34- The Road to Afabet The EPLF, Protracted Warfare, and the ...

The Road to Afabet: The EPLF, ProtractedWarfare, and the Liberation of EritreaCharles ThomasThe thirty year struggle to liberate Eritrea from Ethiopian control concluded in 1991 with theentrance of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front forces into Addis Ababa. Themilitary regime of Mengistu Haile Miriam lay in ruins, having never recovered from the decisivedefeat at the Battle of Afabet. This battle saw the entire Ethiopian Northern Command crushed bythe veteran fighters of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, the patrons and allies of the veryEPRDF who now took control of the battered state of Ethiopia. For the duration of the strugglevarious grassroots liberation forces had taken up the Eritrean struggle against their Ethiopianoccupiers and now with the final destruction of Mengistu's regime the EPLF realized the longstanding dream of a recognized Eritrean state. But how had they accomplished this? For those longthirty years Ethiopia had been the recipient of massive military aid, first from the United States whobuilt the army of Haile Selassie after the Second World War and then by the Soviet Union whobecame so entrenched in Ethiopia's struggle that Soviet and Cuban troops had taken a direct role inthe struggle. Beyond this, Eritrea was hamstrung by a lack of any international recognition- theywere seen as nothing more than internal rebels and therefore were barred from any aid by the policiesof the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. Despite these deficiencies, theemergent Eritrean People's Liberation Front would not only survive the worst of the conflict'sstruggles, but triumph where their predecessors had failed. This paper argues that this remarkablefeat of arms was only made possible by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front's strict adherence tothe practice of what Mao would term Protracted War and seeks to analyze the structuring of theconflict through his theories of liberation warfare.While the EPLF had emerged as its own separate liberation front in 1970, the conflict overEritrean independence had begun in 1961 under the leadership of first the Eritrean LiberationMovement (ELM) and then the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). These groups were the armedresponse to the chain of events following the Second World War which placed Eritrean under theEthiopian crown in ostensibly a federal system. However, Ethiopia was an absolute Monarchy underthe Emperor Haile Selassie, who did not recognize the theoretical federal system. Beginning in 1952Selassie proceeded to dismantle the barrier between the former Italian colony and his own nation.The constitution was suspended and the jailing of dissident politicians and journalists soon followed.1

In 1956 Amharic was made the official language over the protests of the majority of the nation whichhad traditionally adopted Tigrinya or Arabic as their preferred languages. i That same year theAssembly was “Temporarily Suspended.” Although elections followed they were without directionor organization, leading to bitterly contested results. The nascent Labor Union movement that hadbeen growing in strength and organization was essentially driven from sight by a series of crushingblows dealt to it by the Federal military during protest strikes in 1958. ii This was followed in 1959by the leaders of the Assembly voting to replace their own penal code with that of Ethiopia after oneof their increasingly common visits to Addis Ababa, Selassie's capitol. By 1960 the main politicalsupports of a separate Eritrea had been dissolved, with most governmental and grassrootsorganizations having been reduced to irrelevancy or driven from the country. Even protests directedat the United Nations, which had created the rapidly crumbling federal system, were simply met withthe response that all protests would have to pass through the federal government first- in this case theEmperor himself. iii The final curtain fell in 1962, when the Assembly was at last “persuaded” to voteitself out of existence, a process aided by armed police and jets providing air cover. Eritrea wasofficially no more as of November 14 th , 1962. ivThe shooting war had already started in 1961 under the auspices of the absentee leadership ofthe ELM, which was quickly subsumed by the more radical and active ELF. Both began the policyof characterizing the conflict as a struggle against an African colonizer and therefore their war wasone of decolonization and liberation. However, despite these claims, little progress was madedomestically or internationally. Guerrilla strikes and assassinations were carried out, but theEthiopian military carried out a reign of terror that stifled most major operations. This was aided bythe massive military aid the Ethiopian forces received from the United States. From 1960 onAmerica's military aid to Haile Selassie's forces was staggering, with $10 million dollars a year ingrants and loans being offered and from 1964 on material and logistical support continued to arrive. vThis made the struggle all the harder on the Eritrean guerrillas and the Ethiopian strategy continuedto evolve to incorporate the massive advantages they accrued in armor, air superiority, and specialcounter-insurgency forces. The struggle became even grimmer for the ELF as the Ethiopian forcesslowly recognized the influence of the Algerian FLN on the ELF's strategic thinking, where theEritrean rebels had divided their front into five semi-autonomous zones under the control of localleaders. vi While in theory this gave a certain amount of tactical flexibility, it instead gave theEthiopian forces a chance to target the zones one by one while fractious central command meant thatlittle concerted aid was forthcoming. By 1970 the commanders of three of the zones protested thestructure and after a period of attempted negotiation and finally violence, split off to form theEritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).2

