Map: LRA attacks, January 2010 – June <strong>2013</strong>SUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityLRA attack 2010LRA attack 2011LRA attack 2012LRA attack <strong>2013</strong>SOUTH SUDANCARN100km200kmDR CONGOLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 8
I. INTRODUCTIONThe overall situation in the LRA-affected zones of CentralAfrican Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (Congo), and South Sudan continues to bedominated by uncertainty, fear, and insecurity. Militaryand diplomatic efforts made under the auspicesof the African Union Regional Cooperation Initiativefor the Elimination of the LRA (AU RCI-LRA), workingin collaboration with the UN and its Regional LRAStrategy, have generated some progress towards thegoals of ending LRA violence and protecting civilians.However disappointing the results in some areas, thecombined effect of civilian and military initiatives hasmade life difficult for the LRA. Based on past experience,it is likely that any loss of momentum in thecounter-LRA initiative will be used by the LRA to reorganizeand reconstitute.While the current focus on a collaborative internationalapproach to the LRA problem continues to enjoy broadsupport, at least in public rhetoric, the goal of knittingtogether a strategy binding the AU, UN, and nationalgovernments has yet to be translated into effective andcoordinated action on the ground. The much vauntedAU Regional Task Force (AU RTF), the multi-nationalforce operating under the umbrella of the RCI-LRA,continues to be plagued by a lack of funding, poor logistics,and political challenges that render it virtuallyineffective in providing protection to civilians livingunder threat of LRA attack, who are predominantly ofthe Zande ethnic group. On the ground, the AU initiativeis seen as a hollow exercise in diplomacy.Recent research indicates that LRA cohesion is weakening.It is possible that the majority of groups mightfinally disintegrate if sufficient pressure on them canbe sustained. The campaign to encourage voluntarydefections acts in concert with military operations andcontributes to them by reducing LRA strength. Militaryand non-military interventions together act aspush-pull factors and are effective to the extent thatthey complement each other.The limited successes of Ugandan forces, supported intheir operations by United States expertise and logistics,stand out as positive achievements, particularlyin the areas of intelligence gathering and disruption ofLRA communications, command, and control. The continuingpresence of self-defense militia units in SouthSudan has also been effective in reducing the level ofinsecurity in LRA-affected areas of Western EquatoriaState (WES).In spite of the operational challenges, the campaign toencourage and facilitate voluntary defections has madesome progress over the past year, particularly in CARand South Sudan. Such efforts, however, take place ina context of inconsistent military pressure on the LRAand still suffer from a number of other crippling weaknessesthat can be traced to political and institutionaldysfunctions affecting many of the organizations involved.UN missions in the region, which should play key rolesin facilitating defections, are hampered by an absenceof coordination between missions, the lack of key personnelon the ground, and Byzantine decision makingand procurement systems that are simply too slow tocope with rapidly changing operational needs. Theseweaknesses have a direct impact not only on efforts toencourage voluntary defections, but also on the abilityof would-be defectors to come out safely.In addition, the sheer number of international agencies,international non-governmental organizations(NGOs), and local civil society groups involved incounter-LRA initiatives generate frictions that operateas a drag on collective action. At best, the internationaleffort can be understood as a fumbling attempt, inwhich the good will and best efforts of many playersfall short of the mark – but nevertheless create a positiveeffect.The purpose of this paper is to develop proposals forimproving efforts to counter the LRA by encouragingand facilitating defections from the group. To be effective,a defection campaign must be based on a soundknowledge of the organization it targets. Consequently,the paper begins with an extensive description andan analysis of the LRA’s composition, modus operandi,and area of operations, while commander profiles canalso be found in the annexes. It follows with an analyticaldescription of the contributions of various counter-LRAinitiatives and how they interact. The paperthen focuses on what can be done to improve the rateof voluntary defections. This part of the paper devotesconsiderable attention to related issues that impinge onthe actions of those involved in encouraging or facilitatingdefections.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 9
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