations" Reprinted in US OIDartment of State,Bulletin, Vol.66, 10.1722, (26 June 1972), p.855.

39AS succintly suued up by Kissenger,The contert 1s well as the contert of therurit made it r mrjor ruccess for Americrnforeign policy. The fact that we bad faceddown Brnoi and yet coapleted mrjornegotirtions with Yoscow . . . evoked theprospect of 1 w re hopeful future and tbusput Vietnrm into perspective. The summitshelped us complete the irolrtion of Rrnoi bygiving Moscow and Peking r stake in theirties with ur. Vbrt war even more novel, rewere freed for the better part of the yearfrom the domestic turmoil on which tbus farUnoi had rlwrps been rble to count. Thir,together with the military defeat of theNorth Vietnrmere offensive, led to r breakthrough in the perce negotirtions within.onthe. The summit was equally rignificrntfor the evolution of the Middle Erst .... Iturked r turning point at which moderate Arablarders begrn to move toward Inshington..,.The summit was r success for the American lerdership. Itwas during tbe summit that concrete strategic nuclear rrmecuts were signed, for the first time in bilateral superpowerhistory. It also gave time to the US rdministrrtion toconcentrate more on the ongoing war they were goingwiththroughVietnam, 1.0, for them to reek honourable wry8 to getout of r war they were losing on all frontr men, orterirlrand money. The ABY Yirrlle Systems Treaty wrr approved bythe &nrte Foreign Relrti~ns Committee and endorsed 88-2 by39. Benry A Kirringer, White Ifouse Yars, (Boston, Little,Ems and Co., 1979), p.1253.

the full kaate oa 3 August 1972. The Interim Agreement wasby botb Aoures of Congress in September and oa the 30of that m th, Prerident Uiroa signed the jointresolution.uthorizin# approval of the Interim Agreement and Protocolthereto, botb accords then becue effective on 3rd Octoberwitb the excbange of rrtificrtions.MAIN PROVISIOIIS OF SALT I ACREWENT--Tbe ABY Treaty:The preamble to the treaty stater iuportantpreaieer for the agreement (and for the whole Strategic ArmsLiaitation Talks): the devastating consequences of nuclearwar, the oeed for measures to decreare the risk ofoutbreakof nuclear war,the contribution of limitation of ABYsyrtear to meeting thir need, and the importance of ABYliaitatiou as a prior condition for limiting rtrategicoffensive arar.The objective of the treaty ir very clearly embodied initsprovirionr. It is to prohibit all ABY activities anddeployments. The parties undertook (Article I) pot todeploy Am rystems for the defense of the territory of theircountries or to provide the bare thereof, and not to deployAW ryrtru for regional defense except as rpecif icallgprovided. Article 111 rpecifies in detail the mirsilelaunchers m d &BY radars pdrmitttd for defenre of: r the

nationallauncberr At eacb.Capital, and b: one ICBM field - 100 missiles andThe 1974 Protocol reduced the permitteddeployment to one or the other of there sites.be probibition8 and limftations are further reinforced(Articles V and VI, and some rlreed statements andcommonunderstandings). Sea-based, air-based, space-based orwbile land-based components are probibited; this isessentially because mobility is inconsistent with the basicprohibitioa of other than limited regional defense.Verification was to be by national technical means, andinterference with these means and concealment werebanned.Tbe treaty provided for a Standing Consultative Commissionto facilitate working of the treaty, including dealing40verification and compliance questions.TRE INTEBIY OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT OF 1972rithThis agreement was essentially applicable to ICBM8 and SLBYsbut not to bombers, for a five-year duration while a broaderand more detailed agreement could be negotiated. ICBMbollbars used were frozen at tbe number alraady oper&tional40. Philip J Parley, "Strategic Arm& Control, 1967-87*, inAlexander L George, Philip J Parley, Alexander Dallin,(dr.), US-Soviet Security CooWration, (Oxford,NOW York, 1988), p.217.

or under construction. New fired bombers (silos) couldb~ started; the dimensions of silos could not besignificantly increased; bombers for light or older ICBMscould not be converted into bombers for mordern heavy ICBYS.Bombers for SLBMr could be increased beyond thoseoperational or under construction, up to an agreed level ofeach for each party, but only if a corresponding number ofolder ICBM or SLBY bombers were dimantled or destroyed.Verification41Treaty.notprovisions corresponded wi th those of the ABYThe formal SALT negotiations and agreements recordedduringthe decade 1969-79, represented only the conspicuousnegotiating phase of the SALT process. Integral to thisprocess and even more protracted was the two-decade period-ram 1949 (when the Soviet Union conducted its first nucleartest explosion) until the opening of formal negotiations1969. During tbia period, the two powers in a parallelledand then interactive process, came to recognise that theprimary goal of national security policy in the nuclearhad to be avoidance of nuclear war, that strategic arms race- even with both sides seeking to deter rather than to win anuclear conflict - was an inadequate and risky rag to pursue41. See the fnteria Agreement on Strategic Offrnsive leaponsTreaty.143inage

security and that negotiations and agreements on strategicarms mightarms alone could not.contribute to r@curity in rays tbat rtrrtegicEntering into negotirtions on such premires, a8 Philip42Parley noted, mould imply acceptance of the other side asr worthy negotirtinz partner, a notion with compatible evenifnot identical security goals and standards, tbur makingit conceivrble that a fair, balanced and verifiableagreement aight be arrived at, complied with and foundeffective. Thie premiae, implicit, rather than explicit, rtleast initially, during the SALT process, crme to be highlycontentiour -especirlly in the USA -with the the declinedetente beginning in the lrtter years of the 1970'r.ofSoae Problear Internal to the Regime Treaty Provirionr:The Case of the ABM TrertpAccording to Gloria Duffy, reverrl of the ccmpliancedisputee in the first half of the lB8Os concerned provisionsof agreement tbat were an imperfect coapromise at thetheytimemere negotiated, establishing qualitative conrtrrintr12. Philip J Parley, *Strategic Armr Control, 1867-87", inAlexander L George, Pbilip J ?arlry, Alexander Dallin,( e d ) US-kvirt Mcuritt CooMrrtion, (Oxford,Iewyork, 1@88), p. 270.

on weapons or behaviour, but doing so in a way that43 --contained rubstrntial ambiguities. Such deficienciesprovided upla room for differing US and Sovietfaterpretations of tbeir obligations under the agreementr.Such ambiguities were involved in each of the centralcompliance disputes between the USA and USSR in the 1980s.Certain provisions of the 1972 ABY Treaty conta inedambiguities that contributed to the compiirnce disputes inthe early 1980s. The agreeaent prohibited deployment oflarge-phared array radars (LPARs) for tracking incomingballistic missiles and relaying tbeir flight prth to ABYradars and interceptors except at the one permitted ABM sitechoren by each country. Tbe intent of the negotiations inincluding this provision was to prevent deployment of themost costly, longest lead time component of an ABU system,the existence of which could allow one of the parties tomost easily and quickly breakout of the treaty limits tomount a regional or nationwide ABY defense.The precire wording of Article VI of the ABY Treaty wasdesigned to distinguish LPARr that could be used for43. Gloria Duffy, 'Conditions that Affect Arms ControlCompliance,* in Alexander L George, Philip J Farlry,Alexander Dallin,(odr.),US-Soviet Securit~ Cooperation,(Oxford, Hew York, 1@88), p.270.

purporsr of attacking incoming mirrilsr from tbore used forearly warning, since from external observation, LPARs wouldappear to be the same. In 1972, both the USA and USSR werebeginning modernitrtion programer for their early warningnetworks involving the deployment of new LPARr. Artciler VIcoamitted the parties not to deploy new early warnlag radarsexcept at the periphery of their national territories, andoriented outward. Due to their location and vulnerability,radars deployed in this fashion would be ill-suited for ABUbattle-management.However, at Soviet insistence, a further qualification tothe limits on LPARs, war appended to the treaty by AgreedStatement F. This clause stated that an exception to therule would be provided for LPARr used for space-tracking orverification, much LPARs could be located other than on theperiphery of the country and other than oriented outward.The Soviet LPAR at Abalrkoro war located inland and wasoriented toward6 the north-eart, giving it coverage over atleast 3000 kmr of Soviet territory which did not qualify at'0riented outward'. Due to tbir loophole provided by AgreedStatewnt P, the USSR had been able to claim tbrt the rrdrrwar for rpace-tracking purporer, although tho overthelminglikelihood was that the radar war for early warning.

&b.lakoro clored tbe la8t cmplete gap in the Soviet earlywarning network, mbicb should otbenire have lacked radarcoverage without thir inrtallation. It war rpecificallyoriented to detect tbe launch of US long-range C-4 and D-5Sl,SWr deployed on the Trident rubmarine 'force in thenorthern Pacific Ocean. It was moat likely a technicalviolation of the ABW Treaty, even though it may not haveviolated the rpirit of the agreement,. which sought toprevent the deployment of ABY defenrer.Until the radar operated, the Soviet care could not beproved or disproved. The differencer between LPARs forspace-tracking and for brllirtic mirrile early warning arenot phgrically obrervable by national technical means ofverification, and relate mostly to the roftware or controlrgttemr, which govern the radar's operation. Once the radarbegin8 to operate, it emits rignals that may be monitored todetermine the function it ir rervinc at that time. But itsfunctions can be changed at any time, by manipulating thereram internal controls. The ABY Treaty contained norpecific interior or guidelines lor di8tinguirhing LPARrfrom thore that were permitted for $pace-tracking andrerfication, which hrd allowed varying 08 and 8oviet claimrabout hw the treaty provirionr related to their radarprogramer.

The ABY Treaty Provisions governing LPARs had permittedUSA as well as the USSR, to move toward8 action8 thatthemightnot bavo been constituent with the 8pirit of the agreement.ArticleVI of the treaty ClOlrlY prohibited the deploymentof new LPARs except 18 permitted for space-tracking,verification, use at test ranger, and for early warning,on the periphery and oriented outward.ifIt did not, however,explicitly prohibit the modernization of exirting LPARa,wherever tbey might have been.44In Leslie B Gelb's account, the USSR charged in 1985 thatUS upgrading of two LPARs at Thule, Greenland and FlyingdaleMoors in the United Kingdom violated the Article VIttrictures that new radar8 for early warning could not bedeployed except on the periphery of US national territoryand oriented outwards.According to the Soviet Union, modernization of there twosites actually involved building a new radar andclearly,neither of them were located on the US periphery andoriented outward.Soviet Union a180 hinted, ju8t a8 the USAhad chclrged with regard to Abalrkor, that tbey believedpurpose of upgrading the~e radar8 was to provide ABY battle-44. krlie B Gelb, "Yoscw Prop0808 to End r Dirpute onSiberia Radar", Wcr York Timer, 29 October 1085, p.1.the

capabilities. The USA responded that tbeseradars were not for ballirtic missile defense and tbat their45modernization was not probibitad under treaty terms,be extent of the planned US improvement of tbese facilitiesraised tbe question of the dividing line betweenMderoization of OXirting rYSte.8and the creation of radarsthat represented a new level Of technology and thus wereerrentially oew systems.Tbe problem8 faced by USA and USSRwhile trying to implement, Article VI of the ABY Treaty,showed tbat tbe treaty was not without its flaws,contradictions and ambiguities.ABM Treaty and Strategic Defence: In March 1983, moststrikingly, the Reagan Administrrtion announced that itintended to mount s national rerearch effort directedtowards a nationwide space-based ballistic mirrile defearefor tbe USA.The Soviet Union immediately took tbe poritiontbat rucb a programme would violate tbe ABM Treaty, ArticleI of wbicb rtrter tbat:45. Por Reagan Administration, reinterpretation roe, "TheTreaty and the SDI PrOgraUIe," Testimony by AmbrsradorPaul B Uitee, Special Advimor on Arms Control Mattersand Abraham D Safaer, h@al Advisor to the StateIkpartwnt before the Sub Conittee on Arms control,Int. -- . Security ..- - and Science of the Boure Porei~n AffairsCommittee,' -12 October 1985, US De~artment -of State,Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy 10.755.

46each party undertakes not to deploy ABYrystems for a defense of the territory of itscountry and not to provide for such adefense, and not to deploy ABY rystmu fordefense of an individual weapon except asprovided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.47Article I11of the ABY Treaty permitted tv3 ABW systems tobe deployed by each country, around their nationalcapitalsand around a single ICBM field. A 1974 protocol to thetreaty restricted each side to a single rite.Several key treaty ambiguities surrounded the issue towhether the US SDI programme would violate the ABMrgreement. Perhaps the most important of these wascontained in Agreed State~aent D of the Treaty. Thisprovision stated thrt in the event of the emergence of ABMsystems based on "other physical principles" in whichcoaponents not foreseen would be subject to discussionthrough the Standing Consultative Co~ittee(SCC) andpossibly serve as the basis for amendment to the treaty.This provision meant that systems based on "otherphysicalprinciples" could be puruued only if legitimized by futureamendments to the treaty; otherwise, they would be46. See tbe ABY Treaty.47. Ibid.

prohibited under Article I of tbe Treaty. Proponents of theSDI brd neglected the lrtter rltnerrtive and rdvrnced r morepenisrive interpretrtion, while opponents preferred the.ore restrictive reading of the trarty.Otber ~bi~uities in treaty prOVirion8 brd led to rimilrrlydirsrging interpretrtion6. Tbe trerty probibited*development or testing 02 ABY ryatear oe their components,mbich are rer-brsed air-based, space-brsed, or mobilebased." (Artilce V).lrnd-Vrs the US SDI progrrame purely r rererrcb programme even ifits ultimate rim mas to produce rn ABY system? Were romete:bnolo~ies under development in the 19801, rucb as lreerm,permitted becruse they mere not prime factor connected withan ABU system; or probibited becrure they could becompcaentr of such r cyrtem? Agrin, the treaty providedlittle guidance. There rmbiguitier rlloaed an intensedebate to develop within the USA in 1985 and 19136 endbetween the USA md USSR, rr the Reagan sdmiairtrrtionsought to jurtify its SDI program by reinterpreting ABYtnaty provision6 to pnit rererrcb and developrent onerotic SDI ryrtrmr.

Critics alleged that such interpretrtionr did not reflect48the latent or negotiating history of the trerty. lowever,the ambiguities in the rcturl text of the trerty, Permittedthe Reagan Admi~i~trrti~n to build tomething of r care forit8 reinterpretation,S&T I rad Detente: The SALT procerr began at r time whenexpectations for broad improvement in US-Soviet relrtionrwere running high. The Nixon-Kisaiger notion of r securityregime recognized the principle that such recurity regimeswere very difficult to achieve unless they were supported byr network of common interests rad cooperrtive rrrrngements.Even in retrospect, the principle reems round. The USAthe Soviet Union hrd managed to avoid war for 25 yerrr1969 and r kind of modus vivendi had emerged for maargingthe intense politicrl rivrlry without resorting to war. Theandin48. Among many critiquer, ree Testimony of John BRhinelrnder before the Subcommittee on Arms ControlInternrtionrl Security rod Science of the House ForeignAffairs Committee, Testiaony 24 April 1985. ChristopherPrine, "The ABY Trerty : Looking for Loopboler,"Bulletin of the Atomic 8cientist8, (Augurt/September1983), pp.13-16. Gerard Smith, "How The AdminirtrrtionAnended the ABY Treaty," Letter to the Mew York Timer(23 October 1085), TOD Wicker, *Subverting r Treaty,"Mew York Times, (25 October 1085), R Jeffry SmithStar Wrrr' Tests and the ABY Treaty,* Scieace (5 July1985), pp.29-31.

tenet8 of tbe nuclear pace are well-8tated by49who said:tewis DunnThe stakes of the Soviet -Imer!canconfrontation remained limited even at theheight of the Cold la?. Neither countrysought to challenge the territorial integrityor political independence, let alone thephysical survival of the other. Despiteperiodic East-lest crises froa the late 19408to the early 1WOs over Western Europe'8political orientation, neither power believedthat recourse to military force and the ri8kof escalation to a nuclear exchange masjustified.Additionally, the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, thoughreprehensible froa the American point of view, rentunchallenged.The risks mere Just too great.litb this 25-year history in mind, Kirsinger and othersdevelopedpolicies aimed at codific&tion of the rtrtus quoand the selrch for explicit rules and norms of behavior toreplace the tacit practire of restrrlnt. Patternedbehaviour could generate convergent expectation6 leadingconventialized behaviour. This dercription mort certainlyfits postwar Soviet and American behaviour. Therefore,while the preferences were pretty straightforward in SALT,49. Lewle, A Duan, COntrOlllOg the Bomb, (New York,heatlstb Century Fund, 1982), See also the moredetailed explanation of Jobn k.1~ Gaddis in 'The LongPeace, ' International security. 104, Spring 1886.to

it war wre Complex when it came to detente. In areas ofthe world where in areas like the Third World, competitionwas bound to continue, the avoidance of war was only one ofseveral agenda-items. This made the search for a broadersecurity regime difficult.Statur of SALT - 1 Trertr: As SALT-I was of r limitedduration of five years and there was the expectation that itwould be replaced by a permanent Trerty, the SALT-I was anInterim Agreement rather than a formal treaty. The InterimAgreement formally expired on 20 October 1977. It hadoriginally been thought that five years would allowsufficient time to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement.At the SALT-I1 trlkr continued beyond this date, both theUSA and Soviet Union pledged to contiae to observe theInterim Agreement. In Yay 1986, President Rergrn formallyrepudiated this political cosoitment to SALT-I. The USSR,however, upto the beginning of the Bush Administrrtion,reuined within the SALT-I Treaty limit8.Succesr of the ABY.Trertp: The ABY Treaty is one of themost important and rucce8sful arms control agreements todate. The baric goal of the treaty bad unequirocally beenachieved. Beither power bad deployed a nationvide defenreagriast etrrtegic ballistic mirriles. As Rorold Brown, the

former SQcretary of Defense bad rightly pur it in anutrhell, "Tbe Anti-Blllistic Yirrile Treaty is the moat50substantial agmewat. bile neither the ABY Treaty nortbe Interim Agreement succeeded in stopping the build-upoffensive rtrategic forcer tbrt mas underray ia 1872, thepace and scale of that build-up would have been creatortbe ABY Treaty not cut the possibility of a miss:leinbaddefenserace at its start. In 1985, rs James Schleringer, theformer Secretary of Defense, rightly pointed ou:, *The ABYTreaty has forestrlled rn explosion of otfenrivo developmenton both cides. Back in the 19606, when the E.>viet Unionfirst started to deploy defenses around Yorcow, the UnitedStates government war examining expanding offrctive forcerup to 40-50,000 reentry bodies or warhead8 12 order topenetrate those defenses. The ABY Treaty brr been the5 1cornerstone of restraint for the lart 13 pc~rs." Byaverting a defensive rod offensive buildup, the ABY Trertybad contributed rubstantirlly to the rtrjility andpredictability of the rtrategic balance. In tbt rbrence oftbe ABM Treaty, tbe rheer economic costs moult bare beenrtaggering. The US An8 Control and Dirarmawnt Agency baa50. Ar quoted in Matthew ~um'r, loundatico for theFuture : ?be ABM Treaty rod llationrl kcuit , (ArarControl Aarociation, Varhington, D.C.. 1881), i.17.

conservatively estimated that one hundred billion dollarshad been avoided by Preventing an offense-defenre race overthe last two decades. The SALT-I Treaty succeeded a8 thefirrt bilateral arms control agreement between the twopowers.TRE SIGII#G OF SALT I1 AND ITS MAIN PROVISIONSThe SALT 11 agreement in its completed version was signed byPresident Jimy Carter and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnevin Vienna on 18 June 1979, Carter then had it transmittedto the US Senate on 22 June 1979, for its advice and coneentto ratification. SALT I1 was an extremely detailed andtechnical document which had 19 Articles and nearly 100explanatory 'Agreed Statements', and 'Common Underrtaadings'which attempted to leave as few loopholes and ambiguities aspossible.The SALT I1 Treaty, had it been ratified, would haveprovided for: an equal aggregate limit on the number ofstrategic number delivery vehicles - ICBM and SLBYlauncherr, beavy bombers, and air-to-air rurface ballirticmlrsiles (As). Tbis ceiling would hare been 2400 as&(red at the Vladirostok Suait of 1974 between the leadersof tbe two countrier. The ceiling would have been lowered

to 2250 at the end of 1981; an equal aggregate limit of 1200on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballisticrnirsiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles;and an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVedICBMs.In addition to these numerical limits, the agreementwouldhave included: a ban on construction of additional fixedICBM launcherr, and on increases in the aumher of fixedheavy ICBM launchers, a banon heavy mobile ICBM launchersand on launchers of beavy SLBMs and ASBMs; a ban onflight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with anexception of one new type of light ICBM for each side, a banoa increasing the number of warheads on securitytypes ofICBMs and a limit of ten warheads on the one new type ofICBM permitted to each party, a limit of 14 warheads onSLBMs and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-rangecruise aissiles for heavy bombers would have been limited toan average of 28; and the number of long-range cruisemissiles for beavg bombers of existing types would have beenlimited to 20; ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic misrile and A ban on thecooversion of light ICBM launcher-to-launcbrr of heavy ICBM6- a ban on the Soviet 85-10 1CW; a ban on rapid relord ICBMsystems, a ban on certain new types of strateaic offennive

systems which were technologically feasible, but which hadnot yet been developed. Such systems included long rangeballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic andcruise missile llunchers on the seabeds; advancenotificatioa of certain ICBM test launcher; and an agreeddata base for systems included in various SALT-limitedcrtegories. The Treaty included detailed definitions oflimited systems, provisions to enhance verification, a banon CirCUmVentiOn Of provisions of the agreement and aprovision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection withthe SALT I1 Treaty. The duration of the Treaty would havebeen upto 1985. SALT 11, like SALT I, provided for theverfication of compliance by National Technical Means (NTU),In addition to extending the SALT I provisions prohibitinginterference with and concealment from NTM, SALT I1 includeda specific ban on encryption of missile telemetry when itimpeded verification of treaty compliance. Anothercooperative measure required aircraft with differentaissions (i.e., ALCY carrying bombers versus ordinarybombers to be distinguishable through NTM by FunctionlllyRelated Observable Differences (PRODS). In addition to thebasic provisions and explanatory details of the treaty, SALTI1 also contained a protocol and a 'Joint Statement ofPrincipler'. Tbe protocol, which was to bave remained inforce until the end of 1981 would bave temporily banned the

deplopePt of mobile ICBM, SLCUS and GLCYs with ranges over500 MS. The ultimate disposition of tbese systems was indispute during the SALT I1 negotiations and the protocoldelayed their deployment in order to allow some time fordiscwrsion of these systems in follow-on talks., The Jointstatement Committed tbe USA and USSR to seek 'significantand substantial reductions' in follow-on negotiations onnuclear arms for a SALT 111 agreement.Status of SALT I1 Treatl: The US Senate resisted tbe SALTI1 Treaty much more than it did the SALT I Interim Agreementand the ABY Treaty. Its critics challenged both treaty'sbasic provisions and also the broader relationship of theCarter Administrations's Arms Control Policy to US foreignand defense policies. After the Soviet Union's 1979Afghanistan invasion, President Carter asked the Senate topostpone consideration, but in March 1980, he pledged thatthe USA would abide by the Treaty'r terms, provided theSoviet UnFon did likewise. During Ronald Reagan's electioncamprign, be opposed the treaty and called it 'fatallyf a In 1981, Reagan formally announced that the USAdid mot intend to ratify SALT I1 but pledged not to undercutit if the USSR showed equal restraint. Thereafter, USadherence to the treaty ceared to be a requireaent of

,ntern~ti~nal law and instead became a question of politicalcornmi tment.The Soviet Union adopted the same no-undercut pblicy butmade it clear that it would not cut its forces to theaggregate limit of 2500 (to have been reduced to 2250 by theend of 1981) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. TheSoviets claimed that this provision, which would haverequired sf gnif icant Soviet force reductions wasspecificallytied in the treaty to the entry into force ofthis treaty. Although not specifically required to do so,:he Soviet Union also maintained that it had kept it'sinternationalforces at or below its June 1979 level of 2504.The Reagan administration announced in Yay 1986 that inresponse to alleged Soviet violations of SALT 11, the USAwas terminating its commitment to the "SALT structure".L'SA remained in tecnical compliance with SALT I1 untilSovember 1986, when the ongoing conversion of 8-52Theaircraftto carry cruise missiles put tbe USA over the 1320 limitthe number of MIRVed missiles and ALCY carrying bombers.The USSR too, on its part, indicated that it intended tocontinue to abide by the SALT I1 limits, and until 1989, theevidence indicated that it had remained within the sublimitsof the treaty.on

~ffects of SALT I and SALT 11 on Strategic Nuclear Weapons00ththe SALT accords are historic landmarks in the sphere,f strategic nuclear weaponry. For the first time, USA and~SSR agreed on reductions in both offensive or defensivestrrtegic weapons that were of the state-of-the arttechnology, thus, halting to a certain extent, the madspiralling nuclear arms race between the two countries.Both countries had realised that they possessed in theirrespective nuclear arsenals enough weapons to wipe eachother out and also the world many times over - they verea MAD mode and had an overkill arsenal, With thedevelopment of eacb new offensive or defensive strategicweapon, the other country would take counter-measures toboth acquire that technology and also to admit the newseapons by counter-acting its capabilities.onThus, the armsrace threatened to become a never - ending cycle towardsvertical proliferation unless serious steps were taken toreduce or halt this process. The USA and USSR recognlredthis need and through the signing of the SALT accords, theytook step8 to halt the dangerous arms race which was eatinginto a major portion of the economy - finance whichwouldhave been better utilired for other a8pectr for the welfareof the country's citizens. The accordr were ruccerrful in

halting the MAD arms-race to a certrin extent. Theprovision of NTY of verification were very useful for future,ccords which would have even more intensive forms of~crification. Finally, the SALT treaties laid thefcundation for more comprehensive forms of future strategicnuclear rccorde.

Chapter Three

CHAPTER 1x1THE IllP TREATY (1987)The signing of the INF Treaty was brought about byleaders of the Once - powerful countries of the USA andUSSR. The arrival of Yikhail Gorbachev, especially, broughtabout tremendous changes not only within the USSR but alsoamong the satellite Coauniat countries in Eastern Europe(which once formed the WARSAW PACT) as also tbe rest of theworld. It is essential, therefore, tU under8tand thebackdrop against which these two leaders became heads oftheir respective countries.LEADERS OP USA AND USSR (1985-1987)Ronald Reagan: Ronald Reagan, took over from Jimmy Carter,on 21 January 1981, for the first of his four year terms.then he took over, the morale of the people of the USA vanat a very low ebb because of the incident wherein the USdiplomatic staff in Iran had been held hostage for more thana year in Tehran. By the time Reagan, a former governor ofCalifornia took over as President, the hostages had beenfreed from their traumatic experience. Re thus came toembody an err of new hope and confidence and there war 4resurgence of patriotism, under hlm, amongst tbe peoples ofthe USA. Reagan, knmn as 'The Great Communicator' and 'The

Teflon President' was 1 popular president and was given alarge mandate by bis people to serve a second four-yeartern. However, by the time he left in January 1989, the USAbad the largest deficit budget in the world. The recondterm was alto marred by the revelation of what has come tobe known as the 'Iran-Contra Arms Scandal.' This tcandalrevealed that arms were rold to the Iranians by tbe USA, inexchange for American hostages held in Lebanon, and theprofits that were gained on that sale of arms was divertedto a m the Nicaraguan rebels, known as the Contras, despiteCongressional voting to the contrary.Reagan is well-remembered as the initiator and ardentproponent of the 'Strategic Defense Initiative', popularlyknown as the 'Star Wars' system. Reagan announced hisspeech on the Star Wars programme, to the American peopleand to the world at large, on 24 March 1983. The Star Warsprogramme which bad been set out in a 175 page document,brought out by the Heritage Foundation and prepared by theformer director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt.General Danirl Graham. In it, Graham recornmendo setting upa rystem of 400 satellites and apace platfornr, which wouldconrtantly stay in orbit, equipped with a number of beamweapons capable of dertroying Soviet mirsiler or enemymirrilrr at soon as they took off and also in all subsequent

sections of their trajectory. Such weapons included systemsusing light beams and lasers operating on fluorinatedhydrogen, Or using bears Of nuclear explosions and directedwith the help of laser, microwaves and electro-magneticimpulses released by nuclear explosions. In' addition tothat, Graham recommended that the Pentagon put into orbitcmbat satellites capable of destroying Soviet satellites inouter space and deploy ground-based 'energy guns', capableof rhwting down eneay missiles before they had a chance ofreaching the USA. The SO1 was a programme that wrs a highlycontroversial. In the American commuoity, among thescientists, defense personnel and the lay people in general,it had its die-hard proponents and opponents. Nobody mastoo sure whether the system was feasible and mould vork theway it had been projected to work. The programme vrs stillin the drawing-board rtage and laboratory-testing stage. Itwar an outer space shield system, vhich was very expeariveand highly technological, requiring an intricate set ofdesigns and cooputers. It will require billions of dollarrof Congrerrional rrnetion before it can become fullyoperational. Rwerer, the SDI budget, under the ClintonA&inistration has been drrstically Cut, The name "StarWarn' has distorted tbe 8DI'a public image.

