alternative foreign policy views among the iranian policy elite

A L T E R N A T I V E FOREIGN POLICYVIEWS AMONG THEIRANIAN POLICY ELITEPATRICK CLAWSONWestem policy towards the Islamic Republic of Ivan has longbeen based on the assumption that Iran could be persuaded tochange major aspects of its foreign policy, such as its support fordeath threats against Salman Rushdie, its murder of Iranianoppositionists in the West, its cooperation with terrorists(Lebanon, Palestinians, and various North African countries), andits sponsorship of opposition the lsrael-PLO accord. In theirdeclaratory policy, the G-7 industrial countries share a commonassumption that the problem is with particular Iranian foreignpolicies, not the regime: "Concemed about aspects of Iran'sbehavior, we call upon its govemment to participateconstructively in intemational efforts for peace and stability andto cease actions contrary to those objectives. ''1 That is also U.S.policy as set out in Martin Indyk's speech on the "dual contaimnent"policy, in which he was careful to hold the hope for normal relationswith Islamic Iran: 2i Tokyo G7 Summit Political Declaration, July 8, 1993.2 Martin Indyk, "Clinton Administration Policy Toward the MiddleEast," a special report of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,May 21, 1993.27

28 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSI should emphasize that the Clinton administration is notopposed to Islamic government in Iran. Indeed, we haveexcellent relations with a number of Islamic governments.Rather, we are firmly opposed to these specific aspects of theIranian regime's behavior, as well as its abuse of the humanrights of the Iranian people. We do not seek a confrontation,but we will not normalize relations with Iran until and unlessIran's policies change, across the board.There are some contrary voices, who suggest that Iranianbehavior is not likely to change. Their argument is madestronger by the frequent dashing of hopes that moderates wouldconsolidate power and change policy--a hope first held out inDecember 1979 when the election of Bani Sadr as president wassaid to foreshadow release of the American embassy hostages,and then repeated regularly with each twist and tum of Iranianpolitics. Talk of Iranian moderates has been unpopular amongU.S. politicians since the days of the Iran-Contra affair, in whichPresident Reagan was so badly bumed (the release of some U.S.hostages being matched by the taking of new ones). SomeEuropeans also express in private their doubts about Iranianmoderation. In a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State WarrenChristopher, Foreign Minister Claes of Belgium (which then heldthe EC Presidency) was quoted by U.S. officials as saying, "Itwould be a historic mistake" for Europeans to believe they couldcontinue the search for Iranian moderates. 3How realistic is the assumption that the Islamic Republiccould be persuaded to change important aspects of its foreignpolicy? Surely the answer to that question depends not onlyupon what the West does, but also upon the factors inside Iranthat shape foreign l~licy. The aim of this paper is to examineone of the most important such factors, namely, the attitudes3 New York Times, December 2, 1993.28

PATRICK CLAWSON 29towards foreign policy.THE SIGNIFICANCE OFFOREIGN POLICYAs in most countries, foreign policy is less important thandomestic politics to Iranians and Iranian politicians. Forexample, the headline in the January 25, 1994 Keyhan (thecountry's leading paper) read "Joint Govemment, Majlis Meetingto Examine Country's Most Important Issues"--and foreignpolicy was not mentioned at all among the many issues.Whether ideologues or pragmatists, members of the Iranian elitehave a whole host of domestic matters to occupy their time andattention. Foreign policy is subordinate to these pressingdomestic issues--subordinate in the dual sense that foreign policycomes second and also that foreign policy is seen through thelens of how it affects domestic policy.The Iranian political classes have lots of domestic problemson their mind these days. Let me cite just two among the manydomestic issues which preoccupy them but which have receivedrelatively little coverage in the Westem media. First is thesupreme religious leadership. The generation of pre-revolutionGrand Ayatollahs has largely passed from the scene, with the1992 death of the widely respected Khoei of Iraq and the 1993death of the Iranian Golyepagani. The problem for the IslamicRepublic is that its principal political-religious figures are notamong those who can claim to have eamed the title of GrandAyatollah since the revolution. The country's officiallydesignated political religious guide, Khamenei, desperately soughtacceptance as Khoei's successor in the role of "source ofimitation" (supreme living religious guide), but his claim was metwith resistance if not ridicule. 4 Nor are the prayer leaders in themain cities or other religious leaders closely identified with the4 Mideast Monitor, February 26, 1993, quoting from al-Majalla.

