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MUNINN

MUNINN - Grand View University

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Fellgiebel and the 1944 Plot <strong>MUNINN</strong> Volume 2 (2013)Fellgeibel’s task was to destroy all radio or telephone contact betweenthe Wolf’s Lair headquarters and the rest of Germany. In his book,History of the German General Staff (1954), historian Walter Goerlitzpoints out that General Fellgiebel and his deputy Major General FritzThiele (1894-1944) were crucial to Operation Valkyrie because theycontrolled communications that would ultimately determine the successor failure of Valkyrie. 5 Despite history running the latter course, thispaper contends that Fellgiebel was given an unrealistic task and that hedid the best he could under circumstances that left him largely on hisown.Interestingly, Hitler had not acted on earlier suspicions ofFellgiebel and others. Four days after the bomb exploded, GeneralAlfred Jodl (1890-1946), chief of operations for the OKW, spoke toofficers of the high command: “Persons have been suspected before,but the Fuhrer has always passed over the incidents good-naturedly,and has held his hand over the making of any disclosures. So it was, forinstance, with General Fellgiebel, who had already becomeconspicuous earlier by his remarks.” 6 Albert Speer (1905-1981), headof the German war economy and a chief advisor to Hitler, later wrotethat he was never aware of Operation Valkyrie in July 1944, but he sawin officers the discontent about Germany and its chances to win thewar. Speer recalled a July 9, 1944, meeting with General Fellgiebelalong with Quartermaster-General Eduard Wagner (1894-1944),General Fritz Lindeman (1894-1944), and Brigadier General HelmutStief (1901-1944) at Berchtesgadener, Hitler’s headquarters and retreatin the Alps: “My Office Journal records my astonishment at the waythey belittled the desperate situation at the front.” 7 Fellgiebel wasconcerned about the fact that there was a separate communicationsnetwork for each branch of the army, which he felt caused thesquandering of materials and men. In his memoir, Speer believed thislack of concern over the front was because Fellgiebel and others had bythis time become fully committed to the plot to kill Hitler. Speer saidthey appeared to be a bit reckless. 8Operation Valkyrie had set-backs from the beginning.Colonel Stauffenberg was promoted to full colonel in June 1944 andgeneral staff, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris who was head of German counter-intelligence(Abwehr), and other high ranking officers who were involved with the later July 1944Plot. The Oster Conspiracy would have been attempted if Germany had gone to war withCzechoslovakia in 1938, which it did not.5Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,1957), 437.6Zimmermann, 187.7Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: MacMillan, 1970), 379-380. Editor’snote: One of the structures near Berchtesgadener was referred to as the Eagle’s Nest,which may be more familiar to readers as the general nickname of the area.8Speer, 379-380.34

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