Culture

Unreliable evidence 39
Arts, pioneered overviews which showed how much was spent on the
sector; the size of the economy; and how many people attended and
participated in cultural events. Since then, successive governments
have acknowledged the need to account for spending on the cultural
sector, not least in terms of evidencing outputs. However, their
efforts were largely unsustained and unsuccessful.
That it should have been so was, perhaps, not surprising. Prior to
1997, when New Labour came to power, cultural policy was, to all
intents and purposes, determined by the actions of such organisations
as the former Museums & Galleries Commission and the Arts Council
of Great Britain. Despite being directly funded by government, these
organisations tangibly operated at ‘arms’ length’ from it. Indeed, it has
been suggested that they functioned in what was, effectively, a ‘policy
vacuum’. At best, the government departments responsible for
funding the cultural sector (such as the Office of Arts and Libraries
and, subsequently, the Department of National Heritage) reviewed
current provision, sought to improve the management of its advisory
and funding bodies and promoted examples of best practice. As
Muriel Nissel recognised in 1983, the prevailing culture of performance
measurement was generally considered inappropriate for
cultural provision and was effectively steered clear of.
However, with the establishment of the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport (DCMS) in July 1997, the ways in which cultural
policy have been articulated, disseminated and assessed appear to
have been transformed. Key to that was the fact that central government
strategically ‘reclaimed’ responsibility for cultural policy.
In what remains the most detailed statement of its plans to ‘reform’
the sector, A New Cultural Framework, published in 1998, DCMS
announced that it would be playing a full-part in ‘joined-up govern-