30 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSregime regarded as plausible "sources of imitation. ''5 This ismore than a source of embarrassment, it is a serious politicalproblem. The regime is not seen by the people or by thereligious establishment as being the embodiment of religiousvalues, which challenges its entire self-conception. Plus there isthe practical problem that no prominent leader appears to beinterested in the job now held by Khamenei. Were he to die, thejob would have to be filled by some second-ranker, which wouldfurther undermine the regime's claims to religious privilege.A second domestic issue that absorbs the political leadershipis the self-perceived unpopularity of the present system. Duringthe first decade after the 1979 revolution, Islamic Iran's leaderstook great pride in the hundreds of thousands of people whowould regularly turn out to demonstrate their commitment to therevolution's value. The leaders now feel that the population isnot necessarily on their side. Listen to the leaders' words:Khamenei, speaking on "Revolutionary Guards Day" to a groupof Guards, said, 6Don't think that the Islamic Republic is going to be destroyedby the utterances of a few simple-minded wishful thinkers whosay it is going to end today or tomorrow . . . . [But] Iran isalone in the world today . . . . The element of loneliness in thecontemporary movement has created a degree of similaritybetween us and the movement of Husayn Bin-Ali [who wasslaughtered with all his followers in a battle he enteredknowing the outcome would be certain death].The regime has gone so far as to hold exercises with 122,000Bassidj-force reservists in 170 cities, practicing seizing public5 The regime is reduced to promoting the qualifications of aheretofore obscure centelmrian, Ayatolhth Araki; cf. Jomhuri Islami,December 21 ,and 22, 1993, as printed in Akhbaar.6 Radio Tehran, ,as transcribed in FBIS, January 18, 1994.

PATRICK CLAWSON 31buildings and radio stations from rioters, including an exercisethat closed a section of downtown Tehran while troops"recaptured" the Majlis. 7 The outbreak of riots in several majorcities in spring and summer 1992 has left the regime nervous,partly because popular demonstrations of unrest continueregularly. For instance, in a January 1994 riot, "a large number[of] troublemakers" used cranes to haul concrete blocks onto ahighway in southeast Tehran. 8Foreign policy is seen through the prism of domestic issueslike these. So, for instance, the Islamic Republic ishypersensitive to the attitude of foreign governments to themembers of the People's Mojahedeen, because Tehran is worriedabout popular unrest. However unreal may be thereconcerns--and I very much doubt that the Mojahedeen couldorganize unrest, much less seriously challenge the regime--Iran'sleaders regard any toleration for activities of the Mojahedeen asevidence of foreign plotting against their govemment.The primacy of domestic politics, and the viewing of foreignpolicy through the lens of domestic issues, applies also to thefamous split between radicals and moderates. Despite therepeated denials by the regime's voices in the West, Iranians viewpolitics since 1981 as characterized by a split between radicalsand moderates. The differences between the two are primarilyabout domestic policy, as was nicely stated July 28, 1993 bySalaam, a newspaper close to the radicals:Everybody knows that there have been two major trendsof thought in our society since the revolution . . . . Onetendency believed "social justice" to be the central theme ofthe economy and regarded the fundamental duty of the Islamicgovernment ,as support for the deprived and the barefoot . . . .7 lran Times, December 3, 1993. The exercise, during Bassidj Week,was code-named KHANDAQ.8 Jomhuri lslami cited in lran Times, January 14, 1994.

