GRADUATE COURSES BY QUARTERAutumn 2013 Winter 2014 Spring 201430100 Murphy / Becker30200 Murphy / Reny30300 Myerson / Reny30501 Reny30600 Harris30701 Szentes31000 Shaikh31100 Uhlig31200 Neal / Hortaçsu31700 Shaikh31801 Gautier32000 Galenson33000 Alvarez33100 Stokey33200 Mulligan33502 Alvarez33603 Uhlig33703 Guerrieri34300 Becker34601 Voena34901 Durlauf35002 Heckman35101 Cosar / Ossa35301 Lucas35501 Hassan36101 Myerson / Van Weelden37200 Black38001 Davis / Hurst38102 Vavra38900 Fama39100 Cochrane39001 Diamond / Sufi39400 Diamond / Zingales39600 Panageas39701 He39802 Malani40101 Syverson4020140301HortaçsuCarlton40501 Weyl40603 Budish40801 Hickman41001 Thaler / Kamenica / Pope4110041800 JuddTBA42100 Levitt42800 Galenson42900 Galenson43400 Lopes de Melo15
GRADUATE COURSE DESCRIPTIONS(2013-14)30100 PRICE THEORY I (Murphy / Becker)Theory <strong>of</strong> consumer choice, including household production, indirect utility, and hedonic indices.Models <strong>of</strong> the firm. Analysis <strong>of</strong> factor demand and product supply under competitive andmonopolistic conditions. Static and dynamic cost curves, including learning by doing and temporarychanges. Uncertainty applied to consumer and producer choices. Property rights and the effects <strong>of</strong>laws. Investment in human and physical capital. (=LAWS 43611)30200 PRICE THEORY II (Murphy / Reny)The first five weeks <strong>of</strong> this course are a continuation <strong>of</strong> ECON 30100, Price Theory I.The second half <strong>of</strong> the course will be devoted to the Walrasian model <strong>of</strong> general competitiveequilibrium as developed by Arrow and Debreu. This will begin with a brief development <strong>of</strong> theconsumer and producer theories, followed by the welfare theorems connecting equilibria and optimaand a treatment <strong>of</strong> the classical existence <strong>of</strong> equilibrium theorem. The core <strong>of</strong> an economy, a limittheorem relating the core to the set <strong>of</strong> competitive equilibria, and models in which agents are smallrelative to the market will also be considered. Finally we will study general equilibrium under somealternative assumptions; such as, informational asymmetries and rational expectations equilibrium,public goods and Lindahl equilibrium, financial general equilibrium and asset pricing. (=LAWS43621)30300 PRICE THEORY III (Myerson / Reny)The course begins with expected utility theory, and then introduces the fundamental ideas <strong>of</strong> gametheory: strategic-form games, Nash equilibrium, games with incomplete information, extensive-formgames, and sequential equilibrium. Then the course will focus on the effects <strong>of</strong> informationalasymmetries in markets and the problems <strong>of</strong> moral hazard and adverse selection. Topics include:optimal risk sharing, signaling and screening in competitive markets, principal-agent problems,strategic and informational incentive constraints, incentive efficiency, and mechanism design forauctions and bilateral trading.30400 INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS (Lima)This optional three-week course for incoming graduate students meets September 3 throughSeptember 20, 2013 and introduces some basic mathematical concepts used in economic theory: a"briefing" <strong>of</strong> the math students will encounter in the Core classes. Emphasis is placed on problemsolving,but also on some fairly abstract math you might not see otherwise. Cooperative work isstrongly encouraged.30501 TOPICS IN THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (Reny)Some <strong>of</strong> the topics covered in this course are: Nash equilibrium existence in discontinuous games,existence <strong>of</strong> monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayseian games, defining sequential equilibrium ininfinite extensive form games, efficient auction design, correlated information and mechanismdesign.30600 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION (Harris)This course introduces students to a range <strong>of</strong> economic tools used to study models explicitlyinvolving strategic behavior, information transmission, and contracting in economics and finance.The intention is to prepare the student to conduct research using these tools. Techniques studiedinclude agency theory, signaling models, and sequential games <strong>of</strong> incomplete information. Inaddition, some applications <strong>of</strong> the tools will be covered. The approach is rigorous and analytical.16
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