Fraud as a Negative Catalyst in the Nigerian Banking Industry

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2 (5): 357-363© Scholarlink Research Institute Journals, 2011 (ISSN: 2141-7024)Journal jetems.scholarlinkresearch.orgof Emerging Trends Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)Fraud as a Negative Catalyst in the Nigerian Banking IndustryAkindele R.IDepartment of Management and accountingObafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria___________________________________________________________________________AbstractFraud in the Nigerian Banking Industry before the recent merger and acquisition and recapitalisation effortswas at alarming rate. It has caused many banks to collapse, and many investors and depositors funds weretrapped in. Infact it has prevented many banks from achieving their goals and many businesses went intoliquidation. Honestly speaking it has become a cankerworm that has eating deep into the vibric of the financialsector of the Nigerian economy. That calls for the need for this study and the purpose of this study therefore isto identify the causes of fraud, measure it’s impact and identify means of controlling. The study is a surveyresearch and questionnaire was used for the collection of primary data while libraries, journals, write-ups,seminar papers and books by popular authors were used for secondary data. The findings show that lack ofadequate training, communication gap, and poor leadership skills were the greatest causes of fraud in Nigerianbanking industry. It was concluded that adequate internal control system should be put in place and thatworkers satisfaction and comfort should be taking care off.__________________________________________________________________________________________Keywords: fraud, catalyst, effectiveness, efficiency and Nigerian economy__________________________________________________________________________________________INTRODUCTIONThe level of fraud in Nigeria before the latest reformhas assumed an epidemic dimension. It has eatendeep into every aspect of life to the extent that even athree year old child talks about ‘419’, the newlydiscovered sobriquet for Advance fees fraud, which ishaunting us as a nation. The problem of frauds andeven forgeries are endemic and spreading likeharmattan fire in the banking industry. In Nigeria,frauds have assumed a frightened scale andsophisticated consequent upon the general economicand depression of the last decade. Over the lastdecade, the growth in the rate of occurrence of frauds(successful and unsuccessful attempts have beenshocking Bolton and Hand (2002). Oludifipe (1994)stated that even though the industry is becomingmore militant and vigilant, millions of naira is stilllost on a daily basis. He attributes the mostsignificant percentage of these frauds to collusionbetween staff of banks and the fraudsters, whichconstitutes a very serious economic crime.Shongotola (1994) likens the Nigeria bankingindustry to “not just a battle front with a clear cutfiring line between banks and bandits but a veritablemine field in which some banks and their topmanagement staff are in secret leagues with theenemy”. He says that only the measured alertness andcollaboration of genuine banks together withimproved supervisory measures from CBN ad NDICwill terminate such pirate organizations. As it werefrauds seem to have increased as new technology isborn and more advanced techniques of enhancingbusiness transactions have been developed.Fraudsters are constantly devising new plans,357updating old methods and trying out new techniquesof bypassing these electronic systems meant to ensurehigh security of banking operations. Theintroductions of automated systems that losehandwriting and fingerprint trails have not helpedmatters either.In view of the staggering sums lost to fraudsters bythe Nigerian financial sector, in these recent timesand the rate at which fraudsters appear to have shiftedtheir attention and directed their energies to banks,devising all unimaginable tactics to exploit loopholesin the control measures and capitalize on carelessnessof the staff and customers, Fraud in the industry hasprevented many banks from achieving their goals.Some banks were just seen in the physical as bodyand building they were already liquidated and manywere