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March 2007 - Eitzen group

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Saronic Gulf, 1988; the explosion ofbuses on board the ferry Our Lady ofMediatrix in the Philippines, 2000; thebombing of the French tanker, VLCCLimberg in Yemeni waters, 2002. In allof the above incidents, each ship wastarget, not tool. Even, the ship maybecome a tool for terrorists (i.e. 9/11case). For instance, a cruise ship can bewell target, but a cargo vessel maybecome a tool for terrorism. The impactof attacking passenger ship is muchmore than a cargo vessel. The value ofhuman life is immeasurable and lots ofrich people and celebrities travel oncruise ships. Whereas, very less peopleare there on cargo ships, compared toany passenger vessel, but result of devastationmay be worse depending oncargo characteristics. Ships may be seenas political weapons by terrorists whohave political or terrorist agendas.For pirates or hijackers, ship is a hot target,not a tool for piracy. By hijacking apassenger ship or wealthy cargo ship,they can fulfil their aims. Unlike thepirates of old, many of today's piratesare maritime terrorists with an ideologicalbent and a broad political agenda.This nexus of piracy and terrorism isespecially dangerous for energy markets.Stowaways use ship as tool for humantrafficking. Normally, they have nointention to damage the ship or cargo.Their views are different as they do notuse the ship for destructive purposes,neither for any constructive purposes.A terrorist attack on transport infrastructurein a certain region will cause arise of all transport costs to that region.This will induce some people no longerto look for jobs in that region. Thelabour supply will therefore decrease inthis region. This will cause the regionsproduction to decline, and will reducerelative wage in this region. The lowerrelative wage leads to emigration out ofthat region and lowers the supply oflabour even more.Only two percent of all terrorist incidentsrecorded since 1969 have takenplace at sea. Several reasons account forthis. First, terrorists have generally preferredland venues as they are fixed, easierto penetrate and more immediatelymedia accessible. Second, operating atsea requires specialist skills andresources that all but a few organizationsposses. Third, most terrorist<strong>group</strong>s are tactically conservative, optingfor familiar methods that have beentested and offer a relatively high chanceof success.At the end, our view of what is a likelyterrorist target cannot be taken to be thesame as those of the terrorist. Overtime their objectives can be expected tochange depending upon circumstances,which in turn will change their choice oftargets; changes which cannot be accuratelyforecast. Since we cannot providemaximum security for every possibletarget, we have no choice but to identifyand prioritize targets and allocateresources accordingly.If we consider ships are likely targets,resources allocated to their security willnot change appreciably over time. Onthe other hand, a terrorist has theadvantage of flexibility in target selectionas well as flexibility in allocating thenecessary resources to attack the target.9

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