In particular, it has focused attention on orbitingfortresses Uring laser berms to zapp ICBMs rs tbey rise outof their silos, or if tbey mi88 the first time, catching thewarheads before they can re-enter the atmosphere. But theproblemsof building and above a11 powering such veritable'Death Stars' are enormous. To mention only one, ArthurClarke, as m illustration bar stated that, "focusing tbeirgiantlasers might need mirrors larger and far more robustthan the 206-inch on Mount Palomar which required years of1skilled labour and millions of dollars to mrke.Mikhail S. Gorbachev: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev wrsnominated by the Politbure to become the General Secretaryof the USSR after the death of his predecessor, KonstantinCbernenko. In March of 1985, Andrei Cromyko, the formerForeign Minister and President, then described him rs theman vho had a 'nice smile' but 'iron teeth.' WithGorbachev'o arrival, the English language has becomewith the addition of two Rurrirn words, anrociated withricherpolicy in the main scheme of the Soviet ryrtem - the twowords being that of 'GLASNOST' and 'PERESTROIKA', which mean'openoerr' rod 'rentructuring' rerpectively.hls1. Arthur C Clarke, 'Star Wars and Star Peace', TheTelegrrpb, (Calcutta), 16 December 1@86, p.6.

2According to Gorbachev:Presstroika has already pushed forward anumber of very interesting people in everysphere: in politics, in economics, in thespiritual sphere. The spreading of theprocesses Of democratization and theirdeepening, will bring forward new interforces, new interesting people, new freshfaces. The idea of perestroika is Chat itcreates a mechanism that could manage andself-regulate our rociety within tbeframework of the democratic process. Thiswill allow the inclusion of the people, andthe best part, the intellectual prrt, thecapable prrt and the talentpd part indeciding the proceeses by which to renew oursociety at all lrvels of the management ofthe country.Gorbachev, born in 1931, had brought about a freshness andwhiff of fresh air not seen in the Soviet Union for a verylong time. The glasnost policy was really put intopractise. Accidents were reported, dissident voices wereallowedto be heard, cultural and literary activities wereencouraged and articles criticizing the ercerres andportraying the reality of the Stalin regime were allowedbe published.In the economic front, Gorbrchev was reekingto destroy the centralized command syrtem, which wasintroducedin the 10308 rod which had #pawned an elghteenmillion strong bureaucracy.2. Richard Smith, "The Gorbachev Interview", the Telegraph(Calcutta), 39 Yay 1988, p.8.to

For the first time in forty-seven years, Gorbachev calledfor the Couunist Party Conference.It was the nineteenthsuch conference meeting in the history of CommunistSovietOnion. Five thousand delegates from 411 over the USSRattendod the meeting which was held from 28 June to 1 July1988. The Communist Party Conference, after four days ofpolitical debate ended witb overwhelming support forGorbacbev's policies whicb called for a radical overhaulthe Soviet system.Among other proposals, the powers of theCommunist Party would be limited, Communist party leaderswould bead legislative bodies at every level of power,price system would be changed, a new community would beformed to observe the functioning of the Constitution, theterms of top officials would be limited to two terms of fiveyears each, a new and stronger presidency would be(more on the lines of the American Presidential system)ofthecreateda memorial for Stalin's victims would be built. Gorbacbevstated during the Conference, "We will make perestroikairreverrible. We till reach a fundementally new state ofour mciety, a new humane and dewcratic image of380ciali~m*'3. Quoted in Thonu A SanctonInCan Re Bring It Off?" m,(New Tork), 27 July, 1087, 10.30, p.6.and

Gorbachet's calls for gllSnOSt (openness), demokratizrtsiya(democratization) and PERESTROIKA (restructuring) bad becomethe ratcbwordr of a bold attempt to aodernize 81s country'rcreaking economic archinerg and revitalize a society subduedby reventy years of totalitarian rule. In televi80daddresses, speeches to the party and in faithful and fleshpressingpublic appearances, be had spread his gospel ofwdernization. Trrnslrting his words into action, be wasstreamlining the government bureaucracy, reshufflinp themilitary, inducting reform-minded allies into the partyleadership and allowing multicandidate elections at thelocal level. In foreign policy, he had brought about r seachangefrom the Soviet point of Vier. His 'new politicalthinking' included a resolution of regional coaflicts whichoccupied an importance next only to creatin~ a vorld freefrom the threat of nuclear ranihilation. Indeed, theintense dialogue that hrd bmn ~oing on between Moscow rndllsbingtoa rince 1985 had linked the nuclear is8ue andregional conflicts as twin ~anifestations of the centralcleavage in contemporrry international relations. Asrightly put by Bhabrin Sen Cupta, Soviet Union, underGorbacbev, "took r new caprehenrive look at regionalconflictr, identified tbeir caurer and conrequrncer with aleas dwutic and deteminirt mind and develowd a foreign

policy cum 8trltegiC approach that would help manage,control and resolve these conflicts in co-operation with the4USA and other parties indirectly involved in them." ~hus,ans control 1s 1 top priority in Soviet Union's agenda,under Gorbachev, took on a new sense of urgency, which was awelcome departure from his predecessors' way of thinking.The Pirst Summit Between Corbachev and Reagan:Gorbachev'snew thinking' in Soviet foreign policy bas been muchacclaimed. This new thinking eaphasized the integral andinterdependent nature of a11 the world, that is, globalsecurity, the understanding that no country can enhancesecurity at the expense of others ('mutual security'), theacknowledgment of political action to achieve security, rreasonable reserve of military power, to press the goal of anuclear-free world, to democratize internationalitsrelations,to strengthen tbe United Nation system and to createinternational legal norm6 against intervention.Geneva Superpower Summit of lB8S: The first face-to-face ona one-to-one basis between Yikhail Gorbachev and RonaldRea~an took place in Genera, 8witzerland, in November 1985.Since this was to be the first suwit between tbe USA and4. Bhabain Sen Gupta, ~Mgioaal Conflict," The Btatesmrn,(Calcutta), 25 Jwr 1986, p.6.

the USSR in six-and-a-half years, worldwide interert in theswit became phenomenal. There were press reporters,journalists tepre80nti~g every ujor and importantpublication - both On the magazine and newspaper fronts.The people representing the communications network - audio,visual and printed media - had come days in advance of thesuuit. There were anrlysas and prers reports galore.Prominent international relations analysts were raked togive their views on the back&round to the summit andforetell the outcome of the talks between the two leaders.The world waited with bated breath - it sighed with relieftbat the two leaders would be meeting on the highert leveland discussing matters in rn amiable way and it hoped thatan agreement on important matters tbat affect the wholeworld would be reached. Before Reagan visited Genevaproper, he wanted the buman-rights issue to be the maintopic for discussion at the summit while Gorbachev wanted itto be the arm-control irsue. These two issues then wouldset the tone for the Geneva slll).it. Tbe rummit began on 19Rovemhr 1985, when Reagan and Gorbacbev met at Geneva.Both of them held private talks which larted for about anhour. They were then joined by their rerpective delegates.Tbe talks continued in the afternoon and the concludingseerion for tha day wa8 again rererved for a privatediscursion between the two leaders. Corbachev met with a

delegation collprisiag representatives of US anti-war movementsand Peace organizations. The delegation, apart forexpressing a wish for the successful outcome of the summitalso handed over a petition to the General Secretary, whichhad been signed by one-and-a-half million Americans whowanted a freeze On all nuclear arsenals. On the second dryof the suuit talks, i.e., on 20 November 1985, the leadersmet at the Soviet Mission in Geneva for continuation oftheir talkr. The ruuing up of discussions held between thetwo leaders took place during the concluding rersion of thetalks between them on the name evening. One-and-r halfhours was utilized by the two leaders to mark the conclusionof the summit talks at Geneva and to issue a jointstatement. At the conclusion of the summit It was foundthat private discussions between the two leaders had takenup a little more than five hours which ended up being morethan the actual time for the summit agenda. The privatediscussions were not ude public. A 'Joint Statement' rrsissued by the two leaders at the end of the summit. Animportant priority on which they both agreed was that a"nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the USAcould have crtastropbic consequencer, they emphasized theimportance of preventing any war between them, both nuclearor conventional. they also would not seek to achieve

military ruperiority.Since the private dircussiono betweenthe two leaders were not made public, the people couldarrive at what they talked about only through the post-Geneva ruuit interviews and rwecher tbat tbey gave tovarious periodicals and aewspawrs, at different timer.prom there interviews, it is clear that they discussednuclear arms and how to reduce them, explained proposals forequitable, verifiable and deep reductions,discusred regionalconflicts and the issue of human rightr. .A combination of prensures, especially from the Europeanallies of the USA had compelled it, sventually, to agree onthe Geneva summit. While explaining the impact of theJsignificance of the Geneva summit, Gorbrchev stated:Geneva was very important. Without Geneva,Reykjavik would not have been possible. Thisis the first point.Geneva made it posrible tore-establish the suspended political dialoguebetween the Soviet Union and the US. Thir isimportant on its own because now we havs adialogue, an improved understanding of thepositions of each other...lmportant documentswere signed with the (US) President. We raidthat nuclear war is impenirsible and thatthere can be no winners in the war. Thir isan important political fact - the rerponse tothore who are talking of limited nuclear war.Another important agreement war tbat neitherlid0 would seek military ruperiority. Iea180 touched on other bilateral relations. . . . Geneva was an important milestone ininternational relations.5. 8.-d Iaqvi, -The Docuent," 7%. Telegraph, (Calcutta),25 November 1986, p.6.

ho positive rerult of the Geneva summit war that it had thetwo ru~rpowers talking again, across the table andthrashing Out their differences rather than adopting aconfrontatioDa1 Ot Cold war attitude.the way for the Reykjavik summit between theThe summit also pavedtwo leaders.rill Reagan and Gorbachev had met in Geneva for the two-daysummit, relations between their two countries werebelievedto be at such a low ebb that commentators were talking of a'second cold war.' However, after the summit, thepolitbure of the Soviet Communist Party declared in astatement on 26 November 1985, that "there are nocontradictions which would inevitably doom the SovietUnionand the US to confrontation, let alone mar .... The factthat the two countries could meet and discuss in six years6on this level itself, is a positive sign." Thus, the seedsfor a fifty percent cut in the nuclear arsenal of both theCountries and the elimination of intermediate range nuclearmissiles was planted in the Genera Summit and it war theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme that mould bethe orin bone of contention during the Reykjavik Summit.6. "Geneva Summit - A Private Affair," Rconoaic andPoliticrl Weeklr, 7 December 1985, lo.40.

TBS SECOND SUMMIT BETWEEN UGIR AID GOBBACEEV:the Bevkfarik SWmit (11-12 October 19861: The secondsumit between the two leaders, Reagan and Gorbachev tookplace on 11 and 12 October, 1986, in Reykjavik Iceland.Reykjavik Stamit was held within a year of the Geneva Summitgetting over and was called at a very short, notice. Thehost was Prbsident Vigdis Pinnbogrdottir of Iceland. fl hadbeen agreed at the Geneva Summit that the two leaders mouldmeet again at Iashington, by 1986.heAoreuer, since relationsafter that rummit between the two countries had not been toocordial, Gorbachevcould have realized that no arms dealagreement would be struck at Washington, whichhis visit a futile one and also he would notwould makebe able tojuetify his visit to his critics back home at the Kremlin.There are two reasons why Corhachev could have proposedReykjavik Summit - one - to get to know whether Reagan warreally serious on possible accords (so that any impendingvisit of Gorbachev to Washington could be r fruitful one), -two - this way he could be fulfilling the conditionattending a superpower eummit meeting in 1986, as hadtheofbeenagreed upon in the 'Joint Statement' issued by the twoleaders, at tb* Geneva Swit of 1985.be able to rilence the Democrat8 (who threatenedFor Rergan, ha mouldSoviet - American relations and the until-then-poorto rairearm6

ecord of Reagan '6 admini8tration)if he succeeded ina f in date for the next runit and conservatives amongfixingBepuhli~&n6, should the summit fail, by reassuring them thathe was not going Soft on Communist leaders.The sumit, which was held at Hofdi House, started on the11th morning of October 1986. Gorbachev had brought withhim three propollrls to be discussed at Reykjavik: to reducenuclear weapons by fifty percent with an intention ofeliminating them altogether by the end of the twentiethcentury, to discuss on the American option on theintermediate-range missiles and finally, to totallyeliminate all such US and USSR missiles In Europe and tofreeze all intermediate-range missiles with a range oftheuptoone thousand kilometers, in Asia, while discussing, through7negotiations, about their deployment and future, On 12October 1986, lee., the last dry of the Reykjavik Summit,tbere was grert optimism in both the Americrn and Sovietcamps that there would be an agreement reached between thetwo leaders on a fifty percent reduction in the nucleararsenal of both countriel and an elimination ofintermediate-range nuclear ~isriler in Europe.The evening7. Yikhrit Gorbachev, Once Yore on Reykjavik (NovortiPress, Moscow, 1986), p.9.

session between the two leaders,wbich had ttarted at 3 P.M.,lasted for about four hours. Rowever, by the end of thesumit discussions, no agreements of any kind had beenreached between the two countries.my had the Reykjavik Summit failed to bring about anyconcrete agreements between the two leaders ?The anrwer tothat lies in the Strategic hfenae Initiative, the space-based shield against ballirtic miesiles a!d the pet projectof President Ronald Reagan. While Gorbachev insisted thatthe SDI should be confined to laboratory research,Reaganwas adamant that the USA would not only conduct rcientificresearch on the weapons in the Star Wars programme but wouldalso develop and test them.While talking about the reasonefor the failure of the Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan8rtated he proposed:to the General Secretary an entirely newproposal; a ten-year delay in the deploymentof SDI in exchange for the completeeli~ination of all ballistic mirailer fromthe respective arrenale of both nationr. Solong a8 both tbe United States and the SovietUnion prove their good faith by dertroyingnuclear missiles, year by year, we would notdeploy SDI, The General Secretary raid hewould consider our offer, but only if werestricted a11 work on SDI to laboratoryresearch, which would have killed ourdefeamire shield.8. Quoted in Fyodor Burlatsky, Prom Geneva to Reykjavik,(Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1@87), pp.121-122.

~t a prerr conference that Gorbrchev gave while he was inIceland, he concluded that, "I must say the Americansto this meeting empty-handed.cameI think the President rodoruselver should reflect on this entlre siturtion thrt has9evolved here. We have traveled a long way." While talking10about SDI, Gorbachev stated:The question is whether the world is to entera new stage in the arms race through space,through SDI or the whole process of the armsrace stopped and the process of disarmamentand elimination of nuclear weapons bepinr.In the militrry sense, SDI is the new stagein the arms race. SDI means new weapons, newtypes of weapons, space weapons.It is quiteobvious that this will not ease internationaltensions - this will fuel internationaltensions ... We are not scared of SDI, we arenot afraid of SDI, and the world should beaware of this. To eliminate nuclerr weaponsas a means of determining American aggressionand in return be threatened from outer spacecan only be accepted by those who arepolitically naive. There are no such peoplein Soviet leadership.It is quite clear from this view of Gorbrchev on SD1 that hewar rtrongly of the vier that the American SDI programmewould only fuel a new arms race between tbe USA rnd the USSR- this time an arms race in space. Gorbrchev knew that the-9. Quoted in J. JaCk~on, *Sunk by Star Warn," TIJ!E, 20October 1986, p.10.10. Quoted in Sreed Naqvi, "Document," The Telegraph,(Calcutta), 25 lovesber 1986, p.6.

goriet Union was in absolutely no position to embark onanother round of arms race. It would only cripple thesoviet econmy.Besides, another cold war situation couldarise between the two formidable powers.In his asressaent of the Reykjavik Summit, krbachev said,=we bare not fully realized the sipnificance of whattmppened. But we will rerch this realization. If nottoday, the tomorrow.We will grasp the full ripnificrnce ofBhykjaVik and will do justice to the rccomplishments andgains, as well as to the missed opportunities andlosses.Dramatic as the course of the talks and their results were,the Reykjavik meeting greatly facilitated, perhaps forfirst time in many decades, our search for r way to achieve11nuclear disarmament, " Gorbrcbev felt that as a result ofthe Reykjavik summit, the USA and the USSR bad now rsacbed ahigher level in analysinp the situation and a180 indetermining the objectives and the framework ofpossible accords on nuclear disarmameat.thefutureIt can be rtatad that the Americans viewed the SDI r8 theirtrump card, an ace up their sleeve, a proposal whichforce the Soviet8 to come to the negotiatingwouldtable during1 Ibid., 0D.Cit.

whicb the Americans would have the upper hand and thereby beenahlad to dictate the terms for any agreement signedbetween the two countries. They also felt that, with theSDI, the Americans had a technology that was far superior totbat of the Soviets and tbat it would have taken many yearsbefore they (Soviets) could match up with them (Americanr).Bovever, the Soviets viewed the SDI as the main rtumblingfactor and obstacle to any meaningful agreement between thetwo countries. Furthermore, they regarded the Americanattitude of being that of the aggressor nation, thusneedlessly starting a never-ending arms race battle betweenthe two countries, this time i~ the outer apace domain. TheReykjavik rummit was originally intended to set a date for asummit between the US and the USSR leaders at Washington andalso to work out a framevork for an agreement on mediumrange missiles. However, it ended up as a rummit where nodeal was made, no date was set and no plans envisaged forfuture rummitr.In conclusion, though the Geneva and Reykjavik swmitc didnot produce and end up in any treaties being signad betweenthe USA and the USSR, they acted as forerunners to theVashington Summit of 1987, where concrete reroltr wereproduced and achieved. The USA &ad the USSR were no. firmlyoa a detente pbare. The atmosphere of a cold war rituation

ad receded into the past. The two countries now felt thatmisunderstandings and issues could always be thrashed out ina cordial manner. Couunication between them had startedflowing without disruption. Pinally, a very warm andcordial relationship and rapport was established betweenPresident ~onald Reagm and Canera1 secretary YikhailGorbachev vhicb was to continue till the end of Reagrn'ssecond term as President of the USA.TEE 1A881NGTON 80PERPOlER SUMMIT OF 1987On 8 December 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan signed theIntermediate range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which called forthe elimination, by its proposals, medium and shorter rangemissiles. Immediately afterwards, they entered into threedrys of discuseions at the White House that yieldedstatements reflecting A significantly softer tone in theirrelationship. On the one hand, they promised to pres8 aheadin negotiations at Geneva for a second treaty that would cutin half their long range strategic forcer (i.e., both landand sea based missiles and bombers); on the other, theyagreed to keep on talking de~pite continued disagreemrnteover Star Wars and various regional issues.hen the Third Bwit ended, Reagan, still insisted onhaving a nuclear aru race in space and Gorbachev still

demanded a strict allegiance to the terms of the 1072 Anti-~~ilistic Missile Treaty, banning such activity. AS 1987drew to an end, the nuclear arms race was far from overthe Third Reagan brbachev summit had at least demonstratedthat the superpowers could agree to disagree in order to goon building trust. m y did the world's most powerfuladversaries choose this particular moment to speed upbuttheirarms reduction efforts? "The INF Treaty should be studiedand explained in terms of the various dynamic processes onboth sides - economic, political, military and social - thatled to its signing. Therefore, it is imperative toconstruct a coherent narrative describing the largerhistorical developments shaping US-Soviet relations in ourtime.The Geneva and Reykjavik summits had not brought about anytangible agreement between the USA and the USSR. However,these summits rere important insofar as they served to bringthe two countries to the negotirting table, clearing majorand minor irritants and obstacles along the rap beforeSigning a treaty of considerable significrnce to nationaland international politics. The Washingtoo SuperpowerSummit, the third sunit in a series of swits betweenReagan and Gorbachev, took place from the 7 to 8 of December1087. This was the first summit held in Washington after a

gapof fourteen yearr.The last one had taken place in,973 when US President Richard Nixon had played host tomneral Secretrry Loonin Brerhnev of the Soviet Union.GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OP TEB INP TREATYbe INP Treaty, in its final and signed version was notof a matter of days, weeks or months but the productof hard bargaining6 and negotiations among the top officialsof the USAtheand the USSR, and took years ,An the making.Tbere were trying times when either or both sides felttbe signing of the treaty would never take placethateither dueto last minute hitches or due to the intransigence rhownone or both the countries. Before discussing the text anditsimplications, it is inportant to spell out the detailsand step8 that went into the making and final formulation ofhe INQ Treaty.Tbe chronology of negotiations leading to the signing of thetreaty between Reagan and Gorbachev providing for theelimination, over three years, of their respective country'smedium and short range nuclear weapon8 is as follows: Aslate a8 December 1979, NATO agreed to adopt abytwo-trackreaponso to tho Soviet SS-20 missiles being installed in thewestern part of Soviet Union. The first track would bemegotiations aimed at eliainating the missiles, while the

second would be deployment, starting in 1983, of 464 CLCMSand 108 Perishing 11 missiles. In October 1980, thepreliminary talks between the two countries began and thetwo rides laid out their positions. The US sought a ceilingon the SS-20s balanced by equal deployments of the USweapons. The Soviets wanted a freeze on new deployments.The 'zero-zero' option which formed the basis of theeventual deal was offered as the first proposal by RonaldReagan's administration, in November 1981. The Soviets,however, rejected the 'zero-zero' proposal and offered theirown plan in February 1982, which called for the cancellationof the US deployments and gradual reduction of NATO andWarsaw Pact missiles and nuclear capable aircraft. In July1982, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinky, negotiators for the USAand USSR, respectively, secretly agreed to a deal whichwould give both sides 75 launchers and 150 nuclear capableaircraft. However, both the governments rejected the deal.General Secretary Purl Andropov offered to reduce SovietEuropean missiles to the levels of Britirh and Frenchforces if the USA abmdoned its INF deployment.The PSI again modified the zero-zero plan in March 1983 toreduce US deployments to between 50 and 450 warheads if theSoviets reduced their missiles, worldwide, to the samelevel. This proposal was changed by Andropav in Yay 1983,

hec~llod for an equal level of warheadsinstead of1.uncbers. In September 1983, Reagan changed the USp~p~sal saying that the USA would now ineiat onmatchingthe global Soviet IWP. When NATO began deployment of thefirst Pershings in West Germany in November 1983, thesoviets walked out of the Geneva talks. When the INF talksresumed in Yarcb 1985, the US pushed for the zero-zeroproposals md the Soviets called for a freeze on newdeployment. When Gorbachev newly rsrumed power in April1985, he announced a freeze on Soviet deployment of SS-20s.In November 1985, Gorbachev &gain proposed A freeze ofdeployment by botb sides followed by later reductions.USA replied by proposing an equal number of 140 launchers~md 420 warheads on each side.0. 21 November 1985, in the final Reagan-Gorbachev summitcommunique froa Geneva, botb men supported the idea of rn12interim agreement. Gorbachev, in January 1986, drew up aproposal whereby a11 US and Soviet INP weapons could be13eliminated in five to seven pears. The US countered thlrproposal in Pebrorry 1986 with a revised 'zero-zero' planThe12. The Tiwr of India, (Hew hlhi), 6 December, 1987.W. Herbert P Bix, "The IRP Treaty : An Interpretation,"Monthly Istiw, Vol.40, June 1088, 9.14.

which was proPosed to take effect over a period of threeyears. Under this Proposal, in the first year, both sideswould be down to 140 launchers. This number would be cutagain in half during the second year and eliminated totallyby the year 1990. In Yay 1986, the Soviets proposed atreaty based on Gorbachev'a proposal (January lD86). InSeptember of the same year, the US proposed an interimceiling of a hundred warheads in Europe.men Reagan and Gorbachev met for their second summit atReykjrvik,Iceland, in October 1986, both agreed to eliminrteall European-based INF weapons. By February 1987, Gorbacbevstated that the Soviets were willing to sign a separate INFtreaty rhich would not be part of larger (START) treaty onlong range nuclear weapons. The USA, in March 1987, tabledr draft treaty which included an on-site verificationtreaty. lhen US Secretary of State, George Schultz metGorbachev at Yoacow in April 1987, he proposed a treatybased on the zrro-zero plan. By the summer of 1987, theGeneva arms control negotiations worked on the details of atreaty based on zero-zero plan. In August 1987, the USnegotiators tabled a proposal rhich called for on-siteverification. In the latter part of the same month, lastGarmany announced that 72 Perishing I4 missiles would bediruntled. In Soptember and October 1987, Schultz and tbe

Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward Shevardnadze, met inWashington and again in Moscow to work out the final detailsof the treaty. They jointly announced on 30 October 1987,that the Washington Summit would be held on 7 December ofthat same year and that the treaty would be signed at thissummit to be held at Washington between the leaders of theirtwo countries.During Leonid Brezhnev's term as General Secretary of theUSSR, the Soviet Union had built a new class of missiles andhad placed them in strategic places, aimed and pointed attargets in Western Europe. The Soviets called these missiles'Pioneer' but it was better known by NATO and the West - asthe SS-20. The SS-20 had a range of about 3100 miles rndeach missile was mounted on a mobile launcher and hadthreeaccurate warheads. In 1979, the Carter Presidency decidedto follow the 'Dual Track' policy.By this policy, "The USwould offset the Soviet missiles by deploying a new gene-rationof its own 'Euromissi1es'- Tomahawk cruise missilesand Perishing I1 ballistic missiles - while at the same timemaking a good-faith effort to negotiate with the USSR a cola-14promise that would scale back the missiles on both rides."14. Strobe Talbott, "The Road to Zero," TlYE 14 December,1987

men Ronald Reagan took over as the President of the UnitedStates of America, he adopted Richard Perle's (who was thethen Asristaat Secretary of Defense) 'zero-option' as hisown.SS-20sBy zero option is meant that there would be no Sovietin exchange for there being no American missiles inthat same class and category. On 18 November 1981, PresidentReagan stated in a speech that "the US is prepared to cancelits deployment of Pershing I1 and ground launched cruisemissiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4,15SS-5 aissiles." The INF Treaty, which was the mainpurpose and reason behind the convening of the Washingtonsummit, by the respective heads of the USA and the USSR,16Reagan and Gorbachev, was signed on 8 December 1987. Thedocment to this historic treaty is entitled "Treaty Betweenthe United States of America andthe Union of SovietSocialist Republics on the elimination of their IntermediateRange and Shorter Range Yirtiiles."The INF Treaty is alengthy complex package of document8,conoisting of reventeenarticles, various protocolti and appendices.The Logic of U8A's ConwrsionThe various factors that transformed the US position underReagan, as far as Nuclear Armti Beduction go are a8 followti.15. See the IH? Treaty Document.1s. Ibid.

