BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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RECOMMENDATIONS • Microsoft should at the very least make HVCI (SKCI.DLL) verify its own integrity • CI.DLL does this, and is additionally protected by PEAUTH.SYS, PatchGuard, and Warbird • Even better, the Hypervisor (or an SKM component) should ensure that code pages are signed according to expected rules, and crash the machine if not • For example, IUM code should never be associated with a non-Microsoft root • SKM should disallow launching Trustlet IDs that it doesn’t know about • It already hardcodes Trustlet IDs in the SKM Capability Definitions • Microsoft won’t be releasing Trustlets on a frequent basis – and when it does, it can update SKM • Better yet, actually enforce Secure Boot to be enabled, turned on, and with the expected certificates loaded, before allowing VSM to enable itself • Force the attacker to write their own hypervisor, not use yours • These are all defense-in-depth measures – obviously no way to truly protect against a physical attacker without Secure Boot
YOU HAVE QUESTIONS? I HOPEFULLY HAVE SOME ANSWERS Sincere thanks to the following people, without whom this presentation would not have been possible: • Arun Kishan, Dave Probert, Alain Gefflaut, David Hepkin, Seth Moore, Baris Saydag, Bruce Dang, Dave Mitduri, Jason Shirk
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BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM HOW WINDOWS 1
Page 3 and 4:
PRESENTATION OVERVIEW • Microsoft
Page 5 and 6:
VBS FEATURES IN WINDOWS 10 / SERVER
Page 7 and 8:
ENABLING VBS
Page 9 and 10:
HOW DOES IT ALL WORK? • Hyperviso
Page 11 and 12:
SEPARATION OF ROLES • Instead of
Page 13 and 14: PLATFORM REQUIREMENTS • The Boot
Page 15 and 16: HARD CODE GUARANTEES • When hard
Page 17 and 18: VIRTUAL SECURE MODE (VSM) BOOTSTRAP
Page 19 and 20: SKM LAUNCH • To initialize VTL 1,
Page 21 and 22: BCD VSM POLICY OPTIONS • The poli
Page 23 and 24: SKM INTERNALS
Page 25 and 26: SKM STRUCTURES • SKM has a PCR at
Page 27 and 28: SKM CAPABILITIES • The SkCapabili
Page 29 and 30: SECURE MODE CALLS • Secure Mode C
Page 31 and 32: SPECIALIZED SECURE MORE SERVICE CAL
Page 33 and 34: NORMAL MODE SERVICE CALLS • SK ne
Page 35 and 36: IUM INTERNALS
Page 37 and 38: SECURE SYSTEM CALLS • SKM exposes
Page 39 and 40: SECURE BASE API • Trustlets shoul
Page 41 and 42: NOTABLY MISSING… • Trustlets ca
Page 43 and 44: NORMAL MODE SYSTEM CALL PROXYING Th
Page 45 and 46: LAUNCHING A TRUSTLET • Process At
Page 47 and 48: EXAMPLE IUM-COMPLIANT SIGNED BINARY
Page 49 and 50: TRUSTLET INSTANCE GUID • Trustlet
Page 51 and 52: LSA TRUSTLET • One of the two inb
Page 53 and 54: LOADING A TRUSTLET • Ldr, or the
Page 55 and 56: TRUSTLET TO NORMAL WORLD COMMUNICAT
Page 57 and 58: CAN WE BUILD OUR OWN TRUSTLETS? •
Page 59 and 60: CONCLUSION RISKS AND THOUGHTS
Page 61 and 62: SECURE KERNEL COMPLEXITY / ATTACK S
Page 63: VSM WITHOUT SECUREBOOT • What’s
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BATTLE OF SKM AND IUM

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