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NET ASSESSMENT 119
school ground-power strategists, and the joint
world now considers such thinking standard.
Dr. Davis treats the story of the theory’s development
better than he does in the postwar assessment.
Maj Gen David A. Deptula’s monograph Firing
for Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare provides
a simpler explanation of how and why we use effectsbased
operations—an evolutionary leap in planning
that, together with our new precision-strike
capabilities, allowed coalition air and space power
in conjunction with only cavalry and special operations
to crush the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
and then support conventional forces in the
march to Baghdad 18 months later. These hugely
different operations shared a theory that enabled
the same platforms and warriors to succeed in both
cases. Flexibility is indeed the key to airpower.
Davis comments that “it is difficult to conceive
of any bombing plan that will release the grasp of
a police state on its populace” (p. 317). But as General
Deptula writes, the goal of effects-based operations
is “control,” not simple attrition. Moreover,
modern air and space power strategists don’t plan
to win wars through aerial bombardment alone—
that idea went out with Billy Mitchell. On the other
hand, perhaps Operation Allied Force and Slobodan
Milosevic demonstrated that we should never say
“never.”
Second, examining the desired effects is critical
to effective campaign planning—not shooting for
a specific body count or a magic number of tanks
destroyed. So it’s important to remember that what
many people traditionally think of as tactical targets—convoys,
troops, and old-fashioned interdiction
and close-air-support targets—can (and often
do) yield strategic effects. The highway leading
north from Kuwait City is a case in point. On February
26–27, 1991, F-15Es, A-10s, and a host of other
coalition aircraft wreaked havoc on the Iraqi army’s
armed retreat. Dr. Davis doesn’t even mention this
event, even though other sources point to it as a
key reason that some allied leaders sought a quick
end to the ground campaign. Strategic target sets
are critical, but effects can cause unintended consequences
that ripple far beyond the battlefield.
I’m not sure that I buy the author’s conclusion
that “the strategic bombing campaign against Iraq
was a decisive factor. . . . When joined to the tactical
air effort against Iraqi forces in Kuwait . . . air
power was the decisive factor” (p. 320, emphasis in
original). I strongly feel that the “which is more decisive”
debate is both futile and tired. Yet, this criticism
doesn’t take away from the fine scholarly effort
by Dr. Davis, who has a gift for capturing a
wildly complicated plan and making sense of it on
paper. Furthermore, his documentation and level
of specificity are outstanding. Many unique sources,
including mission reports that probably only aircrews
and intelligence officers have read, are available
to the average reader solely through this
book. I also like On Target because it may set young
and old warriors alike to thinking about why we do
what we do—and how we do it.
Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF
Washington, DC
Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century edited
by Heike Bungert, Jan Heitmann, and Michael
Wala. Frank Cass Publishers (http://www.frank
cass.com), 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,
Oregon 97213-3644, 2003, 200 pages, $84.95
(hardcover).
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening
of archives in the former East Germany, a torrent
of information has appeared in the popular
press. The scholastic approach of Secret Intelligence
in the Twentieth Century examines German intelligence
structures and policy as well as the attempts
of other powers to gather intelligence about German
states. Some of the early essays in the book
cover issues already known to most intelligence researchers,
but one also finds real gems dealt with
for the first time in print. An account of the attempted
use of ethnic Germans during World War
II makes for interesting reading, for example.
What makes this book unique, however, are the
post–World War II pieces, such as the one that addresses
the ability of Gen Reinhard Gehlen of
Fremde Heere Ost, one of the intelligence arms of
the German High Command, to foresee the demise
of the World War II–era Anglo-Soviet bond
and Germany’s emergence as a vital part of the
Western defense alliance. Not only does one find
details concerning Gehlen’s influence on German
national-security making and policy development,
but also information about his ties to the CIA and
the US Army’s G-2 in Heidelberg. A KGB officer’s
viewpoint of KGB and East German penetration of
the Gehlen organization and its successor, the
BND (German Intelligence), makes the whole period
come alive. The establishment of East German
security services and their role in the East-West spy
game show that the Soviets were intimidated by
Gehlen’s successes but that the KGB also lacked
the skills to be successful in a Western-oriented
Germany.