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As such, E1 poses the greatest danger to individual elec -tronic systems, while E3 poses the greatest threat to networkedinfrastructure, such as long line power and telephone networks.The focus <strong>of</strong> the military is primarily on electronic system im -pacts due to E1.With the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union and no perceivedthreat, the military’s investments in EMP assessment capabilitieswere significantly reduced.CBRN Survivability OversightThe late 20th century saw the emergence <strong>of</strong> tactical andstrategic nuclear capabilities by developing nations whose po -litical agendas and policies are diametrically opposed to the in -terests <strong>of</strong> the United States.In September 2008, the DoD formally established a senior -level Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Surviv -ability Oversight Group (CSOG) through the mechanism <strong>of</strong> theCBRN Survivability Policy, <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> Defense Instruction(DoDI) 3150.09.The CSOG charter established its mission to ensure thatequipment survivability in a nuclear weapons effects environ -ment, including EMP, is addressed specifically by requirementsduring the acquisition process. Further, the CSOG was chargedto establish the process for evaluating legacy system vulner -abilities deployed by the services and to prepare a yearly reportto Congress about the progress toward achieving hardening <strong>of</strong>each service’s mission critical systems.The CBRN Survivability Policy: (1) defines a CBRN missioncritical system; (2) calls for the establishment <strong>of</strong> processes toidentify and review a mission critical system in the context <strong>of</strong> theJoint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS);(3) establishes processes for ensuring system survivability in aCBRN environment; and (4) identifies lines <strong>of</strong> responsibility forpolicy implementation.EMP Program MissionThe new U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> EMP Program mission is multifaceted butultimately comes down to providing senior <strong>Navy</strong> leadership theinformation to assess fleet posture with regard to EMP. Currentlyfour core elements comprise the new program: testing and as -sessment, guidance, surveys and standards.The U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> EMP Program supports the functions <strong>of</strong> theNAVSEA electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) technicalwarrant holder by providing guidance to <strong>Navy</strong> acquisition pro -grams relative to military standards, requirements and designpractices.It is vital that the U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> EMP Program engage programmanagers early in the acquisition process to provide guid -ance and education about the effect these requirements haveon their respective programs. The EMP Program is standingby to assist program managers with such tasks as developingand/or reviewing capability design documents and systemspecifications.The Road AheadThe road ahead for any new program is fraught with chal -lenges. The most significant challenge for the new U.S. <strong>Navy</strong>EMP Program is cognizance. Due to the long absence <strong>of</strong> a robustEMP Program, few people in the U.S. <strong>Navy</strong> or across the greaterDoD community have an intimate knowledge <strong>of</strong> EMP causesand effects. The prevailing thought appears to be that the prob -ability <strong>of</strong> occurrence is low, so the issue is not important and canbe easily dismissed.However, the risk <strong>of</strong> failing to implement a mitigation strat -egy for EMP is at the highest level, and the consequences <strong>of</strong> fail -ing to take precautions now can be catastrophic.Blaise Corbett has been with the <strong>Navy</strong> since 2002 and has beendirectly involved in the EMP assessment <strong>of</strong> naval systems since 2004.Corbett is currently the group leader for the Naval Surface WarfareCenter Dahlgren Division EMP assessment group.James Partak, an engineer originally from Naval Surface WarfareCenter White Oak, has more than 39 years <strong>of</strong> experience in the area <strong>of</strong>nuclear effects to electronic systems. Now retired from the <strong>Navy</strong>, Jimsupports the EMP assessment group through EG&G, a division <strong>of</strong> theURS Corp.Applicable Policy• • • • • DoDI 3150.09. Chemical, Biological,Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)Survivability Policy (Change 1). Aug. 17,2009.MIL-STD-1310G. Standard Practice forShipboard Bonding, Grounding, andOther Techniques for ElectromagneticCompatibility and Safety. June 28, 1996.MIL-PRF-24758A. PerformanceSpecification – Conduit Systems,Flexible, Weatherpro<strong>of</strong>. Sept. 24, 2004.OPNAVINST 3401.3A. NuclearSurvivability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> and Marine CorpsSystems. Jan. 5, 1989.OPNAVINST 9070.1. Survivability Policyfor Surface Ships <strong>of</strong> the U.S. <strong>Navy</strong>. Sept.23, 1988.CHIPS January - March 2010 15

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