Conway Maritime Press - Warship 44

INCLUDED IN TmS ISSUE: 

::::=======::J 

THE DIADEM CLASS CRUISERS 

:a&&~_HIPS AT SEA: THE PAST AND FUTURE 

TONE AT WAR

Contents 

Volume 44, October 1987 

193 Editorial 

194 Airships at Sea, by Robert Largess 

204 US Submarine Losses During World War II, by Vernon J 

Miller 

210 The Diadem Class Cruisers, by Keith McBride 

217 The Hunt Class by John English 

223 Tone: Modifications and War Service, by Lengerer, 

Kobler Edamatsu and Rehm-Takahara 

232 Pride of Poland: Orzel (Part III), by Przemyslaw 

Budzbon 

242 Ship Trials, by DK Brown 

249 As & As 

250 Book Reviews 

Managing Editor: Robert Gardiner 

Editor: Andrew Lambert 

Art Editor: Mark Stevens 

Typesetting and artwork by Witwell Ltd. 

Liverpool 

Printed and Bound in the United 

Kingdom by R.J. Acford 

Chichester. 

Published quarterly by Conway Maritime 

Press Ltd. 24 Bride Lane. Fleet Street. 

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Second class postage paid at New York 

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Subscription rates: £14.00 per annum for 

four issues published in January. April. 

July and October. (Post paid in the 

United Kingdom.) 

FRONT COVER: The cruiser Diadem 

leaving Portsmouth early in her 

career. Note the torpedo nets, Victorian 

paint scheme and forecastle single 6in 

guns. Editor'8 collection. 

© 1987 Conway Maritime Press Ltd 

All articles published in WARSHIP 

are strictly copyright and may not be 

reproduced or stored in a retrieval system 

without the written consent ofthe 

pu blis hers. 

ISBN 0851774385 

ISSN 0142·6222

The Rise of the 

Submarine 

evenly years ago, on 

17 November 1917, 

British and German 

forces fought out the 

inconclusive second Battle of 

the Heligoland Bight. This 

engagement is usually 

recalled because it marked 

the only combat service of 

the two Courageous-class 

large light cruisers, which 

singularly failed to deal with 

a German light cruiser 

squadron. 

In essence, a combination 

of poor staff work and 

irresolute leadership spoiled 

a bold concept which had 

important strategic 

objectives. In their efforts to 

control the gowing threat of 

German U-boats, the British 

mined the exits from *re 

German swept channels 

through their own fields off 

Heligoland. This forced the 

Germans to operate 

minesweepers far out to sea, 

covered by light cruisers and 

supported by capital ships. If 

the sweeping could be 

stopped, by destroying the 

sweepers, the exits for the U- 

boats could be made much 

more hazardous. Ttre 

HNIS Glorious, 1918. With her sister, Courageoua, shewas 

unable to deal with German light cruisers; 15 inch and4 inch 

guns proved a poor cornbination for cruiser action, CPL, 

strategic benefits flowing 

from this were diffrcult to 

ascertain, though control of 

the North Sea was a 

worthwhile prize, freeing 

resources for offensive 

operations elsewhere. 

In the event. the Germans 

were prepared to risk their 

heavy forces in order to keep 

the U-boat channels open 

because after Jutland the 

naval high command no 

longer had any illusions 

about the ability of surface 

forces to affect the outcome 

ofthe war. Control ofthe 

sea was not vital for 

Germany; denying control to 

Britain and hel allies was 

far more significant, offering 

a chance ofpeace on 

acceptable terms. Therefore, 

Grand Admiral Tirpitz's 

battlefleet intended to play 

the key role in his complex 

games of bluff and 

diplomacy, ended up as the 

supporting arm for despised 

commerce raiders. 

This shift of emphasis from 

heavy surface fleets to 

commerce raiding, with the 

battlefleet either as raiders 

or supports, has been a 

feature of all continental 

seapowers, from Louis XIV's 

FYance to Soviet Russia. It 

reflects the differing 

attitudes toward seapower in 

the two naval traditions. The 

positive, Anglo-American 

school has usually sought 

control, while the negative 

French, German and 

Russian tradition has 

followed t}:,e guerre de course 

and'fortress fleet' methods. 