This split of the armed forces would not be the last but was certainly the most important ofthe conflict. The literature since the independence of Eritrea has followed various paths to analyzethe reasons behind the divergent characters of the ELF and the EPLF, covering aspects of religions,ethnicity, class, even economic backgrounds of the various member groups, but perhaps the simplestexplanation is that of a rising tide of student recruits in the late 1960s brought with them newerradical ideas that had been absent in the earlier leadership of the ELF. These progressivephilosophies were brought to the fore as these students assumed leadership positions and participatedin overseas training courses in such revolutionary countries as Cuba and China. By 1970 the risingambitions of these younger aspiring leaders and the faltering grip of the older conservativeleadership simply could no longer coexist and the split occurred. The ELF remained a fiercelynationalist but loosely disciplined group of guerrillas and older intellectuals while the EPLF took amore rigorously revolutionary tack and began organizing a disciplined peasant base from which togrow its infrastructure. This revolutionary tack, inspired by the movements of Mao, Giap, andCastro, would lead the EPLF to greater success throughout the conflict and it would eventually bothoutlast its rival organization and achieve its ultimate goals.The first major step in the alteration of the conflict was the EPLF's efforts to restructureEritrean society to successfully wage a People's War. The successful Protracted Wars in China andVietnam both relied on the social transformation of their states to both enhance nationalconsciousness of the struggle and to create a logistical base that would support the war efforts of theliberation forces. To effect this social change, the EPLF created a transformative social program anda national ideal for the emergent Eritrean consciousness. By building off a base of five major massorganizations (for workers, peasants, women, students, and youth) which began to operate openly in1977 after years of clandestine organizing, the EPLF enunciated a completely transformativeprogram which would alter the very fabric of Eritrean society. This program’s stated goals wouldcompletely rebuild Eritrea in terms of agricultural production, industrial production, education,health care, and even gender relations.In terms of agricultural production and relations, the Eritrean general program for reformcalled for a socialized agricultural sector with control placed back in the hands of the producers. Intheory the program claimed its goals as including the nationalization of the lands expropriated by theEthiopians and their feudal collaborators and revising this into larger collective farms for the use ofthe masses. It also sought to introduce more modern farming methods, including the use ofmachinery and modern fertilizers to help increase the productivity of the peasant class. For the stillexisting pastoralists, veterinary and breeding aid would be provided as well as financial aid to helpthem become sedentary and successful animal breeders. Beyond all these (and several other small3

provisions) it purported to allow for the amicable and fair resolution of land inequality andownership disputes while providing for the organization and collectivization of peasants so they maylook after their own affairs. vii For the most part these goals were reached. Self-sustaining cells ofpeasant organizers set up village committees that represented all strata of agricultural life. In suchmodel villages as Zagher they oversaw the redistribution of land that had been monopolized byricher farming families and settled disputes within the community. viii While this was a long process,by the end of it large numbers of peasants that had never had land of their own to work had plots toproduce with. Often surplus land could then be farmed collectively by the newly set up farmersassociation, the produce of which then went into a cooperative shop. The individual plots as wellwere allocated along the lines of the association membership, which organized them in such a way soas to allow the easier introduction of new farming techniques. The front even trained “barefootveterinarians” along the lines of China’s famous barefoot doctors to offer free veterinary services tothe pastoral and agricultural population’s animals.Similar alterations were made to the structure of industrial production and relations. Muchlike the Ethiopian- and collaborator- owned land, the industries held by these proscribed groupswould be nationalized along with the vital large industries of the nation itself, such as the ports,mines, public transport, and power. Meanwhile foreign owned industries of a small scale would beallowed as long as the owners were from nations that had not opposed Eritrean independence. ix Toaid growth in the industrial sector, urban land would be made state property along with excess urbanhousing. The rent for this housing would then be set at a reasonable level for the standard of livingin the region by the managing government. The citizens whose property was thus nationalizedwould be duly compensated for their losses. x In terms of the workers themselves, their rights were tobe strictly safeguarded, partially by the organization and politicization of the workers themselves.These stated rights included an eight hour workday and at maximum a six day work week as well associal security nets for age and disability. The nationalized urban property would be made availableto these organized workers to assure them decent living conditions. Most tellingly, the politicizedworkers would be given the right to “participate in the management and administration of enterprisesand industries.” xi By offering the workers organizations, security, and strong interest in thecontinuation of the national industries, the EPLF theoretically offered a complete revolution to theworking class. Again, much like the agricultural reforms, the EPLF were able to implement the vastmajority of these while the struggle was still going on. During their administration of Keren in 1977they retained the status of the previously nationalized housing but slashed the price of the rents,particularly the lowest rents to further aid those distressed by the conflict. xii They also changed thepay scale for workers, lowering those that were highest while dramatically increasing those that had4

