AwaitingLaunch_1397728623369

AWAITING LAUNCH: 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT ICOC 

FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and 

Daniel A. Porras (Editors) 

www.orfonline.org

AWAITING LAUNCH: 

PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT ICOC 

FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and 

Daniel A. Porras (Editors)

Contents 

Preface 

About the Authors 

Abbreviations 

I. The ICoC and the Outer Space Regime 

ICoC and Long Term Sustainability of Outer 

Space Activities 

Yasushi Horikawa 

What's in a Code?: Putting Space Development 

First 

Peter A. Garretson 

Mission Completed and Mission Ahead: ICoC to 

the Future 

Li Juqian 

ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration 

Mohamed HatemElatawy 

It happened to Us… 

Ronnie Nader 

Customary International Law: A Troublesome 

Question for ICoC? 

Michael Listner 

ICoC and the Institutionalisation of Space 

Security 

Paul Meyer 

The ICoC: A Starting Point 

Victoria Samson 

Space Code of Conduct….. Only a Beginning 

Ajey Lele 

1 

5 

15 

17 

19 

27 

37 

45 

51 

53 

61 

69 

75

II. 

III. 

Towards A More Responsible Use of Outer 

Space 

Gérard Brachet 

ICoC and the Right of Self Defence 

Kazuto Suzuki 

Unique Perspectives 

ICoC: An Imperfect but Necessary Step? 

Xavier Pasco 

Cyber Threats to Space Systems 

Christian Olarean 

University Micro-Nano Satellites: Need for ICoC 

for their Sustainable Use 

Gayantha RL Kodikara 

ICoC for Outer Space Activities: An Industry 

Perspective 

Ýbrahim ÖZ 

Addressing Challenges in Space through New 

Multilateral Processes 

Beatrice Fihn and Gabriella Irsten 

Regional Views 

The Proposed ICoC for Outer Space: An 

Australian Perspective 

Brett Biddington 

EU Efforts for an ICoC: A Mexican Perspective 

Fermin Romero Vazquez 

ICoC and Sustainable Use of Outer Space: An 

African Perspective 

Gayya Habila Umaru and Godstime James 

Draft ICoC: An Ukrainian Perspective 

Borys Atamanenko and Natalia Redchyts 

ICoC: Perspective for India 

KR Sridhara Murthi and Mukund Rao 

81 

87 

93 

95 

101 

109 

117 

119 

125 

127 

137 

145 

157 

159

IV. 

ICoC: Perspectives from Latin America and the 

Caribbean 

Roberto Becerra and Romina Acevedo 

ICoC: African Perspectives 

Solomon Belay Tessema 

Accommodation of Competing Interests: A Latin 

American Perspective 

Ciro Arevalo-Yepes 

Annexures 

1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 

including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 

1967 

2. IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 2007 

3. Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of 

Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use 

of Force Against Outer Space Objects, 2008 

4. Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities, 2013 

5. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in 

Outer Space Activities (UN GGE Report), 2013 

169 

177 

185 

191 

193 

200 

210 

215 

226 

V. Endnotes 

Endnotes 

229 

231

Preface 

It has become a bit of a cliché to say that outer space has become crowded, 

congested and contested. No comprehensive international rules or 

regulations have been framed since the Outer Space Treaty was concluded in 

1967 though several limited measures have come about that address specific 

concerns regarding outer space activities. However, the need for new 

comprehensive mechanisms is real and there have been different initiatives 

that have been proposed and considered within the UN Committee on 

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as well as the Conference on Disarmament. 

But there has been no consensus in the international community about these 

proposals. 

Most recently, the European Union (EU) effort with regard to an 

International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Outer Space Activities has been 

gaining traction. The ICoC is a comprehensive proposal, trying to establish 

norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and military 

domains of outer space. But it has been difficult to build consensus around 

the proposal precisely because it is so comprehensive and covers a range of 

issues. While it must be acknowledged that the EU has done a commendable 

job in terms of preparing a comprehensive document, the major difficulty 

for a significant number of countries has been with the process by which the 

EU developed this. 

Having said that, the EU has been engaged in a much wider process of 

engaging the larger international community since 2012 and this appears to 

be appeasing a lot many more nations than before. The EU has also 

instituted Open-Ended Consultations, which were held in Kiev and in 

Bangkok in May and November 2013 respectively. A third such session is 

slated to take place in the summer of 2014. These discussions are open to all 

Preface | www.orfonline.org 1

and done with the purpose of evolving an inclusive format that could give 

every state party a sense of ownership with the Code. 

Even as the process is important, the ICoC debates need to focus on the 

content and address some of the substantive issues that might need to be 

elaborated and clarified. Governments and analysts from around the world 

have expressed their opinion over the last two years on this issue. This 

volume is an effort to carry this debate forward. We asked over two dozen 

analysts and practitioners from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the West who 

are active in this global debate, to look at how the ICoC could be additionally 

refined, clarified and strengthened. This represents an important effort to 

bring together the diversity of opinions on this emerging global issue. 

As this volume shows, the Code's emphasis on non-infringement of the right 

of self-defence remains a major concern for a number of emerging 

spacefaring countries. It is unclear why the Code insists that it will not 

restrict the right to self-defence but it could be because it wants the most 

advanced space powers to be part of the Code and are afraid that these states 

might not join fearing restrictions on their military activities and advantages. 

But many countries see this right as a troublesome one and a possible 

legitimising of the weaponization of space. For many developing countries 

this right is meaningless because they are in the early stages of development 

of their space capabilities and find that they are simply in no position to 

exercise this 'right'. In addition, they do not also have the means to defend 

themselves against space powers with superior technologies. It must be 

appreciated that the EU has taken on-board this concern and has now 

balanced this 'right' by asking that all states should “refrain from the threat or 

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 

state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the 

United Nations.” It must be noted though that analysts from the developing 

world still remain sceptical on this issue. 

Another theme that has been commented upon is that of space debris. 

While the Code notes the need for states to refrain from activities that might 

contribute to the creation of space debris, this issue merits additional focus, 

as highlighted by a few authors. Focus also has to be on active debris 

removal measures and how international technology cooperation may be 

pursued with greater vigour. The authors of the chapters in the section on 

international cooperation emphasise this point. 

2 | Awaiting Launch: Perspectives on the Draft ICoC for Outer Space Activities

One difficulty with regard to international cooperation, as given in the 

current draft of the Code, is that the rules of engagement for cooperation 

are left to individual states to determine. While the Code should not become 

a constraint for new and emerging space powers, regional and international 

cooperation without a broad set of rules and regulations could create 

additional insecurities at multiple levels. Cooperation that is unregulated in 

nature could potentially affect the military balance between states and could 

lead to arms race in outer space. However, it will be naive to assume that 

space technology can be controlled in the traditional manner of arms 

control-like mechanisms. Controls need to be envisaged in terms of how 

technology is used rather than in terms of denying the spread of technology. 

This could be achieved by instituting intrusive inspections and such measures 

to ensure civil space technologies are not used for ballistic missile purposes. 

Yet another area that has raised concerns is the new text's attempt to make a 

distinction between states that subscribes to the Code and those that do not. 

The section on Cooperation Mechanisms states that subscribing states 

“resolve to notify, in a timely manner, to the greatest extent practicable, all 

potentially affected Subscribing States of any event related to the outer space 

activities they are conducting which are relevant for the purposes of this 

Code, including: scheduled manoeuvres that could pose a risk to the safety 

of flight of the space objects of other Subscribing States.” Another clause 

in the same sections notes, “The Subscribing States resolve to provide the 

notifications on any event related to the outer space activities described 

above to all potentially affected “Subscribing States.” This emphasis on 

distinguishing between subscribing states and others could impede 

international space cooperation. 

This distinction is also made in another section, on Information on Outer 

Space Activities, which encourages exchange of information only among 

Subscribing States. In fact, the previous text did not contain such a 

distinction as far as sharing of information is concerned. The particular 

clause says “timely information on outer space environmental conditions and 

forecasts ... to relevant governmental and non-governmental entities of other 

Subscribing States.” 

While this distinction may have been introduced as a bargaining chip on the 

part of the EU, this can prove to be a major flaw if it is not removed finally. 

Space debris is not going to make a distinction between states that have 

Preface | www.orfonline.org 3

subscribed and those that have not. A debris hitting upon an object of a 

Subscribing or non-Subscribing State will only result in the creation of 

additional debris, affecting the long-term sustainable use of outer space by 

future generation. Thus all states need to cooperate on these common 

problems, irrespective of whether they are subscribers to the Code or not. 

In spite of these deficiencies and inhibitions expressed by a large number of 

states, ICoC has the potential to emerge as an important measure that gains 

wide acceptance if some of the issues addressed in this volume, reflecting 

the concerns and suggestions from around the world, are addressed by the 

EU. The editors of this volume hope that this will become an important and 

handy source for the wide global perspectives on this vital issue. 

In the course of writing this book, we have accumulated a number of 

intellectual debts. This book was published under the aegis of the ORF. We 

would like to particularly thank Sunjoy Joshi, Director ORF for supporting 

us right from the beginning of this project. A special thanks also to Samir 

Saran for all of his help in seeing this through. We are quite convinced that 

without their support, we would not have been able to successfully complete 

this project. We also want to thank Sebastian Kleim and Anshu John for the 

assistance in editing this manuscript. Finally, our biggest thanks to all the 

contributors of this volume. Despite their extremely busy schedules, they 

willingly took the time to write original contributions in the very short time 

that we gave them. 

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan 

Daniel A. Porras 


About the Editors and Contributors 

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Research Fellow at the 

Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan joined 

ORF after an almost five-year stint at the National Security Council 

Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India (2003-2007), where she was an 

Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at 

the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a 

Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, 

National Chung Tsing University, Taichung, Taiwan in early 2012. She is the 

author of three books: Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity 

Among Asian Great Powers, The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy 

and Its Implications for Asia, and Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in 

Asia; she has also co-authored two books. Her research articles have 

appeared in edited volumes, and in India Review, Bulletin of Atomic 

Scientists, The National Interest, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Strategic 

Analysis, and CLAWS Journal. Other writings have appeared in the Journal 

of Strategic Studies, Journal of Peace Research and Contemporary South 

Asia and she has also contributed essays to newspapers such as Times of 

India, Hindustan Times, Economic Times, and Pioneer. 

Her areas of research interests include Indian and Asian foreign policy and 

security issues, US foreign policy, space security and other arms control 

issues. She has her own blog at: 

http://securitystrategyrajagopalan.blogspot.in/and she can be contacted at 

rajeswarirajagopalan@gmail.com; rpr@orfonline.org. 

Daniel A. Porras is a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. 

H was formerly the Space Project Manager of the Emerging Security Threats 

Programme (ESTP) at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in 

About the Editors and Contributors | www.orfonline.org 5

Geneva, Switzerland. Prior to joining the ESTP team, he was an Associate 

Officer for the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law in 

Rome, Italy, where he worked on the finalisation of the Protocol to the 

Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 

Specific to Space Assets. Mr.Porras received his Bachelor degree in Political 

Science from Baylor University and his Law degree from California Western 

School of Law. He is admitted to the California Bar and has published a 

number of scholarly articles on outer space law. 

Dr. Yasushi Horikawa, as a technical counsellor of Japan Aerospace 

Exploration Agency (JAXA), provides advices to international relations and 

application satellite development and utilization programs of JAXA. He is 

also the Chair of the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Use of Outer 

Space (UNCOPUOS) for 2012- 2013. During his carrier, he has assumed 

various executive and leadership positions. From 2005 to 2009, he served as 

an executive director of JAXA responsible for the development of 

application satellites such as Earth observations, communications, 

broadcasting and global positioning satellites as well as the operation and 

utilization of these satellites. He contributed to the development of the 

International Space Station as Japanese Program Manager and to the 

successful implementation of Japanese meteorological satellite programs and 

Earth observation programs. 

Lt. Col. Peter Garretson is a transformational strategist at Headquarters 

U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. He served two years as a strategy 

and policy advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on space, 

technology, energy, and U.S. grand strategy, and two years as Division Chief 

for Irregular Warfare Strategy and Policy. Prior to that, he served 16 months 

as the first serving U.S. officer on a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 

International Affairs Fellow at India's Institute for Defense Studies and 

Analysis (IDSA) where he researched innovative paths forward for U.S.-India 

space cooperation. Prior to his fellowship, he served four years in the U.S. Air 

Force's Directorate of Strategic Planning as the Chief of Air Force Future 

Technology and Deputy Director for Air Force Transformation, charged 

with looking 30-50 years into the future at the key trends and technologies 

that would shape conflict and statecraft. Lt. Col. Garretson spent time at 

America's premier institutions of technical innovation, as a Service Chief 


appointed intern to the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), and 

as a Service Academy Research Associate at America's, Los Alamos 

Natutional Nuclear Laboratory (LANL). He is senior pilot, winner of the 

NSS Space Pioneer award and award wining author on air and space power 

strategy. 

Prof. Dr. LI Juqian is law professor of China University of Political Science 

and Law (CUPL), Associate Dean of School of International Law of CUPL, 

Associate Director of International Law Center of CUPL, Executive 

Director of China Space Law Institute, Standing Council-Member of Beijing 

International Law Association, Council-Member of Space Security Council 

of World Economic Forum. Prof. LI has published books and articles in 

English and Chinese on international law and international economic law, 

contributed books chapter. He is also one of the authors of the Annual 

Report on China's Legal Development Under Rule of Law since 2009. As 

visiting professor, he taught law in Korea in 2004 and 2005 and Iceland in 

2006. He also acted as a teacher for Chinese astronauts (Taikonauts) in China 

Astronaut Center. 

Mohamed Hatem Elatawy is a Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of 

the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations and Other International 

Organizations in Geneva. 

Ronnie Nader is EXA-ASA/T Astronaut, Director of the Ecuadorian 

Space Program. 

Michael Listner is an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law 

and Policy Solutions, a firm that counsels governmental and private 

organizations on matters relating to space law and policy, including issues 

surrounding space debris. He is the current President and CEO (Interim) of 

the International Space Safety Foundation where he also serves as Vice- 

President for Legal Affairs. Michael holds a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in 

Computer Information Systems from Franklin Pierce University and 

obtained his Juris Doctorate (J.D.) from Regent University School of Law. He 

is a member of the New Hampshire Bar, a member of the International 


Institute of Space Law (IISL), and peer-reviewer for Space Policy Journal. 

Views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of 

International Space Safety Foundation. Contact Michael at 

Michael@spacelawsolutions.com. 

Paul Meyer is a former Canadian career diplomat and Ambassador for 

Disarmament. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of International Studies 

and a Centre for Dialogue Fellow at Simon Fraser University and a Senior 

Fellow at The Simons Foundation, both in Vancouver, Canada. 

Victoria Samson is the Washington Office Director for Secure World 

Foundation and has more than sixteen years of experience in military space 

and security issues. Before joining SWF, Ms. Samson served as a Senior 

Analyst for the Center for Defense Information (CDI), where she leveraged 

her expertise in missile defense, nuclear reductions and space security issues 

to conduct in-depth analysis and media commentary. Prior to her time at 

CDI, Ms. Samson was the Senior Policy Associate at the Coalition to Reduce 

Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of arms control groups in the Washington, 

D.C. area, where she worked to share information quickly and efficiently 

between Congressional staffers, members of the media, embassy officials, 

citizens and think-tanks dealing with national missile defense and nuclear 

weapons reductions. Before that, she was a researcher at Riverside Research 

Institute, where she worked on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense 

Agency's Directorate of Intelligence. She is also a prolific author of 

numerous op-eds, analytical pieces, journal articles, and electronic updates on 

missile defense and space security matters, including the book, American 

Missile Defense: A Guide to the Issues (Contemporary Military, Strategic, 

and Security Issues), Praeger Security International, (ABC/CLIO: Santa 

Barbara, CA), 2010. 

Dr. Ajey Lele is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and 

Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. His areas of expertise include Weapons of 

Mass Destructions with major emphasis on Biological Weapons, Space and 

National Security, Non Military Threatsand he is also author of several books 

and research papers. 


Dr. Gérard Brachet is Space Policy Consultant, former Chairman of the 

UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2006-2008), French 

expert on the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Outer Space TCBMs 

(2012-2013). 

Prof. Kazuto Suzuki is Member, Panel of Experts, Established Pursuant to 

UN Resolution 1929 (2010) at the United Nations, New York; and Professor 

of International Politics at Graduate School of Law of Hokkaido University, 

Japan. He was Visiting Fellow to Princeton Institute for International and 

Regional Studies (PIIRS) in 2012. He has conducted researches from 

International Political Economy perspective in Space Policy, together with 

nuclear energy policy (contributed to Independent Investigation Commission 

of Fukushima nuclear accident), export control policy, science and 

technology policy, counter-terrorism and policies on market regulation. He 

has contributed to the drafting the Basic Space Law of Japan, and served as 

space expert in number of government consultation councils. He is a full 

member of International Academy of Astronautics, the chairman of the 

Space Security Commission of International Astronautical Federation, and a 

member of Space Security Council of World Economic Forum. A prolific 

author, his most recent publications include, Regulatory Power of European 

Union (2012, Japanese) and Space and International Politics (2011, Japanese, 

Suntory Prize Awarded), Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space 

Collaboration (2003). 

Dr. Xavier Pasco is a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la 

Recherche Stratégique (FRS) based in Paris where he is in charge of the 

Department “Technology, Space and Security.” Previous to 1997, he was 

researcher at CREST (Center for Research and Evaluation of the 

relationships between Strategies and Technology) associated to Ecole 

Polytechnique. His research is currently focused on space and high 

technology policies and decision-making processes associated with national 

security strategies. He is working more specifically on the U.S. policies and on 

their impact on the transatlantic relationship in the space activity, both in the 

civilian and military domains. He also conducts work on the NATO- 

European defense structure relationship in the domain of interoperability 

and coalition warfare. Xavier Pasco is also associate Professor at the 

University of Marne-la-Vallée and fellow at the Space Policy Institute in the 


George Washington University (Washington D.C., U.S.A.). He is also giving 

lectures in the French Military School in Paris. He is also the European 

Editor of the international academic review Space Policy. 

Christian Olarean is Legal Advisor to the Permanent Mission of Romania 

to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in 

Geneva. 

Gayantha RL Kodikara is a Research Scientist at the Arthur C. Clarke 

Institute for Modern Technologies, Sri Lanka. 

Dr. Ýbrahim ÖZ is Vice President of Turksat Satellite Operations and Cable 

TV Incorporation. He is responsible for operations of Turksat Satellites, 

generating and uplinking digital television bouquet, procurement and 

program management of new satellites as well as research, development and 

satellite design. Prior to his current position, he was satellite control and 

monitoring director of Turksat AS. He was responsible for operations of 

Turksat Communication Monitoring Centre to provide its customer 

continuous and reliable any kind of video, voice or data transmission via 

Turksat satellites. 

Beatrice Fihn is the Programme Manager of Reaching Critical Will. She 

monitors and analyzes a wide range of disarmament negotiations and 

discussions at the UN and elsewhere. She joined Reaching Critical Will in 

2010 and prior to this position, she worked as a research officer at the 

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, where she carried out research on 

geopolitics and global security in areas such as outer space and emerging 

strategic technologies. Beatrice represents Reaching Critical Will on the 

steering groups of several international civil society campaigns, like the 

International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the Campaign to 

Stop Killer Robots. She has a BA in International Relations from Stockholm 

University and a Masters of Law at University of London with a 

specialization in public international law. 


Gabriella Irsten is a Programme Associate with Reaching Critical Will 

(RCW). She coordinates RCW's project on the international code of conduct 

on outer space activities. Furthermore, her work involves policy building and 

advocacy for stronger disarmament tools by means of incorporating human 

rights as well as humanitarian aspects into United Nation (UN) disarmament 

processes. Other work-related topics include military spending, human 

security and other peace- & security-related issues. She has a joint master's 

degree in Humanitarian Action & Peace Building and Conflict Resolution 

(NOHA) from the Ruhr Universität Bochum in Germany and Uppsala 

University in Sweden. 

Brett Biddington is the founder of a consulting company specialising in 

space and cyber security matters. He is a director of the Kokoda 

Foundation, a Canberra-based 'think tank,' and is an Adjunct Professor at the 

Security Research Institute at Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western 

Australia. Between 2002 and 2009 he was a member of Cisco Systems' global 

space team. Before that, he was an intelligence and security specialist and 

later a capability developer in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). He 

sponsored command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 

and electronic warfare projects including classified and unclassified space 

initiatives. 

Dr. Fermin Romero Vazquez is an External Consultant for the Mexican 

Space Agency. He is the former Secretariat Pro Tempore for the Space 

Conference of the Americas. He has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 

International Relations with extensive experience in the Mexican federal 

public service, particularly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE). At SRE, 

he served as Director for the General Assembly and International 

Organizations, Director of International Security, Deputy Director for 

International Organizations, and Deputy Director of Political and Social 

Affairs. Currently, he is the Director for UN General Assembly, Space 

Agenda and Telecommunications in the Directorate General for the UN of 

SRE, where he is actively promoting the development of aerospace and 

telecommunications in Mexico, and has helped to establish the Mexican 

Space Agency. In November 2010 he was appointed by the Plenary of the 

6th Space Conference of the Americas, as the VI Secretary Pro Tempore of 

the SCA for 2011-2013. 


Dr. Gayya Habila Umaru is a space law expert at the National Space 

Research and Development Agency (NASRDA). 

Dr. Godstime James is currently the head of Hazards and Environmental 

Management Division in the Strategic Space Applications Department of the 

National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA). He is also 

the Special Assistant (Technical Matters) to the Director General/Chief 

Executive officer of NASRDA. Since his assumption of duty at NASRDA, 

Dr James has been involved in the coordination of space application projects 

in the thematic areas of hazards and the environment. In addition, he 

coordinates the activities of the regional support office of the United 

Nations Platform for Space Based Information for Disaster Management 

and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER) in Nigeria; an office that is 

responsible for supporting the West and Central African countries with space 

based solutions to disaster management. Dr James has participated in several 

UN-SPIDER Technical Advisory Missions including the Missions to Togo, 

Cameroun, Nigeria, and Cape Verde. He has published extensively in highlyregarded 

journals and is currently a member of several professional bodies 

including the African Association for Remote Sensing of the Environment 

(AARSE), the American Association of Geographers (AAG), the American 

Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing (ASPRS) and the Nigerian 

Institution of Surveyors. 

Borys Atamanenko is Chief of Department in charge of international 

relations for the Ukraine National Space Agency. He represented the 

National Space Agency in the founding of the Scientific and Technological 

Center of Ukraine, an international organization set up by the governments 

of Canada, the European Union, the United States of America and Ukraine 

in order to promote the space-launch sector of Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Dr Atamanenko graduated from Kyiv 

National Taras Shevchenko University, where he received a PhD in Physics 

and Mathematics. He is an Honorary Professor of the National University 

“Lvivs'kaPolitechnika”. He has participated in the elaboration of 

international agreements on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use 

of outer space between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China, the CIS 

states (Russian Federation, Belarus, Azerbaijan), the European Space Agency, 

India, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Dr 


Atamanenko is an expert in adherence to the international commitments of 

Ukraine under the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code 

of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation related to the development 

of launch vehicles (Cyclone-4), Earth Remote Sensing satellites and ground 

infrastructure equipment. He was a member of the United Nations Group 

of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building 

Measures in Outer Space Activities. 

Natalia Redchyts is Senior Specialist, International Relations Department, 

State Space Agency of Ukraine. 

Dr. KR Sridhara Murthi is Adjunct Professor, Jain University and Adjunct 

Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. 

Dr. Mukund Rao is International Consultant in EO, GIS and Space, 

Principal Investigator, DST Sponsored project on National GIS Standards at 

NIAS, and Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), 

Bangalore. 

Dr. Roberto Becerra is Director of the Office of International Affairs of 

the Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities in Venezuela. Mr Becerra was a 

founding member of the Bolivarian Agency and the Venezuelan Space 

Centre. He was an institutional representative for the Ministry of Science and 

Technology in the Executive Secretariat for the Venezuelan Presidential 

Commission for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Mr Becerra is a member 

of the Venezuelan delegation to COPUOS. He earned his law degree in 

International Studies and his Masters in International Relations from the 

Venezuelan Central University. 

Dr. Romina Acevedo is an officer for the Office of International Affairs of 

the Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities in Venezuela. 


Dr. Solomon Belay Tessema is Director of the Entoto Observatory and 

Space Science Research Center owned and operated by 31 public universities, 

one private university and Ethiopian Space Science Society (ESSS). In this 

role, he is responsible for leading the research center, developing, promoting, 

capacity building, national and international collaboration in Astronomy, 

space science and related fields and operationalizing different research tools 

and services to benefit Ethiopia and the region as well. This role includes 

responsibility for, teaching and research, project management and leadership 

of Research Center. Prior to assuming this position, Dr. Solomon held a 

variety of activities to develop and popularize astronomy and space science 

in Ethiopia in addition to teaching research responsibility in the college. Dr 

Solomon is an Ethiopian scientist and academic. He is assistant Professor 

Physics (Astrophysics) at Kotebe University College, Ethiopia. He completed 

his PhD in Astrophysics at the Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa in 

Collaboration with University of Gothenburg, Sweden, in 2010. He was 

awarded the Certificate of Appreciation by the International Astronomical 

Union (IAU) in 2009 “for grateful recognition of commitment and 

outstanding contribution to the success of the international year of 

Astronomy 2009 in Ethiopia” and also “for contribution to the Universe 

Awareness Programme to inspire and educate young children in Ethiopia” 

He is one of the founding member of ESSS has serving Board members and 

Head of Research Education program of ESSS since August 2012. 

Dr. CiroArevalo-Yepes is President of the Latin America and Caribbean 

Regional Group in the International Astronautical Federation (GRULAC- 

IAF). He is also a member of the World Economic Forum, WEF/Global 

Agenda Council on Space Security and chairs the Standing Advisory Group 

on Assistance and Technical Cooperation, SAGTAC of the Director General 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. He previously served as 

the Colombian Ambassador to the UN in Vienna and chaired COPUOS 

from 2008-2010. 


Abbreviations 

ASAT 

CD 

CEOS-GEOSS 

CGMS 

CoC 

COPUOS 

EC 

ECS 

EEAS 

ESA 

EU CoC 

EU 

EUMETSAT 

GEO 

GSO 

HCoC 

ICAO 

ICG 

ICoC 

IMO 

Anti Satellite 

Conference on Disarmament 

Committee on Earth Observation Satellites - Global 

Earth Observation System of Systems 

Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites 

Code of Conduct 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

European Commission 

European Cooperation for Standardization 

European External Action Service 

European Space Agency 

European Union Code of Conduct 

European Union 

European Organisation for the Exploitation of 

Meteorological Satellites 

Geostationary Earth Orbit or Geosynchronous 

Equatorial Orbit 

Geo-Synchronous Orbit 

Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 

Proliferation 

International Civil Aviation Organisation 

International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite 

System (for Global Positioning) 

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 

International Maritime Organzation 

Abbreviations | www.orfonline.org 15

IMSO 

ISEF 

ISO 

ITSO 

ITU 

LEO 

LTSS 

MEO 

MTCR 

NASA 

NEA 

NEO 

OST 

SIA 

SRM 

SSA 

STM 

TCBMs 

UN 

UNCOPUOS 

UNGA 

UNIDIR 

UNOOSA 

UNSC 

WG 

International Mobile Satellite Organization 

International Space Exploration Forum 

International Organization for Standardization 

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 

International Telecommunications Union 

Low Earth Orbit 

Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space 

Middle Earth Orbit 

Missile Technology Control Regime 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Near Earth Asteroids 

Near Earth Orbit 

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 

Satellite Industry Association 

Solid Rocket Motor 

Space Situational Awareness 

Space Traffic Management 

Transparency and Confidence Building Measures 

United Nations 

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space 

United Nations General Assembly 

United Nations Institute for Disarmament and Research 

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 

United Nations Security Council 

Working Group 


I. The ICoC and the Outer 

Space Regime 

The ICoC and the Outer Space Regime | www.orfonline.org 17

ICoC and Long-Term Sustainability 

of Outer Space Activities 

Yasushi Horikawa 

Introduction 

It is my great pleasure to contribute to this document, “Awaiting Launch: 

Perspectives on the Draft ICoC.” Although I am the current Chairman of 

the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

(UNCOPUOS), it must be noted that these are my personal views. 

Space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite 

communications, Earth observation systems and satellite navigation 

technologies, provide indispensable tools for achieving viable long-term 

solutions for sustainable development and can contribute more effectively to 

the efforts to promote the developments in the world, improve people's lives, 

conserve natural resources and enhance the preparedness for and mitigation 

of natural disaster(and consequences). Efforts are, therefore, being made to 

prevent or mitigate threats to space security, since the protection of the space 

environment is crucial for these applications. 

The following represents the most vigorously debated issues regarding longterm 

sustainability of outer space in relation to the UNCOPUOS. 

During the Cold War, 

around 120 satellites 

were launched every 

year. The number of 

launches is increasing 

again in the recent 

years, and during 

2011, 80 space 

vehicles reached the 

Earth orbit or beyond, 

which is the highest 

number since the year 

2000. 

Space Environment 

Satellites are operated to serve for science and technology development, 

manned and unmanned space exploration, and security and military use. 

ICoC and Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities | www.orfonline.org 19

During the Cold War, around 120 satellites were launched every year. The 

number of launches is increasing again in the recent years, and during 2011, 

80 space vehicles reached the Earth orbit or beyond, which is the highest 

number since the year 2000. 

Currently, there are around 1,000 operational satellites orbiting the Earth. 

Since the first satellite, Sputnik, was launched in 1957, more than 6,000 

satellites have been launched. Half of these have already been consumed, but 

more than 2,000 are still orbiting uselessly. The sources of debris are not only 

defunct spacecraft but also fragmentation due to satellite explosions and 

collisions and anti satellite tests (ASAT). As a result of inadvertent and 

intentional destruction, more than 20,000 pieces of space debris with a 

diameter larger than 10 cm are circulating around the Earth. Furthermore, 

there are numerous objects with a diameter smaller than 10cm in space, 

which are not trackable. 

Collision with this debris could destroy a spacecraft and endanger astronauts. 

We are on the verge of the spontaneous increase of space debris. By its very 

nature, the space environment is quite different from the ground and the air. 

A space vehicle cannot change its position easily, as its orbital behaviour is 

strictly constrained to the orbit onto which it has been launched. 

As of today, prior notification of the type of a satellite being launched is not 

required. At the very least, when a satellite is launched, an advanced 

notification should be disseminated to all countries concerned, and necessary 

coordination should be pursued through various kinds of cooperative 

mechanisms. Currently, only the International Telecommunication Union 

(ITU) operates an advanced notice system for frequency registration and 

coordination. The problem is that small satellites are often not registered, 

even after launch. Sometimes, the ITU is not involved at all with the launches 

of small satellites for educational or capacity building purposes, commercially 

procured satellites for private use, and satellites for security and military 

purposes. 

The efforts to collect satellite launch information are implemented by various 

coordination mechanisms such as Committee on Earth Observation 

Satellites - Global Earth Observation System of Systems (CEOS-GEOSS) 

for Earth Observation, UN-International Committee on Global Navigation 

Satellite Systems (ICG) for Global Positioning, the Coordination Group for 


Meteorological Satellites (CGMS) for weather forecasting, International 

Space Station partner meetings, Science Community, and Amateur 

Community. United Nations mandated UN Office for Outer Space Affairs 

(UNOOSA) to collect information about space objects after launch. With 

this effort, information on the orbiting objects is registered, but satellites are 

not tracked in a unified manner. 

In the discussion on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, it is 

inevitable to touch upon small satellite applications. Today, various 

applications of small satellites are planned and carried out by an increasing 

number of governmental and non-governmental entities. Except for some 

specific missions that require the most advanced technologies or specific 

scientific research, small satellites and even larger Earth observation and 

communication satellites can be manufactured by governmental and nongovernmental 

entities with varying levels of financial and technological 

resources. The limited human resources and funding could be more 

effectively applied if space development and utilisation could be pursued in a 

coordinated and cooperative manner 

 

Against this background, there is a need to examine how long small satellites 

should remain in their orbits. The satellites launched for educational and 

capacity-building purposes may not need to be in their orbits for extended 

periods. For these, theirlife-time should be limited. This is because small 

satellites are often launched through piggy-back rides, and they could impose 

significant threats to main satellites because of the lack of a propellant 

system for maneuvouring. Those small satellite users should be made aware 

of these threats through various workshops or symposiums. 

Protection Measures and Mechanisms 

The 50th Anniversary Declaration of UNCOPUOS acknowledges that 

significant changes have occurred in the structure and content of space 

endeavours, as reflected in the emergence of new technologies and the 

increasing number of actors at all levels. The Declaration, therefore, noted 

with satisfaction the progress made in strengthening international 

cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space by enhancing the capacity of 

states for economic, social and cultural development and by strengthening 

the regulatory frameworks and mechanisms to that effect. 

The satellites 

launched for 

educational and 

capacity-building 

purposes may not 

need to be in their 

orbits for extended 

periods. For these, 

theirlife-time should 

be limited. This is 

because small 

satellites are often 

launched through 

piggy-back rides, and 

they could impose 

significant threats to 

main satellites 

because of the lack of 

a propellant system 

for maneuvouring. 


One of the achievements of UNCOPUOS in establishing the international 

regime for space activities is the Treaty on Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST), which establishes the fundamental 

principles of international space law and entered into force in 1967. 

Thereafter, four more international agreements entered into force, based on 

the work of the Committee. Over the years, additional sets of principles, 

declarations, recommendations and guidelines have also been established by 

the Committee and its subcommittees and adopted by the UN General 

Assembly. 

One of the major trends over the past decade-and-a-half has been the steady 

increase in the presence of private actors. There have been active discussions 

for several years in addressing the increasing involvement of private actors in 

the exploration and use of outer space. Currently, the discussion of national 

legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space is 

underway. A proposal for recommendations by the General Assembly for 

states considering enacting national space legislation has been adopted. It will 

continue to be important to reflect and review the implementation of 

international obligations and the way in which states can best act and 

cooperate for safe, peaceful and sustainable use of outer space, particularly in 

view of increased private sector involvement. 

As everybody now knows, satellites in the near-Earth orbit face a significantly 

hazardous situation from space debris. With this understanding, the UN is 

not only promoting and supporting international cooperation among its 

Member States, but also paying attention to the way to sustain space for 

continued use. In recent years, discussions have been conducted in various 

fora to undertake space utilisation in a mutually agreeable manner. Such fora 

include the advanced coordination of ITU for frequency registration, the 

European Union-led efforts to develop an International Code of Conduct 

for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the UN Conference on Disarmament 

(CD) and the First Committee of the General Assembly. 

In 2009, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UNCOPOUS 

established a working group (Working Group) on Long Term Sustainability 

of Outer Space (LTSS). This WG aims to identify and examine a wide range 

of issues related to the long-term sustainability of space activities, and to 

prepare a consolidated set of practices and operating procedures and 


guidelines by the end of 2014. The issues are being investigated by the four 

Expert Groups. Group A deals with sustainable space utilisation supporting 

sustainable development on Earth; Group B deals with space debris, space 

operations and tools to support collaborative space situational awareness; 

Group C addresses space weather; and Group D discusses regulatory regimes 

and guidance for all actors in the space arena. The draft report and best 

practice guideline from these Expert Groups will be presented at the WG in 

early 2014. 

Setting up the best practice, procedures and guideline requires Space 

Situation Awareness (SSA). It requires coordinated multisite networks among 

the space faring nations. Sharing SSA information between governments and 

commercial actors, among governments, and with public is becoming 

necessary to ensure safety in space. 

Furthermore, the work and processes outside COPUOS should be 

recognised. For example, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is 

working on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) in 

space activities. The GGE has strengthened closer dialogues for the benefit 

of long-term space utilisation by the international space community as a 

whole. They submitted a report to the General Assembly in 2013. This 

report on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures(TCBMs) is not 

legally binding, but describes the concept and meanings of TCBMs and 

recommends pursuing the long-term sustainability of outer space activities 

through COPUOS and the Code of Conduct (CoC) discussions. 

The European Union (EU) is leading the discussion on CoC. The 

establishment of the Code is being pursued to ensure free use of outer space 

for peaceful purposes and to maintain security and integrity of space objects 

in orbit, while giving due consideration to legitimate security and defence 

interests of states. The Code focuses on establishing norms of behaviour for 

the use of outer space. Again, this code is not legally binding but requests a 

political commitment. I would strongly support both of activities. 

Another forum, the CD, considers the prevention of an arms race in outer 

space and the banning of the use of weapons in space through a legally 

binding treaty. The CD has discussed the Prevention of an Arms Race in 

Outer Space (PAROS) for a number of years. However, the CD discussion is 

deadlocked because states cannot agree on its agenda. In 2008, China and 


Russia introduced the draft of the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of 

Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer 

Space Objects (PPWT). The PPWT has the support of many states, but not 

all, because of definitional issue and verification concerns. 

Information on non-functional space objects that may threaten operational 

space objects should be shared among all states concerned. Warning of the 

collision of space objects irrespective of functional status and the 

manoeuvre or removal of space objects should take into account legal 

aspects such as definition and identification of space objects, jurisdictions, 

process of caution and warning, sharing the role of players, responsibility 

and liability with reasonable and verifiable approach. The results of these 

initiatives will provide necessary solutions technically, politically, and legally at 

a certain level. Otherwise, we will not be able to utilise space in the near 

future. 

International Cooperation 

As described above, international cooperation is a must to maintain longterm 

sustainability of outer space activities. Moreover, in the coming years, 

closer and more intense cooperation between countries with established 

space capabilities and those gaining experience in space utilisation will be 

increasingly important to ensure that best practices are implemented by all 

space actors, including emerging actors. Over the past 50 years, space-faring 

nations have significantly advanced their space technologies, overcoming 

numerous technical, programmatic and political challenges. The path toward 

attaining a similar level of excellence will not be easy for developing 

countries and cooperative work with advanced space-faring nations are 

strongly recommended. 

I would like to emphasise that space exploration or development is not an 

easy task. From my experience as a space engineer, the important aspect is 

systems engineering. A thorough and detailed system requirements definition, 

high reliability and quality assurance, long-life design, and low-life cycle cost 

are key success factors. In order to achieve mission success, well-structured 

development processes, standardised procedures, incorporation of lessons 

learned from past experience and thorough review by experienced experts 

are essential. Space technology provides a wide range of essential tools for 

making informed decisions in support of development at local, national, 


egional and global levels in both public and private domains. 

The past 50 years of space research and development have produced many 

experts with significant experience and knowledge in this field. More and 

more of these experts are now retiring, but the knowledge, lessons learned 

and best practices gained from their expertise and involvement should be 

utilised for space activities in the interest of emerging space countries. It 

would be very useful to examine how such expertise could be made globally 

available on request as one of the forms of international cooperation. 

Conclusion 

The practical benefits of space technology applications today virtually touch 

every facet of human endeavour extending over communication, navigation, 

meteorology, education, health, agriculture, resource management, 

environmental protection and disaster management. 

However, inequalities certainly exist in terms of benefits received by the 

countries and regions of the world, including access to geospatial data and 

capacity to use space technology for development. These inequalities are 

amplified with the lack of relevant institutional framework. In order to 

spread the benefit of space science and technology and their applications as 

much as possible throughout the world, international cooperation, especially 

those with advanced and emerging space actors, are essential. 

Another significantly important matter is to implement advanced launch 

notification and information exchange of the space objects. All the space 

actors must behave responsibly to ensure sustainable use of outer space. For 

this again, international cooperation is necessary and advanced space-faring 

nations should consider capacity building for the long-term sustainability of 

outer space. 

To adapt to the emerging and future challenges to the global community, the 

UN mechanisms, including UNCOPUOS which I am currently chairing, 

need to, in close coordination with its Member States, work for effective 

solutions. 

Inequalities certainly 

exist in terms of 

benefits received by 

the countries and 

regions of the world, 

including access to 

geospatial data and 

capacity to use space 

technology for 

development. These 

inequalities are 

amplified with the lack 

of relevant institutional 

framework. 


What's in a Code?: Putting Space 

Development First 

1 

Peter Garretson 

Very likely, it is in the interests of all who benefit from space—individuals, 

businesses, and states—to see the establishment of norms which “safeguard 

the continued peaceful and sustainable use of outer space for current and 

future generations,” that recognises “space debris affects the sustainable use 

of outer space, constitutes a hazard to outer space activities” and seeks “to 

establish and implement policies and procedures to minimise the risk of 

accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful 

interference with another State's peaceful exploration, and use, of outer 

2 

space.” 

To date, however, the draft ICoC has yet to command widespread support in 

the international community sufficient for it to establish its intended “regime 

of transparency and confidence-building measures, with the aim of creating 

mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation and 

3 

foster national, regional and global security and stability.” 

It was famously said by the fictional character Jack Sparrow: “The only rules 

4 

that really matter are these: what a man can do and what a man can't do.” 

Applied to space security, this means that for a regime like the ICoC to be 

truly meaningful, it must have the buy-in from the major actors who actually 

have the capability to do things in space. It is certainly meaningful that the 

Code seems to have strong support in the EU, which contains several states 

capable of operating spacecraft and one state, France, capable of launch. It is 

also meaningful that the U.S., while not willing to sign the draft originally 

It was famously said 

by the fictional 

character Jack 

Sparrow: “The only 

rules that really matter 

are these: what a man 

can do and what a 

man can't do.” 

Applied to space 

security, this means 

that for a regime like 

the ICoC to be truly 

meaningful, it must 

have the buy-in from 

the major actors who 

actually have the 

capability to do things 

in space. 

What's in a Code?: Putting Space Development First | www.orfonline.org 27

formulated by the EU, is nevertheless encouraging its elaboration and 

negotiations into a form that it can sign. 

But these states are already heavily invested in space, space services, the 

minimisation of debris, and appear to have abandoned any ambition for 

kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). If the code was narrowly intended to 

stigmatise practices by space-capable states that would create long-lasting 

space debris such as the Chinese ASAT test, it appears to have already been a 

5 

success. No similar test has been performed since, even by China. And it is 

now well-established that any such test would be costly and bring the censure 

of the world. 

But if the Code is to truly become a broader instrument, one that establishes 

a regime that creates a least-regret path toward the greatest flourishing of 

humanity-benefiting space activity—which is certainly in the interests of all 

states—it is absolutely critical that the space-capable Asian states: China, 

India, and Japan feel a sense of ownership over the Code. 

For this to happen, these states must feel that they have materially shaped the 

Code to reflect their interests. This is likely to be difficult because the 

problem these states have with the Code is less its content and more the 

manner in which it came to them. 

These states rightly perceive that they are legitimate, fully established powers 

on the international stage, as well as fully established spacefaring states, and 

that they deserve an equal voice in any rule-making. Moreover they are likely 

to feel that they have a disproportionate interest in such rule-making because 

they are the most affected by any such rule. Unlike the states of the EU, the 

Asian space powers exist outside a stabilizing regional security architecture. 

Instead they are faced with an anarchic environment with security concerns 

on all sides, multiple security dilemmas leading to a need for “self-help.” 

Regrettably such self-help encourages similar actions from others, creating a 

6 

multi-party security dilemma that worsens the situation for all. A non-legally 

binding instrument appears to constrain this self-help without providing the 

security of a binding regime. Unlike the Cold War space powers who tested, 

deployed, and then eschewed kinetic ASAT weapons as they became more 

invested and dependent upon space, the rising powers of Asia feel 

themselves technologically behind in an area that appears to provide some 

coercive or deterrent value, and have yet to reach an equivalent level of 


investment and a similar perception of dependence. Attempts to restrain 

7 

such capabilities are seen as a form of imposition or “lawfare” in the context 

of a history of colonialism and imperialism. It is because of the perception 

of these states that essentially this code was developed without their input 

and then presented to them full cloth under some degree of pressure. 

It is therefore unlikely that these powers are going to embrace the Code 

without serious modification. The question is: “Can there be anything 

substantial to modify when the contents of the Code appear to be 

fundamentally common sense and unobjectionable?” 

The answer is: “Yes.” The Code requires substantial revision because serious 

errors of omission not only betray a lack of vision and fundamentally wrong 

focus, but fails to recognise the fundamental purposes and ambitions of all 

three Asian space powers as well as key ongoing trends shaping the domain. 

Here is a list of seven deficits in the current code: 

Space Development 

The current draft fails to establish space development as a fundamental and 

perhaps primary purpose. This is not a minor point. While the original 

authors may see space and space programmes through a securitised lens, this 

is not the view or purpose of the Asian space powers which see space 

resources as key to sustainable development on Earth and seek a pro-growth, 

space-industrial agenda to expand mankind's economic sphere at least into 

the inner solar system. The current draft hardly seems encouraging of an 

agenda for economic growth and growth of activity in space. This code 

seems focused on the world of today, protecting the investment in the small 

number of communication and surveillance satellites, rather than the needs 

of the world of tomorrow as articulated by the pioneers and visionaries of 

the Asian space programmes who see not exploration or security as the 

raison d'être, but rather economic development. 

The current draft fails 

to establish space 

development as a 

fundamental and 

perhaps primary 

purpose. This is not a 

minor point. While the 

original authors may 

see space and space 

programmes through 

a securitised lens, this 

is not the view or 

purpose of the Asian 

space powers which 

see space resources 

as key to sustainable 

development on Earth 

and seek a progrowth, 

spaceindustrial 

agenda to 

expand mankind's 

economic sphere at 

least into the inner 

solar system. 


"There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing 

nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of 

competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon 

or the planets or manned space-flight. But we are convinced that if we are to play 

a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of nations, we must be second 

to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of man 

8 

and society.“---- Dr. Vikram Sarabhai (dedication of Thumba to United 

9 

Nations, Feb 02, 1968) 

“The Moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources 

for human beings….This is crucial to sustainable development of human beings 

on Earth….Whoever first conquers the Moon will benefit first….As for China, 

it needs to adopt a strategy based on its concrete economic power and technology 

level….We are also looking further out into the Solar System-to Mars." -- 

10 

OuyangZiyuan, chief scientist of China's Moon exploration programme 

Further, the paradigm informing all three Asian space programmes is space 

industrial development. The language of the Code stands in stark contrast to 

ambitions expressed by space pioneers and visionaries such as India's Dr APJ 

11 12 

Kalam, or China's Professor Wang Xiji, or recorded in Japan's Basic Space 

13 

Plan for Space Policy, all of which see a vast expansion of on-orbit activities 

with vast Space-Based Solar Power Satellites at the centre. 

In sharp contrast, the language of the current code speaks of sustainability 

more in the context of preserving the status quo than sustaining the 

exponential growth curve necessary to lifting billions out of poverty and 

14 

improving their prosperity with the vast wealth of the heavens, overly 

securitised and largely tone-deaf to an ambitious agenda to use the vast 

energy and material resources of space to solve “the real problems of man 

and society” and provide vast abundance for all humanity. 

And the abundance is truly vast. Industrialisation of space as imagined by the 

visionaries of Asia's space pioneers unlocks untold material and energy 

wealth. The scale of the energy wealth has been affirmed in the Pentagon's 

Space-Based Solar Power Study, and more recently by the International 

Academy of Astronautics (IAA) headed by a former ISRO chairman. And 

the mineral wealth is staggering. Per the NASA public website responsible 

for tracking Near Earth Asteroids states, “it has been estimated that the 

mineral wealth resident in the belt of asteroids between the orbits of Mars 

and Jupiter would be equivalent to about 100 billion dollars for every person 


on Earth today.” The code needs to anticipate humanity's movement toward 

these vast material and energy resources, as is already happening in the 

entrepreneurial space community today. 

For the Code not to anticipate something so central to Asia's vision for space 

is not a small matter. Such a code is likely to establish important incentives 

and understanding for the long term. If the language and purposes of the 

text do not establish development as a separate, co-equal or even paramount 

end, it is unlikely to be encouraging of the agenda for economic growth at 

the heart of Asian space programmes, and reinforce the disproportionate 

securitisation of space. 

While drafters in the arms control communities in EU and the U.S. may see 

space and space programmes through a “securitised” lens with a head-nod to 

exploration, the Asian space powers fundamentally see space and their space 

programmes in terms of economic development. Within the hierarchy of 

values, the Asian powers are likely to see the value of “space sustainability” 

less as an end-in-itself, and more as an enabling end to sustained economic 

development in general—whether it be for a significant near-term expansion 

in communications and remote sensing technology in support of the 

challenges of sustainable growth on Earth, or the vastly ambitious visions of 

Asia's space visionaries. Similarly, the Asian space powers are likely to see the 

obligations in the Code as more in their interests if they understand them as 

being a critical enabler to their larger planned programmes of inclusive 

growth—toward which both their national and international policies are 

aligned—rather than in the context of arms control. 

While the draft preamble mentions “activities of exploration and use of 

outer space for peaceful purposes,” the weak existence of the word “use” is 

completely inadequate, and the preamble and purpose should be modified. 

