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Spanier Marine Corp., 810 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Hogan v. Malone Lumber, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1441, 1443 (E.D. Tex. 1992). A court may consider a wide range of circumstances in evaluating the facts involved in each case. See Hogan, 800 F. Supp. at 1443; Frazier v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Fletcher v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 648 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (citations omitted). Case 4:07-cv-00405 Document 21 Filed 05/22/2007 Page 18 of 21 B. Analysis Cammarata argues that venue is improper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), and alternatively, that this court should transfer this action to the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Cammarata asserts that litigating in Texas would be inconvenient; that many of the witnesses reside in Louisiana; and that Louisiana has a substantial interest in litigating the case there. The federal venue statute in diversity actions states: A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Venue is a “forum limitation imposed for the convenience of the parties. As a concept of convenience rather than jurisdiction it may be conferred on a court 18
either by consent or by the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection.” United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A] forum-selection clause is best understood as a potential defendant’s ex ante agreement to waive venue objections to a particular forum.”) (quoting Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375–76 (7th Cir. 1990)). This court has found that the mandatory forum-selection clause in the Employment Agreement was reasonable. Cammarata has waived his objection that venue is improper under section 1391(a). Case 4:07-cv-00405 Document 21 Filed 05/22/2007 Page 19 of 21 Cammarata argues that a substantial part of the events giving rise to this suit occurred in Louisiana, rather than Texas. There can be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3806.1 (3d ed. 2007); see also Seariver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 459 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that the analysis of whether or not venue is proper in a judicial district based upon the occurrence of a “substantial part of the events or omissions” does not require the court “to determine the ‘best’ venue for a cause of action pending before it, but rather must determine only whether or not its venue is proper”). This court finds that this district is a proper venue for this action. Cammarata alternatively seeks a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” 19
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