32 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSIn the foreign policy arena, it believed in full resistance to theWest and the US, support for Islamic and liberationmovements, and close relations with the Third World countries.To sum up, this tendency regarded itself as follower of theImam [Khomeini]'s thoughts and was known as the "Imam'sline" tendency in the society.The other tendency emphasized giving a free hand to theprivate sector in the economic arena... It regarded any effort tosupport the deprived and the poor as an influence of Marxistand socialist beliefs. In the cultural arena, it believed in acertain dogmatism and backwardness which originated from itstraditio~mlist approach to intellectual developments . . . . In theforeign policy arena, it had a cautious approach toward theWest and the US, etc . . . .Since the emergence of the two tendencies, various titleswere used for them: hardline ,and moderate, radical andconservative, left and right, etc. Both the domestic and foreignmedia used the various terms . . . .It is true that many people, who believe that "the one whowins is right," have change color and have co-ordinatedthemselves with the "tide current." The Majlis member for onetown entered the Third [1988] Majlis on behalf of one wing(the so-called left wing) and entered the Fourth [1992] Majlison behalf of the other wing (the so-called right wing).The radical and moderate labels each apply to tendencies, not toformal or tightly knit groups. On any issue, lines may blur, withsome radicals taking a more moderate stance on that point andsome moderates taking a more radical stance. To make aWestem analogy, the two trends are more like Democrats andRepublican in the U.S. Congress than they are like Labor andConservatives in the British Parliament: individual egos, not partydiscipline, rule supreme. To continue the analogy, much as theDemocrats have "old Democrats" and "new Democrats," so themoderates are split between technocrats (the smaller group, withabout 100 of the 270 seats in file Majlis but with domination ofthe ministries) and the traditionalists (with about 130 Majlisseats). The traditionalists were well described in the New York

PATRICK CLAWSON 33Times as "economically liberal but culturally hard-lineconservatives" connected to the bazaar. 9The thesis of this paper is that domestic political impulseslead a large majority of Iranian politicians to support two foreignpolicy stands. The first is an emphasis on economicdevelopment, which is the cement that holds together themoderate coalition of teclmocrats and traditionalists. The foreignpolicy component of this emphasis on economic development iseconomic ties to the West, which is seen as vital by technocratsand enjoys support from the traditionalists. The second issue isopposition to Western culture, on which the radicals and thetraditionalists agree. The radicals argue that opposition toWestem culture entails a foreign policy based on suspicion aboutthe West's political agenda and support for anti-Westemmovements, though the traditionalists are not so sure if thisforeign policy is necessary. The final section of this paperexamines prospects for the future.MODERATES, ECONOMICS,AND THE WESTIranian radicals have generally opposed any emphasis oneconomic growth or on material weUbeing. During the 1993election campaign, leading radical Mohtashemi complained,"When you set the economy as the principle, and sacrificeeverything at its altar, there would remain nothing by which youcould be powerful, free, and independent . . . . We can't haveIslamic and revolutionary culture by slogans and rhetoric whenour economy is a Western capitalist economy. "1° AyatollahKhamenei has shown sympathy for this point of view, though he9 "ban's Chief Faces Merchant Class Challenge," New York Times,January 31, 1993.loS a l a a m , May 17, 1993, as printed in Akhbaar.

34 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONShas not been active on the issue. ~1 To the extent they careabout economics, the radicals prefer to emphasize social justiceand state control, not economic growth. The economic policiesthey implemented when they ran the govemment were Indiansocialism, with "economic self-sufficiency, a disdain forconsumerisim, a stress on national planning, the tightening of thestate's clutches on industries, restrictions on foreign trade,maintenance of an overvalued currency, and hostility to foreigninvestment. ''12By contrast, Iranian technocrats are very interested ineconomic growth---much more so than in foreign policy. Forinstance, President Rafsanjani's 1993 election address was 95percent about economics; foreign policy was barely mentioned. 13In choosing to stake his reputation on economics, Rafsanjani hasmade a dangerous gamble. His problem is that income cannotmatch popular expectations, no matter how good are the policies.Expectations formed during the oil boom under the Shah's ruleare that Iran can have a standard of living similar to that in theWest, which was the goal that the Shah held out. That goal wasalways ambitious for this generation, and it became completelyunrealistic after the oil crash of 1985. Iran's per capita earningsfrom oil, in real terms, are no more than one-fourth of their1977/78 level.Rafsanjani recently pointed out that the standard of living has" In December 1993 he issued a letter to Rafsanjani that in effectgave him carte blanche to do what he wanted on economic policy. Theletter, about the Second Five-Year Plan, was issued by the IslamicRepublic News Agency on December 20, 1993 (two days beforeRafsanjani presented the Plan to the Majlis); printed in FBIS, December21, 1993.t2 Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic,London: I.B. Taurus, 1993, p 29713 Tehran TV, May 29, 1993, as transcribed in FBIS-NES.