een lowest. xiii As to the industries themselves, even as early as 1975-76 the EPLF liberated zoneshad a plurality of small cottage industries sustained by and sustaining the revolution. Woodworkingcollectives altered weaponry while machine shops fabricated parts for everything from weaponry togenerators and agricultural machinery. These small front-run workshops were acknowledged to bethe future of the nation: “These small shops are going to be the base for the new Eritrea.” xiv Thecollective work, reform, and politicization of the industrial base of the revolution played a vital rolein the conflict.In every sector the greatest emphasis was placed on education. Free compulsory education,grants and scholarships, the establishment of more primary schools and institutes of highereducation, and most importantly the pledge to “Combat illiteracy to free the Eritrean people from thedarkness of ignorance” xv were central to the educational revolution that the EPLF insisted on fortheir nation. While it might be thought that most of these goals could only effectively be pursued inpeacetime, perhaps more than any other sector of its Revolution the EPLF made education aubiquitous part of their struggle. The EPLF demanded that all members serving in the front beliterate in Arabic or Tingrinya and established this training for the both the older members and the‘Vanguards,’ the youth that were inducted into the struggle initially in non-combatant roles until theyreached of age. These new inductees were also given educations in history, political theory, first aidand public health, and other basic subjects. In the EPLF run refugee camps and liberated townsclasses were given in political theory, the history of Eritrea, and most of all literacy. These sameliteracy courses were run out of the hospitals for those rehabilitating from injuries, as well as coursesin geography, and elementary math. xvi Astonishingly these same sorts of courses were also providedto Ethiopian prisoners-of-war, the vast majority of which were illiterate conscripted peasants.Beyond the training in the field, the EPLF established and ran over 36 schools in 1976 alone. xviiWhile it cannot be said that the education was given for entirely selfless reasons, as a cynicalobserver can easily claim that such education is better labeled indoctrination, it cannot be denied thatthe mass teaching of literacy altered the entire philosophical base of the nation and helped spread theconception of Eritrea as more than a collection of nine separate nationalities.Hand in hand with education was the complete overhaul of public health services. The EPLFsought to establish a system of free public health care that not only treated the populace at large, butserved as a basis for locally manufactured medicines and as centers for the eradication of contagiousdiseases. xviii Public health was paramount. In this, as like in much else of their goals, they maderemarkable headway. Two tiers of medical training (a basic and an intermediate) were established toproduce a greater amount of qualified medical personnel to man the expanding programs as themovement gained maturity. As of 1977 alone the EPLF was operating four major hospitals with a5

combined capacity of nearly 1400 patients. xix These facilities were equipped with basic medicalnecessities such as microscopes, refrigerators, and X-ray machines. Beyond these central hospitals,the front operated over 20 intermediate clinics established in liberated or semi-liberated areas to dealwith regional patients and even had limited inpatient capabilities. To supplement these formalfacilities, teams of doctors were trained to travel the largely rural areas in the mold of the “BarefootDoctors” to inoculate the populace as well as offer free medical care to the villages. Over the courseof their struggle the EPLF extended medical services to the populace at large where there had beenessentially no formal health services previously.Lastly, and perhaps the most radical step taken in their social revolutionary program, theEPLF obliterated the previous conceptions of gender roles in their liberated areas. Whereas Eritreahad long been an extremely conservative and patriarchal state regardless of region, the EPLFexplicitly stated their goals for women’s rights. They were to be freed from domestic confinement,be assured full rights of equality in representation, pay, and participation, and progressive marriageand family laws were to be established. xx Beyond this the EPLF promised to respect the right tomaternity leave, to provide maternal services, and even to try and eradicate prostitution, which theyviewed as a violent act against women. It would be right of a commentator to be skeptical though, asit is common for revolutionary movements to exalt women’s rights and yet do little to attain them. xxiHowever, like all other provisions within its programs, the EPLF did a remarkable job in attaining itsgoals under the pressures of wartime. First and foremost, women were organized as an importantpart of the front and were always given equal representation within the political structure of theEPLF itself. They were not barred from serving in any capacity within the front and womencommonly took combatant roles, with women constituting 13% of the army by 1977. xxii Theeducation programs offered by the front were perhaps even more revolutionary for the womeninvolved, as literacy had been even rarer amongst women than men before the conflict. However,the alterations to women’s rights did not stop within the boundaries of direct service to the front. Inliberated areas the land reform was just as open to women as men and women were amongst thosethat claimed plots of land in Zagher and other model villages. As the EPLF’s programs becamemore ingrained into the social fabric of communities, they often began taking on variations of theirmarriage law. This was a revolutionary step, as marriage was a defining characteristic in traditionalEritrean society, where it essentially relegated women to a servile role. xxiii With the new laws beingput into place, concepts of mutual consent for marriages became common as well as a woman’s rightto divorce. Beyond this ages of consent began being established, doing away with child-marriageswhich had the effect of opening up a whole new world of independent adolescence for youngwomen, transforming their possibilities in education, employment, and even newer ideas of6

