Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning – PDF - COCo

would be "undermined by the pursuit of self-interestthrough confrontation and conflict" (p. 188). He findsplanning neither apolitical nor objective.The design of the planningprocess predicts the outcomeProblems in suppressing politicsduring planningThe need for control createsleaders who see only turbulencearound them.Four sins of trivial planning.Leaders or managers of planning activities can shape thefinal outcome of the process by the design andimplementation of the planning process. Their bias may beexpressed as "planning as an end unto itself,""consideration of a narrow form of rationality," "towardsteady incremental change rather than periodic quantumchange," "toward centralized power...and away from theneeds of influences whose stake in the organization is notformally economic," "toward short-run economic goals," and"toward simpler, impoverished forms of strategiesthemselves" (p. 196).When planning avoids the politics of the organizations,leaders tend to find themselves managing sharpenedconflicts when the plans face implementation. Bysuppressing natural conflicts, self-interest, goal trade-offs,resource redistribution and the political dimensions of anorganization in the planning process, the final plan lacksrealism and practicality.Planning and Control. Planning, according to Mintzberg(1994) seems to appeal to the leader's interest in controland, concurrently, an aversion to risk, avoidance ofcreativity and truly "quantum changes." The link betweenplanning and control than leads to the pitfall repeatedthroughout history of planners who characterize their periodas the most turbulent (and therefore heightening the needfor control through planning). Like Chicken Little, thosewith a higher need to plan and control may experience evensubtle changes as "environmental turbulence."What he describes as a second pitfall--the illusion of controlcreated through planning--then leads to a real purpose forcontinuous planning: public relations. That attitude byleaders results in the four sins of "trivial planning": (1) usepast trends to predict the future; (2) well-publicized andvery public evidence of planning; (3) continuous planningwith insufficient time to effect change, and (4) pretending tochange in order to remain conservative (pp. 217-218).Fundamental FallaciesMintzberg (1994) uses Chapter Five as a review of thefallacies of strategic planning. He ties the concept offallacies to his last chapter through this borrowed definition:"An expert has been defined as someone who knowsenough about a subject to avoid all the many pitfalls on hisThe Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning – Page 4

or her way to the grand fallacy" (p. 221). In Mintzberg's"grand fallacy," the failures of planning are not coincidentalbut integral to the very nature of planning.Three assumptions underlyingstrategic planning.Fallacy of PredeterminationThe three assumptions underlying strategic planning are: (1)assumptions of formalization in which the strategy makingprocess can be programmed by the use of systems; (2)assumptions of detachment in which "thought must bedetached from action, strategy from operations, ostensiblethinkers from real does, and, therefore, 'strategists' from theobjects of their strategies;" (3) assumptions of quantificationin which "the strategy making process is driven by 'harddata,' comprising quantitative aggregates of the detailed'facts' about the organization and its environment.The act of planning assumes predetermination in theprediction of the environment; the unfolding of the strategyformation process on schedule; and the ability to impose theresulting strategies on an accepting environment. Inassuming the ability of planning to predetermine the future,the planner and the leader create the conditions by whichplans fail to meet expectations.A basic tenant of planning rests on forecasting, but theperformance of forecasting has been less than ideal.Forecasting fails to accurately predict discontinuitiesbecause it relies on extrapolations. More helpful has beenthe use of scenarios, especially when the scenarios arelinked to contingency planning.Fallacy of DetachmentQuantitative data drives outqualitative data (and informationon emerging trends).Fallacy of FormalizationMuch has been written on the need for strategy developmentand planning to be done away from routine and distinct fromdaily decisions. Unfortunately, this concept challenges boththe leader's ability to allocate time purely to planning and theleader's ability to be abstract while immersed in the dailyworld.The reliance on hard, objective data drives out qualitativedata which has a greater chance of reshaping theorganization and sensing subtle environmental changes. Inthe long run, Mintzberg points to the need for planners tomake conscious and articulated "attachments" to theirpersonal influences on the planning process.In the unknowing acceptance of this fallacy, Mintzberg(1994) suggests he is converging on the essence of thegrand fallacy. Strategy formulation, for Mintzberg, can notbe formalized nor innovation be institutionalized.The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning – Page 5

Formal planning systems thatfailed or no formal systems atall?His discussion examines two dimensions of the fallacy offormulation: the possibility that formal systems of planningcreate dynamics which reduce the possibility of truly beingstrategic or the possibility that planning processes havenever really been formal (other than to follow a checklist).Two kinds of thinking lead todifferent kinds of strategy.Managers more simultaneous,holistic and relational.The Grand FallacyHis remaining discussion offers a glimpse into Mintzberg'stheories for better planning. His ideas include the belief thatdifferent thinking styles and personal preference for decisionmaking make some people more adept and interested inplanning as an analytic process, while others prefer a morecreative and intuitive process. His challenge to leaders isthat they work to understand the two different kinds ofthinking processes.Mintzberg (1994) offers research that finds managerial workappears to be more "simultaneous, holistic, and relationalthan linear, sequential and orderly" (p. 319). This wouldseem to suggest that managers would be more likely to finda "disorderly" and creative planning process more familiarand related to the real world of the organization.That leads him to a summative restatement of the grandfallacy of the "planning school": "because analysis is notsynthesis, strategic planning is not strategy formation" (p.321). In short, "analysis can not substitute for synthesis. Noamount of elaboration will ever enable formal procedures toforecast discontinuities, to inform managers who aredetached from their operations, to create novel strategies.Ultimately, the term 'strategic planning' has proved to be anoxymoron" (p. 321).The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning – Page 6