A code that properly accounted for Asian equities would strongly assert the 

purpose of: economic development and the expansion of mankind into the 

universe. 

The current draft fails 

to establish survival 

and human habitat 

expansion as a 

purpose. While some 

believe this may not 

be possible, there are 

many—such as the 

U.S.-based National 

Space Society (NSS), 

the largest 

international 

grassroots space 

advocacy 

organisation–for 

whom this is the 

fundamental purpose 

of a civil space 

programme. 

Human Survival and Human Habitat Expansion 

A caricature of East and West is that the West is very short term in its 

thinking while in the East the history of millennia-spanning civilizations 


encourages a longer view and even fabled 100-year plans. From that 

perspective the Code is also inadequate. If the benchmark is merely a code 

for the next five years, where the utility of space is limited to “bits and 

bytes,” it might be considered adequate from such a short-term perspective. 

But from a long-term perspective, from a civilisational perspective, it is 

totally inadequate. The current draft fails to establish survival and human 

habitat expansion as a purpose. While some believe this may not be possible, 

there are many—such as the U.S.-based National Space Society (NSS), the 

largest international grassroots space advocacy organisation–for whom this is 

15 

the fundamental purpose of a civil space programme. 

The weak use of “preservation of the environment, disaster management, 

16 

the strengthening of national security,” fails to capture our shared interest in 

survival and our mutual duty to cooperate in finding ways to protect against 

threats that originate in outer space such as asteroids, comets (“Planetary 

Defense”) or protection of human and other bodies from contamination of 

foreign/non-native biological organisms (“planetary protection”). A code 

affirming of these ends would include language about the safety of the 

biosphere and the potential impacts from asteroids and comets and affirm 

that long-term sustainability of outer space activities includes the long-term 

goal of human habitat expansion and the expansion of our economic sphere 

to the farthest reaches of outer space. 

Minor Planetary Bodies 

The Code is also inadequate in its treatment of conduct with respect to 

minor planetary bodies and their derivatives by state, trans-state and sub-state 

actors. Since the writing of the OST, mankind has become aware of the real 

and present threat of impact events from minor planets such as asteroids and 

comets. Also, it appears to be within the proximate technological reach of 

both states and private entities to access and alter the orbits of Near Earth 

Asteroids (NEAs). The code provides no instruction to states as to how they 

should share data on natural impact threats. Neither does the code explicitly 

instruct states to report or author regulations for sub-national entities such as 

companies, NGOs or individuals to report intentions to alter the orbital 

characteristics of a minor planetary body. Already there are at least two 

17 

western firms (Planetary Resources, Incorporated (PRI) and Deep Space 

18 

Industries (DSI) interested in asteroid mining, and they will likely be joined 

by others both in the West and other regions. Similarly, most of the major 


space powers are developing ideas for asteroid deflection, and the 

Association of Space Explorers has even brought it before UN, yet the Code 

is silent on this tremendously important matter. A code sympathetic to these 

ends would direct timely notification of any knowledge of a potential natural 

impact event, or any intention to alter the orbit of a celestial body such as an 

asteroid or comet by a state or any commercial or non-governmental 

organisation operating under its flag or subject to its laws which could affect 

19 

the safety of Earth's biosphere or safety of navigation. 

Active Debris Remediation (ADR) 

Responsible actors do not just refrain from irresponsible actions; they also 

take responsible actions to proactively improve the environment for legal 

commerce and human activity. A code should incentivise contributions to the 

global public goods. With the anticipated vast expansion in launch activity 

likely to occur with the forthcoming revolutions in re-usable launch vehicles 

and hybrid launch systems and associated new markets (space tourism, 

propellant, space-resource utilisation equipment, space-solar power, space 

habitats), merely refraining from debris-creating practices is going to be 

insufficient to prevent the Kessler Syndrome—where the density of debris 

and space objects mean that more collisions happen, creating still more 

20 

collisions in a runaway effect. Such a syndrome can only be avoided if we 

vastly scale back our ambitions or develop an active debris remediation 

capability. The Code fails to establish as a purpose or provide instruction for 

states to encourage the creation of a cooperative active debris remediation 

capability. No encouragement is provided for an actuarial/insurance-based 

/or private/public-private-partnership approach. 

While the Code is laudable in its emphasis on the problems of space debris, 

the language would be more satisfying if its language had a deeper 

acknowledgement of the concern for human life and habitation in space, 

anticipating a future of commercial space on-orbit facilities (“space tourists”) 

and eventually large on-orbit habitats. Designs for such habitats date to the 

1970s and are the subject of annual student design competitions such as the 

21 

Asian Regional Space Settlement Design Competition as well international 

22 23 

competitions sponsored by NASA and the NSS where students from 

China, India and Japan regularly compete. 

A Code that has a 

positive vision of 

commerce in space 

would have an explicit 

mention of the 

expansion of human 

commerce. Its 

guiding principles 

would affirm proper 

respect for the 

activities of 

commercial firms. It 

would be specific 

about responsibility of 

states to regulate 

non-governmental 

commercial activities 

and the safety and 

security of citizens 

chartered from their 

states. 


Commerce 

The Code is also fundamentally disappointing in its securitised, state-centric 

approach, and fails to acknowledge the important role that governance and 

conduct between states has in structuring and sustaining a market to enable 

legitimate commerce. Most Asian states have domestic and foreign policies 

centered on growth and inclusive growth, and recognise the fundamental 

utility of private industry. The Code, as written, does not set forth as a 

purpose of transparency and confidence-building to create a stable climate 

for industrial growth, development and human habitat expansion, it has 

essentially no focus on a positive vision of commerce in space. 

A Code that has a positive vision of commerce in space would have an 

explicit mention of the expansion of human commerce. Its guiding 

principles would affirm proper respect for the activities of commercial firms. 

It would be specific about responsibility of states to regulate nongovernmental 

commercial activities and the safety and security of citizens 

chartered from their states. It would instruct Subscribing States to author 

regulations to ensure commercial and non-governmental operators refrain 

from the same irresponsible behaviour. It would affirm the importance of 

establishing rights to reasonable safety and exclusionary zones to encourage 

safe operations and early entrants. It likely would affirm the desirability of 

advanced propulsion systems (such as nuclear) to provide greater access and 

manoeuvrability in the solar system and beyond. 

Space Traffic Management (STM) 

Asia, which values harmony and collaborative structures may be less than 

comfortable with a code that even at its most ambitious seems fundamentally 

anarchic in the long-term with respect to basic space traffic management. 

The code does advance things by encouraging self-reporting, but the reality is 

that technology will and should allow a real, global, space traffic control 

system within the CIS-Lunar system similar to what exists in the air and on 

the sea. The Asian states might feel more comfortable with a code that 

affirms the goal of a true space traffic management system. 

Such a system could include four components similar to air traffic 

management—established safety zones, passive and active surveillance, 


communications/control system, and traffic managers. A broader vision of a 

space traffic management system would create an organising incentive for 

collaboration between states and commercial entities on space situational 

awareness (SSA) [knowing what spacecraft are where] and conjunction 

analysis systems [knowing when satellites may pass close enough to collide]. 

A code affirming an orderly domain would instruct states to endeavour to 

maximise the participation of all government and non-government objects in 

a transparent space management system, except where such assets constitute 

critical national technical means or military capabilities which will 

nevertheless proceed with all due regard for the safety of navigation of other 

parties who are not a party to such action. 

Due Regard 

Sovereign national instrumentalities such as military craft are exempted from 

civilian air traffic control systems when their mission requires it. 

Nevertheless, it is considered responsible for them to proceed “with due 

regard” for the safety of navigation of civilian commerce. A code that 

affirms the desire for a space traffic management system which increases 

overall transparency but establishes a norm of “due regard” might be the 

best balance for the Asian space powers who likely favour growth and order 

for commerce, but who nevertheless must cope with security dilemmas 

where freedom of manoeuvre provides comfort. 

So, if we are to evaluate the Code from a long-term civilisational perspective, 

or from a collective attempt to enable and secure global public goods, we 

find the current draft of the Code is severely flawed in its essence and focus 

and suffers from serious “sins of omission”—particularly the sins of failing 

to recognise the fundamental purposes, ambitions and vision of all three 

Asian space powers, as well as a range of pro-active purposes that address 

ongoing trends. 

However, from the perspective of the authors—who hope to establish 

norms which protect our dependence on space and to encourage 

cooperation and transparency to lessen the chance of conflict in space—as 

well as from the Asian space powers, these omissions should be considered 

“not a bug but a feature.” 


These omissions are fortunate because they provide a substantive, positive 

and face-saving way out of the current situation—providing ample latitude 

for meaningful alteration of the code without compromising the 

fundamental starting purposes of its originators, creating norms that 

“enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities” and 

“safeguard the continued peaceful and sustainable use of outer space for 

24 

current and future generations,” through greater transparency and more 

responsible practices with regard to interference and debris—which 

ultimately, is to the benefit of all mankind. 


Mission Completed and Mission 

Ahead: ICoC to the Future 

LI Juqian 

Background 

It has been a serious challenge for many years now for the international 

community to regulate space activities because of the fast development of 

those activities and the great demand for the use of space. One of the ways 

to help the international community to cope with challenge is to create or 

develop the ICoC for outer space activities. The ICoC, after series of 

consultations widely held among countries, could be forged as the consensus 

of the international community, which can be the basis of future legal 

documents. 

Introduction 

“Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of 

man's entry into outer space,” as stated in the first paragraph of the widely 

25 

accepted Outer Space Treaty, space activities are still fascinating to all 

countries, especially those who want to make good use of outer space for the 

rapid development of economic benefits in telecommunication, remote 

sensing, transportation, or even of national defense benefits. This is just one 

side of the coin; the other side is that space activities are more and more 

annoying, sometimes dangerous to more and more countries. The collision 

of the U.S. satellite Iridium 33 and the Russian non-functional satellite 

Cosmos 2251 over Siberia is a very clear signal to all countries that space 

activities are costly and dangerous. Every country acting in outer space must 

Mission Completed and Mission Ahead: ICoC to the Future | www.orfonline.org 37

mind its behaviour and follow some rules besides the Outer Space Treaty, 

particularly since space is so crowded. 

Is there any possible solution we can follow in order to avoid the so-called 

chain reaction that would totally destroy all the possibility for further use of 

outer space by mankind? What kind of rules may we create or develop for 

the long-term sustainability of outer space activities? Can the ICoCfor Outer 

Space Activities, initiated by the EU, save the future? 

The answers exist in a three-dimensional analysis: what is the situation, what 

are the tools we have, and what more can we do for the future. 

The Situation: The Big Gap between Demand and 

Supply 

Outer space is very important to mankind. In ancient times, not only the 

stars in the sky inspired human beings' imagination and spiritual activities, 

but were also used to guide ships on the sea, travellers in the forest or in vast 

open land. In contemporary times, outer space activities are essential to 

human beings. The daily life of human beings is fully tied with outer space 

activities. For example, a person living in a city needs a car, TV and cell 

phone, which are all based on the satellites in outer space. Besides, weather 

forecasting, remote sensing, telecommunication, and transportation are 

inseparable from outer space and are basic necessities of modern society. 

Even the missiles, which are the basic equipment for modern national 

defence, need to be guided by satellite navigation systems, e.g. GPS for the 

U.S., Galileo for EU, GLONASS for Russia, Beidou for China, and more 

such systems that are being developed by India, Japan, Korea. Outer space 

activities permeate the texture of states' economic, political, cultural and 

military life and individual's daily life, and play an important role for all. 

Outer space activities can also change society by driving social 

communication. In the mountainous countries, telecommunication systems 

based on satellites are easier to be build than wire telephone systems, and are 

seen far better for communication. The same situation can be applied in the 

desert countries or archipelagic countries. Most of these are developing 

countries, demanding much more communication with the rest of society. 


The economic influence of space activities cannot be ignored. According to 

the 2013 Satellite Industry Association (SIA) report, globally, 2012 revenues 

26 

for the satellite industry totalled $189.5 billion. The global satellite industry 

grew 7 per cent in 2012, outpacing both worldwide economic growth rate 

27 

(2.3 per cent) and U.S. growth (2.2 per cent). 

However, outer space is crowded after nearly six decades of competitive 

exploration of the seemingly infinite space. The number of satellites in orbit 

was more than 1,000 in August 2012, 57 per cent being commercial 

28 

satellites. As a matter of fact, all of them are moving fast in orbit. In 

addition, space debris is also moving fast, up to 7.8 kilometre per second. “In 

recent years awareness of the space debris problem has grown considerably, 

largely because various spacecraft have been hit by pieces of debris, 

intentional debris-generating events have occurred, and satellites have 

29 

collided with one another.” Currently, more than 16,000 objects 

approximately 10 centimetre in diameter or larger were tracked and 

catalogued by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), about 23,000 pieces 

30 

of debris of this size are being tracked but not catalogued. There are over 

300,000 objects with a diameter larger than one centimetre and several 

31 

million that are smaller, according to estimates. 

It is too big a gap between the increasing demand and the crowded space 

orbit. Mitigation of space debris is an inevitable question for countries to 

consider and prioritise. 

The economic 

influence of space 

activities cannot be 

ignored. According to 

the 2013 Satellite 

Industry Association 

(SIA) report, globally, 

2012 revenues for the 

satellite industry 

totalled $189.5 billion. 

The Tools: Not Enough, And What Is Enough? 

International law is the common rule with legally binding force for all states 

in space activities. As provided in Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty, space 

weapons were limited on different conditions but were not totally prohibited. 

Other articles in the same treaty stipulate that contracting parties shall bear 

responsibility and liability for their activities. However, nothing in this widely 

accepted treaty referred to space debris. And the following treaties, even the 

1979 Moon Agreement, have not regulated space debris. There are also no 

legally binding rules to refrain from creating space debris. The U.S. and USSR 

conducted anti-satellite weapon tests many times and produced significant 

space debris during the Cold War. The U.S. made 40 ASAT tests from the 

32 

1950s through the mid-1970s. All these tests, of course, violated no law. 


The UN has made two guidelines for the mitigation of space debris, since 

the space debris problem first loomed large in the 1990s. The first is a 

“Technical Report on Space Debris” (A/AC.105/720) adopted by the 

Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN COPUOS in 1999. Space 

debris mitigation measures were recommended cautiously in this report for 

the first time to the international society. The second is the “Space Debris 

Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space”, incorporated in the report A/62/20 of UN COPUOS in 2007. This 

report clearly recommended seven guidelines, particularly to “avoid 

intentional destruction and other harmful activities” which was absent in the 

1999 report. All of these guidelines have no legally binding force, which 

means that no country has the legal obligation to follow them, but can on a 

voluntary basis. This embarrassing situation indicates that there is no 

consensus among the international community. 

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 

and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), was 

drafted and proposed mainly by China and Russia in order to provide a 

legally binding regime for space activity. Unfortunately, the U.S. refused it for 

lack of verification and other reasons. The attempt to make a legally binding 

rule restricting space weapons has been in deadlock in the CD, though it has 

been referred to many times in the United National General Assembly 

(UNGA) resolutions. 

There are not enough legal tools for regulating space weapons and space 

debris. Under such circumstances, the situation has only deteriorated. 

In this backdrop, the ICoC was initiated by the EU as a formal document to 

be accepted. The advantages of it exist in two aspects: firstly, it covers a 

bigger scope than the two UN guideline documents, not limited to mitigation 

of space debris, which means some concerns in PPWT as a framework 

regulating outer space activities are not excluded; secondly, it provides a 

regime for information exchange and confidence building, which means this 

option is not totally based on self-restraint without monitoring. Basically, it is 

a system of rules without legally binding force, but with a transparency 

mechanism of external political pressure. 

The rules were modified and polished to accommodate different concerns 

after a series of consultations. For example, the first edition in 2008 has 

referred a little to the right of self-defence, a fundamental right for a state 


ecognised by the Charter of the United Nations. “The Subscribing States 

resolve to abide by the following principles: ...... the inherent right of 

individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations 

Charter.” After being criticised in consultations, a new line was inserted that 

“the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force against 

the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United 

Nations, and the inherent right of states to individual or collective selfdefense 

as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations”. 

The newest version is the draft of 16 September 2013, which can be 

regarded as the fourth edition, if calculated from the first published version 

33 

by the EU on December 17, 2008. The draft introduced changes based on 

comments and suggestions the EU received during, and after, the Open- 

34 

ended Consultations which took place in Kiev in May 2013. The second 

edition was released on October 11, 2010, and EU began its informal 

consultation with the larger international community. After two years, the EU 

published the third version on June 5, 2012 for further consultations. Each 

edition represents a small progress. Each progress is evidence that it is 

gaining support. 

The most attractive shining spot of ICoC is that it has been noted in the 

UNGA Resolution since 2010, “Noting further the presentation by the 

European Union of a draft code of conduct for outer space activities”. A 

report by the GGE on Outer Space Transparency and Confidence-Building 

Measures, requested by UNGA Resolution 65/68, and finalised in July 2013, 

noted the EU's proposal for an ICoC, as well as the open-ended 

consultations on the proposal held in Kiev in May 2013. In the 

recommendations, the Group endorsed efforts to pursue political 

commitments including a multilateral code of conduct. In December 2013, 

the UNGA Resolution 68/50 made small progress, “Noting the presentation 

by the European Union of a draft of a non-legally binding international code 

of conduct for outer space activities,” indicated that the first stage of the 

draft ICoC has been successful. Then, what is the next step to advance? 

The Treaty on the 

Prevention of the 

Placement of 

Weapons in Outer 

Space and the Threat 

or Use of Force 

against Outer Space 

Objects (PPWT), was 

drafted and proposed 

mainly by China and 

Russia in order to 

provide a legally 

binding regime for 

space activity. 

Unfortunately, the U.S. 

refused it for lack of 

verification and other 

reasons. 

Step Further: Forging “Soft Law” for “Hard Law” 

The difference between “hard law” and “soft law” is obvious; the former has 

35 

legally binding force while the latter does not. Usually, any violation of the 

former is regarded as a breach of duty and invokes legal responsibility. But, 


any disobedience of the latter will not invoke legal responsibility, since it is 

just a voluntary rule. The term “soft law” is used often after the 

establishment of the UN, referring to those rules recognised widely by 

countries via political process, but they still have no legally binding force, 

lacking any formal legal procedures. A good example of this is the UNGA 

resolutions, intended to make rules for the international society. The UNGA 

resolution creates no legal obligation, even if it contains rules that look like 

“law.” Only when there is additional evidence to support the conclusion that 

rules in the resolution is law, can it be regarded as law. The mere fact that the 

resolution is passed by many countries is not enough evidence to establish 

“law.” 

“Soft law” can help the establishment of “hard law.” Though it is not law, it 

can be used to forge consensus among the international community, which is 

the first place to create “hard law.” As “hard law,” a treaty means an 

international “agreement” concluded between subjects of international law. 

Consensus is the basis of the “agreement.” 

Forging consensus usually is the first step of making a treaty. Ubisocietas, ibi 

jus. Where there is a society, there is law. Law comes after social activities that 

establish certain norms of behaviour. The first man-made satellite was 

launched into outer space in 1957, but the UN Resolution regarding the legal 

principles of space activities was passed five years later in 1962, and the first 

space treaty, OST, was concluded another five years later in 1967 based on 

those legal principles of the space activities in the resolution. Even after this, 

more and more “soft law” in the form of UNGA resolutions has been 

passed. 

By introducing the draft ICoC, the EU supports the notion that voluntary 

“rules of the road,” grounded in best practices among space actors, offer a 

pragmatic approach to achieving, and strengthening, adherence to norms of 

behaviour in space. 

In order to advance the ICoC, two more steps need to be taken, the first step 

should be making the draft as a UNGA resolution after consultation, and the 

second step should be transforming the “resolution” into a treaty, “hard law.” 

Of course, it may take years of effort before reaches fruition. 


Conclusion 

In conclusion, to cope with the challenge of space activities, a wellrecognised 

and concluded treaty, the “hard law,” is the best and first choice. 

But, because of the different interests in different countries, it is hard to 

make a treaty. The thirty-five year standstill of treaty-making after 1979 

indicates the lack of consensus. The ICoC initiated by the EU is a good try 

to make “soft law,” which can be used as forging consensus among the 

international community. Based on this consensus, a new treaty in this area is 

desirable. Though voluntary “rules of the road” have their advantages, “soft 

law” is not enough for dealing with more and more complicated space 

activities. Rules with legally binding force are better for the international 

community. It is the destination of the ICoC, to be transformed into new 

“hard law.” 

“Soft law” can help 

the establishment of 

“hard law.” Though it 

is not law, it can be 

used to forge 

consensus among the 

international 

community, which is 

the first place to 

create “hard law.” As 

“hard law,” a treaty 

means an 

international 

“agreement” 

concluded between 

subjects of 

international law. 

Consensus is the 

basis of the 

“agreement.” 


ICoC: Recommendations for Further 

Elaboration 

36 

Mohamed Hatem Elatawy 

The latest frontier of human activity is outer space, with nearly 60 years gone 

by since the launch of the first satellite into orbit. True to its form, this 

frontier still lacks a full legal framework that would bring order and 

predictability to this environment, despite the conclusion of a number of 

treaties on outer space. Against this backdrop, and building on discussions 

within different international fora, the EU proposed the establishment of a 

code of conduct on outer space activities. 

After initial internal deliberation within the EU and with few others who the 

EU considered as spacefaring states, the EU presented a draft Code of 

Conduct in 2010 with the aim of agreeing on a text to be adopted at an 

international meeting to be held specifically for that purpose. However, faced 

with opposition from a number of states objecting to the process for 

developing the draft - especially with some rejecting the adoption of a 

document that was not widely negotiated - as well as objecting to the content 

of the proposed draft, the EU launched the current process to conduct 

open-ended consultations on the draft. Three rounds of consultations were 

held (Vienna, 5 June 2012, Kiev, 16-17 May 2013, Bangkok, 20-22 November 

2013), with a fourth expected in the first half of 2014. In light of the latest 

draft of the ICoC that was the subject of discussion in Bangkok in 

November 2013, this article aims to review the principles that should be 

enshrined in a CoC on outer space activities as well as the major issues 

pertaining to the latest proposed draft. 

Since this ICoC was 

first proposed, a 

debate ensued on 

whether there is a 

need for such a 

document or whether 

it is a distraction from 

international efforts to 

reach legally binding 

treaties to govern 

different aspects of 

outer space. Instead 

of engaging in such a 

debate, and without 

prejudice to efforts on 

reaching legally 

binding instruments 

on outer space, the 

need for a CoC 

depends more on 

what is contained 

within this code. 

ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration | www.orfonline.org 45

The first question that poses itself is: whether there is an actual need for an 

ICoC on outer space activities. Since this ICoC was first proposed, a debate 

ensued on whether there is a need for such a document or whether it is a 

distraction from international efforts to reach legally binding treaties to 

govern different aspects of outer space. Instead of engaging in such a 

debate, and without prejudice to efforts on reaching legally binding 

instruments on outer space, the need for a CoC depends more on what is 

contained within this code. To judge the utility of such a code, it is more 

important to concentrate on the general principles governing it. In this 

context, the following principles are of major importance: 

First: The need to address outer space stems from the common ownership 

of humankind of this medium, which is becoming essential for a multitude 

of applications that have become ubiquitous in modern societies. Indeed, the 

principle of outer space as a common heritage of humankind, or as a 

common global good, was one of the basis of the Outer Space Treaty of 

1967 (with 102 countries adhering to and a further 26 countries signatories) 

as well as the annual resolutions, beginning in 1981, passed by the General 

Assembly of the United Nations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in 

Outer Space (the latest passed in UNGA in December 2013 with only two 

abstentions and no negative votes - UNGA A/RES/68/29). 

Second: Given the common interest in outer space and the direct or indirect 

usage of outer space by all the countries of the world, any regulation of 

outer space activities should be carried out by all countries collectively. 

Consequently, negotiations on such regulation(s) must be carried out in the 

proper venue that enjoys universal membership such as the United Nations 

General Assembly, or in such venues specifically mandated to negotiate such 

instruments such as the Conference on Disarmament. 

Third: As a common good, outer space must remain free of any potential 

conflict – rather it should be recognised as a non-conflict zone. Indeed, any 

conflict in outer space will have a cascading effect that will make this 

environment unusable not only for conflicting parties but also for third 

parties. 

Fourth: Any regulation should aim at improving the outer space environment 

for the use of all countries and should not, in any way, aim to limit the full 

utilisation of outer space by any other state. Instead, efforts should aim at 


improving the outer space environment and make it more accessible for 

everyone. If, as identified by some, the issue of space debris is the most 

serious risk for the further utilisation of outer space, then such an issue 

needs to be tackled in a way that would allow emerging space powers to 

generate less debris through sharing of best practices and upgrading their 

technological capabilities. 

Bearing in mind the above and stressing the continued need for a solid legal 

framework to govern this latest frontier of human activities, the idea of an 

ICoC to govern space activities might indeed be useful if it were properly 

negotiated in the relevant venues and if it were to abide by the above 

principles. The challenge posed to the officials involved in developing this 

CoC is to ensure that such principles are built into the proposed draft and, 

once the next round of consultations are held, the draft should be submitted 

to a proper venue to launch a proper multilateral negotiating process. 

The September 16, 2013 version of the proposed draft on ICoC on Outer 

Space Activities is still a work in progress. In order to be congruent with the 

objectives outlined above, many issues need to be addressed. The following 

are some of the issues that need to be addressed in the draft to be able to 

garner wider support, as it has the potential to do. 

Mitigation and Management of Space Debris 

One of the major issues pertaining to the code of conduct is its scope. While 

the current draft is said to cover outer space activities, in reality it mainly 

focuses on the mitigation and management of space debris. Indeed, Section 

II of the current draft, which is entitled “Safety, Security and Sustainability 

of Outer Space Activities”, limits itself to space debris. However, in other 

parts of the draft, there is an attempt to expand into other unrelated issues. 

The end result is at best a patchwork and does not provide a consistent 

effort. As such, it might be more pertinent to limit the scope and title of the 

proposed Code to the mitigation and management of space debris. 

Whereas space debris constitutes the major focus of the Code, the current 

draft fails to establish the proper international institution or authority to deal 

with the issue. It identifies the steps that subscribing states should seek to 

follow to minimise generating space debris (or rather long-lived space debris). 

It also stipulates that those states resolve to refrain from any action, which 


will bring about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of space 

objects. Nevertheless, it recognises exceptions wherein states may take such 

actions that may lead to the damage or destruction of space objects if that is 

justified by imperative safety consideration, in particular if human life or 

health is at risk, or in order to reduce the creation of space debris (as well as 

such actions justified by the Charter of the United Nation including the right 

to self defence – which will be discussed later). 

The current draft, however, fails to specifically identify what constitutes an 

imperative safety consideration, or how to reduce the creation of space 

debris. Moreover, it fails to identify who takes a decision that such conditions 

truly exist and what course of action is to be taken. Whilst it establishes a 

consultation mechanism, it remains voluntary and of an ad-hoc nature 

without the ability to take binding decisions. 

In the absence of a multilateral authority sanctioning actions for the 

common good, exceptions stipulated by the draft Code could be construed 

as a license to take unilateral actions instead of serving the aim of the Code 

in “creating mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent 

confrontation and foster national, regional and global security and stability” 

(Article 1.3 of the proposed draft). On the contrary, unilateral actions may 

lead to disputes (for example, disputes related to the legal ownership of 

space debris, especially regarding space objects that may be considered by 

some as space debris while claimed by others as national property that may 

contain sensitive material), or even actions that may be considered by some 

states as belligerent in nature. This is not to argue that there are no situations 

wherein an action might be needed or beneficial to deal with a threat, or to 

mitigate space debris. However, such decisions need to be taken in a proper 

multilateral forum and with participation of all relevant parties. 

International Cooperation for Debris Mitigation 

As discussed above, the issue of space debris is one of the major challenges 

that is affecting the full utilisation of outer space. Space debris already exists 

as a result of many decades of launching space objects. Emerging and new 

space faring nations thus come into the space age with the space 

environment under challenge, without them having contributed to the initial 

problem. It is thus essential for any code of conduct that deals with space 

debris or any other aspect of regulating the utilisation of outer space not to 


diminish the ability of any state, especially emerging space faring nations and 

developing countries, to have full access to outer space and reach its full 

potential. Neither should emerging space faring states or developing 

countries be asked to shoulder the cost of mitigating the already existing 

space debris that they had little, if any, role in generating. 

Instead, there is a possibility, through international cooperation and 

technology transfers, to provide emerging space faring nations and 

developing countries with best practices and non-debris generating 

technologies to ensure that future space explorations and utilisation will 

result in the creation of the minimum amount of space debris. The proposed 

draft of the Code does provide a mechanism for international cooperation 

however that remains limited in scope and with limited commitment of the 

adhering states as to the provision of best practices and technology transfer. 

Self-Defence 

All through the process, since its inception, the proposal of the EU to 

include a reference to the right of self-defence has proven to be one of the 

most controversial elements of the proposed draft. Two major objections are 

raised in this regard. First, a number of countries question the prerogative of 

this Code to deal with the military aspects of outer space, an area that has 

traditionally been reserved to the CD that functions as the single multilateral 

negotiating body on disarmament issues (similar objections were raised 

regarding the reference to the so-called ICoCagainst Ballistic Missiles). In 

addition, the inclusion of the right of self defence in the draft CoC is 

considered by a number of countries as a “back door” to legitimise 

weaponisation of outer space, which to say that, at the very least, this 

provision contradicts the objective of the Prevention of An Arms Race in 

Outer Space (PAROS). 

As argued previously, outer space is a common good for all, and as such it 

must remain a zone of peace and outside the bounds of conflict. Moreover, 

the weaponisation of outer space for any purpose – whether offensive or 

defensive, against any space/celestial body or against an earth-bound target – 

would effectively turn space objects into potential targets and turn outer 

space into a potential conflict zone. 

The inclusion of the 

right of self defence in 

the draft CoC is 

considered by a 

number of countries 

as a “back door” to 

legitimise 

weaponisation of 

outer space, which is 

to say that, at the very 

least, this provision 

contradicts the 

objective of the 

Prevention of An Arms 

Race in Outer Space 

(PAROS). 

While the right of self defence is in itself an undisputed right that transcends 

the issue of outer space, it is not unrestrained. Rather, there are legal 


equirements that need to be met to exercise such a right (for example the 

37 

Caroline case). Moreover, principles of international humanitarian law and 

the laws of war, especially the principles of “distinction” and “neutrality”, 

cannot be safeguarded in the case of use of force in outer space. 

With the consistent and strong opposition to the references of the right of 

self-defence since the earliest drafts, and specifically in the three consultative 

meetings that were held since 2012, it is very difficult to envision that such a 

draft would command a wide adherence in the case that such a reference is 

maintained. 

Conclusion 

There is a necessity for further measures to govern outer space activities 

through the negotiation and conclusion of further legally binding 

instrument(s), whether for the peaceful utilisation of outer space or to 

prevent an arms race in outer space. Nonetheless, an ICoC on outer space 

activities could facilitate such a process and positively contribute – in the 

interim – in managing the outer space environment. For such a CoC to be 

beneficial it not only has to be negotiated widely among all states in a proper 

multilateral venue, but it has also to be congruent with being a common 

heritage of humankind or a common global good, wherein all states have a 

stake and have a say in its management. This Code must not in any way 

curtail the right of all states to the full utilisation of outer space and must 

also be compatible with the need to maintain outer space as a non-conflict 

zone. As such, it needs to deal with the issue of space debris through a 

proper multilateral forum and to help mitigate future space debris through 

the provision of international assistance and technology sharing to emerging 

space-faring nations and developing countries. It also needs to avoid 

controversial issues that are outside the scope of such a code, such as the 

issue of self-defense which may prove to be the stumbling block against a 

wider adherence to any such code. 


It happened to Us… 

Ronnie Nader 

When we launched our first satellite, the NEE-01 PEGASUS on April 25, 

2013, it was the culmination of a very long road that started in 2007 when I 

got back to my country after passing the ASA/T cosmonaut training in the 

GAGARIN Cosmonaut Training Center in Russia.On 29 August of that 

year, we published the Ecuadorian Civilian Space Program that specified, 

among other goals, to have the first Ecuadorian satellite for the year 2016; we 

were early by 3 years. 

The NEE-01 PEGASUS is a very special satellite, not only the first of its 

class (cubesat) to be able to send in real time video form orbit, and- those 

with experience and expertise will recognize how difficult that can be for a 

small cube just 10x10x10 centimeters.But it is special for us as it is the first 

satellite completely designed and built in the Latin American region, from the 

PCB coating all the way up to the whole satellite, but most importantly 

because, as in the own words of the audio beacon message that the satellites 

transmits: “… I'm as small as the child that dreamt of my existence 30 years 

ago, but I am also big as I represent the hope for the future and progress of 

a whole nation.” 

PEGASUS represents a whole new era for my people. 

And on 23 May 2013, after working perfectly for about a month, an object 

know as SCC-15890, classified as a piece of space debris crossed paths with 

our first satellite, grazing it and sending it tumbling, unable to contact our 

ground station. 

It happened to Us… | www.orfonline.org 51

While in cold technical words, this event can clearly be represented as the real 

and present dangers of the space debris problem, those words cannot 

describe the despair and sorrow of a whole nation watching in impotence, 

how the irresponsibility of others could send our hopes and dreams into 

darkness. The EXA fought gallantly for 3 months to recover the signal of the 

satellite, to no avail, until we had to declare it a total loss and execute the 

insurance policy, which we had the fortune to have. Later, in January of this 

year, we were able to install a repeater in its twin, the NEE-02 KRYSAOR 

and send it to orbit in the hopes of recovering its signal, and were able to do 

so, to the most grateful and joyful surprise of our people who could now 

watch in national broadcast how our first space-son was able to survive, hear 

its voice from space once more. 

But there are two words imprinted with fire in the national memory: SPACE 

JUNK. I can tell for sure that no other country knows more about those 

words than the Ecuadorians, for whom those words are associated with 

despair, sorrow, impotence, and rage. Yes rage, rage at the irresponsibility of 

others, at their lack of respect to the legitimate aspirations of other members 

of the mankind. No one is the owner of space, space is for all, it is the 

ecosystem where Earth lives, and no one has the right to pollute it 

irresponsibly. 

So something must be done, and we have to respect each other's right to use 

space. A Code of Conduct must be drafted and put in place, as the space 

junk problem is becoming more and more complicated and that is why we 

support such initiative wholeheartedly, as we have suffered their devastating 

consequences. 

And reading these words, someone may think that we Ecuadorians can get 

too emotional about just a satellite, and I can only say that everyone is 

entitled to their own points of view and feelings, but just think about the real 

possibility that this was not a satellite but a manned spacecraft, then a lot of 

people would have been very emotional, standing with the families of those 

astronauts. 

It happened to us, it can happen to anyone. 


Customary International Law: A 

Troublesome Question for ICoC? 

Michael Listner 

The first publicly released draft of the ICoC (the Code) represents a 

significant evolution from the former EU Code of Conduct (EU CoC), 

which failed to garner international support and was abandoned in 2012. 

The present form of the Code has addressed many of the shortcomings and 

bears little resemblance to its predecessor. Combined with the EU utilising 

United Nations Institute for Disarmament and Research (UNIDIR) as a 

backdrop for promoting and facilitating the effort to gather potential 

signatories, the effort for the Code is substantially larger in scope than the 

38 

original effort by the EU Council. 

Despite these efforts, there is still concern about the Code and whether the 

major spacefaring nations will sign on. Considering that it was the reluctance 

of the U.S. to sign on to the (EU CoC) that contributed to its demise, the 

question of whether the U.S. will sign onto the Code is a compelling one. 

There are many issues to be addressed in the current draft of the Code, but 

one concern that could be a factor for the U.S. is whether the Code could 

become customary international law if it signs on to the measure. 

The Code and Its Effect on U.S. Law 

To establish whether the U.S. could inadvertently create customary 

international law by adopting the Code, it is essential to understand the legal 

standing of the Code and how it would be implemented into the legal 

structure of the U.S. The Code is what is termed in international law as a 

TCBM. TCBMs are part of the legal and institutional framework supporting 

Customary International Law: A Troublesome Question for ICoC? | www.orfonline.org 53

military threat reductions and confidence-building among nations. TCBMs 

are recognised by the UN as mechanisms that offer transparency, assurances 

and mutual understanding among states and they are intended to reduce 

misunderstandings and tensions. TCBMs also promote a favourable climate 

for effective and mutually acceptable paths to arms reductions and nonproliferation. 

When applied to space activities, TCBMs can address other space activities 

outside of those performed by the military or those performed for national 

security reasons. TCBMs promote transparency and assurance between 

states, but they do not have the legal force of treaties and states entering into 

them are bound only by a code of honour to abide by the terms of the 

instrument. TCBMs are considered a top-down approach to addressing 

issues; they are not intended to supplant disarmament accords but are 

39 

intended more as a stepping stone to legally enforceable instruments. 

The non-legal nature of the Code and TCBMs in general is of particular 

interest to the Obama Administration because it allows the Executive Branch 

to unilaterally address outer space security issues without the involvement of 

Congress. The Administration relies on the premise that the Code and 

TCBMs in general are recognized as a type of executive agreement called a 

40 

“non-legal” agreement. Non-legal agreements are political commitments or 

“gentleman agreements” entered into by the United States with foreign 

governments, over which the Executive Branch has long claimed the 

authority to enter into without Congressional authorisation. The Executive 

Branch's claim of unilateral authority over these types of agreements is based 

on the view that these agreements are political and not legal commitments 

and not subject to the same constitutional constraints of entering into legally 

binding international agreements, which means that it lacks an express 

41 

stipulation that it is intended to be non-legal in nature. As it happens, §1.4 

of the Code states explicitly that “Subscription to this Code is open to all 

States on a voluntary basis. This Code is not legally binding.” This provision 

is sufficient to establish that the Code is a non-legal, political agreement, 

which gives the Executive branch exclusive authority to negotiate and enter 

into. 

Even though the Code is not intended to be legally binding on states in the 

international arena, it could have a binding effect on a nation's domestic law. 

This concern was articulated by members of the United States Congress 


elating to the now defunct(EU CoC) and the present Code in a letter to 

President Obama dated January 18, 2012. The letter, which was signed by 

Congressmen Michael Turner and Joe Heck and Senators John Kyl and Jeff 

Sessions extended support for the administration's decision not to sign on to 

the (EU CoC) but at the same time expressed concern about then Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton's announcement that the U.S. intended to negotiate 

42 

the current Code. 

The letter expressed Congress' concern that international policy derived from 

signing onto a non-binding code would require the Department of Defense 

and the intelligence community to implement regulations, which would have 

a legally binding effect domestically and could influence both the national 

and economic security of the U.S.. The letter also contends that while the 

administration's legal authority to unilaterally enter into a code is uncertain, 

the potential implications of regulations created to implement a code may 

involve the commercial sector, particularly in terms of the growing 

commercial space market and the jobs it creates. The authors of this letter 

make a valid point. The Executive branch could require its agencies to 

implement or comply with the practices and political promises within an 

adopted Code and use regulations to achieve that end. 

Federal regulations are detailed rules created by executive agencies that 

outline how federal statutes legislated by Congress are implemented. 

Regulations created to meet the assurances of the Code would be applied to 

43 

current statutes and not a statute created in response to the Code. For 

example, one of the unknowns is how the Code will affect commercial space 

activities, especially in terms of future regulation. Commercial space activities 

are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation and 

specifically FAA pursuant to Title 51, Chapter 509 of the United States 

44 

Code. If assurances in the Code require that commercial space activities 

meet certain standards, then FAA would be required to implement new 

45 

regulations. 

The same holds true for the Department of Defense and the intelligence 

community in the U.S. If their activities are implicated by the Code, the 

executive agencies that they operate under would be required to implement 

regulations that would affect their authorisation statutes to meet the 

assurances made under the Code subject to any statutory limitations. 


All this means that if the Code is adopted by the U.S., regulations from the 

Executive branch and its agencies, which will be legally binding upon the 

agencies and non-governmental entities of the U.S., will be implemented 

along with practices to fulfill assurances within the Code. The question is 

whether compliance with the assurances of the Code could inadvertently 

create customary international law. 

Customary International Law and the Code 

Customary international law is defined as international obligations arising 

from established state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal 

written international treaties. It consists of two components. First, there 

must be a general and consistent practice of states. This does not mean that 

the practice must be universally followed; rather it should reflect wide 

acceptance among states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Second, 

there must be a sense of legal obligation, or opiniojurissivenecessitatis. In 

other words, a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally 

free to disregard does not contribute to customary law; rather, there must be 

a sense of legal obligation to the international community. States must follow 

the practice because they believe it is required by international law, not merely 

because that they think it is a good idea, or politically useful, or otherwise 

46 

desirable. 

The definition of customary international law is nuanced because not all 

states are equal when considering whether a state's practice and 

opiniojurissivenecessitatis reaches the level of customary international law. 

State practice and opiniojurissivenecessitatis of states such as the U.S., which 

holds a special place and position of prestige in the field of outer space 

activities, will be given more weight than a state that has a fledgling space 

programme and would be more likely considered to be customary 

international law than those of a state with a nascent space programme. 

The spectre of the Code becoming customary international law is not a 

trivial matter. There are significant assurances in the Code that could be 

problematic for international space law and U.S.' space policy should it be 

deemed to be custom. One problem could arise in the context of the Outer 

47 

Space Treaty (OST) and specifically with Article IX. Article IX is an elusive 

precept in the OST in that it has yet to be put into practice and given 

48 

customary usage. The Code as drafted contains many requirements 


specifically under §§ 5-6 that are synonymous with the requirements of 

Article IX. If the assurances in §§ 5-6 of the Code are regarded as customary 

international law through practice by the Subscribing States to the Code, then 

those practices could inadvertently reach across the threshold and establish 

an international customary practice of the application of Article IX by not 

only Subscribing States of the Code but also non-Subscribing States and 

those who are parties to the OST. This means that the potential exists for 

what was supposed to be a non-legally binding measure to affect a legally 

binding international treaty that is the foundation of international space law. 

Another concern is the effect a transformed Code could have on the national 

49 

space policy of the U.S. specifically with the use of TCBMs. Pursuant to the 

National Space Policy of 2010, the U.S. is engaged in multilateral discussions 

50 

with the GGE to use TCBMs to address outer space security issues. If the 

U.S. adopted the Code and it were to become customary international law, 

any TCBMs that the U.S. entered into per the National Space Policy could 

become customary international law as well. This means that in its attempt to 

engage outer space security issues in a non-binding manner, the U.S. could 

inadvertently become binding customary international law, which would give 

Congress leverage to insist that it be involved in further negotiation and 

approval of TCBMs. This would take political leverage away from the 

Obama Administration, invalidate this avenue of U.S.' space policy and 

require reconsideration of its National Space Policy towards outer space 

security. 

Whether the assurances and principles advocated in the Code implemented 

by the U.S. through practices and domestic regulations could reach the level 

of customary international law is answered by applying the test enunciated by 

51 

the 11th Circuit of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. The first 

prong of the test argues in favor of customary international law in that the 

practice of the principles in the Code by the U.S. would reflect the wide 

acceptance of the practice by the other Subscribing States to the Code. The 

practice of the principles within the Code by the U.S. would be given special 

emphasis taking into consideration the place of position and prestige that it 

has in outer space activities. 

The spectre of the 

Code becoming 

customary 

international law is not 

a trivial matter. There 

are significant 

assurances in the 

Code that could be 

problematic for 

international space 

law and U.S.' space 

policy should it be 

deemed to be 

custom. 

The second prong of the test for customary international law, which is 

whether the U.S. would have a sense of opiniojurissivenecessitatis towards 

the Code, is less favourable for customary international law. The question of 

the U.S.' opiniojurissivenecessitatis is two-tiered: Whether the U.S. would 


have a sense of international legal obligation when employing the principles 

of the Code into practice, and whether the Executive branch's action of 

promulgating regulations that are legally binding to the domestic agencies 

and non-governmental entities under its jurisdiction would represent an 

intent to show international legal obligation. The short answer to both 

questions is no. 

The United States would enter into the Code with the specific understanding 

that the assurances within the Code are political promises and not legally 

binding obligations to the international community. The use of legally 

binding domestic regulations by the Executive branch to bring its domestic 

agencies and non-governmental entities into compliance with the Code 

would not rise to the level of acknowledging an international legal obligation. 

The Code's non-legal nature means that the assurances and principles are not 

self-executing and there would not be an automatic international legal 

obligation nor would Congress have to create new federal statutes to 

implement the Code's assurances, which means that that the legal effect of 

any regulations instituted because of the Code would be to reinforce and 

clarify existing federal statutes. These regulations would reflect the position 

that the U.S. finds compliance with the Code is a good idea, is politically 

52 

useful, or otherwise desirable. Taking into account the standing of the U.S. 

in outer space activities, an acknowledgement like this would not support an 

interpretation of customary international law. 

The likelihood of the Code morphing into customary law is slim without the 

influence of a state like the U.S. providing a core intention to make the Code 

a legally binding international obligation through its practices and 

53 

opiniojurissivenecessitati. However, the U.S. and others may be still hesitant 

to sign on to the Code if there is even a remote possibility that the Code 

could spawn customary international law. States with less developed outer 

space capabilities might try to press the issue that the Code does create 

customary international law, and even though such a claim would likely be 

ineffective, it still presents uncertainty when assessing whether or not to sign 

onto the Code. 

If the true intent of the EU Council is for the Code to be a non-binding 

measure then the solution to alleviate this uncertainty is to pre-emptively 

negate a claim by a Subscribing State or any potential scenario where the 

Code could make the leap into the realm of customary international law by 

redrafting §1.4 of the Code to read as follows: 


1.4 Subscription to this Code is open to all States, on a voluntary basis. 

• 

• 

• 

The Subscribing States will adhere to the principles and precepts of 

the Code because they believe that it is desirable to further the 

preservation of outer space for all nations. 

The Code is not intended to be legally binding and does not have 

legal standing of an international treaty, executive agreement or any 

other legally binding instrument nor is the Code intended to become 

the precursor to any legally binding instrument. 

The Code's precepts and principles are not intended to become 

customary international law. The general and consistent practice of 

the Code's precepts and principles by the Subscribing States and a 

Subscribing State's use of domestic regulation in furtherance of its 

adherence to the Code's precepts and principles and assurances will 

not be considered the acceptance that the precepts and principles of 

Code create an obligation under international law. 

This modification or one similar to it would eliminate uncertainty regarding 

the internationally legally binding nature of the Code whether expressly or 

through custom. 

Conclusion 

Whether the Code is adopted by the U.S. may turn on many issues aside from 

the issue of customary international law. The question of customary 

international law and the Code may turn out to be a non-issue, but in the 

world of geopolitics with states angling to gain an advantage, the rule of 

unintended consequences cannot be overlooked. Addressing the issue 

proactively would eliminate a potential game-changer for an implemented 

Code and boost confidence for those states. 

The United States 

would enter into the 

Code with the specific 

understanding that 

the assurances within 

the Code are political 

promises and not 

legally binding 

obligations to the 

international 

community. The use 

of legally binding 

domestic regulations 

by the Executive 

branch to bring its 

domestic agencies 

and nongovernmental 

entities 

into compliance with 

the Code would not 

rise to the level of 

acknowledging an 

international legal 

obligation. 


ICoC and the Institutionalisation of 

Space Security 

Amb. Paul Meyer 

It is difficult to judge the significance for international security cooperation 

of the proposed ICoC outside of the strategic context that gave rise to it. 

Outer space is a realm, the importance of which seems to be in inverse 

proportion to the amount of attention it has received in multilateral 

diplomacy. The foundational treaty (OST) of 1967 established key principles 

to govern the exploration and use of outer space, including that of the 

common “province of all mankind,” the peaceful purposes, prohibition on 

national appropriation, harmful interference and the stationing of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, OST failed to provide for 

any supporting infrastructure for the benign and cooperative regime it 

created and although the treaty achieved wide support (100 states parties) 

there has never been even one meeting of its member states. The UN system 

did afford some attention to the issues of outer space through the activity of 

two bodies: the COPUOS, which meets annually in Vienna and the CD in 

Geneva. The international security dimension of outer space was seen to be 

the purview of the CD, but after a decade of regular work by an ad hoc 

committee, the CD's official treatment of space terminated in 1995 never to 

be resumed, although a space security item remained on its agenda. 

The CD's prolonged failure to agree on a programme of work, which would 

include some consideration of outer space security has served to underscore 

the incompleteness of the existing legal framework based on the “peaceful 

purposes” orientation of state action in outer space. For despite this peaceful 

orientation, the OST did not definitely close the door on weaponization of 

outer space, with the treaty's ban limited to the stationing of WMD only. For 

The CD's prolonged 

failure to agree on a 

programme of work, 

which would include 

some consideration of 

outer space security 

has served to 

underscore the 

incompleteness of the 

existing legal 

framework based on 

the “peaceful 

purposes” orientation 

of state action in outer 

space. For despite 

this peaceful 

orientation, the OST 

did not definitely close 

the door on 

weaponization of 

outer space, with the 

treaty's ban limited to 

the stationing of WMD 

only. 