These are not the result of 

any free election; they are 

forced on n'ations by 

geostrategic imperatives. 

The unsuccessful operation 

of 17 November 1917 demonstrated 

that the Admiraltv 

favoured stopping up the 

earths of the raiders, to use a 

common hunting analogy of 

the time. Zeebrugge and 

Ostend were variations on 

the same theme. However, 

the technology of the time 

did not offer any reliable 

method of achieving this 

object, and the U-boats had 

to be defeated out at sea by 

the introduction ofthe 

convoy system. If the 

Germans had possessed a 

battlefleet which the Royal 

Navy could afford to meet in 

a weakeried conditiori: more 

risks could have been taken 

and the plan tried again. For 

much the same reason the 

Soviets employ powerful 

surfaco squadrons over their 

bailistic missile deployment 

areas, though it was 

generally assumed in the 

1960s that their surface units 

would be used to break the 

Greenland-Iceland-UK ASW 

barrier. Nations do have 

natural strategies, and in the 

case of Germany by late 

1917 the lesson had been 

learnt. The next war saw a 

German fleet caught off 

balance, forced to devote its 

resources to commerce 

raiding and coastal 

operations. 

Andrew Lambert 

193

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AT 

SEA 

ROBERT LARGESS 

provides an 

th_e airshlp as afactor 

in naval warfare,

I 

J- aviation history, and a minorfootnote 

- a technological blind alley - at 

that. FYom the vantage point of the 

present; its applications and potential 

seem very limited, compared to the airplane, 

and the long struggle to develop 

the airship seems to have been an overwhelming 

failure, in the sense of 

achieving its continuous use and production. 

Yet, the airship's story is fascinating 

and worth studying because it was a 

struggle, and a struggle to which the 

pioneers brought brilliance and courage. 

The airship has its heroes and geniuses - 

Mathy, Strasser, Eckener, Maxfield, 

Lansdowne, Moffett, Rosendahl, Barnes 

Wallis, Scott, Nobile - great engineers, 

airmen and Navy men, who can take 

their place alongside the airmen of the 

heroic days of aviation who brought 

military and naval aircraft and civil air 

transport to fruition over the period 

spanning the two world wars. 

The difference, of course, is that those 

who gave their efforts and lives to the 

airplane succeeded, and those who gave 

their's to the airship, on the whole, failed. 

Today it seems that the airship remains 

at the stage at which the airplane was in 

the 1920s; a pioneering effort, pursued by 

visionary developers whose dreams seem 

to offer an uncertain hope of corporate 

profit. They are men with a clear idea of 

the specific, if limited potential of their 

vehicle, struggling to establish it as a 

practical proposition against disinterest, 

conventional wisdom, and nagging 

technical difficulties. 

It is difficult to recall today that 

aviation began with the airship; that five 

nations produced extensive fleets of 

naval airships and operated them in wartime 

with considerable success; and that 

through the middle 1930s it appeared that 

the airship possessed greater potential 

than the airplane. The airship's 

legitimate past achievements, as well as 

its present potential, are overshadowed 

by its ultimate failures. These 

achievements, however, have special 

interest to the US Navy which took both 

rigid and non-rigid airships to their most 

advanced forms and was. for manv 

North Sea No 8 (and NS7 in the distance) 

escorting the surrendering High Seas 

Fleet on 21 November 1918. These ships 

out performed contemporary British 

rigids. With an enclosed car carrying two 

five-man relief crews, they achieved 

flights up to 101 hours, 50 minutes endurance 

and 30O0 miles. Capable of 

screening and tactical scouting forthe 

Grand Fleet, they still lacked the 

Zeppelins' capabilities as long-range 

shategic scouts. Author's eollection 

Sea Scout Tlpe'Zeto' No 59 landing on 

the Flrious' new flying-on deck in 1918. 

