The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin

NOVEMBER 2015
ISSUE NO. 112
The Politics of Water Governance
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
PAULA HANASZ
ABSTRACT Transboundary water politics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin are
affected not only by inter-government relations between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh,
but also by dynamics on different scales, including the hydropolitics between Indian states
within the basin. At the same time, the disputed issues, and the patterns of power dynamics
between actors, are similar in transboundary interactions in the basin as well as in inter-state
interactions within India. Both transboundary water disputes and India's inter-state ones are
subject to intense politicking. Within the Indian polity, however, domestic water issues divert
political attention away from transboundary ones. Indian states also have significant influence
over transboundary water governance, and at times this is at odds with India's central
government. This paper describes the parallels and interdependencies between inter-state water
conflicts within India, and the transboundary ones with India's neighbours.
INTRODUCTION
There is no dearth of literature on issues related to
water security and water conflicts in India. Most
studies, however, focus on inter-state conflicts,
the constitutional provisions for jurisdictions
over water issues, or the legal aspects of India's
water conflict tribunals. Absent is any analysis of
how hydropolitics between Indian states relate to
water interactions with Nepal, Bhutan and
Bangladesh. This paper describes the parallels and
interdependencies between inter-state water
conflicts within India, and the transboundary
ones with the country's neighbours.
Similarly, there has been no assessment of
how the decentralised and fragmented approach
to water governance within India affects
transboundary water governance. Although there
is an extensive body of literature on devolved
federalism and its effect on different sectors such
as land, law and order, and education of interest
here is the effect of state-based water resource
management on transbound ar y water
governance.
India is assumed, in relation to its neighbours,
as a unitary, cohesive unit rather than an
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ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 112 • NOVEMBER 2015
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
aggregate of states, ministries, and interests that
compete and sometimes conflict with each other.
Taking a constructivist view of India's water
governance, i.e., one that accounts for these
complexities, contradictions and conflicts in
water governance networks, allows for a more
nuanced understanding of the transboundary
water interactions between India and its coriparians.
This, in turn, allows for the exploration
of a more flexible and appropriate transboundary
water policy.
This article examines state-level political
dynamics that affect the water interactions that
India has with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.The
purpose of this analysis is to provide insights into
an overlooked aspect of regional hydropolitics
that may be of relevance to Indian hydrocrats as
well as international organisations engaged in
water resource policy-making in the region (e.g.,
the World Bank-led South Asia Water Initiative).
Relations with Pakistan over the rivers of the
Indus basin are outside the scope of this paper as
the political relationship between India and
Pakistan is highly securitised and their water
interactions are largely governed by one
international agreement, the Indus Waters
Treaty.
Understanding how water resources are
governed within India should provide insights
into the management of transboundary waters.
There are three reasons for this. First, water
disputes within India are more conflictual than
transboundary indeed, hydropolitics between
India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are highly
cooperative in comparison to water interactions
1
between some Indian states. This means that
domestic disputes attract more political attention
within India than do international ones. Second,
Indian states have significant influence over
transboundary water governance, and at times
this is at odds with India's central government.
Third, the principles that underpin domestic
water governance and water conflict resolution
between states are reflected in India's approach to
transboundary water issues. These themes are
extrapolated in the following sections.
INTER-STATE VS. TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER DISPUTES
Governance of water issues in India is fragmented
and decentralised. It is fragmented because there
are numerous bodies, authorities, departments
and institutions that have responsibility over
water, and many laws that create ambiguous and
2
complex regulations regarding water resources.
The governance of India's rivers is also
decentralised as the states, rather than the central
government, have primary jurisdiction over the
3
management of water within state borders. This
means that the governments of Nepal, Bhutan
and Bangladesh must negotiate (in the broadest
sense of the word, meaning formal and informal
discussions on a topic of mutual interest) with
Indian states in addition to the central
government. This adds an extra layer of politics
and difficulty to transboundar y water
governance.
The decentralised authority over India's rivers
becomes increasingly problematic as the growing
demand for water directly contributes to the
politics of federalism; the movement towards
economic liberalisation in the 2000s has
increased federalist competition, as each state has
become more responsible for attracting
investment and funding its own development
4
efforts. Competition is thus one of the causes of
inter-state water conflicts in India. The issue of
ownership is another cause. As Lahiri-Dutt points
out, the question of ownership is posed at
different scales: Between the state and
communities in general, between the central
government and respective states, and between
5
local and state governments . Water ownership,
then, is the source of disputes.