ICoC and the Institutionalisation of Space Security | www.orfonline.org 61

many years since the treaty's entry into effect, states have expressed their 

support for additional measures to “reinforce” the regime established by 

OST, most notably through the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 

Space” (PAROS) resolution which the UN General Assembly has adopted 

annually since the early 1980s with near universal support. This resolution's 

call for states to take further measures has not been translated into any 

significant action and its annual reiteration has taken on a quasi-ritualised 

form largely devoid of practical consequence. 

Motivating Events 

This situation of declaratory concern coupled with a lack of remedial action 

might have been allowed to continue for quite some time, as is often the case 

in the multilateral system, but two external events seem to have roused states 

from their complacency regarding outer space security. These events were the 

demonstrations of an anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) capability conducted by 

China and the U.S. in early 2007 and 2008 respectively. The re-emergence of 

ASAT tests by leading space powers after these had been quietly abandoned 

for a quarter of a century (Soviet and American tests and associated ASAT 

development having been shelved in the mid-1980s) was a very disconcerting 

development. It raised anew the spectre of state-conducted attacks against 

satellites and the possibility of the benign operating environment of outer 

space being transformed into a battle ground with devastating effect on all 

users. This apparent renewal of a threat coincided with increasing awareness 

of the dangers posed by space debris to the safe operations of spacecraft and 

the initiation of international cooperation (first on the part of national space 

agencies and later endorsed by states via UNGA resolutions) to try and 

mitigate the risk of space debris. A further relevant factor was the increasing 

number of states, which were owners of satellites, with this “stakeholder” 

grouping having expanded from a dozen or so to more than 60 possessing 

satellites and almost all states being consumers of space-enabled services. 

It is from this international context that the EU, in the fall of 2008, first 

brought forth its proposal for an ICoC to govern outer space activities. The 

EU seemed to recognise that time had come to answer the oft-repeated call 

of the “PAROS” resolution to reinforce the OST-centred regime with 

additional measures and put something concrete before the international 

community. The gestation of the EU initiative has proven to be a long one 

and its diplomatic “roll-out” subjected to various fits and starts including 

what seemed to be a revolving door of officials responsible for the project. 


The initial draft of ICoC was presented in December 2008 as a basis for 

consultation with partners and considerable time was spent over the next two 

to three years on bilateral outreach to interested space faring states. While 

there was little transparency during this period, an important endorsement 

was achieved when the then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a 

statement in January 2012 supporting ICoC. A second phase of multilateral 

consultations got underway with a meeting in Vienna in June 2012 on the 

basis of a new version of the text. A further multilateral consultation was 

held in Kiev in May 2013 with the latest version of ICoC issued in 

September ahead of a further consultation in Bangkok in November. The 

timing of the ad hoc diplomatic conference, which has long been envisioned 

as the mechanism for adopting ICoC is still up in the air, but some point in 

2014 would seem likely. In terms of contents, we probably should not 

anticipate major changes to the text that has emerged from over five years of 

the EU-led consultative process. So how are we to assess the results of this 

long labour? 

Evaluating the Text 

The drafters of the ICoC would readily acknowledge, I believe, that the text 

is largely a compilation of principles and provisions drawn from existing 

space-related agreements and declarations. Its purpose is simply set forth in 

the first article as “to enhance the safety, security and sustainability of outer 

space activities”. An early link is made with transparency and confidencebuilding 

measures, steps which long have been espoused by states as 

representing the type of measures which could serve the aim of reinforcing 

the legal regime for outer space called for in the PAROS resolution. Thus the 

Code describes itself (in section 1.3) as “a regime of transparency and 

confidence-building measures” that is “complementary to the normative 

framework regulating outer space activities”. This association of the ICoC 

with TCBMs is perhaps best understood as a framing device which imparts 

some status to ICoC as a compendium of the type of measures long 

advocated to strengthen the OST-based space security regime. 

While it has been clear from its inception that the ICoC was to be a political 

arrangement rather than an international legal instrument, it is noteworthy 

that an explicit statement to this effect (“This Code is not legally binding”) 

was deemed necessary to include, presumably to assuage American anxieties 

that any suggestion that it was legally constraining would draw domestic 

political opposition. Section 3 is essentially a listing of agreements and 


declarations to which the subscribing states “reaffirm their commitment”. 

The compliance with existing commitments theme also appears in Section 4 

“Measures on Space Operations and Space Debris Mitigation” wherein states commit to 

implement the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines already endorsed in UNGA resolution 

62/217 of 2007 or the regulations of the International Telecommunications Union 

governing allocation of radio spectra and orbital assignments. Going beyond these existing 

commitments, Section 4.2 expresses a resolve to “refrain from any action which brings 

about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction of space objects unless such action is 

justified”. There follows three conditions which would justify such action, “by imperative 

safety considerations, in particular if human life or health is at risk; or by the Charter of 

the United Nations, including the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence; or 

in order to reduce the creation of space debris”. 

Critics of this key article requiring states to refrain from the destruction of 

space objects point out that the exceptions enumerated in 4.2 vitiate its 

apparent constraint, by providing large loopholes, be they based on claims of 

public safety or self-defence. Given the potential for destructive action to 

further add to the already major threat posed by space debris to secure space 

operations by all concerned, the absence of a stronger constraint on such 

action underscores the security deficiencies of the ICoC, particularly if 

measured against the standards of international security accords. Although 

the ICoC at several points affirms a security rationale (alongside safety and 

sustainability) there is no specific prohibition or limitation on security-related 

activities among its provisions. Some formulations seem to even dilute 

restrictions contained in the OST. For example, in Section 4.1, states “resolve 

to establish and implement policies and procedures to minimise the risk of 

accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful 

interference with another State's peaceful exploration, and use, of outer 

space”. 

The requirement to avoid harmful interference with another state's space 

operations, a key provision of OST, is rendered here in the weaker form of 

minimising the risk of such harmful interference. Of course, as a voluntary 

undertaking designed to be acceptable to the largest number of states, the 

absence of a real security content for ICoC can be explained as a function of 

what that constituency of potential subscribing states was willing to agree to. 

If the ICoC is viewed through a security lens of confidence-building rather 

than through the more demanding perspective of arms control, it is easier to 

see how its architects could conceive of it as providing an important if initial 


collective effort at consolidating and supplementing the existing politicallegal 

regime governing outer space. This confidence-building enterprise also 

helps to situate the more novel and operational (as opposed to normative) 

features contained in the last two parts of ICoC. 

Institutional Support 

The third part of the Code is entitled “Cooperation Mechanisms” and its 

Sections 5 to 7 set out several notification, information-sharing and 

consultative provisions that hold more practical interest. Section 5 provides 

for notification “in a timely manner, to the greatest extent practicable” to “all 

potentially affected Subscribing States” of a range of outer space activities, 

including pre-launch notifications, proximity manoeuvres, debris-creating 

events and high-risk re-entry events. While it could be said that states already 

have committed to providing such notifications through a variety of 

multilateral and bilateral accords, the next section takes information exchange 

to a new level. Section 6 has states sharing on an annual basis information on 

space policies, strategies and procedures to minimise accidents, collisions and 

the creation of space debris. The consultation arrangements in Section 7 also 

introduce new procedures and go beyond those of OST in granting an 

affected state the initiative to request consultations regarding activities of 

another subscribing state deemed in contravention of the Code. 

Significantly, Section 7.2 raises the possibility of (but does not go so far as to 

create a standing capability for) ad hoc fact-finding missions to be staffed by 

international experts for the purposes of conducting an investigation of 

specific incidents and arriving at findings and recommendations, albeit “of 

an advisory nature”. Any such missions would be established pursuant to 

decisions of the meeting of subscribing states. 

Finally in the last part of the Code, under the rubric “Organizational 

Aspects”, a series of mechanisms are described that, if implemented, would 

provide an on-going capacity for interaction amongst subscribing states and a 

degree of secretarial support. Section 8, for example, provides for annual 

meetings of the subscribing states with a wide mandate “to define, review 

and further develop this Code and ensure its effective implementation”. At 

the same time, it stipulates that the decisions at these meetings “both 

substantive and procedural, are to be taken by consensus”, which carries a 

strong risk that a dissenting state could block any decision whatsoever (as has 

been the experience with other multilateral forums with the same rules of 

procedure such as the CD. Subscribing states may wish to refine the meaning 

Given the potential for 

destructive action to 

further add to the 

already major threat 

posed by space 

debris to secure 

space operations by 

all concerned, the 

absence of a stronger 

constraint on such 

action underscores 

the security 

deficiencies of the 

ICoC, particularly if 

measured against the 

standards of 

international security 

accords. 


of “consensus” in this context and distinguish between substantive and 

procedural issues if they want to ensure effective decision-making at these 

key meetings of states. 

In addition to the annual inter-governmental meeting, ICoC provides for 

tangible and on-going institutional support through a “Central Point of 

Contact,” which is to be “designated by the subscribing states” at their first 

meeting. As described in Section 9, the Central Point of Contact is to inter 

alia “maintain an electronic database and communications system;” “serve as 

secretariat at the Meeting of Subscribing States” and render other 

organisational functions upon request, specifically with respect to “the 

preparation and implementation of familiarisation activities referred to in 

section 6.4” (which include visits, observations, dialogues and even 

conferences – potentially a significant workload). 

The aforementioned database is further described as a means to “collect and 

disseminate notifications and information submitted in accordance with the 

provisions of this Code; and serve as a mechanism to channel requests for 

consultations.” Together these envisioned tasks suggest an extensive scope 

for the ICoC secretariat, in the form of the Central Point of Contact, 

however this entity is finally defined and structured. 

Conclusion 

The secretariat-like duties assigned to the Central Point of Contact, when 

combined with the ICoC's informational exchange and consultative 

mechanisms, could potentially represent a major institutional enhancement to 

the existing regime for outer space security. As noted earlier, this institutional 

support is all the more significant given how absent it has been from the 

regime centered upon OST, especially its space security dimension. It is also 

aligned with ICoC's explicit self-identification as a regime of TCBMs that are 

designed to raise levels of confidence through transparency and predictability 

as well as habits of regular consultation and interaction. 

If ICoC is to make a real positive difference to the outer space security 

situation, it will be through use of its innovative “software” of institutional 

support, rather than by addressing the “hardware” of space arms control or 

through its reiteration of longstanding norms. This is not to exclude eventual 

contributions to these other areas of concerns, but in its present form the 


code can offer little “value added” to space arms control or norms of 

responsible conduct. The ICoC's innovative institutionalisation of space 

security, however, holds out the promise of enhancing the levels of trust and 

cooperation amongst states to a stage that could facilitate the negotiation of 

more far-reaching agreements. 


The ICoC: A Starting Point 

Victoria Samson 

The draft ICoCfor Outer Space Activities started off as an agreement 

negotiated within the EU in 2007-2008, agreed to within EU structures by its 

Member States in June 2008, and then opened up to other states. This nonlegally-binding 

document is an effort to gather up the various actions that 

have emerged through the years, which allow countries to responsibly and 

safely use space and list them in one document. While the ICoC is not 

perfect, it is an excellent start to the conversation on what major space 

stakeholders believe to be responsible use of space, something that is key if 

only to figure out when actors are acting irresponsibly in space. These norms 

of behaviour are increasingly important with space becoming commoditised 

and an ever-growing number of players getting access to and depending on 

space. 

Outreach 

The first draft of the ICoC was released for international discussions in 

October 2010. The EU, perhaps heady with relief after having shepherded 

the document through the approval process to get the countries of the EU 

to sign on to it, failed to fully recognise the need for international diplomacy 

to promote ICoC and encourage other states to join. While some allies (like 

the U.S.) had been consulted during the early drafting stage of the first 

iteration of ICoC, many other major space stakeholders were not. Sensitive 

to the historical precedent of the West presenting them with a fait accompli 

for national security issues, many countries were concerned that the ICoC 

negotiations were scripted to deliberately leave out new and emerging actors 

in space. While this was most likely simply an oversight, it still set off alarms 

for many non-western countries and automatically made them suspicious of 

Sensitive to the 

historical precedent of 

the West presenting 

them with a fait 

accompli for national 

security issues, many 

countries were 

concerned that the 

ICoC negotiations 

were scripted to 

deliberately leave out 

new and emerging 

actors in space. 

While this was most 

likely simply an 

oversight, it still set off 

alarms for many nonwestern 

countries and 

automatically made 

them suspicious of 

ICoC's true intent. 

The ICoC: A Starting Point | www.orfonline.org 69

ICoC's true intent. It should be noted that EU was still very new to 

conducting diplomatic outreach at this time: the 2009 Lisbon Treaty gave EU 

the power to engage in the making of foreign and security policy, and ICoC 

was one of the first international diplomatic efforts the EU undertook. 

The U.S. withheld its official position on the draft CoC until January 2012, 

when Secretary of State Hilary Clinton announced that the U.S. would not 

sign this particular version of CoC but would instead work with partners and 

use it to develop an International CoC that would have widespread support. 

Prior to this announcement, there had been a large amount of discussion 

about CoC within the U.S. government, including a wide interagency review, 

an operations impact review done by the U.S. Department of Defence, and 

Congressional concerns that this document was a back-door to a future 

treaty that could potentially limit freedom of U.S. action in space. 

Meanwhile, the European External Action Service (EEAS) began a series of 

informal meetings around the world trying to garner support for CoC and 

refinement of the language of CoC. A meeting was held in June 2012 in 

Austria of interested parties (on the margins of the UN annual meeting of 

its COPUOS to discuss concerns about the CoC. This did cause some 

confusion for some, as the CoC is deliberately not going through the UN 

process, even though the organisers have taken advantage of attendance at 

UN meetings to also host outside discussions on CoC. A second draft of 

CoC was released in June 2012, which attempted to incorporate some of the 

comments received to date about the document. A second meeting was held 

in the Ukraine in May 2013, which included representatives from 61 

countries and ended up focusing mostly on procedural issues. rincipal 

Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the 

EEAS Ambassador JacekBylica said at that point that they were going to 

strive to get an agreed-upon document for CoC at some point in 2014. A 

third draft of CoC was released in September 2013. In November 2013, a 

follow-up meeting was held in Thailand, and reportedly led to much more 

substantive discussions. Lady Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the 

EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European 

Commission, asserted then that the “EU launched a process of broad, 

inclusive and transparent consultations on its proposal with all interested 

states with the objective to achieve the widest possible support and has 

54 

announced its intention to conclude the process in the course of 2014.” 


Strengths 

The CoC is being negotiated at the state level. While it is not officially a 

treaty, and very deliberately not designed to be one, selected experts are being 

used to ensure that the current discussions represent a wide variety of 

viewpoints. This does give some momentum to the document, as it is being 

pounded out at the state level, and thus gains whatever prestige a top-down 

type of agreement can garner internationally. This is particularly helpful, 

given that the document is not a legally-binding treaty and its success 

depends on the widespread acceptance of its contents among all actors in 

space. 

While much of the document reinforces pre-existing behaviour by space 

actors, there are a few parts that can specifically help new and emerging 

space powers. In the latest iteration of the draft, a new section (6.3) was 

added, which had the following recommendation: “Subscribing States, 

particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with programmes for 

the exploration and use of outer space, who are in a position to do so, are 

encouraged to contribute to promoting and fostering international 

cooperation in outer space activities, giving particular attention to the benefit 

55 

and the interests of developing countries.” Of course, the caveat was given 

that “Each Subscribing State is free to determine the nature of its 

participation in international space cooperation on an equitable and mutually 

acceptable basis with regard to the legitimate rights and interests of parties 

concerned, as, for example, appropriate technology safeguard arrangements, 

56 

multilateral commitments and relevant standards and practices." 

One of the ICoC's 

greatest strengths – 

that it is being 

negotiated at the 

state level – is also a 

weakness of the 

document. This is not 

a fatal flaw, but 

something to keep in 

mind. 

Furthermore, part of the draft CoC, which calls for sharing information on 

countries' own space strategies, policies, and programs, as well as information 

about outer space environmental conditions and forecasts, can serve as an 

excellent confidence-building measure (CBM). For example, section 6.4, 

which also is new in the third iteration of the CoC draft, recommends that 

“The Subscribing States endeavour to organize on a voluntary basis, to the 

extent feasible and practicable, and consistent with national and international 

law and obligations, including non-proliferation commitments, activities to 

familiarise other Subscribing States with their programs, policies, and 

57 

procedures related to the exploration and use of outer space.” This is 

helpful for emerging space actors, as it can bolster efforts to develop national 

laws to utilise space more efficiently and share information about policies 


that could be useful to incorporate into countries' domestic political agendas 

where appropriate. 

Weaknesses 

One of the ICoC's greatest strengths – that it is being negotiated at the state 

level – is also a weakness of the document. This is not a fatal flaw, but 

something to keep in mind. It is being discussed at the state level, partially 

because this is how the international system is set up to deal with issues like 

space that cross national borders, and partially to reflect that many new 

actors to space will do so via national programmes. However, space has 

changed since the days of the Cold War when practically the only actors were 

nation-states. Commercial entities play an increasingly important role in the 

security and stability of the space domain and in establishing norms of 

behaviour. Yet they are not officially represented in the CoC discussions. 

Many countries are striving to incorporate their input in their national 

representation, but this is not guaranteed. It is also a residual effect from how 

the existing space treaties determine responsibility for space assets: at the 

national level. In the end, states are responsible for actors within their 

territories. Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty spells it out fairly 

succinctly: “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility 

for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial 

bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by 

non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried 

58 

out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.” As 

well, it is possible that were commercial entities to be included in these 

discussions, countries without large commercial space sectors might perceive 

this a way of weighing the discussions toward the more dominant space 

powers. But it is something to keep in mind when determining what the best 

practices are for a responsible space actor. The commercial sector has much 

value that it can add to these discussions. 

Some of the wording of the draft CoC has raised hackles as well. 

Specifically, the inclusion of “self-defence” has caused a lot of debate over 

its utility to this document. This phrase shows up in section 2, which 

discusses “the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of 

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 

in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United 

Nations, and the inherent right of states to individual or collective self- 


59 

defence as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations.” It makes 

another appearance in section 4.2, which calls for subscribing states to 

“refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or 

destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified: by imperative 

safety considerations, in particular if human life or health is at risk; or by the 

Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right of individual or 

60 

collective self-defence; or in order to reduce the creation of space debris.” 

This has prompted concern by some who worry that its inclusion allows for 

a de facto weaponisation of space, as they argue that anything can be 

justified by a very loose interpretation of being for self-defence. That, 

however, is unlikely and would be going against the spirit of the language, if 

not the letter of it. The right to collective self-defence is enshrined in many 

international agreements, including the United Nations Charter, so this 

wording here is not ground-breaking. In fact, because this language is already 

present in the UN Charter, it is not necessary to repeat in CoC for the legal 

principle of self-defence to be part of the legal regime in outer space. 

However, some countries believe that it is crucial to reiterate the legal 

concept of self-defence, in part to satisfy domestic critics. Thus, adding it 

does not introduce any new concepts and removing it may impact their 

ability to sign onto CoC. 

What may be more difficult to reconcile is thedisconnect between what 

various participants believe that CoC is intended to cover. Does it include all 

activities that constitute responsible behaviour in space? If so, then securityrelated 

issues like acknowledging the right to self-defence can reasonably be 

argued to belong to such a document. But some believe that CoC should 

only focus on peaceful uses of space, echoing the language used to bifurcate 

space issues in the UN, where the COPUOS deals with civil (or non-security) 

space issues, while the CD has been relegated to handle space security issues. 

This differentiation may have made sense during the Cold War when there 

were very distinct usages of satellites, but given how much the line has 

blurred today on satellites which are intended for national security purposes 

and those intended for other uses, it seems an outmoded way to look at the 

world. However, there are some who never have been comfortable with CoC 

being a non-legally binding document and may use this issue as a back-door 

to attempt to force efforts to work on a legal treaty on this aspect of space 

sustainability – the security elements of space – even though such efforts 

would almost inevitably fail. 

The right to collective 

self-defence is 

enshrined in many 

international 

agreements, including 

the United Nations 

Charter, so this 

wording here is not 

ground-breaking. In 

fact, because this 

language is already 

present in the UN 

Charter, it is not 

necessary to repeat in 

CoC for the legal 

principle of selfdefence 

to be part of 

the legal regime in 

outer space. 


Moreover, given the deadlock in the CD, some security elements in the CoC 

is seen by many states as a way of advancing the discussion on security topics 

in a positive manner. In this regard, some see CoC as an important 

foundation for building consensus on norms of behaviour that might then 

progress to future agreements, potentially of a more binding nature. One 

possible linkage could be made to the final report of UN GGE's TCBMs in 

Outer Space Activities, which in July 2013 completed a consensus document 

on possible space TCBMs based on discussions held among 15 selected 

61 

countries. 

Prognosis 

The ICoC has been many years in the making, which is understandable, as it 

is intended to define and create consensus around the norms of behaviour, 

which have emerged throughout the Space Age. Rules of the road tend to 

arise organically. The EU hopes to have it ready to be signed by the end of 

2014; it is this author's hope that that turns out to be the case. However, even 

if it turns out that there is no final document and all that happened was a 

series of meetings to discuss how the international community perceives 

responsible space behaviour, this can be considered a positive step as well. 

What is very encouraging is that the discussions have mimicked utilisation of 

space, which began with a few dominant countries and then proliferated 

around the world. Likewise, discussions on ICoC started off with the more 

established space powers and then spread out to include emerging space 

actors and those who are relatively new to the domain. Now that the process 

is more inclusive, it is extremely important that those who have a stake in the 

secure and sustainable use of space participate in these discussions in good 

faith and work toward the goal of a tangible document, as that would be 

good from a perception perspective. Yet in the end, a Code of Conduct is 

simply that – a set of agreed-upon behaviours. It does no good if a 

document is generated that is promptly ignored. What is going to determine 

the ICoC's legacy is how well its norms are carried out over the long term. 

Hence, it is important to use this process as a way in which to build 

consensus on those rules of the road that are most crucial to allow for the 

continued access of and use of space, so that all may continue to benefit 

from it. 


Space Code of Conduct.... Only a 

Beginning 

Ajey Lele 

History is replete with examples where various civilian and military 

technologies have always challenged the existing international legal 

architectures. Nation-states have always found it a challenge to control the 

'side-effects' of technologies by using legal means. In order to control the 

misuse of technologies by state and non-state actors, various specific 

mechanisms are found and have been regularly formulated in varying forms 

and under various formats. Several regimes, treaties, rules of roads, codes of 

conduct and so on on issues relating to technology control and management, 

mostly under the umbrella of arms control and disarmament, are found 

agreed upon under multiple arrangements from bilateral, multilateral 

mechanisms to efforts supported by the United Nations (UN). 

Space technology could be viewed as one of the most crucial technologies, 

which have brought innumerable benefits to mankind over the years. Today, 

particularly in the 21st century, the survival of mankind is found to be much 

more dependent on this technology either directly or indirectly. Space 

technology can also be manipulated for the purposes of warfare, both in a 

defensive and offensive role. Also, with increasing investments by various 

states in the space arena, the challenges with regard to space debris, 

accidental collision of satellites, space traffic management, space weather 

among other issues are increasing. In view of this, various states are keen to 

develop a universally accepted mechanism to allow the 'just' use of this 

technology. 

Interestingly, the UN had begun its efforts to preserve outer space for 

peaceful purposes some months before the launch of the first satellite 

Space Code of Conduct.... Only a Beginning | www.orfonline.org 75

Sputnik in 1957. However, since the technology was in the nascent stage of 

development then, the perceptions in regard to space security were probably 

not yet fully evolved. Nuclear issues being the cornerstone of security in that 

era, activities in outer space were viewed under the limited nuclear prism. 

Hence, early proposals with regard to devising a mechanism for space 

security have a nuclear backdrop. The proposals for prohibiting the use of 

space for military usage and the placement of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD) in space were deliberated in the late 1950s and early 1960s by the 

UN. 

Shortly after the launch of the first satellite Sputnik, the UN formulated a 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) during 1958-59 

to address various issues ranging from international collaboration and 

research to legal aspects and monitoring the track of objects launched in 

orbit. Subsequently, five treaty mechanisms were put in place, which address 

core issues concerning various space matters. They include the Outer Space 

Treaty (OST, 1967), the Astronaut Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability 

Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1975) and the Moon 

Agreement (1979). Now, three decades after the last treaty mechanism was 

put in place, a serious effort has begun to put together a globally accepted 

formulation to realise space security in the form of the International Space 

Code of Conduct (CoC). It is likely that this CoC would be put in place 

shortly with a majority of stakeholders accepting it. 

As part of the debate to assess the draft of CoC (version September 16, 

2013), it could be also useful to compare and contrast it with the already 

available mechanisms in the space domain. It may not be feasible to 

undertake an explicit content comparison because most of the available 

mechanisms are for a specified area and CoC covers a wider canvas. 

However, it could be useful to appreciate the overall comprehensive 

approaches behind formulating such mechanisms. 

Till the 1980s, various treaty mechanisms were formulated to address various 

issues concerning space technology management. However, all these efforts 

were inadequate to ban space weapons. OST, which could be viewed as a 

more compressive space treaty among the group of five, also limits itself, 

making provisions only to ban the deployment of WMDs in outer space. 

Hence, post-1980, few serious efforts have been made to bring together 

various stakeholders on a common platform to debate this issue. One such 


effort is the resolution about Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 

(PAROS), which advocates a ban on the weaponisation of space. However, it 

could be broadly argued that all these efforts have proven to be inadequate to 

devise any legal regime to ban space weapons. 

Against the above backdrop, the question is, 'would the current draft under 

the discussion for CoC (version of September 16, 2013) help to ban the 

weaponisation of space?' The clear answer is no. However, it is important to 

note that the process of reaching any consensus on this subject would be a 

long-drawn process and the issue needs to be addressed in a step-by-step 

fashion and CoC should be viewed as a one step in that direction. 

Interestingly, the draft CoC could be viewed as somewhat selective in nature 

with regard to its faith on existing treaties, conventions and other 

commitments relating to outer space activities. It is not seeking to reaffirm 

the commitment in all the important mechanisms available. Amongst the five 

treaty mechanisms mentioned above, this draft CoC has not taken into 

cognizance the Moon Agreement (1979). COPUOS has addressed various 

issues over the years leading to a few important declarations/resolutions. The 

draft document has not considered reflecting on 

• 

• 

1982: Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth 

Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting 

1986: Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer 

Space. 

One probable reason why the Moon treaty is not finding a place in CoC 

could be because of the differences in perceptions with regard to the issue 

of the common heritage of mankind (CHM). It needs to be appreciated that 

in the 21st century, renewed efforts are being made by a few states regarding 

their Moon agenda. Presently, the reasons for interests in the Moon are not 

from the Cold War-centric conception of one-upmanship. Hence, this is the 

appropriate time to debate CHM issues. Unfortunately, the draft CoC has not 

taken any cognizance of specific issues concerning deep space missions. 

Also, it appears that the principles concerning the remote sensing satellites 

could clash with the spy-satellite agendas of a few states and that may be the 

reason the draft CoC does not promote the 1986 principles in this regard. 

The draft CoC has not 

taken any cognizance 

of specific issues 

concerning deep 

space missions. Also, 

it appears that the 

principles concerning 

the remote sensing 

satellites could clash 

with the spy-satellite 

agendas of a few 

states and that may 

be the reason the 

draft CoC does not 

promote the 1986 

principles in this 

regard. 


Broadly, it could be argued that the draft document is committed to most of 

the existing treaty mechanisms. This indicates that the purpose of theCoC is 

not to replace or override any existing international regimes on space and 

disarmament but to build-on-it. 

UN Treaty Mechanisms Regarding Space Activities 

Type of 

Treaty 

Outer Space 

Treaty 

Rescue 

Agreement 

Liability 

Convention 

Registration 

Convention 

Moon 

Agreement 

Source: UNOOSA 

Opened in Enforced in Signatory 

Nations 

1967 1967 26 101 

1968 1968 24 92 

1972 1975 23 90 

1975 1976 4 51 

1979 1984 4 13 

Party 

Nations 

The above table shows that many states are taking a very cautious approach 

to joining any global regime on space. In the future, being a part of CoC (as 

a Subscribing State) could also encourage these states to join the existing 

treaty regimes. 

The present draft document has two major issues that require further 

deliberations. One, there is less clarity on the issue of the right to selfdefence 

as a justifiable action (point 4.2). The idea about what constitutes 

self-defence could vary from state to state and situation to situation. There 

exists a possibility that possible testing of space weapons could be carried 

out under the garb of self-defence. Also, catastrophic situations could arise 

in case of such missions going wrong. Two, there is less probability that all 

states could disclose their strategies and polices with regard to security 

related aspects (point 6.1). Moreover, there is a possibility that the 

information provided by a few states could be wrongly utilised by others. The 

CoC mechanism itself has no verification procedures and the authenticity of 

any information disclosed about security policies would always remain 

elusive. There has to be more clarity on these issues, otherwise the basic 

purpose of CoC could be defeated. 

It is important for CoC to take note of the report of the UN GGE on Outer 

Space issues. The GGE on TCBMs in Outer Space Activities was an 


important platform for discussions on issues concerning space security. The 

first GGE on this subject was held two decades back during the period 

1991–1993. However, because of lack of any concrete mechanism to take 

these suggestions further to a logical conclusion, no major process was 

witnessed. The second GGE on the same subject was established in 2011 

and submitted its final report on July 29, 2013.This report presents various 

methods for improving cooperation and reducing the risks of 

misunderstanding and miscommunication in space activities. It specifically 

offers concrete, feasible, and practical recommendations with regard to 

TCBMs. Point 38 of this report highlights the need for exchange of 

information on major military outer space expenditure and other national 

security space activities. Here again, a similar question could be asked 

regarding the authenticity of any information received (if any) in this regard 

and the means to verify them. Overall, it is for CoC to factor in the reality 

that the GGE has also made various useful suggestions and presented ideas 

on similar lines as that of CoC. The proposed CoC should emerge as a 

mechanism which is more specific and a step ahead of GGE. It is important 

not to bracket GGE as a complementary effort but aim to grow beyond that. 

The basic idea behind establishing any security regime is to design a 

normative and legal framework so as to assure 'security'. In the space arena, it 

has been observed that, to date, various efforts have not met with much 

success. There has been a deadlock in the CD for almost two decades and the 

UN efforts including PAROS have remained mostly as non-starters. During 

February 2008, China and Russia proposed the Treaty on Prevention of the 

Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 

against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) as an international legally-binding 

treaty that would outlaw the weaponisation of space. The first draft of this 

treaty has some major flaws and it is expected that Russia and China will be 

presenting the second draft for discussion shortly. It is important to ensure 

that a mechanism like PPWT be seen as a 'continuum' to the process of CoC. 

The proposed CoC 

should emerge as a 

mechanism which is 

more specific and a 

step ahead of GGE. It 

is important not to 

bracket GGE as a 

complementary effort 

but aim to grow 

beyond that. 

The cornerstone of various UN mechanisms related to arms control and 

disarmament issues are generally viewed as the treaties related to the nuclear, 

chemical and biological weapons (NPT, CWC and BWC). The process of 

formulation of these mechanisms has been difficult and time consuming but 

the end result has been reasonable with regard to NPT and the significant 

success of CWC. However, the limitations of BWC are evident because of 

the lack of verification protocol. The biggest limitation of the present draft 


CoC is that it is voluntary in nature. The past experiences with voluntary 

disclosures, for instancein fields like missile disarmament, particularly The 

Hague Code of Conduct(HCoC), are not very encouraging. It has been 

found that such ideas are acceptable to many states in principle but are 

mostly not taken seriously thereafter. 

The idea behind using CoC as an 'expression' for space security is noble but 

the issue is, 'how effective would it be?' What is important is that the efforts 

should continue to improve the existing draft of CoC to further advance 

TCBMs. The CoC could be viewed by many as a useful foundation and a 

constructive starting point, but it is important to remember that similar 

initiatives (in some form or other) were offered earlier too, without much 

success. Fortunately, CoC has succeeded in bringing together important 

stakeholders to debate this issue. In general, beyond the CoC, various spacefaring 

states are also found to be keen to develop mechanisms for 

cooperation. In January 2014, ministers and high-level officials from 

important stakeholder states have met together in the United States. The 

formation of International Space Exploration Forum (ISEF) could be 

viewed as a positive step in support of global cooperation. The need of the 

hour is to quickly channel the interest generated from GGE, CoC and ISEF 

debates to finalise the CoC draft and immediately start the next process of 

formulating an international legally binding treaty mechanism. 


Towards A More Responsible Use of 

Outer Space 

Gérard Brachet 

Use of Outer Space and Long-term Sustainability 

Use of outer space has, so far, more or less ignored the need to address its 

long-term sustainability. The safety and sustainability of space activities in 

earth orbit over the long term is increasingly a matter of concern for all 

space actors, nation/states, regional space organisations and commercial 

satellite operators. The increasing number of actors in outer space, both 

government and private, the difficult task of managing the finite radioelectric 

spectrum available and the geostationary orbit slots, the effect of 

space weather on space operations, and the proliferation of space debris, not 

forgetting the risks associated with the potential use of weapons in outer 

space are all factors which call into question our ability to continue operating 

safely and without interference in the Earth orbit. 

Some numbers are useful here to characterise the situation: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

11nations have acquired a space launch capability, conducting about 

70 to 80 launches per year (80 in 2011, 75 in 2012, 78 in 2013). 

4994 space launches have taken place from 1957 till the end of 2013. 

About 17000 objects are tracked and cataloged by the U.S. Space 

Surveillance Network, of which 22% are spacecraft, 12% upper stage 

rocket bodies, 10% mission-related objects, 56% fragments (up from 

41% before the China ASAT test of January 11, 2007). 

About 60 States and regional governmental organizations operate 

satellites in Earth orbit and an increasing number of private 

Towards A More Responsible Use of Outer Space | www.orfonline.org 81

companies operate commercial satellite systems, both in the 

Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) (mostly telecommunications) and 

in Low Earth Orbits (LEO) (telecoms and earth observation). There 

are today about 1000 operational satellites, of which half are 

operating from the GEO ring, rest operate mostly either on the LEO 

orbits or the Medium Earth Orbits (MEO) orbits used by GPS and 

other global navigation satellite constellations. 

Increased crowding in LEO as well as in the region around the geostationary 

ring creates new challenges, among which managing the orbital and radio 

spectrum resources is becoming a real issue that will probably require more 

stringent rules and enforcement mechanisms by the ITU. In addition, the 

proliferation of space debris on and around certain orbits is a major concern, 

which calls for additional international mechanisms to limit debris creation 

and mitigate the negative impact of the present population, thereby ensuring 

a sustainable use of outer space. 

Concerning the risk of outer space becoming a battlefield, one can note the 

positive fact that deployment of weapons in outer space has apparently not 

taken place so far. A less positive fact is that ground-based weapons can be 

used - and have been used - against spacecraft in LEO. If such weapons were 

activatedduring a conflict, it is clear that additional debris cloud resulting 

from such actions would jeopardize for a long time the secure use of near- 

Earth outerspace. 

In a nutshell, the safety, sustainability and security of outer space activities 

are fragile, particularly if one takes a long-term view. Responsible use of 

outer space by all actors is essential to preserve outer space as a safe and 

secure environment. 

Initiatives in the UN context 

The issue of sustainability of space activities has already been addressed by 

many sectors of the space community, for example the Inter-Agency Space 

Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) which focused on the proliferation 

of space debris, by the International Academy of Astronautics which 

62 

published a report on space traffic management in 2006 and by the 

International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS), 

which published a report called “An ICAO for Space?” in 2007. 


It was also raised by the author of this paper, then chairman of the 

63 

UNCOPUOS in his paper “Future role and activities of the UN COPUOS” 

presented to member states' delegations at the plenary session of UN 

COPUOS in June 2007. Following this initiative, at its 52nd session, in June 

2009, the French delegation to UNCOPUOS formally proposed the topic of 

“Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities” as a new agenda item 

of COPUOS in 2010. 

COPUOS agreed to include this item as a new agenda item in its Scientific 

and Technical Sub-Committee (STSC) in 2010 and beyond. The 

COPUOS/STSC then decided to set up a formal Working Group to address 

this issue, as it had done in 2003 for the space debris issue. Dr. Peter 

Martinez (South Africa) was selected to be the chairman of this new 

dedicated Working Group and its first meeting took place in conjunction 

with the 53rd session of COPUOS in Vienna in June 2010. The UN 

COPUOS Working Group will conclude its work in 2014. In fact, the 

COPUOS/STSC will consider the report during its February 2014 session. 

EU Proposal for ICoC 

In parallel to the COPUOS activities on Long-Term Sustainability of Outer 

Space Activities, the discussions on the PAROS at the CD in Geneva were 

not making any progress because the CD could not agree on a work plan. As 

a consequence, the Council of the EU has taken in 2007 an initiative to 

propose an ICoC for Outer Space Activities. A first version of the EU draft 

Code of Conduct was approved by the EU Council in December 2008 and 

widely circulated. 

In a nutshell, the 

safety, sustainability 

and security of outer 

space activities are 

fragile, particularly if 

one takes a long-term 

view. Responsible use 

of outer space by all 

actors is essential to 

preserve outer space 

as a safe and secure 

environment. 

Bilateral consultations with many spacefaring nations were conducted by the 

EU in 2009–2010, leading to a new version of the EU-proposed ICoC 

circulated in September 2010. A first multilateral meeting took place on 5 

June 2012 in Vienna, where an updated version of the draft ICoC was 

presented by the newly established European External Action Service 

(EEAS) and a second multilateral forum took place in Kiev, Ukraine, from 

15-16 May 2013. This led to the issuing of yet another version of the draft 

ICoC in September 2013, presented and discussed at the third multilateral 

forum in Bangkok in November 2013. The EU European External Action 

Service is presently considering the comments it has received at this meeting 

in order to plan for the next stage of consultation. 


The UN Group of Governmental Experts 

The First Committee of the UN General Assembly prepares and submits to 

the full General Assembly a draft Resolution on TCBMs in outer space 

activities. In 2010, Resolution 65/68 on TCBMs on outer space activities, the 

first such resolution was adopted without a negative vote from the United 

States. Further there was request from the UN Secretary General to set up a 

GGE to conduct a study on outer space transparency and confidence 

measures and report to the UNGA by end of 2013. The GGE has been 

formally set up at the beginning of 2012 and included representatives from 

15 countries: Brazil, Chile, China, France, Italy, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, 

Romania, Russian Federation (Chair), Rep. of Korea, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 

Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States. 

The GGE held its inaugural meeting in New York on July 23 to 27, 2012 and 

two subsequent meetings in 2013, one in Geneva in April and a second one 

in New York in July. The GGE worked very efficiently under the 

chairmanship of Victor Vasiliev, Deputy Chief of the Russian permanent 

mission to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in 

Geneva. The Group finalised its report, adopted by consensus, during its 

meeting in July in New York. It was submitted to the First Committee of UN 

General Assembly for endorsement in September 2013. The report was 

thereafter endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly in its Resolution 

68/50 adopted on the 5December 2013 (reproduced in annex). 

It is worth mentioning here some of the recommendations that appear in the 

GGE report: Section VI (Consultative mechanisms) stated: 

“Timely and routine consultations through bilateral and multilateral 

diplomatic exchanges and other government-to-government mechanisms 

including bilateral, military-to-military, scientific, and other channels can 

contribute to preventing mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust. They may 

also be useful in: 

a. clarifying information regarding exploration and use of space, 

including for national security purposes. 

b. clarifying information provided on space research and space 

applications programmes 

c. clarifying ambiguous situations. 


d. discussing the implementation of agreed transparency and 

confidence-building measures in outer space activities. 

e. Discussing the modalities and appropriate international mechanisms 

to address practical aspects of outer space uses. 

f. Preventing or minimizing potential risks of physical damage or 

harmful interference. 

States are encouraged to consider using existing consultative mechanisms, for 

example as provided for in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and 

the relevant provisions of the ITU Constitution and the Radio Regulations.” 

Also, its concluding section noted: 

“The GGE endorses efforts to pursue political commitments, for example, in the 

form of unilateral declarations, bilateral commitments or a multi lateral code of 

conduct to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space. 

The GGE concludes that voluntary political measure scan form the basis for 

considerations of concepts and proposals for legally binding obligations.” 

Clearly, while not quoting directly the EU-proposedICoC, the GGE report 

recognises the value of such an approach as a step towards more 

transparency and more international confidence in the conduct of space 

activities. The fact that the GGE report was adopted by consensus among its 

experts and was later unanimously endorsed by the 1st Committee and by the 

full General Assembly indicates a strong support by the international 

community for the directions it is pointing to. 

Conclusion 

The converging initiatives described above of UNCOPUOS, of the EU for 

an ICoC and the recent work of the UN GGE on Outer Space TCBMs 

illustrate the concern of both space-faring nations and non space-faring 

nations for the future safety and sustainability of the uses of outer space for 

government-sponsored as well as commercial applications. 

However, much remains to be done to transform these recommendations 

into actions or, in some cases, legally binding obligations. 

The complementary work done within the ITU to reinforce its ability to 


egulate the use of the radio-electric spectrum and the GEO orbital slots 

should eventually develop into a whole new set of principles and guidelines 

which will provide for better governance of outer space. Hopefully this new 

governance structure will lead to a safer and more sustainable outer space 

environment in the future. 


ICoC and the Right of Self Defence 

Kazuto Suzuki 

After the ASAT test by China in January 2007, the global space community 

has moved toward establishing a general rule to prevent similar actions that 

create large number of debris. In April 2007, the UNCOPUOS has adopted 

Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, based on the Inter-Agency Space Debris 

Coordination Committee (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, which 

was published in 2002. Although these guidelines are not legally binding 

documents, they set up ethical and social benchmark on what should be done 

to secure the safety of the space environment. Furthermore, the delegates of 

the EU submitted a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EU CoC). 

This document took a step further to set up norms of behaviour for space 

faring states to protect the space environment and prevent the intentional, as 

well as unintentional, creation of space debris. 

The EU CoC has currently been accepted as the draft for the ICoC for 

Outer Space Activities. The draft ICoC was discussed in the open-ended 

consultations in Kiev and Bangkok in May and November 2013, respectively. 

This article discusses the issue of the right of self-defence in the newly 

emerged draft from these discussions. It is based on Draft 16 of September 

64 

2013, which is publicly available today. 

Right of Self-Defence Clauses 

Article 2 (General Principle) of the draft states that 

“The Subscribing States decide to abide by the following principles: 

ICoC and the Right of Self Defence | www.orfonline.org 87

• the freedom for all States, in accordance with international law and 

obligations, to access, to explore, and to use outer space for peaceful 

purposes without harmful interference, fully respecting the security, 

safety and integrity of space objects, and consistent with 

internationally accepted practices, operating procedures, technical 

standards and policies associated with the long-term sustainability of 

outer space activities, including, inter alia, the safe conduct of outer 

space activities; 

• 

the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force 

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 

or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of 

the United Nations, and the inherent right of states to individual or 

collective self-defence as recognised in the Charter of the United 

Nations” (emphasis added) 

Furthermore, Article 4.2 states that 

“4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, to: 

• 

refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, 

damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is 

justified: 

• 

• 

• 

by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human life 

or health is at risk; or 

by the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent 

right of individual or collective self-defence; or 

in order to reduce the creation of space debris; and, where 

such exceptional action is necessary, that it be undertaken in a 

manner so as to minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, 

the creation of space debris” (emphasis added). 

From these two clauses, it is clear that the inherent right of self-defence is 

included in the context of the Charter of the United Nations. In other 

words, as long as the Subscribing States respect and are fully in accordance 

with international law and obligations, there is no reason to reject the idea of 

including the right of self-defence, which is inherently embedded in the 

system of international law and obligations. 


Difficulties of Verification 

If it is obvious that the right of self-defence was inclusive to the system of 

international law, there is no necessity to spell out the issue in the text of the 

draft. In fact, other framework documents concerning non-proliferation 

issues, such as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), does not mention the 

right of self-defence in its text, even though it states, “Reaffirming their 

commitment to the United Nations Charter.” 

One of the explanations of the difference is the difference of the nature of 

these codes. HCoC was designed to improve transparency and confidencebuilding 

measures for the activities of launching states. Launching states, 

which have capabilities to build and launch satellites with rockets, have the 

potential to be converted into ballistic missiles and it is, therefore, important 

to improve transparency to make sure that launching activities are conducted 

only for peaceful purposes. In doing so, HCoC developed several measures 

such as a declaration of policies, providing information and launch site visits. 

The important point of these measures is that these are verifiable measures. 

If Subscribing States do not commit to or implement thee measures that 

they declared, it can be seen and verified by other states. 

Meanwhile, it is quite difficult to verify the commitments of Subscribing 

States under the ICoC. Even though the states may properly notify the 

information on their space objects, it is difficult to verify whether these 

notifications are true due to the lack of means to monitor space objects. The 

Space Surveillance Network (SSN) of the United States can only detect 

objects bigger than 10cm in diameter and its catalogue of space objects is 

still incomplete. 

Since space activities are difficult to verify, Subscribing States need some sort 

of assurance that their space assets will not be the target of military activities. 

The explicit statement of the right of self-defence is, hence, considered to be 

deterrent against any military action towards their assets. The nature of 

uncertainty and non-verifiability made it necessary to spell out the right of 

self-defence. 

If it is obvious that the 

right of self-defence 

was inclusive to the 

system of 

international law; 

there is no necessity 

to spell out the issue 

in the text of the draft. 

In fact, other 

framework 

documents 

concerning nonproliferation 

issues, 

such as the Hague 

Code of Conduct 

(HCoC), does not 

mention the right of 

self-defence in its text, 

even though it states, 

“Reaffirming their 

commitment to the 

United Nations 

Charter.” 


The History of the Code 

Another aspect of differences is the history of the two Codes. HCoC was 

developed from the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) framework 

and designed to improve its implementation. This means that the objective 

of HCoC was to enhance capabilities of the non-proliferation regime, but 

not to establish a new framework of international governance. In other 

words, HCoC was not created to prevent the actions of the states. Instead, 

HCoC permits existing activities but demands the states to improve 

transparency. 

On the other hand, the ICoC was developed as a response to the Chinese 

ASAT test in 2007. The ASAT test created a large cloud of space debris that 

would increase the risk of collision with their space assets. This sort of 

intentional creation of debris for any purpose was unacceptable for many 

countries. Thus, in April 2007, as mentioned above, the UNCOPUOS 

adopted the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. However, UNCOPUOS 

and the IADC are civilian organisations that could not establish a rule for 

military use of space. Since the Chinese ASAT test was believed to have a 

military connotation, it was not enough to regulate the use of space in a 

civilian forum. Thus, the delegates of the EU have, therefore, proposed a 

Code of Conduct that might go beyond pure civilian domain of space. 

The major obstacle for the EU in promoting this initiative was, by and large, 

due to the objection from the U.S. Even though the Obama Administration 

came into power in January 2009, the U.S. space policy was defined by the 

65 

National Space Policy of 2006, established during the Bush Administration. 

This document emphasised that the U.S. “rejects any claims to sovereignty by 

any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and 

rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the U.S. to operate in and 

acquire data from space,” and therefore, the U.S. space bureaucracy – NASA, 

Department of State, and Department of Defense – were unable to show 

any commitment to the EU CoC. However, after a number of intense 

meetings, the U.S. officially announced its readiness to support negotiations 

on an ICoC in January 2012, on the condition of taking the EU CoC as a 

“draft” for the ICoC. 

After the change of American policy, Japan and Australia joined to support 

the promotion of the ICoC. Consultation processes for drafting the ICoC 


were conducted under the chairmanship of the EU in 2013, which attracted 

more than 60 states from all over the world. In this context, the discussion 

on the ICoC needed to be more cautious about the sovereignty and military 

aspect of the space activities. It was, therefore, necessary to clarify the right 

of self-defence in the ICoC document. 

Legal Status of Space Assets 

It is commonly understood that the legal status of space assets is defined by 

licensing and launching states. States bear international responsibility and 

liability for national activities, including activities of private companies. In 

many cases, states issue licences to the operators of the space assets, which 

are protected by state sovereignty. Also, states have to take responsibility for 

launches. Thus, state sovereignty extends to space assets. If those assets are 

intentionally destroyed, it would be considered military aggression against the 

assets controlled by a state, which would be equivalent to an act of war. 

States, therefore, have the right of self-defence. 

This would suggest that states not only have the right to retaliate against an 

act of aggression, but also the right to exercise protective and preventive 

actions from an act of aggression. If there is a reasonable suspicion of a 

possible attack on space assets, states may act to prevent such an attack. 

However, it would be extremely difficult to identify the act of attack on space 

assets, and it would be unrealistic to consider the possibility for states to take 

any action to prevent attack on space assets except diplomatic and peaceful 

means. This means that it would not be tolerable for the international 

community to accept the concept of preventive military measures for 

protecting space assets. From this perspective, the right of self-defence does 

not extend to preventive measures. 

