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C O V E Rwhich could result in another loopholeof 0.7 to 1 Gt CO 2e in 2020 (denElzen et al. 2010).Land use, land-use changeand forestry accounting rulesAnnex I Parties are pushing toinclude weak land use, land-usechange and forestry (LULUCF) accountingrules that would allow themto increase their emissions. This couldbe achieved partly by allowing countriesto set their own reference levels(‘baselines’) for their emissions.Some countries are also proposingthat accounting for forest managementremains voluntary, thereby allowingAnnex I Parties to simply notaccount for any emissions increases.The size of this loophole could bebetween 0-0.6 Gt CO 2e/year subjectto the final agreement on accountingrules (UNEP 2011). The cumulative(2013-2020) magnitude of the loopholecould be as large as 4.8 Gt CO 2e.Non-additionality under theCDMThrough the Clean DevelopmentMechanism (CDM), developed countriescan obtain carbon credits fromprojects in developing countries to‘offset’ their emissions, so that developedcountries can continue to pollute.Projects have to prove that theyare ‘additional’ – that they could notbe built without the extra financingthrough the sale of carbon credits. Ifthis is not the case, the emission reductionsare not real and there is actuallyan increase in emissions.The number of emission reductioncredits to award a project is calculatedagainst a hypothetical baselineof what emissions would havebeen if a dirty alternative had beenbuilt. Setting the baseline too weakresults in the over-crediting of emissionreductions.It has been estimated that 20% toover 50% (Schneider 2007, Haya2009) of CDM projects are non-additional.Projected certified emissionreduction credits (CERs) to be generatedbetween 2013-2020 range fromOne loophole in the current climate change framework is the fact that emissionsfrom international aviation and shipping are not accounted for under the KyotoProtocol even though they are substantial.3.5 to 7 billion (IGES Aug 2011,UNEP RISOE Sept 2011). Assumingthat the percentage of non-additionalprojects is equivalent to the numberof non-additional CERs, the loopholecould be between 0.1-0.4 Gt CO 2e in2020 and 0.7-3.5 Gt CO 2e cumulatively.Double-counting of offsetsDue to the enormity of the climatecrisis, developing countries willalso have to contribute to mitigationefforts. It is expected that developedcountries will provide the full incrementalcosts for these emissions reductionsthrough National AppropriateMitigation Actions (NAMAs), butunlike offsets, the effort will be attributedto the developing countries themselves.Since emissions reductions fromboth offsets and NAMAs will takeplace in developing countries, the accountingof these reductions is extremelyimportant. In the case ofNAMAs it is clear that the effort willbe attributed to developing countries.In the case of offsets, it is essentialthat only one party claim the emissionsreductions due to the offsets. Ifboth the buyer (developed country)and the seller (developing party) countthese emissions reductions towardtheir goals, then this is a clear case ofdouble-counting. Unfortunately thereis little clarity in the negotiations asto whether and how double-countingcan be avoided.A recent study by the StockholmEnvironment Institute estimates thatdouble-counting would increase emissionsby 0.6-1.6 Gt CO 2e in 2020based on assumptions on demand andsupply of offsets (Erickson andLazarus 2011).International aviation andshippingCurrently emissions from internationalaviation and shipping are notaccounted for under the Kyoto Protocol,even though they are substantial.As such, Annex I Parties’ emissionsfrom this sector can continue to increasewithout affecting compliancewith their emission reduction commitments.Based on projections from theinternational aviation and shippingauthorities, growth in emissions fromAnnex I Parties is estimated to amountto a loophole of 0.4-0.9 Gt CO 2e in2020 (Terry 2010).Aggregate loopholesThese accounting loopholes,taken together, could more than negatethe pledges of Annex I countries.Taking the estimates of the ‘condi-THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE No 255/25647
C O V E R‘If a weak pledge-based approach riddledwith loopholes is adopted, we risk a 4°Crise in global temperatures or higher...’tional’ (high) Annex I pledges, emissionreductions amount to roughly 3.8Gt CO 2e in 2020 (UNEP 2010). Theloopholes together add up to approximately3.3-7.4 Gt CO 2e in 2020. Ifwe assume that Annex I pledges areat the high end of the spectrum, wefind that pledged emission reductionsare significantly lower even when applyingthe lower end of the loopholeestimates and actually disappear whenapplying the higher end (see figure below).ConclusionIf developed countries are seriousabout fulfilling their responsibilityto lead in the fight against climatechange, they need to put ambitioustargets on the table that are in line withthe science and do away with loopholes.There is no plan(et) B. Everypassing day of inaction closes the doorfurther on preventing catastrophic climatechange. Unfortunately thosecountries failed to do their part inDurban – the pledges remain low anduncertain.ÿuDr Payal Parekh is a climate and energy expert whowas in Durban.Referencesden Elzen, M. et al. (May 2010).Loopholes 2020 (Gt CO 2e) Cumulative (Gt CO 2e)Surplus allowances CP1 1.5-2.9 9-13Surplus allowances CP2 0.7-1.0 0.7-1.0 *LULUCF 0-0.6 0-4.8Non-additional CDM credits 0.1-0.4 0.7-3.5Double-counting 0.6-1.6 0.6-1.6 *Aviation and shipping 0.4-0.9 0.4-0.9 *Total 3.3-7.4 11.5-24.8*No cumulative estimate availableEvaluation of the CopenhagenAccord: Chances and risks for the2°C climate goal. NetherlandsEnvironmental Assessment Agency(PBL). Available at http://www.ecofys.com/en/publications/23/.Erickson, P. and Lazarus, M. (2011). Theimplications of internationalgreenhouse gas offsets on globalclimate mitigation. StockholmEnvironment Institute WorkingPaper WP-US-1106. Available athttp://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/SEI-WorkingPaper-Erickson-ImplicationsOfInternationalGreenhouseGasOffsets-2011.pdf.IGES (2011). IGES CDM ProjectDatabase, 1 August 2011. Availableat http://www.iges.or.jp/en/cdm/report.htmlHaya, B. (2009). Measuring emissionsagainst an alternative future:fundamental flaws in the structure ofthe Kyoto Protocol’s CleanDevelopment Mechanism. Energyand Resources Group Working PaperERG09_001. Available at: http://erg.berkeley.edu/working_paper/2009/ERG09-001.pdfKartha, S. (2011). Annex 1 pledges,accounting ‘loopholes’, andimplications for the global 2°Cpathway. South Centre Policy Brief.Available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=2081&Itemid=182.Rogelj, J. et al. (2010). CopenhagenAccord pledges are paltry. Nature464, 1126-28. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/4641126a.Schneider, L. (2007). Is the CDMfulfilling its environmental andsustainable development objectives?An analysis of the CDM and optionsfor improvement. Öko Institut.Available at http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-en.pdf.Terry, S. (2010). Integrity Gap –Copenhagen Pledges and Loopholes.Sustainability Council of NewZealand. Available at http://www.sustainabilitynz.org/news_item.asp?sID=214.UNEP (2010). The Emissions Gap Report– Are the Copenhagen AccordPledges Sufficient to Limit GlobalWarming to 2°C or 1.5°C? Availableat http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/UNEP (2011). Bridging the EmissionsGap. Available at http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/bridgingemissionsgap/UNEP RISOE Pipeline Analysis andDatabase 1 September 2011.Available at: http://cdmpipeline.org/THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE No 255/25648
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