Process Control Network Security

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1.2 Reading guideChapter 2 will present the reasons for research, the goal, the research questionsand research approach. In addition, the CIA triad and STRIDE will be brieflydiscussed.Chapter 3 will introduce the reader into the “Industrial IT” environment, includingfrequently used terminology, components and recent changes in communicationtopology.Chapter 4 will present the main differences between the “Office IT” and“Industrial IT” environments.Chapter 5 will focus on the risks involved in “Industrial” IT environments. Theserisks are important because mitigating controls should be in place to limit theserisks.Chapter 6 will focus on the legislation, good practices and control frameworksthat already exist.Chapter 7 will present the risks specific to “Industrial IT” environments and byalso using other frameworks will conclude in one specific framework to addressthe risks specific to “Industrial IT” environments.Chapter 8 will discuss our conclusions (i.e. answers to the research questions)and will provide recommendations and suggestions for future research.Process Control Network Security Page 6
2 Research ApproachThis chapter will present the research approach. First of all, we will present thereasons for research. Afterwards, we will present the goal and accompanyingresearch questions that will be answered in this thesis. Finally, the researchapproach is discussed.2.1 Reasons for ResearchDuring some preliminary research, we noticed that the “Industrial IT”environment is and will be changing during the last and upcoming decades. Theoffice IT will probably also be going through large changes in the future, however,we will concentrate on PCNs (Process Control network) here. For moreinformation and a definition of PCNs, please refer to Section 3. The PCNs and the“Industrial IT” environment used to be fully segregated (isolated) from otherPCNs and the “Office IT” environment. However, more and more interconnectionsare introduced in newer environments and even unsupported systems aremodified to support interconnections. These interconnections are introduced bothbetween different PCNs and between PCNs and the “Office IT” (e.g. to representcurrent stock levels in the BI (Business Intelligence, logistic) software in theOffice IT environment). In this way the formerly isolated PCNs became exposedto new risks. More detailed information about this change can be found in Section3.4.These changes from isolated systems to fully interconnected systems introducednew risks to the “Industrial IT” environment. An attacker could for example hackthe workstation of a salesman via the Internet (“Office IT”) and gain access to the“Industrial IT” environment via the interconnections between the “Office IT” and“Industrial IT” environment. In this way, the attacker could for example shutdown the power plant or production plant or even blow things up in the worstcase scenario. Therefore, PCN security should get more attention, also from ITauditors, as the interconnectivity is growing.2.2 GoalThe goal of this thesis is to provide insight in the most important security risksthat are exposed to the implementation and management of PCNs integrated withthe office IT environment. The goal is to present a framework to mitigate thecurrently most important threats posed to PCNs. To emphasize on the goal: theframework will not address a complete set of all measures or controls whichshould be implemented. Instead it will deal with the threats which are currentlyposed and mitigating measures which need to be additionally implemented on topof existing control sets or measures taken.2.2.1 Research QuestionsThe research goal as stated in Section 2.2 resulted in the following researchquestion:“What are currently the most important risks that are exposed to theimplementation and management of Process Control Networks and howcan we determine whether a company is in control?”In order to answer this research question, we deducted multiple sub-questions:1 What are PCNs?2 What are the most important differences between PCNs (“Industrial IT”) and“Office IT”?Process Control Network Security Page 7
Page 1 and 2: Process Control Network SecurityCom
Page 3 and 4: Table of ContentsPreface ..........
Page 5: 1 Introduction1.1 IntroductionFor t
Page 9 and 10: The relationship between CIA and ST
Page 11 and 12: The picture below shows some typica
Page 13 and 14: 3.4 Communication Topology (past vs
Page 15 and 16: 4 PCNs vs. Office IT4.1 Introductio
Page 17 and 18: The differences mentioned above and
Page 19 and 20: As a result, access controls design
Page 21 and 22: - unpatched machines within the PCN
Page 23 and 24: In addition, the scale on which cyb
Page 25 and 26: The list below presents examples of
Page 27 and 28: SpoofingidentityTamperingwith dataR
Page 30 and 31: SpoofingidentityTamperingwith dataR
Page 32 and 33: does hardly take place. Unauthorize
Page 34 and 35: The US department for Homeland Secu
Page 36 and 37: • Inadequate logical access restr
Page 38 and 39: functionality. These firewalls shou
Page 40 and 41: NIST 800-53 control AC-2 describes
Page 42 and 43: 1 Unsupported systemsThe following
Page 44 and 45: CategoryControlIncreasedinterconnec
Page 46 and 47: CategoryControlcomponents.4.5 In si
Page 48 and 49: 2 Increased interconnectivity (e.g.
Page 50 and 51: 9 ReflectionDuring the writing of t
Page 52 and 53: [GIA09][GOOD08][ITIL09][MCA09][MS09
Page 54 and 55: [TEN09][THER01]SCADA plugins for Ne
Page 56 and 57:
I.2.1.4 SummaryThe table below summ
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Shared resourcesinsufficientlyaddre
Page 60 and 61:
where it is stored. If an unauthori
Page 62 and 63:
Replay attacks:A replay attack is a
Page 64 and 65:
TCP/IP:The TCP/IP model is a descri
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