The Indian Constitution does provide for the
establishment of tribunals for the resolution of
inter-state river water disputes, but in practice
this gives the central government no real
advantage or manoeuvrability over the states, as
it is still constricted by the influence of interest
6
groups and voters. These tribunals have been
largely ineffective in resolving disputes between
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
7
the contesting states . Without an effective
oversight and arbitration mechanism, the interstate
water disputes within India are left in a
similar position to transboundary water disputes
which, because of the anarchic nature of
international law, cannot be adjudicated by a
higher authority (especially not in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, where no River
Basin Organisation exists).
Part of the problem of unresolved inter-state
water disputes is not so much the structure or
mandate of the tribunal themselves, but rather
that water disputes within India are
characterised by bitterness, tend to get
enmeshed in party politics, and become
8
intractable . The domestic politicking over interstate
water disputes within India distracts
political attention from transboundary matters.
This has significant implications for policies
aiming to improve water cooperation in the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. As Dash
notes, Regional cooperation is a two-level
process in which domestic support and regional
bargains and negotiations must overlap if
9
cooperation is to proceed . Domestic issues
simply take precedence over regional cooperation.
In the words of S. Dinar:
In the GBM [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna]
Basin, for example, domestic politics play a
large role in the hydropolitics between the
basin riparians. Political factions that accuse
the ruling party of compromising their
respective nation's sovereignty and national
interest often curtail cooperation between
Bangladesh, Nepal, and India. Although
hegemonic stability theory tells us that a lack
of regional cooperation is due to the desires of
India to prevent multilateral regional
cooperation, domestic factors including
political instability and nationalist fervor
intensify the conflict and also prevent
10
collaboration .
The nuances of inter-state hydropolitics in India
also illustrate that dispute resolution
mechanisms and institutions alone are not
immune to politics and that the political context
must be considered when addressing water
conflicts. The significance for transboundary
MAP: THE GANGES-BRAHMAPUTRA-MEGHNA BASIN
Source: Australian National University CartoGIS CAP
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
water policy of the intense politicking between
Indian states is that it creates an unhelpful
impression: that if India cannot manage its own
domestic water conflicts, it will not be able to
11
manage the international ones. Also, there is an
assumption that conflicting needs and interests
of the different states must be reconciled
domestically before any international agreement
12
can be reached .
Yet India's transboundary water relationships
are better than the water interactions between
13
Indian states. While there is a degree of basinwide
coordination and integration between India
and its neighbours, no such arrangements exist
within India; indeed, there is a strong resistance
to the idea of the River Basin Organisation on the
14
part of the state governments. This poses a
policy challenge to those within and outside the
region who are working to build a River Basin
Organisation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna basin.
Moreover, existing legal structures do not
allow for the participation of non-state political
actors in the adjudication of inter-state water
15
disputes. This is problematic because, as Iyer
argues, any consultative, interactive approach to
conflict-resolution must also be inclusive: It
must include and involve those who have a vital
interest in the decision, namely the farmers,
industrial establishments, municipalities, and
people in general because all of us are water-
16
users . He continues that the present system of
inter-state water dispute resolution is de facto an
inter-government system. As such it cannot be
said to be one that focuses on water justice
outcomes or procedural justice. Yet water justice is
increasingly an important issue in the scholarly
and policy discourse even though it is still
grappling with how to apply a justice approach to
17
transboundary water governance.
Mohan explains that the political boundaries
of states often subsume issues that are humane,
18
common and social in nature , meaning that
they are rarely addressed in state-centric water
dispute mechanisms. This is also the case in
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. As Prasai and Surie
point out:
Consideration of broader stakeholder
perspectives is vital to effective transboundary
water governance in South Asia
[but] the lack of regional cooperation and the
absence of local and sub-national perspectives
continue to prevent sustainable development
and management of transboundary water
resources for livelihood improvement, food
security, poverty reduction, and effective
19
adaptation to climate change .
