Tucker v. Journal Register East - Connecticut Employment Law Blog

conduct with regard to Pecoraro’s CHRO proceeding constitutes“participation” in a Title VII case, she has satisfied herburden. 4In Deravin, the Second Circuit held that defending oneselfagainst charges of discrimination in a Title VII proceedingconstitutes a “protected activity” within the meaning of TitleVII. Id. at 203-05. The Second Circuit noted that the TitleVII’s “participate[] in any manner” language is broad, and thatcourts have expansively construed this explicit language. Id.;see Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11thCir. 1999). The Second Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’sholding that “‘[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansivemeaning,’ and thus, so long as ‘Congress did not add any languagelimiting the breadth of that word,’ the term ‘any’ must be givenliteral effect.” Deravin, 335 F.3d at 204 (quoting United Statesv. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). Therefore, in Deravin, theSecond Circuit found that an employee testifying in an employmentdiscrimination case concerning his own allegedly discriminatoryaction had participated in a Title VII proceeding. Id. at 205.In Jute, the Second Circuit furthered its analysis of the4The parties do not discuss whether a CHRO action constitutes “aninvestigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII, and it is not clear tothe court what the specifics were of Pecoraro’s CHRO complaint. The courtnotes, however, that a CHRO action, although proceeding before a state, notfederal, agency, can nevertheless be brought pursuant to both CFEPA and TitleVII. Therefore, the court shall assume that Pecoraro’s CHRO case qualifies as“an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.-12-