courtship. Although this is not to say that all communities accepted these changes quickly or easily,the balance of sexual power was altered by the social revolution of the EPLF and women were to agreat degree liberated from their previous servitude. xxivThe social revolution altered Eritrea irrevocably and even at the time was noted for its farreaching consequences. No less a scholar of revolutions than Gerard Chaliand wrote “the EPLF isby far the most impressive revolutionary movement produced in Africa in the past two decades.”This complete social revolution would prove to be vital to the success of the Eritrean struggle for twoprimary reasons. The first was that the revolution and the acceptance of its precepts more thananything else helped the Eritrean cause overcome the regional, linguistic, and confessional barriers tonational unity. While earlier attempts in Eritrea had faltered when regional differences helpedfracture efforts of liberation, following the adoption of the social revolution there never was acredible threat of ethnic or religious divisions within the Eritrean front. By adopting a socialrevolution and using it to advance precepts that created a national ideology and identity which wasaccepted and proliferated by the populace, the EPLF created a nation in the process of liberating it.The second major reason for the importance of the social revolution has already beendiscussed in a passing manner: the creation of loyal and productive base areas are a necessity for thepursuit of a protracted conflict. By large scale agrarian reform, worker’s rights, women’s rights,education, and health care the EPLF created a popular front that earned the peoples’ loyalty andefforts. More than this, in the model villages and towns and amongst the workshops and hospitals inthe remote regions, they created a popular society that then had a vested interest in seeing theirrevolution succeed in the only way that mattered: the military overthrow of the oppressive power.As such the EPLF’s social revolution created areas that were loyal and productive for their effortsand which turned barren for their opponents. xxv Put in Maoist terms, strategically they always hadone of the necessary conditions for the prosecution of a Protracted War and tactically the guerrillasalways had a deep popular “sea” to “swim” in. The implementation of the social revolution createdthe conditions necessary for their military triumph.Of course while this transformation of Eritrean society to create the conditions for a People'sWar was necessary for the military triumph of the EPLF, this transformation would have beenuseless without a strategic and tactical adherence to the concepts of Protracted War that theyallowed. This was seen in the ultimate fate of the ELF, which had adopted several parallel structuresin reaction to the success of the EPLF and yet was effectively destroyed when they refused to altertheir strategy in the face of altered conditions. In contrast, the EPLF continuously applied thelessons learned in earlier liberation conflicts and patiently waited for the correct conditions totransition to more decisive forms of warfare. These lessons were most famously enunciated by Mao7

Tse-Tung in a series of lectures presented over the period of the Chinese Civil War and the Sino-Japanese war of 1936-1945. Noting that the Communist Chinese forces were weak in comparison toboth the Kuomintang (KMT) of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Army of Imperial Japan, he laid out thestrategic vision necessary to effectively prosecute the conflict against these enemies for the ultimatevictory of his revolutionary forces. Perhaps central to the military canon of Mao is his work “OnProtracted War,” which lays out the three stages that a revolutionary army must pass through duringits protracted struggle with a superior enemy: Strategic Defense, the Strategic Stalemate, and theStrategic Offensive. The struggle waged by the EPLF from 1970 to 1991 would pass through eachof these stages, often more than once, before the successful resolution of their War.At the time of their emergence the EPLF found itself in the midst of an increasinglycoordinated and well-executed Ethiopian offensive. The Ethiopian army had launched a strongground offensive in late 1970 that battered the ELF regions and followed this with a vigorousbombing campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force. xxvi Finding themselves vulnerable, the EPLFassumed what Mao would term the Strategic Defensive. xxvii The Eritrean forces were small, badlysupplied, and unable to resist the counter-revolutionary forces in the early stages of a conflict. Theprimary course of action for the revolutionary front necessarily was that of survival while extendingthe Ethiopians further and depleting their strength. Simultaneously the efforts at establishing thesocial base from which to draw strength and find concealment was underway. This proved easierthan expected, as throughout the early 1970s the Ethiopian forces treated the “pacified” regions ofEritrea as occupied territory and committed numerous atrocities and indignities upon the Eritreanpopulace. Villagization schemes were attempted to cut back on guerrilla support without adequatefood supplies or sanitary considerations. xxviii Livestock and crops were simply seized. Entirepopulations saw their homes burnt to the ground. This had the obvious effect of inciting thepopulace against Haile Selassie’s troops and caused a resurgence in membership in both liberationfronts.It was during this period of general equilibrium that the EPLF moved into the second stage ofMao's theories of protracted war: the Strategic Stalemate. xxix In this phase the revolutionaries thenhad two primary goals: the prosecution of guerrilla warfare and the mobilization of the populace.Thus, during the second phase a process of the simultaneous weakening of the enemy andstrengthening of the revolutionaries would take place until such time that the balance of power hadfirmly tipped in the favor of the revolution, when the final stage of the protracted conflict wouldbegin. This was noticeable in the expansion of both nationalist fronts in the face of continuedEthiopian oppression and the increasing role of the social programs of the EPLF, although still donein secret. During this period, both the ELF and EPLF carefully used the time and space gained by8