Furthermore, the relationship between India's
state governments and the central government is
largely a zero-sum game: the attitude prevails that
20
one side's gain is the other's loss. Nonetheless, as
Mohan argues, this need not be the case and that,
in relation to the governance of transboundary
rivers at least, Increasing roles for Central
institutions does not necessarily mean a
21
whittling down of the powers of the states . This
may become a necessary paradigm shift if or
when India embarks in earnest on the Inter-
Linking Rivers Project. If it does, the Inter Linking
Rivers Project will require India's central
government to better coordinate and control the
states on water issues because of the vast
amounts of water that will be moved between the
states. The Centre will also have to take ownership
of the transboundary aspects of this ambitious
22
project, such as water flow into Bangladesh.
Thus an important challenge for policy is to
establish material incentives and disincentives
that enable dynamics at the negotiation table
based on positive-sum thinking.
Under India's Constitution, the central
government already has significant leeway to take
charge of transboundary rivers and inter-state
ones too, should Parliament deem it in the
national interest (for example, when one state's
water management has harmful effects on
another). Yet, the Center has never exercised its
powers and always allowed States to take the
larger responsibility. This wilful abdication by the
Center led to an understanding that the States
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
have exclusive power to manage water
23
resources . This complicates water governance
b e c ause states must b e consulte d in
transboundary water policy.
STATES' INFLUENCE ON WATER
INTERACTIONS WITH TRANSBOUNDARY
NEIGHBOURS
Indian states have significant influence over the
governance of transboundary rivers. States are, in
the words of an environmental lawyer, the
biggest stakeholders in transboundary water
interactions and must be part of discussions
about how transboundary waters that flow within
their boundaries should be managed though
there are numerous joint river commissions to
which state representatives are invited, but rarely
2 4
come. The governance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is largely dependent
on how Indian states manage their water because
most of these rivers flow through India: how
much water is taken out or polluted within Indian
states, will have effects downstream, i.e., for
25
Bangladesh, and how much water Indian states
claim they need will enter water-sharing
negotiations with upstream Nepal and Bhutan.
States are also influential over the central
government, though this is not often
26
acknowledged. For example, Gujarat saw the
World Commission on Dams as a conspiracy
against and a threat to the [Sardar Sarovar
Project], and its perceptions had a strong
influence on the government of India" that
resulted in India rejecting the findings of the
27
Commission's report.
In terms of transboundary water governance,
the influence of the states is significant because
international water-sharing treaties cannot be
reached with the input of the central government
alone; the support of the relevant states is
28
crucial. The water interactions between India
and its co-riparians are complicated by the
involvement of several Indian states, such as
29
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. For
example, Sikkim was recently able to prevent a
water-sharing deal that the central government
was negotiating with Bangladesh on the grounds
that it did not allocate satisfactory amounts of
30
water for Sikkim.
There are other complicated issues in northeastern
India that affect transboundary water
governance. Arunachal Pradesh, for instance,
holds enormous hydropower potential on the
Brahmaputra River, which is fast-flowing in the
state's mountainous terrain. There are 160 dams
being planned to harness this potential and boost
economic development in Arunachal Pradesh, but
the state is having trouble reaching an agreement
with downstream Assam, which is concerned
about flooding and siltation. Assam could
strengthen its case against Arunachal Pradesh by
engaging directly with Bangladesh which is
downstream of Assam and would likely also be
affected by dams in Arunachal Pradesh. However,
an ongoing dispute between Assam and
Bangladesh over compensation for Bangladeshi
migrants stands in the way of any such discussion
31
being instigated.
Bangladesh has also been affected by the
influence of the state of West Bengal. That state's
Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee, refused to
endorse the proposed agreement between India's
central government and that of Bangladesh over
32
the Teesta River. The Modi government may be
more successful in getting the agreement signed
because it has a better relationship with the
government of West Bengal than did the previous
central government. Again, domestic politics
matter in transboundary hydropolitics, and must
be factored into policy-making processes at the
international level.
Similarly, Bihar continues to resent the
central government for not being brought into
negotiations over the Ganges Treaty with
33
Bangladesh like the state of West Bengal was.
This is important because the support of Bihar,
and that of Uttar Pradesh, will be critical for any
34
agreements India negotiates with Nepal.
Significantly for the negotiation process, Bihar
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
does not have a great power asymmetry with
35
Nepal, unlike India as a whole.
INTER-STATE AND TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER GOVERNANCE: PARALLELS
In addition to the influence of Indian states on
transboundary water governance, there are several
parallels between the way water is governed within
India and the way it is governed in the region.