Arms reduction, rummitry gain1 ng, rtrtesman like posturingand the like, were activities thrt the Reagan administrationemphatically rejected during it6 first term. But it wasliterally pushed into all these PrlCtisO~ during its recondterm. In making this turn around,according to B,erbert P.Bix,the US political leaderrhip was not responding to a changedmilitary balance of power rith rerpect to the Soviet Union.Iashington's diplomatic responses to Moscow had little to dorith any dramatic changes in the actual militarycapabilities of Soviet Union brought about by Gorbachev'sreformist leadership. Neither did they concern any radicalchange in Soviet approach to strategic armsFor Gorbachev's arms reduction approach had beennegotiations.consistentwith past Soviet practise, dating back to the late 1960s and17early 1970s.Pet, something had changed. At the level of strategicarresrment, Washington recognized thrt over the course of18the 19808, it had multiplied nuclear redundancy. Reagan17. Berbert P Bix, *The INF Treaty : An Interpretation,"Monthly Review, Vo1.40, June 1988, p.8.18. US and Soviet rtrategic force inventories at the end of1987 were a8 follws: USA - 200 launchers and 13012warheads; US88 - 2475 launcher8 and 11248 warheads.Total ncrtonr for the USA war 30472 and for the USSR--. .--84192. Hee bulletin of the Atomic Sclentirtr, January-Pebruary, 1988, p.50.

and his policy ukers also recognized a need to respond tothe changed political posture ofthe Soviet leadership.Besides, Washington was forced to return to detente and to anew, less confrontational relationship with its mainmilitary ad versa^ because of problems generated by Reagan'sown domestic and foreign policies tbat had discredited19President and weakened the US economy.Over the 1980s, investment in productive capacity failedrise substantially. Instead, the nation's business elitecaught speculation fever, invested in financialmanipulations,thecorporate takeovers and the consumption ofhigh-priced foreign imports. Yeanwhile, political scandalsand economic crises buffeted the Reagan Administration.the dollars volume fell against foreign currenciestoAllduring1986-87, the economic indicators began driving home theaesshge that the US economy had sustained serious injuries,and tbat the standard of living of most Americans would20probably suffer as a result.It is clear that the INP Treaty was entered into mainly inresponse to the changed economic and political situation19. Por a detailed account, set Herbert P Bix, "The IRFTreatl : An Interpretation, Monthly Review, Vol.40,June 1988, p.10.20. Ibid.in

the United States. Influential domestic elites, toolhad cometo fee1 tlut the OCOnOlliC costs of Reagrnite policies hadgrown too burdensome and were endangering not only the coreof US economy but the global capitalist system,Consequently, the perceptions 6prerd throughout elitecircles that the injuries this administration had alreadyinflicted 00 the economy would take a long time to heal andthat during that time it made 60II6e to want to reduce thecosts of the US silitary build-up.There are reasons for the actual timing of the INF Treaty.First, the Iran-Contra scandal which led to the moralcollapse of the Reagan Presidency. The twin failures of theUS-Middle Pst policy and the secret White Rouse-directedWar in Central America, were the underlying causes of thatscandal. After the Iran-Contra fiasco broke in the US presson 25 November 1986, it dominated the headlines until 19October 1987, when the World Stock Market crash occurred,the largest lor8 of stock values since the Great Depressionof the 19306. This led to further loss of public supportfor Reagan.The groundrork for agreement on an IIP Treaty war laid in1985 betweor the Schultr-Shevardnrdrta conference in Januaryu d the firrt Lagan-Gorbachev Burit of November. Bowever,

the administration still clung to it8 hard-line anti-Soviet21rhetoric, a11 through 1985 and 1986, in order to sell the"Reagan Doctrine" of global counter-revolution and the'waron terrorism.' Relations with the Soviet Union became thefocal policy concern only after the Reagan Presidency itselfwas disgraced and started to lose public support at the veryend of 1986. Then, with the publications of tbe mildlycritical 'Tower Commission Report' on 'Irangate' on 27February 1987, Reagan's standing in the polls slipped to anall-time low.On 1 March 1987, Gorbachev came to Reagan's aid announcingin Moscow that the Soviet Union was willing to sign "withoutdelayn& separate agreement on medium range nuclear missiles.The issue of reducing short range and strategic longrangemissiles could be left for future negotiations. Reaganaccepted and with this his anti-Soviet crusade was over.Gorbachsv's Com~ulsions Soviet leaders over tbe past decadebad displayed an ever-increasing desire for improvedrelations witb the United States and itr NATO allies.Theyhad in fact made the normalization of diplomatic relations a21. John Galthung, "Tbe Cold War an an Exercire in Antirm:The US Government, the Governmentr of Western Europemd the People," gLTERRATIVES, Vol.XIV, No.2, April1989, p.173.

preconditionto the success of their ongoing internalreforms. How can we account for this Soviet concern to reachnew accords on nuclear and conventionalarms reductionsparticularly at a time when many lestern leaders had notabandoned their hope of dismantling the Soviet system?Gorbachev stated that "a better educated, younger leadershiphas cometo the fore and is attempting to develop a morerealistic theoretical discourse that will permit asignificant reduction of spending on military waste. It isthe prospect of an economic, political and social crisis intbe near future that requires consideration of past policies22and urgent action in the present." Therefore, the newleadership called for a reformation of the entire Soviet23economic, political, social and moral order. Such was thecontext in which the INF Treaty on tbe Soviet side needed tobe set.Soviet arms-reduction proposals were now dominatedby Gorbachev's interest in creating the external conditions24for vital Soviet reforms. The Cbernobyl Nuclear Disasterof 26 April 1986, Afghanistan, ethnic problems and the like22, Mikhail Corbacbev, Perestroika : New Thinking for OurCountry and the lorld, (London, Collins, 1987), p.5.23. For details, see Leon lolsy, gCorbachev's Row Thinkingand World Politics," Monthly Review, Vol.40, October1988, pp. 18-31.

had also compelled Gorbachev to offer concessions on armsreductions. These were the factors and circumstances whichforced Gorhachev and the Reagan administration to pursuenegotiations for arms reductions.TEE WASHINGTON SUPERPOWER SUMMIT (DECEMBER 7-10, 1987)The Washington Superpower Summit mainly revolved aroundsigning of the INF Treaty by the two leaders. Though othermatters and issues were discussed, no substantial or gainfulresults came out of it. Reagan was not able to make humanrights or regional issues anything more than a side showthe business of arms control. Gorbachev invited severalgroups of influential Americans to the Soviet embassy topush his case for arms reductions, vorld peace and hisinternal reforms. By far, the most important of thesemeetings was with nine Congressional leaders, including fourof the Senators who would ultimately decide to ratify theINF Treaty. The two sides made even less progress on theother issues under discussion. Reagan had begun the very25first sessions with an hour long speech on human rights.thetoOn SDI, the language worked out was both tortured and murhy,just what war needed to defer tbe dispute to another day.25. Ibid., Ope Cit., p.14.

Gerasiwv, the Soviet spokesman stated that it meant thatboth sides had postponed tbeir quarrels. Nor was there anymovewent on regional issues. There had been some hope thatGorhacbev would announce a starting date for a promisedSoviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but he declined to do sounless Reagan first cut off aid to the Afghan rebels. Therewas no agreement either on Nicaragua Or the Persian Gulf.THE INP TREATY:In tbe preamble to the main text, both the United States andthe Soviet Union declared that they were "conscious thatnuclear war would have devastating consequences for a11mankind" but they were also "convinced that the measures setforth in this treaty will help to reduce the risk ofoutbreak of war and strengthen international peace andsecurity." To that end, they "shall eliminate itsintermediate range and shorter range missiles (and notouch systems thereafter).haveThe treaty involved the elimination of all Iand-based mediumrange and shorter range nuclear weapons of the USA andUSSR anywhere in the world. Moat of these weapons werelocated in Europe.theThe treaty provided a time table wherebythe Soviet Union would withdraw to Soviet territory therhorter-range~irsiles it bad deployed in Eart Germanyand195

~zechoslovakia within 90 days of the treaty coming intoforce and destroy them within 18 months. All other INFcategory missiles would be destroyed over a three-yearperiod after the treaty came into force. Both aides woulddestroy 100 missiles, each within the first six months, theSoviets, thereafter, destroying their missiles at a fasterrate than the USA (thereby reflecting the greater number ofSoviet missiles) and both sides completing the process tworeeks short of the three-year limit. The position of 72Pershing IAs, described as being owned by Vest Germany butwith warheads owned by the USA was not governed by thetreaty itself but by separate formal rssurances given to theSoviet Union, the warheads on the Pershing !As would bedismantled and returned to the USA for destruction in thelast two weeks of the three-year period provided for in theelimination of US and Soviet missiles.The treaty laid down procedures to cover a period of 13years from the date on which it took effect. Baselineinspections of every INP facility would be made as thetreaty went into force. During the first three year8thereafter, the missiles would be destroyed, with thisdestruction mutually certified and with each side beingpermitted to make upto 20 inopections (at a few bour'rnotice) per year, of INF facilities, on challenge.

close out inspections would be made at the end of this threeyear period. In the following five years, eacb side wouldhave the right to make upt0 15 such inspections per year,and in the final five years, ten such inspections could bemade by each side per year. There was no provision forverification beyond this period, although the prohibition onpossession of INF-category weapons was for an indefiniteperiod. The treaty also provided for the creation of 4Joint Special Verification Committee.THE MISSILE COUNT OF THE USA AND THE USSR IS GIVEN REREUSSRUSAIntermediate range (1000 to 5500 kms)Deployed 470 429Non Deployed 356 260Shorter range (500 to 1000 kms)Deployed 387 0'Non Deployed 539 170*Excluding the 72 Pershing IAsOwned by the FBC1752 859

BEACTIOI TO TEE SIGNING OF THE INP TREATYThe British Prim Minister, Margaret Thatcher and the Sovietleader 0~Pressed the hope that the agreement on theelimination of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) inWashington would be a source of extra security for the worldand would rertructure international relations on the basisof deeper mutual understanding. Thatcher said, "We areliving in historic times and the treaty on INF by President26Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be hirtoric."Several world leaders also welcomed the Soviet-US accord onthe elimination of intermediate rnd shorter range missiles.The Japanese Prime Minister, Noburu Takeshita, expressed thehope that the Soviet Union and the United States, after thesigning of the treaty, would set up negotiations on cute instrategic nuclear weapons and conventional arms. The FrenchPresident, Francois Yitterand, said that the world was nowfaced with r choice either to disarm or take up the road ofsuper rearmament. The French Prime Minister was of the viewthat it wao a positive agreement if followed by agreementsthat would make it a reality. Austria's Vice Chancellor andForeign Minister, Louis Mock, said in Vienna that theimportance of the treaty was that a whole category of26. The Timer of India, (Hew Mlhi), 8 December 1987.

missiles was being removed from the nuclear arsenals of bothpowers. At the same time, Mock voiced concern, as hepainted out that the agreement covered only part of theauclear potentials.Therefore, it had to be regarded as thesignal for further disarmament moves, including elimination27of cheaical weapons and cuts in conventional armaments.~t a news conference in Cairo, the lest German ForeignMinister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, said that improvedcooperation between lfashington and Moscow would help bringabout a solution to the Middle East problem, includingseven-year Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israeli conflict,The United Nations Secretary General, Javier Perez deCuellar, described the signing as a "truly remarkabledevelopment." In a statement, de Cuellar said he hopedprogress would now be made on reducing long rangethestrategicmissiles. The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, hailedthe signing of the treaty re a move toward world peace anddisarmuent. Yankelovich and Smoke in "America's Newl'binkingv tell us the reaction of the American public to thetreaty.*The INF Treaty does enjoy its great public supportfor traditional 'arms control' reasons. Americans understandthat tbe treaty means only a small percentage reductioninZJ. The Tiws of India, (Im Dclhi), 10 December 1987.

either side's nuclear forces. ATS-1-3 and the PAPlBrownstudies show that what the public find interesting in theINP Treaty is its novel provision8 for on-siteinspection8in the USSR. That is the secret of its appeal, winningpublic approval by margins greater than 70 per cent at theverymoment that the majority also thinks tSe Soviets arelikely to cheat on arms control. The on-site inspectionfeature means, to the public, that Americans do not needrely on trust in this agreement. Evan if the Sovietrcheat, the cheating would not make much military28difference."For the first time in contemporary history, a treaty badbeen signed which eliminated two classes of nuclear weapons.Nor is this because they were physically and morallyobsolete, for they were not, but because they were toodangerous to humanity and civilization. While the treatywas Soviet-American in form it was truly international incharacter. Nuclear weapons had to be removed from ninecountries. This demonstrated the feasibility of building anuclear-free and hence a safer world and confirmed the unityand oneners of plans.todidThe treaty on the elimination ofintermediate range and rhort range mirrller war a rerult of28. Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, "America'r 'NewThiaking,' Foreign Affairs, Spring 1988.

the breakthrough in thinking, of the removal of a seeminglyinsurmountable psychological barriers between the twonuclear powers. It marked an advance to a qualitativelydifferent level of cooperation in solving major universalproblems.The INF accord signed by Gorbachev and Reagan is one ofthose rare events which can be said to be truly historic.For the first time since the world lost its nuclearinnocence, a pact had been concluded whereby the twosuperpowers had agreed to actually dismantly a part of theirnuclear arsenals instead of aerely seeking to manage itsgrowth. As rightly pointed out in the editorial of the Timesof India, a step to reverse the forty-year old nuclear arms29race had been taken and it had to have a logic of its own.The treaty cut roughly just four per cent of nuclear stocksand did not cover long range weapons-totaling 1178% warheadson the US side and 10986 on the Soviet side - which wereunder negotiation at the START talks in Geneva; also,several thousand battlefield nuclear weapons on the twosidem also are not covered,as pointed out by Robert30Kaylor.29. The Times of India, (Row Delhi), 10 December, 1987,SO.Bobert Kaylor, "After IMP? The Next Rew Arm8 Race,*NETS & WOULD REPORT, Map 1988. p.8.

The IW Treaty is certainly r success if measuredaeainstthe Veet'r proclaimed arms control objectives during the1980s. levertheless, the INF Treaty provoked considrrrbleunease in the Vest, by its provisions as well rs byimplications for the future. As questioned by Lynn31E.Davis, mould NATO's strategy of flexible response remaincredible?itsWould the imbalance between conventional forcesin Europe nor become more dangerous? Would the treatyunleash political forces leading to the denuclearizationthe continent and American disengagement from NATO? Itwould have been both ironic and tragic if this NATObecame the vehicle for a future alliance crisis.TheofsuccessINF Treaty ras marred by serious flaws, ambiguities,contradictions and other shortcomings that stood to hauntthe treaty's implementation and offer ample opportunitythe Soviets for violating or circumventing its intent andprincipal provisions. These flaws related prominently toloopholes which enabled the Soviets to continue theproductionof components of banned missiles, the permittedretention of missile launchers to qurlifications in the banof fli~ht testing, to the constraints extended toto31. Lynn E Davis, "Lessons of the IAF Treaty," toreilnAffrirs, Spring, 1888, p.720.

conventional weapons Systems and above al1,to an inadequate,circumscribed verification regime that invited lmagnificati0n of all the inherent risks. These flaws werelargely the Consequence Of negotiations conducted under thepressure of self-imposed deadline. According to Prank32J.Gaffney Jr., there was now the compounded danger thatsome of the same flaws, that unless it wasrecognized andconfronted, would find their ray into a much more fateful,complex and demanding START agreement on US and Sovietstrategicforces - one thrt seemed to be rpproached withsimilar, illogical haste.Dan Quayle was of the view that, "What is not nearly 80well understood, however, are the treaty's implicationNATO and its posture of deterrence and defence - morespecifically, how the eliaination of the INF missiles will33further undermine NATO's strategy of flexible response."Be further felt that a corollary of the INF Treaty wasimperativeforfor the Alliance to revitalize its drfenres.Indeed,NATOts strategy wrr at a cross-roads. Either, Quljle32. Prank J Gaffney Jr., "The INF Treaty and its Shadwrover tho START liegotiatione," Strategic Revin,lrrhington, Spring, 1988, p.33EtiE::f:"After the IMP Treaty: The RAM Defencestrategic Review, linter, lesr, p.9.

felt, NATO would correct the deficiencies in its posturethat the destruction of its INF missiles would compound, orit would penit its strategy of flexible response to a pointof no return.IDthe opinion of the then US Secretary of State, Georgeschultz, "This treaty is in our security interests. Thecollective security commitment embodied in the NATO alliancehas been fundamental to our national security since 1949.his treaty removes forever, a Soviet nuclear threat thathas confronted our NATO allies - and, I should add, ourfriends and allies in Asia and the Pacific - for over thirtyyears. This treaty strengthens NATO, By doing so,it3 4strengthens the security of the United States. PresidentReagan said, "(The summit) had lit the sky with hope for allpeople of goodwill," while General Secretary Gorbrchev hadthis to sag about the lashington Bummit, "(It was a) major35event in world politics."The Washington summit of 1987 was successful insofar as ithad results in the signing of the INF Treaty, which,iffaithfully carried out, would, for the first time in the34. George Schultze, "Achieve8ents Of the INP Treaty,"Department of State Bulletin, Iashington,July 1988,p.B.35. Quoted in Thomas A SanctionInThe Spirit of Iarhington,"- TIME (lev York), 21 December 1987, l0.51, p.5.

history of a nuclear world, rid the world of two classes (inits entirety Of state-of-the-art modernnuclear aissiles.Even though the destruction of these missiles would reducethe stockpile of the world's arsenal by just four percent,it represented a beginning - a tentative beginning perhaps -but nevertheless, a beginning in the right direction,towards disarmament.IMPLICATIONS :The INF Treaty had both positive and negative implications.Let us examine the positive aspects. The signing of the INFTreaty was a significant event in sloving the arms race andfurthering the cause of peace in at least four specificsenses. First, the Treaty represented a remarkable shift inthe military thinking of the superpovers. They nor seemedto be saying that strategic stability was better served notby nuclear arms control, which heretofore, had meant controlof the pace and scope of arms expansion, but through realarms reductions. Second, the treaty signaled the dismantlingof the Cold far and the advent of a more hopeful period inwhich US-Soviet relations might be conducted on the basis ofcooperation and rationality. Third, the treaty badstrengthened demands throughout leatern Europe, tor thedenuclearizrtion of the entire continent in response to

pressures from opposition parties and peace-movements, aswell as the Soviet peace offensive. lest Germany said, aspointed out by Herbert Bix, that their country wasdisproportionate~y threatened by the presence on German soil36of NATO's short range missiles. East Germany hadexpressed concern over battlefield nuclear weapons in thepossession of NATO and the Soviet Union.Fourth, the Sovietleadership described the IN? agreement and the armsreduction process, of which it was a part,as a manifestationof its own internal reform policy of perestroika.For then,it reached restructuring, or 'new thinking for the world' inthe realm of foreign policy. During the past years, theyhad outlined with increasing clarity, their view of thepost-cold war world. They were: an emphasis on the inter-dependence of the contending social systems, perceptionsmilitarism and not capitalism as the main danger, based onan assessment of the nuclear threat, regional conflict6inflicting immense loss of life and an uncontrolled brastrade and the primacy of politics over force ininternational affairs.ofAccording to Gorbachev, the changesin approach in foreign relations were clear-eloring downthe arms race, rrdically softening US-USSRofconfrontation,36. Herbert P Bix, "The INP Treaty : An Interpretation,"Monthly Review, Vo1.40, June 1988, p.6.

37m d reduction of regional tensions. As correctly statedby Rrrinder Singh, by presenting the IN? Treaty as theforetaste of their new, dynamic approach, they hadstimulated change in both alliance systems, while forcing38professional cold warriors in the West into the defensive.Here, it is also important to look at the negativeimplications of the Treaty. At that stage in US-Sovietnegotiations, the INF Treaty by itself meant very littlemilitarily. This means that in actual levels of nucleararmaments that were affected by it, its results werenegligible. Secondly, what the two sides had agreed todismantle were the missiles, that was to say, the longbodies of the rockets and the re-entry none-cones whichcarried the warheads but not the warheads themselves. Thedestruction of the rockets was not going to be easy, though.The solid-fuel cylinders used in the American Pershings 11sand the Soviet SS-20s were highly explosive and on ignition,they emitted gases which could not but pollute theenvironment. Thirdly, in the view of Y.S.Halperin and Y.O.37. Yikhail Gorbrchev, Perestroika,(lew York, Harper k Row,1087), p.8.38. Ilarindor Singh, 'Of Yissilea and Warheads," Economicand Pollticrl Weekl~, December 1987, p.2192.

Donuell, even in a Post-INF world, the strongest, mostconservative NATO governments - Britain, Prance andWestGermany - wanted to maintain some level of Cold Warconfrontation with the Soviet Union. Economic considerationpartly accounted for the continuing cold-war commitment of39NATO's policy makers.Other rea8ons are strategic. The key NATO governmentsremained committed to 'flexible response', the strategicdoctrine they adopted in 1968 which then meant the reintro-duction of conventional bombs on US Air Porce Bombers.Today, it means the upgrading and strengthening of conven-tional and nuclear weapons systems in categories not coveredby the IN? Treaty. The NATO governments were also proceedingto compensate for the loss of their INP missiles bymodernizing their short-range nuclear forces. They perceivedthe need for nuclear veapons in vier of their uncertainty ofthe effects that the arms reduction process and a looseningof Bloc-ties could have on their own internal politicalprocesses. In short, the prevailing situation was acontrary one in which cold-war structures of actionperception remained deeply embedded for varlous reasons.39. Y.S. Ealperin and Y. O'Donnel, 'The Nuclear Fallacy,"Bulletin --- of the Atomic Scientists, January-Februaryl988,pP.6-7and

ustlp, did the Gorbachev-Reagan accord in any wayto ulre the world a safer place to live in?promiseUnfortunately,one could not but say 'NO" to this query. In order to see40the reason why, when had to remember with Norman Cousins,that it is imporsible for any nation to rage nuclear warthe entire human race, and that would mean against itselftoo. "For thanks to the rinds serving as the conveyer beltof mass death, the nuclear guns Can be said to contain,through barrels: one that is pointed against the enemy; asecond is pointed against the people rho are not enemies;(and) a third bends back completely and is pointedonassquarelyon the holder."This means that "nuclear weapons cannotbe used for fighting and winning any war - curtains not4 1nor. "They have an inexorable logic of their own, that logic isoverwhelmingly and indeed incomparably stronger than the'ideology', whether liberal or Marxist, to which themanagers of the nuclear stater may claim to be welded.if nuclear weapons cannot now be used for fighting andwinning a war, blackuil reorins the only purpose for whichBut40. lorman Cousins, Prerent Tense, (New York, YcGraw Rill,1@67), p.428.41. Inga Thorroa, 8Disarmmnt - Issues and Prospects,"Nrinrtreu, 18 April 1981, p.12.

they can possibly be used.Then again, since both sets ofstate managers happen to be in possession of largestockpiles of these weapons of black, they cannot possiblyblackmail Qach other. victims must be sought elsewhere -that is, at the level where power is not wielded. But inorder to intimidate them constantly and effectively and thusto squeeze resources out of them, it must always continue topretend, as pointed out by Aarinder Singh, to fret about the42nuclear stockpiles of the other.It should also be mentioned that the nuclear umbrella ofboth sides was erected to provide a protection cover to itsconventional weapons industries. It is these industrieswhich involve most of the military spending and many ofill effects of militarism. Therefore, marginal and evenmassive elimination of nuclear weapons alone will not do.Indeed, what is needed to survive as a civilized species isnothing less than a complete and general disarmament.theFOLLOW-UP MEASURES TO THE IIF TREATYThe Washington Summit of 1987, which took place from the 7 -10 December 1987, between the two leaders of the US6 and the42. Ahrindrr Singh, "01 Yirsiles and Iarheads," Economicand Political Weekl~, 19 December 1987, p.2192.

USSR, Prerident Ronald Reagan and General SecretaryGorbacbev,YikhailreepectiVely, resulted in the signing of theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) on 8 December1987. Hwever, this treaty would have remained only a papertreaty bad it not been ratified by the US Senate. Alltreaties signed between the USA and other countries requireto be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the US Senate.It is because the US Senate never ratified the SALT I1Treaty that was signed by the two powers in 1979 that(SALT 11) has never been enforced.Uatification and Im~lementation US and Soviet negotiatorsreached agreement on all technical issues that had held up 4US Senate debate on ratifying the treaty to eliminate mediumrange nuclear miesiles. The issues dealt with verifyingprovisions of the treaty, signed by Reagan and Corbachevhcember in Washington to scrap all US and Soviet inter-43~diate range nuclear missiles. The US Senate, by anoverwhelminglyaffirmative rate of 93 to 5, recommendedratification of the INP Treaty with the Soviet Union. Itthus gave the US President, Ronald Reagan and GeneralLlecretary Mikhail Gorbacbev, the much sought aftercanterpiece for their four day summit in Yoscor. Under the43. Tbe Statesman, (Calcutta), 13 Yay 1988.itin211

US Constitution, the Senate, by a two-thirds vote, mustapprove all American treaties. The vote of 93 'ayes' and 5'nays' with only two Senators not voting, the previousday,caused the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd of lestVirginia to 'phone the news to Reagan in Helsinki with thecheering word that he had the US legislature bebind him in44his bargaining with Corbachev. However, a month or soprevious to this, ratification was not so certain.The INP Treaty was opposed by such die-hardconservativesfrom Reagan's own Republic Party as Senator Jesse Helms ofNorth Carolina (a man who was convinced that any arrangementwith the Soviets was treacherous). It was also opposed bySenators basically in sympathy with the treaty - but who didnot trust the bonafides of their own president, Ronald45Reagan. This was because the Reagan Administration hadtaken a cavalier interpretation of earlier US arms controltreaty commitments. It has ignored past Administrationofficials'testimonies in winning Senate approval ia orderto gain new license for Reagan to proceed with hisdetermination, to develop an outer space laser and mirrordefense system nicknamed 'Star mars.'44. The Tims of India, (Hew Delhi), 29 May 1988.45. Ibid.

originrlly, it had been howd that the Senate approval wouldcon before Reagan left for Yo8cow. When that provedimpossible, the President's White House Chief of Staff,noward Baker, a former Senate major leader bim~elf, was leftbehind, to persuade his former colleagues.The Presidiu ofthe Supreme Soviet, a thirty six member body, headed byPresident, Andre1 A. Gromyko, met in a special session andcast a unanimous vote in favour of the treaty. With theagreement approval by the legislative bodies of bothcountries, Reagan and Gorbachev were expected to formallyexchange the final copies of the documents at the close oftheir summit meeting at Moscow.According to Gromyko, "The ratification of tbe Trerty by theSupreme Soviet will patently demonstrate the supportthegivenby the legislative body on behalf of our entire people tothe policy of constructively developing relations with the46US." The Soviet Foreign Yinister, Edward Shevardnadze,hailed the treaty as a product of the Kremlin's 'new47thinking' on international utters." Thur, the fourthsummit between Reagan md Gorbachev ended with the twoleaders exchanging documents on the ratification of the INF46. The 8tate6mrn (Calcutta), 29 MAY 1988.47. Ibid.