already into distress. Taking a walk downmemory lane, one can name a number of banks thatwound up distressed due to fraud. There is, therefore,a great need to study the changes and consequent offraud perpetrated in the banking industry and to lookfor ways 0f preventing fraud having realized that Is itreally possible to have a fraud free banking industryin Nigeria.The focus of the study is to identify and assess thecauses, consequences, detection, prevention andcontrol of fraud in the Nigeria Banking Industry.LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICALFRAME WORKYoung, (2002) says that, ample evidence exists thatindividual integrity of those running the banks today

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)has never been at a higher level. Never before havewe seen attention to the actual steps; procedures andcontrol of monetary transactions. Employees’ as wellas firms in all industries engage in fraudulentpractices all over one world. Although the existenceof fraud in our banks is not an uncommon orunexpected behaviour, the prevalence ‘of it is what isworrying because of all the various problemsconfronting the most untraceable’. (Ogwuma, 1985)and Akindele R.I el al (2008).Frauds in banks early lead to loss of monies thatordinarily belong to someone other than the banks.The loss results in some ceases in reducing the levelof resources available for use in the operations of thebanks. In very bad cases where frauds occur withcrippling frequency and in wholesomeness, the bankmay be forced to close down as a result. When thebank loses money and is wound up, the customerslose money. This leads to loss of confidence andeventually reduced patronage. Another reason forworrying in the banking industry is the vast variety ofnature, character and methodology employed infraud. Moreover, the control of identified specieseems to give birth to another that is invariably moresophisticated and complex. Thus each case can besaid to be a variant of another and undoubtedly aninstructive study in human negative use of ingenuityand endowment.Crosse and Hempel (1973) and Canhil M el al (2002)had identified five major types of fraud perpetrated inthe banking industry. These include; “Borrowing” from the till. This usually starts outwith borrowing a few naira, which are returned.Overtime, the sums involved increase and thewillingness ad ability to ‘repay’ declines. Forgeries of customers’ signature to withdrawfrom his/her account. Transfer from customers account to collaboratorsaccount. Granting of loans to fictitious borrowers. Granting of loans without adequate informationand security from the borrower.There are two main sources of frauds in banks – theinternal source ad external. Though distinguishable intheory, these sources are very often inseparable inpractice. That is to say, a successful fraud often takesplace and succeeds as a result of the collaborationintentional or unintentional (i.e due to carelessness orerror of judgment, of an insider – a bank employee ormember of staff).Indeed it was recently affirmedthat” the public believes and rightly too, that mostfrauds in banks are the active connivance of bankstaff. Otherwise how does anybody explain forexample, how a cheque drawn in favour of theFederal Government of Nigeria is paid into someprivate account and the funds withdrawn? Or howdoes one explain how a completely differentinstitution or individual collects a draft prepared inthe name of an institution or individual? This is notan exception of the rule, it is frequent occurrence”(Soneye, 1985), Botton et al (2002)The sources of bank fraud can also be classified intoinstitutional factors, lapses or inadequacies andenvironmental/societal factors, lapses, Adewunmi,(1985), Cahill, Chen and Lambert (2002) andHulthen R et al (2002).Institutional factors/lapses/inadequacies are factorsthat we can trace to the internal environment of theorganization. They are, to a great extent, factorswithin the control of the management of the bank.The major institutional source of fraud is poormanagement. This is often manifested in variousways. Lack of adequate supervision is a manifestationof poor management. Also inadequate control in theform of effective policies, procedures and systems isindicative of poor management (Biscaia, AlexiouPavon and Hulthen 2002).Socio economic