PATRICK CLAWSON 35improved in the last 5 years, during which non-oil GDP grew 7.5percent per annum. TM He could have added that in the previousl0 years, basic goods became more widely available, even thoughper capita GDP fell about 50 percentJ 5 Consider the followingimprovements:• Infant mortality fell to 35 per 100,000 in 1993/94 from45 in 1989/90 and 100 in 1976J 6 The number of doctorsto 50 per 100,000 in 1993/94 from 34 in 189/90, whichhad also been the level in 1976.• The number of higher education students rose to 17 perthousand population in 1993/94 from 8.5 in 1989/90 and4.5 in 1976/77.• The average urban family diet improved in 1990/91compared to the pre-revolution level of 1978/79. Inkilograms per annum, consumption of red meat was 148compared to 93 pre-revolution; of butter and shortening,92 compared to 46; of rice, 296 compared to 190; ofbread, 736 compared to 538; of sugar, 170 compared to78.17,4 President Rafsanjani's presentation of the second Plan, Tehrantelevision, December 22, 1993, as transcribed in FBIS-NES, December30, 1993.,s Depending upon the exact population estimates and the technicaldefinition of GDP, the estimate reductions cited by Iranians are between50 and 60 percent (Keyhan, February 3, 1991; Keyhan English,February 16, 1991). Central Bank data suggest that 50 percent is aminimum figure.,6 1993/94 and 1989/90 data from President Rafsanjani's presentationof the second Plan, Tehran television, December 22, 1993, astranscribed in FBIS-NES, December 30, 1993. 1976 data from BankMarkazi Iran, Annual Report 1356 (1977/78), lor higher educationstudents, and Iran Almanac 1976 (Tehran: Echo of Iran Press, 1976).1~ Keyhan, February 8, 1993, as printed in FBIS.

36 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS• Electricity was found in 99 percent of households in1991; television, 90 percent; refrigerators, 92 percent;washing machines, 34 percent; and automobiles, 14percent--all multiples of the 1979 figures. TM Telephonelines rose from 22 per thousand in 1978 to 60 perthousand in 1993.19Despite the improvements in the standard of living, Iraniansare profoundly pessimistic about their economic situation. Themood in Tehran about the economy is grim, fixated on thesharply declining value of the rial on the free market (from 1450per dollar in late October to 2100 by late December).Rafsanjani's reform program is widely blamed for the currenteconomic difficulties. In the wake of criticism from Klmmeneiamong others, in November he had to reverse price and tradeliberalization 2° while he spent much of December fighting offproposals for postpone the Second Five-Year Plan start fromMarch 1994 to March 1995. Meanwhile, the foreign debtproblems grow worse, forcing cancellation of major, highlyprofitableprojects like the $1.7 billion deal to develop the SouthPars gas and oil field. 2~ Plus the declining price of oil has ledthe Majlis Economic and Finance Committee to propose revisingthe forecast 1994/95 oil revenue to $9.4 billion, compared to18 Iran Statistical Center data printed in Hamshari, January 8, 1994,as translated in Akhbaar; the Central Bank data differ slightly.19 President Rafsanjani's presentation of the second Plan, Tehrantelevision, December 22, 1993, as transcribed in FBIS-NES, December30, 1993, and Post and Telephone Minister Gharazi, Jomhuri lslami,May 31, 1993.20 Salaam, November 23 and 24, 1993, as printed in Akhbaar. TheCommerce Minister's actions were ~dso described in Hamshari,November 18, 1993, also printed in Akhbaar.21 Resalaat, January 19, 1994, as printed in Akhbaar.

PATRICK CLAWSON 37$18.0 billion in 1990/91. 52 The radical newspaper Salaamgloated in November, 23As long as the rival faction was in a majority in the Majlis, theofficials and supporters of the adjustment policy blamed thatfaction for failure to achieve the plan targets . . . . Now thatthey have lost that pretext and the right wing controlseverything, they blame one another . . . . The day they tookover the government from the radicals, they said they hadtaken delivery of an empty treasury . . . . Now it is an honor tohave a country with more than $30 billion debts, with foreigncompanies refusing to sign contracts to sell goods to Iran(owing to Iran's refusal to pay its debts of the past three orfour years).It would seem that the emphasis on economic growth, theimportance attributed to access to Western economies, and thegloom about economic prospects would all work to increase theWest's leverage in using economics as a means to change Iranianforeign policy. But Iranian are convinced that access to Westemeconomies does not require changing political behavior. Iraniansfeel that Europe and Japan will continue trade and investmentirrespective of Iranian actions because of the importance of Iranas market and oil supplier. This feeling has some basis in fact.Consider how German govemment spokesmen Dieter Vogelexplained why the Iranian Intelligence Minister had been invitedto Bonn on the eve of the trial of Iranian government agents forfour murders in Berlin by referring to Iran's economicimportance, "We will naturally hold the talks with Iran that arerequired by German interests; . . .Iran is a trading partner of22 Resalaat, January 19, 1994, as printed in Akhbaar,.23 S a l a a m , November 22, 1993, as printed in Akhbaar.