Treaty and pledging to move towards a treaty on strategicans reduction.Gorbachev said the exchange of documentsmeant that the era of nuclear disarmament had begun.Whilethe Soviet leader hoped that an agreement on strategic armsreduction would be concluded by the year end, Reagan feltthat it would take more time.The two leaders, in a statement, later "expressed theirjoint confidence that the extensive work done provides thebasis for concluding the treaty of reduction andlimitationof strategic offensive arms (START) which would promotestrategic stability and strengthen security not only of the48peoples of the USSR and the USA but of all mankind."Guided by this fundamental agreement, the US President andtbe Soviet General Secretary agreed to continue theirefforts in these areas energetically and purposefully andinstructed their negotiators to resume discussions on START49on 13 July 1988. Walking at Gorbachev's side in RedSquare,Reagan said he no longer viewed the USSR as the 'evilempire'. Additionally, Alexander Cockburn saw 'Munich inMoscow', apparently with Gorbrchev as today's NevilleChuberlain.48. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 2 June 1988.49. Ibid.

m e MOSCOW Sunmit was another milestone in the process ofbreakingdown the Cold War. Beyond the expected signing ofthe ratification of the INP treaty, its mainsignificance.as that Ronald Reagan's sortie into 'enemy territory'evidence that the 'enemy image' of the Soviet Unionas the focus of 'evil' was falling apart. Bowever, whensummit was over, it was clear that the Cold War rrs notover. There was r great disparity in the intentions andattitudes of the two governments toward winding down theCold War, especially on ending the arms race andtheyetcurtailingmilitary intervention in the third World. The USSR wanted toget on with START and begin steps toward reducing levels ofconventional arms. Gorbachev was anxious to establishpatterns of negotiation based on principles of non-intervention and self-determination as the alternative toprolongeddisastrous regional wars. The Reagan Doctrine,aspointed out by Leon Wolsy however, remrlned in place despiteits fiascos, employing a11 possible military and economicmean8 to force US 'solutions' to conflicts from the Persian50Gulf to the Philippines. Agreement6 had been Violated andnegotiators undermined. US arms continued to pour throughPdirtm to exploit the withdrawal of Soviet troops from50. Leon Volsy, *Gorbachevls Hew Thinking and WorldPolitics,* roothlv Review, Vo1.40, October 1988, p.28.

Afghanistan and a never-say-die effort was being made torestart the failed Contra War against Nicaragua. Bowever,thepolicies Of the Reagan Doctrine would be harder and harderto sustain as the international community became lesstolerant of unilateralism and military intervention inThird Vorld.Im~lementation: The IIF Treaty was ratified by both the USArod the USSR and came into effect from 1 June 1988.Accordingly, its provisions were carried out from that dateonwards. Thus,the US and the USSR had started implementingthe INF Treaty, widely acclaimed as the probable first stepin the long road towards a world free of nuclear weapons, ithad not been too easy to transform the rather simpleconceptions of the INP Treaty - the elimination of two typesof missiles - into reality. It had demanded newthelevels ofopenness or glasnost by Soviet and American militaryestablishments, This was in the sharing of highlysensitiveinformation, the working out of elaborate procedures for thedestruction of missiles and the creation of a set ofextremely intrusive verification mechanisms to prevent51possible violations of the treaty. In the past few yearseven the limited and partial arms control agreemento of the51. C Uaja Mohao, "The Iuclerr War Games," Frontline,(Madras), 1-7 October, 1988. p.37.

earlier era had been under great strain thhnks to thepersistent charges of cheating.The IAF Treaty, unlike the earlier agreements which reliedon intrusive intelligence gathering mechanisms to verifycompliance, had Set new standards for on-site, directverification procedures. Further, though it vas a bilateraltreaty between the USA and USSR, its implementation covereda number of third countries which had deployed Soviet orAmerican missiles. They included the United Kingdom, thePRC, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands on the Western sideand Czechoslovakia and CDR on the Eastern front.The first months of implementation saw the verification ofthe baseline data. The agreed count of missiles includedthose operationally deployed as well as those non deployedin storage depots. One of the glaring weaknesses of the INFTreaty was that the principle of elimination applied only tothe missiles, not to the nuclear warheads. Critics havepointed out that it is the nuclear warhead that kills peoplenot the misrile. The treaty obviously permitted therecycling of the warheads removed from the missiles, Thisclearly was contrary to the spirit of the treaty. At theThird U# Special Session on Disarmament, India demanded that

the warheads also he made part of the eliminationprocess.~t called for measures at the international level for thepeaceful use of the nuclear material released by the53disarmament process.The Washington Summit Of 1987 succeeded in signing a treatywhich was a major step in dismantling Cold Far.failed, the new-found and newly-built rapprochementthe USA and the USSR could have led to a breakdownIf this hadbetweenin notonly dialogue between them but also in overall relations,53bringing about a resumption of Cold Far. The summitsucceeded in expanding direct Soviet-American bilateralrelations and a notable rise in people-to-peoplecontactsand an exchange of students and artists of the twocountries. It also succeeded in furthering Soviet-Americanscientific cooperation,leadersAn agreement was signed between thefor a joint study on global climate, environmentalcharge and protection of the ozone lager. In anotheragreement, the two sides agreed to cooperate in the peacefulused of outer space. YiLitary exchanges between the twocountries,which would have been unthinkable ever oince the52. C b jr uobm, Yhe Nuclear Games," Frontline (Madras),1-4, 1988, p.37.53. C Raja Yohm, "Dioolrntling Cold War," The Bindu,(Madras), 2 January, 1088.

cold War began between them, had taken place during and,fter the sumit. Borever, in the sphere of ragionalissues, the runit could not bring about any agreementespecially on tbe vexing problems of Afghanistan andclmbodia.Vhile dircussing the INF Treaty, Professor Y.B. Naircorcnted, "The INP Treaty is a historic landmark in theannals of strategic arms control history. Thir treatymarked for the first time the complete elimination of anentire class state-of-the-&rt missiles between the-then twogreat superporers of the world, USA and USSR. The Treatyalso contributed in no small major to the considerableeaming of tensions between the world's two greatest nuclear-54arsenal possessing countries in the world." Overall, theINP Treaty can be regarded as a EUCCOSI in itsREGITIVE AID POSITIVE IrPLICATlONS OP TREATYThe treaty stater that only the airriler,together with theirlarucbers and rupporting rtructurer are to be destroyed hut54. In conrerrrtion with Prof.M.B.Mair,Kerala University,during SomiMr on 'Ktbnicity rod Nation Building',organired by USWI, hdrar and CSSAB, UniverrityHadram, on 23 March lBB4.

the nuclear warhead device and the aisrile guidance elementsfrom the INF missiles could be removed which could tben bereused And recycled on new weapon systems. The whole purposeof the treaty would bave then been lost if thir actuallyhappened. Another feature of the treaty which enable thesides to take fifteen mistilea, launch canisters andlaunchers and 'eliminate' them not by phyricaldestructionbut by putting them on etatic display, could result in thesemissiles being used in case of a war, should the need arise.Lastly, though the treaty is of unlimited duration, eitherparty "has the right to withdraw after giving slx monthsadvance notice" if it 'decides tbat extraordinary events...55bave jeopardized its supreme interests."Rowever, the positive aspects of the INf Treaty is tbatfor the first time, entirely eliminated two state-of-the-artnuclear airsiler. Secondly, It had contributed to theeasing of relations between the USA and the USSR.It8 complex intrusive verification procedurerfor the START Treaties and other nuclear andrras control treaties.it,Thirdly,war the basicconventional55. Rerbert P Bir, 'Tbe IUF Treaty : An !nterpretation,'Monthly Review, June 1888, pp.3-5.

The lashington Summit was a victory for tbe 'new thinking'of Gorbrchrv, in international relations. It had redefinedSoviet - American relations and de.on6trated that tbestructures of Cold War need not be as lasting and permanent1s they rere widely assumed to be. It had raised optimismin the collective hopes of tbe people that peace could begiven a chance.

Chapter Four

The Iaitiation of START TalksCBIPTER IVSTART I AND START I1 TREATIESThe two Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaties were bothhistoric in nature. mile START I became the last arm8control treaty between the USA and USSR, START 11 signalledthe start of bilateral arms control treaties between the USAand the new republic of Rursia. When Ronald Reagan took overas the 40th president of the USA, he had decided early inhis administration not to ratify what his colleaguescalledthe 'fatally flawed' SALT I1 Treaty,which had been rigned byPresident Carter in June 1979. Reagan also did not try toamend it and was patently uninterested in reruming the SALTnegotiations. Senior members of his administration hadclearmadethat priority would be given to building up Americrnmilitary power, and perhaps then to negotiate armslimitation - and as rtated by Raymond L Gartboff, this war1so as to he able to negotiate from a porition of rtrength.The Soviet leaders had expected the Reagan adminirtration totake a tough rtand on SALT 11. They were expecting demand8for renegotiations. As pointed out by Gartboff, they, atfirst, tried to di8coura;e attempts to amend the treaty by1. Rayeond L Carthoif, htente and Confrontation,(Iarbin;toa D.C., the Brooking8 Inrtitution, 1985,p.1032.

emphasizing that it war already the retult of balanced~apnlirer by both side8 and that, a8 r rolemnly signed2treaty, it should not be reopened. kter they began tostre88 the value of the treaty without ruling out 8050addition8 or minor chaager.Bwever, they did not know bow torerpond to the new adainistrrtion, even though it decided totalkno action contrary to the unratified treaty (and alsothat of the unexpired SALT Interim agreement of 1972),the t in being.Through most of 1981, Soviet Ambarsador to USA, Dobrynin, inprivrte meetings with US Secretary of Strte, Alexander Haig,kept urging a resuaptioa of the mtrrtegic rrmr trlkr. Haigonly repeated the need for Soviet rrrtraiat in the Third3lorld and in Poland . lben the United Stater wrr ready torerwe strategic arms talk8 (which had n w been redubbedstrategic arm8 reduction talk*, or START, to strersreduction - and to rbed the old rcronymn SALT - it ramattempting to berd- off riling American public 8upport for a4froeze on the deployment of all nuclear rrrpanr.for3. Alexander M Bail, Jr., Caveat: Realism. Reagan .nd?oreicn Policy, (Urcmillan, London, 1984), pp.102-109.4. &pond L Gartboff, Detente and Confrontation,(Irrhington D.C., th. Brooking8 In8tltution, 1985,p.1023.

The START n8gOtiati0n8 from 1982 through 1983 bave been we115chronicled in detail. Tbe internal policy debates anddecirionr within the Reagan adminirtration bad beenrevealing, and ulti~tely more rignificant, than thenegotiationr between the United Stater and the Soviet Union.Not only had there been conrtant bureaucratic infighting,but the general policy of the Reagan administration arwellas its leadersbip style (at least in its first term) ensuredthat the American porition preceded agreement.At the beginning of the START negotiations, it mas fatedfail at each side initially took a porition thrt warto it8 advantage, thrt reflected bargaining tactics.toloadedTherewas no fundamental incoapatability in the aims of the twosides which could be compared to that in the INP Talks.However,there were other heavy impediments to succeesfulimplementation. First, there was the legacy of SALT 11. Inframing an a m6 control position, the Reaganadmlni6trationignored the SALT I1 limitations and set out to do better forthe United States.Since the SALT I1 provisionr representedthe results of seven years of hard bargaining, it ma6unlikely that the Soviet Union mould make appreciably5. Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gubitr:Ad.inistration and the Stalemate l r Nuclear Armsbotrol, - (Kwpf, Iw Tork), 1984.

greater COaCersiOns. The United States, howerrr, proposed&-per reductions in a ray that would aim at the heart ofsoviet strategic force, as they called for a reduction of-0 thirds in Soviet large missiles. While the proposedoverall equal levels would nominally be equitable, the more&tailed rubceilings went against the interests of thesoviet forces. Yore important, a8 Strobe Talbott hasmrrectly pointed out, more of the planned majorL.provements to the US strategic force - the large YXmirsile with MIRVs, the 0-1 Bomber, the Trident SLBM and6submarine force - would have been banned or reduced. WhileSoviet Union mas being asked to give up most of its bestforces, the United States could mordernise its best forcesm d get rid of older systems for retirement, in any case.Tbe Soviet approach, while also rlanted in itr favour,attempted to preserve and build on the foundation of SALT11. In effect, the Soviet8 attempting to negotiate SALT111, propored sizeable reduction8 from the SALT I1 ceilingr.(In fact, the basic limit of 1800 rtrategic nuclear delivorynbicles war the same as the number proposed by the Carteradwinirtration in Yarch 1977 - and by the Nixon6 Ibid., 0~.Cit., pp.233-n6.2s

adninirtration in Augurt 1970 - although, as rtated by7Glrthoff, other proporrlr differed.START did not begin until mid-1982. By the rumwr of 1983,both rides had made some modifications in their poritionr,8but the gap still remained great. The United States, inparticular,war not ready to accept curtailment to its ownbuild-up of counterforce capabilities comparablecapabilities. mile the US proporals were noaioally equal,they would have applied unequally. As an example, thepropored limit of 5000 mirrile warheads for eacb sidewouldhave involved a sizerble and equitable cut of rbout onethird in the arrenals of both rider. But a rub-ceiling of2500 on land baaed missiles and further rubllmits of 210 onYX-sized and ICBMs (for example, the Soviet SS-18 andand US-YX) and of 100 on very large ICBYr (the SovietSS-10la), would have meant a cut of more than half in Soviet ICBMwarheadr and two third8 in SS-18 and 8s-19 warheadr, whilethe US could have deployed additional ICBM warheads,including the then planned 200 YX mirriler. In addition,7. btwod L Garthoif, Detente and Confrontation,(Ir~rhingtoo D.C., The Brookingr Inrtitution, l985),SS-8. Strob. Talbott, Deadly Grrbitr: The Reagan Adcinirtratienrod tbe Stalemate in luclear Anr Control, (Knopf,Ies York, 1984), pp.277-342.

all other US Strategic .oderaizrtion progranaes couldhavecontinued as well: Trident I SLBYs, bomber bared ALCY8,~uburine-based SLCYs and tbe Perrhing I1 and GLCY~uropsaa-baaed eyrtems. Overall, while the proposal wouldhave alleviated the vulnerability of American land-baredintercontinental mirailer, it would have greatly increased0the vulnerability to Soviet laad-bared mirrilen.The natural conservrtirm on both sides which had beenevident throughout the SALT negotiations of the 19708,remained. Both tried to get maximum reductions in tbeforcer of the other ride, but without being willing to makecomparable sacrifices in their own forcer andcaprbilitier.Both were also vary about constraining future optionr. Inthe past, that contradiction had been resolved byrercbingagreemntr that did not reriourly reduce the rtrategicforcea of each ride.The interest of tbe Reagan adminirtration ar a whole (andthis interest mar urked by diragreemeatr among it# chiefcomponentr) in rtrategic a n 8 limitation talk.remained veryuncertain. The argument continued to be made, ar RaymondGarthoif har stated, and believed by row (including9, Raymond L Garthoif, Deteote and Confrontation,(Warhiogton D.C., tba Brooking8 lartitutioa, l885),pp.1025-1026.

president Reagan) that only as military power was restored,(i.e., expanded and enhanced), would the Soviets have anincentive to negotiate seriously (lee., to accede to US10tams).After the Soviet leaders decided to brwk off INP talks atthe end of 1983, they also suspended START negotiations. Asrightly belived by the USSR, after a gear-and-a-half of thenonstart of START, the United States was not reriourlyinterested in negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement,They also believed that the rhock in the West of ending thetwo negotiations would cause a raappraisal and might jar theUnited States into undertaking a more rerious negotiatingeffort. Instead, the Reagan Administration was able toclaim tbat it remained as interested in arm8 limitation asever and that tbe Soviets were solely to blame for the breakdown caused by tbeir walk out.In March 1983, an important new element entered into thepicture tbat would caure a long rhadow over rubrequrntrtrategic arm8 negotiation8 and porriblr limitationr.President Reagan made a dramtic #pooch in March 1883 on the10. Ibid., Op.Cit., p.1026.

11concept of strategic missile defense. While both Bidesbad continued to conduct research and development work onantiballi8tiC missile defense or BUD), the ABY treaty of1912, of indefinite duration, had for a decade largelyremovedthis grey area of rtrategic defense from tho armsequation. It was now back. While the technology W18uncertain and distant, the very idea of 'Star Wars', a8President'r idea was quickly dubbed, captured wide publicattention. It also stirred considerable disquiet. ThePresident's initial idea was to substitute assured defensefor deterrance by assured retaliation. Later dircussion ofhi6 concept, officially termed the Strategic DefenseInitiative (SDI) blurred this rim and tended more to stresson high priority research and development of exotic BYDsgatemr that might complement rather than replace, rtrategicoffensive forcer intended to deter. The concept, as we11 amthe concrete technical rchemes rnviraged, remaineduncertain. Ievertheleaa, the US launched a $ 28 billion fiveyear programMuy in the United Stater and in WerterntheEurope rightlyqwrtioned the desirability, ar we11 at the technical11. President Ronald Raaga!, *national Security: Addrers toMation, March 23 1083, Preridential Document, Vo1.19,26 March 1983, pp.442-448.

prospct, of the purruit of rtrategic defense. The ideaitself challenged the underpinings of mutual deterrence,which had been the foundation of US and NATO policy, evenbefore SALT. Moreover, while the Administration argued,which, however, was not convincing enough, that its wholedevtlopment programme would be compatible with the ABYTreaty, no one could dispute that the avowed purpose of SDIwas to find effective means of ballisitic missile defense(BUD), the deployment of which (and at least rome testing)would require amendment or abrogation of the ABY Treaty.There also arose r new charge, not only from hardlinecritics outside the administration, but from theadministrrtion itrelf, that the Soviets were violrting theABY Treaty. Some criticr saw this action as merelycoincidental with the rising interert in rome qurrterr infreeing the United Stater from the constraints of thetreaty.The reaction of the Soviet Union war strongly negative. TheSoviet leader, Yuri Andrapor, personally rerponded to theStar gars rpaech with a denunciation of the reopening of theisrue of BUD and reaffirmation of mutual deterrence and theA M Trerty. Soviet rcientistr, like many Amaric~n one#rilhtly 8. no prospect of r truly effective defeare against

an enemy first strike, as President Reagan had as his goal.what they did See was the possibility of and a likely~uerican lead in developing a partiallyeffective defensethat, while not affording a protection againat the fullforce of an enemy first strike, might be considered adequateagainst a uinor retaliatory one. Thus, they felt that thesDIwas a concerted long-term American plan to develop afirst-strike capability. It was seen as an ominousrlternative to arms control, predicated on removing the moateffective existing arms limitation, the ABY Treaty; andprejudicingthe prospects for any strategic offensive arm6limitation. The US prograue to develop a strategic BUDthus complicated the attainment and preservation of anystrategic arms limitation. Arguments advanced by PresidentReagan and his administration that the SDI wouldfrcilitateoffensive arms reduction were, a6 Garthoff rightly put612naive.The first set of START trlks, held from June 1982 toDecember 1983, sought to achieve rigaificrnt reductions inthe strategic ballistic uissilr forces of tbe US andSoviet Union. The five rounds of negotiations were,haever, plagued by fundaseotal differences betmeen the two1. Raymond L Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation,(~rrhintton D.C., The Brookinpr Institution, 1985),it,the

sides on what f0rcOS would be reduced, bow the remainingforces would be configured, and how the reductions would beverified.The primary US objective in the START negotiations was toreduce those Soviet capabilities and force asymmetries mostthreatening to the US, particularly the Soviet advantage inheavy missiles and missile throw-veight. To this end, theUS used warheads, throw-weights and missiles, rather thanlaunchers, as the primary units of account in thenegotiations. This approach strongly discriminated againstland-based ballistic missiles forces, which was the main legof the Soviet strategic triad, while leaving sea-basedforces, which was the major portion of the US triadsignificantly less constrained and air-based forcercompletely unconstrained. Thus, it can be seen that the USranted to negotiate from 1 vantage position. The unspokenbut underlying aim of this discrimination was to restructurethe Soviet triad, decreasing their reliance on ICBMs andincreasing the role of SLBYs, bombers, and cruise missiles,which are considered to be more stablizing in A crisissituation. The Soviet Union based it initial approach tothe negotiations on the SALT I1 framework, calling forpercentage reduction8 in the SALT I1 limits 00 strategicnuclear delivery vebicles (ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy

wbers) and in the sub-limits on MIRVed weapons. It alsoproposed a new limit on nuclear launchers or warheads.soviet Union dismissed the US appraach as one-sidedThebecauseit required much deeper Cuts in Soviet than in US land-basedforces and placed 00 restriction on strategic bomberscruise missiles, areas of significant US advantrge.During the first five sessions of START, little progress masmade. In November 1983, the US began the deployment of INFmissiles in Europe. When Round V of START came to a closeat the end of 1983, the Soviet Union declined to set rresumption date, charging that US INP deployments in13had changed "the overall rtrrtegic situation."Nuclear and S~ace Arms TalksandEuropeAfter r year away from the negotiating table, theUnited States and the Soviet Union agreed in January 1985 toresume negotiatio~r on strategic offensfve weapons under theumbrellaof the lrclear and Space Arms Talk8 (NST), whichmould 8180 include negotiations on intermediate rangenuclear forcer and defense and space meaponr.bqan in March 1985, neither the US nor tbe SovirtWhen the NSTporition13. Anr Control and National Securit~: An latroduction,(Iarhington D.C., The A rm Control Arrociation, 1980),p.60.

had Changed rignificantly. However, the Soviet Union nowlinked an agrOewnt on rpace-bared weapon8 that wouldconstrainthe US programme on strategic defenrive weapons,whicb had become a prominent feature of US policyfollowingPresident Reagan's Star Wars speech in March 1983. TheSovietUnion argued, as did the United States when the ABWTreaty was negotiated, that the development and deploymentof strategic defenses would dertabilize the US-Sovietstrategic balance and force a major build-uparms.of offensiveNevertheless, as given in the account by the Arms Control14and National Security, a reed of consensus began to takeroot in Geneva. In the third round of the NST, the SovietUnion tabled a new proposal that crlled for a SO per centcut in ballastic ~issiles and heavy bombers and limitednumber of rtrategic nuclear varheads to 6000, on eachAlthough the Soviet proposal contained rome provisionrtheride.thatrere unacceptable to the United Stater (rucb 18 theinclusion of US fonard-bared rystem, a ban on long rangecruise misriles and linkage to a ban on all purposefulresearch), the US welcomed the Soviet mhift tovardr theconcept of deep reductions.SDI

START N ~ I A T I O N S (1981-1988)In lD81, following an indepth review of US security,armscontrol bnd compliance policieo, President Reagan decided tos ~ significant krrductionr in rtrategic forces ratherthanrere limitations on future growth. In a speech at Eurekacollege on 9 May 1982, the President outlined the USproposal which emphasized reductions in intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBMs),On 3 May 1982, Reagan announcedthat the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks would open on 29June of that year in Geneva. Re also stated that the USwould refrain from actions that would undercut the 6xistingstrategic arms agreements 60 long as the Soviet Union showedequal restraint.Shortly, after the START negotiations began in Geneva on 29June 1982, the US presented a proposal for rtrategicreductions to be implemented in two phaaes, The proposalincluded reductions in the number of rtrategic ballirticrirsile warheads to 5000 for each ride with a rublimit of2500 warheads on land bared ICBMs; a limit of 850 deployedstrategic ballistic mirsiler with a rublimit of no more than210 heavy and medium ICBMs of which PO .ore than 210 couldbe heavy ICBMs. TMre mublimitr were to onlure rubrtantifilcut8in the most destablizing mirrilr ryrteu - ballirtic

missiles, especially large ICBMs with MIRVs; a ban on newheavy miSsiles; sub8tantial reductions in ballisticmissiles, destructive capability and potential throw-weight;an equal ceiling on heavy bombers below the US level in SALT11; equitable limits and constraints on other strategicsystems.On 29 March 1983, the Soviets tabled a START Treaty whichwould result in 25 per cent reductions in the number ofstrategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles andbombers). The proposal banned all GLCNs and SLCYs and ALCYswith a range in excess of 600 kms. The Soviet proposalprovided reductions of the most destabilizing systems. TheSoviets also charged that the US proposal discriminatedrgainst the Soviet Union and that it would force them torestructure their strategic forces.The Comaiosion on Strategic Porces (Scorcraft Commission),which bad been appointed by President Reagan, published itsreport on 6 April 1983. The report, which gave a truepicture, underscored the need to modernize US strategicweapons, had to undertake negotiations leading to balancedares control agreemeats that would promte stability intimes of crisis rad result in muatngful, verifiablereductions. The President endorred tbis report.

