BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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UEFI RUNTIME CALLS • The UEFI specification provides firmware with the ability to expose certain functions that remain resident in memory, and can be called from the live, running OS • A lot of complexity exists here around locking and memory map layouts, since there’s no facility provided to synchronize with the OS • NT uses certain key UEFI Runtime Calls, such as the ones that provide the ability to enumerate, get, and set EFI variables • System reset/shutdown also done through UEFI, as well as Capsules (firmware updates / crash dump data) • Specifically, the UEFI Variable API exposed to user-mode (Get/SetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable) performs a system call which is ultimately handled by the HAL, which then calls UEFI • So what happens if an <strong>IUM</strong> application wants to access UEFI Runtime Calls? • VSM can therefore be configured to virtualize UEFI Runtime Calls, and to run them in VTL 1 • NTOS (or rather, HAL) therefore will perform a Secure Mode Service Call to access UEFI • This means that malicious firmware could access VTL 1 data during this time!
<strong>IUM</strong> INTERNALS
Page 1 and 2: BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM HOW WINDOWS 1
Page 3 and 4: PRESENTATION OVERVIEW • Microsoft
Page 5 and 6: VBS FEATURES IN WINDOWS 10 / SERVER
Page 7 and 8: ENABLING VBS
Page 9 and 10: HOW DOES IT ALL WORK? • Hyperviso
Page 11 and 12: SEPARATION OF ROLES • Instead of
Page 13 and 14: PLATFORM REQUIREMENTS • The Boot
Page 15 and 16: HARD CODE GUARANTEES • When hard
Page 17 and 18: VIRTUAL SECURE MODE (VSM) BOOTSTRAP
Page 19 and 20: SKM LAUNCH • To initialize VTL 1,
Page 21 and 22: BCD VSM POLICY OPTIONS • The poli
Page 23 and 24: SKM INTERNALS
Page 25 and 26: SKM STRUCTURES • SKM has a PCR at
Page 27 and 28: SKM CAPABILITIES • The SkCapabili
Page 29 and 30: SECURE MODE CALLS • Secure Mode C
Page 31 and 32: SPECIALIZED SECURE MORE SERVICE CAL
Page 33: NORMAL MODE SERVICE CALLS • SK ne
Page 37 and 38: SECURE SYSTEM CALLS • SKM exposes
Page 39 and 40: SECURE BASE API • Trustlets shoul
Page 41 and 42: NOTABLY MISSING… • Trustlets ca
Page 43 and 44: NORMAL MODE SYSTEM CALL PROXYING Th
Page 45 and 46: LAUNCHING A TRUSTLET • Process At
Page 47 and 48: EXAMPLE IUM-COMPLIANT SIGNED BINARY
Page 49 and 50: TRUSTLET INSTANCE GUID • Trustlet
Page 51 and 52: LSA TRUSTLET • One of the two inb
Page 53 and 54: LOADING A TRUSTLET • Ldr, or the
Page 55 and 56: TRUSTLET TO NORMAL WORLD COMMUNICAT
Page 57 and 58: CAN WE BUILD OUR OWN TRUSTLETS? •
Page 59 and 60: CONCLUSION RISKS AND THOUGHTS
Page 61 and 62: SECURE KERNEL COMPLEXITY / ATTACK S
Page 63 and 64: VSM WITHOUT SECUREBOOT • What’s
Page 65: YOU HAVE QUESTIONS? I HOPEFULLY HAV

BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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