frozen in time; it extends beyond that actual moment of seeing the Other for the first time.In many ways, the first contact is preceded by the concept of contact.BEGINNING WITH <strong>PARA</strong>HUMANSThis isl<strong>and</strong>’s mine, by Sycorax my motherWhich thou tak’st from me.(Shakespeare, The Tempest, I. ii. 331–2)Literature, critics will argue, offers us the ability to view the Other from the vantage point ofthe European explorers. Rabelais’s monster <strong>and</strong> all monsters who represent the negativemoment of Western civilization, e.g. Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, introduce to thereader, through a breach of “decorum,” the order of civilization:Thou most lying slave,Whom stripes may move, not kindness! I have us’d thee(Filth as thou art) with human care, <strong>and</strong> log’d theeIn mine own cell, till thou didst seek to violateThe honor of my child. 9Prospero reverses the moral force of Caliban’s complaint much in the same way he reversesthe winds <strong>and</strong> nature, causing cataclysmic disaster. Prospero’s control of nature is ametaphor for his control of <strong>and</strong> over the beginning or the Cosmos. This, of course, includesthe categories of the human <strong>and</strong> the non-human. Within the play, Caliban is a necessarymonster against whom Prospero must construct an identity. The winds that Prospero is ableto conjure, through good magic, deconstruct the naturalness of nature <strong>and</strong>, by implication,morality. Prospero is caught in a tension between the human, the superhuman, <strong>and</strong> the nonhuman.Caliban’s moral complaint, which is more an appeal through humanity, calls for aresponse that Prospero cannot readily provide without revealing his own <strong>and</strong> civilization’scontradictions. What Caliban’s complaint dem<strong>and</strong>s, however, is a clear definition of“humanity,” a definition possible for Prospero only through a process of negation. Ironically, itis Mir<strong>and</strong>a, the innocent child, who in this crisis comes to her father’s rhetorical aid <strong>and</strong> who,too, invokes her own reversal of Caliban’s complaint by delineating, without reflection, theorigins of human nature <strong>and</strong> the non-human:Abhorred slave,Which any print of goodness will not take,Being capable of all ill! I pitied thee,Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hourOne thing or other. When thou didst not, savage,Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble likeA thing most brutish, I endow’d thy purposesWith words that made them known: but thy vile race(Though thou didst learn) had that in’t which good naturesCould not abide to be with; therefore wast thou25
Deservedly confin’d into this rock,Who hadst deserv’d more than a prison. 10Mir<strong>and</strong>a, the supposed innocent, chastises Caliban for his essential vile nature in such a wayas to suggest the availability of a coherent moral code predicated upon the implicit “goodnatures” of all humans. She describes how she attempted to impart this nature to Calibanthrough the transformation of “gabble” into ordered language; her mission civilitrice isapparent in her efforts to bring Caliban into humanity through this order of language. Herreversal of Caliban’s complaint is not altogether irreversible, in the sense that both Caliban<strong>and</strong> Prospero step outside the order of nature in their own unique ways. Mir<strong>and</strong>a’s difficulty isin preventing her venomous attack on Caliban (depicting him as the monster who is outsideof nature) from spilling over onto her father, who also defies the order of language throughhis incantations. Mir<strong>and</strong>a’s order is sustained by what lies outside of it, in this case the “vilerace” to which Caliban belongs. The integrity of human nature is sustained by that which, ineffect, lies outside of it: Caliban.Caliban’s presence, his role as monster, <strong>and</strong> his enslavement on the isl<strong>and</strong> provide theopportunities for moral reversibility. This reversibility, however, is not ending. Morality isdismantled, not by a higher morality, but by the lack of a higher morality, to which Calibanappeals for justice. Prospero’s moral ascent to the sacred is a descent or a lateral move intoan alternate structure – in this case, magic. For Prospero to become more civilized he mustbecome more brutal. The impossibility of ascent to a higher plane, the sacred, results in afrustration <strong>and</strong> brutality which presses upon the Other to define, via the negative, the humancenter. Like Caliban on the isl<strong>and</strong>, the Other of Western discourse must become for the sameever more vile in order to sustain the idea of order, righteousness, good natures, <strong>and</strong>community through civilization.If one then returns to Brink’s Adamastor as a contemporary manifestation of this civilizingmission, the residue of Shakespeare’s Caliban is apparent. Shakespeare’s Caliban is closelyconnected to the Adamastor by certain discursive str<strong>and</strong>s. Both represent the repressedpassions in civilization which exceed civilization. The sexuality of Caliban <strong>and</strong> T’Kama areheld in suspension around an ambiguous civilized sexuality. In this sense, theparahuman–parasacred coupling is both a site of oppression <strong>and</strong> a site of liberation. Thecivilized can be sexual only as it draws from the savage the necessary energies of sexualexpression. Both Caliban <strong>and</strong> T’Kama are within the discourse of civilization, even while theyare unaware of it. T’Kama, in particular, is more uncivilized than Caliban in so far as he iscompletely alien to the explorers. A mark of the civilized is language, <strong>and</strong> Caliban clearly hadbeen instructed in its use by the good Mir<strong>and</strong>a:The problem was that it was impossible to talk to the visitors. I had the distinct impression thatthey knew nothing resembling a language. They could utter sounds, but these were quitemeaningless, like the chattering of birds. So perhaps they were a kind of bird after all. However,we tried to communicate with them through gestures <strong>and</strong> after a while they began to respondin the same way. 11Brink reverses the context for deciding upon what is civilized. T’Kama, unlike Caliban,becomes the bearer of discourse, <strong>and</strong> it is the visitors who are non-communicative <strong>and</strong>,26
- Page 2: PARA/INQUIRY“For those of us who
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- Page 8 and 9: CONTENTSList of figures ixAcknowled
- Page 10: FIGURES3.1 Questioner of the Sphinx
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Faurisson reveals that the Shoah is
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MEMORIES OF FORGETTINGCertainty is
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political. Each of these ground(ing
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totalizing discourses or a determin
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Kantian wound often move toward a q
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Secret fauna and flora which the re
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CHAPTER 6Parasacred ground(ing)s
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often exist outside (the pagus) the
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graveyard. The sacred disfigures,be
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death, which is another repetition
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able to choose from a range of poss
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eligious. Mary’s presence as a mi
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As one walks through a cemetery, ti
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104Figure 6.15b Clinging to the Cro
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To think not is to linger with a ne
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PARASACRED IMAGESNor does one need
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irreverent piety in so far as eachr
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CHAPTER 8EpilogueParaultimacy
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The steps, the corridor, to the plo
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GLOSSARYI should say that in so far
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The early writings of the French ph
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NOTESPOSTING1 Michel Montaigne, Apo
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metaphysical notion of effectivespa
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and probably goes back to helios.Ea
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“compensate” the rigidity of th
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GLOSSARY1 Peter A. Angeles writes(H
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Stanford: Stanford University Press
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Riverside Shakespeare edn, Boston:H
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Carroll, Lewis 23cemeteries 93, 101
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painting 58; laughter as epiphany 5
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“paraexperience” 83, 86; the po
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postmodernism: authenticity 33;ceme
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Thousand Plateaus, A (Gilles Deleuz