US prerented its first draft START treaty on 7 July1983. This draft text reflected the central elements of tbeUS START propasal, while 1160 taking into considerationSoviet Concerns about the Origin11 US proposal. TbeUS relaxed its proposal limit of 850 deployed ballistic#isriles on its insistence that no more than half of the.arbeads on ballistic missiles be land-based. In addition,ths proposal included a limit of 400 heavy bombers. Theproposal would give botb sides the option of rertructuringtheir forces more flexibly, including moving in thedirection of smaller and less threatening single varherdICBMs.The START talks came to a halt in December 1983 when theSoviets refused to set a date for their rerumption. Theyalleged a "change in the strategic situation," followingNATO deployment of intermediate range of nuclear misoiles inresponse to Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. On 22November 1984, the US and Soviet Union jointly announcedtheir agreement to enter into new negotiations on nuclearand sprce issuea.The US Secretary of State, George Schultz and ForeignMinister, Andre1 Grayko, met in Geneva between 7 - BJanuary 1985, to set an bgenda for new comprehensive arm#control negotiations to cover mtrategic nuclear aras, INP

and defense and 8paCe. During his second Inaugural Addressto the country (for a second four-year term in office),President Reagan raid, "We are not just discussing limits ona further increase in nuclear weapons. We seek, instead, to15reduce their number."men the US and the Soviet Union began, on 12 March 1985,new negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), theUS, among other objectives, sought radical reductions in thenumber and destructive power of offensive strategic arms anditdrafted the START treaty of 1983. The Soviet side madeno specific proposal. They, however, insisted on placinglimits on the US SDI as a precondition for progress instrategic arms area. In a message to Congress on 10 June1985, Reagan stated that the US would continue to refrainfrom undercutting the SALT I agreement andSALT 11thethe unratifiedagreement a8 long as the Soviet Union exercisedequal restraint and actively pursued arms reduction atGeneva. Reagan also announced the dirmantlement of aPoreidon ballistic missile rubmarine to give the Sovietslore time to take the necessary step8 i n joining the US inestablirhing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.15, Quoted in United Stater Information Agency, Yay lB88puphlet .

the USSR presented its START proposal on 30 September 1985.hichcontained a number of elements found unacceptable bythe US, such an, counting certain US systems as strategic,while excluding, what the US felt, was an even greaternumber of comparable Soviet systems.The Soviets, however,accepted, for the first time, (due to economicconsiderations), the principles long advocated by the US -that of deep reductions in strategic offensive forcer.Itwas the turn of the US to present a new proporal, on 1November 1985, at the neeotiating table which included thefollowing major elements: a limit of 4500 reentryvehicles(RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs which was about 50 per cent belovcurrent levels; a sublimit of 300 RVr carried by ICBMs,which was about 50 per cent the current Soviet level; asublimit of 1500 RVs carried on permitted ICBMs except thoseon silo-based light and medium ICBM8 with six or fewerrarherdr; a 50 par cent reduction of the higbert overallstrategic ballirtic airrile throw weight of either ride;contingent upon Soviet acceptance of there RV and throw-weight limits, the US would accept an equal limit of 1500 onthe number of ALCYs carried by US and Soviet heavy bomber8 -about 50 per cent below planned US deployment levelr; alimit of l2SO - 1450 on 8trategic ballirtic miriler (ICBM8and 8LIIYs) - about 40 par cent to 50 per cant below the

current Soviet level, in the context of an appropriateagreement on strategic ballistic missiles, the US wouldaccept a limit of 350 On heavy bombers, roughly a 40 parcent reduction from US SALT accountable levels; a ban on a11new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernisationof existing heavy missiles - the most destablizing weapons;a ban on a11 mobile ICBMs because of difficulties inverification.On 21 November 1985, President Reagan and General SecretaryGorbachev, issued a joint statement in Geneva, following twodays ia intensive negotiations. Aaong other things, theyagreed to commit their countries to early progress at theGeneva NST talks, and to focus in particular on areas wherethere was common ground, including the "principle of 50 percent reduction in the nuclear arms of the US and USSR16appropriately applied." Both realized the expensesinvolved were very great and that the public pro88 in bothcountries clamoured for w re public goods, andthey did not want to further increase nuclear weapons.therafore,In June 1986, the bvieta presented a new interim proporal,which called for lea8 than the SO per cent reduction8 agreedto at the lB85 Geneva sunit. Reagan stated that the Soviet16. ?be Tim6 Of India, (sew hlhi), 22 ~OVe.bet 1085.

proposal was positive, 4lthough be emphrsired that the UScould not accept the PrOPOSll without changes, When Reaganand Corbachev w t in Reykjavik, Iceland, for the second onto-onesummit conference between them on 1 October 1986, theditcussions on START stalled when Rergrn refused to limitSDI research and testing to the lrborrtory, as Gorbrchev anddemanded. The US team presented a new START proposal inGeneva, on 22 October 1986, which incorporated areas ofagreement reached rt Reykjavik hod they proposed newsolutions in rrers where differences remained. It WAS inthe early period of 1987 that the US proposed that the areasof agreement reached at Reykjavik should serve as the basisfor START agreement. Both the sides developed a jointworking document which specified the points of rgreement anddisagreement on key issues.fben George Schultz and Edurrd Shevardnrdze met in Yoscowfra 13 to 15 April 1987, they both agreed to focus STARTnegotiations on the priority objective of 50 per centreduction in strategic arms. On 8 Yay 1987, the US termpresented a draft START treaty in Geneva, which would reduceUS and Soviet strategic arm6 by 50 per cent. This drrftreflected baric areas of agreement reached by Reagan rodCorbcbev, at the Pepkjavik rummit in October 1986. TheBoriet Union rerponded to the US drrft treaty presented on 8

way, with its own draft treaty which they presented on 31july 1987. Under this Proposal, the 50 per cent reductionin strategic offensive arms was contingent upon achievementof a US-Soviet accord to limit the testing and deployment ofspace-based defense systems.Pollo~ing three day8 ofintensive dis~~ssi~ns betweenSchultz and Sbevardnadze, from 15 to 17 Setember, 1987, theyagreed to intensify the negotiating efforts in Genevareduce strategic offeasive arms by 50 per cent. Thoughadditional progress was made on outstanding issuer,important issue6 - such as the needtofor a sublimit onballistic missile warheads and the Soviet proposal to linkSTART to US acceptance of measures that would cripple theSO1 programme, remained unresolved.On 30 October 1987, Reagan aad Schultz metMinister Shevardnadte in Washington.with ForeignThe discusrion onSTART focussed on ballistic missile warheads andverification. The two sides agreed to consider bow bestproceed on this subject in Geneva. At their third summitmeeting, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty eliminatingintermediate-range nuclear risriler, at Washington, on 8December 1987. At the ruuit, which took place between 7 to10 December 1987, they alro agred to inrtruct theirto

paotiators to work twards completion of a START agreement,at the earliest possible date, preferably in time forsignature of such a treaty, during their next meeting, inMoscow, in tbe first half of 1988. During the summit, thetmo leaders made further progress on START, includingapeement on a sublimit of 4900 for the total number ofballistic missile warheads, declaration of the number ofwubeads on existing ballistic missiles and building on theverification provisions of the INF Treaty, and guidelinesfor the effective verification of a START treaty. However,inportant differences remained, including such issues asmobile ICBMs, SLCYs and the details of an effectiveverif ication regime.Round IX of the NST talks began in Geneva on 14 January19118. fork on a joint draft START treaty continued. Atthese trlks, the US presented a draft protocol on'Iupection and Monitoring', a key element in a STARTtreaty, on 12 February, 1988. During the Ceneva tslks, theUS presented a draft Memorandum of Understanding. The UShad now fulfilled a commitment to present all three of thedoamants that the ministaro raid are needed to be addresredby the negotiators prior to the march ministerial meeting.These document8 were the: Protocol on In8pection; ProtocolOD Conversion or ~1i.inatio~; Memorandum of Undarrtanding

(on data exchange). The Soviets, in their turn, presented adraft Protocol On InIIpection, draft Protocol on Conferenceor Bliminatioo, rod a draft Memorandum of Uoderstanding,betwee0 7 to 11 March, 1988. By mid-March 1988, the~egotiators developed joint draft texts of threeverificatioo documents with disputed points indicated inbrrckets.On 22 and 23 March 1988, George Schultz rod fdurrdSbevrrdnadze met in Vashington DC, to make intensive effortsto complete a STARTqreaty at the earliest possible date.The Ministers reviewed the three joint draft documentsprepared by the oegotirtors and reemphasized theircommitment to effective verification measures, and agreedthat the oegotirtors would seek to resolve the remainingdifferences in these documents and report on the progressmade at the next ministerial meet in^. At the meeting rtMoscow between Schultz and Sbevardnadze, on 21 rod 22 April1988, they reviewed the drafting of the START treaty textand three related documents. They noted the progreer madeand discussed remaining differences, including verificationand counting of ouclerr armed, long ranged ALCYs; limitatioorad verification of SLCYs; sublimits; aod mobile ICBMs.Secretary Scbultz presented new ideas of ALCYs andadditional data on mtratsgic forcer. They a180 reaffirmed

their commitment to complete a START Treaty by the earliestpossible date. Thus, it Can be Seen tbat the STARTnegotiations, between the USA and USSR, from 1981 to 1988were full of proposals and counter proposals and drafts andcounter proposals from both sides.False Starts to STARTIn an interview to Arms Control Today on 19 December 1989,conducted by Jack Yendelsohn and Robert Culdin, AmbassadorBurt stated, wben asked whether a START agreement would beready 13 principle by tbe June 1990 summit between BushGorbacbev, replied, "The President of the United Stateswouldandlike to complete a START treaty wben be meets withCorbachev in June. He recognizes, however, that pores adifficult task. So we have said tbat we would like toresolve a11 the major outstanding issues by the June summit,17aich leaves us a little bit leeway following tbe summit."By the April 4-6 Iaehington ministerial meeting betweenSecretary of State, James A. Baker and Soviet Forei~nUinister Eduard Shevardnadze, it was clear that there wouldbe no START trerty for Presidents Bush and Gorbacbev to rign&ring their scheduled 30 Nay to June 1090 ruuit. In fact,17. Jbck Nendelrohn and Robert Guildin, "Ambassador RichardBurt on the State of START," Arms Control Today,Pmbrlury ISW, Vo1.20, Il0.1, p.4.

tbere was little headway in resolving outstanding issues inSTART-the range of the cruise missiles to be limited and the18nature of the restrictions of SLCMs. As Spurgeon M.Ieeney,Jr., put it, "It's not clear whether lack of progress inSTART was due to tactical manoeuvering - related either tothe endgame of an important negotiation or to the Lithuanian19crisis - or to longer-term strategic concerns." It was acombination of a11 three tbat resulted in START failure.Inthe lead up to and aftermatb of the lashington summit,itself,between Bush and Gorbachev,a previously obscure issueinvolving the upgrade of tbe Soviet Union's SS-18 ICBM - thelargest and most threatening Soviet missile,bearing the NATOcode name "Sataa"- emerged as a highly politicized stumblingblock to START negotiations. Although the Soviet Union hadlong since agreed to slash its force of these heavy missilesin half, START critics charged that this was not enough,insisting on a total flight test-ban tbat would endmodernization and leave the remaining SS-18s to atrophy in20tbeir silos.18. Discussion on 'Pro-S~it Showdown: Complexities Catchupwith START, CPE, Moderator Jack Yendelsobn, @Control Todax, May 1990, Vo1.20, No.4, p.13.IS.Ibid.20. Matthew Bunn, "SS-1START," Ar -r,Modernization: Tbe SATAN andJuly/August 1990, Vo1.20,l0.6, p.13.the

~t the sumit, the Bush administration felt the politicalbeat and continued to 'insist on some limits on SS-18 testingand modernization, in the face Of stiff Soviet resistance.r he mnit ended with the issue still unresolved, along withdisputes, over the Soviet Backfire bomber and US rales ofstrategic missiles to its allies. lith the two Presidentsunable to reach accord, it was unrealistic to expect theirnegotiators to do So without political decirions from thetop; there was reportedly, in the weeks following thesummit, little progress in Geneva. The SS-18 continued tofester, drawing political fire on START and posing one ofthe largest obstacles to a final accord.Despite the Washington Summit commitment to finish a STARTtreaty by the end of the year (1990), the START negotiationhad virtually stalled with little hope of meeting thedeadline unless the process was accelerated by high-levelofficialr on both sides. During the summit, Secretary ofState, James Baker identified three major remainingobrtrcles of a START accord: reatrainto on SS-18 flighttesting and moderni-zation; limit8 on the Soviet Backfirebollbar, and details of provirions designed to prevent eitherside fma circrurenting the treaty.

A State Department official said that neither delegation wasreceiving sufficient instructions to get the treaty finished21by the end of that year (1990) . The likelihood of theMoscowSmit (11-13 February 1991) during which the STARTtreaty was to have been signed, faded with the onset ofPersian Gulf War and the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania.According to Spurgeon Y.theKeeny, Jr., the cancellation of thesummit mas the price paid for "having dawdled over the STARTnegotiations for years while each side's negotiators souaht22minor advantages." With real effort, the treaty couldprobably have been coapleted for President Reagan's Moscowsummit in June 1988, and certainly for President Bush'sWashington Summit in June 1990.The final treaty, which wasnow essentially complete, had not measurably changed overthe past few years.On 28 January 1991, only two weeks before the scheduledMoscow Sunit at wbich the United States and the SovietUnion expected to sign the historic START Treaty,SecretaryOf State James Baker rnnounced that the meeting would have21. Dunbar Lockwood, "START Talk8 Stalled, 1990 Finish InJeopardy," Arms Control Today, Sspteaber 1990, Vo1.20,R0.7, pp.17-21.22.+Spurgeon Y teeny Jr., "Need START be a CaSualty?" ArmsControl Toda , January-February, 1B91, Vo1.21., NX

to be postponed to "a later date in the first half of this23gear." Baker explained that "The Gulf War makes itinappropriate for President Bush to be away from Iashington.though the START Treaty in its entirety was almostready,the Gulf War between USA and its allies against Iraq overthe latter occupation Of Kuwait in January 1991, againstalled the treaty from being signed.In addition, work on the START treaty will require some24additional time." On 7 February, Baker told the SenateForeign Relations Committee that the three outstandingissues in START were: non-denial of telemetry, downloading,and the definition of new types of missiles. It is foundthat the START Treaty, which took about ten years tonegotiate, could have been ready during the closing stagesof Ronald Reagan's second term re President of the USA,the amall niggling points could have been resolved, rsmajor portion of the negotiations had taken place during histerms in office. The Treaty was further delayed due to thePersian Gulf Iar that took place in the beginning of 1991.The treaty had been echeduled to be signed betweenifthe23. Dunbar Lockwood, "Moscow Summit, START SigningPostponed,' Arms Control Today, March 19B1, Vo1.21,10.2, p.25.24. Ibid.

presidents Bush and Gorhachev in thier February summit.However, due to the circumstances which were beyond theircontrol and vhch have been mentioned above, it could nottake place as scheduled.TIE SIGHING OF START TREATYOn 16 April 1991, President George Bush stated the plans for25a summit in Moscow were still "predicated" on being ableto sign START.The US Secretary of State, James Baker, andthe Soviet Foreign Minister, Alexander Bessmertykh, met26Lisbon, Portugal, to clear problems relating to START.their meeting at Geneva on 7 June 1991, both Bessmertnykhand Baker failed to resolve differences that remained27regarding START. Both the US and Soviet Union statedthat they had narrowed their differences over START but thatthere were still major points of contention which were: howmany warheads had to he loaded into each missile; bow eachside would transit missile test data to earth so thatatIneachside could monitor it and how to define new types of28missiles.25. Rev York Tiaes, 17 April 1991.26. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 2 June 1991, p.3.27, lev York Times, 8 June 1991.28. Re. York Tiws, 21 June 1991.

~ush felt that a reduction in defence expenditure rhouldmade quicklY because recession in the US could then belessenedbut the delay by the negotiators to come up witha treaty that would really cutback on long range continentalnissiles .asprogressing so Slowly that President Bush askedthe Soviet negotiators to Show more flexibility in theirtalks and also sent a note to President Gorhachev,suggesting that Baker and Bessmertnykh should meet so that29it would quicken the arms accord. Reacting to thisrequest, the White Rouse official issued a statementbesayingthat Gorbachev has agreed to Bush's request to sendBessmertnykh (Soviet Foreign Minister) to Washington toand complete the START Treaty in time for a summit meeting30in late July. On 10 July 1991, President George Bushformally asked the Senate to ratify a treaty that was signedby 22 countries in November 1990 at Paris. The treaty,knan as Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), waslandmark treaty which would slash non-nuclear forces inEurope. By the terms of the treaty, each side would (NATOand former Warsaw Pact Members) be limited to 20000 battletank#, 30000 armoured combat vehicler, 20000 artillerypiewr, 2000 attack belicopterr, 6800 combat aircraft. Bushtrya29. Mew Tork Times, 7 July 1991.30. Rev Tork tins, S July, 1991.

described the treaty 1s "the most ambitious arms-controlagreement ever concluded," and stated that it 'will be ofmajor importance in laying the indispensable foundation for31the post Cold War security architecture in Europe." Thisact of Bush of asking for ratification of the CFE Treaty,was due to the considerable ease of tension between the USAand USSR. The agreement resulted in r substantial lesseningof defence expenditure on both aides and was possible onlydue to a lessening of tension between the two powers,was real and significant.Two days later, Bush clarified that he saw no evidenceGorbacbev had decided to speed negotiations on START inwhichthathopes of securing economic assistance from the West. He32added that there was "no linkages." START Talks andGorbachev's desire for economic assistance to boost theriling economy of his country. Bush issued thisclarification because the START talks had begun inWashington tbe day before, which was leas than r week beforeGorbachev bad requested aid from the Western leaders,following their annual economic suuit in London. By 13July 1991, talks batween Baker and Beasmertnykh failed to31. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 11 July, 1991.32. Tbe Telegraph, (Cllcutta), 13 July, 1991.the

achieve complete agreement on START, though both sidesagreed that the negotiators would continue to work on it.* ~ we f were 96 per Cent a couple of weeks ago, we are 97 percent now. But we have got to be 100 per cent ," said33Baker, Tho was referring to the stage of agreement onSTART between USA and USSR,It was on 14 July 1991 that Secretary of State, James Bakerand Soviet Foreign Yinister,Alexander,Bessmertnykh,rn~ouncedthat they had resolved all issues regarding START except forsome highly technical disputes which they hoped to resolvein the coming days. The announcement came after four days3 4of marathon talks between the two. However, it was onlyon 17 July 1991 that the United States and Soviet Unioncould formally announce to the rest of the world that theyhad come to an agreement over START, and that all the thornyissues were resolved, especially after a compromise wasreached between them on the highly technical issue ofthrowweight on new missiles. Soon rfter this announcement,President Bush immediately agreed to meet PresidentGorbachev in Yo8cow in late July, for the signing of the35treaty and other i88ues.33. The Timer of India, (Delhi), 13 July, 1991.34. Nw York Tiws, 15 July lD91.35. lam York Timer, 18 July 1991.

GorbaCheV, meanwhile, left for London, to confer with the G-7 leaders, who had gathered there for their annual summit,in the second week of July 1991. Gorbachev met theseleaders after the suamit for economic aid for bishe Western leaders had come up with a six-pointwhich included associate membership of the IMP, advicecountry.programme,fromother institutions, technical assistance and follow-upmeetings with G-7 ministers. However, the Soviets weredisappointed with this package and the Soviet Foreignministry spokesman commented that "more could have been36accomplished," by the 6-7 leaders in tbeir package to theSoviet Union.President George Bush left for Moscow for a two-daysuperpower summit. It was basically to sign the STARTtreaty which had taken almost a decade to negotiate.However, this time, he knew and the world knew that, hegoing to Moscow not as leader of a superpower countrywasgoingto meet and hold talks with the leader of the othersupercountry of the world, but increasingly, as thepreceding events had shown and the future event6 wouldshow, as the leader of the only superpower country in theworld.The last few days of the negotiations concerning the38. The Telegraph (Calcutta), 19 July l@el, p.3.254

START treaty had shorn that the US aegotiators reemed to beable to have the last few issues resolved because they (the0.5 negotiators) had increasingly bewoe the dominant partnerin the negotiations and as the signed START treaty wouldlater Show, the an8 Cuts in strategic weapons definitelyfavoured the USA. The meeting of the leaders of the Westernindustrial countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Great Britain,Prance, Germany and Italy), at London on 15 and 16 July1991, was dominated by talks on whether to give financialaid for the Soviet Union's visibly tottering economy and ifso, by how much. Thus, there were critics who alleged thatthe last few highly contentious technical issues that hadtaken so much of the time of both US and Soviet negotiators,was solved in a very short time ar Gorbachev ranted toimpress upon the US the good intentions of the Soviet Unionand also for the aced of the lest to donate a generouseconomic aid to the Soviets in the latter's efforts to shedits Comaunist heritage and turn its economy the Capitalistwag.TEE MOSCOWSTART TREATYSUMMIT: 30,31 July, 1991 - THE SIGUIUG OP TBEGeorge Bush, on the first day of the summit, i.e., on the 30July 1991, annouaced, after him discorrions with Gorbachevthrt Iarbington would soon give Mort ravoured Nation (YPN)

trade status to the Soviet Union.Bush raid, "Iben I returnto waehington, 1 will submit to the Congress the US-Soviettrade agreement we rignod 00 Year ago. Then we can grant37the Soviet Union YPN trade status." Rowever, Bush made itclearrepublicsthat the Soviets would have to relent on the Balticissue, Cuba and dispute with Japan over the fourislands to facilitate their speedy integration into worldeconomy.It was on the last day of July 1991, that the historiccentre-piece of the summit, i.e., the START treaty, wassigned.In a fitting climlx to START, the treaty was rignedwith pens made out of the scrapped missiles destroyed in38accordance with the INF Treaty of 1987.START TREATY (PROVISIONS)The United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to carryout rrductions of strategic arms in three pharer, over rperiod of seven years, reducing to BOO0 accountable vehicler(deployed ICBMs), SLBMo, their arrociated launcher8 andheavy bombers). The two rides had a180 agreed to: rsublimit of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM and BLBY37. The Timer of India, (Mew Dclhi), 31 July 1991.38. Tbe Telegraph, (Calcutta), 31 July 1991.

warherdr; 1 Sublimit of 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs;and r 46 per cent Cut in the aggregate throwweight of Soviet1CBYs and SLBYs. The Soviet Union had agreed not to givefuture nodificrtions of the SS-18 ICBM greater throwweightthan the existing 9s-18 Nod 5.The duration of START Treaty would be for 15 years unlesssuperseded by a subsequent agreement, with tbe option ofextending the treaty for successive five year periods. Thesides agreed that the treaty could be signed and ratifiedwithout completing the Defense and Space Treaty, regulatinganti-ballistic activities, which was then under negotiation.BalliSti~ missile warheads would count as one warhead eachunder the 6000 limit. No matter what the actual number ofbombs and short range attack missiles (SRAM8) carried by aheavy bombers, its paylord would count rs only one wrrherdunder the 6000 ceiling. Existing and future US heavybombers might be required to carry no more than 20 longrange nuclear ALCMs, existing and future US heavy bombersmight be equipped to carry no more than 16 range nuclearALCYs. Each of the first 150 US ALCY carrying bomberr wouldcount as carrying ten warheads. Beyond 150, they wouldcount as having the number of ALCYs for which they wereactually equipped. Each of the first 180 Soviet ALCYcarrying bombers mould count as having the number of ALCYsfor which they were actually equipped.257

xis sting ALCYs with a range of more than 600 kas would besubject to START limits. (The conventionally-arwd TacitRainbow anti-radiation missile, which has a range of over600 kms would be exempt from this provision. The DefenseDepartment, however, had proposed cancelling the ~acitRainbow programme in the Fiscal Year 1992 budget). Futureconventionally armed ALCYs with a range greater than 600 kaswould not be accountable under START if they Were externallydistinguishable from long range nuclear armed ALCYr.Nuclear-armed SLCUs with a range over 600 kms would belimited to a maximum of 880 deployed missiles in a separatepoliticrlly binding agreement. Each year, the two rideswould declare the maximum number of long range nuclear armedSLCYs they planned to deploy over the succeeding five years.The two sides would also exchange data annually on the typesof SLCY platforms and the number of deployed nuclear armedSLCYs with a range between 600 and 300 kms. Soviet Backfirebombers would be limited to 500, in r separate politicallybinding agreement. In addition, the Soviet Union had agreedto operrtional conrtraints, to make it more difficult forthe Backfire to rtrike the United Stater.Irrherd readings for existing missile types had beeneatrbli8hed. For exraple, each peacekeeper and SS-18

missile would be counted as having 10 warheads on futureballistic missile types, had been agreed to, in principle,The rides had agreed to limit tbe number of non -deployedlobile ICBMs and launchers. They had also agreed that nondeployed mobile ICBYs had to be stored some distance frommobile ICBY deployment Sites and from any facility wheremobile missile launchers were stored. Factory serialnumbers would he used to identify legally produced missiles.Both parties had agreed that a START verification regimewould, at a minimum include: data exchanges: on-siteinspections (OSI) to estabilish a base line inventory; OSIof conversion and elimination of weapon systems; continuousperimeter (portal monitoring of certain mobile ICBYproduction facilities), short notice inspections atfacilities; short notice inspections at facilities relatedto strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verifytbe number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) on deployed ballisticmissiles; challenging inspections of Suspect sites inaccordance with agreed procedures; a ban on telementryencryption and Other concealment measures; and cooperative~earurer, including open displays of rtrategic aystems, toenhance obrerratioo by natiooal technical mans.The US would have continuour perimenter/portal monitoring ofthe final arrrmbly plants for the Soviet 95-24 and 59-25

ICBYS, while the Soviet Union would have similar monitoring,t the US Tbiokol plant in Promontory, Utah, that producesthe first etagas of the US MX and Midgetman ICBMs, as wellas second site, probably the Hercules plant at Magna,Utah, already subject to continuous monitoring under the INPTreaty. The US, bowever, does not believe that the firststage of the Midgetman should be considered tbe smallesttrerty-limited item for purposes of determining whatinspections at other sites may be examined.Each side would be permitted to inspect non-ALCY carryingheavy bombers that had been tested with ALCYs, ruch as theUS B-1, and ensure tbat they had not been converted to ALCYcarriers. Heavy bombers tbat bad not been tested with ALCms,such as the US 8-2, would not be subject to suchinspections.START TREATY: A CRITIQUEThe signing of tbe START Treaty came as r sort of anti-Climax. It had taken about a decade to negotiate. In fact,the world had been expecting that it would be signed atleast by 1987 or lQ88 during President Reagrn'o term inoffice. With a little more effort by negotiators from bothteams, the technical isruer could have been resolved earlieron 80 that the treaty could have been signed. When the

treaty was finally signed in July 1991, the +orld had beenoverfed by the Press about the treaty's historic provisionsthat it no longer created the stir or impact that thesigning (of the START Treaty) should have. Yoreover, theworld itself was passing through historic tiees. The twosuperpowers, the USA and USSR, had been Cold llar rivals forabout four-and-a-half decades, beginning with the end of theSecond World War. Aowever, with the arrival of YikhailGorbachev, first as General Secretary and then as, Presidentof the USSR, things began to change. His policies of'perestroika' (reetructing) and' 'glasnost' (openess) weredefinitely having an impact on a11 aspects of Soviet societyand this impact could be felt in the changes that were beingwrought not just in the Soviet Union but in the vorld over.The Berlin Wall, which no one had (even a few yearspreviously) thought, would live to see it destroyed, hadtakn place and the Unification of Germany, which many hadfelt would be impossible, had taken place. Many of theformer Soviet satellite countries were now trying to shakeoff the Communist yoke from their backs and nationalisturges were being manifest in many of these countries. Thus,it was now evident that the build-up of a never ending armsarsenal between the two former superpower rival8 washcaing a thing of the part and that nov that the Cold War

etween the two parers was at an end, arms control was notas much of an issues it once was, as when the two powers hadbeen intense rivals.A news-analysis article in the 'New York Times' hadrightlystated that the START treaty's objective was first toreduce, rather than limit long range nuclear arsenals andthat the treaty was signed more to establish verification39procedures that could be used for future arms accords.When the provisions of the START Treaty are fullyimplemented, the US will still be left with about 9000strategic warheads and the USSR (now Russia) with about 7000whichwould still be capable of destroying the earth morethan twenty to thirty times over.When the START negotiations had first begun, its primaryobjective was to bring out a 50 per cent cut in the longrange nuclear arsenal of both powers. Rowrver, when theSTART Treaty mas signed, the implementation of itsprovisions would bring about only a 35 per cent reduction inthe Russian nuclear arsenal and for the USA, it was evenless - a 25 p.r cent reduction.The treaty was both inadequate in #cop0 and unequal incuts it ude. It altogether left out a crucial weapons39, The Hew York Times, 16 July 1991.tbe

system from itt purview, i.e., the tea-launched cruiseaissile (SLa). The USA Could bring out its superiorpartner rtrtus in the negotiations preceding the signing ofthe START treaty by this (i.e., by not having SLCYincludedin START'S proVi~ion6). The Soviets had insisted the SLaf6be included in the talks but the US prevailed over the USSRin making them give up this demand. The SLCMr which "carrya strong surprise elewnt and which blur theline betweenstrategic and tactical arms," as Praful Bidwri notes, had40 .-"become increasingly important over the years." Moreover,the contour hugging cruise missile are difficult to detectand destroy in their flight trajectory. The US, in thisregard, have a clear superiority, where SLCMs are concerned.The cuts are asymmetrical/unequal because the US has more ofits strategic bombers bared at sea or on bombers whileUSSR had more warheads on landbased ICBMs. The biggertreduction was in the number of Soviet SS-18 hervy ICBMs(308). The SS-18s take only 25 to 30 minutes to reach theirtargets while strategic bombers take hours.Finally, $TART doe# not forbid the development of newer,Wre sophisticated, accurate and powerful nuclear weapons.the40. Praful Bidrai, "START: More Arm# Control thanUoductioa," The Times of India, 5 August 1991, p.7.

gmever, START has its plus, positive points too.The delayin the signing of START is A case of 'better late thannever'. A 25 Per cent and 35 per cent cut in the nucleararsenals of both powers respresented a one-fouth and one-third cut, respectively, which though not 'quite there1, wasanyway, still a substantial cut. The complex verificationcontrols established in START, could be used as a foundationfor other future arms accords.men Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan, hailed the STARTTreaty a8 tbe fruit of nine years Of negotiationsUSA and USSR and told newsmen that he hoped that the USbetweenthe Soviet Union would have further talks to reduce theirstrategic arsenals, he was reflecting the feelings of the41entire world.lhen the treaty is implemented, the twin objectives of alessening in overkill capabilities and ravings in hillionrOf dollars rill be achieved, The fact that it is no longeranimperative for the USA and the present Russia to go foran endless build-up of newer and more powerful weapons ofmass destruction, makes for a more secure and atable world.and41. The Times of India, 2 August 1993, p.7.

