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18of violence (used for both political and financial gain) athome.Research findings from Nepal and other more recent postconflictsettings suggest that many of these lessons havenot been fully learned. In Nepal for example, external actorshave seldom analyzed the extent to which organizedcriminal activity sustained armed groups during theconflict. Our research suggests it was significant. Nor haveexternal actors invested resources to understand if theseillicit activities continue to sustain political actors today.Evidence from our research is mixed, but the fact thatthe same forms of illicit activity largely remain the same,coupled with the absence of a culture of asset disclosurefrom political parties and high-level public officialssuggests a significant problem. In contrast, in Sierra Leone,the UN Peacebuilding Commission has ensured thatorganized crime-related issues remain on the country’stransition agenda. This is an important development, yetit is unclear how these efforts will be accompanied inpractice. Sierra Leone, along with Liberia, Côte d’Ivoireand Guinea Bissau, form part of the West Africa CoastalInitiative (WACI), a multi-institutional regional effort aimedat mitigating the impact of organized crime along theWest Africa coast, which has led to the establishment oftransnational crime units in each of these countries. At thesame time though, it is unclear how the structural driversof organized crime in Sierra Leone will be addressed. Thecombination of organized crime with a still fragile politicalsettlement, entrenched patronage, corruption, and massyouth unemployment place the country’s reconstructionand peace consolidation efforts at risk.A focus on stability and positive economic growth oftenovershadow important democratic deficits in transitioncountries. In Mozambique, for example, politics has beenoverwhelmed by rampant corruption and organizedcrime, not least because the ruling party itself has blockedeither the establishment or the effective implementationof different transparency and accountability mechanisms.A historically weak political opposition has not helped.The emergence of a new opposition party and growingdiscontent with corrupt practices and mafia-likemanagement of the state might, however, result in a shiftin policy and practice in the long-term. In the meantime,the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ continuesto grow on a par with violence related to both organizedand ‘disorganized’ crime. The overall governance anddevelopment impacts have been substantial. In Nepal,while crime appears to be more ‘disorganized’ thanorganized at present, the manner in which criminalactivity has been used both during and after the conflictto support political aims does not bode well for politicalstability. Given the culture of public sector corruption inNepal, such practices risk becoming more entrenched asthe country transitions toward a more ‘democratic’ formof politics. Western development actors are attempting tosupport certain measures aimed at enhancing governanceand strengthening political parties, yet it is unclearwhether these efforts will have an effect in a countryw<strong>here</strong> the West holds limited sway.In several of the case studies, political contestation isregularly affected by organized crime, or by how politicalactors use organized crime to defend interests. Forexample, in Nepal, Jamaica, and Guyana, political leadershave mobilized gangs to support their electoral goalsor hamper those of others. In none of these cases havepolitical leaders been held accountable for their behavior.In Ghana, political parties are suspected of using the spoilsof drug trafficking to support electoral campaigns and tounderwrite voter turnout. Again, the absence of accessto information laws, regulatory frameworks for assetdisclosure, campaign financing ceilings, political partyfunding, media investment ceilings, and strong electoraland financial management and compliance bodies leavesmuch of this behavior unchecked.“Illicit markets breed violence” is a widespread themein the literature. Our research confirmed that this is notalways the case; the relationship between illicit marketsand violence is very complicated. The use of violencecan be understood, for example, as an importantcharacteristic of the strategies of political or businessgroups. In Nepal, Guyana, and Jamaica, political leadersorganize criminal gangs to exercise violence in support ofpolitical objectives. Political parties also use the threat ofNYUCICResponding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
violence by criminal gangs to provide security or securepublic contracts and other services. In Ghana, a majorcocaine and heroin transshipment point marked bysignificant involvement of political and security actors,no drugs market-related violence has yet been registered.This suggests a modus operandi that currently benefitsall those involved. In some settings, however, violencecan be provoked by efforts to break those links. Manyobservers trace the huge upsurge in homicides in Mexicoto the country’s shift to a multi-party system, a processthat saw the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) loseits hold on power and the unraveling of the PRI’s informalarrangements with organized crime, a political-criminal“settlement” minimizing violence. In Jamaica, violencealso became more independent of the political process ascriminal groups such as the Shower Posse gained relativeindependence from political patrons. In Mozambique,many fear that violence might increase if the ruling partywere to lose its relative control of organized criminalactivity in the country. In Sierra Leone, a country emergingfrom a brutal civil war in which criminal activity playeda crucial role, criminal violence has been minimal andcontrary to expectations, ex-combatants have not formedcriminal gangs or become involved in the drug trade. 