38 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSsignificant size. ''24 Or consider that Iran has paid little price forits campaign of assassination of Iranians living in Europe. In areport on several murders in Germany, the German FederalCriminal Office concluded, "Behind all these crimes stands asovereign state;... Iran does not shrink from committing seriouscrimes in pursuing its opponents . . . . The reaction in the Westis most likely to be verbal" rather than any action. 25CULTURE, RADICALS, ANDTHE MUSLIM WORLDRadicals place highest priority on combatting Westemism. Anti-Westemism is more than just hooligan squads enforcing properdress by detaining or beating those women judged to be wearing"bad hejab" (visible hair, makeup, and form-fitting clothes).There is also an intellectual element, as seen in conferences likea three-day affair in January 1994. 26 The radical media campaignaround the issue regularly, deploring the lack of action on"protecting our Islamic-lranian character and identity from thecultural conspiracy of those who fear and dislike ourrevolution. ''27The Westemism that the radicals confont has many facets.Sexual morality is a vital component: what for the West isfreedom for women to participate fully in public life is to Iranianradicals a call for licentious behavior. The use of Westem words24 Vogel,"Allies Oppose Bonn's Iran Links," Washington Post,November 6, 1993.25 Quoted in Rick Atkinson, "Killing of Iranian Dissenters: 'BloodyTrail Back to Tehran'" (a quote from J,'unes O'Dea of AmnestyInternational), Washington Post, November 21, 1993.26 Keyhan International, January 13, 1994.27 Keyhan International, December 23, 1993.

PATRICK CLAWSON 39and Latin letters, from technical literature to popular advertising,is seen as undermining Persian, the language of great poets andphilosophers. Television soap operas and rock concertsundermine public plays on religious themes and family outings.Western food displaces a cuisine based on complex saucesprepared in the home for large family meals; the West evenreplaces traditional Iranian fast food at the chelokebab.The radical agenda is not simply medieval obscurantism ornostalgia for small-town and rural life. Much of what ispresented to Iran as Westem culture is in fact decadence thatmany in the West also abhor. Iranian radicals reject theMadonna of MTV, not the Madonna of the New Testament.Much of the change in Iran's attitude towards the West from1964 to 1994 reflects changes in Westem society, not any waveof fundamentalism in Iran. After all, the Islamic revulsionagainst the West became became a mass movement about adecade after Westem popular culture changed profoundly in waysrepulsive to many, West and East. Sex and violence are staplesof television; story lines reject respect for authority and tradition;individuals are guided by what feels good rather than by moralvalues of good and evil. Who can be surprised if many Iraniansfind unattractive a society that presents Michael Jackson as oneof its stars?Iran's cultural confrontation with the West is not just a moralissue: it is also a matter of foreign policy, concerning foreigngovememnts. Leaders across the board agree that the Westdeliberately uses culture to undermine Iranian society. Forinstance, at the ceremony changing leadership of the KeyhanInstitute (the largest media firm in Iran, owned ex-officio by thereligious leader), the outgoing supervisor Sayed MohammadAshgari condemned "global arrogance's mischevious acts in orderto create division among the Moslem Iranian people," asserting,"Our revolution is a cultural one based on Islam," while incomingsuperviosr Hossein Shariatmadari said, "Although the artillery hasfallen silent, the engagement is not over. The only thing is thatthe field of engagement has changed . . . . [Now] the war is of