the friendly populace and slowly crumbling Ethiopian Empire to establish their strong bases whichwould support them until the momentous events of 1974.Ethiopia had already been teetering on the edge of a revolution in the early 1970s and theincreasingly repressive measures of Emperor Haile Selassie did not rectify the increasing discontentamongst the populous or the army. In 1974 the dam broke and Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Lionof Judah, the Elect of God, who had been Emperor of Ethiopia since 1930 was overthrown in apopular coup, arrested, and later killed by his military forces which subsequently took control of hisEmpire. The group behind this, the Derg, xxx was a loose council of 120 military officers that sawthemselves as enlightened technocrats that could navigate Ethiopia through its current crises andrestore its power and prestige. Although nominally headed by General Anam Andom, the committeewas the site of several vicious behind the scenes struggles for power which ended with a formerMajor in the Ethiopian Army, Mengistu Haile Mariam as the main wellspring of power in the nation.General Andom was executed in November of 1974 and Mengistu assumed one of the two chairs ofthe Derg which he would dominate for the next 17 years. However, the upshot of this activity wasthat the already over-extended Ethiopian military was thrown into general disarray.The next four years would prove crucial to the eventual success of Eritrean nationalism. Thebacklash against the growing excesses of the Derg (which shortly blossomed into what becameknown as a “Red Terror” as thousands of Ethiopians and Eritreans were summarily executed orimprisoned and tortured) drove massive amounts of recruits into the guerrillas’ camps and openednew opportunities for alliance with other revolutionary groups such as the Tigrayan PeoplesLiberation Front (TPLF). In addition, this period saw the EPLF move its base areas out ofconcealment and publicly proclaim its social programs while attempting to expand their influence onthe populace. It was during this time that the third and in theory final phase of Mao's strategictheories came into play, that of the Strategic Offensive. xxxi Having weakened the enemy, harassedhis communications, taken the security of the countryside from him, and mobilized and organizedtheir own strength in terms of both quality and quantity of forces, the EPLF now transitioned from itscombination of guerrilla and defensive warfare to one of guerrilla and offensive mobile warfare. Thegoal of the EPLF at this point became one of seeking out the Ethiopian military on terms favorable tothe Eritreans and forcing a decisive battle.The fruits of this strategy can be seen in the rapidity and decisiveness of the EPLF's advanceacross the front. 1975 saw an abortive attack on the capital of Eritrea itself, Asmara, whichprovoked the Ethiopians into even greater reprisals against the populace and in early 1976 theEritreans casually crushed the ill-fated Ethiopian “Peasant's Crusade” which was intended to swampthe Eritrean fighters. 1977 saw continued confidence on the part of both Liberation Fronts. Early9

in the year the EPLF captured Nacfa and Afabet, two major trading centers on the northern Sahelprovince of Eritrea. These conquests were followed by Decamare and Keren, both importantindustrial centers. Beyond this, Keren was a natural fortress that commanded the passes to that gavethe easiest access to the Sudan, which at this point served as both a humanitarian and logistic basefor the Eritrean struggle. Finally, and seemingly decisively, the EPLF managed to cut the roadbetween Asmara, the capital, and Massawa, the primary port, in October of 1977. With Mengistu’sEthiopia caught between the Liberation fronts in the North and a brutal war with Said Barre’sSomalia in the West over the Ogaden territories, xxxii it seemed impossible that the state could lastmuch longer.It was at this point that an astonishing international realignment altered the balance of inEthiopia once again. Mengistu’s Ethiopia had already claimed itself as a Marxist republic sinceshortly after its inception, although this had always been taken as at best a philosophical stopgap forwhat was essentially an ideologically empty revolt and coup. However, by 1977 the ailing Ethiopiacontinued to declare its devotion to Marxist ideals and had completed an arms agreement with theSoviet Union. This new arms agreement alongside the belated recognition of the human rightsviolations of the Derg regime caused President Carter and the United States Congress to deny anyfurther military support to Mengistu’s Ethiopia. Sensing an opportunity for a greater presence in theHorn, the Soviet Union immediately filled the military vacuum in Ethiopia, consequentlyabandoning its current proxy of Somalia. By July over $500 million worth of Soviet Arms floodedinto Ethiopia, dwarfing the previous United States aid. xxxiii Beyond the military hardware, whichincluded everything from MiG-21 fighters and SAM-7 anti-aircraft rockets, military personnel fromthe Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact nations, Cuba, the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen, andLibya arrived to bolster and train the Ethiopian Army. xxxiv During the Siege of Massawa it wasreported that Soviet advisers took a direct part in the fighting against the Eritreans and even thatRussian Naval vessels provided shore bombardment to help drive away the EPLF advance. xxxvCuban troops served openly in the Ogaden War, helping halt their recently abandoned Somali alliesand aiding in their eventual defeat over the next year.This massive aid continued, with 1978 shipments of advanced arms raising the total price ofmaterial aid to over $1 billion. xxxvi Tanks, Katyusha rocket batteries, MiG fighters, and long rangeartillery all were provided along with the expertise to effectively use them. Small arms wereprovided in almost obscene amounts as the Ethiopian army rose like a phoenix from its past fouryears of defeats. This staggering amount of military aid could only have one effect on the Eritreanstruggle: strategic stalemate and eventual losses. As mentioned in passing previously, the EPLF hadmade a bold strike at Massawa in late 1977, driving the Ethiopian troops from the city to the fortified10