Need for Tallinn Manual for Space Activities 

Retaliatory actions for aggression against space assets are considered to be 

legal in this context. To understand this aspect, the Tallinn Manual on the 

66 

International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare provides useful insights 

about the right to self-defence in non-traditional use of force or threat. It 

argues that if the “use of force”, which is constituted by severity, immediacy, 

directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, state 

If there is a 

reasonable suspicion 

of a possible attack 

on space assets, 

states may act to 

prevent such an 

attack. However, it 

would be extremely 

difficult to identify the 

act of attack on space 

assets, and it would 

be unrealistic to 

consider the 

possibility for states to 

take any action to 

prevent attack on 

space assets except 

diplomatic and 

peaceful means. 


involvement, and presumptive legality, raised to the level of “armed attack”, 

states retain the inherent right to self-defence as it is defined in the Charter 

of the United Nations. It also states that “any use of force that injures or 

kills persons or damages or destroys property would satisfy the scale and 

effects requirement” for armed attack. In this regard, an ASAT test 

conducted by China can be considered an armed attack, which will trigger an 

act of self-defence. However, other forms of ASAT actions such as jamming 

or non-kinetic disruption of space-based services cannot immediately call for 

the right of self-defence unless the act injures or kills persons or damages or 

destroys property. Also, the Tallinn Manual states that “acts of cyber 

intelligence gathering and cyber theft, as well as cyber operations that involve 

brief or periodic interruption of non-essential cyber services, do not qualify 

as armed attacks”. 

There are many uncertainties regarding the definition of an act of aggression 

or an armed attack in outer space, as in the case of cyber space, and it needs 

to be discussed further to ensure the implementation of ICoC. Once ICoC is 

agreed upon by a substantial number of Subscribing States, there should be a 

discussion by experts for the Tallinn Manual for Space Activities in order to 

improve the implementation of the Code. However, what is certain is that 

the explicit writing of the right of self-defence is necessary to remind all 

states that an armed attack in outer space has consequences and to deter any 

ASAT activity, which would jeopardise the peaceful use of outer space. 


II. 

Unique Perspectives 

Unique Perspectives | www.orfonline.org 93

ICoC: An Imperfect but Necessary 

Step? 

Xavier Pasco 

Inventing a “CoC” for Improving Security in Space: A European Union idea 

Born from a European initiative in the aftermath of the Chinese ASAT test 

conducted in January 2007, the proposal for an ICoC has appeared for the 

last five years as a key test of the EU cohesion and diplomatic skills. Initially 

mentioned in 2007, the notion of a CoChas first been quickly endorsed by 

the Council of the EU as a way to distinguish the European approach of 

space security, a mounting issue, from the two former space superpowers 

traditional views, as the latter opposed the issue for years at the CD. After 

some level of initial diplomatic consultations, a first version of the Code was 

then made public during the French presidency of the EU in December 

2008. A simple look at the history of this initiative would suffice to convince 

of the peculiar political angle given by EU to this topic and its reasons for 

doing so. 

Firstly, it must be reminded that EU, which cannot touch upon strictly 

military issues, has always worked hard to open a narrow path towards 

integration of security issues. In this context, space security has quickly 

appeared as having the right mix to help the EU diplomacy take shape on an 

important issue propelled onto the international scene by the Chinese ASAT 

test. But a closer look at the inward functioning of the EU should be given 

thought as well. 

The diplomatic 

initiative involving the 

ICoC has also 

reflected a major 

evolution of the 

internal balance of 

power in the EU with 

new “Treaty on the 

Functioning of the 

European Union” (socalled 

Lisbon treaty) 

signed by the EU 

Member States in 

December 2007 and 

intended to better 

unify European 

policies and 

consolidate a legal 

personality for the EU. 

The diplomatic initiative involving the ICoChas also reflected a major 

evolution of the internal balance of power in the EU with new “Treaty on 

ICoC: An Imperfect but Necessary Step? | www.orfonline.org 95

the Functioning of the European Union” (so-called Lisbon treaty) signed by 

the EU Member States in December 2007 and intended to better unify 

European policies and consolidate a legal personality for the EU. This would 

take several forms including having EU regulations and policies enacted by 

the European Commission (EC) and the Council of the EU, two major 

components of the EU alongside a reinforced Parliament, better integrated 

to form a single EU policy. Space has been no exception to this evolution. In 

particular, the article 189 of the Lisbon treaty is providing more weight to 

the European Commission (EC), which is to elaborate and propose an 

integrated European Space Policy covering all space activities. This article is 

today subject to various interpretations regarding the limits of the powers 

given to the EC on these issues, especially in its relations with the Member 

States and with the European Space Agency. This situation has brought 

about rather tense relationships, especially when it came to discussing the 

range of possibilities given to the EU. However, whatever the real practices 

that will prevail, it remains that a renewed attention has been given by EU to 

space in all of its facets, including the new notion of the European space 

diplomacy. 

The conjunction of the Code of Conduct initiative and of the reinforced 

role of EU in space policy making has explained the major role played by the 

EU institutions in this debate. This role has endured from then on, 

sometimes at the price of possible misunderstandings by many states 

wondering about this unprecedented European involvement. 

Highlighting Basic Collective Principles 

From the perspective adopted by the major European space countries, 

including France in the first place, a few principles have to form the basis of 

what could become an ICoC: ensuring the freedom of access to space for 

peaceful purposes; ensuring the preservation of the security and integrity of 

space objects in orbit; but also considering the right of self-defence of states 

as ensured in the UN Charter. This three-legged position was in particular 

stated by the French president Sarkozy in a speech made on 11 February 

2008 in Kourou in French Guyana. This speech was made a day before the 

proposal for a new treaty – Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer 

Space (PPWT) – made by China and Russia in the CD in Geneva. This 

parallelism between a CoC pushed by EU and a new treaty preferred by 

China and Russia is worth noting to better understand both the criticism of 


the European initiative and also the reasons that have been presented in the 

defense of the Code. Indeed, beyond the fundamental principles highlighted 

in the text proposals, some issues regarding both the form and the 

perception of the CoC have somewhat complicated European outreach 

efforts. What could be called the environment of the CoC proposal has 

remained intensively discussed over the recent years: 

• 

First, the non-legally binding character of what would remain what 

67 

political scientists would call an international regime has been 

discussed by many countries or legal specialists as dismissing the 

importance of the text (and of its content) outright. Only a legally 

binding text, i.e. a treaty, would accord genuine importance to the 

issue by making its signatories liable to it. 

• 

• 

Another issue deals with the parameters of the ICoC which would 

call upon state parties to “refrain from any action which brings about, 

directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects unless 

such action is justified (…) ”, implicitly raising the notion of military 

related actions and possibly questioning the very nature of the text 

regarding disarmament. According to the critics of such a possibility 

given to the Code, these notions are being addressed in specialised 

UN forums, especially at the level of the CD and may not be dealt 

with at the level of such an initiative. 

Last but not least, this text has been considered with some level of 

reluctance from the perspective of a number of emerging space 

countries, for reasons of possible constraints applied to nascent 

space programmes. In many respects, this form of criticism has 

rejoined somewhat more general and recurrent defiance from the 

part of representatives of key emerging states, notably India and 

China, towards international opinion often viewed as by-products of 

the main international powers' strategies and imposing norms on 

behalf of the international community. This “original sin” syndrome 

has, for example, been mentioned many times in the case of the socalled 

the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 

Proliferation, a text intended to provide more transparency in the 

field of space activities and ballistic missile development and calling 

for notification of launches and better communication of the nature 

of activities. This text introduced in 2002 and signed by some 138 

This parallelism 

between a CoC 

pushed by EU and a 

new treaty preferred 

by China and Russia 

is worth noting to 

better understand 

both the criticism of 

the European initiative 

and also the reasons 

that have been 

presented in the 

defense of the Code. 


countries (as of early 2014) has been at the centre of debates related 

to enduring technical gaps between the main spacefaring countries 

and others. This has remained a major contentious issue preventing 

some major countries from adhering to it, even if the progress has 

been steady, given the positive outputs provided to the whole 

international community by improved coordinating mechanisms and 

better transparency. A similar path towards mutual understanding and 

trust will obviously have to be followed for the space Code of 

Conduct if it is to be developed as a truly global mechanism. 

Competing Projects? 

These elements have clearly exacerbated a form of competition with the 

Chinese-Russian more legal-based approach to the problem of space security. 

By sometimes directly challenging the EU-supported approach, Chinese and 

Russian representatives have constantly defended the merits of PPWT by 

underscoring (1) the legally binding character of a treaty and (2) the fact that 

such a treaty would properly address the issue of disarmament in space 

through the CD. 

Beyond the content of both text proposals, which can be discussed in term 

68 

of relevancy or comprehensiveness, their relation with the diplomatic 

environment, i.e. their ability to effectively address practical space security 

concerns shall remain an ultimate measure of their respective legitimacy. 

Indeed, the two presumed strengths that support the PPWT project, namely 

its legally binding character and the legitimacy of discussions conducted at 

the CD, have been considered on the contrary as major weaknesses by 

supporters of the Code. Any legally enforced text will necessarily render 

signatures from countries more difficult as, as for any treaty, the exhaustivity 

of the cases considered, the symmetric character of the threats or, for 

example, the possibility of fair verification will become prerequisites for 

most of the possible signatories. In this case, and given the fact that no 

learning procedure will precede the legal constraints once the treaty signed, 

discussions around the details of the treaty will probably lead to diplomatic 

deadlock in the first place as it has already been largely experienced for more 

than a decade at the CD. While in a sense ultimately desirable from a legal 

perspective, it is fair to acknowledge that pursuing the treaty-only path will 

indeed likely delay any agreement at any level, precisely leading to a situation 

that all want to avoid. The whole PAROS (Prevention against Arms Race in 


Outer Space) process has been largely blocked in Geneva since the beginning 

of the last decade also due to the comprehensive nature of the discussions 

conducted at the CD, including nuclear strategic reduction discussions often 

put in the balance with the PAROS debate per se. Raising the debate about 

measures for improving collective space security on the short-term at the 

level of those PAROS discussions would no doubt have the effect of 

recreating an undesired link with high-level slow and difficult debates, then 

negating the usefulness of the current diplomatic process altogether. In other 

terms, the best would then very likely become the enemy of the good. At this 

stage, the CoC initiative has also signalled a recognition of the difficulties 

experienced at the United Nations. 

A Peculiar EU Expertise for Sensitive Situations 

In some sense, this has also explained this unusual level of involvement of 

the EU in this initiative. The whole history of the EU political integration 

can indeed be conceived as a parallel to this institutional and legal debate. 

Conceiving a collective “Common Foreign and Defense Policy” has always 

proved to be impossible for EU despite many decades of high-level 

discussions between Member States. Clearly, issues associated with national 

sovereignties have prevented EU from finding a common political agreement 

on a common defence policy. No EU “ministry of defence” would exist for a 

long time. As mentioned, this has put the EU in a position to look for a 

narrow path, helping making progress in terms of defence and security while 

not equipped with any integrated legally binding mechanism. This path has 

been under construction for many years now, ending up with many ad-hoc 

agreements on many concrete steps dealing with security at large, without 

going into details of any military decision-making process per se, that has 

remained under the control of individual Member States. While this process 

has demonstrated many shortcomings, it has also allowed reinforcing 

collective decision on security issues, possibly leading to sending EU 

mandated material, and sometimes personal, in operations, for example for 

securing maritime routes or helping resolve humanitarian crises. The EU has 

seen the glass half-full. 

In a more profound 

way, this may show 

that a Code of 

Conduct-based 

solution may not be 

irremediably opposed 

to any treaty-based 

solution in the longer 

term. 


The ICoC Project: A Way to Avoid Mutually Exclusive 

Approaches? 

A parallel with the security situation in space can be drawn directly from this 

way of proceeding. As this kind of aggiornamento may not be conceived as a 

definitive solution, even the most sceptical observers have recognised that it 

allows intervening in the best of collective interests, even if in a limited 

manner. A similar situation may prevail for those space security issues that 

will have to be tackled in the short term and that certainly puts EU in a 

position to exert its peculiar expertise in effective “quick fixes”. 

In a more profound way, this may show that a Code of Conduct-based 

solution may not be irremediably opposed to any treaty-based solution in the 

longer term. It can certainly be admitted that the particular urgency of the 

security situation in space can motivate some form of political pragmatism 

and lead the main spacefaring nations to get to agree on an acceptable modus 

vivendi as represented by something like a CoC and based on those nations' 

good will. But of course, such a first move may also signal a general intent on 

behalf of the state parties to look for a more long-term and engaging legal 

solution, possibly leading to a future common agreed treaty. In any case, one 

immediate advantage of proceeding in such an incremental manner would be 

to provide more time to discuss possible contentious elements of any future 

text without blocking the whole discussion process altogether. As a matter of 

fact, it can even be advanced that a first step in that direction, allowing 

testing new relationships between states, may likely help in elaborating 

further rules in greater mutual confidence, based on this previous experience. 

Faced with the resistance displayed today by countries unwilling to get legally 

engaged in a quickly-defined treaty, the CoC path might then well be 

conceived as a necessary first step to create mutual confidence and 

knowledge, precisely paving the way for more definitive frameworks. In this 

respect, very much in line with the EU experience, the “soft law” approach 

(as often labelled by sceptical lawyers) may end up proving to be an effective 

way to progressively create consolidated relationships while addressing urgent 

issues. Whatever the solution envisioned, space certainly deserves to be at the 

centre of our collective thinking for the best of our collective security. 


Cyber Threats to Space Systems 

Christian Olarean 

Internet has gone through fundamental changes over the last 20 years. Since 

the 1990s, it has influenced various domains including trade, health, 

commerce, social media, and governance. Yet, how cyber space will develop 

remains unclear, especially in relation to threats, which impact space systems. 

Still, when it comes to a joint vision, many different views and uncertainties 

are visible in different definitions of cyber space, in different understandings 

of using cyber space. These differences beg the question as to whether a 

Code of Conduct for space activities is needed and what might be done 

further to mitigate the threats which impact space systems? 

Why Cyber in Space Security? 

There are at least four reasons why the international community should care 

about cyber security and space security. First, when policy makers from 

different countries are talking about this topic, they are wondering if this is 

really a big or real issue or if this is just something over advertised by the 

media. These individuals should be thinking about the challenges they will 

soon face. From an economic point of view, at the micro level, every one of 

us should care about our own cyber security; and at the macro level, our 

governments should be highly concerned about this issue. Moreover, with 

the current allegation of espionage by foreign intelligence agencies, such as 

digital industrial espionage, we need to extend our concerns on space 

systems, with regard, in particular, to companies which are capable of 

producing components incorporated in commercial satellites, which could be 

manipulated and used to extract or filter information with cyber tools. 

From an economic 

point of view, at the 

micro level, every one 

of us should care 

about our own cyber 

security; and at the 

macro level, our 

governments should 

be highly concerned 

about this issue. 

Moreover, with the 

current allegation of 

espionage by foreign 

intelligence agencies, 

such as digital 

industrial espionage, 

we need to extend our 

concerns on space 

systems, with regard, 

in particular, to 

companies which are 

capable of producing 

components 

incorporated in 

commercial satellites, 

which could be 

manipulated and 

used to extract or filter 

information with cyber 

tools. 

Cyber Threats to Space Systems | www.orfonline.org 101

Second, Internet looks different from ten years ago. The security 

environment is changing rapidly while we are trying to stabilise it, and there 

are different challenges. Malicious codes are spreading and people must deal 

with them on a day to day basis. A dramatic expansion of networked users 

and devices has developed in just the last few years. All of these factors 

expand the probability of becoming “infected”, and the biggest danger for 

the governments is not to be aware of this as they use infected satellites for 

coordinating critical infrastructures on the ground. 

Third, there is the big number of internet users who have shared computers 

that are connected to the Global Network (Internet). An internet user from 

one country can take action in a neighbouring country or other countries 

without actually being present physically at that place. This action can be with 

or without intention, but the most important issue is the potential to avoid 

national and international laws because of low levels of regulations or poor 

diplomatic relations between some countries. When the Internet was 

developed, just a few people understood what kinds of services and 

opportunities would develop and be available all over the world. 

Nevertheless, in the same time with this expanded development, systems 

became dependent on each other, and if one stopped working, it was very 

easy to have “cascade” events, where an entire network could collapse. One 

example of cyber interference with outer space activities could be a cyber 

attack that occurs before, during or after a launch of a satellite, using botnets. 

69 70 

Guidance systems could be attacked (through jamming and spoofing ) 

within that country or region, conducted by anyone ranging from freelance 

71 

hackers to terrorists to state-sponsored organisations. In this case, it is very 

easy to see a cascading negative effect into other systems: industrial launch 

machines will stop working, launch of the object could be delayed or 

trajectory changed and the space object could be destroyed by simply 

changing the launch parameters. 

The latest satellites use large computers for updating purposes and 

reconfiguration software, which again prove to be vulnerabilities to cyber 

attacks. One another method, which can be used is “grilling” – remotely 

changing the position of the solar panels to expose all to the Sun, to re-direct 

all their power to itself and burn it. Moreover, through a cyber attack, a 

72 

satellite could be brought down from the orbit. These are only some of the 

effects at the beginning of a list of possibilities that could lead to the 

crippling of critical information infrastructure and non-critical facilities 

related to space systems. 


Four, the “Internet security company McAfee stated in their 2007 annual 

report that approximately 120 countries have been developing ways to use 

the Internet as a weapon and the targets are financial markets, government 

73 

computer systems and utilities.” To the above-mentioned targets, one could 

add space systems. Without transparency and confidence building measures 

to create mutual understanding and trust between all actors and states 

involved in developing cyber and space systems, regional and global security 

could deteriorate. Therefore, a normative framework regulating cyber space 

and outer space activities is a must. 

A Code of Conduct for Cyber and Space Security? 

Firstly, there is no treaty, no bilateral, multilateral law or regulation applicable 

to cyber/space systems that could lead to treaties, bilateral agreements or to 

United Nations General Assembly resolutions. “The fundamental framework 

is provided by the UN Charter of the United Nations, which aims at 

74 

international peace and security by obliging Member States,” among other 

things, “to refrain from forceful measures against the integrity or 

independence of states, while at the same time respecting their right to self- 

75 

defence.” 

Secondly, with the emergence of new types of threats that are diffused and 

difficult to locate by traditional methods and means that we require a new 

approach to combine both political and economic-financial instruments to 

counter this phenomenon as a whole. We require new methods and 

techniques to influence the security context alongside traditional means of 

military force, ultimately aiming to amend the domestic and the international 

security rules because of vulnerabilities to the critical cyber infrastructure 

and defence strategy of every country. 

Cyberspace has already proven to be one of the primary drivers of 

international economic growth in the 21st century; the cyber domain should 

also be seen as a vulnerable domain that should be protected. However, this 

can change only if the unregulated cyber world as well as the outer space 

environment is brought under a more regulated framework, which could 

provide more sustainability and safety in outer and cyber space. 

One example of cyber 

interference with outer 

space activities could 

be a cyber attack that 

occurs before, during 

or after a launch of a 

satellite, using 

botnets. Guidance 

systems could be 

attacked (through 

jamming and 

spoofing) within that 

country or region, 

conducted by anyone 

ranging from 

freelance hackers to 

terrorists to statesponsored 

organisations. 


The Benefits of an ICoC 

There are several advantages to a potential ICoC. First, because it is in the 

state's best interest; if not, it will not be followed. Non-legally binding tools 

and frameworks are often useful in a sense that they provide a level of 

76 

flexibility, which is not possible with binding treaties. As has been seen with 

norms of behaviour that have been developed in other domains, these rules 

77 

can be amended with relative ease as circumstances change. This allows 

various options to be tested before formal agreements are sought. 

Furthermore, non-binding tools can be used as a mechanism for 

harmonising national laws and practices, allowing states to move towards 

adherence, while keeping within their economic and technological 

78 

capacities. Non-legally binding tools and frameworks would permit 

incremental movement towards solutions on issues that need to be addressed 

in a timely manner, especially on those issues where political obstacles can 

79 

make the negotiation of legal instruments a protracted process. 

For example, one of the most important CoCs is the Hague Code of 

Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). The HCoC is aimed 

at bolstering efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide and to 

further delegitimise such proliferation. The HCOC consists of a set of 

general principles, modest commitments, and limited confidence-building 

measures. It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR), and is administered collectively by all of the 

80 

Subscribing States”. HCOC was “formally brought into effect on 

November 25, 2002, at a Launching Conference hosted by the Netherlands 

at The Hague. The U.S. actively participated in the conference and is one of 

the original Subscribing States to HCOC (formerly known as the 

International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation - 

ICOC). The HCOC has been signed by more states than the Outer Space 

Treaty (OST), though it is not legally binding. As of January 2014, 138 

countries have subscribed to HCOC. 

Because of the lack of progress on legally binding instruments within 

traditional fora, combined with a sense of urgency on the part of the 

international community to address stability and sustainability issues in cyber 

security and space security, alternative options are being sought by 

81 

policymakers to address threats in cyber space. “It is this drive for progress 


that could lead policymakers to focus on developing non-legally binding 

solutions that help establish norms for responsible cyber space nations in the 

near term … [while] a cyber space treaty could take many years to negotiate 

82 

and decades to enter into force.” 

So, why norms of behaviour? While it has been many years since a formal 

space law instrument has been adopted, the United Nations General 

Assembly recently adopted the United Nations Space Debris Mitigation 

Guidelines, prepared by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the 

COPUOS, in order to make tangible progress on the issue of space debris 

83 

rather than no progress at all. Such small steps can be helpful in the 

safeguarding of political momentum on most important issues. 

Norms of behaviour are also often seen as being useful because they provide 

a level of flexibility that is not possible with traditional, highly structured, 

84 

legally binding treaties. As has been seen with norms of behaviour in other 

domains, such as aerospace and maritime activities, rules of the road can be 

amended with relative ease as circumstances and needs change. This allows 

different frameworks to be tested, giving the international community an 

opportunity to measure the effectiveness of specific approaches. 

Furthermore, norms of behaviour can be used as a tool for harmonising 

national laws and practices, giving states ample room to move towards 

adherence in accordance with their own economic and technological 

85 

capacities. Moreover, it could establish an effective behaviour that will allow 

cyber users to continue receiving benefits from information and 

communications technologies (ICTs). On the same lines, it could give 

guidance on responsible behaviour in cyber space, for civil use and military. 

If there is a better understanding of cyber warfare, a threat for space 

systems, the existence of a CoC will be more appropriate and could: 

• 

• 

Address the needs of a wide range of states with varying levels of 

development; 

Encourage adherence to internationally accepted norms of behaviour 

in cyber and space security. 

As has been seen 

with norms of 

behaviour in other 

domains, such as 

aerospace and 

maritime activities, 

rules of the road can 

be amended with 

relative ease as 

circumstances and 

needs change. This 

allows different 

frameworks to be 

tested, giving the 

international 

community an 

opportunity to 

measure the 

effectiveness of 

specific approaches. 

If a CoC emerges, it will be important to look at legal instruments such as 

the Geneva Conventions and UN Charter. The difficult question is how to 

apply these in cyber space and outer space. Because there are no rules in the 

cyber domain, a CoC could be one way to establish a framework, especially if 


the main cyber powers agree on these conceptual rules. A treaty will not be 

established until sufficient CBMs exist. For the first stage, a CoC will have 

more advantages, and more countries will adhere to this than a treaty. 

Treaties which regulate international relations could also be applied in cyber 

space. Even if there are no rules, the international community and important 

countries could adapt existing rules from International Law where they do 

not have an answer for cyber space, and here it is very important to have a 

CoC. Moreover, a CoC will increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation. At 

the moment, it is more important to have bilateral agreements and certain 

rules of behavior, at least at this level, if not at regional and international 

levels. When a country is developing a cyber-security strategy, it should take 

into account and have a discussion with neighbouring countries, to be able to 

have a secure cyber and outer space. 

Another recent example of a CoC is the International Code of Conduct for 

Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). “On 9 November 2010, 58 private 

security companies met to sign an ICoC in which they pledged to respect 

human rights in their activities and to comply with international humanitarian 

law. The multi-stakeholder initiative for this document, the first of its kind, 

was launched jointly by Switzerland and supported by private security 

companies, as well as various industry associations, government customers, 

humanitarian and civil society organisations. The Code of Conduct for 

Private Security Service Providers aims to set industry principles and 

standards based on international human rights and humanitarian law, as well 

as to improve the transparency and responsibility of the industry. By 

December 2013, around 600 security companies had signed the ICoC with 

86 

continuing industry support and more companies continuing to sign”. 

Conclusion 

This essay looks at cyber threats as a means to influence and affect space 

systems. A Code of Conduct could possibly impose non-binding “sanctions” 

on countries, non-state actors or name individuals if they use this domain for 

malicious purposes. According to International Law, offensive initiators 

could be charged and punished for these actions. 

The private sector is the one that owns and operates the greater part of the 

87 

worldwide networks and services that forms cyberspace, and most of the 

times is not present or engaged in the discussions related with a CoC. 


During major cyber-attacks - such as the attacks against Estonia in 2007, 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 2008, Lithuania in 2008, and against 

Aramco, a Saudi Arabian national oil company in 2012 - the private sector 

proved itself a crucial part of effective cyber responses. Authorities had to 

rely on trusted communities of computer and information engineers, 

network operators, and numerous experts from national companies affected 

in these attacks. Importantdiscussions on cyber security would therefore 

benefit from private industry participation. Governments, together with the 

private sector and other appropriate stakeholders, can address and develop 

valuable cyber security norms – both at the national and international level – 

improving risk management and resiliency. New cooperation models are 

needed now, and the role of private sector in cyber security policies is vital. 

Given that cyber space is globalised, it is imperative that all cyber space 

actors are engaged in cyber space security initiatives. Only such 

comprehensive processes can bring about a more secure cyber and space 

network. 

Considering that the progress in implementing the Code will be monitored 

through the meetings of the Parties and that the Code will be revised and 

updated as necessary in light of the forthcoming developments in cyberspace 

and in close relation with space regulations and legislations, all parties should 

collaborate in the fulfilment and implementation of the objectives and 

principles contained in the Code. It is necessary that all countries contribute 

to the development of this legislation and not just the major players. 

In any case, it is better to have a CoC than nothing at all, even if this is 

weaker than a treaty. There is a clear need to bring the international 

community together on how cyber and space security issues are dealt with in 

the future. 


Reference 

A. Kerrest, “Treaty vs resolution”, 2009. 

C. Brunner and G. Konigsberger, “'Regulatory Impact Assessment'—a tool to strengthen 

soft law regulations”, in I. Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of 

Non-Binding Norms in International Space Law, 2012. 

General Assembly, Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its Forty-Fourth 

Session, Held in Vienna from 12 to 23 February 2007. 

In the Crossfire – McAfee, Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Cyber War, 

www.mcafee.com/.../reports/rp-in-crossfire-critical-infrastructure-cyb. 

M. Krepon, “Origins of and rationale for a space code of conduct”, in A. Lele (ed.), 

Decoding the InternationalCode of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 2012. 

S. Aoki, “The function of 'soft law' in the development of international space law”, in I. 

Marboe (ed.), “Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 

International Space Law”, 2012. 

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.Accessed on 21st January 2014. Accessible at: 

http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/coc.html. 

U.S. Department of State.http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/101466.htm.See also Austrian 

Foreign Ministry. http://www.bmeia.gv.at/index.php?id=64664&L=1. 

UN Charter. http://un.org/uncharter/. Accessed on 21 January 2014. 

UNIDIR, Emerging Security Threats, “Norms of Behaviour: a Possible Option to Maintain 

the Growth of Asia–Pacific Space Activities”, Sec1:2. 

http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/norms-of-behaviour-a-possibleoption-to-maintain-the-growth-of-asia-pacific-space-activities-en-416.pdf. 

UNIDIR, Emerging Security Threats, “The Role of Norms of Behaviour in African Outer 

Space Activities”, Sec1:4. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-roleof-norms-of-behaviour-in-african-outer-space-activities-en-418.pdf. 


University Micro-Nano Satellites: 

Need for ICoC for Their Sustainable 

Use 

Gayantha R. L. Kodikara 

The ICoC is an important non-legally binding code that is open to all states 

on a voluntary basis in order to make outer space safer and more secure for 

the conduct of various space operations. The ICoC has correctly identified 

various issues regarding the notification of outer space activities by states and 

should be applied to issues arising from sustainable use of small satellite 

missions undertaken by universities. Due to the rapid expansion of small 

satellite programmes at universities all over the world, ICoC could be further 

fine-tuned to address the specific points identified hereunder. 

In recent years, micro and nano satellites, classified as having a mass ranging 

88 

between 10-100 kg and less than 10 kg respectively, appear to be emerging 

89 

as a growing industry even, at the university level, due to their low cost, 

90 

short development time and relative simplicity. Due to their small size, cost 

effectiveness and simple manufacturing requirements, it is possible to launch 

tens of micro and nano satellites in a single launch vehicle (E.g. PSLV C09 

and PSLV C20 mission by Indian Space Research Organization, India) for a 

91 

wide range of civil and military applications. 

In addition to that, more frequent mission opportunities with a large variety 

of missions supporting the rapid expansion of technical, scientific 

knowledge and experience with international, local and small industries, 

92 

creates a wide spectrum of potential users and potential builders. It also 

University micro and 

nano-satellite 

development 

programmes have 

been recognised not 

only as an important 

tool to provide a 

space technology 

research environment 

by producing space 

scientists and 

engineers for the 

future, but also having 

the potential to open 

a new way of space 

development, by 

providing far lower 

cost and quicker 

access to space. 

University Micro-Nano Satellites: | www.orfonline.org 109

provides ground-breaking opportunities for space engineering education by 

enabling students to get hands-on experience on one complete cycle of a 

space project, starting from basic ideas to designing, manufacturing, testing 

on the ground, providing feedback on the results, launching, ground-based 

93 

operations and analysing results received from the satellite. 

University micro and nano-satellite development programmes have been 

recognised not only as an important tool to provide a space technology 

research environment by producing space scientists and engineers for the 

future, but also having the potential to open a new way of space 

94 

development, by providing far lower cost and quicker access to space. In 

addition to the common objectives mentioned above, numerous universities 

have developed their own specific objectives, such as establishment of 

centres of excellence for the development and usage of micro-satellites and 

complementing the development efforts of satellite application requirements 

95 

by providing a micro-satellite platform for technology development. The 

existence of these objectives demonstrates that many universities consider 

building micro-satellites a priority over other national or service-oriented 

objectives. 

University satellite programmes are usually subjected to strong economic 

budget restrictions. Expensive state-of-the-art hardware, with high durability 

and reliability, is not, therefore, generally used. Manufacturing of satellites 

cannot follow previous fixed rigid design but must be realised by trial-anderror 

techniques and continuous improvements. It is too difficult to develop 

a robust satellite within the short time provided by regular university courses 

(generally two years) with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, 

96 

which are not readily available. Therefore, a short development period is 

necessary. This can also lead to severe limitations for students in terms of 

respecting international spacecraft manufacturing standards issued by 

international organisations such as the International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO), European Cooperation for Standardization (ECS), or 

by space agencies such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

97 

(NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA). 

Due to all of the above reasons, if the popularity of small satellite missions 

at universities grows significantly, the number of micro and nano satellites 

will increase steadily in the most populated low earth orbit (LEO) region, 

likely creating more space debris and increasing the risk of collision risk with 

each other. 


Space debris, as described before, are man-made objects and their fragments 

launched into space, including launch-related objects, explosion fragments, 

collision fragments, sodium-potassium liquid coolant droplets, and slag 

98 

particles from solid rocket motor (SRM) firings, all of which are inactive 

and travel at orbital velocities without serving any functional purposes. This 

can all generate large quantities of smaller debris by themselves and by 

collision with each other. It has been estimated by several models that the 

amount of space debris will increase exponentially, creating very serious 

hazards to near-earth space activities (e.g. collision with a metallic particle of 

one cm radius is energetically equivalent to a collision with a half tonne car 

99 

moving at a speed of 100 km/h). In particular, the LEO region, extending 

from the beginning of the space environment up to an altitude of 2000 km, 

is the most densely populated orbit in terms of number of space objects. 

Simulations also demonstrated that, even if the orbital debris population 

remained as it is with no further objects added to space, the level of 

100 

fragmentation in LEO will continue to increase exponentially. 

Unfortunately, the current trend of “University Micro-Nano Satellite 

Programmes,” objects entering to LEO region are steadily increasing, and so, 

effective measures to mitigate space debris are becoming urgent. It appears 

that a combination of mitigation measures aiming to reduce generation of 

space debris during design, manufacture, operation, and disposal phases of 

the mission as well as remediation measures aiming to manage the existing 

space debris population through debris removal is the only way to guarantee 

101 

sustainable future use of the near earth environment. 

The following counter measures and remedies are, therefore, suggested to 

reduce the amount of space debris while conducting small satellite missions 

at universities: 

• 

• 

• 

designing of space systems so that they do not become space debris; 

that is, positive end of life processing of satellites and the 

establishment of proper disposal procedure for rocket upper stage; 

encouraging students to equip their satellites with end-of-life de-orbit 

102 

and orbital life time reduction capabilities; The de-orbiting system 

could be designed with the aims of teaching the importance of 

103 

avoiding the creation of dangerous space debris; 

larger size satellite remnants that do not have self-removal 

capabilities, which has to be removed from economically and 


104 

scientifically useful orbits to disposal orbits; could be handled by 

designing a small satellite with electro-dynamic tether (EDT) package 

105 

or a robot arm to capture the non-corporative targets. 

In order to safeguard the sustainable use of outer space for current and 

future generations, it is clear that more attention should be paid to the 

sustainable utilisation of university small satellite programmes, which are 

blooming in developed and developing countries. This new trend has more 

advantages for space technology education and technological advancement 

for developed and developing nations, without proper management and 

guidance. This will create more disadvantages to the future generations by 

polluting and delimiting the orbits for future important satellite missions. 

Therefore, we have identified some important points for consideration in the 

course of the discussions on ICoC. 

1) “In order to minimise the creation of outer space debris and to 

mitigate its impact, the subscribing states commit to limit, to the 

greatest extent practicable, any activities in the conduct of routing 

space operations, including during the launch and the entire orbital 

life time of a space object” (Article 4.3). 

According to this, the most important step is the selection of micromini 

satellites for a single launch vehicle. It has to be correctly chosen 

based on their national and global significance, life time and deorbiting 

facilities at the end of the mission, instead of filling the 

space and weight of launch vehicle, and fulfilling the commercial 

launch service agreements. Universities are also expected to follow 

ICoC in addition to their own policies and procedures to mitigate the 

debris in space (Article 4.1), because satellites do not follow the 

geographical boundaries as demarcated on Earth. Addressing the 

issues at the university or national level may not, therefore, be very 

helpful for the sustainable use of space. The objectives of the 

university small satellite missions should be compliant with national 

or global interest and with their space policies, instead of having 

competition among the universities or among the private sectors. 

2) “Rapid dissemination of knowledge and experience through the 

educational process in international and local level” (Article 6.3). 


This article in the ICoC mentions that the Subscribing States, 

particularly those with relevant space capabilities and with 

programmes for the exploration and use of outer space, are 

encouraged to contribute to promoting and fostering international 

cooperation in outer space activities, giving particular attention to the 

benefit and interest of developing countries. Micro-nano satellite 

programmes at universities create a platform to develop space 

technology in developing countries through educational scholarships 

and joint education programmes by states that have the relevant 

space capabilities. It is also important for ICoC to give priorities to 

encourage the educational sector to spread awareness about the 

importance of the responsibility of states to take all appropriate 

measures, including the development of policies and laws, in order to 

prevent outer space from becoming an arena of conflict. 

3) Following the international spacecraft manufacturing standards issued 

by international organisations or by space agencies is crucial for 

improving the quality of satellites, which can help minimise the risk 

of collision, the creation of space debris, harmful radio frequency 

interference, among other issues. It is also important to emphasise 

the importance of getting international manufacturing standard 

certificates for university satellites before sending them into space. 

4) Students should be encourage to developed their small satellites with 

end of-life de-orbit and orbital life time reduction capabilities, or even 

design a small satellite with the aim of active debris removal. More 

research opportunities and funding should be provided in this regard 

in order to guarantee the sustainable use of circumterrestrial space. 


Reference 

Argoun, Mohamed B., 2012. “Recent design and utilization trends of small satellites in 

developing countries”, ActaAstronautica, 71: 119-128. 

Castronuovo, Marco M., 2011. “Active space debris removal—A preliminary mission analysis 

and design”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 69, No. 9-10: 848-859. 

DeLuca, L.T. et al., 2013. “Active space debris removal by a hybrid propulsion module”, 

ActaAstronautica, Vol. 91: 20-33. 

Graziani, Filippo, Piergentili, Fabrizio and Santoni, Fabio, 2010. “A space standards 

application to university-class microsatellites: The UNISATexperience”, 

ActaAstronautica, Vol. 66, No. 9-10: 1534-1543. 

Kramer, Herbert J. and Cracknell, Arthur P., 2008. “An overview of small satellites in remote 

sensing” International Journal of Remote Sensing, Vol. 29, No. 15: 4285 - 4337. 

Liou, J.-C. and Johnson, Nicholas L., 2009. “A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of active 

debris removal in LEO”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 64, No. 2-3: 236-243. 

Liou, J.-C., Johnson, Nicholas L. and Hill, N.M., 2010. “Controlling the growth of future 

LEO debris populations with active debris removal”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 66, 

No. 5-6: 648-653. 

Nakasuka, Shinichi et al., 2010. “Evolution from education to practical use in University of 

Tokyo's nano-satellite activities”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 66, No. 7-8: 1099-1105. 

Nishida, Shin-Ichiro and Kawamoto, Satomi, 2011. “Strategy for capturing of a tumbling 

space debris”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 68, No. 1-2: 113-120. 

Nishida, Shin-Ichiro, Kawamoto, Satomi, Okawa, Yasushi, Terui, Fyuto and Kitamura, Shoji, 

2009. “Space debris removal system using a small satellite”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 

65, No. 1-2: 95-102. 

Singer, Michael J. and Musacchio, John T., 2011. “An International Environmental 

Agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations”, 


Smirnov, N.N., Kiselev, A.B., Kondratyev, K.A. and Zolkin, S.N., 2010. “Impact of debris 

particles on space structures modeling”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 67, No. 3-4: 333- 

343. 

Thyagarajan, K., Gupta, J.P., Goel, P.S. and Jayaraman, K., 2005. “University small satellite 

program—ANUSAT”, ActaAstronautica, Vol. 56, No. 1-2: 89-97. 


Walker, R., Martin, C.E., Stokes, P.H. and Klinkrad, H., 2002. “Sensitivity of long-term 

orbital debris environment evolution to the deployment of nano-satellite swarms”, 


Xue, Yong, Li, Yingjie, Guang, Jie, Zhang, Xlaoye and Guo, Jianping, 2008. “Small satellite 

remote sensing and applications – history, current and future”, International 

Journal of Remote Sensing, Vol. 29, No. 15: 4339 - 4372. 

International Code of Conduct of Outer Space Activities, http://eeas.europa.eu/nonproliferation-anddisarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_16_sept_2013_en.pdf. 

Reference | www.orfonline.org 115

ICoC for Outer Space Activities: An 

106 

Industry Perspective 

Dr. Ýbrahim ÖZ 

Industry as an actor is not prominently covered in the current draft of the 

ICoC. From an industry perspective, the following needs to be highlighted. 

“1.4. Subscription to this Code is open to all States, on a voluntary basis. This 

Code is not legally binding.” The Code can be opened for contribution not 

only to states but also to other parties of the satellite industry such as satellite 

operators, satellite manufacturers, ground station manufacturers and 

organisations. As such, harmful radio frequency interference reduction and 

elimination studies run by organisations such as the Satellite Interference 

Reduction Group (SIRG, http://satirg.org/) and ground station equipment 

manufacturers could be organised and promoted. 

“4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, to... 

improve adherence to, and implementation of International 

Telecommunication Union regulations on allocation of radio spectra and 

orbital assignments, and on addressing harmful radio-frequency 

interference.” Harmful radio-frequency interference is a continuous danger 

that causes severe damage to satellite communications and results in loss of 

significant revenue. We appreciate that this problem has been addressed here 

and it is understood that this Code will try to resolve the ever-worsening 

issue. 

The Code can be 

opened for 

contribution not only 

to states but also to 

other parties of the 

satellite industry such 

as satellite operators, 

satellite 

manufacturers, 

ground station 

manufacturers and 

organisations. 

As being one of the top discussion topics in satellite communication 

conferences, it is no surprise that the harmful radio-frequency interference is 

one of the biggest problems of the satellite communication industry. 

ICoC for Outer Space Activities: An Industry Perspective | www.orfonline.org 117

Interference is accidental in most cases but reports show that deliberate 

interference occurrences are growing in frequency. There is no easy 

resolution, since identifying the source of accidental interference is hard 

enough, whereas identification of the source and resolution of deliberate 

interference is almost impossible when the interferer knows his job. 

International deliberate interference is also a common occurrence now and 

existing regulations are, unfortunately, not enough to stop such deliberate 

interference. 

The Code could handle this issue by giving it higher importance, placing this 

topic under a separate title since it is a major problem and is completely 

different from physical space debris. Existing work being carried out to 

prevent harmful interference could be promoted. For this purpose, a separate 

working group could be established by subscribing entities to promote 

cooperation over interference avoidance activities, education and technology. 

Such a working group could contribute through the publication of guidelines 

and standards to avoid interference. In addition, improving communication 

by means of a common interference database between entities to report and 

resolve interference occurrences is crucial. 

“4.4. To that purpose, they resolve to adopt and implement, in accordance 

with their own internal processes, the appropriate policies and procedures or 

other effective measures in order to implement the Space Debris Mitigation 

Guidelines of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space as endorsed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217 

(2007).” Apart from the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, 

both of which concern state liability for damage caused by satellites in space, 

there are no treaties regulating space debris but there are non-binding 

international guidelines. For example, ýn December 2007, the United Nations 

General Assembly endorsed the Debris Mitigation Guidelines adopted by its 

COPUOS. The guidelines direct satellite and launch vehicle operators to 

consider measures to limit the probability of accidental collisions in orbit. 

In 2010, the International Telecommunication Union recommended “that 

before complete exhaustion of its propellant, a geostationary satellite at the 

end of its life should be removed from the GSO region” and be boosted to a 

“graveyard” storage orbit, “such that under the influence of perturbing 

forces on its trajectory, it would subsequently remain in an orbit with a 

perigee no less than 200 km above the geostationary altitude.” 


Addressing Challenges in Space 

through New Multilateral Processes 

Beatrice Fihn and Gabriella Irsten 

Introduction 

In today's interconnected world, it is more apparent than ever that some of 

the main security challenges we face are global problems that cut across 

borders. Much like climate change, the financial crisis and migration flows, 

such problems need to be tackled as a community as no state can adequately 

protect itself alone. 

The past two decades have witnessed an increasingly larger presence of 

activities in space, not only by the traditional space powers like the U.S., 

Russia and Europe, but also from African, Latin American and Asian states. 

This significant increase of space activities means that the continued absence 

of a solid regime of rules in space could potentially harm the future of our 

space endeavours, no matter what country one is from. 

Space is one of few global commons that border every community on earth. 

It has become an increasingly important factor for the economy, 

communications and development. As our dependency on space assets has 

grown, it is becoming increasingly important to address the issue of safety 

and security in space, and to preserve this unique environment so all can use 

it responsibly. 

Space is one of few 

global commons that 

border every 

community on earth. It 

has become an 

increasingly important 

factor for the 

economy, 

communications and 

development. As our 

dependency on 

space assets has 

grown, it is becoming 

increasingly important 

to address the issue 

of safety and security 

in space, and to 

preserve this unique 

environment so all 

can use it responsibly. 

Just like with climate change and international finance, space is truly one of 

those issues of global concern. One major mistake by someone on the other 

side of the globe has the potential to seriously affect all of us. It could harm 


those with assets in space, those that use assets in space, and those that will 

use such assets in the future. At the same time, no state or international 

organisation possesses the sovereign authority or responsibility for regulating 

space. 

So as the space sector and our dependence on it continues to evolve rapidly, 

it is a continued challenge for the international community to adapt fast in 

order to understand how to deal with space security, as a part of the overall 

picture of the global security environment. It therefore follows that any 

adequate response to ensure space security needs to be a global one, where 

the international community works together to prevent significant harmful 

behavior. 

Unfortunately, the international policymaking community has been unable to 

achieve any global tools that will help address the concerns that increasing 

outer space activities has led to. Traditional multilateral forums like the CD, 

the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) or the UNGA 

have failed to achieve any tangible results, largely because international 

discussions tend to apply the consensus rule, or the idea that all governments 

need to be fully onboard before agreements can be made. 

Over the last two decades, most international agreements on security and 

disarmament issues have developed through more dynamic processes, with a 

smaller group of states driving the agenda forward. Negotiations on issues 

like landmines or cluster munitions showed that a committed group of 

international policy-makers can take the lead in developing norms to address 

global problems, no matter if all governments are initially on board or not. 

107 

The ICoC is, therefore, an example of a recent trend in security policies, to 

move beyond deadlocked forums and traditional framing of problems, to 

encouraging creative thinking and alternative methods of moving forward. 

While the code is intended to be a voluntary and non-binding agreement, it is 

a first step towards addressing the global security concerns caused by our 

increased presence in outer space. The ICoC is a creative attempt to move a 

stagnated issue forward, and with this initiative, the EU might have rescued 

the space issue from the deadlocked bodies of the UN. However, the ICoC is 

far from a complete solution for the challenges in outer space that the 

international community is facing. 


Making the International Code of Conduct Work 

One of the strengths of the ICoC is that it is a proposed “soft law” measure. 

At times, when some governments seem reluctant to negotiate legally binding 

treaties, space security might be more easily discussed in the form of 

voluntary agreements or TCBMs. A soft law can help define responsible 

activities and set out agreed norms of behaviour when legally binding 

agreements cannot be reached. It can also work as an intermediate step 

towards legal and political measures. Furthermore the Code's non-legally 

binding nature means it does not contradict any other on-going discussions, 

for example on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in 

the Conference on Disarmament. Quite the opposite, the ICoC has the 

potential to stimulate the discussions on a treaty preventing the placement of 

108 

weapons in outer space (PPWT). 

Despite the fact that the ICoC was originally drafted by the EU member 

states, the process of developing it further has included a number of regional 

meetings and international consultations. These regional meetings and 

international consultations have enabled participation from emerging space 

actors and states with a future interest in space. Since its launch in 2012, the 

process to finalise an ICoC has aimed to be an inclusive process, open to all 

states interested in the issue. The different regional seminars, organised 

through the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, have 

enabled the creation of more in-depth knowledge for emerging space actors, 

giving these governments a better platform to engage in the international 

consultations regarding the code. The regional meetings fostered more 

detailed discussions around space security and allowed for many states with 

109 

smaller space programmes to have a stronger voice on this issue. 

However, the process to negotiate an ICoC has also highlighted certain 

tensions between states with more advanced space programmes and 

emerging space actors. When the Soviet Union and the U.S. first embarked 

on their space activities, hardly any limitations or restrictions were in place, 

which made it both easier and cheaper for them to develop their national 

space programmes. 

However, the process 

to negotiate an ICoC 

has also highlighted 

certain tensions 

between states with 

more advanced 

space programmes 

and emerging space 

actors. When the 

Soviet Union and the 

U.S. first embarked on 

their space activities, 

hardly any limitations 

or restrictions were in 

place, which made it 

both easier and 

cheaper for them to 

develop their national 

space programmes. 

Much like in climate change discussions, several emerging space actors are 

now reluctant to develop restrictions on space activities. It could be argued 

that international rules could mean constraints for the development of their 

space programme, which could lead to slowing down national development. 


It can be argued that new regulations in space would have never been needed 

unless the first actors in space had not developed their programmes without 

due consideration for the long-term sustainability of the space environment. 

There has been an inherent suspicion throughout this process, as it is led by a 

small group of wealthy countries with already advanced space programmes. 

ICoC has been criticised to be a tool to limit new states from developing 

their own space programmes and that ICoC is interfering with domestic 

110 

policy-making of nations, which are already developing outer space policies 

on their own initiative. Many of the 'new' space nations are countries which 

are facing direct climate change effects in the form of natural disasters and 

are, therefore, dependent on satellites and space programmes for their 

disasters risk reductions and early warning programmes. As it looks today, 

many of these states are relying on buying and receiving weather forecasts 

etc. from outside sources, which not only prolongs information gathering but 

is also costly. 

The ICoC process has fed into many of the above-mentioned “suspicions,” 

largely due to the lack of transparency within the process. The EU has, since 

the beginning, faced difficulties dealing with transparency as it often works in 

secrecy and closed forums where the only publicly-shared information 

usually is the already agreed upon final outcome. Some of these traits apply 

to the ICoC process. This has been highly visible for many countries, which 

111 

feel they were not sufficiently consulted in the drafting process. 