The original Sea Scouts were made by 

marrying this miniscule gas-bag to a 

standard BE 2C or Maurice Forman aeroplane 

fuselage. The'Zeros' carried an 

improved car, streamlined for towing by 

ships and boat-hulled for water landings. 

A total of 144 Sea Scouts ofall types were 

built. Carryingbombs, wireless, and ultimately 

a 'dipping' hydroplane, they were 

capable ofpatrols up to 50 hours. The 

limiting factor was the physical endurance 

of the crews. Author's eollection 

decades, their main proponent and sole 

user. The airship's significance to today's 

navy should be enhanced by the fact that 

the naval airship's perennial role has 

been as an anti-submarine vehicle, and at 

times at least a very valuable one, 

particularly when the nature of anti-submarine 

warfare.was only beginning to be 

grasped. Indeed, if for no other reason 

than that the history of ASW remains of 

critical interest today, it is worth considering 

the real lessons of the history of 

the airship. 

Why was the airship a success, and 

how great a success was it against the 

submarine in World War I? Was it a 

success in this role in World War II?And 

why was it not a success which as a 

strategic bomber, a long-range naval 

reconnaissance vehicle and a AEW 

vehicle? 

The compiehensive history of airship 

operations and development has yet to be 

written, but a briefanalysis is possible. It 

must begin with an examination of the 

parameters of the airship as a vehicle. 

During World War I, the period of its first 

military application, its speed wds a little 

less than that ofthe airplane. Despite this 

inferiority however, it possessed certain 

advantages. The airship's lifting ability 

was not based on horsepower produced 

by engines of limited power and 

uncertain reliability, so that even the 

smallest and simplest airships, the US B- 

class with the engine and fuselage of the 

Curtiss Jenny, or the British Sea Scout 

based on the BE-2C, could carry sufficient 

fuel to remain on station over a 

convoy for an entire day. Crucial, too, 

was the fact that an engine failure did not 

mean the automatic loss of the craft when 

it was airbome over the sea; blimp 

engines could be stopped for in-flight 

repairs. The most advanced World War I 

airships carried heavy bomb loads, multiengine 

power plants, large crews, fuel for 

patrols of over 100 hours, and, the most 

telling weapon of all, big, heavy and 

effective radios. It can be easily demonstrated 

that for operations over water duiing 

World War I, airships played a more 

important and effective role than 

airplanes. 

Yet, since then, the airship has barely 

changed either its dimensions or speed. 

Improved materials, engines and 

electronics and have given it greater 

usable lift, strength, reliability and 

perhaps a 50 per cent increase in speed. 

195 

:ij

ABovE: This ungainly craft is C-23A, one 

ofthe valuable and effective Coastal 

class, which bore the brunt of.the 1917 U- 

boat offensive. The envelope is the highly 

successful tri-lobed Astra-Torres design; 

