presentation departments reproduced

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004
Tempo
One could argue that in America we do
things on “too” time scales: too short and too
long. Too short because we don’t have the
patience to run investments past an immediately
foreseeable payoff; thus, we miss contributions
of great value. Too long because we
actually believe that our detailed strategic
plans will not be overrun by events. Ideally, we
would replace them with “to” time scales:
toward a meaningful, long-term vision and
toward faster results on a project scale. In
other words, we could replace detailed strategic
plans with visions such as “we expect to
have an entire unmanned strike force” or, as
President Kennedy proposed in 1961, “to
land a man on the moon before the decade is
out.” Such visions are quite different from the
detailed, committee-built road maps (strategic
plans) that list endless series of projects,
each funded according to the political winners
or losers of a given year. On the other
end of the scale, we need to ensure that we
pursue ongoing projects with a sense of
urgency seldom seen in government. Doing
so may entail initiating fewer projects, finishing
them, and then turning resources toward
other promising activities.
The benefit of a new technology to the
military depends upon the advantage it provides
multiplied by the time the system operates
before a countersystem negates it, or
multiplied by the total amount of time a costsaving
technology is deployed. In either case,
the time to develop and field that technology
directly affects its overall value. The often
unrecognized cost of delays in developing
technologies and systems can become dramatically
larger than expected. Take, for
example, a new material or change that
improves the reliability and overhaul time of
jet engines on military aircraft. The cost of
delay associated with reengining the KC-135
fleet came to $231 million a year (fig. 5). When
applied across all engines, such costs could
easily reach into billions of dollars a year. The
cost of delay remains the same, regardless of
whether the delay occurs during technology
development or production. The bottom line
is that the government should do all it can to
limit costly delays by making dynamic changes
in funds and offering proper incentives to
complete projects with urgency.
Newt Gingrich often refers to government
time, indicating that, for example, people
have come to accept long lines at the department
of motor vehicles that they would find
absolutely unacceptable at any commercial
establishment. We have grown accustomed to
long delays in R&D demonstration programs
for defense, but commercial venture capitalists
often look for similar results and returns in
18 months or less. By getting answers quickly,
they can determine whether a project has
$231
$19.6
Lost Value ($M)
250
200
150
100
50
0
$20
$32
$11.8
Lost Value ($M)
20
15
10
5
0
$2.0 $1.6 $1.1
10% Development 20% Production 10% Performance 12 -Month 1% Development 1% Production 1% Performance 1 -Month
Cost Overrun Cost Shortfall Slip Cost Overrun Cost Shortfall Slip
Figure 5. Cost of delay for the KC-135 reengining program. (Adapted from Donald G. Reinertsen et
al., “Cost of Delay Analysis: Calculating Project Decision Rules,” Journal of Cost Analysis and Management,
Winter 2002, 14–15, http://www.sceaonline.net/Publications/JOURNAL%202002.pdf.)