These parallels illuminate possible policy
approaches for water governance; what works at
one level may work on another, and vice versa.
First, inter-state water disputes, as well as
transboundary ones, are driven, in the words of
Iyer, by a competitive unsustainable demand for
water Supply creates demand and necessitates
36
more supply .
Second, power asymmetry between actors,
and the broader political context, matters
significantly. The theoretical aspects of power in
relation to hydropolitics is well established (cf.
37
Zeitoun and Allan ). For the purposes of this
article, however, a general understanding of
power asymmetry suffices. In other words, the
same political, military, economic and upstream
power dynamics play out between Indian states as
do between India and Nepal, Bhutan and
Bangladesh. For example, Arunachal Pradesh
opposes the restructuring of the Brahmaputra
Board (which consists of India's north-eastern
states) because the new configuration may
3 8
undermine its power position. India,
meanwhile, is the undisputed hydro-hegemon of
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin despite
being downstream of three co-riparians, namely,
39
China, Nepal and Bhutan. Likewise, the political
context matters; negotiations over water are
about 'horse trading' and the actors with the most
issue power hold the upper hand.
The third parallel between inter-state and
international water governance is the strong
preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral,
cooperation. Bilateral agreements tend to benefit
the most powerful party, while multilateral ones
40
are more likely to benefit weaker parties, thus
this preference relates to the importance of power
asymmetry. For example, upstream Arunachal
Pradesh favours strictly bilateral cooperation
with downstream Assam instead of the River
41
Basin Organisation that the latter is proposing.
At the international level, India deals with Nepal,
Bhutan and Bangladesh in an exclusively bilateral
42
way. Indeed, this approach is enshrined in
India's most recent National Water Policy,
43
published in 2012.
The fourth parallel is that hydrological data
are not readily shared between Indian states, nor
between co-riparians in the Ganges-Brahmaputra
-Meghna basin. As Mohan notes, inter-state
water sharing and conflict resolution is
constrained by inadequate availability of
information, as well as hardened regional
identities and loyalties which stand in the way of
44
sharing available data. At the transboundary
level, there is no basin-wide knowledge base and
data are surprisingly scarce and difficult to
45
obtain . Moreover, a culture of secrecy and
suspicion prevails across all governments in
South Asia, thus stifling any inclination to
46
declassify or share data. Many transboundary
hydropower projects, for example, are not known
t h r o u g h g o v e r n m e n t - t o - g o v e r n m e n t
communication, but through reports in the mass
47
media. India's 2012 National Water Policy
suggests that some water-related information
48
may be declassified (currently, all hydrological
data relating to international borders is classified
49
on the grounds of national security.)
The fifth parallel is that a zero-sum attitude to
water sharing prevails. As Paranjpye shows, at
inter-state levels there is a lack of integrative
50
thinking among all parties concerned . This is
also a feature of transboundar y water
interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
basin. As Wirsing et. al. point out, A zero-sum
water resource atmosphere is clearly building up
51
in Himalayan Asia .
The sixth parallel is that water governance at
all scales has been dominated by supply-side
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
concerns, and by the various disciplines of
52
engineering. The Inter-Linking Rivers Project is
53
one prominent example of this within India. In
terms of transboundary water governance, it too
has, according to Prasai and Surie, long been
dominated by technical perspectives from civil
54
engineering, economics, and international law .
Moreover, state and non-state actors at both
international and sub-national levels subscribe to
and propagate a global discourse around
hydropower as the 'green' and sustainable source
of energy. This discourse, in turn, is used to
strengthen the argument for the construction of
more and larger dams in India's mountainous
north-eastern states, as well as in Nepal and
Bhutan. Huber and Joshi show that in Sikkim a
'there is no alternative' narrative is being
constructed by state and commercial non-state
actors (but not civil society) about the inevitability
and inherent worth of big hydropower dams. At
the same time, these dam narratives are used to
reinforce the image of Sikkim as a 'green state'. The
confluence of these narratives results in colored
representations of the cost benefit equation of
hydropower development, which tend to
overestimate pay-offs (e.g., low variable costs of
generation, employment, electrification, rural
infrastructure, plentiful revenues) and
u n d e r r e p o r t o n p o t e n t i a l n e g a t i v e
55
consequences . This is not unique to Sikkim but
also can be said to be true at the transboundary
level. Both Nepal and Bhutan are cultivating a
'green' image while at the same time keen to
exploit their hydropower potential for economic
gain and other benefits.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the way in which water resources
are governed in India, and how inter-state water
d i s p u t e s a r e n e g o t i a t e d , i l l u m i n a t e s
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. India's domestic
w a ter g o v e r n a n ce i s f ra g m e n te d a n d
decentralised which, among other problems,
creates ambiguity over water ownership and thus
leads to inter-state disputes. These disputes
could, under law, be arbitrated in special tribunals
established specifically for resolving water issues
between India's states. But the tribunals are
largely ineffective. Transboundary water issues,
too, cannot be resolved by a higher authority such
a s a R i ver B a s i n O r g a n i s ation. B o t h
transboundary water disputes and India's interstate
ones are subject to intense politicking.