TEE DISI~EG~TIOI( Or TEE SOVIET UNION AND AFTER~vent8 Leading to the SiEninlr Of START E: The START ITreaty, which was the Mst comprehensive strategic nucleararms control treaty signed was also the last treaty signedbetween the USA and USSR. After the signing of this treaty,dramatic events took place in the Soviet Unon and also therest of the world. The failed coup in the USSR, when a fewof the Communist hardliners tried to wrest governmentcontrol, and undo all that Corbachev had tried to changethrough his policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, and bringback the country to what it one was-as the supreme leaderand respresentative of Communist idealogy, did not succed.Instead, it (the attempted coup) only served to hasten theprocess of Soviet disintegration. Slowly but surely,Gorbachev, the man who was mainly responsible for all thischange, was being sidelined and marginalized. Though he wasstill an important figure in the international arena, he wasloeing his hold on the domestic front. The Balticrepublics, (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) were in fermentand declared their independence. Boris Yelstin, the manwhom Gorbachev bad picked up to lead his reform programmesand whom he later sacked, was the Prerident of Russia.After the August 1991 coup, during which Yelltin bravelystood up to the coup leaders, he (Yelstin) became

increaringl~ .om Powerful and it was very clear that hiswas n w being increasiagly heard, both in the Sovietunion and the rest of the world.HOW that the rivalry between USA and USSR was officiallyover, with the end of the Cold War between them, bothsideswere confident enough to take unilateral decisions in thefield of strategic nuclear weapons.~osh who led the way, in this regard.It was President GeorgeIn a surprise speech,~ush announced on 27 September 1991, a unilaterfil set of42decisions and proposals, for US and Soviet nuclear forces.The reduction that Bush had called for included: acompleteellaination of all ground-launched short range nuclearweapons (about 1300 artillery shells and 850 missilewarheads), including those in Europe and South Korea anddismantling and destroying all such warheads; withdravala11 tactical ouclear weapons from US ships andofrubmrrines,raoval of all US long range bombers (about 40 at 12 brans)from alert operations and moving their weapons (about 640)to separate rtorage areas, removal of all accelerating theirdeactivation and dismantlement before this is required bytbu START Treaty.42. The New Tork Times, 28 Septeaber 1091.

4be ~ush plan envisaged that at least 3050 tactical warheads.ill be eliminated. Nore then 1000 strategic warheads wereremoved from alert duty on 28 September 1991. As a resultof the Buah unilateral decision, the plan, when implemented,would completely denuclearize the US army, for the firsttime in 30 years.It would remove the great majority of US nuclear weaponsEuropean soil. It would eliminate several classes ofnuclear weapons altogether: nuclear artillery shells, shortrange surface-to-surface missiles (Lance) and nuclearondepthbombs for anti-submarine warfare. It would effectively endthe nuclear depth bombs for anti-submarine warfare. Itwould effectively end the nuclear role of the US MarineCorps, which bad a limited ground and airhone nuclearcapability. It resulted in the complete withdrawal of USnuclear weapons for South Korea. South Korea was thus,Completely dsnuclearized.operations of the US Navy.groundIt would denuclearize the routineIt ended the practise of 24 houralert for US nuclear bombers, which had been one ofthe enduring practises of the Cold War since 1957.TO match the unilateral arms initiative of George Bush,President brbrcher came up with one of his own plans whichreflected the new distribution of powers io the Soviet

union, since the failed Coup. Gorbacbev stated that hiswere shared by Boris N. Yelstin and the leaders of the43other Soviet republics.Under this initiative, Gorbachev agreed to utch the USchanges:i.e., destroy all Soviet nuclear warheads for airdefense missiles from deployment areas and store or destroythem, remove bombers from alert durty and store theirnuclear weapons at storage depots, remove fromalert dutythose ICBMs slated for retirement under the START Treaty,remove tactical nuclear weapons from naval forces (ships,submarines and land-based aircraft), create a single,unifiedstrategic command and remove 6 SSBNs with 92 SLBMsfrom operational duty.The USSR, Gorbachev announced, would reduce its strategicforces to a level of 500 START Treaty &ccountable warheads -1000 fewer than required by the START Treaty, He challengedthe USA to match this reduction. He aanounced that 503ICBMs, including 137 MIRVed would be removed fromOperational alert duty, thus eliminating 1094 warheads from44the available force. Item-wise, Gorbachev matched andale0 went further than Bush's speech (5 September 1991), in43. The New York Times, 6 October 1991.44. .Uucle.r ~otebook," Bulletin of the Atomic SCientiStS,hrcb 1992, p.40.

several rerwcts. These included: agreeing to remove 811tacti-1 naval nuclear weapons from ships, submarines andland bared aircraft bases, but instead of just storing them,AS Bush bad announced, he suggested eliminating altogether.Concerning tactical air delivered bombs and missiles,Gorbachev proposed removing weapons from forward deployedunits and storing the warheads at separate bases. Heproposed that both nations proceed to negotiate additionalcuts of one-half in their strategic weaponr. He alsoproposed that they (USA, USSR) agree to stop producingfissile material for nuclear weapons. He announced a onepear moratorium on nuclear testing and proposed that othernations do likewise.Corbachev announced the cancellation of severalmodernization and deployment progrrrnmes. Research andDevelopment would cease for A new short range missile forthe bomber fleet and for a new mobile ICBM. The rail mobileSS-24 was frozen at the existing level, and no RPD wouldcontinue for a follow-on missile. Gorbachev announced thatthe SS-24 would be confined to its three permanentgarrirsions and not deployed in a dispersed manner. Thirunilateral initiative by Gorbacbev ia the arena ofrtrrtegic nuclear arms-cuts war the last he was announcing16 Prerident of the USSR. Yeanwbile, dramatic events were

taking place in Europe. Not many bad visualized that theUSSR, a federation Of fifteen republics, which had come intowing in the October Revolution of 1917 and which haddominatedthe world scene, thereafter, as a superpower,representing one side of the bipolar world we lived in afterWorld Iar 11, would one day, come to an end. However, itdid end, with three agreements. The Minsk Agreement of 8December 1991 was signed by the Presidents of the RussianPederation, Ukraine and Belarus. This agreement announcedthe abolition of the Soviet Union and the formation of a newassociation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).The Ashkhahad Declaration was signed on 13 December 1991, bythe Presidents of the five Central Asia Republics -Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan. The Presidents of these republics met atAshkhahad, Turkmenistan. The declaration was issued insuport of and participation in the CIS but only on conditionthat they were accepted as co-founders.The final formationof the new Commonwealth took place in Alma Ata, thecapitalof Kazakhstan, on 21 December 1991, and included all theformer Soviet republics except the three Baltic states(Estonia,Latvia, Lithuania) and Georgia. These unilateraldecisions of the part of both Bush and Gorbacbev wasresult of tbe considerable rare of tensions between theas Itwo

former Cold War rivals. These initiatives would lessen theoverkill capabilities of both the powers vis-a-vis theirrespgctive nuclear arms arsenal. It would also lessen thefinancial burden on their economies.President Bush, in hisstate of the Union address of 28 January 1992 includednuclear reduction proposals.newBe stated tbat if the CIS waswilling to de-MIRV their ICBMs, the USA would "convert asubstantirl portion of its strategic bombers to primarilyconventional use". Bush announced the termination of the B-2 bomber programme at 20 aircrafts, instead of thepreviously planned 75. Re also announced that the USA wouldunilaterally cancel the small ICBM programme, cease allproduction of MX/Peacekeeper missiles, and ceasenewproductionof additional advanced Cruise Missiles beyond the 640already bought. In addition, the President announced tbatthe USA would cease production of I88 warheads for Trident11/05 SLBYs, thus formaly bringing to a complete halt the USnuclear weapon production complex for the first timethe days of the Manhattan Project at the end of Worldsince11. It was now the turn of the Rursian President, BorisTeltrin to comg out with r unilateral rtrategic nuclear armsproporal. Be prerented a broad programme of Cuts andterminations rod ruggested tbat the USA and Rurria rhouldruduceWrrtbeir rtrategic nuclear forces to a level of about2000-2500 warbeads erch, abwt half the level that had kennl

proposed by President Bush the night before, Yeltsinprovidedadditional details and an update to the Gorbachevinitiative of October 1991. Re gave a 10-point speech whichcovered the full range of arms control and disrrma.enfissuer including strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.concerning strategic forces, Yeltsin announced recentreductions: about 600 ballistic missiles (ICBYs andSLBus)with nearly 1250 warheads had been removed froa operationalreadiness. 130 ICBM launch silos had either been destroyedor prepared for destruction; six SSBNs had been prepared fortheir launch tubes to be dismantled. He announced the endof developmsnt or modernization progrrmmes for severalstrategic systems.Yeltsin stated several START Treaty-related and operational decisions. Russia would acceleratethe START Treaty implementation period from seven to threeyears, and could accelerate this even faster if the USAwilling. Following on Gorbachev ' s previous pr~posr 1,Yeltein proposed that the two sides agree to reduce theirremaining 8trategic forces to a level of 2000-2500 weaponsabout half of the 5000 weapon level Gorbachev pledged forunder START Treaty reductions. On the tactical ride,Yeltsin annouaced several decisions purruant to the earlierinitiative#. 88 also pledged continued Russian effort8 toceaae all weapons-grade plutonium production by the yearwas

2000 A.D. m d announced that several plutonium productionreactors would be stopped in 1993, ahead of schedule. Beproposed that the USA and Russia agree on a controlledcessation of production of fissile materials for nuclearweapons. This was in addition to a new call for a nucleartesting morAtOriurn, starting with renewed US-Rusrian talksand possibly a gradual reduction in tests. Theseannouncements amounted to the end of modernizrtion forSoviet/Russian nuclear forces. As pointed out earlier, theresult of a11 there unilateral proposals would result insubstantial cuts in defence-spending and ths money tbussaved could be used for productive purposes.MAIN PROVISIONS OF START I1START 11 codifies the Joint Understanding signed by bothPresidents at the Washington Summit on 17 June 1992. Itsprovisions provide for the elimination of the mostjestahilizing strategic weapons - heavy ICBMs and all otherMIRVed ICBMs. It also provides for the reduction by twothirdsbelow current levels the total number of strategicnuclear weapons, deployed by both countries. The Treatyincludes a Protocol on Elimination or Conversion concerningICBMs and heavy ICBM silos, a Protocol on Exhibition andInspection concerning beavy bomberr and a Memorandum ofAttribution.

START 11'8 hhtiOn8hi~ to the START TreatpSTART I1 builds upon the START Treaty signed on 31 juiy 1991between the USA and the Soviet Union. However, it (START11) ullo for far greater reductions in strategic nuclearforces. A l l START provisions will pertain, except aserplicitlp modified in the new treaty. START I1 cannotenter into force before the START Treaty. It will remain inforce throughout the duration of START I.Main Limits: The treaty sets equal ceilings on the numberof strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by eitherside. These ceilings are to be carried out in two phases.Phase One i6 to be completed seven (7) years after START Ienters into force and Phase Two is to be completed by theyear 2003, However, Phase Two can be completed by the endof year 2000 if the US can help finance the elimination ofstrategic offensive arms in Russia. The Treaty set8 rangesfor some of the central limits.Phase One: By the end of this phase, each side must havereduced it8 total deployed strategic nuclear marheads to3800-4250. There include the number of warheads on deployedICBMs and SLBMS as well as the number of warhead8 for whichheavy bombers with nuclear missions are equipped. Of thetotal 3800-4250 warheads, no mre than 1200 may be on

deployed YIRVed ICBMs, no nore than 2160 on deployedand no more than 650 00 deployed heavy ICBMs.SLBUS,phase Two:BY the end of the second phase, erch side muathave reduced its total deployed ltrategic nuclearto 3000-3500.heavy ICBMs.warheadsOf those, none may be MIRVed ICBMs, includingThus, all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated fromerch ride's deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying.a singlewarhead will be allowed. No more than 1700-1750 deployedwarheads may be on SLBMs. Tbere will be no prohibition onY 1 RVed SLBYs .haloading: The treaty allovs for a reduction in thenumber of warheads on certain bassistic missiles. Suchdownloading is permitted in r carefully structuredfashion,modifying the rules agreed in START, Each side is able todownload two existing types of ballistic missiles by uptofour warheads each in addition to the US Minuteman I11 andthe Rurrian SS-N-18. Tbere are no aggregate limits onnumber of warheads that can be downloaded. A limit of 105ICBMs of one these types may be downloaded by upto fiverarbeads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in rilolin ~hich it .asthedeployed at the ti80 of the START Isignature. Thug, the three warhead US Minuteman 111 ICBW,the four warhead Busrian 85-17 ICBM, and 105 of the air

warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs are able to be downloaded to asingle warhead, to comply with the requirement to eliminate~1RVed ICBYs. The US Peacekeeper ICBM and the RussianSS-18 heavy ICBM and SS-24 ICBM, each of which carry 10warheads, and the remaining SS-19 ICBMs must all beeliminated, in accordance with START procedures.Missile System Elimination: In START I, deployed SLBMsand most deployed ICBMs my be removed from accountabilityeither by destroying their launchers (silos for fixed ICBMs,mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs, and launcher sections ofsubmarines for SLBUs), or by converting those launchers sothat they can carry only another type of permitted missile.The one exception is the SS-18. Under START, therequirement to eliminate 154 deployed SS-18s must be metthrough silo destruction, not conversion. In START 11,these rules generally continue to apply, The majorexception is the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be convertedto carry a single warhead missile, which Russia has raidwill be an SS-25 type. The treaty lays out specificprocedures, including on-rite inspections, to ensure thatthose converted silos will never agrin be able to launch aheavy ICBM. remaining 64 SS-18 silos subject to START11 will bare to be destroyed. In exchange for the right toretain upto go converted silos the treaty requires that all

SS-18 mirsiles and cannisters, both deployed and nondeployedrbould be eliminated not later than 1 January 2003.?he major change here is that while START I did not #eek thedestruction of missiles, in START 11, the Rusrians haveagreed to eliminate rll SS-18 missiles, both deployed andnon-deployed, The goal of eliminating completely beavyICBMs rill then be fully achieved.Heavy Bombers: In START I, nuclear heavy bombers aresubject to more flexible counting rules than are ballisticmissiles. Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only rhortrange missiles or gravity bombs counts as one warhead. USheavy bombers equipped to carry long range nuclear ALCMseach count as 10 warheads, and Ruesirn heavy bombersequipped to carry long range nuclear ALCUs each count a8 8warheads. In START 11, heavy bombers vill be counted usingthe number of nuclear weapons - whether long range nuclearALCWs, short range missiles, or gravity bombs - for rblchthey are actually equipped. This number is specified in thetreaty's Memorandum on Attribution rad will be confirmed bya one-time exhibition and by routine START I on riteinspections. START II's other new feature is the provirioathat a maximum of 100 beavy bombars that have never beenaccountable under the START Treaty as long rrnp nuclearAm berry bombers uy be reoriented to r conveational role.

Such bombers will not count against the treaty warheadlimits. They will be based SePlrAtely from heavy bombersequipped for nuclear weapons, and will be used only for POPnuclearmissions, and will have observable differences fromother heavy bombers Of the same type that are not orientedto a conventional role such rs heavy bombers mry be used ina nuclear role after three months notlfication, but then maynot be reoriented again to r conventionrl role.Verification: Tbe comprehensive START verificrtion regimecontinues to apply to the new treaty. In addition, START I1includes some new verification measures, such a8 obaervrtionof SS-18 silo converrioa and missile elimination procedures,exhibitions, and inspections of all heavy bombers reorientedto a conventional role to confirm their obaervrbledifferences.45It was on 29 December 1992 that US and Rusrir announcedthat they had finally agreed upon a draft treaty onetrategic nuclear aror reduction, which would eliminatemultiple wrrhead nuclear long range miS8ileS that botb riderbad.theBeform the draft 81s finally agreed upon, three areas45. The Hindu, (Madras), 30 December 1Q92.

of disagreement had to be resolved: While one area relatedto the Russian demand to keep some of the missile silos, orlaunch tubes for their lnrgest SS-18 missiles, the secondrelated to the number of multiple warhead SS-19 misrilerthat the Russians would be able to convert or download tosingle warhead micsiles rod retain and the third arearelated to the US strategic bomber force.On 2 January 1993, President George Bosh arrived fromMogadishu, Somalia after visiting US troops4 6there. The47treaty (START 11) itself was signed on 3 January 1993.Evaluation: The START I1 Treaty is clearly and obviouslybased on thr START I treaty, the differences being thatwhile the latter was signed between USA and the rapidlydisintegrating USSR (infact, START I was the last treatybetween these two countries), the former was signed betweenUSA ani Russia (the first strategic arms control treatybetween them). However, START I1 went a rtep further thanthe START I treaty in that by itti provirionr, the mostmodern class of nuclear weapons, 1.e. the land bared MIRVICBM3 would be eliminated. By its provisions, the treatyset a ceiling of 3500 nuclear warhead8 on each mido by the46. The Bisdu, (Madras), 3 January 1993.47. Tbe Hindu, (Madrar), 4 January 1993,

year 2003 A.D. at the latest. It also would eliminate about15000 of tbe combined 21000 warheads in the Russian and USnuclear arsenals, which would roll back two decades of thesuper power arms race. Russia would totally eliminate the88-18 multiple warhead nuclerr missiles, the deadly class ofits missiles which was its mainstay. The Treaty would beimplemented only after START I came into effect. Thesigning of the START I1 treaty crowned George Bush's fouryear presidency. Though the Cold War was over and thenuclerr arms race seemed to be a rapidly fading memory andthe USA and Russia were no longer the traditionrladversaries, the treaty is an important ltep in the processof nuclear arms reduction and a reminder to the rest of thevorld that the two countries still possess enormousmtockpiles.Uatwar Singh, the former Indian Minister of ExternalAffairs, was asked, during his Chairmanrhip of the NationalWorksbop on Social Sciences and Ruaanitier, conducted by theCantre for Canadian Studies, Department of History,Pondicherry University on 25 and 26 January 1993, whether hefelt that the START I1 treaty rigaed between the USA andRussia was uinly due to economic rearoar, be replied "Tbiris oar of several rearoar - the Win rearon la the end of

48Cold War'. Though the end of the Cold War was one of themain reasons, the other .&in factors that cannot be ruledout were the overkill and economic reasons. Both countriesrealised that they had in the nuclear arsenals core thanenough weapons of mass dsstruction to destroy botb theirc$untries and the world many times over. It was thus,imperative that they reduce the weapons to the levels ofMutual Assured Destruction levell but at manageablelevels.The economic factor too, i.e. both countries realised thefutilit7 of &a endless arms race which would entail anunnecessary burden on both their economies.Both the START I and I1 Treaties, when finallyimplemented,will be considered as historical treaties as both thesetreaties envisage the largest percentage of nuclearweaponscuts in nuclear history, so far between the two largestnuclear possessing :>uotries in the world - USA and Russia.48. Interview with Mr. Natwar Singh, Ex-Union Minister ofExternal Affairs, India, conducted on 26 Janaurf 1993,at Pondichsrry University, Pondicherry, on t h occasion~of his Chairunship of the 'Natioaal Workshop on SoclalSciences an5 Bwnities,' conducted by the Centre forCanadian Studies, Department of History, PondicherryUniversity, 25-26 January 1393.

Chapter Five

e history rnd relrtionship of the United States of Americrand the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the twentiethcentury is inextricsbly linked and interwined with eachother. Botb countries had certain aspects that were commonto each other. Both of them were comparatively newcountries. The USA officially came into being in 1776 withthe signing of the Declaration of Independence. Though theUSSR rs Russia hrd existed for many hundreds of years, itwas only when the Czar (Nicholas 11) wrs overtbrown rnd theBolsheviks were instrlled in the government under V.I.Leninthat the Soviet Union came into existence. It was for thefirst time in world history thrt r government, espousing rcompletely new ideology, i.e., Cowunism, based on KarlMars's rod P.Eagel's ideas on people's power, would beruling the country. The USSR, thus became the first countrywith Coamunism rs its foundation IS well as r role model forComunism, for other countrier.Botb countries are/were vast, the USSR being the lrrgertcountry in the world while the USA is the third largest,Both countries poswrred/possess natural as well as humanrewurzes. Iiwever, given there frctr, it ir only in thiscentury, i.e., the twentieth, thrt there two wsatries

entered the world scene as global powers and specificallyafter the Second lorld War, as suprpowers. Borevar, on 2mbor 1942, an event occurred that .was mooontous inrecorded world history ar it was on this day that, for thefirst tin, a self-rustaining chain-reaction was achieved atStagg Field, Chicago. Before this day, the world was prenuclearwhile after this day, the rorld can be said to beliving in a nuclear era. Between December 1942 to July1945, AmtiCrn scientists and engineers built two uraniumtype and one plutonium type atomic bomb. The firet atoebomb, code named 'Trinity' was detonated at a test-site atAlwrgordo in Southern New Mexico on 16 July 1945.Tbe rest of the world knew about the existence of tbetreaendous and terrible devastative power of the atom bombwhen an uraniua type atom bomb, code named 'Little Boy' wasdetonated over the Japanese city of Riroshima, on 6 Auguet1945 md a plutoniw type atom bomb, code nard 'Pat Man'was detonated over another Japanese city, Nrgauaki, on 9August 1945, by the Americans. With the bombing of thesetwo 0iti.r of Japan, World War I1 war swiftly brought to anend rhon the Jap.nwe surrendered to the Allies,uooonditioaally. ?Be fact that a little more than four-and-8-1 -08 bar0 e1ap.d rince the detonations of theseata bombs over Rirorhiu and Nagauki without ray more

nuclear bombs (as of date) being ret off in any part of theworld doer not mean that the world is cafe from nuclearweapons. It only means that countries posrerring ruchweapon8 rhould recognize the dangerous catastrophic effectsruch weapons would cause on the very existence and survivalof the world. However, 1s long as weapons of marsdestruction like nuclear weapons exist, the world will neverbe completely safe.It war only during and especially after the Second World Warthat the United States of America and the Union of SovietSocillist Republics became superporers. The isolationistpolicy followed by the USA after the 'Wonroe Doctrine' marenunciated by President Monroe in the firrt balf of thenineteenth century. This doctrine stated that Europeancountries would be banned from further expanrion in thee i s It war during the First World War, only, wbenthis isolationist policy lollwed by the USA war reversed,wben tbe country, under Prerident Woodrow Wilson joined theWar. Bowever, it was during the Beeond World War, in 1942,when the USA joined the War as a meaber of the Allies afterthe bombing of Pearl Harbour by Japrn that UBA rmerted as aujor power. With the dropping of atom bombs on the twoJaprnue cities of Birorbimr and Mrg~rakl in Augurt 1945,the cwntrr war ertablirbed rr tbe world's firrt port-World

War I1 Superpower.The USSR too, which was mainly concernedwith domestic internal matters during the First WorldWar,as the Bolshevikr, under V.I.Lenin, was intent onconsolidating its power within the Union, only emerged as absuporporrer during and after the Second World War. Thoughboth the USA and USSR were on the same ride (membercountries of the Allies) durlng tbe Second World War, itbecame very clear that both countries belonged to differentsides of the fence, noon after the War.The USA and USSR followed and believed in different setsidealogies. The birth of the USA was founded on theprecepts of democracy and a free-market economy while theUSSR followed Communism and a government-controlled economy,During its little more than seven decades of existence asthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republicr and its rmergeoce asA superpower following World War 11, it8 relation with theother superpower, the United States of America, wasbasically based on the idealogical differences between them.While on the one hand, the USA reprerented a prime exampleof the idealogy of 'CAPITALISM', on the other, the USSRa role model for 'COYYUNISM'. Thus, the relationshipobt.ined ktwwn the two countries were urked with periodicupr and dwn8.ofwasThe two exprerrionr that best ruued up thenlationrhip obtained between the USA and the USSR are 'Cold

War' and 'Detente'. While Cold War was 4 phase when bothcountries were in a state of hostility in terms ofpolitical, economic or subversive action but fell short ofan actual/real war, 'Detente' was a phase when there was apalpable reduction of tension in relations between thecountries and therefore, consequent to this, a reduction ofthe poseibilities of WAR.Apart from the idealogical factor, the other major factorwas the political future of Eastern Europe during and afterthe Second World War. While the USSR, under Josef Stalinwas bent on having as many European countries fall under itshold and sway as satellites, following the Communistidealogy, the USA tried its level best to contain the spreadof Communisa by means of containment. Towards this end(policy of containment of the spread of Communism), the USA,under its President, Harry S. Truman, introduced theYarshall Plan and the Truman Plan in 1947 and 1948,respectively. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization wasformed on 4 April 1940, with the specific purpole ofprotecting Westera Europe from Soviet aggression and byarticle V of the treaty, an armed attack again#t one or aorr-bar countries, would be coasidered an attack against a11the other member countries. As A reaction to this (NATO)allia~ce, tho Warsaw Pact was formed ia 1955 at Warsaw, as

tb. Communist reply and reaction. The other major eventsthat took place between the USA and USSR which rdded to theCold War Phase, were: Withdrawal from the Elbe before rsettlement of the Polish question; the isolation of Berlinand the Berlin airlift; the construction of the Berlin Wallin 1961, the Rungarian uprising in 1956, participation inwar at Korea, the clash of the superpovers at the Suez Canalin 1956, the shooting down of the U-2 plane over the USSR inMay 1960; the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961; the CubanMissile Crisis in 1962; military intervention in Vietnam in1069; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the USboycott of the Olympics at Moscow in 1980 and theretaliatory tit-for-tat gesture by the Soviet block when theSoviet Union and its satellites boycotted the Olympics heldat LOS Angeles in 1984.with the arrival of Yikhail S.Gorbachev as General Secretarymad then the President of the Union of Soviet Republics,after the death of Konstantin Chernenko, relation8 betweentba two ruperpowerr improved to 8uch an extent that thoevent8 thlt later unfolded during and after Gorbachev'rtanre in office ultimately led to the demire of Communistm, the unification of the two Germany#, the end of themid War betveen the two povrrr and the end of the Varaawpact, i.e., of countries in Bastern Europe, individually rod

collectively under the influence and sphere as satellites ofthe former Soviet Union,A very important aspect of the relationship between tbe twosuperpowers during the existence of the Soviet Union war therole played by the existence of nucleonics in the weaponsstockpiles of both the countries. lhen atom bombs were usedby the USA to destroy and devastate the cities of Hiroshimaand Nagas&ki, on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively, theworld at large first became aware of the potency anddestructive powers that weapons of mass destruction werecapable of unleashing. Tbough estimates vary of the numberof people killed in the attack on the Japanese cities, a11agree that thousands upon thousands of citizens were killed.lhen the USSR went nuclear in 1949, the Cold War between thetwo powers became truly entrenched. An endless race rtartedfor nuclear superiority in terms of number of nuclearweapons in their respective aresenals as a160 thedestructive potency as well as capability of the6a weapons.This state of affairs reached its peak when both thesecountries in the world bad nuclear arsenals that exceeded50000 nuclear weapons. Many, if not a11 of these weaponshave greater explosive power than tbe atom bomb thatdestroyed Hiroshima &nd unj have explosive power6 that arebudred timer greater. It 16 therefore obvious to all

concerned that all-out nuclear exchanger would be catastrophicand unprecedented in human history and the worldwideeffects would be of upredictable magnitude.This is where and why arms control comes in. The aim ofa m 6 control is to limit/reduce the risk of war by limiting/reducing the threat from potential adversaries instead ofonly relying on anticipated or perceived changes in themilitary threat. This does not mean that arms control is inconflict with or is a substitute for military preparednessby providing increased security at levels that are lower andleas dangerous. The concept of arms control encompassed awide range of existing agreements and concrete proposalsthat were designed to constrain and manage the nuclear andgeneral military confrontation. Through such (arms-control)agreements, immediate goals can be achieved. These goalsinclude an increased stability and predict-ability in theoverall military relationship by limitations and reductionsin the of nuclear confrontation, in times of crisis - anenhanced military stability, the prevention of the spread ofnuclear weapons to additional nations, an improvement In thepolitical environment, decreares in the politicalcoarequencer of nuclear war and finally, reduction8 in thecoet of military preparednear.