lapses/inadequacies: The bank is anintegral part of society. It is affected by as well as itaffects the elements in its immediate and remoteenvironment. If the wrote society of which the bankis a part, is morally bankrupt, it will be difficult, ifnot impossible to expect the banks to be insulatedfrom the effects of such moral decadence. Oursocieties have debased the entire old moral standardsand appear to be unconcerned with probity, honesty,integrity and “goodname”. The family friends, thereligious houses and society at large seem not to carehow you come about your riches but accept,accommodate and even respect you for your wealth,however, dishonesty it has been acquired. All theseencourage fraud as the end seems to justify themeans, and no means seems to be morallyunacceptable.Nature and Types of FraudFrauds in financial institutions vary widely in naturecharacter and method of perpetrations. But in general,fraud can be classified into; perpetrators and methodused on the basis of perpetrators, three categories arenoted, namely: - internal, external and mixedperpetrations. Internal perpetrators are made up of thestaff, external perpetrators refer to outsiders notconnected with the institution, mixed refers to acollusion between the staff and external parties.Classification of fraud by method used is the mostcommon form of classification employed by financialinstitutions; the list is in exhaustive as fraudsters on adaily basis are devising new methods. The followingare the most important and common types of fraudhighlighted by Bank Administration Institute (1989)in Fraud prevention and Detection series.Advanced Fees Fraud: Popularly known as ‘419’,advanced fees fraud may involve an gent with an358

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)offer of a business proposition which would lead toaccess often for a long term. The source of funds orbusiness is not specific and can only be reachedthrough the agent who does so for a commission.Once the commission is paid the agent disappearsinto thin air.Account Opening Fraud: This involves a depositand cashing of fraudulent cheques. An individualasking to open a transaction account at anunsuspecting bank with false identification papersunknown to the bank does it.Cheque Kiting: Kiting, as defined by us comptrollerof the currency’s policy guidelines for national BankDirectors, is a method whereby a depositor utilizesthe time required for cheques to dear to obtain anunauthorized loan without any interest charge’. Thegoal of the kiter may be to use these uncontrolledfunds, interest free, for a short time to overcome atemporary cash shortage or to withdraw fundspermanently for personal use.Cheque Fraud: Most common cases of this kind offraud are through stolen cheques and forgedsignatures. This is very popular because cheques areused daily and are not too hard to come by. Mosttimes, this type of fraud does not require collusionand can sometimes go understand unless theperpetrator gets greedy.Clearing Fraud: This is a fraud perpetrated in theclearing of cheques. It is done by suppression of aninstrument so that at the expiration of the clearingperiod applicable to the instrument, the collectingbank will give value as through the paying bank hadconfined the instrument good for payment.Misrouting of clearing cheques can also assistfraudsters to complete a clearing fraud.Counterfeit Securities: This is one of the oldestforms of crime. Documents, securities, bonds andcertificate could be forged, duplicated, adjusted oraltered and presented for loan collection. Equallytreasury notes, cashiers cheques, bankers acceptance,certificate of deposit in an altered form could bepresented to banker redemption.Computer Fraud: This could be perpetrated by thecorruption of a programme, hacking, tampering witha diskette to gain access to unauthorized areas andgive credit to an account for which the funds were notoriginally intended.Loan Fraud: This is perpetrated when funds are lentto a non-borrowing customer or a borrowingcustomer that has exceeded his credit limit. In mostcases the staff are the perpetrators like the cashiersand they hide this from the management.Money laundering fraud: This is a means to concealthe existence, source or use of illegal obtained moneyby converting the cash into untraceable transactionsin banks. The