the car is constructed from the forward 

sections of two Ar.ro 5O4 fuselages. A 

chain of radio-direction finding stations 

was built to supportthe Coastals by 

supplying accurate positions to their U- 

boat reports. Coastals tested light 

automatic cannon on a platform atop the 

envelope, and torpedoes set to run a 

shallow spiral course for use against U- 

boats at periscope depth. They were 

towed by and refueled from Grand Fleet 

cruisers, picking up reliefcrews by 

bo'sun's chair. T\vo wer€ lost to German 

seaplane fighters, operating off the 

Dutch coast. A uthor's collection 

RIGHT: Mathy's last command, the L-31, 

passes over the Ostfrieslnnd. at the start 

of a scouting flight. Note streamlining, 

multiple engine cars and barely visible 

dorsal gun platform above the control 

car. This super-Z,eppelin design sawthe 

greatest production of any rigid airship, 

with 39 German examples of various 

mods, and three foreign copies (including 

the British R-34 which crossed the 

Atlantic in 1919 with 31 men and the 

American ZR-l, the first rigid 

inflated with helium). These ships carried 

on an extensive bornbing campaign over 

Britain; bombed subs; spotted mines; and 

supported the High Seas Fleet with 

distant strategic reconnaissance, tactical 

196 

scouting, and close-in screening. They 

proved remarkably resistant to aircraft 

bombs and machine guns and even direct 

hits from high-angle artillery. Afterthe 

introduction of Brock-Pomeroy- 

Buckingham incendiary bullets in 1916, 

however, they suffered disastrous losses 

to British plane s. (Author's colleetion\ 

But top speeds still remain below 100 

knots, and only a halfdozen super-rigids 

of the 1930s such as Hind.enburg, Macon 

and R-100 exceeded the largest of the 

wartime ships. What makes later airships 

different from those of World 

War I is less their characteristics as 

vehicles than what they carried. The 

Macon, for example, incorporated a 

hangar and five airplanes, and the ZPG- 

3W carried a huge internal AEW radar. 

ASW blimps of World War I carried 

dipping hydrophones which were no 

more effective than the ASW listering

gear of contemporaxy surface escorts, but 

ASW blimps of World War II carried 

radar and sono-buoys that really worked. 

During the same period, technological 

development has canried the airplane 

through a series of quantum leaps and 

produced a new vehicle, the helicopter. In 

all performance characteristics but two 

fixed and rotating wing aircraft easily 

out perform the airship. The airship's 

tremendous internal volume permits 

bulkier loads than those possible aboard 

conventional aircraft, and ithas greater, 

unrefueled endurance. This last characteristic 

derives, of course, from the 

fact that the airship's lift does not derive 

from engine power, and thus the expenditure 

of fuel, no matter how gteat the 

load it carries. 

The ultimate example of the airship's 

endurance capabilities was shown by the 

US Navy's ZPG2 non-rigids of the 1950s. 

On 15 March 1957, one of these ships, 

commanded by Cdr J R Hunt landed at 

Key West after a flight that began on 4 

March. Cdr Hunt left South Welrmouth, 

crossed the Atlantic to Portugal, flew 

south to Africa. and re-crossed the Atlan- 

Asovr: USN rigid, Maconrecovering 

planes on 7 July 1933. Note trapeze, 

internally mounted engines, and aft 

control position in lower fin. The 

kindows' above the props are tubing for 

condensing water ballast from engine 

exhaust. She represented the most 

advanced development ofthe airship as a 

naval instrument and with her 7000-mile 

range, she had the ability to deploy 

reconnaissance aircraft hundreds of 

miles in advance of US carrier striking 

forces. to achieve that elusive first 

intelligence of enemy carrier positions , 

which was so decisive in the early Pacific 

carrier battles. The main system . 

developed before the war for'this 

purpose, the catapult-equipped cruiser 

and her scout planes, could not perform , 

this role without being exposed to.easy 

destruction by the enemy earrier forces 

they were seeking; they required the 

protection of their own force's CAP. The 

Macon'e 7i-knot speed, however, gave 

her the potential mobility to rernain at , 

the limit of enemy fighter range, while 

her own planes maintained contact. USII 

Lnrr: The XtrgC-l being lifted into the 

Abon's internal hanger,3 May 1932. She 

had the capacity to stow five planes 

internally, as well as external hook-on 

points. The Macon later controlled planes 

by radio at more than 100 miles distance. 

Night operations were simple, and night 

dive-bombing attacks on enemy caniers 

were studied. The F9C. however. was a 

high performance fighter strengihened 

for carrier landings, and less than ideal 

for the airship scouting role which 

should have stressed range and lightness. 

A 1937 USN design would have 

carried nine scout bombers similar to 

NorthropBT-1. USN 

tic, setting a world record for distance 

and endurance, covedng 9448 miles in 

264 hours, 12 rninutes, continually airborne 

and unrefueled. 

t97

It is this quality of endurance, borne of 

fuel efficiency, which distinguishes the 

airship from not only the airplane and 

the helicopter, but from the hydrofoil and 

SES (Surface Effect Ship), which are 

perhaps more genuinely comparable to 

the airship. These vehicles, as they now 

exist, provide remarkably similar speeds 

and pay load capacities to airships. 

