32111. In a subsequent motion, the Trial Judge ruled that the Plaintiff’s claims were notamenable to resolution by stated case under Rule 33. He again affirmed thefundamental nature of the litigation, as understood by all Parties:Initially the plaintiff made a proposal of a special case that was rejected by bothCanada and British Columbia. The defendants were unable to agree on the factsproposed by the plaintiff. They say acceptance of the proposed facts would haveamounted to a complete abandonment of defences raised in these proceedingsconcerning the nature and extent of aboriginal title in the claim area. 209Turning to British Columbia’s proposal to litigate the constitutional applicability ofprovincial forestry legislation by special case on the assumption that there are Crownlands in British Columbia subject to Aboriginal title, the Trial Judge stated:… [I] have concluded that it would not be helpful to have that issue determinedwithout an answer to the central question, namely, do aboriginal rights andaboriginal title exist for Tsilhqot’in people anywhere in the claim area … 210112. The Parties clearly understood the nature of the litigation from the outset.Lesser, included relief was always an issue in these proceedings and, with respect,declarations should issue to those portions of the Claim Area where the Trial Judgefound Aboriginal title was established on the evidence.113. This conclusion is amply supported by the general principle that courts shouldtake all reasonable measures to promote the full and final resolution of litigateddisputes. 211 This principle finds expression in s. 10 of the Law and Equity Act:In the exercise of its jurisdiction in a cause or matter before it, the court mustgrant, either absolutely or on reasonable conditions that to it seem just, allremedies that any of the parties may appear to be entitled to in respect of anylegal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in the cause or matterso that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be209 William v. British Columbia, 2004 BCSC 964, 30 B.C.L.R. (4 th ) 382, para. 3 [underscore added].210 William v. British Columbia, 2004 BCSC 964, 30 B.C.L.R. (4 th ) 382, para. 5 [underscore added].211 Great Canadian Casino Co. v. Surrey (City), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1188,79 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049 (B.C.S.C.)
33completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedingsconcerning any of those matters may be avoided. 212C. Alternative Argument: The Trial Judge was not barred from declaringAboriginal title to lesser, included areas in the Claim Area.114. Even if the Plaintiff’s prayer for relief did not include declarations of Aboriginaltitle to lesser, included portions of the Claim Area, the Trial Judge nonetheless had abroad discretion to grant such declarations.His refusal to do so rests on amisunderstanding of the law and reliance on authority that has been roundly rejected asa general statement of the law. Contrary to his conclusions, there was no impedimentto granting declaratory relief shaped by his findings of fact at the conclusion of trial.1. Broad discretion to grant declaratory relief115. The courts’ discretion to grant declaratory relief is not limited to the termsspecifically requested by the plaintiff. A court may grant a declaration upon the factsproven at trial, even if the plaintiff did not request a declaration in those specific terms,or did not request any declaration at all. 213 As part of this discretion, the court maygrant a declaration in narrower terms than those requested. 214116. In Delgamuukw, Mr. Justice Lambert of this Honourable Court, in dissent but noton this point of law, expressed the governing principle as follows:The power to make such declaratory orders is contained in Rule 5(22) of theSupreme Court Rules. And, of course, it is self-evident that if the prayer for reliefasks for a declaration of rights in wider terms than the Court considers justified212 Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253, s. 10 [underscore added].213 See, e.g.: Native Women's Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, paras. 36-37; Meisner v. Mason,[1931] 2 D.L.R. 156, 1931 CarswellNS 39 (N.S.C.A.); Harrison-Broadley v. Smith, [1964] 1 All E.R. 867 (C.A.); Hulton v.Hulton, [1916] 2 K.B. 642, aff’d [1917] 1 K.B. 813 (C.A.); Rt. Hon. The Lord Woolf & Jeremy Woolf, Zamir & Woolf,The Declaratory Judgment, 3 rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), p.283.214 Attorney-General v. Guardians of the Poor of the Merthyr Tydfil Union, [1900] 1 Ch. 516 (C.A.), pp. 550-551; ReLewis’s Declaration of Trust; Lewis v. Lewis; Lewis v. Ryder, [1953] 1 All E.R. 1005, (sub nom. Loudon v. Ryder (No.2)), [1953] 1 All E.R. 1005, [1953] Ch. 423 (Ch. D.); Nicholls v. Tavistock Urban District Council [1923] 2 Ch. 18(Ch.D.); R v. Bales; Ex parte Meaford General Hospital (1970), [1971] 2 O.R. 305, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.); Rt.Hon. The Lord Woolf & Jeremy Woolf, Zamir & Woolf, The Declaratory Judgment, 3 rd ed. (London: Sweet &Maxwell, 2002) at 284; Frederick M. Irvine, McLachlin & Taylor, British Columbia Practice, 3rd ed., looseleaf(Markham: LexisNexis, 2005), at 5-66.
- Page 1 and 2: JUN 04 * u|UCOURT OF APPEALCourt of
- Page 3 and 4: C. Alternative Argument: The Trial
- Page 5 and 6: DateDecember 18,1998October 14,1999
- Page 7 and 8: OPENING STATEMENT1. The Tsilhqot’
- Page 10 and 11: 2then Chief of the Xeni Gwet’in,
- Page 12 and 13: 414. The Tsilhqot’in people inhab
- Page 14 and 15: 6… [T]he proper rights holder, wh
- Page 16 and 17: 8F. Tsilhqot’in Territory and the
- Page 18 and 19: 10bounding the Claim Area. For them
- Page 20 and 21: 12…I am satisfied Tsilhqot’in p
- Page 22 and 23: 1452. The Trial Judge summarized th
- Page 24 and 25: 16records document numerous situati
- Page 26 and 27: 18days, Tsilhqot’in warriors also
- Page 28 and 29: 20declaration because of the manner
- Page 30 and 31: 22• On the west, from Xeni across
- Page 32 and 33: 24part of their oral traditions, pr
- Page 34 and 35: 26declaration of title in accordanc
- Page 36 and 37: 28would have cross-examined witness
- Page 38 and 39: 30circumstances of the case, which
- Page 42 and 43: 34by the evidence, then the Court c
- Page 44 and 45: 36exactly what declaration he seeks
- Page 46 and 47: 38declaration should be granted”.
- Page 48 and 49: 40occupation sufficient to ground t
- Page 50 and 51: 42(a) The Plaintiff was not require
- Page 52 and 53: 44process and the legal requirement
- Page 54 and 55: 46157. Proof of an ancestral and mo
- Page 56 and 57: 48uncertainty”. 272 The meaning o
- Page 58 and 59: 50therefore, of opinion, that all n
- Page 60 and 61: 52land regularly used by the Tsilhq
- Page 62 and 63: 54stated that it depends on the fac
- Page 64 and 65: 56the lands in question. At common
- Page 66 and 67: 58193. Moreover, the Trial Judge’
- Page 68 and 69: 60PART 4 - NATURE OF THE ORDER SOUG
- Page 70 and 71: 62R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2