cash is disguised to make the incomeappear legitimate and is usually done by collusion ofa customer with a member of staff.Money Transfer Fraud: Fraudulent money transfermay result from a request solely for the purpose ofcommitting a fraud or the alteration of a genuinefunds transfer request. This can be done by changingnames, adjusting figures or account numbers. Thisform of fraud is made easy for fraudsters because ofthe ease at which they can be dare e.g mail,telephone, electronic process, telex and even thelatest technology of using GSM phones.Telex Fraud: The messages that are passed throughtelex in form of codes could be altered to divert thefunds to another account.Letters of Credit: Most common in internationaltrading, these are instruments used across borders adscan be forged, altered, adjusted and take longer toidentify. So, in most cases, perpetrators escape.METHODSIn understanding this work, two types of data wererelied upon, namely primary and secondary. On theprimary data, structured questionnaire were designedand constructed to gather information in realizing theobjectives of the research. For secondary data, theresearcher relied mostly on archival materials,internal records of banks, Publications of bank staff,Seminar papers,The population for this study was 6 banks; 3orthodox and new generation. Six banks were thenselected; three orthodox namely: First bank, Nationalbank and Wema bank and three new-generationbanks. The essence of dividing the banking industryinto two is to critically assess any differences orvariances in the types, causes, and detection methodsand control measures of fraud. Also to see if theorthodox banks with their old methods are successfulin reducing fraud, to see the variation in their lossesand the effects.The new generation banks are also looked at to see ifthe excessive reliance on computer andtechnologically complex machinery is not anothercause of the increase in fraud in banks. The samplesize of the study consists of 50 subjects, which werechosen from simple random method.RESULTInformation gathered from the research as perresponses towards fraud in the Nigerian bankingindustry in terms of total scores, mean score, standarderror, standard deviation, variance were shown intable 1(see appendices). Table 1 shows a summary ofthe variables. Using the mean statistic we can say thattraining is the strongest variable and so the lack ofadequate training is a major cause of fraud.Inadequate communication channel is another majorcause of fraud. This is followed by weak leadershipstyles of supervisors and managers. From thissummary we can deduce that inadequate training hasthe greatest impact compared with weak leadershipstyle and poor communication. The result was testedfurther using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to359

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)determine the difference between means as shown intable 2.Table 3 shows that irregular training combined withpoor leadership skills is the stronger combination ofvariables causing fraud. The ANOVA in table 4shows that communication gap in combination withinadequate training as strongest influence within thegroup. Although between groups the combination ofpoor leadership skills as well as inadequate trainingare the strongest communication channelThe central bank of Nigeria recorded various casesof frauds as presented in table 5.On the contrary, the Nigerian Deposit insurancecorporations (NDIC) annual report shows somevariations in the estimate over the last number ofyears. In 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, the money’slost to fraud were recorded as N689.2m, N2730.57m,N2851.11m and N11, 243.98m respectively. TheNDICS’ report on frauds for the quarter endedSeptember 2002 revealed that the incidence of fraudsin banks is on the increase. In all, banks reported 415fraud and forgery cases valued at about N15,274billion between June and September 2002. Aconsolidated report on fraud and forgeries collated bythe committee of chief inspectors show that a total of292 fraud attempts were made on banks in Nigeriafrom January 2000 to September 2000. The amountinvolved was seven billion naira.There have also been compiled reports from Nigeriancommercial and merchant banks. In 1996, a declinewas recorded from 606 cases to 487 in 