Order Granting Permanent Injunction - maldef

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Case 3:06-cv-02371 Document 153 Filed 05/28/2008 Page 24 of 35 The city’s argument that it is acting to support the federal government’s immigration enforcement is specious. Local enforcement of federal immigration law is sanctioned by section 287(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act which provides: [T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States . . . , may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law. 8 USC § 1357(g)(1). Nothing in the Ordinance demonstrates the city’s intent to assist the federal government in this manner. The Ordinance here requires more than the collection of immigration documents. The Ordinance puts the burden of verifying immigration status upon landlords. In LULAC, the district court held that a California proposition was a regulation of immigration, in part, because the law required that state agents determine immigration status. 908 F. Supp. at 770. That court noted that: state agents are unqualified – and also unauthorized – to make independent determinations of immigration status. . . . Indeed, determinations of immigration status by state agents amounts to immigration regulation whether made for the purposes of notifying aliens of their unlawful status and reporting their presence to the INS or for the limited purpose of denying benefits. Id. The court determines that the Ordinance burdens private citizens and city officials with making immigration status decisions based upon a scheme that does not adopt federal immigration standards. Accordingly, the Ordinance is a “regulation of immigration” inconsistent with the federal government’s rights and in violation of the first De Canas test. Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance fails the second and third De Canas tests. In light of the court’s ruling with respect to Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Permanent Injunction – Page 24
Case 3:06-cv-02371 Document 153 Filed 05/28/2008 Page 25 of 35 the first De Canas test, it does not consider the parties’ arguments regarding the second and third De Canas tests. 2. Savings Clause Defendant argues in the alternative that if the court concludes that the Ordinance as drafted is preempted, the court should sever provisions pursuant to the savings clause of the Ordinance. Section 4 provides: If any section, paragraph, subdivision, clause or phrase of this Ordinance shall be adjudged invalid or held unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity of this Ordinance as a whole or any part of any provision thereof other than the part so decided to be invalid or unconstitutional. Ord. § 4. At the preliminary injunction hearing, the city provided the court with three exhibits demonstrating various ways it believes the court could sever certain portions of the Ordinance in order to craft an Ordinance that is not preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Specifically, Version One omits all references to the HUD regulations and requires noncitizens to provide only a “signed declaration of eligible immigration status.” Version Two omits all references to the HUD regulations and requires noncitizens to present only a “form designated by ICE as acceptable evidence of immigration status.” Version Three omits all references to any federal regulations and leaves the rest of the Ordinance, for the most part, intact. In its supplemental brief, Defendant effectively offers a fourth version by arguing that if the term “eligible immigration status” is problematic, the court could simply omit the word “eligible” from the phrase throughout the text of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs argue that the court should not engage in rewriting the Ordinance, that the portions the city argues should be severed are not independent and cannot be severed, that severing Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Permanent Injunction – Page 25
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Order Granting Permanent Injunction - maldef

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