Naval Base and two small islands off shore. However, this was to be the high water mark of theliberation struggle for the next seven years as the EPLF could not complete their control of the cityand were then left to face the counteroffensive of the resurgent Eastern-bloc backed Ethiopian Armywhich was able to focus its energies on Eritrea following their victory in the Ogaden in 1978.It was at this point that the EPLF effectively took stock of their strategic situation. Havinglost the strategic initiative in the incomplete siege of Massawa and facing a resurgent foe there wasno way they could successfully challenge the massive and well equipped Ethiopian offensive whichwas brewing against them. xxxvii Again taking their cues from earlier liberation struggles, the EPLFengaged in what Mao termed the Strategic Retreat. While this was implicit in “On Protracted War,”he more fully delineated the concept in his earlier lecture “Problems of Strategy in China’sRevolutionary War” where he began his exploration with the pronouncement “The objective ofstrategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counteroffensive. Retreat isnecessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy means to jeopardize thepreservation of one’s own forces.” xxxviii The retreat, while intended to preserve the forces of theliberation front, was also intended to create the circumstances by which a shift back to the offensivecould be effected. The Eritreans were obviously cognizant of this strategic concept, even drawing aparallel between their current withdrawal and the famous 1934 “Long March” of the Chinese CivilWar, which guaranteed the preservation of the Chinese Communist Forces. And as Mao's forcesreestablished themselves at the safe base area of Yenan, from which they would later emergetriumphant, so the EPLF established themselves in the mountain fastness of Nacfa, a natural fortressthat had been transformed into a base area productive enough to support their forces.Of course, the same Ethiopian offensive which forced the EPLF into a retreat provided apoignant counter-example in its effects on the still struggling ELF. Although they faced a far greaterconcerted assault than the EPLF, the ELF leadership refused to enact a strategic retreat and insteadchose to fight the Ethiopians from their newly liberated areas. Within weeks the ELF lines werebroken and they were retreating in a panic. xxxix The aftermath revealed that the shattered remnants ofthe ELF were spent as a military force and the vast majority of its fighters were absorbed into thenow safely entrenched EPLF. While the ELF's stubborn insistence on maintaining their hold led onlyto their destruction, the EPLF's retreat to Nacfa accomplished a number of important goals. Theretreat preserved the nationalist front’s armed forces, it consolidated them in the face ofoverwhelming enemy forces, it established them closer to their own base of support in Nacfa andnorthern Eritrea, it established their forces in far more advantageous terrain, and it also forced theEthiopian forces to extend themselves and their lines of communication even further into ruggedEritrean territory. With these factors established, the sole remaining effective Eritrean Front xl11