1997, theamount; however, rose from N1, 600.82m in 1996Nigeria recorded the following cases as shown intable 6. From the table above, there was a rapidincrease in the amount of money actually lost eventhough the number of cases fell from 612 in 1998 to403 in 2000 and skyrocketed in 2001 but fell again to628 in 2002. Even with the reduced number of cases,the amount lost increased rapidly except for a fallfrom N1,243.55m in 1996 to N788.87m in 1997 andthen from N7.404b in 1999 to N906.3m in 2000. Onthe contrary, the Nigerian deposit insurancecorporations (NDIC) annual report shows somevariation in the estimates from 1998 to 2002. Theseestimates were N689.2m in 1998, N2730.57m in1999, N2851.11m in 2000, N11, 243.98m in 2001and N15.274b in 2002 indicting a steady butstaggering increase in money lost to fraudsters.Surprisingly, a consolidated report of fraud andforgeries collated by the committee of chiefinspectors show that a total of 292 fraud attemptsamounted to N7b in 2000 alone. There have also beencompiled reports from Nigerian commercial andmerchant banks showing at first a decline in no ofcases from 606 in 1996 to 487 in 1997 but anincrease in amount lost from N1, 600.82 to N3,777.90m. then a rise in no of cases to 573 but adecline in the amount of N3,196.57 in 1998 then toN7.404b in 1999.In the last four to five years, the number of cases offraud has declined but the amounts lost in these fewercases are devastating. First, Bank of Nigeria, one ofthe old timers, recorded the cases in table 7.Lookingat the estimates above, in 1999, the number of caseswere 95 amounting to N248.34b but fell to 69 casesamounting to N169.12b in 2000 and fell again in2001 t0 54 cases amounting to N128.17b. Year 2002saw an increase in cases to 61 and also an increase inamount to N231.54b and then another fell in 2003 inthe amount lost to N212.7b even though number ofcases increased to 66. From the tables, leadershipstyles could be a serious cause or influence on theimpact to perpetrate fraud. Also, communication,some respondents felt the lack of inadequatecommunication channels is also a determinant of thelevel or rate of fraud in the banking industry. Inaddition, the lack of training and proper skills is thestrongest factor causing fraud. This stems from theinability of the staff to effectively carry out a job.Training creates an awareness of possible techniquesby which a fraudster could carry out his activities.Therefore, the lack of training enhances the avenuefor fraud because people are not skillfully equippedto handle and tackle fraud. Also they are unable torecognize the intent to perpetrate even when it isquite glaring. Training is a very vital aspect ofbusiness, to keep with changing times and evolvingtechnology. Just in the same way as technologyevolves and develops; fraudsters are evolving newtechniques and developing more crafty ways to getaway with huge sums of money. Fraud, which hasbeen on the increase at an alarming rate hasaccordingly gained the increasing attention of thegovernment, monetary and supervisory authorities inview of the fact that frauds result in huge financiallosses in banks, their customers, the depletion ofshareholders’ fund and capital base and loss ofconfidence in the financial system which mayultimately precipitate failure of the sector.This study identifies those actors or elements thatcause fraud. It looks at motivational factors such asfinancial incentives, promotions and bonuses as wellas leaves and leave-allowances. The absence of suchmotivational factors could lead to dissatisfaction andaccording to the differential association theory offraud, the member of staff sees the benefits offperpetrating fraud as more favourable than hispresent position and this pushes him to commit thefraud. Looking at the impact of fraud on profits,reputation and customer confidence, the occurrenceof fraud has inevitably reduced the profits making.Also, there were cases where the CBN comes in toregulate activities and even sometimes wind up thebanking operatives of some banks.360