40 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSideas. ''28 Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the MajlisResearch Center, argued that the conflict between Western andIslamic culture is not resolvable because "the Westerners aredominating the Islamic world and want to expand and maintainthat domination. 29While moderates like Larijani sympathize with the rejectionof Westemism, on the whole they place less emphasis on thecrusade against Western culture than on the need to developeconomically. That causes conflict, because the anti-Westemcrusade often clashes with economic liberalization, since theformer emphasizes respect for tradition while the latter permitsindividuals freedom of choice, inlcuding the choice to rejecttradition. To take an example that preoccupied Tehran inDecember 1993 and January 1994, the liberalization program hasencouraged foreign investment and permitted advertising forforeign goods--specifically Coca Cola and Westem-stylehamburgers. Revulsion against the United States extended so faras to force closure of a restaurant imitating the McDonalds styleopened by some Iranian who had long lived in Spain, and acampaign has begun against Coca Cola. Mohsen Rafiqdoost,supervisor of the Janbazan and Mostazafan Foundation, explainedcampaign against Coca Cola: "We shall not permit the return ofWestern culture even in its weak form under the cover ofeconomic prosperity." 30 Another example is the drive to set upgovernment-sponsored video clubs that will rent only Iranian andselect Westem videos (e.g., World Wrestling Federation shows).Yet another is the fulminations against satellite dishes which arenow popping up across Iran (estimates range from 50,000 to2s Keyhan, December 29, 1993, as printed in Akhabaar, December 30,1993.29 Resalaat, December 14, 1993, as transcribed in FBIS-NES, January6, 1994.30 Jomhuri lslami, January 18, 1994, as printed in Akhbaar.

PATRICK CLAWSON 41120,000) to pull in Star TV.As these examples show, many Iranians find themselvesattracted to at least parts of Western culture. Sometimes thesame individuals combine deep craving for parts of that culturewith opposition to many of its aspects. Others generally acceptWestern culture. Amuzegar has a point when he argues thatWestemization fits well with some Iranian attitudes: 31In a society where material well-being-----even conspicuousconsumption--has had strong cultural roots not only among thewell-to-do but also within the underclass, this austere andpuritanical policy could attract precious few . . . . Similarattempts to fit Iranian society into an Islamic mold have alsoproved impossible. After more than a half century ofWesternization, liberation from old taboos, global contacts, ,andan acceptance of new values and institutions, the state has beenunable to reverse the irreversible.I have deliberately underemphasized the role of religion inthe conflict over Westem culture. The Islamic religion is a vitalelement in traditional Iranian culture, but in addition, Islam is theembodiment of the altemative to Westem culture in every sphereof life. By focusing on Islam as the center of the conflict withWestemism, Iranians can see the conflict not as a matter ofnarrow national pride but as a clash of civlizations, each of whichclaims to be universal. Furthermore, emphasizing Islam allowsIranians to represent themselves as the center of humancivilization through the claim that they uphold true Islam--aclaim that marries Shiite prejudices, Iranian pride, andrevolutionary conviction. This elevation of anti-Westemism intoa clash of civilizations converts a domestic policy (promotion oftraditional and communitarian values) into a foreign policy issue,because the domestic legitimacy of the anti-Westem campaign isgreatly bolstered by the recognition on the part of others of Iran's31 Amuzegar, Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic, p 301.

42 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSleadership of global Islam.W H A T THE FUTURE HOLDSIranian foreign policy will continue to be shaped by the beliefthat Iran has a central role in world affairs, a belief that has deeproots in Iranian culture and was a major tenet of the Shah'spolicies. Majlis Vice Speaker Hojatalislam Hassan Rowhanirecently articulated the basic assumption of many Iranians:"Whether wanted or not, the Islamic Republic of Iran isshouldering the leadership of many communities of the world.But Iran's leadership is different from America's domineeringleadership. ''32 This conception of Iran as a natural great powertranslates into an assumption that Iran's neighbors will certainlyunderstand that they have to work with Iran, if not acknowledgeIranian leadership. Reporting at Friday prayers in Tehran abouthis trip through Central Asia, President Rafsanjani took as naturalthat, 33Even those people who are not Muslims--because there arealso many non-Muslims living there---they, too, understandthat, because of natural circumstances, their happiness and theirinterest lies in cooperation with Iran, because that is the wayour region has operated.Because Iran expects to be the major power in the region, itwill continue to have genuine difficulty perceiving why others inthe area are touchy about Iranian assertion of what it sees as itsnatural rights. Iranians of many stripes are convinced that Iranhas gone far to accommodate its neighbors. For example, on theGulf islands, many Iranians think that the Shah was~ Keyhan Weekly (in English), January 13, 1994.33 Tehran Radio, November 5, 1993, as transcribed in FBIS-NESNovember 8, 1993.

