alternative foreign policy views among the iranian policy elite

44 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSagainst the Israel-PLO accord were mistaken; a statementto that effect attributed to an official in an Austrian NewsAgency report caused a firestorm in Iran. 3s However,some suggest Iran, may confine itself to non-violentopposition. There are some signs of a cooling with thePalestinian radical Hamas organization, but Lebanesepapers report Iranian aid continues, and the dispute maybe about Hamas cooperation with secular leftists, whichshocked Tehran. 39 A similar evolution has taken placewith the Lebanese Hezbollah, where Iran's decliningsupport may reflect moderation or atmoyance atHezbollah's participation in democratic elections. 4°Furthennore, it may be that Iran is concentrating moreattention and resources on what appears to be theprospect of a major payoff in Algeria, as well as buildinga movement in the Levant's strategic prize (Egypt) ratherthan in the Palestinian and Lebanese side-shows. InOctober 1993, Osama al Baz, the head of EgyptianPresident Mubarak's political affairs bureau, accused Iranof training terrorists active in Egypt, renewing chargesnot heard much for a year. 41Accommodation with Turkey. It would seem that Iranhas tempered the support it extended in 1991-2 to thePKK terrorists in Turkey. Interior Minister38 Jomhuri lslami, September 23, 1993 and then nearly every day thesubsequent two weeks (as printed in Akhbaar).39 1ran Times, January 7, 1994 and, on $10 million said to have beenpledged for 1994, Al-Shiira (Beirut), December 13, 1993, as printed inFBIS-NES, December 15, 1993.40 Al Shira (Beirut), January 4, 1993, as printed in FBIS-NES,January 5, 1993.41 al-Wasat (Cairo), October 22, 1993, as printed in Mideast Monitor.