needed to accomplish two simple military goals: grow their own strength while reducing that of theEthiopians in preparation for a strategic counter offensive. They had managed to move fromStrategic Retreat and Defense into Strategic Stalemate seamlessly while integrating those remainingfighters of the ELF into their Nacfa stronghold.The Stalemate period would last from 1978-1984, a period that saw an ever-weakeningEthiopia continue their attempts to root the EPLF out of their base in Nacfa. The mobile guerrillacolumns of the EPLF wreaked havoc on the extended Ethiopian lines of communication while thefortified lines of of the Nacfa base withstood four separate offensives in 1979 alone. These strikescontained over 50,000 Ethiopian troops supported by massive amounts of armor and artillery and yetwere unable to make any measurable headway against the base areas of the EPLF. xli In 8 daysbetween July 14 th and 22 nd the Ethiopian army lost approximately 6,000 men. Following each ofthese abortive attacks the Eritreans reaped a massive amount of captured arms and ammunition. Thelines were again tested in 1982 by the 120,000 man Ethiopian “Red Star” campaign, which again didlittle more than waste massive amounts of men and armaments while increasing Eritrean morale andarms caches. xlii With this continued weakening of their opponents and their own consequent growthin strength, the Eritreans felt they were ready to enter the counter-offensive stage by 1983 but thiswas delayed by a series of local counter-attacks by the still massive Ethiopian forces. These sharpoffensives, including one of comparable size to the “Red Star” took place over the period of 1983-1985, but could not deny the inevitable shift in strategic initiative and strength which signaled thebeginnings of the final Strategic Offensive stage of the war.The final counter-offensives which began in 1987 were due to a combination of factors thatweakened the Ethiopians severely and at least kept the EPLF from suffering the same fate. Thefailed offensives of 1979-1985 drained the Ethiopian forces of men and weapons and emboldenedthe large number of guerrilla fronts now actively fighting within Ethiopia itself. Beyond militaryoverreach, Ethiopia was in the midst of one of the most severe famines the world had ever seen.Although food aid was diverted to their military, Ethiopia was slowly starving and popular supportof the Mengistu regime was almost nonexistent. In opposition to this the EPLF was as strong as ithad ever been. It had absorbed what was left of the ELF’s armed forces, it had captured a vastamount of military hardware from the Ethiopian forces over the course of their failed attacks in thenorth, it had fostered several of the now mature guerrilla fronts that were tearing their enemy apartfrom the inside, and while not well stocked with food by any means, their base areas produced someamount of food and their efficient social programs such as the Eritrean Relief Association ensuredthat they were at least in not as bad of shape as the Ethiopians. The balance of power had shifted forthe last time and the strategic offensive began in December 1987 as the EPLF forces overran the12

Ethiopian defenses outside of Nacfa. Their mobile conventional forces sought out local advantagesagainst the weakening Ethiopian forces in an attempt to obtain a decisive victory and on March 17 th ,1988 secured one.As noted earlier, Mao's entire theory of Protracted War is intended to to bring about theconditions by which a decisive victory may be gained over an opponent. xliii As such, all of the effortand struggle of the previous 27 years were concentrated into the assault of the EPLF on the EthiopianNorthern Command at the Battle of Afabet. The Ethiopian garrison was already disaffected by theirlow pay, their previous defeats, and inadequate medical services. xliv Desertions were rife within theDerg's forces and previous EPLF attacks on other local forces had the Ethiopian forces decidedlyuneasy about the continuance of the conflict. On the morning of the 17 th , the Eritreans finally seizedthe initiative and launched their opening assault, driving the Ethiopian front lines back or simplydemolishing them. Within the first few hours the entire Ethiopian command was encircled byveteran Eritrean fighters. An occasionally spirited defense and the attempt of the Ethiopians to inserta new commander came to naught; the Eritreans could always bring up more troops while theEthiopians were isolated, demoralized, and increasingly uncoordinated. xlv Two days later theEthiopian forces were essentially annihilated. One-third of them were captured and the vast majorityof the remainder were assumed dead, with the casualties exceeding 15,000 dead in the destruction ofthe last major Ethiopian fortress in Eritrean territory. This was a dramatic reversal that Mengistu'sEthiopia would never recover from. Whereas the Eritreans compared their earlier withdrawal withthe famous “Long March,” now the world took notice and compared Afabet with Dien Bien Phu, thedecisive Vietnamese victory over the French colonial forces in the first Indochina war. xlvi While theconflict was not immediately halted following the victory, from this point on the Eritrean anddissident Ethiopian forces they fostered never were in serious danger of reversal. In 1990 Massawaand Decamere were recaptured and by 1991 Asmara and Addis Ababa were taken in the finaloffensives of the liberation struggle. Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe and his forces melted away in theface of the advances of the EPRDF and EPLF, leading directly to the regime change in Ethiopia andthe formal liberation of Eritrea, whose military liberation was finalized by an internationallyrecognized plebiscite in 1993.The liberation and affirmation of a sovereign Eritrea after 30 years of conflict was a stunningfeat of arms. While the first wave of African decolonization was accomplished through almostsolely nonviolent means and the second wave against the minority-ruled states was supported by theFrontline States, Eritrea's struggle was never formally recognized or aided by other African nationsor the international community. Instead, the Eritreans adapted what had up to that point been themost effective plan for military liberation seen: that of the Protracted Struggle as practiced in Asia in13