PATRICK CLAWSON 43magnanimous in taking only the small islands and not Bahrain, 34although few would endorse Jomhuri Islam i's view, "Sovereigntyof Iran over Bahrain should be reestablshed on the basis ofhistorical precedents [to which end Iran] should launch an effortto terminate the separation. ''35 When Iranian leaders speak todomestic audiences, they are absolutely inflexible on Iran's rights:the moderate Rafsanjani threatened "rivers of blood" if Iran'splace on Abu Musa was interfered with. 36Within the general framework established by the principlesthat Iran is a great power and that domestic concerns mattermost, foreign policy could go in a variety of directions. Theuncertainty is great because of the perception that the currentpolicy has not been successful. Radical spokesman Mohtashemivoiced a widely held view when he complained in 1993, "Foreignpolicy during Hahsemi-Rafsanjani's term [1989-1993] has beenunsuccessful, and he has not even been able to maintain relationsIbrged with foreign centers in the past. ''37 The complaint is thatIran has not been able to develop better relations with the Westor with Arab states, while simultaneously sacrificing some of theprestige it held as the ideological pure voice of radical Islam.Given the perception in Tehran that things are not going welland that past policy has not worked, policies could changesharply. There are mixed indications as to whether moderatepolicies could predominate:• Arab politics. Early reports that Iran would not act34 Shireen Hunter, lran and the World, Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1990, p 101.3sJomhuri lslami, January 7, 1993, ,as transcribed in FBIS-NES.36 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, "Domestic Politics andTerritorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula,"Survival, Winter 1993, p 10.37 Jahan-lslami, May 29, 1993, as printed in FBIS-NES, June 1, 1993.

44 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSagainst the Israel-PLO accord were mistaken; a statementto that effect attributed to an official in an Austrian NewsAgency report caused a firestorm in Iran. 3s However,some suggest Iran, may confine itself to non-violentopposition. There are some signs of a cooling with thePalestinian radical Hamas organization, but Lebanesepapers report Iranian aid continues, and the dispute maybe about Hamas cooperation with secular leftists, whichshocked Tehran. 39 A similar evolution has taken placewith the Lebanese Hezbollah, where Iran's decliningsupport may reflect moderation or atmoyance atHezbollah's participation in democratic elections. 4°Furthennore, it may be that Iran is concentrating moreattention and resources on what appears to be theprospect of a major payoff in Algeria, as well as buildinga movement in the Levant's strategic prize (Egypt) ratherthan in the Palestinian and Lebanese side-shows. InOctober 1993, Osama al Baz, the head of EgyptianPresident Mubarak's political affairs bureau, accused Iranof training terrorists active in Egypt, renewing chargesnot heard much for a year. 41Accommodation with Turkey. It would seem that Iranhas tempered the support it extended in 1991-2 to thePKK terrorists in Turkey. Interior Minister38 Jomhuri lslami, September 23, 1993 and then nearly every day thesubsequent two weeks (as printed in Akhbaar).39 1ran Times, January 7, 1994 and, on $10 million said to have beenpledged for 1994, Al-Shiira (Beirut), December 13, 1993, as printed inFBIS-NES, December 15, 1993.40 Al Shira (Beirut), January 4, 1993, as printed in FBIS-NES,January 5, 1993.41 al-Wasat (Cairo), October 22, 1993, as printed in Mideast Monitor.

PATRICK CLAWSON 45Director-General for Security Gholamhossein Bolandian,after the seventh meeting of the Iran-Turkish securitycommittee in Ankara, reported that an understanding wasreached on cooperation against terror. 42 Reportedly inearlier talks, Iranian Interior Minister Besharati gaveTurkish Interior Minister Gazioglu a list of 138 Iraniandissidents, asking that they be expelled or their activitiescurtailed. 43 Also, Interior Minister Turkey MehmetGazioglu and Iran Mohammad Ali Besharati signed inTehran a protocol and "hostile acts along their commonborders."Russian relations. Consider the Iranian reaction to thebitter civil war in Tadzhikistan, in which 20,000 to50,000 people have died in the last 18 months. Iran hasbeen "notable for its absence and impotence;" foreign aidto the rebels has come instead from Saudis and Pakistan,channelled via Afghanistan. 44 This is but one example ofa general trend in which Tehran ignores Moscow'santi-Muslim policies, such as its stance on Bosnia or onKashmir, while vigorously condemning the West forpositions that are in fact less distant from Iran's s t a n c e . 45In tum, Russia provides Iran with access to technologyit cannot acquire elsewhere. For instance, in December42 Abrar, December 8, 1993, as printed in Akhbaar. The survey inMideast Monitor, December 22, 1993, of Turkish press reporting onIranian Vice-President Hassan Habibi's visit in December 1993 wassimilarly upbeat.43 Mideast Monitor, October 19, 1993.44 Barnett Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," Survival, Winter1993-94, p 86. Rubin cites a range of 20,000 to 50,000 dead; AmnestyInternational cites only the higher figure.a5 lran Times, March 19, 1993.