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)Furthermore, various controls were recognized, forexample, proper recruitment procedures, dualcustody, logs and registers, segregation of duties datavalidation, call over of posted entries, signingpowers, cash limits physical checks and counts,program controls and prompt posting of transactions.The cause of fraud were also revealed, such cases asemployee dissatisfaction, negligence, carelessness ofthe customer, relaxed security controls, inadequaterecord keeping methods and lose security over highrisk areas like computer files. The study also revealedhow professional personnel detect those nefariousacts and finally the mechanisms put in place toprevent and control the occurrence of fraud such asthe Regis cope camera to take pictures of anyonecollecting very substantial amount of money. Also, itrevealed that some banks use staff rotation as ameans of preventing fraud.CONCLUSIONIn view of the craze for money, and the prevailingharsh economic environment, big time frauds are onthe increase in Nigeria. Banks are losing amountsrunning into millions of naira to fraudsters on a dailybasis in most cases, when the frauds are detectedearly, amounts already drawn are usually difficult torecover. Even where bank inspectors discover fraudand there is the possibility of recovering some of thefrauds, the cooperation of the police has not beenparticularly encouraging. Also in some cases toplevels of management that do not want negativepublicity for the bank try to smoothen certain cases.Time is therefore of essence in effecting control offrauds. A sound and effective control system will notonly prevent fraud but will at an early stage detect it.In a nutshell, the impact of fraud is so great that allhands must be on deck to ensure that there are noloopholes for perpetrators. Even though, fromstudies, it is gathered that for as long as Nigerians aremoney crazy, there will always be fraudsters, one canonly attempt to minimize fraud in the bankingindustry. It is my opinion that bank can only reducethe occurrence of fraud by ensuring conclusive,satisfactory and comfortable working conditions ofstaff and also to prepare for the inevitability of theoccurrence so as not to loose too much operating timewhilst dealing with the occurrence.RECOMMENDATIONAs banks are to increase their requirements pertainingto qualifications; draw up more efficient screeningtechniques, ascertain that references are not fictitiousat the recruitment stages. Also ensure that there issegregation of duties, efficient internal controls, jobssatisfactions and job enrichment. The task of bankmanagement is challenging enough without the eventpresent risk of fraud, so awareness should also becreated so as to ‘nip’ the situation in the ‘bud’ beforeanything serious occurs. This requires more than justsound judgment and dynamic action; it calls forcommitment that can only be gained if themanagement has ensured that all the motivationalincentives have been put in place. A total alertnessthat takes nothing for granted and awareness that trustcould be misplaced, this being a diligent andpainstaking approach.Furthermore, training techniques should be upgradedto test honesty and integrity and not just technicalskills. This should entail extensive trainingprogramme regularly done, as well as personalitytests and IQ tests so as to understand the personalityand character of the trainee. This would reducenegligence and carelessness in carrying out basicprocedures that could pose as loopholes for fraud.REFERENCESAkindele R.I, Nassar M.L and Owolabi A.A. (2008)Essentials of Research methodology ObafemiAwolowo University Publisher, Ile- Ife.Almah F. Saaid, King, R., Nur. Darfiana: (2009)Development of Users’ call profiles usingunsupervised Random forest. Conference proceeding,Third Annual ASEARC Dec. 7-8, Newcastle,AustraliaBank Administration Institute (1989) Fraudprevention and detection seriesBiscaia H, Alexion .S, Pavon .F,and HulthenR.(2002) “Do intelligent techniques aid Frauddetection?. Eurescon project ReportsBiscaia H., Alexiou S., Pavon F. and Hulthen R.(2002) “Do intelligent techniques aid fraud detection?Eurescon project Reports. March.Bolton R.J., Hand D.J.: (2002) Statistical frauddetection: A review Statistical Science 17(3) 235-249.Cahill.M, Chen F,and Lambert D ,Pinheiro. J,andSun. D. (2002) ”Detecting Fraud in the Real World”Handbook of Massive Datasets, Kluewer.Cortesao L., Martins F.: Rosa A., Carvallio P. (2005)“Fraud Management Systems inTelecommunications”: A practical Approach. ICTFMSCrosse H.D and Hempel. G.H. (1973) Managementpolitics for commercial banks pp 242-245Faweett T. and Provost F.,(1996) “Combing DataMining and Machine Learning for Effective Userprofiling”. Second International Conference onKnowledge Discovery and Data Mining, August.361