However, to obtain these speeds, they use 

engine power to provide the lift required 

to free themselves from the friction of the 

sea surface, Thus they too are less fuel 

effrcient than the airship. Indeed, perhaps 

the greatest barrier to an appreciation 

of the airship's unique characteristics 

is the habit of viewing it as a 

competitor to the airplane. 

So the airship's speed and payload are 

comparable to the hydrofoil and SES. A 

bit slower but pbssessing greater endurance 

than the helicopter, it has similar 

VTOL and hovering abilities, althoueh 

less precise control. It can operate at altitudes 

greater than the helicopter, if less 

than the airplane. It suffers similarly 

from the weather, although again in different 

ways. Iow visibility complicates 

airship landings very little: high winds a 

great deal. 

The airship was first used, however, to 

provide the same characteristics sought 

from the airplane: greater speed than the 

surface ship, and above all the extended 

horizon of the airborne vehicle. 

Originally, the airship was intended to 

perform many of the functions of the strategic 

airplane because, for a while, it could 

perforrh them better. A persistent failure 

to appreciate the airshipis most appropriate 

uses, . and instead try to make 

it perform functions for which the 

airplane is better suited, has been 

responsible for much of the disappointment 

which has dogged its development. 

Conversely, a widespread failure to 

appreciate the importance of ASW led to 

the failure to develop the airship between 

the wars, along with all other ASW 

techniques. 

But, what were the achievements of the 

airship in wartime? There are six significant 

examples of the wartime operation 

of large forces of airships as naval forces. 

1. The German rigids (mostly Zeppelins) 

of World War I. 

2. The Italian semirigids of World 

War I, largely operated as strategic 

bombers against Austrian bases. 

3,4, The large forces of non-rigids 

5. created specifically as antimarine 

escorts in World War I 

by Britain, France, and the US. 

6. The antisubmarine blimp force 

created by the US in response to 

the U-boat threat of World War II. 

Clearly, most naval airships 

operated as anti-submarine craft. 

were 

Most 

were simple, cheap and reliable nonrigids, 

and they have the most to tell us 

about the utility of the airship. However, 

some attention must be given to the much 

more ambitious German development of 

the rigid airship as a fleetreconnaissance 

vehicle, a partially successful attempt to 

provide the High Seas Fleet with the type 

of air surveillance that catapult and 

carrier scout planes provided in World 

War II. 

During World War I, the German Navy 

operated 79 of these ships, as their 

historian Dr Douglas Robinson t€lls us in 

his book The kppelin in Combat, T}:,ey 

ultimately reached 743 feet in length; had 

seven engines; achieved speeds ofup to 81 

mph; and reached altitudes of 23,000 feet. 

In fact, these capabilities were developed 

principally to avoid interception in their 

role as strategic bombers, in which they 

suffered disastrous casualties. Such capabilities 

were less necessary for their role 

as fleet scouts for which range, 

endurance, airworthiness, and above all, 

good radio communications and direction 

finding were important. In fact, 

World War I Zeppelins achieved an 

endurance record of 101 hours on patrol, 

and a distance record of 4200 miles. 

Zeppelins took part in the Battles of 

Dogger Bank, Jutland, the Sunderland 

Operation and many leseer North Sea 

actions. They provided close observation 

over the actual battle, close-in scouting 

ahead of the F'leet, and long-range 

scouting in the form of the 

patrol lines covering British routes of 

entry into the,North Sea. Zeppelins thus 

performed the main functions of naval 

reconnaissance aircraft for the first time. 

and with few losses. The only British 

countermeasure they faced was main 

battery fire from the British ships. 

Though these ships performed their 

assigned roles and supported the German 

fleet, they achieved no decisive results. 

The fact is that Zeppelin scouting doctrine 

was improvised from battle to battle 

and there was little opportunity for 

experimental exercises during the war. 