46 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS1993, Russian ambassador to Tehran Sergei Tretyakovreassured his Iranian interviewers at length that Russiawould proceed with nuclear power plants. 46But it seems more likely that policies will change in thedirection of being more radical. That has certainly been thedirection in 1993 in policy towards the United States Considerthe contrast between May and November 1993. In May,presidential candidate Rajab-Ali Taheri said on television, "directtalks with Washington to normalize relations" could help IranYand there was no reaction to speak of from the press or theclergy. In the same month, President Rafsanjani gave aninterview to Time (itself a controversial act in times past) inwhich he said that the Unites States can sometimes do good: "If[U.S. military action in Bosnia] is not done with imperialistgoals, why should one not encourage a good thing? ''48 Incontrast, autumn 1993 saw a storm in response to the leaking ofthe 1992 letter to Khamenei, written by then representative to theU.N. Rajai Khorasani, in which he advised that Iran hold officialtalks with the United States 49 After a wave of press indignationthat such a letter had even been written, Ayatollah Khameneistated, "We don't want to have relations with the UnitedS t a t e s . . . Our condition [for relations] is their repenting of allthe tragedies they have created in the world. ''5° The holding of46 Keyhan Havayi, December 22, 1993.47 Nw York Times, May 26, 1993.46 As printed in Keyhan English, May 20, 1993.49 By Mr. Khorasani's account, in Abrar, November 4, 1993, asprinted in Akhbaar.50 Tehran Radio, November 3, 1993, as transcribed in Akhbaar. Onthe campaign about the Khoras,'mi letter, see Mideast Mirror, November1, 1993.

PATRICK CLAWSON 47discussions with the United States was rejected ,as entailing aweakening of Iran's revolutionary credentials: 51In the existing unequal situation in which the U.S. has all thepropaganda resources, accepting talks with the U.S. meanslosing our revolutionary and anti-arrogance prestige . . . . Ifwe talk about talks ,and with relations with the U.S., itcertainly me,ms backing off from our stands. Because there[will be] such an impression among the world's revolutionariesand Muslims.Looking out to the more medium term, there is also thepossibility that the Islamic Republic, in its current form, will fall.The degree of discontent and the perception of failure are bothstrong. To be sure, there is no credible challenge from anyopposition force, which makes the regime look solid. It is thesolidity of glass: easily fractured. There is no important socialgroup that would come to the defense of this regime were itthreatened, nor does the regime have the support of a repressiveapparatus that can keep it in power against popular discontent.The "senior official" who told the Washington Post in May 1993,"There is no serious prospect of [the Islamic Republic] beingoverthrown," would do well to hedge his bets. 52This paper has not answered the question of whether Iranianforeign policy could fundamentally change under the IslamicRepublic, but it has provided some elements towardsunderstanding the attitudes that shape Iranian policy. Thes~ Sayed Morteza Nabavi, director of Resalaat, ill KeyhanInternational, November 11, 1993.s2 R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "White House to Step UpPlans to Isolate Iran, Iraq," Washington Post, May 22, 1993.

48 IRAN'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONSopposition to Westem decadence, if not Westem culture, is deepand strong. It takes a true optimist to think that the perceivedeconomic advantages from ties to the West will overcome thecultural barriers, especially if Iranian leaders think that they canhave those economic advantages without changing their politicalbehavior. On the other end of the spectrum, the true pessimistcould argue that opposition to the West is deeply rootedculturally while cooperation with the West is based on a tacticalreading of where economic advantage lies, and that tactics couldchange if there appears to be greater economic gain inconfronting the West by, e.g., pressuring Iran's rich neighbors toco-finance its economic development.