22In many settings w<strong>here</strong> organized crime is prevalent,it is the absence of violence that should be of concern.Peter Gastrow argues that organized criminal groupsand networks can constitute real threats to the state“not through open confrontation but by penetratingstate institutions through bribery and corruption and bysubverting or undermining them from within.” 23 He notesthat, “[g]overnments that lack the capacity to countersuch penetration, or that acquiesce in it, run the risk ofbecoming criminalized or “captured” states” over time.Despite this reality, many development and securityactors continue to assess organized crime solely from thescale of violence it produces. The current situation in Maliis an important example. Despite broad knowledge oflinks between high-level officials in Bamako and criminalgroups operating in northern Mali, the country was largelyportrayed as a development success. It was only when the22. Communication with Michael von Schulenburg, former ERSG to Sierra Leone, June 2013.23. Peter Gastrow (2012), Termites at Work: Tansnational Organized Crime and State Erosion inKenya, International Peace Institute, NY.situation turned violent did attention turn to some of themore structural issues underpinning these relations. 24In several of the case studies – Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica,and Sierra Leone – public sector officials or politicalactors have been implicated in organized crime cases.The former Minister of Transport and Aviation of SierraLeone was allegedly linked to a broad cocaine networkin which the Minister’s brother played an importantrole. An investigation led to the seizure of 700 kilos ofcocaine in 2008. The Attorney General and Minister ofJustice allegedly blocked the Minister’s arrest in the faceof a judicial order. 25 The importance of this case for othertransition/developing settings cannot be under-stated.Before the drugs were seized, Sierra Leone did not prohibitdrug trafficking; a law had to be drafted, adopted, andimplemented retroactively in order to prosecute thoseinvolved. 26 The judge who presided over the trial listedseveral lessons from the case, noting in his final judgmentthat “it is imperative to regularly assess old and new threatsand pass the appropriate legislation as soon as possible,”and stressing that the details of the case “shed light onhow easily penetrable Sierra Leone’s security sectorstill is as [s]pecial branch officials, intelligence officers,police officers, could all be got at with ease w<strong>here</strong> largeamounts of money were concerned.” 27 Insights from suchtrials or commissions of inquiry can inform developmentassistance efforts to strengthen governance structures andidentify gaps in the criminal justice system or the scopeand depth of the government complicity in the case. Theycan also help identify direct or backdoor entry points fordevelopment interventions.24. For a more detailed assessment of this issue. see Wolfram Lacher (2012), Organized Crime andConflict in the Sahara-Sahel Region, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, WashingtonD.C.25. In his sentence, the presiding judge implied that the government had been guilty ofobstruction of justice in preventing the trial of the former Minister, noting that “the stateprosecution was withholding vital evidence and was prepared to jeopardize the case in order tosave one person (the minister), constituting an act of perjury.” See Sierra Leone case study.26. As noted in the Sierra Leone case study, the decision to apply a piece of legislationretroactively placed some strain on existing constitutional provisions, but as noted by aformer Sierra Leonean judge, “Sierra Leone’s hitherto lethargic attitude to the incorporation ofinternational conventions and treaties into its domestic law forced it to have recourse to politicalexpediency in the cocaine case presided over by Justice Browne-Marke rather than uphold theprincipal of legality precluding, as a rule, the enactment of retroactive penal laws, an issue thatcame up for litigation before the judicial committee of the Privy Council in the case of Akar vAttorney-General.” Interview with Justice Bankole-Thompson, Accra, Ghana, 29 April 2013. Seealso African Law Reports: Sierra Leone Series (1964-66), and Bankole Thompson (1997), TheConstitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995), Maryland: University Press of AmericaInc. for a legal analysis of the decision in that case (pp. 21-25)27. Justice Nicholas Browne-Marke (2012).19Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing CountriesNYUCIC
Page 1 and 2: NEW YORK UNIVERSITYiCENTER ON INTER
Page 3 and 4: Table of ContentsGetting Smart and
Page 5 and 6: security threats, such as counterin
Page 7 and 8: section provides concluding remarks
Page 9 and 10: I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOn Current Deve
Page 11 and 12: tax evasion, drug smuggling, illega
Page 13 and 14: fraud. The complex web of informal
Page 15 and 16: unpopulated regions, weak instituti
Page 17 and 18: • Supporting crime-sensitive econ
Page 19: II. SUGGESTIONS FOR TARGETEDPROGRAM
Page 23 and 24: criminal activity in order to build
Page 25 and 26: organized crime-related intelligenc
Page 27 and 28: countries, security sector reform e
Page 29 and 30: The growing incidence of cybercrime
Page 31 and 32: 4.2 Apply the principle of shared r
Page 33 and 34: III. KNOWING WHEN TO ENGAGE ANDWHER
Page 35 and 36: these challenges within government
Page 37 and 38: Where criminal enc
Page 39 and 40: Organized criminal corruption can t
Page 41 and 42: Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar.
Page 43 and 44: are prevalent, or where</st
Page 45 and 46: 1.1.3 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
Page 47 and 48: 2.5 USE SECTOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL E
Page 49 and 50: BibliographyBooksArias, Desmond Enr
Page 51 and 52: International Drug Policy Consortiu
Page 53: US Department of State (undated), M

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