Furthermore, the EU has, for example, not been clear on what the text of 

the code will look like, what aspect of space will be included and what the 

overall process will look like. Criticism has also been raised within the EU by 

member states of the lack of clarity of the process. 

The lack of civil society participation and interest is another challenge for the 

ICoC process. Although a few experts from civil space companies and 

academia have been included in the regional seminar, a wider mobilisation of 

public opinion through civil society has been absent. Non-governmental 

organisations (NGOs) are, today, essential parts of successful multilateral 

processes. There is no lack of international challenges and problems that 

need to be solved today, and civil society plays a crucial part in making 

governments pay attention to specific issues and place it higher on the 

political agenda. Without civil society pressure, there are very few immediate 

consequences for governments failing to act. An engaged and active civil 

society will demand results from governments, effectively raising the stakes 


of negotiations and creating more incentives for decision-makers to achieve 

agreements. 

Millions of individuals increasingly rely on space on a daily basis for 

providing essential services, including weather forecasting, communications, 

search-and-rescue operations and navigation. This issue is, therefore, not 

only a concern for government officials and private corporations acting in 

space, but should be an interest for the wider public. Civil society 

participation is a crucial part of ensuring that this issue gets the attention it 

deserves. 

Conclusion 

The process of developing an ICoC has been a welcome step forward in 

addressing the global concerns around sustainable space behaviour. As the 

world grow more and more dependent on space activities, governments need 

to take responsibility for protecting the global environment and ensuring safe 

behaviour. Though not legally binding, an international code could be the 

most significant normative step that captures the interests of all current 

space faring nations, but also the future ones. 

It is encouraging to see a group of governments like the EU taking 

responsibility for a global problem and working towards concrete efforts to 

solve such issues. This is a part of a bigger trend in international security and 

disarmament processes, as it avoids certain states being able to block 

progress. 

However, these kinds of processes also provide a set of challenges. In order 

for the ICoC to become a successful global norm-setting tool, the supportive 

states must make more efforts to listen to considerations and concerns from 

governments around the world. 

However, these kinds 

of processes also 

provide a set of 

challenges. In order 

for the ICoC to 

become a successful 

global norm-setting 

tool, the supportive 

states must make 

more efforts to listen 

to considerations and 

concerns from 

governments around 

the world. 

The EU needs to continue building support and holding consultations on the 

Code, and encouraging governments to engage in the process of finalising 

ICoC. The EU should focus on ensuring the broad participation of a wide 

range of actors, such as regional diverse group of states, regional and 

international organisations and civil society. As the ICoC process is taking 

place outside the traditional forums in the UN, it is particularly important to 


make sure that the process is kept transparent and inclusive to ensure as 

much support as possible. 

It is obvious that ICoC will not be able to fully address the challenges the 

international community is facing in space. It cannot replace negotiated 

treaties that explicitly ban certain damaging actions in outer space. As a 

voluntary code, it cannot be enforced or monitored very efficiently. There are 

some concerns that an ICoC will not be able to prevent further anti-satellite 

tests in outer space, or other worrying developments. The process of 

finalising ICoC must take these concerns into consideration. 

The Code might not be able to solve all the challenges we are facing in space, 

but it is an achievable goal that can create room needed for the international 

community, consisting of a broad and diverse group of stakeholders, to start 

addressing this issue seriously. 

Despite the many challenges, the process around ICoC has been a welcome 

contribution to understanding the complex environment that is outer space 

and kick-start discussions on how to keep it safe and secure. The multilateral 

consultations have encouraged governments to address the issue and build 

capacity amongst emerging space actors to participate actively in the 

discussions. In addition, it has the potential to stimulate other discussions in 

other forums, like discussions around a treaty preventing the placement of 

weapons in outer space (PPWT). The value of political processes is not 

limited to the text agreed upon at the end. A political process is also a part of 

a bigger movement on the issue, where consultations and negotiations in 

themselves can be confidence building, increase transparency and have a 

positive impact on a much wider spectrum of issues than the topic of the 

process. A political process will also automatically raise the issue on internal 

agendas and be given more attention and resources. A political process that 

includes emerging actors will be more likely to achieve this kind of success. 

By working together in a smaller group of states, the EU has contributed to a 

very valuable multilateral process, as it has the potential to provide a starting 

platform for discussions on how we protect space for future generations to 

use peacefully. 


III. 

Regional Views 

Regional Views | www.orfonline.org 125

The Proposed ICoC for Outer 

Space: An Australian Perspective 

Brett Biddington 

In March 2013, the Australian government launched a Cabinet-endorsed 

national space policy. The document is called Australia's Satellite Utilisation 

Policy and the title and content typifies Australia's approach to human space 

112 

endeavours since the dawn of the space age in the 1940s. The policy is 

utilitarian in content and outlook and places high value on a rules-based 

international order. 

Although Australia is not space faring, in the sense that it builds and launches 

satellites from its own territory, Canberra has played an active role in the 

113 

regulation of outer space, certainly from the early 1960s. From 1962 until 

1995, an Australian chaired the Science and Technology Sub-Committee of 

114 

the UN COPUOS. Since 2009, the Australian government has taken a 

renewed interest in the activities of COPUOS in Vienna as well as other 

international efforts including the Kiev meeting in May 2013 and the 

Bangkok meeting in November 2013, which were specially convened to 

discuss the draft ICoC for outer space activities. 

Although Australia is 

not space faring, in 

the sense that it 

builds and launches 

satellites from its own 

territory, Canberra has 

played an active role 

in the regulation of 

outer space, certainly 

from the early 1960s 

All nations, not just those that are space faring, have strong vested interests 

in ensuring that the space environment remains sufficiently safe for them to 

have assured and secure access to the satellite-based services on which they 

increasingly depend. These services – including communications, timing and 

navigation, and Earth observation data collection - may be thought of as 

critical infrastructure of global significance. The current regulatory 

framework for outer space, which was developed when there were few 

The Proposed ICoC for Outer Space: An Australian Perspective | www.orfonline.org 127

objects of human origin in orbit around Earth, is not capable of handling all 

of the challenges that space policymakers and satellite operators face today. 

Space is increasingly cluttered physically and contested politically. There is an 

urgent need to create some rules for space operations that all space faring 

nations are willing to abide by for their own good and for the common good. 

These rules would be observed routinely in normal circumstances, that is to 

say, in circumstances other than war, when normal relations by definition, are 

suspended. 

This paper comments on the contributions that middle powers can make in 

the international regulation of global commons, such as outer space, and 

explains why Australia is committed to seeing an ICoC successfully 

implemented. 

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities (ICoC) 

The EU first proposed the idea of a code of conduct for outer space 

activities in 2008. The Code aims to build trust between space faring nations 

to allow them to work together to “enhance the safety, security, and 

115 

sustainability of outer space activities”. The concept has developed since 

2008 and a fourth draft of the Code was released in September 2013. This 

116 

draft is stronger than earlier drafts and was the subject of “open-ended 

consultations” in Kiev and Bangkok in May and November 2013 respectively 

between interested nations, including the U.S., Russia, China, and India. 

The draft Code enumerates a number of space events and activities about 

which subscribing states agree to provide information and notice under the 

draft Code to the broader community. It also provides for a Central Point of 

Contact that will provide an organisational structure for the Code and 

maintain a database of relevant information that is provided to it by 

subscribing states. 

Much as the Antarctic Treaty steps around the territorial claims that have 

117 

been made by various nations in Antarctica, so the Code steps around the 

question of space weaponisation and overlooks attempts led by China and 

Russia in the Geneva-based CD to establish a treaty seeking to prevent an 

118 

arms race in outer space. 


The most important point of ICoC is that it is voluntary and unenforceable. 

There is no process to apply or enforce sanctions for conduct that violates 

the Code. Its success will depend entirely on the extent to which space faring 

nations that eventually subscribe to the Code actually abide by its provisions. 

A space Code of Conduct is not a panacea. However, while governments are 

willing to talk and listen to each other, they are engaging in the precise 

behaviours that are essential to improved transparency from which comes 

119 

understanding, trust and confidence. 

One Australian government official has provided an informal assessment 

that the draft considered in Bangkok represented a substantial improvement 

over those previously developed. The wording of ICoC is now about as firm 

and settled as is likely to be achieved. The task ahead is to ensure the 

adoption of ICoC by a sufficiently large number of nations as to give it 

120 

enough weight to be adhered to by the space faring nations. 

The Role of Small and Middle Powers 

When judging the effectiveness of any voluntary code, two basic criteria, 

though there may be others, come to mind. Subscribers to the code must: 

• 

• 

see value in voluntary compliance in terms of their own interests. 

The Code must deliver a benefit to them that might include reduced 

operational risks, a more certain trading environment, political kudos 

at home and abroad and economic benefit as well and 

believe that international opprobrium and loss of face will occur at 

an unacceptable level in the event that the code is seen to have been 

violated. 

This is where non-space faring nations have the capacity to exert influence. 

From a positive perspective, they can point to the benefits to their economies 

and the broader global economy, of being able to access space-based services 

that are secure and assured. From a negative perspective, in an increasingly 

networked world, they can point to the dependencies that space faring 

nations have on those that are non-space faring, notably access to raw 

materials and access to markets. In other words, non space faring nations can 

point to second, third and “n” order of effects or impacts (costs and 

benefits) that arise from a more secure or less secure operating environment 

in space. 


Non-space faring nations could support the Code and use its consultative 

and reporting mechanisms to facilitate restraint. Space faring nations may 

well think more carefully and act more cautiously with a widely endorsed 

Code in place than might be the case otherwise. 

Australia is well-placed to encourage medium and 

small powers to adopt the Code. 

Australia's Place in the World 

Australia's international standing and influence is defined by three numbers, 

one large and two small. The large number relates to the sheer size of the 

continent and, even more so, the surrounding seas and oceans for which the 

nation has sovereign or international obligations; in sum, around 13 per cent 

121 

of the total surface of the Earth. The first small number relates to 

population; there are 23 million people in Australia, representing less than 

122 

0.4% of the world's population. The second small number relates to the 

economy. In 2012, although the Australian economy was in GDP terms the 

12th largest in the world, this equates only to about two per cent of the 

123 

world's overall wealth. 

Australian governments routinely describe Australia as a “middle power with 

124 

global interests” or “a capable middle power that is able to contribute to 

125 

global and regional security.” What this actually means in terms of capacity 

to shape and influence world events, including through force if necessary, is 

somewhat subjective but sums to insight about strengths and weaknesses and 

a capacity and willingness to act, independently of others if necessary, in the 

126 

national interest. Australia, as a direct result of its geography and vital 

interests, has experience in the multi-lateral frameworks that build confidence 

and allow nations to pursue their legitimate interests, more or less 

harmoniously, in various global commons. In the 1970s, Australian diplomats 

took a prominent role in the negotiations that eventually produced the UN 

127 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Australia is an active 

128 

supporter of the Antarctica Treaty regime and has also played a useful role 

129 

in international negotiations focussed on nuclear non-proliferation. More 

recently Australian officials have become involved in international 

discussions aimed at developing norms to regulate behaviour in cyber 

130 

space. 


This background provides context for Australia's approach to space, 

including to questions of security, governance and regulation. Between the 

1960s and 1980s, Australia signed and ratified all of the space treaties 

developed by the United Nations, including the failed Moon Agreement. 

Since the mid-2000s, the nation has taken an increasingly systematic interest 

in the regulation of outer space, notably through investment in space 

situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. These capabilities provide credence 

to Australia's increasingly active diplomacy in the space security domain. 

They are discussed in more detail below. 

Australia's Space Interests 

Australia occupies an unusual position with regards to space activity. Some 

refer to it as a space-faring nation although it does not build satellites and has 

no launch capacity. The Futron Corporation, for example, included Australia 

in its annual Space Competitiveness Index for the first time in 2012. Australia 

131 

was rated ahead of Brazil and just behind Israel. Australia is certainly not 

considered to be an emerging space power or a developing country with 

132 

space ambitions. It occupies instead a middle ground defined by vital 

strategic and operational interests and a very high degree of dependence on 

others for access to their systems. 

National Strategy 

Space sits at the heart of Australia's national security strategy. In the 1950s 

and 1960s, Australia hosted the missile development and atomic weapon 

programmes of the UKatWoomera, Maralinga and associated remote 

133 

locations. Since the 1960s Australia has hosted ground stations that are 

essential to the intelligence gathering and treaty monitoring activities of the 

134 

U.S. More recently, and this is discussed in more detail below, since 2010, 

Australia and the U.S. have placed considerable emphasis on the importance 

of space security in the alliance relationship that exists between the two 

nations. 

Space Policy 

Australia is certainly 

not considered to be 

an emerging space 

power or a 

developing country 

with space 

ambitions.It occupies 

instead a middle 

ground defined by 

vital strategic and 

operational interests 

and a very high 

degree of 

dependence on 

others for access to 

their systems. 

135 

Australia's Satellite Utilisation Policy makes specific reference to space 

security and specifically commits the Australian government to: 


“Actively participate in the negotiation of an International Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities, as an important and necessary step in the development of 

136 

international norms for good behaviour in space”. 

No funds were specifically allocated to implement the policy. Instead 

departments and agencies are expected to carry out their assigned tasks 

through normal departmental funding processes. 

Organisation Aspects 

Historically, national coordination of space activities and involvement in 

international space governance has been bifurcated between Defence and 

non-Defence users with quite loose inter-departmental coordination. In 

2009, a small office called the Space Policy Unit (SPU) was established in the 

Australian Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research 

137 

(DIISR). The SPU produced the national space policy and administered the 

138 

Australian Space Research Program (ASRP). In 2013, the Unit was 

renamed the Space Coordination Office (SCO). Its principal on-going tasks 

include administering the Space Activities Act, promoting and coordinating 

an entire range of government approach to civil space activities and to serve 

as the first point of contact for any inquiry to the Australian government 

139 

about space matters. 

Industry 

Commercial interests located in Australia presently operate five 

140 

communications satellites. Four more are presently being built in the U.S., 

141 

all of which are due to be launched in the next three years. The Australian 

government has also directly invested in communications satellites for 

military and national security purposes. There is a discrete military 

communications payload on the Optus C-1 satellite and the sixth satellite in 

the Wideband Global System (WGS) of satellites operated by the U.S. Air 

Force (USAF) has been paid for by the Australian government. The 

investment in one satellite has given the Australian government access to the 

142 

broader WGS constellation. 

Neither the Australian government nor any commercial interests based in 

Australia own or operate any Earth observation satellites. Yet the nation is a 


major user of data derived from satellites, all of which are owned and 

143 

operated offshore. The annual impact of the geo-spatial services industry 

144 

to the national economy is in the order of four billion dollars. The 

Australian government, through normal budgetary processes, is developing 

plans for major upgrades to the ground infrastructure needed to support 

precision location and the receipt of Earth observation data from the next 

145 

generation of broadband satellites. 

Australia is well-placed geographically to support the space activities of many 

nations. It hosts ground stations that support civil and commercial activities 

146 

as well as the national security interests of its close allies. It is relatively 

close to the space faring nations of north and south Asia and is equidistant, 

in terms of longitude, from North America and Europe and also from Africa 

and South America. 

More challenging is the quest to have mainly small Australian companies 

develop products and services that meet niche needs in the global supply 

chains of the companies that build and launch rockets and satellites. High 

labour costs, lack of track record in delivering exceptionally reliable products 

147 

and distance are three challenging hurdles to be jumped. The Australian 

government is aware of these problems, which are not confined to the space 

and spatial services sector of the economy. Objective realities 

notwithstanding, there is a small but vocal group of Australians who argue 

148 

that Australia needs a full-blown space agency with investment to match. 

To date, these advocates have failed to present a compelling case to the 

government. 

Teaching and Research 

Several universities offer courses in space engineering and in various 

branches of space science, including solar physics and space weather, 

149 

planetary science and astrobiology. These research disciplines struggle to 

attract substantial research funds. In contrast, governments have made major 

investments in telescopes (radio and optical) for ground-based astronomy 

150 

over many years. Sensing technologies with dual uses, such as phased array 

radio receivers and adaptive optics, are being developed and deployed on 

modern telescopes. They also have direct application to sensors being 

developed to provide space situational awareness in the future to the levels 

of fidelity that will be essential to the successful implementation and 

151 

operation of the proposed ICoC. 


Space Situational Awareness 

In the context of its alliance relationship with the U.S., the Australian 

government is investing in ground-based SSA capabilities, the data from 

which will contribute to the Space Surveillance Network operated by the 

United States Air Force. A radar is being refurbished and relocated from 

152 

Antigua in the Caribbean to North West Cape in Western Australia. Two 

remotely operated space telescopes are also due to be installed at North West 

153 

Cape in the next two years. Importantly, the 2013 Defence White Paper, 

released by the Gillard Labor Government, placed considerable emphasis on 

154 

a secure space environment and SSA. The 2013 AUSMIN talks were 

attended by ministers from a Liberal coalition government, led by Mr Tony 

Abbott, that won office in September 2013. The communiqué from those 

155 

talks re-affirmed the importance of a secure space environment and SSA. 

There is, in other words, bipartisan support for Australia to contribute to 

space security, especially through SSA. 

In addition, a Canberra-based company, Electro-Optic Systems Pty Ltd 

(EOS), operates ground-based lasers that can precisely determine the orbits 

156 

of space objects including orbital debris. These systems are complemented 

157 

by several university-operated research instruments as well. 

In 2013, EOS led a bid to establish a Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) in 

space environmental management (SEMCRC). The CRC programme is a 

highly competitive programme in which the government invests with 

industry, the universities and other research organisations in applied research. 

The SEMCRC has been shortlisted but the results of the 2013 Round have 

158 

yet to be announced. Irrespective of the outcome, that this proposal has 

gone through to the final round indicates the importance now being 

accorded to the need for operational rules in space that are evidence-based 

and backed by procedures, for example the notification of potential 

collisions that are sufficiently accurate and timely for satellite operators to 

take evasive action if necessary. 

What Australia Does Not Do 

Beyond hosting ground stations, the Australian government has steadfastly 

refused to invest in activities associated with human space flight, such as the 

International Space Station (ISS), or with deep space exploration. Australia 


has also politely rejected overtures by the European Space Agency (ESA) to 

become an associate member, like Canada. The need for prestige that is said 

to accompany such investments is not regarded as a priority. This situation is 

unlikely to change any time soon. 

Important Step 

There is no question that Australia's active interest in SSA has come about in 

part through the encouragement it has received from its allies, notably the 

U.S. Further encouragement by some non-space faring nations, especially 

during Australia's current membership of the UN Security Council, would 

help to cement this commitment. It may also encourage Australia to stay not 

just involved but to provide a bridge between several of the space faring 

nations on the one hand and between the space faring and non-space faring 

nations on the other. 

Conclusion 

Nations that are not space faring are not all equal. Some, by virtue of their 

geography, history and economic circumstances, are better placed to 

influence events than others. Australia falls into this category. It is a 

sophisticated user of space-based utilities with a strong vested interest to do 

what is practicable to ensure that satellite operations may be conducted safely 

and securely. Other nations, such as Nigeria, have ambitions to become space 

faring that are thwarted by a fractured political culture and confused 

159 

requirements. Others, such as the micro-states of the South Pacific, have 

no capability or intention to become space faring but have vital interests in 

assured and secure access, both directly and indirectly, to the data and 

services provided by satellites. 

The voices of these nations, and there are many of them, although they may 

lack space infrastructure, need to be heard. Individually they may be of 

limited consequence but, in concert, their voices may well curb actions of 

space faring nations that, if not fettered, could cause the space environment 

to become so unsafe as to become unusable. If this were to occur it would 

be a classic lose-lose situation and is precisely what ICoC seeks to avoid. 

There is no question 

that Australia's active 

interest in SSA has 

come about in part 

through the 

encouragement it has 

received from its 

allies, notably the U.S. 

Further 

encouragement by 

some non-space 

faring nations, 

especially during 

Australia's current 

membership of the 

UN Security Council, 

would help to cement 

this commitment. It 

may also encourage 

Australia to stay not 

just involved but to 

provide a bridge 

between several of 

the space faring 

nations on the one 

hand and between 

the space faring and 

non-space faring 

nations on the other. 


EU Efforts for an ICoC: A Mexican 

Perspective 

Fermin Romero Vazquez 

Currently, the world relies on satellites for command and control, 

communications, Earth monitoring, early warning, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and meteorological capabilities, navigation with the Global 

Positioning System and military space applications such as navigation and 

160 

intelligence systems. Thus, multilateral space issues are discussed in two 

specialised agencies of the United Nations, including the COPUOS, the CD, 

and the UNGA. 

COPUOS has codified International Space Law, and more precisely the 

treaties governing space activities and the principles adopted by the UN 

General Assembly and other resolutions detailing the implementation of 

such legislation. Space laws and policies have existed for decades and are still 

growing. COPUOS, through its two subcommittees (Scientific and Technical 

and the Legal Subcommittees), focuses on technical matters and the 

promotion of international cooperation on space activities, examines issues 

such as space junk, the use of space systems for disaster management, 

nuclear energy sources in space, registration of objects launched into outer 

space, among other activities. But COPUOS does not have a mandate related 

to space security issues (due to limited institutional capability). In the field of 

space security, it is the CD that addresses military space challenges through 

its agenda item on the "prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)". 

Both COPUOS and CD play an essential role in space affairs by providing a 

venue to address common challenges related to space activities. Additionally, 

the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) addresses matters related 

to the allocation of space resources such as orbital slots and radio 

frequencies. 

EU Efforts for anICoC: A Mexican Perspective | www.orfonline.org 137

Beyond the activities of states in space remain the operations of the 

international satellite organisations such as IGO/Eutelsat, International 

Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (ITSO)/Intelsat and International 

Mobile Satellite Organisation (IMSO)/Inmarsat, whose processing issues 

used to be mainly technical but now have a growing political dimension 

impacting public and private interests inherent in the obligations of 

international public telecommunications services. These include the 

maintenance of global connectivity as well as matters relating to the 

management of orbital positions, resources and frequency assignments, 

which constitute the common heritage of the Parties to the ITSO (149 

states). For IMSO, its scope covers the provision of mobile satellite 

communication systems in the framework of the Global Maritime Distress 

and Safety System (GMDSS) at sea, which also uses space infrastructure and, 

therefore, its activity is also likely to be regulated by the eventual provisions 

of an ICoC for Outer Space Activities. In this field also remain activities of 

Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue (1988), in 

which 41 states and organisations also made their contribution in terms of 

cooperation between international organisations (EUMETSAT, International 

Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), IMO, ITU) and the European 

contribution to the provision of the COSPAS SARSAT by search and rescue 

instruments (SAR) on board of the European Galileo satellite constellation. 

The conception of international space security policies will be conducive to 

better transparency, particularly for space activities, as these policies delineate 

the objectives, principles and rules of space actors with respect to access to 

and the pacific use of space. These norms will provide the context within 

which international civil, commercial, and military space actors can operate 

properly. 

Since February 2008, China and Russia have continually proposed an 

alternative legally binding treaty that would outlaw the weaponisation of 

space, as a complement to existing international treaties; most other space 

faring nations oppose the draft treaty, arguing that it is unverifiable and 

would not cover ground-based systems. 

While no country, or even group of countries, possesses the sovereign 

authority to prevent or minimise the inherent risks of space activities or 

responsibility for regulating space, outer space is instead governed by a 

combination of informal industry standards, unofficial UN guidelines, and 


ilateral agreements to prevent or mitigate potential satellite collisions and 

interference from space debris. 

In this context, the efforts of the EU as a whole, as well as single initiatives 

from some countries concerned about the long-term sustainability of space 

activities, have led to the promotion of an ICoC for Outer Space Activities, 

whose critical defect was the wrong strategy in developing and promoting the 

initiative. 

No one can deny the importance of the main considerations that led the EU 

to launch an initiative aimed at establishing an ICoC in order to manage 

space activities in favour of protecting the planet and humanity, not to 

mention the need to protect space infrastructure. Governments and private 

space operators are multiplying; the space faring nations operate launching 

systems which perform between 30 and 40 launches each year; and more 

than 50 states and regional organisations use satellites in orbit. In addition, a 

rapidly growing number of private companies - large and small - use 

commercial satellite systems. The number of active space vehicles and 

satellites in space is rising, significantly increasing space debris. In addition, 

the eventual deployment of weapons in outer space would make it possible 

to use land-based weapons against space objects in Low Earth orbit. If such 

weapons would be used during a conflict, a considerable amount of waste 

would be generated by these incidents that would threaten the use of near- 

Earth orbits for long time. Given these implications, it is extremely important 

to reflect and discuss on the peaceful and rational use of space as well as to 

prevent any weaponisation in space. 

No one questions the European initiative in its overall objective, but its lack 

of communication and transparency with a wider, more representative group 

of countries at the beginning of the process – beyond some of the 

spacefaring nations –may have been the biggest failure. The current status of 

the initiative is paying the price for that mistake as a prelude to possible 

negotiations in a multilateral forum. The other aspect that poses a degree of 

difficulty when dealing with a complex issue that involves both COPUOS 

and the CD, one must consider that the CD has been paralysed for over 17 

years, without negotiating any multilateral instrument. The working methods 

anchored to consensus have contributed to the paralysis, which complicates 

the stage for consideration of ICoC in a proper multilateral forum, a 

situation that hinders the development and viability of this initiative. 

While no country, or 

even group of 

countries, possesses 

the sovereign 

authority to prevent or 

minimise the inherent 

risks of space 

activities or 

responsibility for 

regulating space, 

outer space is instead 

governed by a 

combination of 

informal industry 

standards, unofficial 

UN guidelines, and 

bilateral agreements 

to prevent or mitigate 

potential satellite 

collisions and 

interference from 

space debris. 


As COPUOS and CD seem not to be a feasible forum to negotiate ICoC, 

there are not many multilateral alternatives for ICoC. Within the framework 

of the UN, the General Assembly is the only alternative as a political option 

for negotiations. Nevertheless, the initiatives taken by various informal 

groups that have proliferated in recent years on issues such as disarmament, 

nuclear supply, trade, including The Wassenaar Arrangement, The Australia 

Group, The Nuclear Suppliers Group could be the light at the end of the 

tunnel. 

Certainly the results of the open-ended consultations and the inclusion of 

the views and criticisms of countries as well as the intensive promoting 

process of the EU has allowed ICoC to become an initiative that is a little bit 

more transparent with its intentions, allowing access to an open and 

participatory process to all interested countries to facilitate negotiations. 

Whilst at the moment there is strong European optimism, based on the 

success of the last consultations in which government representatives from 

countries were more constructive, generating a more positive environment, it 

is clear that EU still has much work to do in the field of high level political 

consultationsand the promotion of the proposal in order to reach an 

acceptable text to most members of the international space community and 

thus pave the way for the start of the negotiation process. 

The clear evolution between the first version and the latest version presented 

by EU in September 2013 offered a new opportunity for reflection by all 

countries to sit down and negotiate a more comprehensive and inclusive 

document on these issues, which are related to outer space TCBMs. These 

161 

may affect both civilian activities and dual-use space technology, carried out 

for defense and security purposes, a complex issue that arouses legitimate 

suspicions from countries with a strong pacifist orientation. 

The consultations in Kiev faced opposition from countries such as China, 

Russia, Brazil and India, which recommended an obvious impasse, that the 

code should be reviewed in a multilateral forum. These countries also 

criticised the text due to the prevalence of some ambiguous concepts such as 

"self-defence", "national security" and destruction of objects in space. The 

references to collective security and the right to self-defence is justified in 

those cases where space objects may be used for hostile or threatening 

162 

purposes. This showed a code will impact security, and not just technical 


aspects of space activities, and is, therefore, seen as invading the scope of 

existing treaties on peaceful uses of outer space and on one of the central 

issues in the agenda of the CD – PAROS. Consequently, some countries 

expressed their difficulty in accepting the draft ICoC highlighting the 

possibility that this may be developed further as soft law. Countries such as 

Mexico have argued the need for legally binding instruments to develop 

space law. 

The new draft, revised in Bangkok, in addition to collecting and reflecting 

the views of countries critical of the project, shows progress in its structure 

and organisation that covers a wide range of topics (space junk, traffic 

management in space, effects of weather and meteorological phenomena, 

among other things) that affect space operations undertaken by states or 

international organisations, as well as the activities of private operators. This 

version also considers the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of 

the United Nations since 2007, in accordance with international space law. 

The recognition of the need for a multilateral ICoC aimed at enhancing 

safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities is an important 

advance that requires a comprehensive approach throughout consultations 

and negotiations to make a clear difference to safety for space objects and 

security regarding military space infrastructure under a regime of 

transparency. 

Cooperation mechanisms, found in sections 5 to 7 of ICoC, will contribute 

to define an approach and methodology for pursuing a kind of verification 

measure sufficient for the purpose of agreements or treaties intended to give 

order to space activities. But will representatives agree to define verification? 

Governments will have to take positive steps, and that will require both 

collaboration and a level of mutual trust. All sectors of the space community 

will be empowered by improvements in space situational awareness, a strong 

benefit considering that investments in this area are among the most useful 

any government can make in space. Unfortunately, political will and trust 

among space actors alone will not be enough. 

The new draft, revised 

in Bangkok, in 

addition to collecting 

and reflecting the 

views of countries 

critical of the project, 

shows progress in its 

structure and 

organisation that 

covers a wide range 

of topics (space junk, 

traffic management in 

space, effects of 

weather and 

meteorological 

phenomena, among 

other things) that 

affect space 

operations 

undertaken by states 

or international 

organisations, as well 

as the activities of 

private operators. 

So far, to outline the challenge for policy makers presented by ICoC, it seems 

clear that the consultations should aim to present a non-legally binding 

document. An international code would be the most significant normative 

step that captures the interests of almost all space faring countries while 


shaping and promoting sustainable outer space conduct. Negotiations will, 

therefore, require time and patience, as many states still do not even have 

space agencies that specialise in these matters. However, given that the threat 

from space debris is increasing exponentially and could lead to a domain that 

is no longer reliable or safe for human use, such discussions cannot wait 

much longer. 

Both spacefaring nations and developing countries - or non-spacefaring 

nations - should attach importance to measures to preserve space as heritage, 

to prevent militarisation, to strengthen an effective international cooperation 

in favour of space security, to promote peaceful uses of outer space, to 

design a solid system of multilateral verification/observation that contributes 

to the promotion of confidence among states. In the legal realm, all 

countries should seek universal application of the provisions of the UN 

treaties on outer space, and endorse greater transparency and confidence in 

the activities related to this field. Principles such as cooperation, mutual 

assistance and the common heritage of mankind can help lead to a new era 

of space policymaking. 

It is a fact that full collaboration among space faring nations is necessary to 

perfect capabilities for detecting and monitoring space debris and other 

threats to space operations. The growing hazard to space operations caused 

by the increasing amount of orbital debris, future collisions between 

manoeuvrable satellites and debris might be avoided if actionable 

information is provided to satellite operators ahead of close encounters. So 

far, most of the debris is located at a high orbit, where it could pose a 

significant threat for decades. That is the reason why space faring nations 

should work with developing countries to establish at least a non-legally 

binding international code of conduct for outer space activities on the basis 

of a common interest, not from the perspective of their national interests 

alone. 

The global space community seeks to require that all space actors act 

responsibly through active participation in ICoC discussions to strengthen 

the current legal framework of space activities. All the participant countries 

must be aware that every party of ICoC will be in a position to share more 

internal details about its domestic space policies. This new stage of 

negotiation established by ICoC would not benefit China's and Russia´s 

geopolitical interests as co-sponsors of the PPWT; both countries recognise 


that a successful ICoC could weaken or even annul PPWT. Nevertheless, 

Russia will continue to support use of TCBMs - which could include ICoC - 

if only to organise a better support base for adoption of PPWT, an unviable 

proposal for the U.S. and its partners EU, Japan and Australia. 

Main stakeholders with interests in outer space have pursued coordination in 

order to establish governance. Obviously, geopolitics often plays a clear role 

in the interest-development of space actors. The space faring nations have 

more influence over what form of governance should be established due to 

power asymmetries and by virtue of having the technological capability to 

access and exploit the outer space realm. However, they need the support of 

non-space faring nations to legitimise their cause. 

The current text is a draft that probably will change on the basis of the 

consensus of the main stakeholders dealing with specific fields or items 

through a systematic approach and an incremental process that can achieve 

enhanced concepts of safety and security in space. The political document 

produced needs a preventive approach through a bold and comprehensive 

agreement of a dynamic nature, one that allows monitoring the progress in 

the meetings of the parties, towards the eventual signature of the code. 

To move forward on negotiations, it is important to collect recommendations 

from all the stakeholders and to introduce mechanisms that would contribute 

to keeping outer space safe and secure for the long term, but it is also 

necessary to separate the technical issues related to sustainability and safety 

as hazardous space debris from matters related to militarisation, space 

security and peaceful use of space to avoid suspicions among the 

stakeholders. 

After the last consultations, it is clear that ICoC is an initiative that is not 

contrary to UN instruments and should be negotiated through a different 

process from COPUOS and CD. Considering that it should also be a political 

framework compatible or complementary to other disarmament initiatives 

(e.g. The Arms Trade Treaty/ATT), it is also necessary to conduct 

consultations and high-level discussions to start preparing for future 

diplomatic steps. 

It is a fact that full 

collaboration among 

space faring nations 

is necessary to 

perfect capabilities for 

detecting and 

monitoring space 

debris and other 

threats to space 

operations. The 

growing hazard to 

space operations 

caused by the 

increasing amount of 

orbital debris, future 

collisions between 

manoeuvrable 

satellites and debris 

might be avoided if 

actionable information 

is provided to satellite 

operators ahead of 

close encounters. 

As long as the promoters are able to achieve rational negotiations with the 

purpose of strengthening current international space law framework, which 


ensures the peaceful use of space, international cooperation and shared 

benefits from outer space exploitation, the whole effort will find legitimate 

reasons to work towards a well-developed and widely accepted ICoC. 

This will be possible only with the joint effort of space faring nations and 

non-spacefaring nations, both members of COPUOS, CD and the UNGA, 

regardless of whether these negotiations are to be conducted within or 

outside the UN. Personally, and quoting Stephen Hawking who believes that 

the future of humanity is in space, I think ICoC poses a difficult and bumpy 

negotiation process but a promising future. 


ICoC and Sustainable Use of Outer 

Space: An African Perspective 

163 

Gayya Habila Umaru and Godstime James 

Background 

Outer space, within the framework of space exploration and exploitation, is a 

limited resource. At the moment, about 94 per cent of man-made objects 

164 

that can be observed in outer space are space debris. In particular, the 

Geostationary and the Low Earth orbits are increasingly getting populated 

with space debris, thereby increasing the danger to space travel and space 

vehicles alike. As a result, several treaties, regulations and agreements have 

been developed to ensure that the scarce outer space resource is used in such 

a way that present and future generations can use it. One of such efforts is 

the ICoC for Outer Space Activities (hereinafter referred to as the Code of 

Conduct). This manuscript examines two questions within the framework of 

the Code of Conduct: first, how does the Code of Conduct affect the space 

debris mitigation problem? Secondly, does the Code of Conduct hinder 

entrance into outer space by space aspiring nations, particularly African 

Countries? 

Introduction 

The main objective of 

space debris 

mitigation is to keep 

the earth orbit free 

from all man-made 

objects that have the 

capacity to damage 

operational satellites 

or interfere with space 

transportation so that 

such a valuable earth 

resource will continue 

to be useful to 

humans of present 

and future 

generations. 

Space debris is '... man-made objects including fragments and elements 

165 

thereof, in earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere.' These man-made 

objects include, but are not limited to small bolts, clamps, upper stages, 

isolated blankets, materials used for the protection of optical devices, apogee 

ICoC and Sustainable Use of Outer Space: An African Perspective | www.orfonline.org 145

kick motors, malfunctioned satellites, pieces and bits of satellites or their 

parts that may have exploded and to an extent micro, nano and cube satellites 

that cannot be controlled from the earth even though they may still be 

functional. Some of these objects may stay in the earth orbit for long periods 

and can eventually collide and damage functional satellites or interfere with 

space transport. Some of the common practices that generate space debris in 

outer space are normal space transportation, in-orbit break-ups or collisions. 

Advancement in space science and technology has led to the development of 

instruments for monitoring space debris. This technology has shown that the 

volume of space debris has been on the increase over the years. This has 

generated a worrisome situation and caused space-agencies of several 

countries to form the Inter Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 

(IADC). The committee was set up to provide the framework for 

“exchanging information on space debris research activities between member 

space agencies, facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris 

research, review the progress of on-going activities and identify debris 

166 

mitigation options”. The principles of IADC have been adopted by states, 

private companies and international organisations. In fact, the IADC 

recommendations contributed to the development of the ICoCfor Outer 

Space Activities. 

International Legal Framework 

Space debris mitigation is one of the efforts being made by the international 

community to ensure the sustainable use of outer space. The main objective 

of space debris mitigation is to keep the earth orbit free from all man-made 

objects that have the capacity to damage operational satellites or interfere 

with space transportation so that such a valuable earth resource will continue 

to be useful to humans of present and future generations. Since the Code of 

Conduct requires subscribing states to reaffirm their commitment to the 

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 

and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies 

1967, (the Magna Carta of Space Law, hereinafter referred to as the Outer 

Space Treaty) and the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the 

UNCOPUOS, among others, it is important to this paper to look at the 

provisions thereof in this paper. 

At the time that the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated and signed in 1967, 

space debris had not become a problem; space security was the burning issue 


due to the Moon race and the Cold War rivalry of that time. As such, the 

primary purpose was security and not safety. Also, there were only two 

launching states (America and the Soviet Union) and few satellites in earth 

orbit. As a result, the space debris problem was not seen as grave, which is 

why the Outer Space Treaty only makes indirect references to space debris in 

Article IX, which states that “if a State Party to this Treaty has reason to 

believe that an activity....would cause potentially harmful interference with 

activities of other State Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer 

space.....it shall undertake international consultation before undertaking such 

167 

activity”. 

The UNCOPUOS, for its part, created no forum for discussion on space 

debris during its early meetings. However, that was not as if it was ignorant 

of the situation. Its first response to the issue did not come until 1994, due 

to the work of IADC. Subsequently, the Committee worked with IADC, 

turning attention to the space debris problem. However, it soon became 

abundantly clear that there was no political will to adopt a legally binding 

168 

international instrument on space debris. 

169 

In June 2007, COPUOS endorsed the IADC Mitigation guidelines while 

170 

the UNGA endorsed the guidelines in December of the same year. The 

guidelines identified the following best practices for space debris mitigation 

in outer space: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Limitation of debris released during normal operation; 

Minimise the potential for breakups during operational phase; 

Prevent in-orbit break-ups; 

Avoid intentional destruction or other harmful activities; 

Minimise the potential for post mission breakups resulting from 

stored energy; 

Remove spacecrafts and launch vehicle stages from useful orbits; 

• 

171 

Prevent in-orbit collision. 

With the above clear guidelines and the fact that member' states of 

UNCOPUOS started presenting an annual report, since 2005, on national 

172 

measures adopted to implement the IADC guidelines, there appears to be 

no need for an ICoC to regulate the space debris problem. However, a 

voyage of discovery into the articles of ICoC will inform us better. 


General Overview of the Code of Conduct: 

The ICoC is tailored towards enhancing the safety, security and sustainability 

173 

of outer space activities. The Code forms a regime of transparency and 

confidence building measures, with the aim of creating mutual understanding 

and trust, helping states to prevent confrontation and foster national, 

174 

regional and global security and stability. 

Furthermore, it harps and takes cognisance of the existing international legal 

175 

frameworks governing outer space and complements them by codifying 

new best practices that would enhance transparency and confidence building 

176 

measures. Subscribing states are to abide by the following principles: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Freedom to explore outer space for peaceful purposes without 

harmful interference... and consistent with internationally accepted 

practices, operating procedure, technical standards and policies 

associated with the long-term sustainability of outer space; 

The inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 

accordance with the United Nations Charter; 

The responsibility of states to take all appropriate measures and 

cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer 


...to take all necessary measures to prevent outer space from 

177 

becoming an area of conflict. 

Article 4, stipulated that States should establish and implement policies and 

procedures to minimise the risk of accidents, collisions of space objects and 

178 

any harmful interference with another state's peaceful use of outer space. 

In the light of the above, the Subscribing States resolve that in conducting 

outer space activities, they are to: 

Do nothing that would bring about the damage or destruction of a 

space object except such action are justified on grounds of safety to 

human life and health risk, or on grounds of self-defence, or in order 

to reduce the creation of space debris. The Code of Conduct went 

further to provide that in extreme cases where the exceptions are to 

be applied, the destruction of the space object should be done in 


such a way as to avoid the creation of space debris; 

States should take appropriate measure such as technical, prior 

notification and consultations between countries to reduce the risk 

of collision; 

States should improve adherence to, and implementation of the 

International Telecommunication Union regulation on allocation of 

radio spectra and orbital assignments, and on addressing harmful 

179 

radio interference. 

The provisions in Article 4 of the Code of Conduct are similar to the 

provisions in the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the UNCOPUOS as 

endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 62/217 

(2007). In particular, the provisions 'a' and 'b' of the Code of Conduct above 

are similar to the provisions of the guidelines, though stated in a slightly 

different language. However, the provision in 'c' is newly introduced. 

Article 4.2 of the Code of Conduct, promotes space security i.e. the 

prevention of arms race in outer space. However, it has been shown that 

180 

space weaponisation and the creation of space debris are sometimes linked. 

As a result, the use of a weapon in outer space if not properly managed may 

create two scenarios; (1) the weaponisation of outer space, which is a space 

security concern and (2) the creation of space debris, which is a safety 

concern. Example, when China destroyed its defunct weather satellite 'Feng 

Yun 1C' in January 2007, the action generated two scenarios. First, it 

suddenly ended an understanding on anti satellites (ASAT) tests that had 

181 

been observed by space faring nations for over 20 years. Second, the test 

caused a huge cloud of debris in the Low Earth Orbit that is estimated to be 

about 150,000 pieces of debris that are larger than one centimetre in size, of 

182 

which many would stay in the earth orbit for hundreds of years. In 

summary, the first paragraph of Article 4.2 of the Code of Conduct seeks to 

prevent the intentional use of weapons to destroy space objects and also the 

prevention of the unintentional damage of space objects, an effect due to the 

space debris that has been created. 

Furthermore, the Code of Conduct created some very reasonable and useful 

exceptions, which may be used by States from time to time to destroy space 

objects. They include situations: 


i. that threatens human life or is about to cause health risk; or 

ii. 

iii. 

where a state is exercising its inherent right of self-defence, i.e. 

responding militarily to the destruction of its space asset by another 

country; 

Where the need arises to prevent the creation of more space debris. 

183 

The first two exceptions above have never been exercised. However, the third 

exception fits with the U.S. missile strike against the disabled military satellite 

'USA 193' of February 2008. The space object was brought down so as to 

prevent the uncontrolled explosion of a hydrazine tank on-board the military 

satellite; such an explosion would have resulted in the creation of enormous 

space debris. The strike was such that very limited space debris was generated 

and the risk of any components of the USA 193 satellite reaching the earth 

184 

was totally foreclosed. 

It is notable that the exception provided against the use of weapon to 

destroy space objects intentionally or unintentionally also provided a 'caveat'; 

States that may resort to this exception should ensure that space debris is not 

created. The U.S. example above fits into the last resort provided by the Code 

of Conduct for States to be 'beware' and their actions may be justifiable. It is, 

therefore, safe to conclude that the Code of Conduct seeks to endorse the 

U.S. type of missile strikes against their disabled military satellite 'USA 193' 

which complies with international space security and safety conditions of 

eliminating a toxic chemical that is dangerous to human health, preventing 

the danger of a re-entry, reducing the length of time the dead space craft 

would require to get out of the Low Earth Orbit and preventing the creation 

of more space debris. 

The second principle of Article 4.2 is regarding the resolve of Subscribing 

States to take appropriate measures to minimise the risk of collision when 

conducting outer space activities such as prior notification and consultation 

between countries. As already mentioned in this essay, collisions is one of the 

major sources of space debris populating the earth orbits; the satellite 

collision of February 10, 2009 between the functional American Iridium-33 

and the dead Russian Kosmos 2251 generated a huge quantity of debris, the 

exact count of which has not yet been established but about 600 pieces of 

185 

various sizes have been identified. The amount of debris generated is three 

times the number created by the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, which 


is said to amount to 20 per cent of the debris population before the 

186 

collision. 

Consequently, the Code of Conduct is calling on space faring nations to use 

the available surveillance and conjunction capacity networks or networks 

with other institutions already giving conjunctions assessment to create a 

truly global Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system with all satellite 

187 

owners and operators participating. As such, this would put owners and 

operators in a position where any probability of accidental collision with 

known objects during the system's launch phase and orbital lifetime is 

estimated and limited through the adjustment of launch time or in-orbit 

188 

avoidance manoeuvre. 

The last principle of Article 4.2 of the Code of Conduct is an affirmation 

that states would improve adherence to, and implementation of the 

International Telecommunication Union (hereinafter called ITU) regulations 

on allocation of radio spectra and orbital assignments, and on addressing 

harmful radio-frequency interference. The observance of this condition is 

very important considering the fact that orbital slots and spectrum rights are 

very scarce. To have an interference-free use of radio frequencies, which is an 

essential condition for the proper functioning of a satellite, the laws of 

physics must be obeyed. The law states that “if two different transmissions 

are made in the same geographic area at the same frequency, they will 

interfere with each other resulting in the deterioration or even loss of 

189 

signal.” As a result, the use of two satellite systems in the same radio 

frequency or adjacent orbital position would surely cause interference, which 

could be avoided through the use of different frequency or coordination 

190 

between the operators of the adjacent satellites. 

Therefore, to ensure interference-free use of orbital slots and the radio 

spectrum, the ITU was established as the coordinator of all frequency 

assignments, including those of satellite systems. To achieve its aims, ITU 

established an international legal regime consisting of its Constitution, 

Convention and Radio Regulations to govern: 

Reading the Code of 

Conduct together, it 

displays a 

comprehensive 

approach to all 

avenues of preventing 

the creation of space 

debris; it embraces 

debris mitigation, 

prevention of harmful 

interference with 

space activities, and 

also covers weapons 

in outer space to the 

extent that they lead 

to space debris and 

harmful interference 

without banning 

ground-based 

weapons. The Code 

reinstated the inherent 

right of self-defence 

along the lines of 

Article 51 of the 

United Nation Charter. 

radio spectrum allocation to different category of radiocommunication 

service; 

the rights and obligations of member administrations in obtaining 

access to the spectrum or orbit resource; 


The international recognition of these rights by recording frequency 

assignments (i.e. orbital positions used or intended to be used in the 

191 

Master International Frequency Register). 

If these rules were strictly adhered to, there would have been no need for the 

Code of Conduct to call for the improved adherence to and strict 

implementation of the ITU regulations. But that is not so because with 

increased demand for satellite services, which result in increased demand for 

orbital slots, various unethical behaviours have emerged in the international 

192 

satellite network registration. Some of these unethical behaviours include 

the problems of over-filing (paper satellites), undermining the coordination 

process, using floaters to bypass deadlines, giving satellites a 50-year life-span 

during registration instead of 15 years and the growing secondary markets 

for orbital rights. 

In the light of the above, the call for the improved adherence to the ITU 

regulations by the Code of Conduct without calling for a review of the 

regulation to correct the current unethical practices and empower the Union 

to enforce its regulations is not likely to change anything. This is because 

'good will' alone is not sufficient to stop operators from circumventing the 

193 

regulations. Without the hope of such a review in the near future, the call 

by the Code of Conduct for improved adherence is not sufficient. At best, it 

would amount to a non-binding Code of Conduct calling for an improved 

adherence to a non-binding ITU Regulation which amounts to an appeal to 

“good reason only,” a requirement that has already failed. 

Lastly, reading the Code of Conduct together, it displays a comprehensive 

approach to all avenues of preventing the creation of space debris; it 

embraces debris mitigation, prevention of harmful interference with space 

activities, and also covers weapons in outer space to the extent that they lead 

to space debris and harmful interference without banning ground-based 

weapons. The Code reinstated the inherent right of self-defence along the 

lines of Article 51 of the United Nation Charter. Furthermore, it aims at the 

prevention of outer space becoming an area of conflict, without touching on 

arms control. The Code calls for space situational awareness and better 

adherence to the ITU regulation. It further makes provision on the 

notification of outer space activities, registration of space objects, 

information on outer space policies, executive measures, notification of outer 

194 195 

space activities and information on outer space activities with the aim of 


oosting transparency and confidence. It would not be wrong to say that the 

draft Code of Conduct is tailored towards international friendliness, 

understanding and cooperation being one of the best ways to guide against 

the creation of space debris and interference in outer space. 

Does ICoC Create Barriers for New African Space 

Players? 

Given the enormous benefits derived from the exploration and exploitation 

of outer space by spacefaring nations, the number of new entrants has 

increased significantly over the years. The second part of this essay, 

therefore, seeks to address the concern of whether the provisions of the 

ICoC would create barriers for entry for emerging spacefaring countries, 

particularly African States. 

