Loosening-Konys-Grip-July-2013-FINAL

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LRA, particularly as top commanders attempt to exaggeratethose risks as much as possible.But recently, as groups became smaller and more mobile,some members were able to defect without beingpursued. Some groups are now too small or weak tochase those who leave. According to at least two recentreturnees, commanders of small groups worrythat those sent to retrieve defectors would also defect. 47In the past, LRA groups that were more stable couldminimize defections by using established perimeterguards. But sedentary groups run the risk that LRAmembers will build relationships with local communitymembers and seek their help to escape, as happenedin Haut Uele from 2007-2008, as well as in Kafia Kingiin 2011 on at least one occasion.Many LRA escapees who manage to elude their captorsstill must make a long journey through denseforests from remote LRA encampments to the nearestarmy detachment or civilian settlement. They are oftenunable to take sufficient provisions for the journey,for fear of tipping off LRA commanders to their plans.They may face extreme hunger or thirst while traveling,as well as exposure, disease, and wild animals.Though some are able to survive in the bush for weeksor months, some escapees have undoubtedly died inthe attempt.Local communities usually welcome non-Ugandan defectors,mostly Zande, who survive the bush journey. 48If they escape in their country of origin, they usuallyare returned home quickly. However, for those whoescape in a different country than that from whichthey were abducted, the journey home can be perilous.Though government authorities, UN actors, and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) havestrengthened protocols for coordinating cross-borderreturns, these systems work best for children andwomen. 49 Non-Ugandan adult males who escape fromthe LRA in a different country have often been jailed orheld in custody for extensive periods of time, thoughimproved coordination in the past two years has re-47 Interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu, 3 and 7April 2013.48 Across LRA-affected areas of CAR, Congo, and SouthSudan, there are periodic, localized tensions between Zandefarming communities and Mbororo (Fulani) herdsman.However, Mbororo herders usually feed Zande escapeesthey encounter in the bush and transport them to nearbycommunities or authorities. For more, see The Resolve,“Peace Can Be,” February 2012.49 Even so, there remain long delays in repatriating them insome cases.duced the number of such cases.Ugandan defectors, particularly male combatants, facegreater danger in trying to establish contact with localcommunities. Failure to build trust or communicateclearly with local communities may lead to beating orlynching. Some of the interviewees said they tried tosecure assurances before surrendering by either wavingwhite flags from the side of the road or writingletters to local community leaders. In most cases theyreceived no response and feared they would be attackedif they stayed in the same place. Ugandan LRAdefectors also assume false identities – pretending tobe from one of the neighboring LRA-affected countries– to avoid being killed while coming out. Many,especially combatants, attempt to find civilian garb beforeleaving the bush. Looting or bartering of civilianclothes, particularly suits and shoes, could signal thelooters’ intent to defect. Three different former fightersinterviewed for this report testified that they askedMbororo cattle herders they encountered in the bushfor “good clothes” to help facilitate their defection.Despite their fear, Ugandan defectors often receive assistancefrom local communities. In late 2012, civiliansin the CAR towns of Obo and Mboki helped severalUgandan combatants defect. Their willingness to assistLRA defectors is likely linked to intensive efforts bycivil society leaders, local authorities, the NGO InvisibleChildren, and US military advisers to encouragecommunity members to assist defectors.Ugandan defectors also face potential mistreatment atthe hands of military forces. Five former combatantssaid they avoided surrendering to the Congolese army(FARDC) as they heard rumors while in the LRA thatCongolese soldiers killed LRA defectors on the spot. 50There have also been at least two cases of the SouthSudanese military (SPLA) mistreating Ugandan LRAdefectors it has received, and likely many more. 51However, Ugandan LRA combatants are also wearyof the Ugandan military. Though Ugandan forces donot physically abuse them, defectors fear being recruitedand forced to fight their former colleagues in thebush. 52 The Ugandan army uses many former Ugan-50 There have been several documented cases of Congolesesoldiers mistreating Ugandan defectors. See Cakaj, Ledio,“Too Far From Home: Demobilizing the Lord’s ResistanceArmy,” Enough Project, February 2011.51 For instance, the South Sudanese military held a maleUgandan LRA defector in custody for several months in late2011 and early 2012.52 Three of the former LRA combatants interviewed forLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 22