their own struggles for freedom. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front established their ownsociety and identity which provided them with a popular logistical base that supported themthroughout the conflict. While never able to match the outside training and material given to theiropponents, it created a self-sustaining conflict that only required the continued labor and loyalty ofthe Eritrean people to prolong the conflict. This in turn fueled a brilliant military campaign thatfollowed the precepts of Mao in placing the continued existence of the military force above all otherconsiderations until such time that the enemy could be stalemated and then destroyed. In the end, thecombination of the social and military structures of the EPLF allowed them to gain a brilliant victoryin the last and often unheralded of the postwar decolonization conflicts.iiiiiiivvviviiviiiixxRichard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York, NYL Praeger Publishing, 1980), 27. For aconcrete representation of this linguistic policy, see Dan Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the EritreanRevolution (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1993), 58-59.Connell, 58.Ibid., 57-58.Sherman, 29. In terms of the threat of violence against the Eritrean Assembly, Connell claims Ethiopian jet fighterswere buzzing the city and police had surrounded the assembly while the proceedings were underway. See Connell,57.Following Haile Selassie’s return, the United States became Ethiopia’s primary military partner and supplier, with thetotal amount of aid granted from 1946-1975 equaling approximately $286.1 million dollars. For a total breakdown ofthese costs, see Sherman, 176-177.Sherman, 74 among others including Alex DeWaal, Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. (New York:Human Rights Watch, 1991), 41.For a full accounting of these concepts can be found in Article 2, Section A of the document “Objectives of theNational Democratic Programme of the EPLF” which can be found in a number of publications, including AppendixB of Sherman.The example of Zagher is a particularly famous one as it served as a model village for the EPLF and was reported onin both Connell, 109-126 and David Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front.(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), 111-114.See “Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 2, Section B.“Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 2, Section E.“Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 4, Section A, Part 8.Pool, 123-124.Ibid., 124.Connell, 40.“Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 3, Section B, Part 1.Connell, 38-39.Sherman, 104.“Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 3, Section C.Sherman, 102“Objectives of the National Democratic Programme of the EPLF”, Article 4, Section B.Notably the role of women in the aftermath of the success of the FLN has been cited as less than satisfactory.Sherman, 106.Connell does an excellent job explaining the extraordinary effects that these reforms had on women’s lives in Eritrea.His chapter “Destroying Shyness” is an excellent window into the process (Connell, 127-137).Connell also offers an interesting look into the interconnectedness of the revolutionary consciousness with the refusalof poor peasants to consent to the stripping of Eritrean women of their rights, rightly seeing the parallels betweentheir own new-found freedoms and those of women. Connell, 136.Even after the return of Ethiopian troops in the 1978-1985 Offensives, the EPLF loyalist areas still resisted the Dergforces and clandestinely aided the EPLF, a decisive factor in the struggle.DeWaal does an excellent job discussing the prevalence of these blunt tactics of populace sweeps and randombombing.xixiixiiixivxvxvixviixviiixixxxxxixxiixxiiixxivxxvxxvi14

xxvii Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War” in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War, ed. M. Rejai (Garden City, NY:Anchor Books, 1970), 275.xxviiiVillagization is a common counterinsurgency strategy used since the days of the Boer War or even before. Itconsists of the forced removal of the populace to fortified and controlled villages to both protect them from and limittheir contact with the insurgents, thereby cutting off the enemy guerrillas from any popular support. It generallyemerged into the popular consciousness during the Vietnam War, but in that conflict as in most others the actualeffects of the strategy are debatable.xxix Mao, 276.xxxDerg is the Amharic word for “Committee” and was the name taken by the new regime.xxxiMao, 278.xxxii The Ogaden War began in 1977 with Somalia invading the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to support the irredentistclaims of the ethnic Somalis living in the region.xxxiiiSherman, 90. This section also deals with the wide array of weaponry involved in the transaction.xxxivIbid., 90-91.xxxv Connell, 154. However, this direct ground intervention seems to have been more due to the recent arrival of theweaponry and subsequent Ethiopian unfamiliarity with it. As to the naval bombardment, it remains a pervasive butunsubstantiated rumor.xxxviSherman, 90.xxxviiBy June 21 st of 1978 there were reportedly 70,000 Ethiopian troops massed in Tigray preparing for theupcoming offensive and by July those number had risen to over 100,000, which if they were not superbly trainedwere at least equipped with new and effective material. See Connell, 160-161.xxxviiiMao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” in Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War,ed. M. Rejai (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 279-280.xxxixConnell, 163-165.xlxlixliixliiiThe ELF still existed in a very diminished state until its final destruction by the EPLF in 1979-1980.Ibid., 115.The offensive saw a massive number of troops deployed against the Eritrean forces, although most of these wereconscript troops with little training. These were mostly used for massive blunt assaults against the EPLF positions.As such, although they outnumbered their Eritrean opponents by eight to one, the assaults often ended in bloodyrepulses and by the end of the campaign over 40,000 of these Ethiopian conscripts would be casualties. See De Waal,117.Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” 283.xliv Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 252.xlv Ibid., 256.xlviThis comparison was explicitly made by scholar Basil Davidson on the BBC news broadcast of March 21 st , 1988. Ithas since been quoted or paraphrased in the majority of the literature on the Eritrean war.15