Interestingly, the African continent is the least involved in space activities 

among all the continents. As a result, the level of adherence of African 

countries to space treaties is very low. The African continent has 54 states but 

only 21 states have ratified the Outer Space Treaty, while 12 states have 

signed but have not ratified it; 14 states have ratified the Liability Convention, 

while 10 states signed without ratifying it; three states have ratified the 

196 

Registration Convention; while only one has ratified the Moon Agreement. 

In the same vein, only 16 African states are members of UNCOPUOS. 

Furthermore, of all the African states, only Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, 

Morocco, Egypt and Kenya are active in space. Even though Kenya has 

space interest and is active in the African Resource and Environmental 

Monitoring Constellation Satellites (ARMC) programme, it does not have a 

satellite; hence, its level of participation in space activities is still at the policy 

level. 

In the light of the above, the participation of most African states in outer 

space activities is likely to be futuristic. As a result, the provisions of Article I 

of the Outer Space Treaty which states that outer space, including the Moon 

and other Celestial Bodies shall be free for exploration and use by all states 

without discrimination of any kind or on the basis of equality and in 

197 

accordance with international law is a welcomed idea to all African States. 

Hence, it is a welcome development that the future use of outer space by 

new entrants is guaranteed by the provisions of the ITU Regulations on 

Interestingly, the 

African continent is 

the least involved in 

space activities 

among all the 

continents. As a 

result, the level of 

adherence of African 

countries to space 

treaties is very low. 

The African continent 

has 54 states but only 

21 states have ratified 

the Outer Space 

Treaty, while 12 states 

have signed but have 

not ratified it; 14 

states have ratified 

the Liability 

Convention, while 10 

states signed without 

ratifying it; three 

states have ratified 

the Registration 

Convention; while 

only one has ratified 

the Moon 

Agreement.In the 

same vein, only 16 

African states are 

members of 

UNCOPUOS. 


Planned Services, which were developed in order to guarantee all Members 

Countries of the ITU equitable access to the Geostationary Earth Orbit 

(GEO) and associated frequency resources for specific future satellite 

services. These include the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) and Broadcasting 

198 

Satellite Service (BSS), in specific bands. 

However, the provisions on the long-term sustainability of outer space as 

required by paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the General Principle of the Code of 

Conduct as it relates to space debris mitigation will be a major concern to 

African states if they wish to build made-in-Africa satellites and develop 

African launch vehicles. This is because an African country that is just 

venturing into space would need to perfect the technology through a series 

of trials and experiments, some of which will inevitably cause space debris. 

With such an expectation, African countries are automatically excluded, or 

they would only venture into space with the knowledge and readiness to 

violate the Code of Conduct on sustainability of outer space, blocking any 

possibility of the crystallisation of such state practices from becoming 

Customary International Law. A way forward is the liberalisation of existing 

space technology that will guarantee the sustainable use of outer space by 

states that have developed and are using them. 

Lastly, the improved adherence demanded by the Code of Conduct on the 

ITU Regulation will be a major challenge for both African states and the 

world at large, as long as abiding by the ITU Regulation is left to “good will.” 

In practice, a situation where states register the life span of their satellites as 

50 years when it is known that the life span is around 15 years, excluding the 

fuel that would be reserved to transport such a satellite to the graveyard orbit 

is of serious concern to African states. The implication is that the registration 

of such a frequency would give the country/entity 100 years right over that 

slot and frequency which prevent the retrieval of such rights, after 30 years 

and re-allocation to another. This is a major setback to the implementation 

of the ITU regulations on the unplanned services procedure and a direct 

attempt at preventing the rotational system of slots as desired by ITU; 

particularly for new entrants into the space arena. As much as these concerns 

are adequately noted, there are no other provisions in the Code of Conduct 

that prevents emerging space faring nations from partaking in the use of 

outer space. 


Conclusion 

The concept of developing an ICoCis indeed a welcomed development. 

ICoC's provisions for the safety, security and sustainability of outer space 

including compliance with and promotion of treaties, conventions, 

cooperation mechanisms, information on outer space activities and 

consultation mechanism are noteworthy. The Code provided for the space 

debris mitigation problem by calling on all subscribing states to refrain from 

any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, 

of space objects unless such action is justified. In addition, the Code calls on 

all subscribing states to improve adherence, and implementation of ITU 

regulations on allocation of radio spectra and orbital assignments, and on 

addressing harmful radio-frequency interference. However, the Code falls 

short of calling for the review of the ITU Regulations and the empowering 

of ITU with enforcement powers to prevent the continuous abuse of ITU 

regulations. 

The Code of Conduct also acknowledged the provisions of existing treaties 

and conventions that support the use of outer space by all nations for 

peaceful purposes. Hence, the Code of Conduct does not hinder new 

entrants from using outer space in the future. However, it should be noted 

that the African continent will need time to develop African satellites and 

launch vehicles and that to optimise this technology, they will unavoidably 

contribute to space debris. 


Draft ICoC: A Ukrainian Perspective 

Borys Atamanenko and N. Redchyts 

From the day of its independence, Ukraine has clearly defined its 

commitment to peace and disarmament, renouncing all nuclear weapons, 

strategic missile weapons and strategic military aviation. Ukraine, as a party to 

four United Nations Treaties on outer space, adheres to the principles of 

peaceful use and exploration of outer space for the benefit and in the 

interests of all states, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 

development, without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and 

in accordance with international law, facilitating and encouraging 

international cooperation. 

The main objectives of the ICoC are strengthening of security and stability 

in outer space activities, as well as development of mutual understanding and 

trust in outer space activities. In our opinion, security in space becomes 

important and necessary at the stage of progressive exploration and use of 

outer space by more and more participants of different forms of ownership. 

A global regime of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer 

space, in our conviction, promotes the maintenance of peaceful and 

sustainable use of outer space for present and future generations in a spirit 

of close cooperation, openness and mutual understanding. 

One has to consider the issue of space security as comprehensive in nature 

as possible. It includes issues of space debris in Near-Earth Orbit, tracking 

of non-operating objects and fragments of space debris, enhanced level of 

trust and awareness of space activities undertaken by states, prevention of 

weaponisation of outer space among other issues. The provisions of the 

draft ICoC are focused on ensuring the safety of outer space activities 

In our opinion, 

security in space 

becomes important 

and necessary at the 

stage of progressive 

exploration and use of 

outer space by more 

and more participants 

of different forms of 

ownership. A global 

regime of 

transparency and 

confidence-building 

measures in outer 

space, in our 

conviction, promotes 

the maintenance of 

peaceful and 

sustainable use of 

outer space for 

present and future 

generations in a spirit 

of close cooperation, 

openness and mutual 

understanding. 

Draft ICoC: A Ukrainian Perspective | www.orfonline.org 157

eyond disarmament issues. Therefore, it would be logical if the line of 

particularly peaceful uses of outer space was clearly tracked in the title and 

provisions of ICoC. 

We consider the ICoC to be a voluntary and legally non-binding instrument. 

In this regard, we emphasise the fact that ICoC should be based on broad 

consensus, as its implementation, in particular, and effectiveness will depend 

entirely on the goodwill of the Subscribing States. It is essential to ensure the 

acceptability of ICoC for the largest possible number of states. 

Taking into account the non-binding nature of ICoC, we consider the 

undisputed fact that ICoC provisions should neither extend beyond the 

framework of the existing international treaties on peaceful exploration and 

use of outer space inanycasenor should it contradict the framework. 

Also, in our opinion, it is necessary to focus on the organisational aspects of 

ICoC implementation. This primarily relates to the definition of the 

conditions under which the first Meeting of the Subscribing States must be 

held (eg.: presence of a certain number of signatories). Also, it is necessary to 

consider deeply the activities of the Central Point of Contact as the 

secretariat of the Meeting of the Subscribing States (especially financial and 

organisational aspects). 


199 

ICoC: Perspective for India 

200 

K R Sridhara Murthi and Mukund Rao 

Background 

Over the past four years, an ICoC for Outer Space Activities, which owes its 

origin to an initiative by the EU, has been undergoing a process of 

international consultations. The original draft has seen several modifications 

to give it greater acceptance among the community of nations. The most 

recent draft of 16 September 2013, resulting from the Open-Ended 

Consultations held in May 2013 in Kiev, Ukraine, represents huge progress in 

building support of the international community but it has yet to gain the 

201 

complete support of some of the key space players. This Code is intended 

to form a regime of transparency and confidence-building measures, a 

complement to the normative framework regulating outer space activities. A 

key characteristic of the Code, which is also central to the backing it enjoys 

from some of its staunch supporters, is that it is open to subscription by all 

states but it is not legally binding. Nevertheless, the code is a significant 

effort to promote responsible use of space for common benefit, preserving 

the principle of freedom of access to space by all. While the Code aims at 

enhancing safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities, the 

question remains as to whether it will be an adequate step for ensuring these 

in totality. 

In an earlier discussion on the subject, it has been argued that in order for 

the Code to emerge as a stepping stone to further development of 

international law relating to outer space, the code should satisfy the following 

principles: 

National space 

activities have a 

duality – on the one 

hand, national 

interests and 

aspirations drive 

nations to take up 

space activities and 

veil them in national 

“right or pride” but, on 

the other hand, 

international 

cooperation (either 

commercial or 

otherwise) necessarily 

forms a critical 

component of most 

space activities - 

requiring 

transparency, 

openness and 

sharing. A balance is 

most essential – a 

good space policy 

can help bring the 

balance and meet 

both requirements – 

within and outside. 

ICoC: Perspective for India | www.orfonline.org 159

• 

• 

• 

consistently reinforce and further evolve the equity principle of 

freedom of activities in Outer Space, as enshrined in relevant UN 

treaties; this would essentially dovetail the Code to existing laws and 

legal principles. 

promote rules that can avoid mutual interference and conflicts, while 

respecting the pre-existing international mechanisms/institutions (for 

example ITU). 

create limits to space activities that have negative consequences and 

cause damage to the environment (like space debris); 

These would, of course, affect the voluntary nature of the Code but it may 

be essential to embed these three principles. 

National space activities have a duality – on the one hand, national interests 

and aspirations drive nations to take up space activities and veil them in 

national “right or pride” but, on the other hand, international cooperation 

(either commercial or otherwise) necessarily forms a critical component of 

most space activities - requiring transparency, openness and sharing. A 

balance is most essential – a good space policy can help bring the balance 

and meet both requirements – within and outside. It is extremely important 

that nations take a bold step to have a national space policy that not only 

defines and states national goals, aims and needs but also brings in as much 

of alignment and consistency to the international code – otherwise, the 

principles of the Code may be lacking national approval and national 

activities could become inconsistent and unaligned to the international 

regime. A process of developing a national space policy may make nations 

open and transparent in developing their own national interests in space 

without any fear or concern of biases or limitations to access space but will, 

at the same time, also enable sharing and cooperation as an effective 

mechanism for compliance at international level. 

Naturally, the issue will be whether the code is an end unto itself or whether 

it is a first step towards a more rigid framework. Under the present 

circumstances, attaining legally-binding status for the Code is not a realistic 

option (because of technical and geopolitical reasons) and that any 

mechanism that is not legally-binding in nature would be more acceptable. 

But is it enough to develop transparency and confidence-building measures 

without more binding rules? This of course needs to be debated by each 

nation. Over time, this exercise will be seen as important and may drive the 

nations to address these issues from the point of view of the Code. 


Code of Conduct and Multiple Facets of Outer 

Space 

Just in 50 odd years, outer space has become increasingly congested, 

contested, and competitive and is driving the aspirations of every generation. 

More than 10 nations have space launch capabilities and over 50 nations own 

and operate approximately 1,000+ active satellites – and it has become clearly 

evident that space is playing an increasingly direct role in our lives. The 

growing amount of space debris is, therefore, a clear driver for some sort of 

a “self-regulation” and thus, a driver for international discussions on the 

Code. 

The priorities and context for making progressive strides in the regulation of 

outer space activities and preserving the ongoing beneficial role of outer 

space has been voiced time and again. For the past few decades, the progress 

on further developments in international space law has been severely 

impeded, even as changes in the environment and new challenges in outer 

space have created a need for new advances in this field. This resulted in 

uncoordinated developments in policy and legal aspects in different countries 

across the globe, compounding security problems in space. More importantly, 

there has been a stalemate in progress on various issues in the CD, 

particularly in matters of preventing an arms race in outer space and 

prevention of weaponisation of space, which poses a threat to international 

peace and security. The need for legal developments in areas such as 

exploitation of extraterrestrial resources, liability regimes and risk mitigation 

measures, private sector collaboration at the international level and 

establishing national space legislations is still relevant. In this milieu, the 

evolution of the Code of Conduct is a welcome step but it has to effectively 

address the three major facets of outer space, namely, (i) the cooperative 

space (ii) the competitive space and (iii) the security of space. Voluntary 

subscription to the Code and the non-binding nature of the Code is a broad 

brush treatment that is inadequate and unlikely to bring about effective 

solutions to problems, particularly in respect of 'competitive space' and 

'security space'. 

Commercial systems 

in space, such as 

privately owned and 

operated high 

resolution remote 

sensing satellites and 

new breeds of 

commercial 

communications 

satellites, have driven 

another important 

trend – namely, a 

trend for the common 

use of space systems 

for both civilian and 

military applications. 

Progress in Commercialisation and the Code 

Since the end of the Cold War, the global nature of space has been 

increasingly manifest in terms of the number and diversity of actors, in both 


government and private sectors. These actors drive the development of 

space systems and deploy them in Earth's orbit for a variety of reasons, 

including gaining access to specialised technologies and realizing innovative 

applications that provide economic, social, scientific or strategic benefits. An 

increasingly successful capability of space is to serve consumers directly 

through various applications, such as Direct-to-Home Television, broadband, 

mobile and multimedia communications and precise positioning related 

services. These have been the major growth engines for commercial 

applications involving space. As a result, billions across the globe directly 

depend on space systems for certain services that vitally touch their 

livelihoods and lifestyles. Expanding market opportunities and fulfilling 

developmental needs have been driving the need for wider and greater access 

to space resources such as the Geo-Synchronous Orbit (GSO). The 

congestion of GSO and competing claims are a reality now, given the limited 

nature of space resources as well as the technological and political 

environment that is emerging. The commercialisation of a variety of space 

based services has also accelerated competition for accessing space resources 

and mastering certain technologies. There is also much clamour for wider 

access to markets across the globe in view of large investments that entail 

space activities. 

Commercial systems in space, such as privately owned and operated high 

resolution remote sensing satellites and new breeds of commercial 

communications satellites, have driven another important trend – namely, a 

trend for the common use of space systems for both civilian and military 

applications. This is facilitated by the strong economic benefits achieved 

through economies of scale and scope, as well as innovations in technology. 

While this development is highly desirable, it would also warrant a strong 

code of conduct that will assure continuity of services and resilience against 

vulnerabilities. Since commercial space revenue already exceeds government 

expenditures globally, should the Code not address commercial space? It may 

be argued that the Code addresses commercial activities through states, who 

are liable and, therefore, legally responsible for the activities of their citizens 

or entities under their jurisdiction. However, since commercial activities in 

space have a certain natural tendency for globalisation, and their international 

ramifications are many, the code should recognise and encourage effective 

fora at international levels for promoting cooperation, consultation and 

engagement with commercial stakeholders. 


Space for National and International Security 

Space is also increasingly integrated into the military strategies of an 

increasing number of countries, and this dimension of space is a major 

driver for investments in space infrastructure by governments in different 

parts of the globe. It is also a major factor in the policies that influence trade 

in and access to space related technologies. In addition, by its contribution to 

increased transparency and its ability to address major global concerns, space 

is an effective tool for diplomacy and an important instrument of TCBMs. 

According to a report sponsored by the Satellite Industry Association, there 

were 1015 active satellites in space as of May 2012. Of these, 175 were 

military satellites meant for surveillance and military communications while 

the rest of the 840 were civilian satellites meant for various purposes such as 

commercial communications (381), navigation (87), meteorology (36), remote 

sensing (95), space science (75), civil government communications (113) and 

technology demonstration (53). This spectrum of satellite segmentation 

serves to illustrate that satellites form a vital part of national infrastructure, 

which is critical to maintain national services and ensure national security. 

The national security dimension of space applications dictates a need for 

certain binding obligations on states for technology, safeguards and 

cooperation. 

The Code envisages subscribing parties sharing information [box numbers 

70-78] on strategies, policies (including security related) and programmes, 

access to facilities and centres, in order to increase transparency and mutual 

trust. However, in view of the varying levels of capacity and diversity of 

security interests and also different stages of development in national policies 

and regulations, balancing information flow is extremely difficult and would 

need further definition of standards. In the provisions relating to the 

consultation mechanism, the Code permits subscribing parties to set up factfinding 

missions to analyse specific incidents affecting space objects. It is 

necessary that such missions are formed at the request of and with consent 

of affected subscribing parties to avoid actions, which are seen as intrusive 

by the affected party. 


Debris Environment 

The space environment has been increasingly threatened by growing debris 

population in widely used earth orbits, increasing the probability of collisions 

with active space systems. For instance, manmade objects tracked by the U.S. 

Department of Defense have increased since 1990 from 6,900 to some 

22,000 in 2010, a threefold increase. The population of non-tracked debris in 

the range of one to 10 cm size is estimated at half a million pieces and that 

smaller than one cm comprise several millions in number. All these pose an 

even graver threat. A single event like an ASAT test causes further steep 

degradation in debris environment, as has been observed in the wake of the 

Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It is also obvious that such events can evoke 

chain reactions to the further detriment of the environment. By the law of 

nature, it is clear that if nations are creating this debris, they must be 

responsible for removing this debris – of course, overcoming many 

expensive, technical hurdles will require unprecedented international 

collaboration. One can recall the movie “Gravity” that wisely focused on the 

problem of debris and what could happen in the future in space. 

The adoption by the UN of a set of Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2007 is 

a laudable development. In view of a steadily worsening space debris 

environment, commitment to vigorously pursue the adoption of a set of 

binding regulations for checking growth of orbital debris should be integral 

to the agreement on adoption of the Code. For example, in congested 

segments of space, contribution to further degradation should place higher 

responsibilities on the contributors. It may be recalled that India has argued 

in the UN COPUOS for a regime of common but differentiated 

responsibility for debris pollution in space. In relation to provision in the 

Code (box 48 and 49) that subscribing states resolving to refrain from any 

action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of 

space objects that can permanently damage the space environment, the Code 

specifies the exceptional circumstances under which this could be permitted. 

Since even such exceptions could irreparably damage the interests of all 

countries, such a drastic provision for exception is not logical without 

establishing a strong regime for responsibility or a regime prohibiting 

abnormal degradation of the space environment. The right of self-defence 

should exclude possibilities of weaponisation of Outer Space. 


Other Provisions in the Code 

It is interesting to note that the Code does not define key terms that drive its 

objectives such as “safety,” “security” and “sustainability.” There could be 

varied interpretations of the scope and applicability of these terms. Looking 

at the its scope, the Code addresses outer space activities, as per Paragraph 

1.2 (or box number 18), involving space objects launched into Earth orbit or 

beyond. It is not clear whether it covers suborbital flights, which are 

emerging as an important form of space tourism. 

The Code rightly emphasises one of the key tenets of outer space 

endeavours of humankind – namely the freedom for all states in accordance 

with international law and obligations to access, to explore and use outer 

space [box 23]. In this box, both the binding rights and obligations and the 

desirable principles, such as being consistent with international practices, are 

combined together. International law and international obligations, in their 

applicability, should be absolute and should not be further qualified by 

attributes such as international practices, which are subject to varied 

interpretations. Hence it would be appropriate to separate these two different 

categories, namely binding principles (of international law and obligations), 

and principles or objectives of a desirable nature. 

The Code requires the subscribing states to reaffirm their commitment to the 

charter of the UN and the existing treaties, principles and guidelines to 

which they are parties or to which they subscribe. The Code further provides 

a fairly long (inclusive) list in box numbers 30 through 43. It is pertinent to 

observe that this omits mention of some sets of the principles adopted by 

the United Nations General Assembly relating to outer space, for example, 

the Principles relating to Remote Sensing of Earth by satellites. Remote 

sensing is an important field having both civilian and military applications 

and it has a bearing on sustainability aspects. 

The Code rightly emphasises commitment for compliance with existing 

treaties, conventions (box numbers 28-43) and also promotion of their 

adherence. However, the emphasis on their further development is somewhat 

inadequate. It is noteworthy that certain vital issues underpinning sustainable, 

safe and secure use of space in the common interest of all countries depend 

on more vigorous efforts and binding regulations when it comes to issues 

like sharing limited natural resources (like orbit-spectrum resources) or taking 


preventive steps that might minimise the creation of space debris. The Code 

does not dwell on consequences for wrongful actions by subscribers. The 

Code should address this lacuna. 

The conduct of space activities by different states is subject to their varying 

capabilities and there may be efforts on the part of states to enhance their 

capabilities at any point in the future. The space environment has to be 

conducive to this. Furthermore, the capability to monitor the space 

environment and space situation is highly limited. The Code needs to address 

in greater detail the responsibility of those who have such capacity to 

monitor activities in outer space and how they could provide access to 

information to all potentially affected states. Both sections 5 and 6 in the 

Code on notification and information sections should address the gap 

between the need for information and the capacity to provide it. 

Indian Space – National Interest and the Code 

The Indian space programme is primarily built for civilian, scientific, and 

environmental activities – but at the same time, India should never give away 

its right to use space, if required, for any national or security interest that it 

determines rightful. Thus, assured access to space is important for the 1.25 

billion people residing in India – to manage its land, forests, water and the 

environment; to provide education, health and connectivity to remote and 

rural areas; to facilitate TV broadcasting to each home; to manage disasters 

better; to develop the knowledge quotient of its young population in space 

science and also to wind aspirations to planetary explorations among others. 

At the same time, India should use imagery to extract intelligence; use 

encrypted and personalised satellite communications as part of a secure 

information infrastructure; power national “information systems” that can 

bring any advanced knowledge of national security threats. 

With its global role increasing and tremendous potential in the area of hightech 

including outer space, India is a leader among all spacefaring nations – 

planning to invest INR equivalent of nearly six billion USD in the five-year 

period of 2012-2017. Of course, the government owns and operates all of 

India's space systems and has a number of operational space objects. India 

participates in the UN and other international fora addressing the threat 

posed by space debris. 


India needs to take a position on the Code and, more importantly, develop a 

national space policy. Space has long-term implications – decisions taken in 

one ecosystem today may have severe impacts many years down the road 

when the ecosystems may be very different. A definite political position 

should be taken, and the Indian leadership should seek to bring both its 

space policy and the code into line. While the Code could lend order and 

predictability to the space domain by promoting norms of responsible 

behaviour, facilitating the dissemination of best practices and increasing 

transparency, the elected representatives must understand the societal, 

commercial and even defence implications. The Indian administration must 

hold an informal debate on whether to endorse the Code, based on a careful 

assessment of whether the Code would have an operational impact on the 

India's access to and use of space. 

It must be borne in mind that many spacefaring countries, including 

Australia, Canada, and Japan, have already endorsed the Code and nations 

like China, Russia, and U.S. are intensely engaged in internal and international 

debate on the Code – India must not have a ring-side view. 

Conclusion 

The need to ensure safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities 

has become an urgent need for humanity. However, this demands a holistic 

approach to policy making, including the need for a) regulatory frameworks 

to prevent any irreparable damage through use of precautionary principles, 

b) a widely accepted and practiced code of conduct which can enhance 

values of cooperation and common benefit, c) a binding framework of rules 

which stipulate the sharing and use of any common resource of limited 

nature. Free access to space cannot go without binding commitments for 

mitigating risks for all users of space, both in the present and in the future. 

Without a serious commitment to ensure progress on certain binding 

regulations relating to the space environment or space security, the Code will 

have a very limited impact. On the other hand, there have been fears that it 

may slow down or divert efforts to build legally binding commitments that 

are essential for assuring the safety, security and sustainability of space 

activities. 

With its global role 

increasing and 

tremendous potential 

in the area of hightech 

including outer 

space, India is a 

leader among all 

spacefaring nations – 

planning to invest INR 

equivalent of nearly 

six billion USD in the 

five-year period of 

2012-2017. Of course, 

the government owns 

and operates all of 

India's space systems 

and has a number of 

operational space 

objects. 

India has a definitive and long-term interest in space – it must also exercise 

its interest in defining the rules of the road for interstate behaviour in space 


and it must be pro-actively involved in the development efforts of an 

international code of conduct on outer space activities. India is uniquely 

positioned as a developing nation to lead and be a balancing voice to bring 

about a stronger foundation for its own programme along with being a part 

of a more widely accepted international code. 


ICoC: Perspectives from Latin 

America and the Caribbean 

Roberto Becerra and Romina Acevedo 

Introduction 

According to Yaw OtuMankantaNyampong (2012), the legal framework for 

the activities of states in outer space is classified as follows: 

• 

• 

• 

International Space Law. Branch of the international law mainly 

consisting of the five outer space treaties of the United Nations, 

General international law, conventional and customary law, general 

principles, legal decisions and analyses of legal experts from different 

nations, 

New category of guidelines or "soft law", principles and codes of 

conduct - they are not binding on states (similar to the Code of 

Conduct for Outer Space Activities, presented by the EU). 

From the point of view of international space law (treaties and binding 

rules), the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS, 

hereafter the Committee), through the Legal Subcommittee, has played a 

leading role in the progressive development and codification of this legal 

branch, becoming the focal point for international cooperation and for the 

establishment of rules of peaceful conduct for states in outer space. Its main 

contributions include: 

Without judging the 

actions of some 

space actors, it is 

obvious that the 

current international 

regime in outer space 

needs to be 

broadened and 

modified, as well as 

incorporate new 

regulations that 

address the problem 

of space debris and 

unequal access to the 

geostationary orbit, to 

mention just two 

aspects of the list of 

critical issues that 

threaten activities of 

states in outer space. 

ICoC: Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean | www.orfonline.org 169

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty"), adopted by the General 

Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 

January 1967, entered into force on October 10, 1967; 

The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 

Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 

(the "Rescue Agreement"), adopted by the General Assembly in its 

resolution 2345 (XXII), opened for signature on April 22, 1968, 

entered into force on December 03, 1968; 

The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 

Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"), adopted by the General 

Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29 

March 1972, entered into force on September 01, 1972; 

The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 

Space (the "Registration Convention"), adopted by the General 

Assembly in its resolution 3235 (XXIX), opened for signature on 

January 14, 1975, entered into force on September 15, 1976; 

The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 

Other Celestial Bodies (the "Moon Agreement"), adopted by the 

General Assembly in its resolution 34/68, opened for signature on 

December 18, 1979, entered into force on July 11, 1984. 

If one were to scan the year of adoption of each of these legal mechanisms, 

one can conclude that between 1966 and 1979, the Committee was really 

active in developing binding rules (treaties), which currently govern the 

activities of states in outer space. However, the lack of consensus and/or 

political-commercial interest of some members of the Committee, led to the 

202 

adoption of less rigid and non-binding commitments, such as principles, 

203 204 

guidelines, frameworks and codes of conduct. 

Without judging the actions of some space actors, it is obvious that the 

current international regime in outer space needs to be broadened and 

modified, as well as incorporate new regulations that address the problem of 

space debris and unequal access to the geostationary orbit, to mention just 

two aspects of the list of critical issues that threaten activities of states in 

outer space. 


Based on the existing problems, the Committee at its 52nd session in 2009 

agreed that Scientific and Technical Subcommittee should incorporate in its 

programme for the next session (in 2010), the agenda item, “Long Term 

Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,” in order to generate 

recommendations and possible solutions to the current situation. Also, other 

space actors have promoted initiatives in fora other than the U N, including 

the ICoCfor Outer Space Activities, proposed by the EU. The ICoC includes 

a set of non-binding principles aimed to "enhance the protection, security 

and sustainability of outer space activities,” which could be considered as 

part of the development of rules and practical procedures for the proper use 

of outer space. 

This paper presents some considerations on ICoC from a regional 

perspective (Latin America and the Caribbean), making a disclaimer that such 

comments do not represent the official opinion of the Regional Group of 

Latin America and the Caribbean (hereafter GRULAC). 

Discussion 

In the context of the Committee, the region of Latin America and the 

Caribbean made significant contributions to international space law during 

the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, particularly countries such as Argentina, 

Brazil and Chile. Likewise, statements presented by GRULAC during the past 

10 years reflect the firm conviction to continue strengthening the framework 

of binding rules developed by the UN on space issues. 

To be precise, during the 50th session of the Legal Sub-Committee of the 

COPUOS, the GRULAC States said: 

5. We are facing a fast development of space activities, including the 

increasing use of outer space by States, international organizations, 

and private entities, which could have negative impacts on the 

preservation of outer space as it is known it today. (...) The Group 

has the view that coordination and synergy between the two 

Subcommittees will also promote understanding, acceptance and 

effective implementation of existing legal instruments of the United 

Nations. 

Based on that, the GRULAC considers essential the interaction 

between the two subcommittees, in order to promote the 

it would be worthwhile 

to ask whether a 

solution to a potential 

crisis in outer space 

may be reached 

through soft 

proposals on a 

voluntary basis, 

without a legal 

framework that truly 

compels states to fulfil 

their responsibilities 

as space actors. Or, 

alternatively, why not 

reinforce existing 

norms, expanding 

and modifying their 

content to effectively 

address the current 

challenges in space? 

Is the UN the ideal 

multilateral forum to 

coordinate these 

initiatives? 


development of international rules which will constitute an effective 

legal mechanism that incorporate(s) the responsibility of States in the 

use of nuclear power sources in outer space and space debris, areas 

of priority with regard to the environment of outer space.” (p. 2) 

The opinion of the GRULAC during the 56th session of COPUOS 

regarding space debris and the use of nuclear power sources in outer space 

was expressed as follows: 

“... Regarding the "Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in 

Outer Space,” approved by COPUOS at its 52nd session, the GRULAC calls 

this Committee to review it, as well as to promote BINDING RULES, in 

order to ensure that any activity in outer space is governed by the principles of 

preservation of life and peace. In particular, [it] is necessary to pay more 

attention to the legal issues related with nuclear power sources on board satellites 

orbiting the Earth, due to failures and collisions reported which represent a high 

risk to human kind...” (s/p). 

From this perspective, the GRULAC supports the consolidation of the 

principles governing the activities of states in outer space established in the 

five UN Treaties, and suggests the adoption of binding and clear rules for 

global application. While the GRULAC considers “soft laws” are useful 

inputs for codifying international rules, it is nevertheless convinced that 

strengthening the UN treaties is the best option for the development and 

codification of international space law. 

Under these considerations, it would be worthwhile to ask whether a solution 

to a potential crisis in outer space may be reached through soft proposals on 

a voluntary basis, without a legal framework that truly compels states to fulfil 

their responsibilities as space actors. Or, alternatively, why not reinforce 

existing norms, expanding and modifying their content to effectively address 

the current challenges in space? Is the UN the ideal multilateral forum to 

coordinate these initiatives? 

An additional aspect to consider when understanding the visions of 

GRULAC to international initiatives (such as ICoC) is the strict adherence to 

the peaceful use of outer space. Latin America and the Caribbean region has 

been historically characterised as a peace zone, free of nuclear weapons, 

supportive of peaceful cooperation among nations, Latin American 


integration (according to the principle of non-intervention and selfdetermination 

of countries), the universal and indivisible guarantee of 

human rights, democratisation of international society, as well as the care of 

the space environment as common and inalienable heritage. 

The articles of ICoC reflect the right of individual or collective self-defence, 

which is not acceptable to Latin America and the Caribbean since it 

contradicts the principle of the peaceful use of outer space, and opens the 

possibilities to increase the use of force, weapons and the militarisation of 

the outer space arena. 

However, the promoters of this initiative argue that the self-defence principle 

is already found within the UN Charter, which, therefore, justifies its 

inclusion in ICoC.. Although this military approach is clearly expressed 

within the UN Charter, it is necessary to further analyse its meaning and its 

background. 

The UN Charter is certainly a global example for democratising international 

society and reflects the vision and interests of the World War II allies, who 

felt the pressures of the post-War era (the Cold War) at the time these 

multilateral organisations was created. Victorious states were forced to be 

prepared for potential conflicts (hence the right to self-defence). Considering 

the current international scenario, these actions under discussion are out of 

context. Today if there were to be a conflict, the willingness for peaceful 

resolutions should prevail (a concept also included within the UN Charter), 

as well as the desire to strengthen peace and cooperation, including in the 

outer space domain. The position of Latin America and the Caribbean, in 

this regard, is respectable, worthy of admiration and support. 

Developing countries, 

particularly those in 

Latin America and the 

Caribbean, have 

expressed that 

consensus will be 

difficult to reach if the 

text of ICoC refers to 

the concept of right to 

self-defence. 

The references to the right of self-defence have generated controversy 

during the Open-Ended Consultations and other forums where the proposal 

for ICoC has been discussed. Developing countries, particularly those in 

Latin America and the Caribbean, have expressed that consensus will be 

difficult to reach if the text of ICoC refers to the concept of right to selfdefence. 

Another issue to consider in understanding the approach of Latin America is 

the method in which the promoters of ICoC have submitted the proposal at 

the margins of the Committee (UNOOSA-COPUOS), stating that the 


content of ICoC is beyond the competence of the Committee. In order to 

seek solutions aimed at enhancing long-term sustainability of outer space, 

the promoters insist on using different fora due to the lack of consensus, 

institutional bureaucracy or inefficiency of COPUOS. Is this alternative the 

best way to go about? It should be recalled that ctates are responsible for 

establishing the operating rules of the Committee. 

According to resolution 1472 (XIV) of the General Assembly, the duties of 

the Committee are: 

• 

• 

To review, as appropriate, the area of international cooperation, and 

to study practical and feasible means for giving effect to programmes 

in the peaceful uses of outer space which could appropriately be 

undertaken under United Nations auspices, including, inter alia: 

Assistance for the continuation on a permanent basis of the research 

on outer space carried on within the framework of the International 

Geophysical Year; 

Organisation of the mutual exchange and dissemination of 

information on outer space research; 

Encouragement of national research programmes for the study of 

outer space, and the rendering of all possible assistance and help 

towards their realisation; 

To study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the 

exploration of outer space; 

According to Becerra (2012), the Committee is a subsidiary body of the 

General Assembly in charge of promoting international cooperation in the 

space sector (including scientific, technical and legal aspects), which provides 

recommendations to the Assembly through resolution and reports, giving it a 

political character (since Member States are interacting); international 

cooperation is not only or purely technical. As part of the UN system, the 

Committee has the capability to interact and communicate with all 

organisations within the system to fulfill the main objective of the UN 

Charter, which is to preserve international peace. Although the Committee 

has not clearly established operating rules, it has flexibility to create the best 

working condition, all under the direction of Member States. 


During the Open-Ended Consultations of the ICoC, Latin America has 

insisted on strengthening the work of the Committee, especially the Legal 

Subcommittee, due its leading role on the development of international 

space law. This has been a key issue, since the Committee is the centre of 

technical, legal and political discussions established by states to address issues 

in outer space, which according to the GRULAC, must be supported by 

other UN entities and multilateral forums, without neglecting or weakening 

its functions. 

Conclusion 

Since ICoC is currently under consultation, any comment on this regard is 

preliminary. In addition, this paper does not represent the official opinion of 

GRULAC. The objective is to identify a regional approach to new strategies 

and international procedures, while preparing to face the challenge of longterm 

sustainability of outer space activities. Some issues are: 

• 

• 

• 

The Regional Group supports the creation of international legal rules 

that effectively address the current challenges in outer space, 

especially to update the international space treaties and to promote 

new binding rules. 

The Regional Group is committed to maintaining peace, the peaceful 

use of outer space and rejects the inclusion of the right to selfdefence 

concept expressed in ICoC. 

The Regional Group supports strengthening of the Committee (and 

its subcommittees) and the UN, as promoters of international space 

law. 


References 

Becerra, R. (2013). Ciencia y TecnologíaEspacialpara el Desarrollo Integral de 

Venezuela.AgenciaBolivarianaparaActividadesEspaciales (ABAE). Caracas. 

Declaración del Grupo de Estados de Américalatina y el Caribe parael 50° periodo de 

sesiones de la Sub-Comisión de AsuntosJurídicos de la ComisiónSobre la 

Utilización del EspacioUltraterrestre con fines pacíficos (COPUOS), Viena, 28 de 

marzo al 8 de abril del 2011. 

Declaración del Grupo de Estados de Américalatina y el Caribe parael 56° periodo de 

sesiones de la ComisiónSobre la Utilización del EspacioUltraterrestre con fines 

pacíficos (COPUOS), Viena del 12 al 21 de junio de 2012. 

Yaw OtuMankantaNyampong (2012). Protecting the Environment of Space for Economic 

and Social Development – Space Law, International Law and the Problem of Space 

Debris”. Cursoprácticosobrederechoespacialorganizadopor la UNOOSA-CONAE. 

Buenos Aires, Argentina, del 5 al 8 de noviembre de 2012. 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html 


ICoC: African Perspectives 

Solomon Belay Tessema 

Introduction 

Activities in outer space, including those of African countries, are increasing, 

with a growing number of African and other states either launching or keen 

to launch their own satellites. In view of such expanding space activities, 

there is a need to strengthen the existing legal framework in order to address 

various space activities. Attempts are being made to create a set of rules and 

practices to formulate globally accepted guidelines for the space arena. In 

2008, the EU, in its attempt to provide a complementary mechanism to the 

existing framework regulating outer space, had circulated a draft Code of 

205 

Conduct (CoC) in this regard. The Europeans engaged in bilateral and 

multilateral meetings with other space players, mostly within the western 

camp. After incorporating some of the feedback and inputs, the EU released 

a revised version in late 2010. 

Recently, on June 06, 2012, the EU officially launched (in Vienna) a 

multilateral diplomatic process to discuss and negotiate an ICoC for outer 

space. Consultation and negotiations on the basis of this text started in 2012. 

They have continued to discuss the second draft in bilateral and multilateral 

meetings and have also sent officials to discuss it in international fora. Plans 

for consultation and negotiations were drafted and set with timelines, 

including a Multilateral Experts Meeting (October 2012) in New York 

amongst all UN Member States, aimed at adopting the Code in March 2013. 

A consultation meeting took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with African 

experts, space agencies and Ministry of Science and Technology 

ICoC: African Perspectives | www.orfonline.org 177

epresentatives in order to discuss African concerns prior to the Open- 

Ended Consultations in Kiev in May 2013 and Open-Ended Consultations in 

Bangkok, Thailand in October 2013. At the Bangkok meeting, it was seen 

that the EU had improved the document compared to the one presented at 

the two previous meetings. 

In its current document, the main purpose of CoC is to enhance the security, 

safety and sustainability of outer space activities. Its guiding principles 

include freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes; respect for the 

security and integrity of objects in space orbit; the responsibility of countries 

to refrain from harmful interference with each other's assets and to prevent 

conflict in space; and the inherent right of all states to individual and 

collective self-defence. Even though the purpose of the document was stated 

as above, many developing countries fear that ICoC may be used as an 

instrument to pick on some of the countries with different ideologies from 

those of western countries. 

Presently, various states in the world are depending significantly on space 

technologies for the purposes of communication, remote sensing and 

navigation. Various assets in space could encounter an intentional or 

accidental collision with orbital space debris resulting from human activities. 

At present, various activities in outer space are governed by a few globally 

206 

acknowledged treaty mechanisms like the Outer Space Treaty (OST, 1967) 

207 

and Moon Treaty (1979). The agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 

Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 

208 

(Rescue Agreement, 1968) and other agreements such as the Convention 

on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Space 

209 

Liability Convention, 1972) are other important treaties in this regard. The 

UN has also undertaken various initiatives like the COPUOS (1959) and 

PAROS (1982). The UN has produced various General Assembly 

Resolutions, Conference on Disarmament (CD) working papers on the issue. 

In recent times, apart from the EU-sponsored ICoC, two other initiatives 

have come to the fore. One, a Model Code of Conduct prepared by the 

210 

Stimson Center was made available for discussion and debate during 

October 2007. Two, in February 2008, Russia and China put on the table a 

draft of the “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 

211 

Treaty” (PPWT), an international, legally-binding treaty that would ban the 

weaponisation of space. Neither of these initiatives has generated much 


interest. Probably, the PPWT has been viewed as a treaty that allows Russia 

and China to dominate international public diplomacy. The biggest 

shortcoming of this treaty is that it is silent about ground-based missiles that 

can destroy satellites in space. In addition, it is also being viewed as an 

attempt to put pressure on the U.S. missile defence plans. The Stimson 

Center CoC, on the other hand, follows a very simplistic approach and not a 

traditional detailed approach. 

Also, in 2009, a Working Paper on TCBMs for Space Security was presented 

212 

by Canada to the CD. The paper argues that CD should consider security 

guarantees, such as a declaration of legal principles, a code of conduct, or a 

treaty banning the placement of weapons in space in any form. 

Amongst all these initiatives, the EU-formulated ICoC for Outer Space has 

found more acceptability from the point of view of discussions. The EU has 

now officially begun the process of negotiations to take this process forward. 

However, African countries are discussing the usefulness of a code in general 

whilst simultaneously scrutinising the provisions of the EU CoC that might 

hamper the current ambitions and interests of African countries' own space 

programmes. These countries could work to re-shape the current Code or, 

more ambitiously, frame a code of their own. A code that Africa and other 

developing nations frame might not be very different from the EU code, but 

it would emerge from an African perspective. The EU or U.S. or Russia or 

China should not develop this code for Africa. African Eyes are different 

from the western eyes for Africa. 

Therefore, as a first step, African leaders and experts need to push forward 

their concerns and options to EU, Russia, China and the U.S. in an 

unequivocal manner, with a clear message that Africans will not accept the 

ICoC with any external pressure. The EU, UN and U.S. have to take serious 

note of the African concerns and give due consideration in a modified code. 

Meanwhile, Africa should push for greater dialogue with other spacefaring 

countries in Africa, through the African Union, to give more definite shape 

to their concerns and views on a code in accordance with the emerging 

security scenario in Africa. 

CoC for Outer Space Activities 

213 

The (EU CoC) is about measures to be undertaken towards enhancing the 

protection for various activities in outer space. It is aimed at endorsing best 

African countries are 

discussing the 

usefulness of a code 

in general whilst 

simultaneously 

scrutinising the 

provisions of the EU 

CoC that might 

hamper the current 

ambitions and 

interests of African 

countries' own space 

programmes. These 

countries could work 

to re-shape the 

current Code or, more 

ambitiously, frame a 

code of their own. A 

code that Africa and 

other developing 

nations frame might 

not be very different 

from the EU code, but 

it would emerge from 

an African 

perspective. The EU 

or U.S. or Russia or 

China should not 

develop this code for 

Africa. African Eyes 

are different from the 

western eyes for 

Africa. 


practices and undertaking confidence building measures through a series of 

voluntary disclosures about the space agendas of states, as pursued by both 

governmental and non-governmental entities. The subscribing states are 

expected to take appropriate measures to avoid accidents/collisions in space 

between objects and also to avoid any form of harmful interference in 

legitimate activities undertaken in space. States are also expected to remain 

committed towards limiting the creation of space debris. The ICoC expects 

member states to register space objects and provide timely information with 

regard to their launch schedules, various proposed space manoeuvres, 

collisions/break-ups in orbit, re-entry events, space environmental 

conditions. In addition, states are required to share their space policies and 

strategies. The Code also has provisions like regular meetings, creation of an 

electronic database and communication systems. But ICoC does not address 

clearly who is the main cause of space debris. The documents seem more like 

political instruments than space science and technology development. 

Major parts of the EU CoC 

The major elements of the EU CoC are: 

• 

• 

• 

It seeks to codify new best practices while contributing to 

transparency and confidence-building measures and complement 

existing arrangements on outer space activities. 

The “inherent right of States for collective self-defence in accordance 

with the United Nations Charter” would be observed. 

States that are signatories of the Code would be guided by the 

existing legal framework while ensuring national programmes that 

would essentially adhere to and implement, among other treaties, the 

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies (1967); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 

the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 

Outer Space (1968), the Constitution and Convention of the 

International Tele-communications Union and its Radio Regulations 

(2002) 


• 

• 

• 

States that become party to the Code would establish and implement 

national “policies and procedures to minimise the possibility of 

accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of 

harmful interference with other States' right to the peaceful 

exploration and use of outer space.” 

States are also obliged to provide “information on national space 

policies and strategies, including basic objectives for security and 

defence related activities.” 

States engaged “in consultations shall seek solutions based on an 

equitable balance of interests”. 

African Concerns 

Some of the provisions of the (EU CoC) do not address or take into account 

the space science programmes of developing countries, especially African 

ones. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The Purpose, Scope and General Principles of (EU CoC) need 

further modification in order to address clearly rights of African 

countries to develop space programmes without any intervention. 

If the ICoC is accepted as it is, without inclusion of the role and 

rights of African space programmes, the current initiatives for 

African Space Science and Technology will be crippled. 

The Code is also seen as limiting operations and not weapons, which 

raises an objection in terms of the objectives of the Code: the (EU 

CoC) seems to be drafted to protect the interests of the West. 

Even though the EU-Code is not legally binding, many developing 

countries are concerned that ICoC will be part of a Cold War 

between the EU and U.S., and Russia and China. 

Africa believes that ICoC should be initiated from Africa for 

Africans, 

Africans are concerned that the EU CoC will discourage the current 

development of space science and technology in Africa. 


• 

Beijing and Russia have categorically stated that it would be 

“impossible” to share information on its security and defence 

policies. 

• 

• 

• 

The EU initiative to lay out some basic rules and guidelines is 

admirable but there are problems with the EU approach, such as the 

failure to address the role of Africans in the text of the CoC. 

The EU has formulated the code without consulting Africa. Because 

of this oversight, Africa has strong reservations aboutICoC, unless 

the document is revised further. 

Space programmes in Africa are emerging and therefore Africa 

should be consulted as important partners on the ICoC. 

Finally, I recommend that further negotiation of the EU on ICoC should be 

continued with Africa. A CoC for space activities should emerge from Africa 

for Africans, not from the EU or any other country. Africans must unite and 

stand together to respect the interests of Africa. 


References 

“Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, in: 

United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, United Nations, 2002, pp. 

27-35, available at: 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf (accessed on 

June 28, 2012). 

“Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 

Objects Launched into Outer Space” (UN General Assembly Document 2345 

(XXII)), available at: http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/rescue.html 

(accessed on June 28, 2012). 

Conference on Disarmament, “Canada Working Paper: On the Merits of Certain Draft 

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space 

Security” (Conference on Disarmament Document CD/1865), available at: 

http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C40D0B92E5F37A9 

CC12575FC003BCE37/$file/CD_1865_E.pdf, (accessed on June 28, 2012). 

“Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects” (UN General 

Assembly Document 2777 (XXVI)), available at: 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/liability.html (accessed on June 28, 

2012). 

“Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft of the Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities” (Council of the European Union Document 14455/10), available at: 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st14455.en10.pdf (accessed 

on January 12, 2012). 

“Model Code of Conduct”, Stimson Center, October 2007, available at: 

http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/model-code-of-conduct/ (accessed on 

June 28,2012). 

“Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat 

or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)”, Council on Foreign 

Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/space/treaty-prevention-placementweapons-outer-space-threat-useforce-against-outer-space-objects-ppwt/p26678 

(accessed on June 28, 2012). 

“Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, available at: 

http://www.opanal.org/Docs/Desarme/TD/OuterSpace_Treaty.pdf, (accessed on 

June 28, 2012). 

References | www.orfonline.org 183

“United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space”, available at: 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html (accessed on Jun 28, 

2012). 


Accommodation of Competing 

Interests: A Latin American 

Perspective 

214 

Ciro Arévalo-Yepes 

As a pre-condition for its harmonious maturation, to which the ICoCfor 

Outer Space Activities initiative is contributing, International Space Law 

requires that the rights and duties for space activities should be framed 

around critical legal and political values. Without a robust reference structure, 

the space regime could become an antagonistic arena of conflict with 

negative impacts on the space environment, with obvious consequences on 

Earth. 

Since UNISPACE III, where the main consensual principles launched by the 

international community were reinforced, a number of initiatives were 

discussed: Russia-China's draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement 

of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer 

215 

Space Object” (PPWT); the Canadian Working Paper Presented to CD 

216 

(June 05, 2009); the sustainability of space activities currently under 

discussion in the UNCOPUOS; and the proposal “Towards a United Nations 

217 

Space Policy”, launched by the author of this paper in his capacity as 

218 

Chairman of COPUOS during its 53rd session in Vienna in June 2008. All 

these initiatives have one common denominator, the need for greater 

international cooperation to safeguard the continued use of outer space in a 

peaceful manner for current and future generations and to promote 

sustainable development on Earth through their application. 