dan LRA fighters as scouts immediately after theysurrender. Though these men are thought to providevaluable intelligence, often LRA groups change plansonce they know one of their members has defected.Even if the Ugandan military does transport formerLRA fighters back to Uganda, they often pressure andintimidate them to join the UPDF. As of February 2011,there were reportedly over 100 former LRA combatantsin the Ugandan army, fighting against the remainingLRA groups. 53 All the males interviewed for this reportclaimed that they had been asked to join the Ugandanarmy and knew at least one other person who had succumbedto the pressure and joined.Ugandan army officials lure former combatants withpromises of salaries to be deposited into bank accountsin Uganda while the former combatants fight for theUgandan army in CAR. Such promises are almost alwaysfalse as, according to Ugandan law, no personwithout a high school education can be integrated intothe Ugandan army and receive a salary. 54 Most of theformer combatants were abducted as children andhave only a basic elementary education. Almost allof the recently returned former LRA combatants whonow fight for the Ugandan army interviewed by theauthors in the last two to three years have reported thatthey have not undergone any training or other basicprocedures needed to formally be absorbed into thearmy and therefore do not qualify for the salaries theyare promised. 55C. Lack of reintegration aid back home“I have a question. Suppose you were the person who cameout and had nothing, you were suffering and people ask youto go on the radio and tell others to come out, when in factyou wished you were back in the bush? Would you do it?”Former Ugandan LRA combatant who escaped in 2011,29 March 2013“At least in the bush I could find food for myself.” Multipleformer Ugandan and Zande LRA members, April 2013If LRA defectors succeed in surviving the gauntlet ofthis report stated they had been worried the Ugandan armywould recruit them once they escaped. They tried to surrenderto the local population in CAR or even the South Sudanesearmy and police.53 Cakaj, “Too Far From Home,” 2011.54 World Factbook, “Uganda,” Central Intelligence Agency,2012.55 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Guluand Kampala 2011-2013. Author interview with social worker,Gulu, 24 June 2013.obstacles between their escape and their arrival home,they then face the challenge of reintegrating back intotheir communities. Interviews with former combatantsindicate that even though such concern might beseen from the outside as premature – survival beingobviously the initial worry – members of the LRA aremore likely to undertake the perilous return journey ifthey are convinced that the rewards of being home areworth the risk of getting there.1. Reintegration support for UgandansReintegration of Ugandan former members of the LRArequires a holistic, community-based approach. Evenso, the Ugandan government has a primary responsibilityfor facilitating and funding reintegration activities.Since 2000, it has largely implemented this responsibilitythrough the Amnesty Commission, a bodycreated under the terms of the 2000 Amnesty Act thathas been tasked with granting legal amnesty, as wellas providing rehabilitation to former members of theLRA.Since their creation, the Amnesty Act and AmnestyCommission have faced a variety of critiques, includingconcerns about the appropriateness of a blanketamnesty and the quality of reintegration packages.Regardless, the Commission enjoyed support amongsome elements of northern Ugandan civil society, andfor years it was able at least to provide some returningmembers of the LRA with amnesty certificates.However, the Amnesty Commission’s performancehas steadily declined since 2006, when the LRA abandonednorthern Uganda, as the rate of defectors hasslowed and attention in Uganda has shifted to morepressing domestic issues. The Commission failed to issuemany former combatants their amnesty certificates,while lack of funding meant many defectors receivedreduced reintegration packages, or none at all. TheCommission’s offices in northern Uganda, where mostdefectors return, are closed. The Commission’s workwas also compromised by other Ugandan governmentactors working at cross-purposes, including Ugandanmilitary officials who used the denial of amnesty certificatesto pressure returnees to join the military. Additionally,the Ugandan government has blocked theissuing of an amnesty certificate for Thomas Kwoyelo,a mid-level commander who was captured in February2009, as the Department of Public Prosecution (DPP)attempts to try him for alleged crimes committed whilein the LRA.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 23
Page 1 and 2: LOOSENING KONY’S GRIPEffective De
Page 3 and 4: ABOUTPublished© July 2013 The Reso
Page 5 and 6: escape, discourages many from defec
Page 7 and 8: To donors• Fund the construction
Page 9 and 10: I. INTRODUCTIONThe overall situatio
Page 11 and 12: II. THE FINAL CHAPTER?The LRA of 20
Page 13 and 14: Map: Estimated location of LRA grou
Page 15 and 16: C. Kony and LRA command dynamicsThe
Page 17 and 18: or no contact with one another.Ther
Page 19 and 20: III. HOMEWARD BOUNDDebating Defecti
Page 21: the majority of LRA members seek on
Page 25 and 26: 2. Reintegration support for non-Ug
Page 27 and 28: IV. A REGION IN CHAOSThe Context fo
Page 29 and 30: chaos that emboldens bandits, rogue
Page 31 and 32: 1. Standing up the AU RTFHaving fai
Page 33: ited to passive measures in that th
Page 37 and 38: staff in Bangui with improved field
Page 39 and 40: function in spite of the coup. Othe
Page 41 and 42: to respond immediately to the count
Page 43 and 44: cal care they received. Such messag
Page 45 and 46: Map: FM radio Come Home broadcast c
Page 47 and 48: attempt escape.But given that most
Page 49 and 50: information about LRA group movemen
Page 51 and 52: locations be attacked. 101In SRS lo
Page 53 and 54: satellite or mobile phones, crackin
Page 55 and 56: ANNEX I. ESTIMATED LRA COMPOSITIONE
Page 57 and 58: C. LRA groups in CAR and Kafia King
Page 59 and 60: tion in October 2007. LRA defectors
Page 61 and 62: C. LRA commanders in CAR and Kafia

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