Within the Indian polity, however, domestic
water issues divert political attention away from
transboundary ones. Indian states also have
significant influence over transboundary water
governance, and at times this is at odds with
India's central government.
There are various parallels between how water
resources are managed in India and how they are
managed within the broader Ganges -
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. They are both driven
by growing demand for water which leads to
supply-side solutions. They are both constrained
by power asymmetries between stakeholders, and
are subject to complex political dynamics which
must be taken into consideration in any watersharing
negotiation. There is a strong preference
for bilateral, rather than multilateral,
arrangements at both the inter-state level and the
transboundary. Both are also hampered by the lack
of adequate hydrological data, and the reluctant
sharing of what is available. Zero-sum attitudes
toward water sharing prevail both within India and
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin as a
whole. Supply-side solutions and the global
discourse about 'green' hydropower dominate and
drive dam construction. These parallels between
water governance at the state scale and the
transboundary scale can be leveraged to refine
policy approaches at both levels.
The primary conclusion of this analysis is that
the influence of Indian states in transboundary
water negotiations cannot be ignored. Secondly,
Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh must all deal with
Indian states in addition to the central
government. This adds an extra layer of
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The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin
complexity and difficulty that may stall or prolong
discussions.
Domestic water disputes within India take
precedence over transboundary ones, and this
affects the political will invested in transboundary
water policy. Similarly, the Indian states are, on
the whole, opposed to the creation of a River Basin
Organisation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna basin, and this is a further hurdle for
policy-makers interested in this institutional
approach to transboundary water governance.
Lastly, zero-sum attitudes are deeply ingrained at
both the transboundary and state scales, and
policy-makers should focus on enabling positivesum
negotiations in addition to taking a water
justice approach.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Paula Hanasz is completing her PhD at the Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy. She was an ORF
Visiting Fellow in 2014.
ENDNOTES:
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2. Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala. 'Introduction' in Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala and Wasson, Robert J. (eds.) Water First: Issues and
Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage, 2008, p. xxvii
3. Cullet, Philippe. 'Water Law in India: Overview of Existing Framework and Proposed Reforms' Working Paper 2007-
01. Geneva: International Environmental Law Research Centre, 2007, p. 4
4. Hill, Douglas. 'The Regional Politics of Water Sharing: Contemporary Issues in South Asia' in Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala,
and Wasson, Robert J. (eds.) Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia. New Delhi:
Sage, 2008, p. 62
5. Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala. 'Introduction' in Lahiri-Dutt, Kuntala and Wasson, Robert J. (eds.) Water First: Issues and
Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage, 2008, p. xxvii
6. Wood, John R. The Politics of Water Resource Development in India: The Narmada Dams Controversy. New Delhi: Sage,
2007, p. 40
7. Mohan, N. Shantha, Routray, S., and Sashikumar, N. (eds.) River Water Sharing: Transboundary Conflict and
Cooperation in India. New Delhi: Routledge, 2010, p. ix
8. Iyer, Ramaswamy R. Towards Water Wisdom: Limits, Justice, Harmony. New Delhi: Sage, 2007, p. 25
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2008, p. 40
10. Dinar, Shlomi. 'Water, Security, Conflict and Cooperation' SAIS Review22:2 (2002), pp. 246-247
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18. Mohan, N. Shantha. 'Locating Transboundary Water Sharing in India' in Mohan, N. Shantha, Routray, S., and
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ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 112 • NOVEMBER 2015