Accommodation of Competing Interests: A Latin American Perspective | www.orfonline.org 185

In that regard, efforts that have been undertaken by the EU to broaden the 

spectrum of consultations on the ICoC to non-space faring nations, 

including some Latin American countries, are very welcome. Such efforts 

contribute to the formation of opiniojurisgeneralis in a transparent and 

inclusive manner on the critical issues of safety, security and sustainability for 

space activities and are in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 61/75 

(December 2006) and 62/43 (5 December 2007) on transparency and 

confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities. 

It is also important to render the ICoC in consistence with the fundamental 

principles of the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and to 

support their application; the incorporation of those Guidelines in the draft 

ICoC are signs pointing in a good direction. After all, the Guidelines were 

the result of a long-standing UN effort to adopt the most important 

multilateral instrument for the mitigation of space debris. 

Role of Latin America in Developing Norms of 

Behaviour for Space Activities 

Latin American states have been traditionally active in the building of legal 

instruments for space activities, starting with the adoption of the UN 

General Assembly's Resolution on the Declaration of Legal Principles 

Governing the Activities of states in the Exploration and Use of Outer 

Space. The region was actively involved in the adoption of the res communis 

principle of international law, consecrated in Article 1 of the Outer Space 

Treaty, and the inclusion of the Province of All Mankind concept, which 

embraces most of the outer space legal instruments in existence today. 

All of the Latin American member states of COPUOS have participated in 

the drafting of the five UN treaties on outer space activities, the four nonbinding 

sets of principles (none of which have thus far served as the basis 

for a further treaty in the same way as the Declaration), and a series of 

General Assembly resolutions. At a continental level, the Latin American 

states, the U.S. and Canada have formed the Space Conferences of the 

Americas (CEAs - Spanish initials), a commentary platform to enhance space 

cooperation in areas such as technical and space policy. Six sessions have 

been concluded thus far in different countries: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, 

Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico. Very recently, in October 2013, at a regional 

meeting of space agencies in Bogotá, Brazil presented a proposal for the 


creation of a Latin American Alliance of Space Agencies (ALAS - Spanish 

initials) in order to foster and promote the development of cooperative 

projects and programmes in areas of interest to the member countries, as 

219 

well as in common areas of the region. On operative aspect, despite their 

differences, space programmes across the region share a common vision of 

using space-based benefits to facilitate sustainable socio-economic 

development and enhance the lives of people. They have all supported the 

process of Rio+20, as well as the post-2015 development agenda in which 

“many critical survival issues are related to uneven development, poverty and 

population growth. They all place unprecedented pressures on the planet's 

land, waters, forest and other natural resources, not least in developing 

220 

countries.” 

The concept focused on the importance of the principle of intergenerational 

equity – that we must take into account the uncomfortable notion that 

unborn generations may pay for our environmental excesses for lifetimes to 

come. It also outlined common but distinct responsibilities that succinctly 

defined sustainable development as “development, which meets the needs of 

the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 

221 

their own needs.” 

In that regard, space technology is of vital importance for the Latin 

American region because it covers a vast geographic area with dense 

vegetation and typographical features at variance. Technology offering 

communication, remote sensing and weather monitoring solutions has great 

relevance for the everyday running of the state. Countries like Argentina and 

Brazil have demonstrated the capability to build satellites. However, no Latin 

American country has yet succeeded in developing the infrastructure to 

launch a satellite on their own. Hence, there is dependence on states outside 

the region to provide a range of space technology-related services. 

For the past few years Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina have 

all made increasing investments in the space sector. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 

and Peru have had space commissions, agencies and/or research institutes 

for more than two decades. Bolivia is the most recent entrant to the space 

arena, having established its space agency in 2010; Venezuela's space agency 

was set up in 2008; Ecuador's EXA was created in 2007, and Colombia's 

Space Commission (CCE) was established in 2006. In 2010, Mexico created a 

new national space agency, the Agencia Espacial Mexicana (AEXA), with the 

One of the main 

concerns that 

emerged in these 

discussions was how 

effective could a code 

be if it is a nonbinding 

instrument 

that relies on the 

political will of 

subscribers, and what 

would be the role of 

non-subscribers. The 

Latin America states 

would certainly 

advocate for a 

binding instrument 

with an appropriate 

set of mechanisms 

directed at spacefaring 

nations, which 

are the main 

producers of space 

debris. But Latin 

American states are 

also well aware of the 

geopolitical realities 

derived from national 

and regional security 

priorities, which 

remain a critical 

consideration on this 

particular issue. 


aim of investing in space technology for socio-economic purposes. Brazil is 

the state with the most significant expertise in space. Over the years, Brazil 

has made consistent efforts to develop its space programme in multiple 

arenas by collaborating with other states, particularly with China. However, 

despite best efforts, it still lacks successful launch vehicle technology. 

Voluntary Nature of ICoC and its Cooperation 

Mechanisms 

Since June 2010, when the first draft of the ICoC was presented among the 

EU's proposal partners, with a number of meetings being carried out, first of 

its kind among like-minded entities and then gradually involving non-space 

faring nations and developing countries, including some Latin American 

states. Thanks to the organisation of an important American regional 

seminar and other outreach initiatives for the facilitation of the development 

of an ICoCfor Outer Space Activities by UNIDIR, the Mexican Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs and the Mexican Space Agency, which took place in Ciudad 

de Mexico on 1-2 July 2013, a number of key issues were clarified and 

substantive reservations on the ICoC were expressed by the countries of the 

region. 

One of the main concerns that emerged in these discussions was how 

effective could a code be if it is a non-binding instrument that relies on the 

political will of subscribers, and what would be the role of non-subscribers. 

The Latin America states would certainly advocate for a binding instrument 

with an appropriate set of mechanisms directed at space-faring nations, 

which are the main producers of space debris. But Latin American states are 

also well aware of the geopolitical realities derived from national and regional 

security priorities, which remain a critical consideration on this particular 

issue. On the other hand, a non-binding instrument with monitoring 

provisions seems to be the determinant aspect since it empowers the 

222 

instrument in a pragmatic and realistic manner. 

In that regard, the ICoC includes - on a voluntary basis - some kind of 

mechanisms, like the notification in a timely manner, to the “greatest extent 

practicable” to all potential affected Subscriber States of any event which 

includes: risk schedule manoeuvres, predicted conjunction, pre-notification 

of launch of space objects, collisions, risked re-entries and malfunctioning of 

space objects among others (para 5.1). 


The principle of cooperation and mutual assistance (para 5.1) found in the 

ICoC is also reinforced by including measures on Space Operation and Space 

Debris Mitigation (para 4), like the establishment and implementation of 

policies and procedures to minimise the risk of accidents in space, collisions 

between space objects and any form of harmful interference with another 

state's peaceful exploration, and use of outer space. 

Latin American Position on the Threat of Space 

Debris 

Latin American countries have traditionally expressed their support for space 

debris mitigation, especially since they recognise debris as the biggest threat 

to space activities today. They understood that debris can be created in 

intentional and non-intentional manner and that none of the region's 

members can be classified as wrongdoers. They believe that responsibility for 

existing space debris should be allocated without imposing an undue burden 

on emerging space actors. Along with the equitable access to space resource, 

security threat posed by space debris constitutes one of the main concerns 

223 

for many countries of the region. The recent experience of an Ecuadorian 

224 

satellite demonstrated the danger posed by space debris. As expressed by 

Ecuador in UNIDIR's seminar, “as evidence in the case of Pegasus, space 

225 

debris is an important threat even for small, inexpensive satellites.” As 

mentioned in different fora, the region gives special consideration to space 

situational awareness reinforcement in order to reduce risk of collision of 

assets with each other and with space debris. 

In this regard, if the 

EU intends for the 

ICoC to be 

transformed from a 

regional initiative to a 

universal and 

legitimate instrument, 

- even as a voluntary 

one - the articulation 

within the UN seems 

indispensable. 

However, one of the main concerns of the region is that the ICoC does not 

strive to prohibit or even limit kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. The 

instrument aims at limiting the effect of ASAT tests but no more. 

Additionally, it does not refine the concept of peaceful purposes. Some of 

the countries of the region therefore have reservations regarding the draft's 

reference to the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, which 

are seen as “unacceptable encroachment on established principles of the use 

of outer space for peaceful purposes.” This objection was removed from the 

preamble, but was retained in part 2, General Principles. 

The position of the Latin American countries will largely depend on how the 

consultation process will continue, and if they will include other nations like 

Colombia, Peru or Ecuador and not just the regional big players like Brazil 


and, to a different degree, Argentina. The ICoC is currently being structured 

outside of the traditional UN institutions, such as COPUOS, which, for all 

of the Latin American countries, is recognised as the focal point for 

international cooperation in outer space and for the formulation of 

necessary international rules. 

In this regard, if the EU intends for the ICoC to be transformed from a 

regional initiative to a universal and legitimate instrument, - even as a 

voluntary one - the articulation within the UN seems indispensable. The risk 

of duplication and a non-complementary “derapage” could jeopardise such a 

good effort. It is within multilateral structures like COPUOS and the 

International Telecommunications Union that the Latin America region 

traditionally builds its common position, which has contributed to the 

development and codification of international law. Regional views of space 

multilateral policy are highly aligned and expressed as the Latin America and 

Caribbean Group (GRULAC), which is basically focused on the free and 

equitable access to space and on the applicability of space technology for the 

implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. 

Conclusion 

Much has been done to establish a regulatory framework for space activities 

through the combination of legally binding and voluntary measures. The 

ICoC represents an important diplomatic initiative in that direction, not least 

of all since it was conceived to find solutions for emerging space security 

threats. While the importance of preserving the environmental conditions of 

activities in outer space is widely acknowledged by Latin American states, 

there are still differing views on how best to design a future regulatory 

framework for space activities. 

Latin Americans states are supportive of norms of behaviour but share a 

number of substantive reservations unique to their legal and political 

traditions. While not opposed to the reinforcement of existing norms and 

development of new ones, numerous Latin American states maintain that 

legally binding instruments should be developed to prevent weaponisation of 

outer space. Transparent and inclusive negotiation process in the creation of 

rules for outer space activities should be compatible with the needs of all, 

particularly emerging space actors. In that regard, a more inclusive process of 

consultation is advisable. 


IV Annexure 

Annexure | www.orfonline.org 191

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 


including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 

The States Parties to this Treaty, 

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of 

man's entry into outer space, 

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the 

exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on 

for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or 

scientific development, 

Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as 

well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for 

peaceful purposes, 

Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual 

understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States 

and peoples, Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled “Declaration of 

Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 

Use of Outer Space”, which was adopted unanimously by the United 

Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, 

Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing 

in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 

kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on 

celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations 

General Assembly on 17 October 1963, 

Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 

November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to 

provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 

aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable 

to outer space, 

Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 

the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 


Celestial Bodies, will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of 

the United Nations, 

Have agreed on the following: 

Article I 

The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 

celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 

countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, 

and shall be the province of all mankind. 

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 

exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a 

basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be 

free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including 

the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage 

international cooperation in such investigation. 

Article II 

Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 

national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 

occupation, or by any other means. 

Article III 

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use 

of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance 

with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the 

interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting 

international cooperation and understanding. 

Article IV 

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth 

any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 

destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons 

in outer space in any other manner. 

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the 

Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, 

installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 

conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The 


use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful 

purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility 

necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies 

shall also not be prohibited. 

Article V 

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in 

outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of 

accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State 

Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be 

safely and promptly re-turned to the State of registry of their space vehicle. 

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts 

of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of 

other States Parties. 

States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties 

to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any 

phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other 

celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of 

astronauts. 

Article VI 

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national 

activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 

whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental 

entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out 

in conformity with the pro-visions set forth in the present Treaty. The 

activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon 

and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing 

supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are 

carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by 

an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty 

shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States 

Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization. 

Article VII 

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an 

object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and 

each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is 

internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its 


natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the 

Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 

bodies. 

Article VIII 

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer 

space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and 

over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. 

Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or 

constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected 

by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to 

the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the 

State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned 

to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to 

their return. 

Article IX 

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 

celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of 

cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in 

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard 

to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States 

Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon 

and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid 

their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of 

the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, 

where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State 

Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment 

planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other 

celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities 

of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, 

including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate 

international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or 

experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an 

activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, 

including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 

harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of 

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request 

consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 


Article X 

In order to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of 

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity 

with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall 

consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the 

Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects 

launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for observation 

and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by 

agreement between the States concerned. 

Article XI 

In order to promote international cooperation in the peaceful exploration 

and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in 

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform 

the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the 

international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and 

practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. 

On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively. 

Article XII 

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and 

other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties 

to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give 

reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate 

consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to 

assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility 

to be visited. 

Article XIII 

The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to 

the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 

other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State 

Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are 

carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental 

organizations. 

Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by 

inter-national intergovernmental organizations in the exploration and use of 

outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved 


y the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international 

organization or with one or more States members of that international 

organization, which are Parties to this Treaty. 

Article XIV 

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which 

does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance 

with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be 

deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby 

designated the Depositary Governments. 

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of 

ratification by five Governments including the Governments 

designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty. 

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall 

enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 

ratification or accession. 

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 

and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit 

of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the 

date of its entry into force and other notices. 

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

Article XV 

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. 

Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty 

accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States 

Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the 

Treaty on the date of acceptance by it. 

Article XVI 

Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the 

Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the 


Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from 

the date of receipt of this notification. 

Article XVII 

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 

texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 

Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 

transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the 

signatory and acceding States. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed 

this Treaty. 

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 

the twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixtyseven. 


IADC-02-01 

Revision 1 

September 2007 

INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION 

COMMITTEE 

IADC Action Item number 22.4 

IADC Space DebrisMitigation Guidelines 

Issued by Steering Group and Working Group 4 

Foreword 

The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is an 

international forum of governmental bodies for the coordination of 

activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in space. The 

primary purpose of the IADC is to exchange information on space debris 

research activities between member space agencies, to facilitate opportunities 

for co-operation in space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing 

co-operative activities and to identify debris mitigation options. 

Members of the IADC are the Italian Space Agency (ASI), British National 

Space Centre (BNSC), Centre National d'EtudesSpatiales (CNES), China 

National Space Administration (CNSA), DeutschesZentrumfuerLuft-und 

Raumfahrte.V. (DLR), European Space Agency (ESA), Indian Space 

Research Organisation (ISRO), Japan, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) and 

Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos). 


One of its efforts is to recommend debris mitigation guidelines, with an 

emphasis on cost effectiveness, that can be considered during planning and 

design of spacecraft and launch vehicles in order to minimise or eliminate 

generation of debris during operations. This document provides guidelines 

for debris reduction, developed via consensus within the IADC. 

In the process of producing these guidelines, IADC got information from 

the following documents and study reports. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Technical Report on Space Debris, Text of the report adopted by the 

Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of theUnited Nations 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1999 

Interagency report on Orbital Debris 1995, The National 

Science and Technology Council Committee onTransportation 

Research and Development, November 1995 

U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, 

December 2000 

Space Debris Mitigation Standard, NASDA-STD-18, March 28, 1996 

CNES Standards Collection, Method and Procedure Space Debris – 

Safety Requirements, RNC-CNES-Q-40-512, Issue 1- Rev. 0, April 

19, 1999 

Policy to Limit Orbital Debris Generation, NASA Program Directive 

8710.3, May 29, 1997 

Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris, 

NASA Safety Standard 1740.14, August 1995 

Space Technology Items. General Requirements. Mitigation of Space 

Debris Population. Russian Aviation & SpaceAgency Standard OCT 

134-1023-2000 

ESA Space Debris Mitigation Handbook, Release 1.0, April 7 1999 

IAA Position Paper on Orbital Debris – Edition 2001, International 

Academy of Astronautics, 2001 

European Space Debris Safety and Mitigation Standard, Issue 1, 

Revision 0, September 27 2000 

Introduction 

It has been a common understanding since the United Nations Committee 

on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) published its Technical 

Report on Space Debris in 1999, that man-made space debris today poses 

little risk to ordinary unmanned spacecraft in Earth orbit, but the population 


of debris is growing, and the probability of collisions that could lead to 

potential damage will consequently increase. It has, however, now become 

common practice to consider the collision risk with orbital debris in planning 

manned missions. So the implementation of some debris mitigation 

measures today is a prudent and necessary step towards preserving the space 

environment for future generations. 

Several national and international organisations of the space faring nations 

have established Space Debris Mitigation Standards or Handbooks to 

promote efforts to deal with space debris issues. The contents of these 

Standards and Handbooks may be slightly different from each other but their 

fundamental principles are the same: 

(1) Preventing on-orbit break-ups 

(2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that have reached the end of 

their mission operations from the useful densely populated orbit 

regions 

(3) Limiting the objects released during normal operations. 

The IADC guidelines are based on these common principles and have been 

agreed to by consensus among the IADCmember agencies. 

IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 

1 Scope 

The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines describe existing 

practices that have been identified and evaluated for limiting the 

generation of space debris in the environment. 

The Guidelines cover the overall environmental impact of the 

missions with a focus on the following: 

(1) Limitation of debris released during normal operations 

(2) Minimisation of the potential for on-orbit break-ups 

(3) Post-mission disposal 

(4) Prevention of on-orbit collisions. 

2 Application 

The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are applicable to mission 

planning and the design and operation of spacecraft and orbital stages that 

will be injected into Earth orbit. 


Organisations are encouraged to use these Guidelines in identifying the 

standards that they will apply when establishing the mission requirements 

for planned spacecraft and orbital stages. 

Operators of existing spacecraft and orbital stages are encouraged to apply 

these guidelines to the greatest extent possible. 

3 Terms and definitions 

The following terms and definitions are added for the convenience of the 

readers of this document. They should not necessarily be considered to 

apply more generally. 

3.1 Space Debris 

Space debris are all man made objects including fragments and 

elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that 

are non functional. 

3.2 Spacecraft, Launch Vehicles, and Orbital Stages 

3.2.1 Spacecraft ? an orbiting object designed to perform a specific 

function or mission (e.g. communications, navigation or Earth 

observation). A spacecraft that can no longer fulfil its intended 

mission is considered non- functional. (Spacecraft in reserve or 

standby modes awaiting possible reactivation are considered 

functional.) 

3.2.2 Launch vehicle – any vehicle constructed for ascent to outer space, 

and for placing one or more objects in outer space, and any suborbital 

rocket. 

3.2.3 Launch vehicle orbital stages ? any stage of a launch vehicle left in 

Earth orbit. 

3.3 Orbits and Protected Regions 

3.3.1 Equatorial radius of the Earth - the equatorial radius of the Earth is 

taken as 6,378 km and this radius is used as the reference for the 

Earth's surface from which the orbit regions are defined. 

3.3.2 Protected regions - any activity that takes place in outer space should 

be performed while recognising the unique nature of the following 

regions, A and B, of outer space (see Figure 1), to ensure their future 

safe and sustainable use. These regions should be protected regions 

with regard to the generation of space debris. 


(1) Region A, Low Earth Orbit (or LEO) Region – spherical region that 

extends from the Earth's surface up to an altitude (Z) of 2,000 km 

(2) Region B, the Geosynchronous Region - a segment of the spherical 

shell defined by the following: 

lower altitude = geostationary altitude minus 200 km upper altitude = 

geostationary altitude plus 200 km 

-15 degrees latitude +15 degrees 

geostationary altitude (Z GEO) = 35,786 km (the altitude of the 

geostationary Earth orbit) 

3.3.3 Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) ? Earth orbit having zero 

inclination and zero eccentricity, whose orbital period is equal to the 

Earth's sidereal period. The altitude of this unique circular orbit is 

close to 35,786 km. 

3.3.4 Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO) ? an Earth orbit which is or 

can be used to transfer spacecraft or orbital stages from lower orbits 

to the geosynchronous region. Such orbits typically have perigees 

within LEO region and apogees near or above GEO. 

3.4 Mitigation Measures and Related Terms 

3.4.1 Passivation ? the elimination of all stored energy on a spacecraft or 

orbital stages to reduce the chance of break-up. Typical passivation 

measures include venting or burning excess propellant, discharging 

batteries and relieving pressure vessels. 

3.4.2 De-orbit ? intentional changing of orbit for re-entry of a 

spacecraft or orbital stage into the Earth's atmosphere to eliminate 

the hazard it poses to other spacecraft and orbital stages, by applying 

a retarding force, usually via a propulsion system. 

3.4.3 Re-orbit ? intentional changing of a spacecraft or orbital stage's 

orbit 

3.4.4 Break-up ? any event that generates fragments, which are released 

into Earth orbit. This includes: 

(1) An explosion caused by the chemical or thermal energy from 

propellants, pyrotechnics and so on 

(2) A rupture caused by an increase in internal pressure 

(3) A break-up caused by energy from collision with other objects 

However, the following events are excluded from this definition: 

A break-up during the re-entry phase caused by aerodynamic forces 

The generation of fragments, such as paint flakes, resulting from the ageing 

and degradation of a spacecraft or orbital stage. 


3.5 Operational Phases 

3.5.1 Launch phase - begins when the launch vehicle is no longer in 

physical contact with equipment and ground installations that made 

its preparation and ignition possible (or when the launch vehicle is 

dropped from the carrier- aircraft, if any), and continues up to the 

end of the mission assigned to the launch vehicle. 

3.5.2 Mission phase - the phase where the spacecraft or orbital stage fulfils 

its mission. Begins at the end of the launch phase and ends at the 

beginning of the disposal phase. 

3.5.3 Disposal phase - begins at the end of the mission phase for a 

spacecraft or orbital stage and ends when the spacecraft or orbital 

stage has performed the actions to reduce the hazards it poses to 

other spacecraft and orbital stages. 

4 General Guidance 

During an organisation's planning for and operation of a spacecraft and/or 

orbital stage, it should take systematic actions to reduce adverse effects on 

the orbital environment by introducing space debris mitigation measures into 

the spacecraft or orbital stage's lifecycle, from the mission requirement 

analysis and definition phases. 

In order to manage the implementation of space debris mitigation measures, 

it is recommended that a feasible Space Debris Mitigation Plan be established 

and documented for each program and project. The Mitigation Plan should 

include the following items: 

(1) A management plan addressing space debris mitigation activities 

(2) A plan for the assessment and mitigation of risks related to space 

debris, including applicable standards 

(3) The measures minimising the hazard related to malfunctions that 

have a potential for generating space debris 

(4) A plan for disposal of the spacecraft and/or orbital stages at end of 

mission 

(5) Justification of choice and selection when several possibilities exist 

(6) Compliance matrix addressing the recommendations of these 

Guidelines. 

5 Mitigation Measures 

5.1 Limit Debris Released during Normal Operations 

In all operational orbit regimes, spacecraft and orbital stages should be 

designed not to release debris during normal operations. Where this is not 


feasible any release of debris should be minimised in number, area and 

orbital lifetime. 

Any program, project or experiment that will release objects in orbit should 

not be planned unless an adequate assessment can verify that the effect on 

the orbital environment, and the hazard to other operating spacecraft and 

orbital stages, is acceptably low in the long-term. 

The potential hazard of tethered systems should be analysed by considering 

both an intact and severed system. 

5.2 Minimise the Potential for On-Orbit Break-ups 

On-orbit break-ups caused by the following factors should be prevented 

using the measures described in 5.2.1 - 5.2.3: (1) The potential for breakups 

during mission should be minimised 

(2) All space systems should be designed and operated so as to prevent 

accidental explosions and ruptures at end-of- mission 

(3) Intentional destructions, which will generate long-lived orbital debris, 

should not be planned or conducted. 

5.2.1 Minimise the potential for post mission break-ups resulting from 

stored energy 

In order to limit the risk to other spacecraft and orbital stages from 

accidental break-ups after the completion of mission operations, all on-board 

sources of stored energy of a spacecraft or orbital stage, such as residual 

propellants, batteries, high-pressure vessels, self-destructive devices, flywheels 

and momentum wheels, should be depleted or safed when they are no longer 

required for mission operations or post-mission disposal. Depletion should 

occur as soon as this operation does not pose an unacceptable risk to the 

payload. Mitigation measures should be carefully designed not to create 

other risks. 

(1) Residual propellants and other fluids, such as pressurant, should be 

depleted as thoroughly as possible, either by depletion burns or 

venting, to prevent accidental break-ups by over-pressurisation or 

chemical reaction. 

(2) Batteries should be adequately designed and manufactured, both 

structurally and electrically, to prevent break-ups. 

Pressure increase in battery cells and assemblies could be prevented 

by mechanical measures unless these measures cause an excessive 

reduction of mission assurance. At the end of operations battery 

charging linesshould be de-activated. 


(3) High-pressure vessels should be vented to a level guaranteeing that 

no break-ups can occur. Leak-before-burst designs are beneficial but 

are not sufficient to meet all passivation recommendations of 

propulsion and pressurisation systems. Heat pipes may be left 

pressurised if the probability of rupture can be demonstrated to be 

very low. 

(4) Self-destruct systems should be designed not to cause unintentional 

destruction due to inadvertent commands, thermal heating, or radio 

frequency interference. 

(5) Power to flywheels and momentum wheels should be terminated 

during the disposal phase. 

(6) Other forms of stored energy should be assessed and adequate 

mitigation measures should be applied. 

5.2.2 Minimise the potential for break-ups during operational phases 

During the design of spacecraft or orbital stages, each program or 

project should demonstrate, using failure mode and effects analyses 

or an equivalent analysis, that there is no probable failure mode 

leading to accidental break-ups. If such failures cannot be excluded, 

the design or operational procedures should minimise the probability 

of their occurrence. 

During the operational phases, a spacecraft or orbital stage should be 

periodically monitored to detect malfunctions that could lead to a 

break-up or loss of control function. In the case that a malfunction 

is detected, adequate recovery measures should be planned and 

conducted; otherwise disposal and passivation measures for the 

spacecraft or orbital stage should be planned and conducted. 

5.2.3 Avoidance of intentional destruction and other harmful activities 

Intentional destruction of a spacecraft or orbital stage, (selfdestruction, 

intentional collision, etc.), and other harmful activities 

that may significantly increase collision risks to other spacecraft and 

orbital stages should be avoided. For instance, intentional break-ups 

should be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes so that orbital 

fragments are short lived. 

5.3 Post Mission Disposal 

5.3.1 Geosynchronous Region 

Spacecraft that have terminated their mission should be manoeuvred far 

enough away from GEO so as not to cause interference with spacecraft or 

orbital stage still in geostationary orbit. The manoeuvre should place the 


spacecraft in an orbit that remains above the GEO protected region. 

The IADC and other studies have found that fulfilling the two following 

conditions at the end of the disposal phase would give an orbit that remains 

above the GEO protected region: 

1. A minimum increase in perigee altitude of: 

235 km + (1000 · CR · A m) 

where CR is the solar radiation pressure coefficient 

A/m is the aspect area to dry mass ratio (m2kg-1) 

235 km is the sum of the upper altitude of the GEO protected region (200 

km) and the maximum descent of a re-orbited spacecraft due to lunisolar 

& geopotential perturbations (35 km). 

2. An eccentricity less than or equal to 0.003. 

Other options enabling spacecraft to fulfil this guideline to remain 

above the GEO protected region are described in the “Support to 

the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” document. 

The propulsion system for a GEO spacecraft should be designed not to be 

separated from the spacecraft. In the case that there are unavoidable reasons 

that require separation, the propulsion system should be designed to be left 

in an orbit that is, and will remain, outside of the protected geosynchronous 

region. Regardless of whether it is separated or not, a propulsion system 

should be designed for passivation. 

Operators should avoid the long term presence of launch vehicle orbital 

stages in the geosynchronous region. 

5.3.2 Objects Passing Through the LEO Region 

Whenever possible spacecraft or orbital stages that are terminating their 

operational phases in orbits that pass through the LEO region, or have the 

potential to interfere with the LEO region, should be de-orbited (direct reentry 

is preferred) or where appropriate manoeuvred into an orbit with a 

reduced lifetime. Retrieval is also a disposal option. 

A spacecraft or orbital stage should be left in an orbit in which, using an 

accepted nominal projection for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the 

orbital lifetime after completion of operations. A study on the effect of postmission 

orbital lifetime limitation on collision rate and debris population 

growth has been performed by the IADC. This IADC and some other 

studies and a number of existing national guidelines have found 25 years to 

be a reasonable and appropriatelifetime limit. If a spacecraft or orbital stage 

is to be disposed of by re-entry into the atmosphere, debris that survives to 


each the surface of the Earth should not pose an undue risk to people or 

property. This may be accomplished by limiting the amount of surviving 

debris or confining the debris to uninhabited regions, such as broad ocean 

areas. Also, ground environmental pollution, caused by radioactive 

substances, toxic substances or any other environmental pollutants 

resulting from on-board articles, should be prevented or minimised in order 

to be accepted as permissible. 

In the case of a controlled re-entry of a spacecraft or orbital stage, the 

operator of the system should inform the relevant air traffic and maritime 

traffic authorities of the re-entry time and trajectory and the associated 

ground area. 

5.3.3 Other Orbits 

Spacecraft or orbital stages that are terminating their operational phases in 

other orbital regions should be manoeuvred to reduce their orbital lifetime, 

commensurate with LEO lifetime limitations, or relocated if they cause 

interference with highly utilised orbit regions. 

5.4 Prevention of On-Orbit Collisions 

In developing the design and mission profile of a spacecraft or orbital stage, 

a program or project should estimate and limit the probability of accidental 

collision with known objects during the spacecraft or orbital stage's orbital 

lifetime. If reliable orbital data is available, avoidance manoeuvres for 

spacecraft and co-ordination of launch windows may be considered if the 

collision risk is not considered negligible. Spacecraft design should limit the 

consequences of collision with small debris which could cause a loss of 

control, thus preventing post-mission disposal. 

6 Update 

These guidelines may be updated as new information becomes available 

regarding space activities and their influence on the space environment. 


Draft TREATY ON PREVENTION OF THE 

PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE 

AND OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE 

AGAINST OUTER SPACE OBJECTS 

The States Parties to this Treaty, 

Reaffirming that outer space is playing an ever-increasing role in the future 

development of mankind, 

Emphasizing the right to explore and use outer space freely for peaceful 

purposes, 

Interested in preventing outer space from becoming an arena for military 

confrontation and ensuring security in outer space and the undisturbed 

functioning of space objects, 

Recognizing that prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and 

of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international 

peace and security, 

Desiring to keep outer space as a sphere where no weapon of any kind is 

placed, 

Noting that the existing agreements on arms control and disarmament 

relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and the existing legal 

regimes concerning the use of outer space play a positive role in exploration 

of outer space and in regulating outer space activities, and should be strictly 

complied with, although they are unable to effectively prevent the placement 

of weapons in outer space and an arms race in outer space, 

Recalling the United Nations General Assembly resolution on “Prevention 

of an arms race in outer space”, in which, inter alia, the Assembly expressed 

conviction that further measures should be examined in the search for 

effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to 

prevent an arms race in outer space, 

Have agreed on the following: 


Article I 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

(a) The term “outer space” means the space above the Earth in excess 

of 100 km above sea level; 

(b) The term “outer space object” means any device designed to 

function in outer space which is launched into an orbit around any 

celestial body, or located in orbit around any celestial body, or on any 

celestial body, except the Earth, or leaving orbit around any celestial 

body towards this celestial body, or moving from any celestial body 

towards another celestial body, or placed in outer space by any other 

means; 

(c) The term “weapon in outer space” means any device placed in outer 

space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially 

produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal 

functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth's 

atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the 

biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage 

on them; 

(d) A weapon shall be considered to have been “placed” in outer space if 

it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit 

before leaving this orbit, or is permanently located somewhere in 

outer space; 

(e) The “use of force” or the “threat of force” mean any hostile actions 

against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at 

destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently 

disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their 

orbit parameters, or the threat of such actions. 

Article II 

The States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any 

objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on 

celestial bodies and not to place such weapons in outer space in any other 

manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space 

objects; and not to assist or induce other States, groups of States or 

international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this 

Treaty. 


Article III 

Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to prevent any activity 

prohibited by this Treaty on its territory or in any other place under its 

jurisdiction or control. 

Article IV 

Nothing in this Treaty may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the 

States Parties of their right to explore and use outer space for peaceful 

purposes in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the 

United Nations and the Outer Space Treaty. 

Article V 

Nothing in this Treaty may be interpreted as impeding the exercise by the 

States Parties of their right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of 

the Charter of the United Nations. 

Article VI 

With a view to promoting confidence in compliance with the provisions of 

the Treaty and ensuring transparency and confidence-building in outer space 

activities, the States Parties shall implement agreed confidence-building 

measures on a voluntary basis, unless agreed otherwise. 

Measures to verify compliance with the Treaty may form the subject of an 

additional protocol. 

Article VII 

If a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the application or the 

interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall 

first consult together with a view to settling the dispute by negotiation and 

cooperation. 

If the parties concerned do not reach agreement after consultation, an 

interested State Party may refer the situation at issue to the executive 

organization of the Treaty, providing the relevant argumentation. 

Each State Party shall undertake to cooperate in the settlement of the 

situation at issue with the executive organization of the Treaty. 

Article VIII 

To promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of this 

Treaty, the States Parties shall establish the executive organization of the 


Treaty, which shall: 

(a) Accept for consideration communications from any State Party or 

group of States Parties relating to cases where there is reason to 

believe that a violation of this Treaty by any State Party is taking 

place; 

(b) Consider matters concerning compliance with the obligations entered 

into by States Parties; 

(c) Organize and conduct consultations with the States Parties with a 

view to resolving any situation that has arisen in connection with the 

violation of this Treaty by a State Party; 

(d) Take steps to put an end to the violation of this Treaty by any State 

Party. 

The title, status, specific functions and forms of work of the executive 

organization of the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to 

this Treaty. 

Article IX 

International intergovernmental organizations may take part in the Treaty. 

Provisions setting out different options for, and the procedure for, their 

participation in the Treaty shall be the subject of an additional protocol to 

this Treaty. 

Article X 

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 

proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall 

promptly circulate it to all States Parties. Upon the request of at least a third 

of the States Parties, the Depositary shall convene a conference to which all 

States Parties shall be invited to consider the proposed amendment. 

Any amendment to this Treaty shall be approved by a majority of the votes 

of the States Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all the States 

Parties in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of 

this Treaty. 

Article XI 

The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 

Each State Party shall, in the context of the exercise of its national 

sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 


extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have 

jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall notify the 

Depositary of the decision in writing six months in advance of its 

withdrawal from the Treaty. 

Article XII 

This Treaty shall be opened for signature by all States at United Nations 

Headquarters in New York. Any State which has not signed this Treaty 

before its entry into force may accede to it at any time. 

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance 

with their constitutional norms. Instruments of ratification or accession shall 

be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is 

hereby designated the Depositary of this Treaty. 

Article XIII 

This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of 

ratification by twenty States, including all the permanent members of the 

United Nations Security Council. 

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after 

the entry into force of the Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the 

deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 

Article XIV 

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 

Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary- 

General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof 

to all signatory and acceding States. 


Version16September 2013 

DRAFT 


Activities 

Preamble 

The Subscribing States 

• In order to safe guard the continued peaceful and sustainable use of 

outer space for current and future generations, and in a spirit of 

greater international cooperation, collaboration, openness and 

transparency; 

• Considering that the activities of exploration and use of outer space 

for peaceful purposes play a key role in the social, economic, 

scientific and technological development of all nations, in the 

management of global issues such as the preservation of the 

environment, disaster management, the strengthening of national 

security, and in maintaining international peace and security; 

• Noting that all States, both space-faring and non-spacefaring, should 

actively contribute to the promotion and strengthening of 

international cooperation relating to these activities; 

• Recognisingtheneedforthewidestpossibleadherencetorelevantexisting 

international instruments that promote the peace fuluses of outer 

space; 

• Further recognising that space activities and capabilities, 

including associated ground and spacesegments and supporting links, 

are vitalto national security and to the maintenance of international 

peace and security; 

• Recalling the increasing importance of developing outer space 

transparency and confidence-building measures in light of the 


• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

growing use of outer space by governmental and nongovernmentalentities; 

Taking into account that space debris affects the sustainable use of 

outer space, constitute a hazard to outer space activities and 

potentially limit the effective deployment and utilisation of associated 

outer space capabilities; 

Convinced that a multi lateral code of conduct aimed at enhancing 

safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities could 

become a useful complement to international law as it applies to 

outer space; 

Considering that established space actors have acquired 

knowledge regarding general practice stoenhance the,s afety, security 

and sustainability of space activities thatcouldusefully 

bemadeavailabletoother Subscribing States, forthe benefit ofall; 

Reaffirming existingcommitments to resolve any dispute concerning 

activitiesin outer spacebypeaceful means; 

Recognising thenecessity of a comprehensive approach to safety and 

securityin outer space; 

Reaffirmingtheir commitment tothe Charter ofthe United Nations; 

Without prejudiceto ongoing and future work in other appropriate 

internationalforasuchastheUnitedNationsCommitteeonthePeaceful 

Uses of OuterSpaceandthe Conferenceon Disarmament; 

SubscribetothefollowingInternationalCodeofConductforOuterSpace 

Activities (hereinafterreferred toas the "Code"): 

I. Purpose, Scope and General Principles 

1. Purpose and Scope 

1.1. The purpose of this Code is to enhance the safety, security, and 

sustainability of outer space activities. 

1.2. This Code addresses outer space activities involving all space objects 

launched into Earth or bit or beyond, conducted by a Subscribing 

State, or jointly with other States, or by non-governmental entities 

under the jurisdiction of a Subscribing State, including those 

activities conducted within the framework of international 

intergovernmental organisations. 

1.3. This Code for msaregime of transparency and confidence-building 

measures, with the aim of creating mutual understanding and trust, 

helping both to prevent confrontation and foster national, regional 


and global security and stability,andis complementary to the 

normative framework regulating outer space activities. 

1.4. SubscriptiontothisCodeisopentoallStates,onavoluntarybasis.ThisCode 

is not legally binding. 

2. General Principles 

The Subscribing States decide to abide by the following principles: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The freedom for all States, in accordance with international law and 

obligations, to access, to explore, and to use outer space for 

peaceful purposes without harmful interference, fully respecting the 

security, safety and integrity of space objects, and consistent with 

internationally accepted practices, operating procedures, technical 

standards and policies associated with the long-term sustainability of 

outer space activities, including, inter alia, the safe conduct of outer 


The responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force 

against the territori alintegrity or political independence of any state, 

or in any manner in consistent with the purposes of the Charter of 

the United Nations, and the in herent right of states to individual or 

collective self-defence as recognised in the Charter of the United 

Nations; 

The responsibility of States to take all appropriat emeasures and 

cooperate in good faith to avoid harmful interference with outer 

space activities; and 

TheresponsibilityofStates,intheconductofscientific,civil,commercial 

and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use of 

outer space for the benefit, and in the interest, of human kind and to 

take all appropriate measure stop revent outer space from becoming 

an are na of conflict. 

3. Compliance with and Promotion of Treaties, Conventions and 

Other Commitments Relating to Outer Space Activities 

3.1. The Subscribing State sreaffirm their commitment to the Charter of 

the United Nations and existing treaties, principles and guideline 

srelating to outer space activities, to which they are parties or 

subscribe. They reiterate their support to encouraging efforts in order 

to promote universal adoption, implementation, and full adherence to 

such instruments: 


(a) 

(b) 

Existinginternational legal instruments relevant to outer space 

activities, including: 

• the Treatyon Principles Governing the Activities of States in 

• 

the Exploration and Useof Outer Space, including the Moon 

and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); 

the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 

Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 

Space (1968); 

• the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 

by Space Objects (1972); 

• the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 

Outer Space(1975); 

• the Constitution and Convention of the International 

Telecommunication Union and its Radio Regulations, as 

amended; 

• the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 

in Outer Space and under Water (1963) and the Comprehensive 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(1996). 

Declarations, principles, recommendations and guidelines, including: 

• International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

Space adopted by the United Nations General Assembly's 

(UNGA) Resolution 1721 (December1961); 

• the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of 

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space as adopted in 

UNGA Resolution 1962 (XVIII)(1963); 

• the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in 

Outer Space as adopted in UNGA Resolution 47/68 (1992); 

• the Declaration on International Cooperation in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 

Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs 

of Developing Countries as adopted by UNGA Resolution 

51/122 (1996); 

• the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 

Proliferation(2002), as endorsed in UNGA Resolutions 59/91 

(2004), 60/62 (2005),63/64 (2008), 65/73(2010) and 67/42 

(2012); 

• the Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and 

International Inter governmental Organisations in Registering 

Space Objects as endorsed in UNGA Resolution 62/101 

(2007); 


• 

the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations 

Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as endorsed 

in UNGA Resolution 62/217 (2007). 

3.2. The Subscribing States resolve to promote the development of 

guidelines for outer space operations within the appropriate 

international for a for the purpose of promoting the safety and 

security of outer space operations and the long-term sustainability of 

outer space activities. 

II. 

Safety, Security and Sustainability of Outer 

Space Activities 

Measures on Space Operations and Space Debris Mitigation 

4.1. The Subscribing States resolve to establish and implement policies 

and procedures to minimise the risk of accidents in space, collisions 

between space objects or any form of harmful interference with 

another State's peaceful exploration, and use, of outer space. 

4.2. The Subscribing States resolve, in conducting outer space activities, 

to: 

• refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, 

damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is 

justified: by imperative safety considerations, in particular if human 

life or health is at risk; or oby the Charter of the United Nations, 

including the in herent right of individual or collective self-defence; 

or o in order to reduce the creation of space debris; 

and, where such exceptional action is necessary, that it beunder taken 

in a manner so as to minimise, to the greatest extent practicable, the 

creation of space debris; 

• take appropriate measures, for example technical measures, prior 

notification and consultations between countries, to minimize the risk 

of collision; and 

• improve adherence to, and implementation of International 

Tele communication Union regulation son allocation of radio spectra 

and orbital assignments, and on addressing harmful radio frequency 

interference. 


4.3. In order to minimise the creation of outer space debris and to 

mitigate its impact in outer space, the Subscribing States committo 

limit, to the greatest extent practicable any activities in the conduct 

of routine space operations, including during the launch and the 

entire or bital life time of a space object, which may generate longlived 

space debris. 

4.4. To that purpose, they resolve to adopt and implement, in accordance 

with their own internal processes, the appropriate policies and 

procedures or other effective measures in order to implement the 

Space Debris Mitigation Guide lines of the United Nations 

Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as endorsed by 

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217(2007). 

III. 

Cooperation Mechanisms 

5 Notification of Outer Space Activities 

5.1. The Subscribing States, guided by the principle of cooperation and 

mutual assistance, resolve to notify, in a timely manner, to the greatest 

extent practicable, all potentially affected Subscribing States of any 

event related to the outerspace activities they are conducting which 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

are relevant for the purposes of this Code, including: 

scheduled manoeuvres that could pose a risk to the safety off ligh to 

the space objects of other SubscribingStates; 

predicted conjunction sposing an apparenton-orbit collision risk, due 

to natural or bital motion, between space objects or between space 

objects and space debris; 

pre-notification of launch of space objects; 

collisions, break-upsinorbit,andanyotherdestructionofaspaceobject(s) 

which have taken place generating measurable orbital debris; 

predicted high-riskre-entryeventsinwhichthere-enteringspaceobjector 

residual material from there-entering space object potentially could 

cause significant damage or radioactive contamination; 

malfunctioning of space objects or loss of control that could result 

in a significantly increased probability of a high riskre-entry event or 

a collision between space objects. 


5.2. The Subscribing States resolve to provide the notifications on any 

event related to the outer space activities described above to all 

potentially affected Subscribing States: 

• through the Central Point of Contact to be established under section 

9; or through diplomatic channels; or by any other method as maybe 

mutually determined by the Subscribing States. 

• In notifying the Central Point of Contact, the Subscribing States 

should identify, if applicable, the potentially affected States. 

• The Central Point of Contact should ensure the timely distribution 

of the notifications to all Subscribing States. 

6. Information on Outer Space Activities 

6.1. TheSubscribingStatesresolvetoshare,onanannualbasis,whereavailable 

and appropriate, information with the other Subscribing States on: 

• their space strategies and policies, including those which are securityrelated, 

in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, 

and sustainability of current and planned activities in outer space; 

• their major outer space research and space applications programmes; 

their space policies and procedures to prevent and minimise the 

possibility of accidents, collisions or other forms of harmful 

interference and the creation of space debris; and 

• efforts taken in order to promote universal adoption and adherence 

to legal and political regulatory instruments concerning outer space 

activities. 

6.2. The Subscribing States may also consider providing timely 

information on outer space environmental conditions and forecasts, 

including in particular on natural phenomen at hat may cause hazard 

to space craft, to relevant governmental and non-governmental 

entities of other Sub scribing States, collected through their space 

situational awareness capabilities. 

6.3. Subscribing States, particularly those with relevant space capabilities 

and with programmes for the exploration and use of outer space, 

who are in a position to do so, are encouraged to contribute to 

promoting and fostering international cooperation in outer space 

activities, giving particular at tention to the benefit and the interests 

of developing countries. Each Subscribing State is free to determine 


the nature of its participation in international space cooperation on 

an equitable and mutually acceptable basis with regard to the 

legitimate right sand interests of parties concerned, as, for example, 

appropriate technology safeguard arrangements, multilateral 

commitments and relevant standards and practices. 

6.4. The Subscribing States endeavour to organise on a voluntary basis, to 

the extent feasible and practicable, and consistent with national and 

international law and obligations, including non proliferation 

commitments, activities to familiarize other Subscribing States with 

their programs, policies, and procedures related to the exploration 

and use of outer space, including: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

familiarisation visits to improve international understanding 

of a State's processes and procedures for space activities; 

expert visits to space launch sites, flight control centres, and 

other outer space infrastructure facilities; 

observations of launches of space objects; 

demonstrations of rocket and other space-related technologies, 

in line with existing multilateral commitments and export 

control regulations; 

dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and 

the matic workshops and conferences on the exploration and 

use of outer space. 

7. Consultation Mechanism 

7.1. Without prejudice to existing consultation mechanisms provided for 

in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in there levant 

provisions of the ITU Constitution and Radio Regulations, the 

Subscribing States resolve to implement the following consultation 

mechanism: 

• A Subscribing State or States that maybe directly affected by certain 

outer space activities conducted by a Subscribing Stateor States and 

has reason to believe that those activities are, or maybe contrary to 

this Code may request consultations with a view to achieving 

mutually acceptable solutions regarding measures to be adopted in 

order to prevent or minimise the potential risks of damage to 

persons or property, or of harmful interference to a Subscribing 

State's outer space activities. 


• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

The Subscribing States involved in a consultation process resolve to: 

consult through diplomatic channels or by other methods as may be 

mutually determined; and 

work jointly and cooperatively in a time frame sufficiently urgent to 

mitigate or eliminate the identified risk initially triggering the 

consultations. 

Any other Subscribing State or States which has or have reason to 

believe that its or their outer space activities would be directly 

affected by the identified risk may take part in the consultations if it 

or they request so, with the consent of the Subscribing State or States 

which requested consultations and the Subscribing State or States 

which received the request. 

The Subscribing States participating in the consultations intend to 

seek mutually acceptable solutions in accordance with international 

law. 

7.2. In addition, Subscribing States may propose to create, on a voluntary 

and case-by-case basis, independent, adhoc fact-finding missions to 

analyse specific incident saffecting space objects, and to collect 

reliable and objective information facilitating their assessment. These 

fact-finding missions, to be established by the Meeting of the 

Subscribing States and carried out by age ographically representative 

group of experts, end or sed by the involved Subscribing States, 

should utilise information provide dona voluntary basis by the 

Subscribing States, subject to applicable laws and regulations. The 

findings and any recommendations would be of an advisory nature 

and could be shared, upon agreement of the Subscribing States 

involved, with other Subscribing States. 

IV. 

Organisational Aspects 

8. Meeting of Subscribing States 

8.1. The Subscribing States decide to hold regular meetings annually to 

define, review and further develop this Code and ensure its effective 

implementation. 

Additional meetings may be held if decided by consensus of the 

Subscribing States at previous meetings or as communicated through 

the Central Point of Contact. 


The agenda for such meetings could include: 

• review of the implementation of the Code, 

• modification of the Code, and 

• discussion of additional measures which may be necessary, including 

those due to advances in the development of space technologies and 

their application. 

• establishing procedures regarding the exchange of notifications and 

other information in the framework of the Code. 

8.2. The decisions at such meetings, both substantive and procedural, are 

to be taken by consensus of the Subscribing States present. 

8.3. At the beginning of each regular meeting the Subscribing States are 

to elect by consensus their chair for the period until the beginning of 

the next regular meeting. 

8.4. The results of the Meeting of Subscribing States are to be brought 

in an appropriate manner to the attention of relevant international 

for a including the United Nations General Assembly, the 

Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on 

Disarmament. 