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)M. J. Comer (1985) Corporate fraud McGraw HillBook Co. UK.Ogwuma P.A (1985) Problems and prospects of theNigeria Banking industry. Seminar by: the financialinstitutions training centre. Pp5-7Olufidipe, E.O. (1994); Fraud in the Nigerianeconomy and it’s implications for banks & financialinstitutions. The Nigerian Banker July-December pp7-10Paper on Frauds: prevention/control (2001) Regionalmanagers’ conference First Bank of Nigeria, PlcArchivesRosa A., Carvalho P.: (2005) Fraud managementsystems in Telecommunications: a practice approach,in: proceeding of ICT.Shongotola, I.O. (1994); fraud detection and control.Nigeria Banker July-December pp16-19.Soneye O.O (1985) Paper on seminar organized byfinancial institutions training centre p5.Team R.: (2009) A language and environment forstatistical Computing.Young M . R. (2002) Accounting Irregularities andfinancial fraud. Pp 1-9 Publishers: Aspen law andBusiness, Aspen Publishers Inc. NY.APPENDIXESTable 1: Showing Mean Score, Standard Error, Standard Deviation, Variance & RangeA Summary of the Variables.Variables Mean Stat. Std Error Std Deviation Variance RangeCommunication 2.2600 9.394 E-02 0.642 0.4412 2.00Financial incentives 1.6800 6.664 E-02 0.4712 0.2220 1.00Job satisfaction 2.0800 8.963 E-02 0.6337 0.4016 2.00Leadership 2.1400 8.086 E-02 0.5718 0.3269 2.00Motivation 1.7000 6.547 E-02 0.4629 0.2143 1.00Training 2.8200 0.1300 0.9190 0.8445 3.00Source survey research 2007Table 2: ANOVA Table Showing Statistical Summary of VariablesSource: Survey 2007Sum OfSquaresDegree ofReedomMeanSqareFSigCommunication Between groups (Combined) 1.591 1 1.591 3.812 0.057Linear term Unweighted 1.591 1 1.591 3.812 0.057Weighted 1.591 1 1.591 3.812 0.057Job satisfactionWithin groups 20.029 48 0.417Total 21.620 49Between groups0.272 1 0.272 0672 0.416(Combined)Linear term Weighted 0.272 1 0.272 0.672 0.416Unweighted 0.272 1 0.272 0.672 0.416Within groups 19.408 48 0.404Total 19.680 49Table 4: Showing Statistical Relationship between Leadership, Job Satisfaction, Communication and TrainingSum of squares df Mean square F Sig.Leadership * training Between groups (Combined) 1.417 3 .472 1.488 .230Within group 14.603 46 .317Job satisfaction *trainingCommunication *trainingTotal 16.020 49Between groups (Combined) .536 3 .179 .429 .733Within group 19.144 46 .416Total 19.680 49Between groups (Combined) .415 3 .138 .300 .825Within group 21.205 46 .461Total 21.620 49Source: Survey Research, 2007362

Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 2(5):357-363 (ISSN:2141-7024)Table 3: Report Showing Comparison of Training against Leadership, Job Satisfaction and CommunicationTraining Leadership Job satisfaction CommunicationQuarterly Mean 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000N 5 5 5Std. Deviation .4472 .0000 .7071Std. Error of Mean .2000 .0000 .3162Sum 11.00 10.00 10.00Every six months Mean 2.2727 2.1818 2.2727N 11 11 11Std. Deviation .7862 .6030 .6467Std. Error of Mean .2371 .1818 .1950Sum 25.00 24.00 25.00Annual Mean 1.9545 2.1364 2.3182N 22 22 22Std. Deviation .4857 .6396 .7162Std. Error of Mean .1036 .1364 .1527Sum 43.00 47.00 51.00Others Mean 2.3333 1.9167 2.2500N 12 12 12Std. Deviation .4924 .7930 .6216Std. Error of Mean .1421 .2289 .1794Sum 28.00 23.00 27.00Total Mean 2.1400 2.0800 2.2600N 50 50 50Std. Deviation .5718 .6337 .6642Std. Error of Mean 8.086E-02 8.963E-02 9.394E-02Sum 107.00 104.00 113.00Source: Survey 2007Table 5Year Number Of Reported Cases Amount Involved1994 675 N842.68m1995 657 N 3621.01m1996 403 N 1,243.55m1997 414 N 788.87m1998 612 N 3,993.46m1999 573 N 7.404b2000 403 N 906.3m2001 981 N 5.0b2002 628 N 12.696b(Banking Supervision Annual Report 1998& 2003)Table 6Year Number Of Reported Cases Amount Involved1996 403 N 1,243.55m1997 414 N 788.87m1998 612 N 3,993.46m1999 573 N 7.404b2000 403 N 906.3m2001 981 N 5.0b2002 628 N 12.696b(Banking supervision Annual Report 1998& 2003)Table 7Year No Of Cases Amounts Involved1999 95 N 248.34b2000 69 N 169.12b2001 54 N 128.17b2002 61 N 231.54b2003 66 N 212.77b(First Bank of Nigeria Plc Archives)363