The nuclear military competition between the two powers wasa major factor for the continuing arms race betreen themwhich led to an 'action-reaction'cycle,i.e., because of realor imagined pressures, both the powers kept building bigger,better, newer, sleeker, more sophisticated (technology-wise)and more potentially destructive weapons. Thus, in theannual budget outlay, an abnormally high percentrge wasreserved for defence rod defense-related matters. Thispercentage reserved for defence purposes could have beenbetter utilized for the growth of the domestic economy andfor the benefit of the country's citizens.There were major multilateral arms control agreements inwhich both the USA and USSR were major signatories. Therewere a number of major post-war Arms Control Agreements,prior to the signing of the SALT-I Treaty. The 'AntarticTreaty' was signed in 1B59 and was a twelve nation agreementto protect the peaceful status of the Antarctic Continent.It banned the establishment of military bares orfortifications, military manoeuvres, the stationing ortesting of any type of weapon, nuclear explorions and/orradioactive waste dirposal from Antarctlca. The Treatyprovides each party mitb the right to full on-rite andaerial inspections of all Antarctic inrtallationr in orderto verify these provisionr.

In 1069, the 'Hot Line Agreement, a bilateral agreementbetween the USA and USSR established a direct communicationslink between their respective Heads of State for use inmtims of emergency." The treaty seeks to reduce the riskof a nuclear exchange stemming from accident, aiscalculationor surprise attack. Both countries were connected bytransatlantic cable and radio telegraph circuits forcontinuous direct communications. The treaty was updated bya satellite communications circuits, along with multipleterminals in each country. In the same year, i.e., 1963,the 'Limited Test Ban Treaty' (LTBT), a Trilateral Agreementwas negotiated by the USA, USSR, UK. This treaty prohibitedtests of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer spaceand under water. The Treaty allowed nuclear testing tocontinue underground, so long as radioactive debris was notallowed "outside the territorial limits." of the countryconducting tbe test. The treaty was later signed by a totalof 116 countries.The "Outer Space Treaty' was a Trilateral Agreement betweenthe USA, USSR, OK, signed in 1967. It banned tbe placementof nuclear meapono or weapons of mass destruction in orbitaround tbe Earth, the installation of nuclear weapons orweapon8 of mas8 destruction on the Moon or any otherc.leetial body, or in outer apace itrelf and the use of the

Noon or any other celestial body for military purposes,including weapons testing of any kind, military manoeuvresand the construction of military installations. The Treatyguaranteed the right of any party to inspect installationsand equipment of other signatories based on any celertialbody to ensure compliance with these provirions. Eighty-sixother countries later signed the Treaty.In 1967, the 'Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone' or'Tlatelolco' Treaty was signed. This multilateral agreementwas signed by 24 Latin American countries. The Treatybanned the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment oruse of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Argentina has notyet ratified the treaty and Cuba is the only country thathas neither signed nor ratified the treaty. The treaty hastwo protocols attached.The "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was amultilateral agreement whicb was signed and ratified by theUSA, USSR, UK and 133 aon-nuclear weapons countries, toprevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to give anassurance that the peaceful nuclear programes of nonnuclear weapon states are not diverted to weaponsproduction. Won-nuclear weapons signatorier rpecificallypladged not to develop, manufacture, or acquire nuclearweapons. In turn, the nuclear weapon powers agreed to ohare

*the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposesMwith non-nuclear weapons signatories on a "nondiscriminatorybasis." The parties agreed to prohibit the exportation ofnuclear weapons and to regulate peaceful nuclear exports andprogrammes through interaction safesuards, carried out bythe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).In 1971, the 'Seabed Treaty' was aigned and it was rrultilateral Agreement between the USA, USSR, UK and 84other countries and it banned the eaplrcement of nuclearweapons or "weapons of mass destruction" on the ocean floorbeyond a 12 mile coastal zone. It allowed the signatoriesto observe a11 seabed activities of any other signatorybeyond the 12 - mile zone in order to ensure compllrnce.In 1971, tbe "Accidents Measures" Agreement was a bilateraltreaty between the USA rnd USSR, which necessitated thatboth sides improved "existing organizational and technicalarrangements to guard rgainst the accidental or unauthorizedwe of nuclear weapons." Each party pledged to notify theother in case of any accidental or unintentional ure ofnuclear weapons or any other occurrence which could risk theoutbreak of nuclear war and to warn the other in advance of.ay planned missile flight test8 extending beyond itrnrtional territory and 81-d to land international waters.mur, it can be aaid with an absolute rurety and finalty

thrt rrms control is necessary, whether for conventional/nonconventional weapons or for weapons of mass destruction -for r safer and more stable world as well as for divertingthe fund8 thrt would otherwise have been utilized fordefence purposes to other more essentially welfare schemeron the domestic front.h o developments - the emergence and likely perisistence ofrough parity in strategic forces for both the USA and USSR46 also the evolution of verification capabilities due toadvrnces made in the 1960s in satellite technology whichprovided radically improved surveillance capabilities - laidthe groundwork for strategic nuclear arms control. It wason 1 July 1968, the dry the Non-Proliferation Trerty wrrsigned that the US President announced that the USSR hadagreed to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). However,the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakir in August of thatrrae year, on the eve of the scheduled announcement of asummit meeting and r date for the talks forced the Presidentto portpone the negotiations, lerving the issue to begrappled by the incoming Nixon rdainistratioa. Prom tbebginning, President Wixon accepted the modest goal ofrufficieacy and thereby laid the foundation for SALT. InOctober I=@, lixon announced that he had agreed with Sovietleaderr to begin talks on rtrrtegic rrms.

The SALT I negotiations began on 17 November 1969, inaelrinki, Finland. In Yay 1971, Henry Kissingar, Nixon'snational Security Adviser and Anatoly Dobrynin, who was thenSoviet Ambaeeador to the United States, reached agreement inback-channel negotiations that a comprehensive ABM accordwould be accompanied by a more limited agreement onoffensive arms,leaving more complete limitations to SALT 11.On 26 Yay 1972, President Nixon and the Soviet leaderGeneral Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT-Iagreements which included both the ABY Treaty and theInterim Agreement on offensive arms. The ABY Treaty bannednationwide ABY systems, while allowing each side to maintainthe ABY site it then possessed, and to build one of the typethen being built by the other side, for the sake ofachieving symmetry. The Interim Agreement froze each side'smissile launchers at the level then operational or underoonstruction for five years. However, no limits were placedon MIRVs which, therefore, allowed a major buildup inmissile warheads on both aide*, or on bomber forces.Tbe US Senate gave its consent for ratification of the ABYTreaty on 3 Augurt 1972. Both House6 of Congrers alro gaveovenhelming approval to the Interim Agreement. Tho IALT-IAgrmwatr came into force on 3 October 1972. In 1974, both

President lixon and General Secretary Brezhnev rigned aprotocol to the ABY Treaty which reduced the number ofpermitted ABY sites from two to one. The SALT I InterimAgreement on Strategic Offensive Arms war of a limitedduration of five years and the expectation was that it wouldbe replaced by a permanent treaty. The Agreement formallyexpired on 2 October 1977. It had originally been thoughtthat five years would be sufficient enough time to negotiatea more comprehensive agreement. However, as the SALT I1talks continued beyond this date, the US and USSR bothpledged to continue'to observe the Interim Agreement.Afterthe signing of SALT I1 in 1979, the forces of both sidcaremained within the SALT I limits as an integral part of the1981 US and Soviet commitment of no undercutting existlngstrategic arms agreements pending further negotiations.was in Yay 1986 that President Reagan formally repudiatedthis political commitment to SALT I and 11.SALT I is a historic arms accord. As Harold Brown, theformer Secretary of Defense rtated, "The Anti-BallirtlcYirrile Treaty is the most suhrtanrive and important arm#1control agreenent ever reached by the two ruperpowerr."1. Harold Brown, 'The SALT Negotiations: 1909-1972," inBearp Owen rnd Jobn Thomas Smith 11, (edr.), Gera d CSmith: A Career ~ r o m a r ,(Lanham ID. U&Prerr of America, 1 89). p.67.It

1n 1985, James Schlesinger, the Former Secretary of Defence,brought out the intrinsic success of the ABY Treaty whenuid that it had "forestalled an explosion of offensive&relopment on both sides. Back in the 19608 when theSoviet Union first started to deploy defenses around Yoscow,the United States government was exalaining expandingoffensive forces upto 40-50000 reentry bodies, or varheadsto penetrate those defenses. The ABY Treaty has been2mrner stone of restraint..."The SALT I Treaty was successful in its objectives. It wasthe first arms accord between the superpoers which vasruccessful in the objectives it set out to fulfil.betheBoth theUSA and USSR bad pledged in the SALT 1 agreement to"continue active negotiations for limitations on strategicoffensive arms." These negotiations started in November1972 and continued throughout the remainder of the Nixon andlord administrations and for two-and-a-half years ofCarter administration.theSALT I1 wan finally signed in June1979. The objectives for the United States in the SALT I1-gotiationswere to establish equal quantitative limits onme aggregate amber of ICBMs, SLBYs, and long-range3. Quoted in Yattbew Bunn, rouadation for theABY Treat and #ationax Security, (ACA,rcI!7dk p.17.

ombers, and qualitative limits on destabilizing forcedevelopments - in particular - the addition of large numbersof MIRVs. The two sides finally agreed in 1979 on a verydetailed and technical document which had 19 Articles andalmost 100 explanatory "Agreed Stateaents' and 'CommonUnderstandings.' When the USSR occupied Afghaniatan inDacember 1979, Senate ratification for the SALT I1 treaty,which had encountered much more resistance in the Senatethan h&d SALT I, appeared highly unlikely. PresidentCarter, too, asked the Senate in January 1980 to postponeconsideration. President Carter pledged that the UnitedStates would abide by the terms of SALT XI, in March 1980,if the USSR did likerise. During Ronald Reagan'spresidential campaign, be had opposed the treaty on thegrounds that it was 'fatally flared.' After hia election asPresident, he formally announced in 1981 that the USA didnot intend to ratify the treaty. However, he pledged not toundercut it if tbe USSR showed equal restraint. After this,US adherence to the treaty's provisions nor becrme aquestion of political commitment. Though SALT I1 was neverratified by the US Congress, it war an important arms accordtreaty and it bar its place in history as both countriesremained within the tacbnical sublimits of the treaty'sprovision8 - USA, ttll November 1986, while the Soviet Union

war within treaty limits till the eve of it8 breakup. Thetreaty succeeded in halting the nuclear arms race to someextent, until the next treaty, the INF Treaty war rignedbetween them, in 1987.The NATO countries, who were tired of war and unable and/orreluctant to provide the funds and manpower required tocatch the more numerous Soviet conventional forces, decidedin the beginning itself to rely on US nuclear weapons todeter and repel a Soviet conventional attack against WerternEurope. The USA, which had an initial monopoly and lateron, an overwhelming superiority in these weapons, was in acredible position to threaten massive retaliation againstthe Soviet Union in the event of a conventional war inEurope. In the 19709, former lest German Chancellor HelmutSchmidt and other European leaders were of the opinion thatfaced with superpower parity and growing SovietIntermediate-range Nuclear Force (INP) caprbilities, NATOneeded new US intermediate-range forcer to match the growingSoviet threat and to secure more firmly the US rtrategicarsenal to the defense of Europe. In December 197B, NATOagreed to follow the 'dual track' policy to meet the SovietIW challenge. One track called for the deployment of 464Ground-bunched Cruise Missiles (GLCM8) and 108 Perrhing I1ballistic missiles on NATO soil in Vest Germany, England,

Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The new intermediaterange weapons would have the capability to strike targets inthe USSR.They represented a direct threat to the SovietOnion in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.The other track of the NATO dual track policy called for aparallel effort to obtain an arms control agreement on IN&with the USSR.The USA, in the beginning, proposed unspecified equal world-wide levels of US and Soviet intermediate range forces attalks in Geneva in the autumn of 1980. When PreridentReagan resumed the INF negotiations in November 1981, the USposition called for a worldwide limit of zero on US andSoviet INF missiles. This proposal became known as tbe'zero option'. These worldwide limits included Sovietintermediate range SS-20s based in the Soviet Par East,because, as mobile systems, tbeg could be redeployedwithinrange of Europe. In February 1987, General SecretaryGarbachev announced that the USSR wrs prepared to delink INPagreement from other issues and to negotiate a treaty moreon the lines agreed at the Reykjavik summit. The USSR, inthe following sontbs, also agreed to constrain shorter-rangeIUP ~irailes rs well, provided tbat the Federal Republic ofConany also disposed off it8 72 Pershing IA mir8iles anddelivery sy8tems and tbat the United States removed and

dirmantld its nuclear warheads for these systems. The USSRalso indicated its willingness to eliminate the remaining100 In? warheads. The treaty called for the elimination,over three years, of a11 ground-based missiles with rangesbetween 500 and 5500 km and was signed on 8 December 1987,at Washington, bp President Reagan and General SecretaryGorhrcher. It entered into force on 1 June 1988. Thetreaty required that the USA and USSR eliminated allintermediate range missiles, shorter range missiles,associated launchers, equipment, support facilities andoperating bases worldwide. Intermediate range missilesincluded a11 ground launched missiles with ranges between1000 and 5500 kms and shorter range missiles including allthoee with ran&es between 500 and 1000 kms. The treatybanned flight testing and production of these missiles aswell as production of their launchers.The INP Treaty was a 17-article treaty and was rupplementedby two-detailed protocols, one relating to eliminationprocedures, i.e., dismantlement and destruction and theother to on-rite inspections. The accompanying Memorandumof Understanding provided an unprecedented detalledaccounting of the number and location of a11 US and USSR.irriler, lruncherr, equipment and facilities rubject to theteru of the treaty. The INP Treaty resulted in the

destruction over a three-year period, w.e.f. 1 June 1988, ofa total of 2695 deployed and nondeployed missiles: 1836 bythe USSR and 859 by the USA. The USSR scrapped 826intermediate range missiles (650 SS-206, 170 88-48, and sixSS-5s) and 1010 shorter range missiles (726 SS-125, 200 SS-238, and 84 SSC-X-4s). All were single warhead missilesexcept for the powerful SS-20 which carried three warheads.The USA destroyed 689 intermediate range missiles (247persbing 11s and 442 GLCYs) rod 170 shorter range mirsiles(all Pershing IAs). Each US missile carried one warhead.Altbough the treaty did no require the elimination of anywarheads, it resulted in the removal of some 2200 warheadsfroa deployed missiles (including 100 US warheads on lestGerman Pershing IA missiles) to the USA and USSR where theywere returned to stockpilea or recycled. By 31 May 1991,the provisions of the INP Treaty, which required thedestructioo of the GLCUs and GLBYs, were carried out. Thus,it was for the first time in strategic nuclear history thattwo classes of state-of-the-art nuclear weapons weredestroyed. This treaty was largely possible due to theincreased easing of relations between the two countries andthe realization that the installation of weapons, that wereultimtely destroyed by the provirionr of the treaty, wouldhave led to instability in Europe and as a result, toinrtability in the rest of the world.

The rrrival of Uikhlil Gorbachev on the Soviet scene changedCommunist history as never before. His policies of openness(glasnost) and restructuring (perestroika) restructuredSoviet Union and the East Bloc to such an extent that thesepolicies were largely responsible for the dissolution of theonce-mighty USSR and the breakup of the Communist Bloc inEastern Europe. Gorbachev's arrival on the internationalarena was also largely responsible tor President RonaldReagan's change of stance vis-a-vis Soviet Union. Re hadonce called it 'an evil empire,' but the changed climatethat was now sweeping across the world eventually raw theleaders of the then two most-powerful countries in theworld, the USA and the USSR, signing the Intermediate-rangeNuclear Forces Treaty. The INF Treaty, then, was not onlyhistoric in nature - for the first time, two clarse6 ofnuclear veapons would not only be destroyed but eliminatedaltogether - its intrusive verification procedurerestablished in the treaty laid a firm foundation for futureaccords (like START for example) to be signed in the realmof strategic nuclear weapons. The fact that 4 per cent ofthe nuclear arsenal of the two countries was reduced as aresult of the provisions of the IN? Trerty not only provideda rubstaatial savings for both countries but also providedfor greater security and stability in world politicr.

~ooked at from these points of view, the INF Treaty cancertainly be stated to be a success.Between the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 and that ofthe START I Treaty in 1991, profound changes had taken placeat such an unimaginable pace that only a few yearspreviously would have been impossible to believe. TheBerlin Wall was brought crashing down, the two Germany's -East and lest were unified as a single country, the windliberalism was blowing in Eastern Europe, as one by one, theformer Soviet allies or satellite countries as they werethen known, broke off from the yoke of Communism imposedupon them by the USSR, and the once powerful Warsaw Pactwhach had acted as a counterforce to the Western alliance ofNATO had broken up.When START I Treaty was signed on 31 July 1991, it markedthe end of nine years of negotiations and also the end of anera. When the negotiations had first started, traditionalapproaches to nuclear arms control were used. Howavar, thenegotiating process and the Treaty itself could no longer beevaluated within the old cold war of reference. Theapproach of START I negotiations, within the ambit of USSoviet nuclear arms control negotiations waI dominatedeffort6 to attain comprehensive agreement8 which emcompasredtbe entire spectrum of strrtegic offensive nuclearofbyweapon

systems. By the time the treaty was signed, much hadalready been agreed upon. In fact, the Treaty's basicprovisions were already in place by the end of 1989.The Start I Treaty, which was signed between the USPresident George Bush and the Soviet President YikhallGorbachev at their Moscow Summit meeting on 31 July 1991, itconsisted of 19 articles which governed basic provisions.It also consisted of a series of annexes, protocols, amemorandum of understanding, joint statements, unilateralstatements, declaration and an exchange of letters, WhileArticle I commits both sides to reduce and limit theirstrategic nuclear weapons in accordance with treatyprovisions and to comply with its Annexures, Protocols andMemorandum of Understanding, Article I1 nets out the generalreductions, limits and sublimits on the weapon rystems.This article imposed limits on aggregate numbers of deployedStrategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and the weapon8they carry. These limits had to be met over a period ofseven years after the Treaty entered into force.Specifically, neither side could exceed a limit of 1600SNDVe (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers). These deliveryvehicles could not carry more than BOO0 accountablr warbradsaccording to specified limito. A maximum number of 4900warheads could be carried by ballirtic missiles rod no more

than 1100 warheads could be on ICBMs on mobile launchera,lo more than 1540 warheads could be carried by heavy ICBYr.Seven years after the Treaty entered into force, theaggregate ballistic missile throw-weight for deployed ICBM8and SLBMs for both sides could not exceed 3600 tonnes. Oncethe Treaty came into force, these provisions would beimplemented in tbree phases. Implementation 'milestones' orreviews were set for 36, 60 and 84 months. At the end ofeach phase, certain reductions had to be completed in orderto provide for a structured, verifiable reduction process.Articles XVII-XIX provide that the START Treaty onceratified, would remain in force for r period of 15 yerra.It could only be extended by another agreement on tbereduction and elimination of strategic offensive werponn.Each party had the right to withdraw from the treaty if itdecided that continued adherence to the treaty would banits national interests. Should one party decide to wlthdrarfrom the Treaty, it had to give the other six months noticeand declare its reasons for withdrawing.What then did START I achieve? When implemented, it wouldbe the first arms control treaty that would reduce longrangeoffensive nuclear weapons by both rides. Thouch theexact size of the cuts both rides would undertake depended

on the kind of force structure each would decide upon,itbas generally been predicted that in order to meetvehicle ceilings and warhead limits (Article 11),deliverytotal USstrategic nuclear warheads would decline by 20-25 per cent.nd by 30-35 Per cent for the erstwhile USSR. Ballirticmissile warhead reductions would amount to 35 per cent forthe USA and about SO per cent for the former USSR. TheTreaty's most impressive achievement, however, ir thecreation of a verification regime. In the history ofnuclear arms control, the compliance verification provirionsestablished in this treaty, are the most rmbitious.Thoughthe procedures devised for verifying the INF Treaty had beenuseful in designing the START verification regime, thelatter is of a very different magnitude. Under the STARTTreaty, verification not only verifies conversion orelimination of nuclear systems as specified in tberespective protocols butalso verifies compliance withtreaty provisions governing accountable systems.inherently more difficult task to verify permittedIt is annumberrof weapons than it is to establishtheir elimination orabsence. It is only when the START Treaty in fullyiapleaented that its true place in history rill be fullyertablirhed.However, if the goals and objective8 of theTreaty are implemented in it8 true rpirit, the gains to bothparties rill be immense, not only in terms of rubrtantial

am8 cut8 in long range nuclear weapons but alro substantialravings as a result of the changed world scenario andchanged priorities in the area of strategic nuclear weaponr.The unilateral arms cuts announced by President George Bushon 27 September 1991, and President Yikhail Gorbachev'sresponse announced on 5 October 1991, before the dissolutionof the USSR in December 1991 only rent to prove theincreasingly improved climate in relations between the twopowers. The end of January 1992 saw the USA and Ruosiaannouncing additional unilateral nuclear arms control,which, if and when implemented, would pave the way towardsradical disarmament measures. These unilaterrl measuresfrom both powers on strategic arms cuts also went a long wayto show to what extent the nuclear arms race that hadcarried on between them in the Cold Iar era, was now to avery large extent, a non-issue in the post-Cold War era.Other issues like rapid globalization in the economic andpolitical fields were increasingly becoming a top priority.The START Treaty laid the foundations for furtherstabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms andenhancing strategic stability. The START I1 Treaty wbichwas based on its predecessor, was signed between Prrridrntsm r g e Bush of USA and Boris Yeltsin of Russia at Moscow.

This treaty represented the first arms accord treaty thatwas signed between USA and the newly emerged country ofBursia. This treaty further reduced and limited strategicoffensive arms and it codified the Joint Understandingrigned by both the Presidents at their Washington summit on17 June 1992. When the treaty's provisions are implemented,the most destabilizing strategic weapons, i.e., heavyintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all othermultiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVed)ICBMs will be eliminated. It will also reduce by two-third6below current levels the total number of strategic nuclearweapons deployed by both countries. START I1 includes aprotocol on Elimination or Conversion concerning heavy ICBMsand heavy ICBM silos, a Protocol on Exhibition andInspection concerning heavy bombers, and a YeInorandum ofAttribution.Though START I1 builds upon and depends heavily upon theSTART Treaty rigned on 31 July 1991, between the USA and theSoviet Union, the provisions of the former treaty call forfar greater reductions in rtrategic nuclear forcer. Theclore relationship between SRART I and XI Treatier can beseen from the fact that the latter treaty cannot enter intoforce before the former and that it (START 11) will rruinin force throughout the duration of START I. Tbia rbovs

that only when START I is implemented can START I1 be of anyvalue.Therefore, though the latter treaty goes far beyondexpectations, its true place in history can only be aesessedafter its implementation.After the demise and disintegration of the USSR, a greatcontroversy arose, which is still raging on, among many ofthe international relations analysts, about the whetherUSA is the sole power/unipolar power/global power/ onlysuper power left or rather whether it is a multipolar power,that is, one among many great powers left in the world.During the scholars' presentation at the American StudiesResearch Centre (ASRC), Hyderrbad, where I gave a talkentitled "WERE WE BETTER-OFF IN A BIPOLAR WORLD?" where Ihad argued that the USA was the sole unique polar power leftin the world, Glen Johnson, the then-Director of ASRC, wasof the view that, yes, the USA was the sole unique powerthe world, but only in terms of military might.terms of finance and capitalist consumer goods, it was3a ~ultilateral power.theinHowever, inonlyIn this context, Professor Tom Travis, after hlsprenentation at the Seminar on 'Ethinicity and Nation-3. Glen Johafon, Director ASRC, in rerponse to my talkentitled Were We Better - Off in r Bipolar lorld?"presented at ASBC, Byderabad on 2 July 1893.

Building,' held at Madras was of the view that the USA wasthe sole power left in the world, in all aspect8 that the4ten implied.In the r m e coatext, while discussing Indo-US relationsobtained at that time, David iiarrell, Director of ASRC,Sof the vier that the USA was a unipolar power.Oa 23 March 1994, Bhabani Sen Cupta, at the Seminar on'tthnicity and Nation-Building,' stated that the SovietUnion collapsed because power lay in the CPSU, which badonly about 30 people as its members. Though Stalin feltchat a forced pace of progress was possible, he had notrealised that a forced pace, after sometime, becomesstagnant. Another reason was that the Soviet Union couldnot stand the onslaught of the information revolution andtechnology. The third and final reason, be felt, was thrt4. Professor Tom Travis, Visiting Pulbright Scholar,Proferror, Political Science and Director,InternationrlRelations, Bucknell University, Levisburg, P.A., duringhis presentation entitled 'Linkages between theInternational System and Nation Building,' glven at theSeminar on 'Cthaicity and Nation Building' organised byCSSAS and USEPI, Madras, 21 March 1993.5. Converration with Dr. David Rarrell, Director, ASRCRyderabad, during his visit to Pondicberrg Universityto attend the Torksbop on'Re8earfh Methodologies in theSocial Scieacer and Buoanities, organired by USEFl,Yadrau and Department of Bistory, PondicherryUniversity on 11 March 1994).

~fter the Soviet Union became a global power in the1S70r,it intervened in world politics, like in the Middle-Bart and6Indo-China.Among other factors responsible for tbe downfall of tbeUSSR, was the emphasis that successive administrrtionr ofthat country laid on the defense of this once - mightyempire.Meanwhile, the world is going through some of its mostimportant changes.Nobody would have thought, even a decadeback, that the Soviet Union would cease to exist, that theBerlin Wall would come crashing down with such a finality,that the partition of the two Germany's, East and Vest,would seer like just a distant dream now. Yet, the harshreality remains that Germany remained ao two countries forfour-and-a-half decades and the USSR remained a powerfulunited entity for nearly reven-and-a-half decrdea. Exceptfor China, Cuba and North Korea, the last baatione ofCoamunirm in the world, Comunism as an idealogy, today,rtands largely diecredited.6. Observation ude by Bbabani Sen Gupta, on 23 March1994, at the Seminar on 'Ethinicity and NationBuilding,' organised by CSSAS, Univerrity of Yadrre rodUSKPI, Madras.