9. Central Point of Contact 

9.1. A Central Point of Contact is to be designated by the Subscribing 

States at the first Meeting of the Subscribing States and tasked with: 

• receiving and communicating notifications that a State subscribes to 

the Code; 

• serving as a mechanism to communicate information exchanged 

under the Code to all Subscribing States; 

• serving as secretariat at the Meetings of Subscribing States; 

• maintaining an electronic database and communications system; 

• exercising organisational functions in connection with the 

preparation and implementation off amiliarisation activities referred 

to in section 6.4., if and to the extent requested by Subscribing States 

involved; and 

• carrying out other tasks as decided by the Meeting of the Subscribing 

States. 


9.2. The Subscribing States resolve to create an electronic database and 

communications system, which would be used to: collect and 

disseminate notifications and information submitted in accordance 

with this Code; and serve as a mechanism to channel requests for 

consultations. 

9.3. Funding the development and maintenance of the electronic 

database is to be decided by the first Meeting of Subscribing States. 

The electronic database is to be used exclusively in the interests of 

the Subscribing States. 

10. Participation by Regional Integration Organisations and 

International Inter governmental Organisations 

In this Code, references to Subscribing States are intended to apply, 

up on their subscription to the Code: 

• To any regional integration organisation which has competences 

over matters covered by this Code, with out prejudice to the 

competences of its member States. 

• With the exception of Sections 8.2 and 8.3: To any 

international intergovernmental organisation which conducts 

outer space activities if a majority of the States members of 

the organisation are Subscribing States to this Code. 


Text of Resolution 68/50 adopted by the General 

Assembly of the United Nations on 5 December 

2013 

68/50. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space 

activities (GGE Report 2013) 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 60/66 of 8 December 2005, 61/75 of 6 December 

2006, 62/43 of 5 December 2007, 63/68 of 2 December 2008, 64/49 of 2 

December 2009 and 65/68 of 8 December 2010, as well as its decision 

66/517 of 2 December 2011, 

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 15 October 1993 to the 

General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, the annex to which contains the 

study by governmental experts on the application of confidence-building 

measures in outer space, 

Reaffirming the right of all countries to explore and use outer space in 

accordance with international law, 

Reaffirming also that preventing an arms race in outer space is in the interest 

of maintaining international peace and security and is an essential condition 

for the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the 

exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 

Recalling, in this context, its resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990 and 

48/74 B of 16 December 1993, in which, inter alia, the General Assembly 

recognized the need for increased transparency and confirmed the 

importance of confidence-building measures as a means of reinforcing the 

objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, 


Noting the constructive debates that the Conference on Disarmament has 

held on this subject and the views expressed by Member States, 

Noting also the introduction by China and the Russian Federation at the 

Conference on Disarmament of the draft treaty on the prevention of the 

placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force 

against outer space objects being the first State to place weapons in outer 

space, 

Noting the presentation by the European Union of a draft of a non-legally 

binding international code of conduct for outer space activities, 

Recognizing the work that takes place within the Committee on the Peaceful 

Uses of Outer Space, its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and its Legal 

Subcommittee, which makes a significant contribution to the promotion of 

the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, 

Noting the contribution of Member States that have submitted to the 

Secretary-General concrete proposals on international outer space 

transparency and confidence-building measures pursuant to paragraph 1 of 

resolution 61/75, paragraph 2 of resolution 62/43, paragraph 2 of resolution 

63/68 and paragraph 2 of resolution 64/49, 

Welcoming the work done in 2012 and 2013 by the group of governmental 

experts convened by the Secretary-General, on the basis of equitable 

geographical distribution, to conduct a study on outer space transparency 

and confidence-building measures, 

1. Welcomes the note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report 

of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and 

Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities; 

2. Encourages Member States to review and implement, to the greatest 

extent practicable, the proposed transparency and confidencebuilding 

measures contained in the report, through relevant national 

mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with the 

national interests of Member States; 

3. Decides, in order to further advance transparency and confidencebuilding 

measures in outer space, to refer the recommendations 


contained in the report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on 

Disarmament for consideration, as appropriate; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to circulate the report to all other 

relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system in 

order that they may assist in effectively implementing the conclusions 

and recommendations contained therein, as appropriate; 

5. Encourages relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations 

system to coordinate, as appropriate, on matters related to the 

recommendations contained in the report; 

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth 

session, under the item entitled “General and complete 

disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Transparency and confidencebuilding 

measures in outer space activities”. 

60th plenary meeting 

5 December 2013 


V. Endnotes 

Endnotes | www.orfonline.org 229

Endnotes 

1. The views expressed are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position 

of the Department of the Air Force or the U.S. 

government. 

2. Draft “International Code of Conduct for Outer 

Space Activities”, Version 16 September 2013, 

http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-anddisarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_ 

16_sept_2013_en.pdf 





4. Quote from movie Captain Jack Sparrow, character 

in Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black 

Pearl(2003), 

http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0001274/quotes 

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0325980/ 

5. China has tested the same system since 2007, just 

not in a way that created long-lived orbital debris. 

SC-19 (the Chinese ASAT system) was tested in 2005, 

2006, 2006, 2010, and 2013. The first two tests did 

not have targets and the last two tests were against 

ballistic targets. 

http://swfound.org/media/115643/China_ASAT_Tes 

ting_Fact_Sheet_Aug2013.pdf 

6. The security dilemma, also referred to as the spiral 

model, is a term is used in international relations 

and refers to a situation in which actions by a state 

intended to heighten its security, such as increasing 

its military strength or making alliances, can lead 

other states to respond with similar measures, 

producing increased tensions that create conflict, 

even when no side really desires it. Concept 

credited to Jervis, R. "Cooperation under the 

Security Dilemma," World Politics vol. 30, no.2 

(January 1978), pp. 167–174; and Jervis, R. 

Perception and Misperception in International 

Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 

1978), pp. 58–113 

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawfare 

8. http://www.isro.org/scripts/Aboutus.aspx 

9. Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs 

of Asia, the Middle East and South America, By Brian 

Harvey, Henk H. F. Smid, Theo Pirard, January 30, 

2011P.153, available online at GoogleBooks. 

10. BBC News: China denies manned Moon mission 

plans, Tuesday, 21 May, 2002, retrieved from the 

web on 11 Jan 2014 from 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/2000506.stm 

11. Space Solar Power: Key to a Liveable Planet Earth: 

Address at the 32nd International Space 

Development Conference (ISDC) and Acceptance 

speech on receiving Wernher Von Braun Memorial 

Award. Dr. APJ Kalam, San Diego, California 24 May 

2013 retrieved from the web on 11 Jan 2014 from 

http://www.nss.org/news/releases/Kalam_Address_I 

SDC2013.pdf 

12. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id=20110902000023&cid=1105 

13. http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf 

14. For an estimation of the vastness of this wealth, see 

the on-line presentation by the author from Icarus 

Interstellar'sStarship Congress, “A Billion Year Plan” 

(available at: 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGAq2SX1Kcg ) 

or the online essay by the same title on KurzweilAI 

(available at: http://www.kurzweilai.net/what-ourcivilization-needs-is-a-billion-year-plan 

) 

15. http://www.nss.org/about/philosophy.html 


Space Activities”, Version September 16, 2013, 


Sept_16, 2013_en.pdf 

17. http://www.planetaryresources.com/mission/ 

18. http://deepspaceindustries.com/ see also 

http://www.shackletonenergy.com/ 

19. Some think Article 5.1 of the Code is adequate, at 

least in respect of other Subscribing States 


20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome 

21. http://www.arssdc.org/ 

22. http://settlement.arc.nasa.gov/Contest/ 

23. http://www.spaceset.org/ 





25. Outer Space Treaty, sometimes in shorter OST, refers 

to “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 


including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”. The 

treaty has 102 parties as of 1 January 2013. 

26. Satellite Industry Association, “State of the Satellite 

Industry Report”, October 2013, available at: 

http://www.sia.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/2013_SSIR_Final_Oct.pdf. 

27. Ibid. 

28. China Economic Weekly, 27 May 2013, p. 33, 

available at: 

http://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/2013- 

05/27/content_1248040.htm?div=-1. 

29. “Space Security Index 2013”, Project Ploughshares, 

available at: 

http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2013.pdf. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Yuan Lin, “Uncover the Secret of ASAT Weapon,” 

China News Weekly 5, 2007, p. 63. 

33. Needless to say, EU has the earlier editions. 

34. The consultation attended by some 140 participants 

from 61 countries. The author of this article 

attended and made a speech “The changing face of 

international law: increased use of soft law tools?” as 

Chinese international law expert invited by UNDIR. 

35. The terms “hard law” and “soft law” are not strict 

legal terms. “Hard law” is used with the appearance 

of “soft law” to indicate they are different. 

36. Opinions expressed in this article are his own and 

not necessarily reflect positions of the Government 

of Egypt. 

37. Christopher Greenwood, “International Law and the 

'war against terrorism', International Affairs Vol. 78, 

No. 2, 2002, p. 313; OR: Louis-Philippe Rouillard, “The 

Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defence in 

Contemporary International Law”, Miskolc Journal of 

International Law Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004, p. 112 & p. 114- 

5; OR: Chris Richter, “Pre-emptive Self-Defence, 

International Law and U.S. Policy”, Dialogue Vol.1, 

No. 2, 2003, p. 57. 

38. One of the issues of the EU Code of Conduct 

revolved around logistics. The EU Council lacked 

the resources and experience to facilitate an 

international undertaking like the Code. When the 

International Code of Conduct was announced, the 

EU Council outlined three specific projects to be 

undertaken: outreach activities promoting the 

proposal for an international Code of Conduct for 

outer space activities, the organisation of up to 

three multilateral experts' meetings to discuss the 

proposal for an international Code of Conduct, and 

the coordination of a consortium of nongovernmental 

experts. The EU Council allocated 

€1.49 million (U.S. $1.85 million) to sub-contract 

with the United Nations Institute of Disarmament 

Research (UNIDIR) to facilitate the technical 

performance of these projects. 

39. See Andrey Makarov, Transparency and Confidence- 

Building Measures: Their Place and Role in Space 

Security, Security in Space: The Next Generation- 

Conference Report, 31, March-1 April 2008, United 

Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 

(UNIDIR), 2008 for a discussion about TCBMs and 

their role in outer space security. 

40. There are three types of legal Executive Agreements: 

Congressional executive agreements, executive 

agreements made pursuant to an earlier treaty and 

sole executive agreements. Unlike a non-legal 

agreement, each of these agreements are legally 

binding at the international level. See Michael John 

Garcia, International Law and Agreements: Their 

Effect Upon U.S. Law, March 1, 2013, pp. 3-5, 

available at 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf 

41. There are other factors used to determine whether 

or not an agreement is intended to be legally 

binding or not, including the form of the agreement 

and the specificity of its provisions. SeeId.at p. 6. 

42. Michael J. Listner, Congressional opposition to a 

Code of Conduct for space, The Space Review, 

February 6, 2012, available at 

http://thespacereview.com/article/2018/1#! 

43. Congress took preemptive steps to address the 

potential regulatory effect on the national security 

of the United States by adopting a measure such as 

the Code when it passed H.R. 4310. H.R. 4310 

requires the President and the Secretary of Defense 

to give assurances and notifications prior to 

negotiating a measure synonymous to the Code as 

well as other conditions. See generally, Michael J. 

Listner, Separation of powers battle continues over 

the Code of Conduct, The Space Review, January 7, 

2013, available at 

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2215/1#! 


44. This is more commonly referred to as the 

Commercial Space Act. 

45. There is a question as to whether an assurance 

made under the Code could require the Secretary of 

Transportation to implement regulations under Title 

51, Chapter 509 to affect commercial space 

activities. 51 U.S.C. §50919(e)(1) requires that the 

Secretary of Transportation ..."carry out this chapter 

consistent with an obligation the United States 

Government assumes in a treaty, convention, or 

agreement in force between the Government and 

the government of a foreign country..." The issue is 

whether the Code, which is a non-legal agreement, 

would be considered "an agreement" for purposes 

of this statute. If "an agreement" equates to a legally 

binding executive agreement and not a non-legal 

agreement, commercial space activities under Title 

51, Chapter 509 may be immune if the Code is 

adopted by the United States, unless Congress 

amends the law. This would be an unlikely scenario 

given the current Congress' concern as articulated 

in the January 18, 2012 letter. 

46. This definition of customary international law was 

articulated by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in 

United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 

1252 (11th Cir. 2012). The definition of customary 

international law pronounced by the 11th Circuit in 

this case is unanimous throughout the Federal 

Circuit Court of Appeals. 

47. Article IX states that "In the exploration and use of 

outer space, including the moon and other celestial 

bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided 

by the principle of co-operation and mutual 

assistance and shall conduct all their activities in 


bodies, with due regard to the corresponding 

interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. 

States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of 


bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to 

avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse 

changes in the environment of the Earth resulting 

from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, 

where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures 

for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has 

reason to believe that an activity or experiment 

planned by it or its nationals in outer space, 

including the moon and other celestial bodies, 

would cause potentially harmful interference with 

activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 

exploration and use of outer space, including the 

moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake 

appropriate international consultations before 

proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A 

State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe 

that an activity or experiment planned by another 

State Party in outer space, including the moon and 

other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 

harmful interference with activities in the peaceful 

exploration and use of outer space, including the 

moon and other celestial bodies, may request 

consultation concerning the activity or experiment." 

48. Japan invoked Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty 

for the first time shortly after China's ASAT test in 

2007; however, that one use of Article IX did not 

necessarily establish customary practice. Compare 

this to the intercept of USA-193 where the United 

States consulted with COPUOS before it intercepted 

its wayward satellite but did not invoke Article IX 

because it determined the nature of the intercept 

did not require Article IX to be raised. Whether the 

United States inadvertently created a customary 

practice regarding Article IX, specifically as to when 

it need not be invoked, depends on whether the 

United States intended that decision to be a legally 

binding international practice. Absent that intent, 

its decision will have no binding effect under 

customary international law. 

49. The National Space Policy of 2010 reads in part that 

"[t]he United States will pursue bilateral and 

multilateral transparency and confidence-building 

measures to encourage responsible actions in, and 

the peaceful use of, space. The United States will 

consider proposals and concepts for arms control 

measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, 

and enhance the national security of the United 

States and its allies." SeeNational Space Policy of the 

United States, June 28, 2010, p. 6, available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/natio 

nal_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 

50. See generally Michael J. Listner, TCBMs: A New 

Definition and New Role for Outer Space Security, 

July, 2011 available at 

http://www.defensepolicy.org/michlis/tcbms-anew-definition-and-new-role-for-outer-spacesecurity#! 

51. See United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 

1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012). 

52. See Ibid. 

53. The two wildcards in this analysis are the People's 

Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. 

Both have expressed doubts (and in some cases 

disdain) for the Code. The rationale for their 

objections are varied with many being political, but 

the root of their objections lie in the fact the Code is 

not intended to be legally binding. Both countries 

co-sponsored the Treaty on the Prevention of the 

Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), 

which is currently languishing in the Conference of 

Disarmament (CD). The PPWT has limited support 

and its prospects to become binding international 


law are not good. However, if both countries 

subscribed to the Code and implement its practices 

and assurances, they would both be in a good 

position to make the case that the Code meets the 

standard of customary international law. As 

discussed before, this would put the space policy of 

the United States with regards to TCBMs in jeopardy 

and effectively back it into a legal and geopolitical 

corner. The flip side is that if either or both the PRC 

and the Russian Federation made the case that the 

Code meets the standard of customary international 

law, they would both be affected by the Article IX 

issues as they are both signatories to the Outer 

Space Treaty. Seegenerally Michael J. Listner, 

Geopolitical Challenges to Implementing the Code 

of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, June 26, 2012, 

available at http://www.eir.info/2012/06/26/geopolitical-challenges-toimplementing-the-code-of-conduct-for-outerspace-activities/ 

(for a discussion on the geopolitical 

challenges to the acceptance of the Code). 

54. Statement by the Spokesperson of the EU High 

Representative Catherine Ashton on the 

Consultations for an International Code of Conduct 

for Outer Space Activities, Nov. 20, 2013, 

http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/13112 

0_01_en.pdf 


Activities, Version 16 September 2013, 


16_sept_2013_en.pdf, p. 8 

56. Ibid, pp. 8-9 

57. Ibid, p. 9 

58. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 


including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/gares/h 

tml/gares_21_2222.html 


Activities, Version 16 September 2013, p. 3 


Activities, Version 16 September 2013, p. 6 

61. General Assembly Resolution A/68/189,Group of 

Governmental Experts on Transparency and 

Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space 

Activities, distr. July 29, 2013, 

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol 

=A/68/189 

62. Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, IAA, 

2006 

63. A/AC.105/L268 of 10 May 2007(section D) 

64. International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities, Version 16, September 2013 

 

65. The White House, U.S. National Space Policy, 2006. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/micr 

osites/ostp/national-space-policy-2006.pdf 

66. Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the 

International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 

Cambridge University Press, 2013 

67. The reader may refer to the major work by Krasner 

(Stephen), Ed., International Regime, (Cornell 

University Press, Ithaca, New-York, 1983, 372 p.), for 

a comprehensive overview of these international 

instruments. 

68. In particular, the PPWT has been heavily criticized 

considering the rather restricted definition of « 

weapon in outer space » it proposes as well as 

because of the unwillingness of its promoting 

countries to consider ground-based missiles (as the 

one used for the Chinese ASAT test of 2007) as 

possible ASAT weapons. In addition, the difficulties 

to ensure solid verification mechanisms to sustain 

such a treaty have resulted in a strong opposition to 

the text from the part of the United States in 

particular. 

69. North Korean jamming attacks on South Korea 

(December 2010, March 2011 and April, May 2012). 

More information available at: 

http://gpsworld.com/massive-gps-jamming-attackby-north-korea/ 

also on 

http://www.insidegnss.com/node/3532 Accessed on 

March 24, 2014. 

70. Through a cyber-attack, the atomic clock of a 

satellite could be changed (even if this time is less 

than a second) by sending a fake GPS signal, and if 

this satellite is controlling synchronization's of a 

electricity grid, an explosion can occur in the power 

generator of the synchronization station. 

71. Ukraine attempts to take down a Russian satellite 

(March 15th). More information available at: 

http://www.independent.mk/articles/2688/Western 

+Ukraine+Has+Attempted+to+Jam+Russian+Satelli 

tes Accessed on March 24, 2014. 

72. This can be done by sending a signal from the 

ground that causes a satellite to maneuver and 

lower its orbit. This could push it to re-enter the 


earth's atmosphere and burn up. Information 

available at: 

http://unidir.org/programmes/emerging-securitythreats/space-security-2014-implementation-andcompliance, 

Caroline Baylon – A review of the 

Chatham House Space and Cyber Linkages Project. 

Accessed on March 24, 2014. 

73. In the Crossfire – McAfee, Critical Infrastructure in 

the Age of Cyber War, 

www.mcafee.com/.../reports/rp-in-crossfire-criticalinfrastructure-cyb. 

Accessed on January 10, 2014. 

74. UN Charter. http://un.org/uncharter/. Accessed on 

21 January 2014. 

75. Ibid., p.22. 

76. C. Brunner and G. Konigsberger, “'Regulatory Impact 

Assessment'—a tool to strengthen soft law 

regulations”, in I. Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer 

Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 

International Space Law, 2012, p. 90. 

77. UNIDIR, Emerging Security Threats, “Norms of 

Behaviour: a Possible Option to Maintain the 

Growth of Asia–Pacific Space Activities”, Sec. 1:2. 

http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/norm 

s-of-behaviour-a-possible-option-to-maintain-thegrowth-of-asia-pacific-space-activities-en-416.pdf 

accessed on 25/01/2014. 

78. S. Aoki, “The function of 'soft law' in the 

development of international space law”, in I. 

Marboe (ed.), “Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function 

of Non-Binding Norms in International Space Law”, 

2012. p. 61. 

79. A. Kerrest, “Treaty vs resolution”, ibid. pp. 85–86. 

80. U.S. Department of 

State.http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/101466.htm 

see also Austrian Foreign Ministry. 

http://www.bmeia.gv.at/index.php?id=64664&L=1 


81. UNIDIR, Emerging Security Threats, “The Role of 

Norms of Behaviour in African Outer Space 

Activities”, Sec1:4. 

http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/therole-of-norms-of-behaviour-in-african-outer-spaceactivities-en-418.pdf 


82. M. Krepon, “Origins of and rationale for a space code 

of conduct”, in A. Lele (ed.), Decoding the 

InternationalCode of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities, 2012, p. 31. 

83. General Assembly, Report of the Scientific and 

Technical Subcommittee on its Forty-Fourth 

Session, Held in Vienna from 12 to 23 February 2007. 

84. C. Brunner and G. Konigsberger, “'Regulatory Impact 

Assessment'—a tool to strengthen soft law 

regulations”, in I. Marboe(ed.), Soft Law in Outer 

Space: The Function of Non-Binding Norms in 

International Space Law, 2012, p. 90. 

85. S. Aoki, “The function of 'soft law' in the 

development of international space law”, in I. 

Marboe (ed.), Soft Law in Outer Space: The Function 

of Non-Binding Norms in International Space Law, 

2012, p. 61. 

86. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. 

Accessed on 21 January 2014. 

http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intl 

a/humlaw/pse/coc.html. 

87. Idem. 

88. Herbert J. Kramer and Arthur P. Cracknell, “An 

overview of small satellites in remote sensing” 

International Journal of Remote Sensing Vol. 29, No. 

15, 2008, pp.4285-4337,; Yong Xue et al., “Small 

satellite remote sensing and applications – history, 

current and future”, International Journal of Remote 

Sensing Vol. 29, No. 15, 2008, pp. 4339-4372. 

89. R. Walker et al., “Sensitivity of long-term orbital 

debris environment evolution to the deployment of 

nan-satellite swarms”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 51, No. 

1-9, 2002, pp.439-449. 

90. Yong Xue et al., “Small satellite remote sensing and 

applications – history, current and future”, 


15, 2008, pp. 4339-4372 




15, 2008, pp.4285-4337; R. Walker et al., “Sensitivity 

of long-term orbital debris environment evolution 

to the deployment of nan-satellite swarms”, 

ActaAstronauticaVol. 51, No. 1-9, 2002, pp.439-449; 

Yong Xue et al., “Small satellite remote sensing and 

applications – history, current and future”, 


15, 2008, pp. 4339-4372. 




15, 2008, pp.4285-4337 

93. ShinchiNakasuka et al., “Evolution from education to 

practical use in University of Tokyo's nano-satellite 

activities”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 66, No. 7-8, 2010, 

pp.1099-1105. 

94. Ibid,; K. Thyagarajan et al., “University small satellite 

program-ANUSAT”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 56, No. 1-2, 

2005, pp.89-97. 

95. Mohamed B. Argoun, “Recent design and utilization 

trends of small satellites in developing countries”, 


ActaAstronauticaVol. 71, 2012, pp.119-128; 

FilippoGraziani et al., “A space standards application 

to university-class microsatellites: The UNISAT 

experience”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 66, No. 9-10, 2010, 

pp. 1534-1543; ShinchiNakasuka et al., “Evolution 

from education to practical use in University of 

Tokyo's nano-satellite activities”, 

ActaAstronauticaVo. 66, No. 7-8, 2010, pp.1099- 

1105; K. Thyagarajan et al., “University small satellite 

program-ANUSAT”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 56, No. 1-9, 

2005, pp.89-97. 

96. FilippoGraziani et al., “A space standards application 



pp. 1534-1543. 

97. Ibid. 

98. Shin-Ichiro Nishida and Satomi Kawamoto, “Strategy 

for capturing of a tumbling space debris”, 

ActaAstronautica Vol. 68, No. 1-2, 2011, pp. 113-120.; 

N.N. Smirnov et al., “Impact of debris particles on 

space structures modeling”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 67, 

No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 333-343.; R. Walker et al., 

“Sensitivity of long-term orbital debris environment 

evolution to the deployment of nan-satellite 

swarms”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 51, No. 1-9, 2002, 

pp.439-449. 

99. N.N. Smirnov et al., “Impact of debris particles on 

space structures modeling”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 67, 

No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 333-343 

100. Marco M. Castronuovo, “Active space debris 

removal-A preliminary mission analysis and design”, 

ActaAstronauticaVol. 69, No. 9-10, 2011: 848-859. 

101. Ibid.; L.T. DeLuca et al., “Active space debris removal 

by a hybrid propulsion module”, ActaAstronautica 

Vol. 91, 2013, pp. 20-33; J.-C. Liou and Nicholas L. 

Johnson, “A sensitivity study of the effectiveness of 

active debris removal in LEO”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 

64, No. 2-3, 2009, pp.236-243; J.-C. Liou et al., 

“Controlling the growth of future LEO debris 

populations with active debris removal”, 

ActaAstronauticaVol. 66, No. 5-6, 2010, pp.648-653. 

102. Shin-Ichiro Nishida and Satomi Kawamoto, “Strategy 

for capturing of a tumbling space debris”, 

ActaAstronautica Vol. 68, No. 1-2, 2011, pp. 113-120. 

103. FilippoGraziani et al., “A space standards application 



pp. 1534-1543 

104. Michael J. Singer and John T. Musacchio, “An 

International Environment Agreement for space 

debris mitigation among asymmetric nations”, 

ActaAstronauticaVol. 68, No. 1-2, 2011, pp. 326-337. 

105. Shin-Ichiro Nishida et al., “Soace debris removal 

system using a small satellite”, ActaAstronauticaVol. 

65, No. 1-2, 2009, pp.95-102. 

106. The following comments are directed at Part II, 

Section 4 of the September 16, 2013 version of the 

EU's proposed International Code of Conduct for 

Outer Space Activities. 

107. See third draft of the International Code of Conduct 

presented by the European Union on 5 June 2012 in 

Vienna, Austria, 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1696642/1 

2_06_05_coc_space_eu_revised_draft_working__d 

ocument.pdf. 

108. See draft treaty submitted by the Russian Federation 

and China to the Conference on Disarmament, 12 

February 2008. 

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/docume 

nts/Disarmamentfora/cd/2008/documents/Draft%20PPWT.pdf 

109. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 

(UNIDIR) has organised meetings on development 

of an ICoC in Malaysia, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Mexico, 

Kazakhstan, and Thailand. More information can be 

found on UNIDIR's website, 

http://www.unidir.ch/programmes/emergingsecurity-threats/facilitating-the-process-for-thedevelopment-of-an-international-code-of-conductfor-outer-space-activities. 

110. M. Listner, Geopolitical Challenges to Implementing 

the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 

(2012), E-International relations, June 26, 2012 

111. J. Wingard, The Battle for Cooperation in Space 

(2012), Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2012. 

112. Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, 

Research and Tertiary Education (DIISTRE), 

Australia's Satellite Utilisation Policy, 

Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 

113. In alphabetical order, the space faring nations for 

the purposes of this essay are: Canada, China, 

France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, North 

Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, 

Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. 

Nations that aspire to become spacefaring include 

Brazil, Nigeria, Turkey and Vietnam. Some nations 

not listed above have space agencies or space 

offices that coordinate their national and 

international space engagement activities, manage 

investment in ground infrastructure, and 

synchronise national requirements for access to 

satellite-based services. The member states of the 

European Space Agency (ESA) not mentioned above 

are not considered to be space faring for the 

purposes of this paper. 


114. Dr D F Martyn from 1962 to 1970, then Professor 

John Carver from 1970-1995. 


Activities, 16 Sep 2013, p 1. Available at: 


16_sept_2013_en.pdf, accessed 6 Jan 2014. 

116. Robstock D, A Revised and Stronger International 

Code of Conduct for Space, Stimson Centre, 5 Nov 

2013, Available at: 

http://www.stimson.org/summaries/a-revised-andstronger-international-code-of-conduct-for-space/ 

, 

accessed 6 Jan 2014. 

117. Triggs GD (ed), The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, 

Environment and Resources, Cambridge, New York, 

1987. 

118. In 2008 Russia and China proposed to the UN 

Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty aimed at 

Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). 

The draft treaty has the title The Treaty on 

Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 

Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against 

Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The U.S. in particular is 

opposed to the draft treaty as it stands and it has no 

prospect for adoption which this opposition 

remains. A principal U.S. objection to the draft 

treaty is that it lacks a verification regime. See for 

example, 

http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/paros.pdf, 

accessed 12 Jan 2014 and Moltz JC, The politics of 

Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of 

National Interests, Second Edition, Stanford, 2011, 

pp309-310. 

119. With particular respect to China attention needs to 

be paid to questions of language and political 

culture. For a useful account of the pitfalls and how 

they may be overcome, see Gregory Kulacki, 

Chinese Perspectives on Transparency and Security, 

13 January 2003. Available at: 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_glo 

bal_security/international_information/us_china_re 

lations/chinese-perspectives-on.html, accessed 7 

Jan 2014. 

120. Private communications with Australian 

government officials. 

121. http://www.ga.gov.au/education/geosciencebasics/dimensions.html, 


122. http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/ 

1647509ef7e25faaca2568a900154b63?opendocum 

ent, accessed 7 Jan 2014. 

123. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/ 

GDP.pdf, accessed 7 Jan 2014. 

124. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strong 

and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National 

Security, Australian Government, Canberra, 2013, p 

36. 

125. Department of Defence, Force 2030: Defending 

Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, Australian 

Government, Canberra, 2009, para 6.13, p 47. 

126. A useful starting point is the report of a Manning 

Clark House Colloquium, held in September 2007 

with the title Australia as a Middle Power. See: 

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc 

=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCkQFjAA&url=http 

%3A%2F%2Fwww.aiia.asn.au%2Fnswpapers%2Fdoc_download%2F62-2007-australiasrole-as-a-middle-power-finalreport&ei=g9DLUruHE4aLkgXdmYEQ&usg=AFQjCN 

EHOwk8JQ5XvE0QLdlAMLwAF6sz6g&bvm=bv.5818 

7178,d.dGI, accessed 7 Jan 2014. 

127. The website of the Department of Foreign Affairs 

and Trade states: “Australia has contributed strongly 

to the development of the international law of the 

sea in a manner that promotes international peace 

and security and prosperity. In particular, we played 

a constructive and influential role in negotiation of 

the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea and its 1994 Implementing Agreement,” 

http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/international-law.html, 


128. See for example, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 

Cold Calculations: Australia's Antarctic Challenges, 

Strategic Insights Paper No 66, Canberra, 2013. 

129. See http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/ for a 

comprehensive accounting of Australia's 

involvement in nuclear non-proliferation issues, 

especially since the early 1970s. 

130. Australia has a long history of advocacy for nuclear 

non-proliferation and has led several initiatives to 

advance this cause. The country does not possess 

nuclear weapons and does not have a nuclear 

industry to speak of. Somewhat paradoxically, 

Australia holds a third of the world's know uranium 

reserves and is the world's third largest uranium 

producer which is all exported as uranium oxide for 

use in power generation. There is one nuclear 

reactor in Australia which is operated by the 

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 

Organisation (ANSTO) on the south western 

outskirts of Sydney. ANSTO is a government 

organisation and the reactor produces isotopes with 

medical and research applications and otherwise 

provides the essential infrastructure to maintain a 

basic level of national competence about nuclear 

technology upon which government can draw as 

necessary. 

131. Futron Corporation, 2012 Space Competitiveness 

Index:A Comparative Analysis of How Countries 

Invest In and Benefit from Space Industry, U.S., 2012, 

pp 32-37. 


132. The two monographs referenced in this note, for 

example, make no indexed reference to Australia at 

all:Harvey B, Smid HFH, &Pirard T, Emerging Space 

Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the 

Middle East and South America, Springer, Praxis UK, 

2010. Harding RC, Space Policy in Developing 

Countries: The search for security and development 

on the final frontier, Routledge, UK, 2013. 

133. The definitive history is Moreton, P. Fire Across the 

Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint 

Project 1946-1980, Department of Defence, 

Canberra, 1989. 

134. There were two main facilities known respectively as 

Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap (JDFPG) and Joint 

Defence Facility Nurrungar (JDFN). The former 

supports electronic surveillance satellites and 

remains operational. The latter supported ballistic 

missile early warning satellites in the U.S. Defence 

Surveillance Network. Nurrungar closed in 1999 

and was replaced by two terminals located at JDFPG 

that remotely route the data from the satellites 

being supported to a processing centre in the 

United States. 

135. Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, 

Research and Tertiary Education (DIISTRE), 

Australia's Satellite Utilisation Policy, 

Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2013. 

136. Ibid. p 14. 

137. DIISR was called for a short time DIISTRE (see 

previous footnote) and since the election of the 

Abbott Government in September 2013 has been 

called simply The Department of Industry. 

138. The Australian Space Research Program (ASRP) was 

a one-off competitive grant program of AU$40m. It 

was part of the economic stimulus package 

adopted by the Australian government to protect 

the national economy from the most serious effects 

of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-9. Although 

opportunistic in origin, the ASRP funded 14 

separate projects, four directed at educational 

outcomes and 10 that sought to foster industry 

development and innovation. All of the projects 

were successful and several have secured follow-on 

funding. The ASRP formally concluded on 30 June 

2013. More information about the SCO, the ASRP 

and the Australian government's approach to space 

more generally may be found at 

http://www.space.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx. 

139. Australian Government, Space Activities Act 1998, 

Act No. 123 of 1998 as amended. 

140. Optus, headquartered in Sydney, operates five 

satellites at present (B3, C1, D1, D2, D3). Optus is a 

subsidiary of Singtel which is a wholly-owned 

commercial entity of the Government of Singapore. 

Optus has its own board and strict licensing 

provisions prevent the Government of Singapore 

exercising any operational control over the 

satellites. Detail about the Optus satellites is at: 

http://www.optus.com.au/portal/site/aboutoptus/ 

menuitem.26a56e3a0149a03327b868108c8ac7a0/? 

vgnextoid=b99eca88d1825210VgnVCM10000002cd 

780aRCRD. 

141. The National Broadband Network Co (NBNCo) is 

acquiring two satellites and Optus and Newsat are 

acquiring one each. Further details about these 

NBN and Newsat satellites may be found at: 

http://www.nbnco.com.au/assets/documents/ltssatellite-deal.pdf 

and 

http://www.newsat.com/Satellites/jabiru-satelliteprogram-kuband-kaband.html, 

respectively. 

142. See http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= 

123358643, accessed 6 Jan 2014. 

143. Current relevant reports include: 

Australian Government, Continuity of Earth 

Observation Data for Australia: Operational 

Requirements to 2015 for Lands, Geoscience 

Australia, Canberra, 2011. 

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 

Organisation (CSIRO), Continuity of Earth 

Observation Data for Australia: Research and 

Development Dependencies to 2020, CSIRO, 


Rizos, C., Working Group Chair, Australian Strategic 

Plan for GNSS, Australian Spatial Consortium, 2012. 

144. Cooperative Research Centre for Spatial Information 

(CRC-SI) and Geoscience Australia, The economic 

value of earth observation from space: A review of 

the value to Australia of Earth observation from 

space, Acil Tasman, Melbourne, 2010, p vi. 

145. Geoscience Australia and the Australian Bureau of 

Meteorology are leading across-government 

initiatives to develop two investment proposals, one 

to remediate and modernise the ground reception 

system (Earth stations, communications, data 

storage, processing and dissemination) for data 

from Earth observation satellites and the other to 

provide a precision location system across the 

continent. Both plans are substantially complete 

and public versions are expected to be released 

sometime in 2014. 

146. NASA, the U.S. intelligence community, The 

European Space Agency (ESA) and the Swedish 

Space Corporation are examples of organisations 

that have critical ground infrastructure located in 

various parts of Australia. Earth stations in Australia 

have been used to support U.S., French, Japanese 

and Chinese launch activities on a case-by-case 

basis. 


147. In 2012/13 the Gillard/Rudd Labor Government 

proposed a to establish a series of “Precincts” to 

assist various elements of the Australian 

manufacturing sector. One Precinct chosen for 

support was the space and geo-spatial services 

sector. The program is in abeyance whilst it is 

reviewed by the new Abbott Government. Should 

the program proceed, probably under a new name, 

the Australian Government will inject funds to 

support a range of industry and export 

development functions that the industry is 

presently too small and too fragmented to 

undertake on its own initiative. 

148. One such critic is Professor Andrew Dempster from 

the University of New South Wales (UNSW). See for 

example, Dorminey B, Does Australia have a space 

future? , Forbes Magazine, 6 Dec 2013, 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2013/ 

12/06/does-australia-have-a-space-future/ 

149. For a summary of Australian space science 

capabilities see National Committee for Space 

Science, Australian Academy of Science, Decadal 

Plan for Australian Space Science 2010-2019, 

Canberra, 2010, Chapter 2. 

150. The Australian astronomy community is well 

organised and well disciplined. It produces, behind 

closed doors a decadal investment plan which, once 

agreed, provides guidance to government about 

proposed astronomy investments in the coming 

decade. Most recently, the Australian government 

has made a major investment in radio astronomy 

through the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) telescope 

project, much of which will be located in Australia. 

The Government is also seeking to become a 10% 

stakeholder in the 27 metre Giant Magellan 

Telescope (GMT), which is an optical telescope, 

proposed for construction in Chile in the next five or 

so years. These new investments complement 

existing telescopes notably at Parkes, Siding Spring 

and Narrabri. 

151. A case in point is the Advanced Instrumentation and 

Technology Centre (IATC) that has been constructed 

by the Australian National University at Mt Stromlo, 

near Canberra. The AITC has world leading 

expertise in adaptive optics that is being used today 

to build better optical telescopes and also to assist 

with SSA. 

152. The radar from Antigua is being re-furbished and 

brought to Australia for installation at North West 

Cape under a formal Australian defence project – 

JP3029. See Department of Defence, Defence 

Capability Plan: Public Version, Canberra, 2012, 

pp166-7. 

153. AUSMIN 2010 Joint Communiqué, Melbourne, 8 

November 2010. 

154. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 


155. AUSMIN 2013 Joint Communiqué, Washington, 20 

November 2013 

file:///C:/Users/Brett/Desktop/PhD/Australia/AS_US/ 

AUSMIN%202013%20Joint%20Communiqu%C3%A 

9,%2020%20November%202013,%20Australian%20 

Minister%20for%20Foreign%20Affairs.htm accessed 

6 Jan 2014. 

156. See http://www.eos-aus.com/ for more information 

about this company. 

157. Including the Zadko telescope operated by the 

University of Western Australia, the High Accuracy 

Network Determination System (HANDS) located at 

Learmonth in Western Australia, operated by Curtin 

University and forthcoming acquisitions by the 

University of New South Wales in Canberra. 

158. The results of the 2013 Cooperative Research Centre 

round are expected to be announced in February 

2014. 

159. Abiodun A, monograph about Nigeria's space 

programme, publication forthcoming. 

160. The major function of about one quarter of all 

satellites in orbit is to support defense systems for 

countries around the world. Some satellites help to 

connect people in remote regions and others help 

to navigate ships, aircraft, and land vehicles. 

Satellites also help to advance scientific studies by 

providing data critical for Earth, marine and 

atmospheric science research.Most space 

programmes are designed to get satellites into 

Earth's orbit for the sake of better communications, 

mapping, weather observation or military capacity 

at home with direct benefits to ordinary people. 

161. Dual-use space technology means value to both 

civil and military communities, which allow 

countries to have growing military space 

capabilities. Another characteristic of dual-use 

technology is difficulty determining whether 

military capabilities are of a defensive or offensive 

nature. 

162. Advanced military space programs; Weapons in 

outer space; Rising levels of space debris; 

Proliferation of small satellites; Spectrum allocation 

and radio frequency interference; Cyber-enabled 

space threats. 

163. The views presented in this essay are those of the 

authors and does not represent those of the 

National Space Research and Development Agency 

of Nigeria. 

164. “Position Paper on Space Debris Mitigation: 

Implementing Zero Debris Creation Zone”, 

International Academy of Astronautics, 2006, 

available 


at:http://www.esa.int/esapub/sp/sp1301/sp1301.pd 

f. 

165. UN General Assembly Document 

A/AC.105/C.1/L.260,29 ,3.1. 

166. UN General Assembly Document A/AC.105/635). 

167. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 


Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, 27 

Jan. 1967. 

168. Martha Mejia-Kaiser, “Informal Regulation and 

Practices in the Field of Space Debris Mitigation”, Air 

and Space Law Vol. 34, Issue 1 (2009), pp.21-34. 

169. UN General Assembly Document A/62/20 

supplement No.20, paragraph 117-128. 

170. UN General Assembly Document A/RES/62/217, 

paragraph 27. 

171. UN General Assembly Document A/AC.105/C.I/L260, 

supra n. 1. 

172. UN General Assembly Document A/AC.105/917. 

173. “The EU leads a multilateral initiative on an 


Activities”, European Union External Action Service, 

available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/nonproliferation-and-disarmament/outer-spaceactivities/index_en.htm. 

174. Art. 1.3 of the Draft Code of Conduct. 

175. Art. 3.1 of the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Ibid, 

listed the Outer Space Treaty (1967), Rescue 

Agreement (1968), Liability Convention (1972), 

Registration Convention (1975), ITU Constitution 

and Convention (2002), Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

(1963), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

(1996), International Code of Conduct Against 

Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002), Outer Space 

Principle of UNGA Res. 1962 (XVIII), Principles on 

Nuclear Power Sources of UNGA Res. 47/68, 

Declaration of International Cooperation of UNGA 

Res. 51/122, Recommendation on Registration of 

UNGA Res. 62/101, Space Debris Mitigation 

Guidelines of UNGA Res. 62/217. 


177. Art. 2 of the Draft Code of Conduct. 


179. http:///eesa.europa.eu/non-proliferation-anddisarmament. 

180. Stefan A. Kaiser, “Space Security and Space Safety: 

Two Concepts To Be Distinguished”, American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 

181. Stefan A. Kaiser, “Space Security and Space Safety: 

Two Concepts To Be Distinguished”, American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, p.161. 

182. Ibid. 

183. http:///eesa.europa.eu/non-proliferationdisarmament. 

184. “USA-193: life and death of a spy satellite”, 

Sattrackcam Leiden Station (B)log, available at: 

http://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2008/01/usa-193- 

imminent-decay-in-news.html. 

185. Paul Marks, “Satellite collision 'more powerful than 

China's ASAT test'”, New Scientist (13 February 2009), 

available at: 

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16604- 

satellite-collision-more-powerful-than-chinas-asattest.html. 

186. Ibid.. 

187. Martha Mejia-Kaiser, “Collision Course: The Iridium- 

Cosmos Crash”, Paper presented at the International 

Aeronautic Congress 2009.. 

188. UN General Assembly Document 

A/AC.105/C.I/L.260. 

189. Roscoe M. Moore, as quoted in: Maria Buzdugan 

“Recent Challenges Facing the Management of 

Radio Frequencies and Orbital Resources Used by 

Satellite”,.. 

190. HamadounToure, ITU Secretary General, as quoted 

in: Maria Buzdugan “Recent Challenges Facing the 

Management of Radio Frequencies and Orbital 

Resources Used by Satellite” p 311. 

191. Yvon Henri, as quoted in: Maria Buzdugan “Recent 

Challenges Facing the Management of Radio 

Frequencies and Orbital Resources Used by 

Satellite”. 

192. Ibid, p. 317. 

193. Ibid. p. 318. 


195. Art. 6 of the Draft Code of Conduct. 

196. Anastasia A. Gbem, “Space Development in African 

Countries: An Overview”, Annals of Air and Space 

Law Vol. XXXIV (2009) p. 887. 

197. See Article I, paragraph II of the Outer Space Treaty 

1967. 

198. The Allotment Plan for the fixed-satellite service 

using part of the 4/6 and 10-11/12GHz frequency 

bands is contained in Appendix S30B. The plan for 

the broadcasting-satellite service in the frequency 

band 11.7-12.7GHz is contained in Appendix S30 

and the associated Plan for feeder links in the 14GHz 


and 17 GHz frequency bands (Appendix) see Maria 

Buzdugan “Recent Challenges Facing the 

Management of Radio Frequencies and Orbital 

Resources Used by Satellite”, p. 314. 

199. The views expressed by the authors are based ona 

continuous study and careful observanceof the 

developments in Indian space activities and in the 

international arena on the Code of Conduct. The 

authors hope that the views expressed here will 

help in founding an Indian “national” position on the 

Code – which the authors feel is important and 

critical. 

200. The authors are grateful to National Institute of 

Advanced Studies, Bangalore – especially Dr VS 

Ramamurthy, Director and to Jain University, 

Bangalore. 

201. The latest text available at 


16_sept_2013_en.pdf. 

202. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 

Outer Space, adopted on 13 December 1963 

(General Assembly resolution 1962 -XVIII-). 

Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial 

Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 

Broadcasting, adopted on 10 December 1982 

(General Assembly resolution 37/92). 

Principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth 

from outer space, adopted on 3 December 1986 

(General Assembly resolution 41/65). 

Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 

Sources in Outer Space, adopted on 14 December 

1992 (General Assembly resolution 47/68). 

Declaration on International Cooperation in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit 

and in the Interest of All States, Taking into 

Particular Account the Needs of Developing 

Countries, adopted on 13 December 1996 (General 

Assembly resolution 51/122). 

203. COPUOS Guidelines for space debris mitigation 

adopted on 2007 by General Assembly resolution 

62/217. 

204. Security framework related to nuclear power 

sources in outer space, approved on COPUOS 52ª 

session, June 2009. 

205. Council of the European Union Document 14455/10. 


207. “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on 

the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, in: United 

Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, 

United Nations, 2002, available at: 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/ST 

SPACE11E.pdf(accessed on June 28, 2012). 

208. UN General Assembly Document 2345 (XXII). 

209. UN General Assembly Document 2777 (XXVI).. 

210. “Model Code of Conduct”, Stimson Center, available 

at: http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/modelcode-of-conduct/(accessed 

on June 28,2012). 

211. Conference on Disarmament Document CD/1839. 



214. The views expressed herein are solely those of the 

author. 

215. Conference on DisarmamentDocument CD/1839. 


217. Committee of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space 

Document A/AC.105/2009/CRP.12. 

218. UN General Assembly Document A/AC.105/L.278. 

219. Doug Messier, “Brazil Proposes Latin American Space 

Alliance”, parabolicarc.com, November 17, 2013, 

available at 

www.parabolicarc.com/2013/11/17/brazil-proposeslatin-american-space-alliance/. 

220. “Report of the World Commission on Environment 

and Development: Our Common Future“, World 

Commission on Environment and Development, 

March 20, 1987, available at http://www.undocuments.net/our-common-future.pdf 

221. Ibid. 

222. For a detaileddescriptionoftheopinionsofLatin 

American States towardstheICo.C, see“Report On 

American Seminar and Outreach Initiatives forthe 

Facilitation of the Development of an International 

Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Space 

Equities: The Role ofthe Americas in Developing 

Norms of Behaviour“, UNIDIR, available at: 

http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/semin 

ar-report-mexico-en-599.pdf, 

. See forexamplethepresentationof Jose 

MonserratFilhoatthe UNIDIR American Regional 

Seminar (1 and 2 July 2013), “Report On American 

Seminar and Outreach Initiatives forthe Facilitation 

of the Development of an International Code of 

Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Space Equities: 

The Role ofthe Americas in Developing Norms of 

Behaviour“, UNIDIR, available at: 


ar-report-mexico-en-599.pdf, . 

223. “Ecuador Pegasus satellite fears over space debris 

crash“, bbc.co.uk, May 24, 2013, available at 


http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america- 

22635671. 

224. See “Report On American Seminar and Outreach 

Initiatives forthe Facilitation of the Development of 

an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities: Space Equities: The Role ofthe Americas in 

Developing Norms of Behaviour“, UNIDIR, available 

at: 


ar-report-mexico-en-599.pdf, p.3. 

225. See “Report On American Seminar and Outreach 

Initiatives forthe Facilitation of the Development of 

an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities: Space Equities: The Role oft he Americas 

in Developing Norms of Behaviour“, UNIDIR, 

available at: 


ar-report-mexico-en-599.pdf, p.2. 


As the outer space environment changes, the sustainability of space activities is being put under tremendous 

pressure by evolving technologies, an increased number of space actors and a rapidly changing security 

context on Earth. The international community has been slow to react to many of these challenges through 

legal channels, but the last few years have seen the emergence of numerous multilateral political initiatives 

that could represent the dawn of a new era of policy making in outer space. 

At the forefront is the proposed development of an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 

Activities, proposed by the European Union. This Code will seek to enhance the safety, security and stability 

of the space environment through political commitments, establishing a framework within which 

responsible space actors can continue to operate and grow. This Code has undergone many changes and has 

been the subject of much discussion among international space actors. 

This initiative has not been without significant controversy. Numerous issues remain outstanding, and the 

acceptability of the Code to the wider international community is still in question. As the development of the 

Code approaches a new round of Open-Ended Consultations, this book provides a platform to 

international experts who have been closely following the Code's progression and evolution. These experts 

have zeroed in on the hurdles and obstacles that stand between them and an acceptable Code, providing 

insight as to what steps might be taken next in order to launch the Code from a proposed European text to a 

widely-adopted instrument for the regulation of space activities. 

Observer Research Foundation 

20, Rouse Avenue, New Delhi-110 002 

Phone: +91-11-43520020 Fax: +91-11-43520003 

www.orfonline.org email: orf@orfonline.org

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