in extractive industries, and audit and control reforms that might be possible in theTribunal Adminstrativo.10. Signals of Political Will to Fight CorruptionUnfortunately, there is no single set of criteria or indicators that can be used by donors,citizens, civil society organizations, political opponents or others to judge the relativepolitical will of a government to address corruption. In Mozambique, this is complicatedby several factors, including: the country’s nascent democracy, domination by a singleparty of all branches of government which undermines checks and balances, a lack ofdirect accountability to citizens, weak control mechanisms to detect abuses, impunity forwealthy and politically-connected individuals, weak civil society capacity, the absence ofsignificant and meaningful engagement by civil society with government, and anatmosphere of pervasive secrecy and opacity in government and within the parties.Movement on these structural issues, then, will be the true test of democratic maturationand political will to address corruption at its roots.In the meantime, donors and others seeking to ascertain political will should look toreforms that meaningfully impact those critical factors that create an enablingenvironment for corruption in Mozambique. Those reforms should aim to:• Strengthen the checks and balances between and among all branches ofgovernment, with particular emphasis on the independence and impartiality ofthe judiciary;• Improve control mechanisms that strengthen direct accountability to citizens;• Eliminate the culture of impunity and apply the law equally to all citizens;• Strengthen civil society capacity to contribute to and monitor progress of anticorruptionefforts; and• Increase the transparency of government and political parties.Because the nature of such reforms is broad and will take time to fully implement, shortterm measures of political will are difficult to predict in advance. However, steps thatwould signal the greatest seriousness on the part of government are those that mosteffectively tackle the core points where the most problematic corruption is eitherperpetrated or protected, including the following:• Follow through or re-opening of high profile crimes and charges that werepoorly or inadequately prosecuted in the recent past, including the CarlosCardoso and Antonio Siba Siba Macuacua murders and associated crimes.• Increasing dissemination of and access to (i.e., presented in a usable andcomprehensible format) critical government information, such as budgets,public expenditures, and revenues.• Increased transparency in major procurements, including active and informedinvolvement of civil society as a watchdog.• Increased transparency of political party and campaign finances.FINAL REPORT 58
• Decreased use of public resources for political campaigning.• Public declaration of assets, particularly of elected officials and key politicalappointees.Other important steps on the road to reform may be a sign of political will, but are moredifficult to read and for that reason should be viewed more skeptically as measures ofseriousness in fighting corruption. The following kinds of efforts may be genuine efforts(whose prospects for success will inevitably be hindered unless broader structuralreforms are undertaken) or they may simply be an effort to deflect criticism and attentionfrom the real problems.• Passage of laws or development of regulations. While these are importantsteps, it is in the implementation that the intention of political leaders will bemanifest.• Exhortations of political commitment or the need for change. Speakinghonestly about the need for change and political commitment is an excellentfirst step, but without meaningful action on what will be undoubtedly difficultand daunting reforms, words are not enough.• Technical reforms and fixes. These are also important steps for reform, butalone they are not necessarily a sign of political commitment and in fact maybe a way of demonstrating action on the issue without intending tosignificantly change the status quo.FINAL REPORT 59