During the Persian Gulf crisis, the US president George Burhhad spoken of a 'new world order' in the post Cold Varera.When he launched a major peace offensive on 27 September1991 by promoting nuclear arms control (unilateralinitiative), he said, "Tonight, as 1 see the drama ofdemocracy unfolding around the globe, perhaps we are closer7to that (dream of) a new world than ever before." Eventst8king place after this statement show that democracy warstill the goal tbat the peoples of formerly represredPcountries aspired for and democracy it was that war achievedby the fifteen republics that previously constituted theSoviet Union, and also the erstwhile satellite countries ofUSSR which was the block of countries that made up EasternEurope. Other dramatic events outside the former USSR andEastern Europe were also taking place. Decades-oldanimosities and rivalries between two groups of peoplerepresentingdifferent idealogies or beliefr, seemed to bebreaking down everywhere. 'Apartheid', one of the mostbateful and repressive systems tbat one race of people couldimpose on another will officially come to an endin SouthAfrica when multi-party elections are held in that country-md the blacks of that country are enabled to vote for the7. P.S. Surymarayana, "Yr. Bush and a New lorld Order,"The Hindu, (Madras), 23 October 1991.

first ti# in April 1994. Israel rad the PLO are ontalking, negotiating terms - a state of affairs which manytho-t impossible. hen Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Ministerof Israel met Ya8ser Arafat, the Chairman of the PalestineLiberation Organization met at Ialington DC., in the latterhalf of 1993, the whole world was relieved, that the twoleaders were on talking terms and that an accord was signedon Jericho (Vest Bank) and the Gaza Strip. The accordsigned between the British Prime Minister, John Major andthe Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds, in the first halfof December 1993, also brought about a hope that theprotracted civil war between the Irish Republic Army whichwants Northern Ireland to be integrated with the Republic ofIreland and the Ulster Unionists which want Northern Irelandto remain loyal to the United Kingdom, would paure/stop theinsurgency in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland.In a11 these cases, only time alone will tell whetherdmocracy as an institution and idealogy, democraticinstitutions and peaceful initiatfver will bring about thedesired pace and unity this world so desprrately needs.It is not ks if the breakup of the USSR ar a ruperpowerhasude it my easier for the only remaining global militarypower in the world - the United Stater of America. It8inrolwnnt in Soulia, Bounia and hiti, in 1903, was not

without hitches and hiccups. The resignation of Lee Aspinas Defense Secretary, though ostensibly for personal(health) reasons, is a testimony to this. The doainantrepublic of the former USSR, i.e., Russia, too, has beengoing through birth pangs as a democracy. The confrontationbetween the Parliament, led by the Chairman of theParliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov and the former VicePresident, General Alexander Rutskoi on one side agalasttheir country's President, Boris Yeltsin, first led to thedissolution of the Parliament in September 1993 and later tothe storming of the Parliament building ltself (known aa the'mite house'). Many were killed or rounded as troops loyalto the President stormed the Parliament building on 4October 1993. Tanks and armoured personnel carrierssurrounded tbe building and shelled it for sometime beforethe troops moved in. Both the Chairman, Ruslan Khasbulatovand the Vice President, General Alexander Rut~koi, who weresalso holed up in the building, along with theirsupporters,surrendered. Soon after there events, Boris Yeltsineuspended the Constitutional Court on 7 October 1993, and8. Vlrdimir Badpubin, *Hardliners Surrender," The Rindu,(Madras), 5 October 1993. For a comprehensive accountof the confrontation between the Parliament (Ruraian)md Borir Yelstin (President, Ruasia), see theunfolding account in 'The Hindu' from 27 September to 7October 1993.

stated that it would be reconvened only after a newparliament was elected.A few days later, Yeltsin issued adecree whereby the new Coastitution would be put to the votea the same day as the parliamentary elections. When thenew draft Constitution was unveiled by Yeltsin on B November1993, it was found that its key provisions included theright to private ownership of land, a ban on censorship and9increased powers for the President. In the parliamentaryelections that were held on 12 December 1993, Boris Yeltrinwon approval for his draft Constitution which would give thePresident enormous powers. The first ever multi-partyparliamentary elections in Russia brought to the fore anultra nationalist leader - Vladimir Volfovicb Shirinovsky ofthe Liberal Democratic Party. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a 47year old laryer-politician, entertains, as Batuk Calthani10puts it, "wild geopolitical fantasies." His party is aproclaimed xenophobic one and has r s its leader a man rhowants to sea Russian soldiers "washing their boots in the11Indian Ocean." He has openly stated that he would like to9. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 11 November 1993. For acomprehensive account of the run-up to Rusria'rprlianntary elections, see 'The Telegraph', from 22September to 11 November 1983.10. Utik Gathani, 'lest lorried about Zhirinovsky'r Rire,"The Hindu, (Dclhi), 16 Wcember 1993, p.5.11. Quoted fra Ihid.

see the imperial glory of Czarist Russia revived which wouldinvolve reimposition Of Kremlin control over the formerSoviet Republics as re11 as Finland and even Alaska whichhad bean sold to the USA by the Czarist government.Analysts have already compared Zhirinovsky's rise to that ofthe emergence of Ritler after the collapse of leimar inGermany.As Yikhail Gorhachev told Italian State Radio, "Anextremely grave event has occurred, one which calls forcareful analysis. Many of Mr Yeltsin's aupporters havealready commented on the election results hut no one has yet12grasped the gravity of the situation." Presidentialelections are due to be held in Russia in 1996 and if a manlike Vladimir Zhirinovsky (rho has already statedthat hewill stand for the election) wins it, the world rill haveto tread carefully, because World lar 111 can only meanuse of nuclear weapons vhich, in the final run, canthe doom and the end of the world.Does Rorth Korea have or does it not have a nuclearthespellweaponaprogramme and nuclear weapons facilities, i.e., doea thecountry possess nuclear capability? Thi8 issue ha8 beenworrying the world ever since North korea Successfullytested its Boding I missile over the Sea of Japan in Yay12. Quoted in The Hindu, (Wlhi), 1s December 1993.

1993. This missile is an improved version of the erstwhileSoviet Onion's Scud C missile and bas a range of about a1000 hs. The fact that North Korea has a1.o succeesfullytested Bodong I1 missiles, which bare a range of over 1500ku and that these missiles can be used to carry nuclearwarheads, thus placing both South Korea and Japan, itsneighbours, within its reach is a180 a major cause forwncern for the US policymakers.In October 1993, the Kyodonews service quoting a Saudi Arabian newspaper,Aeharq-al-Awsat stated that a secret deal ld been signed between13North Korea and Iran. After North Korea's mithdrawrl fromthe Non-Proliferation Treaty in the first half of 1993, itsactions regarding its nuclear intentions have beenviewedwith suspicion. When, in September 1993, North Koreaannounced that it would no longer discuss giving access toinspectors from the International Atomic Energy A~ency(IAEA) and when it also stalled on accepting condition8 fora third round of talks with US officials, the top General inSouth Korea, underlined an earlier warning by President BillClinton that US forces would annihilate North Korea if thelatter were to use nuclear weapons. The General, Carry ELuck raid, "The President stated hi8 position clearly (when)h. raid it is pointless for them (north Koreans) to try to19. The Hindu, (Madras), 25 Octokr 1993.

develop nuclear welPOnS because if they ever use them, itwould be the end Of their Country. The combined forcescommand is capable of making tbe President's word a grim14reality." A study by US intelligence agencies hasconcluded tbat North Korea probably has already built one or15two atom bombs." Though Washington knows for certain tbatthe North Koreans have extracted some plutonium (the rawmaterial for weapons) from their 5-megawatt nuclear powerplant at Yangbon, they do not know exactly how much.Experts think that it could be as much as 12 kgs which is16enough for one or two bombs. The US Defense Secretary,prior to his resignation stated that a war with NorthKoreawould be terrible, but that at the same time, USA wasdetermined that the North Koreans not have a nuclear bomb.When asked by a panelist on a TV Programme to describe theconsequences of a four month war in the Korean Peninsula,Aspen stated, that there would be "hundreds of thousands of17 -.casualties and major economic dislocation." Since nuclearwarfare is a different ball-game altogether, it is in the14. The Hindu, (Madras) 29 September 1993.15. "Playing a Game of Nuclear Roulette," m, Vo1.143,Mo.2, 10 January 1994, p.15.16. Ibld., p.16.17. The Hindu, (Delhi), 14 Deceaber 1992, p.5.

wrt interests of many that the USA succeeds in notkeeping Xorth Korea from producing nuclear weapons buttaing away any that they might have built and hidden.onlya180Is a Complete ban, i.e.,a complete and general disarmamenton nuclear weapons possible ? Even if this is notit will not be for lack Of trying.possible,Rajiv Gandhi, the-thenfndiro Prime Minister, presented an "Action Plan for ANuclear Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order," to theThird United nations Special Session on Disarmament in NewYork on 9 June 1988. At the welcome address by SoniaGandhi, Chairperson of hjiv Gandhi Foundation, duringBIjiv Gandhi Memorial Initiative for the Advancement ofRuman Civilization held at New Delhi, on 1 and 2 Yay 1993,saidabout that Action Plan, "It was an alternative viaionof a world in which equality, co-operation and co-existence18replaced dominance, strife and deterrence." The heart ofthe Action Plan called for the elimination of all nuclearweapons, in three stages, over the next twenty two yearr,rtarting immediately.theThat the Plan was not put to actionir a lore for the world. At the same internrtional18. See the Welcome Address pamphlet by Sonia Gandhi, atthe 'hjiv Gandhi Memorial Initiative for theAdvancement of Ruman Civilization,' Hew Delhi, 1-2 Yay1993. I attended the rerrion.

conference, the Indian President was of the view, "In therecent past, humankind has taken one step back from @elf-annihilation. Many more such steps are required tosafeguard humankind from destruction, and give strengththe motor forces of civilization. In a world compressed by19knowledge, we need to add the lerven of understanding."The former Indian President, R.toVenkataraman had this to sapduring the Conference about disarmament, "The end of theCold far signals the end of the balance of terror - thatabsurd military extreme of the balance of power concept,which nonetheless precariously spared our species fromextinction for four decades. Arms control can now yield20place to real disarmament." At the Conference, DavidLange, the former Prime Minister of New Zealand stated,know that, however great the reductions in nuclear"Weweapons,however carefully we bind ourselves against theirmanufacture and deployment, we can never eliminate Xroatheir manufacture and deployment, we can never eliminatefrom the collective memory our knowledge of the weaponstheir capacity to intimidate.andWhat we muat aim for, to putit very simply, ir to make the manufacture and deployment of19. Ibid., see Inaugural Addresr pamphlet, 1 Yay 1993, p.4.20. Ibid., see Statement by B. Venkataraman, 1 Yay 1993,p.l.

a1muclear weapons more trouble than it's worth." Themessage of the Secretary General of the United Nations,Eoutros Boutros Ghali, was read out by Ambassador JosephVerner Reed, Special Repreoentative of the UN for PublicAffairs, on the inaueural day.Dr.The Secretary General was ofthe view that, "Disarmament, such a crucial issue during thesuperpowers nuclear confrontation, has to be broadeneddeepened, and integrated into the other major tasksandfacingthe world community in the aftermath of the cold wrr.nuclear arms control is still very important, but it hasbe seen, not in a compartment by itself, but as part of anew security framework. The essential components of such rnew framework are: the non-proliferation, reduction, rndeventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction;transparency in armaments, combined with other confidence-building measures; and r collective determination to respond22to and defeat aggression. "In any care, the world Seems to be going in for r new worldorder.The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAPTA) wasaigned among the countries of the USA, Canada and Yexicotoin21. Ibid. See Statement by Dsvid Lange, 1 May 1993, p.1.a. Ibid. See Message b9 Dr Boutrour Boutrous Gbali, readout by Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed, SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General of the UN forPublic Affairs, I May 1993, p.3.

1993 and the agreement, which was one o! President BillClinton's major achievement for the pear, was pushed throuebthe House of Representatives in the teeth of opposition froma majority of his own party - the Democrats, A major accordthat was signed on 15 December 1993 at Geneva was the GATTagreement, which concluded 6eVeB years of what seemed like23interminable negotiations of the Urugurg Round. The 400pagedocument that was formally adopted by the negotiatingmember countries will bring about the creation of a newinternational organization, which will be known as the WorldTrade Organization and which will replace the exlstiag GATTSecretariat in Geneva. The Agreement seeks to persuademembercountries to liberalize trade by negotiating mutualreductions of import duties and/or tariffs or otherrestrictions on imports/exports.Wherelong range strategic nuclear missiles are concerned,Ukraine, the third largest nuclear possessor in the world,after the break-up of the Soviet Union, also gave the worlda great cause for concern, until not so verylong ago.Ukraine war left with 176 long range nuclear missiles andbetween 1500-1700 nuclear warheads. On 18 November 1993,the Ukranian Parliament voted to scrap only a third of it#23. The Hindu, (Delhi), 16 December 1993, p.9.

24176 strategic nuclear weapons , as their condition forratification of the START I Treaty. This meant that thePlrliwnt had approved (under the terms of the START ITreaty)that only 700 weapons would be scrapped out of itstotal arsenal of more than 1600 nuclear warheads.parliament also declared tbat the country was not bound by atreaty annexe tbat would oblige it to become a non-nuclear25state. Bowaver, many political and scientific analystsmere relieved when Ukraine announced that it would agree tothe complete removal of a11 nuclear weapons from itrterritory at a trilateral meeting of the leaders of USA,26Russia and Ukraine at Moscow. On 14 January 1993, the USAand Russia formally a~reed not to target nuclear weaponsupon each other, with the signing of a bilateral treaty rt27Moscow. For many decades, Soviet and US nuclear warheadsbadbeen on immediate alert, aimed at territorier not onlyof the United States and the former Soviet Union, but also28that of their allies. On the same day, at a separatetrilateralThetreaty meeting, the leaders of the USA, Russia24. The Sentinel, (Cuwahati), 1 December 1993.25. The Times of India, (Dclhi), 2 December 1993.26. The Hindu, (Delhi), 12 January 1994, p.9.27. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 15 Januaq 1994.28. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 14 January 1992, p.1.

and Ukraine signed a tripartite treaty whereby Ukraine wouldeliminate its long range missiles and warheads.The thesis bas shown that as 4 result of the considerablyease to tension between the USA and USSR, and USA rndRussia, strategic nuclear technology resulted in levels ofoverkill in different classes of nuclear weapons in thenuclear arsenals Of both the countries - first - between USAand USSR, next between USA and Russia. This ever-spirallingrace made it imperative for tbem to seek arms accords as aray of seeking stability, reduction and parity betveea tbemas well as slowing the MAD (MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION)capability they both had and have. It was also due to theenormous amount of finance involved. The huge financialburden imposed on USA and USSR in the continued research anddevelopment and production at all stages and levels of thevarious classes of strategic nuclear weapons, necessitatedtbe signing of various bilateral Strategic nuclear armsaccord, between them, over the years.The world cannot afford to be complacent in the post coldwarera. Though strategic nuclear arms control does notreem to be of as much of a primfiry issue a6 it once war, anddisanament aspects are increasingly being sidelined by manycountries around the world, it must be realired that even

after all the strategic arms accords (START I and 11Treaties) are implemented, both USA and Russia will stillpossess a nuclear arsenal large enough to blast a11 lifeform on earth to extinction - many time over. bough re arenow going through a period of reapproachment between theonce-formidable rivals - USA and Russia, the politicalsituation is always in a fluid and flexible state. As wehave ssen over the past few years, dramatic events havetaken place within a very short period, events that manythought would take more than a lifetime. In the sameway,the situation between and among nuclear countries can changedramatically, too. This is why all leaders should be everwatchfuland ever-careful. Mistakes cannot and should notbe allowed to happen. Where nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction are concerned, even a mistakecan mean, both in the short and long run, an end tohumankind.Another aspect that needs to be looked intc urgently is thatof many of the former Soviet nuclear scientists, whoseservices becaae redundant after the breakup of the formerSoviet Union. The expertise that these unemployedscientists possess can prove attractive to many of thedeveloping rnd developed countries that are intent onbecoming nuclear countries. Such countries will go to any

length and offer very attractive terms to these scientistsso As to lure them (scientists) into working for their(country's) interests. One way to stop such a posuibllityfrom becoming reality is to reemploy and engage thesescientists, in the arena of the constructive uses of nuclearenergy, with good remuneration so that they are not temptedto offer their services elsewhere.Now that we no longer live in a bipolar world and the factthat the Soviet Union has broken up into its constituentrepublics should also make the various nuclear possessingrepublics extra-careful about the security of these weapons.Any terrorist or militant group that manages to get even oneof these weapons due to lax security can literally bold theworld to ransom in the case of such an eventuality everoccuring. Nuclear radiation tests, nuclear wastes and thequestion of nuclear dumping also need to be tackled on awar-footing by all governments of nuclear countries. In thequest for achieving non proliferation, it is the duty ofnuclear countries to see that - come what may, and whateveramount of money they might have forfeited in the process -it is imperative that they not sell nuclear technology ofany sort and they muot apply this rule equally, to allcountries, without any exception. Otherwise, it will heconstrued as being patently unfair when this policy is

follwed only in the case of certain countries which do notfollow the dictates of the seller country, while notfollwing the same track for the ally countrier. ~ l lefiorts should be made to see that nuclear plantr areconstructed with stringent security measures, before, duringand after construction. Leakages, like tbe one that tookplace in Chernobyl should be avoided. Regarding nuclearwarte and sites for nuclear dumping absolute care should betaken to see that the waste is sealed in seal and tamperproof cannisters, vhicb is then buried to such a depth andin such places that human habitation is not endanlered.Apart from nuclear weapons and aspects relating to It, thereare very serious problems that the world has to face. Theseproblems, by themselves, when it grows to unmanrgeableproportions, could lead to human disasters and catastrophes.An8 control Should be folloved and practiced in the sphereof other weapons of mass destruction - i.e., in biologicaland chemical weapons, as also of that in conveationalweapons. The advances made in the potency of conventionalweapons, has improved tremendously over tbe years. Thesea m can be found distributed far and wide, in all cornersof the world, thus contributing to a very lar~e extent tocivil strifes, civil wars, terrorist and militantactivities, and secesrionist activitie~. The war going onin Boanil, (as Of date), a former republicof Yugoolavia,

among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, is a case in point.The problem seems intractable and unsolvable and compoundedby the large amounts of conventional weapons that are freelyused.A problem that our world needs to solve on an urgentpriority basis is that of overpopulation. With the verylimited resources that the earth has, to sustain everyindividual and inhabitant that exists in it, it becomesimperative that governments are seized of the problem andtake corrective measures to educate their citizens, on theadvantages of adopting family planning measures.The problems of illiteracy and poverty are inter-related andif the government can educate all its citizens, poverty too,can be eradicated. Illiteracy and ignorance are among themain causes for poverty. This is why, the adage "knowledgeis power" holds true, and many of the ills that are thecause and effect of poverty will go when knowledge isgained.Pollution - noise, smoke, garbage, toxic fumes, aewage andair - pollution is high on the list of problems that need tobe resolved. Another problem is that of environmentaldegradation, especially that of deforestation.Afforestation schemem need to be taken up on a war-footing.

The greenhouse effect, that has such dangerous implicationsfor the health of the inhabitants due to the amount ofchloroflurorocarbons (CFCs) being emitted into the air,should also be controlled and managed.Then there is the problem of growing violence, especially inthe urban areas, arising out of sex or drug related causes.The sociological factors that cause this violence should bechecked and addressed and controlled too. The factors for,urban-related violence are many, and the tensions of livingin the fast-paced world of urban areas being not the leartof them. Then there are the problems arising out of naturalcalamities - (eg., floods, earthquakes, volcano eruptions,bushfires and droughts) and man-made calamities (eg., dambursts,radiation leaks, and pollution) Thus, it Can beseen that nuclear issues are not the oly problems that needto be addressed and solved.Finally, the knowledge gained regarding all aspects ofnucleonics cannot be unlearnt. Just as there are two sidesto every coin and these are the positive and negativeaspects of every invention, nuclear energy as a renewableform of energy should be fully exploited while the negativerrpects should never be used. Though general and fulldirarmrment is not possible to achieve, arms control ir thegoal to be aimed for, always.

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Appendices

TREATYBETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIETSOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA ONTHE ELIMINATION OF THEIRINTERMEDIATE-RANGE ANDSHORTER-RANGE MISSILESThe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the UnitedStates of America. hereinafter referred to as the Parties.Conscious that nuclear war would have devastirtin_e consequencesfor all mankind.Guided by the objective of strengthening str;itcgicstability.Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty \\.illhdp to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strcllgtllc11international ace and security, andMindful oEheir obligations under Article VI of the T~FIIIYon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,Have agreed as follows:Article IIn ilccordance with the provisions or this Trei~ty whichincludes the blemorandum of Understanding and Protocolswhich form an integral part thereof. each Party shall clirni~i;~tcits intermediate-ran e and shorter-range missiles, not hi~vesuch systems [herea f ter, and carry out the other ob1ig;ltionsset forth in thls Treaty.Article I1For the purposes of this Treaty:I. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has aballistic trajccto over most of its flight path. The termUground-launshg bollistic missile (GLBM)*' means a toundhunchedballistic miuik thatair a weapon-dehvery vefilcle.2. The term "cruise miss~le" means an unmanned, selfpropelledvehicle that sustains flisht through the use ofaerodynamic. lift over most of its fli ht path. The tern1-ground-launched cruise missile (GLC d )" means a groundtaunchedmrisc nrissilc th;~t is ;I weapon-delrvcry vchiclc.

3 The lcnn --GLBM 1aurrhr.i' aman* a fired lauwhcr M mngc mt or a (b) for the Uniad Slates of America. m k k oi the lypalauncher saorage fuciliiy. a i ~ range. ~ t or an clim~nauon dcripnatnt by the United States of Ameria os the Pcnhlnt 11racilily as those terms arc defined in the Memorandum or and the BGM-IW. which arc known to thc Union O~SOVICIUndersandins.Soc~al~st Republics by the urn dni~nalions.a 2. For the purporn d thu Trcaty. enisling l y e of'10. The lcnn "transit" muns movement. notified in accordamwith pmnwaph 5 0 of Article IX or this Treaty. .d shortcr-mnpc mt.ukr arc:an intrmrdimtc-ran* rniuik or a launcher or such a mlsmle (ut ror the Union of'Sov*t Socklist R ublin. ndd*r dbcturm mis8ik suppon facdttm. between such a bcilit) and the tip. hi~natd by the un- 2' Ma deployment aru or between deployment arcas. or of a Rcpu a as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23 which an knownshortcr-range missile or a launcher of such a nt~ss~k from a to the United States oi Arne- as the SS:IZ and Ih. 55-23.mirs~lc support fidcility or u n~ts\ilc opcratlnp b;au to an rcspectivcly: andCI,,,,,,,.,,~,," I.,,-,I,,.~I>I r,., IIBC IJWIC~ SI;~IC\ Armcricit. m,~si~~-.~r the ~YF-. .... , ......

Article SYIII. This Treaty, including the Me~norandurn ofUnderstanding and Protocols, which form an integral partthcreof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with theconstitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shallenter into force on the date of the exchange of instrumen~s ofratification.2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102of the Charter of the United Nations.Done at Washington on Dccember 5, 1987, in lwo copies,each in the Russian and English languages, both texts beingequally authentic.FOR THE UNION OFSOVl ET SOCIALISTREPUBLICS:FOR THE UNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA:M. Gorbachev, R. Reagan,Gencral Secretary of theCcntral Committee of theCPSUPrcsidcnt of the UnitedStatcs of Anlcrica

APPENDIX I1QuEsTIomArRa(Academicians)QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO ACADEMICIANS DURING RAJIV GANDRIYEYORIAL INITIATIVE SEMINAR "FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AUMANCIVILIZATION', NEW DELRI, 1-2 MAY 19931. Do you feel that the Indian Ocean should remain a zone ofpeace ? Why?2. Should India go nuclear 7 thy?3. Should India join the Non-Proliferrtion Treaty (NPT)Why?4. How far do you feel has the NPT been a success inachieving its goals? Should the treaty be extendedindefinitely beyond 1995 and should the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be given stronger safeguardmechanisms?5. Row far is the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT rthreat to the instability of the world?6. Do you feel that there should be more regional alliancesfor tbe formation of no-nuclear zoner? If yes, shouldthis be besides joining the NPT 4s individual membercountries or regardless of this action?7. In pour opinion, is it fearible/posrible to acbievc aglobal disarmament on weapons of uss-dertruction -nuclear, ohemical and biological?

8. With the dismantling of the Soviet Bpire, the end of abipolar world and the emergeaceof a 'new world order',do you feel that the world is more at risk now thanbefore, due to the increased number of countries havingnuclear tecbnology/possessing nuclear capability rho maynot be as circwspect with their nuclear weapons as hadbeen the USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union for overfour decades? Also, is the world more rt risk now dueto other factors like the rise and resurgence of Islamicfundanntalisa, regional groupings, deunl f ication,terrorist organizations that use newer and moresophisticated methods to terrorize the world, etc.,79. By the signing of START I and I1 trerties, what, in youropinion, are the benefits for the USA, Russia rnd therest of the world?10. Do you envisage a living, habitable world fifty yearsfrom now?

APPENDIX I1 IQUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO CONFERENCE MEMBERS DURING RAJIVGANDAI MEMORIAL INITIATIVE SEMINAR "?OR THE ADVANCEMENT OFHUMAN CIVILIZATION", NEW DELHI, 1-2 YAY 19931. In your opinion, is it feasible/possible to achieve aglobal disarmament on weapons of mass destruction -nuclear, chemical and biological?How far do you feel has the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) been a success in achieving its goals? Should theTreaty he extended beyond 1995 and should theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) he givenstronger safeguard mechanisms?3. How far is the withdraval of North Korea from the NPTthreat to the instability of the world?4. Do you feel that there should be more regional alliancesfor the formation of no-nuclear zones? If yes, shouldthis be besides joining the NPT as individual membercountries or regardless of this action?5. Bow far do conferences on global disarmament (where itis one of the issues in the fwo-day meeting on'Advancement of Au8an Civilization , at New Dehli, May1-2,1993). help in the general cause of the disarmamentof weapons of mars destruction?

6. By the signing of the START I and I1 Treaties, what, inpour opinion, are the benefits for the USA, Russia andthe rest of the rorld?7. Do you envisage a living, habitable rorld fifty yearsfrom nor?

APPENDIX IVQUESTIONNAIRE(Officials)QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO OPFICIALS DURING RAJIV GANDHIMEMORIAL INITIATIVE SEMINAR "FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF BUYANCIVILIZATION", NEW DELAI, 1-2 YAY 19031. Do you think that the two START treaties will ever brimplemented given that the former Soviet republics ofUkraine and Kazhakstan are yet to formally agree to itsterms?2. With the signing of the START I and I1 Treaties, what, inyour opinion, are the benefits for the USA, Russia andthe rest of the world?Do you feel that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talkr andTreaties will be on an ongoing basis so that there rillbe further cutbacks to the nuclear warheads tbat willremain after the dismantling of nuclear warheadsaccording to the provisions of both the START treaties?4. With the ongoing political instability in Russia, betweenthe President, Mr Boris Yeltsin and the Parliament, (asof March-April 1993), do you feel that the nuclearmissiles in Russia will be under the control of safe,steady and sane hands, regardless of the politicalsituation obtained in that country?5. With the dismantling of the Soviet Empire, the and of abipolar world and the emergence of a new world order ,doyou feel tbat the world is more at risk now than before, dueto the increased number of countries having nucleartechnology/possessing nuclear capability who may not be ascircumspect with their nuclear weapons as had been the USAand the erstwhile USSR for over four decades? Also, is theworld wre at risk now due to other factors like the riseand resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, regionalgroupings, terrorist organizations that uee newer and morerophisticated methods to terrorize the world, deunification,etc, .?362

6. USA u d the erstwhile Soviet Union, with their vastnuclear araanals, had been the two powers to setthe tone toa m control, arms race, nuclear technology and relatediasues where nuclear weapons were concerned. Do you thinkthat the USA and especially Russia can still maintain thateupcriority where nuclear weapons are concerned? Why?7. In your opinion, is it feasible/po8sible to achieve aglobal disarmament on weapons of mass destruction - nuclear,chniul and biological? Why?8. Do you foresee the liklihood of a terroristorganiution ever getting hold of a nuclear weapon? Why?9. Ew far do you feel has the Non-Proliferation Treaty(RPT) been a success in achieving its goals? Should thetreaty be extended indefinitely beyond 1995 and should theInternationrl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be given strongereafegurrd mechanisms?10. Row far is the withdrawal of North Korer from the NPT athreat to the stability of the world?11. Do you feel that the Indian Ocean should remain r zoneof peace? Why?12. Do you envisage a living, habitable world fifty yearsfrom now?