Dr Robinson attributes their lack of 

results to lack of training, experience, 

doctrine, and inadequate numbers. But 

even more to the point, the German fleet 

pursued Zeppelins along with a range of 

other weaponS in the hope of redressing 

British superiority. For all its efforts, the 

High Seas Fleet never evolved an adequate 

plan to bring the Grand Fleet to 

action on its own terms, or even a clear 

conception of what its role in the war, if 

not simply as a'fleet in being', was to be. 

The Zeppelins' failure was part of the 

overall failure ofthe High Seas Fleet. 

But, could they, if employed differently 

or been favoured by luck, possibly have 

handed the High Seas Fleet the opportunity 

for a victory? The question is 

difficult to answer. After all. the Grand 

Fleet used airllames and submarines for 

reconnaissance, both with dismalresults. 

By World War II both were of critical 

importance; the fleet reconnaissance 

airship, however, never got another 

chance. 

But just as the High Seas Fleet achieved 

a great deal in the negative sense -it 

forced the British to provide a superior 

force to counter it - so the Zeppelins 

placed a heary burden on the British both 

as strategic bombers and fleet scouts, 

Perhaps their achievements can best be 

compared to the Russian T\rpolev Bear 

bombers which forced the US to invest 

heavily in anti.bomber defenses and 

have bedeviled US fleet operations over 

the laet 30 yeare, Even if the Bears have 

been succeesfully countered in both roles, 

it has been as a result of a heavy 

expenditure. 

The principal effort made to develop 

the airship as a fleet rcconnaissance tool 

before World War II was with the US 

Navy's Akron and, Macon. The aim was 

to marry the range and endurance of the 

rigid with a long-range reconnaissance 

system of its own, to extend its search 

area beyond the horizon ofthe rigid, and 

reconnoitre enemy fleets equipped with 

aircraft without bringing the rigid into 

direct contact. Thie was to be achieved by 

providing it with integral HTA craft. As 

RK Smith explains in The Akron and 

Macon, Flying Airuaft Carriers of the 

US Nauy, the technique of operating 

planes from an airship base was highly 

successful, and the idea of using the 

airship's planes as standoff weapons as 

well as spies in the sky was evolved. 

The interest of the US Navy in the longrange 

rigid stemmed from the same 

source as its early interest in the carrier, 

the catapult float plane and the longrange 

patrol bomber: the need for reconnaissance 

over the vast distances of the 

Pacific, beyond the support of land-based 

aircraft. Ttre value of the LTA carrier 

would have been as an extension of the 

scouting range of the carrier striking 

group; but the carrier air group would 

have been the essential element and the 

airship the supporting audliary. 

The use of the rigid LTA carrier in ASW 

- in a future Battle of the Atlantic - seems 

never to have been considered. The 

Macon could easily have escorted a 

convoy across the Atlantic, and carried 

aircraft out into the mid-Atlantic Gap 

before tlre escort carrier Bogue appearcd 

there in March 1943. However, the same 

Navy inattention to ASW permitted the 

US non-rigid fleet to dwindle to almost 

nothing between the wars. 

Whereas the development of the rigid 

was always characterized by expense, 

major technological problems, and the 

need to justify costs by demonstrating 

revolutionary capabilities, the non-rigid 

has always been cheap, simple, and 

198

Asovn: A USN K-class blimp escorting an 

Atlantic convoy during World War II. 

This type enjoyed the most extensive 

production ofany airship design; 134 

examples having been constructed by the 

end ofthe war. These ships provided 

anti-submarine and air-sea rescue 

service from Brazil to Newfoundland 

throughout the war. They crossed the 

Atlantic via the Azores to Morocco to 

support the anti-submarine barrier at 

Gibraltar, mine-sweeping in the 

Mediterranean, and operations against 

snorkel equipped U-boats in waters 

around Britain. They carried lo-man 

crews, radar, sono-buoys, and MAD 

by the end ofthe war. USl\y' 

reliable. Blimps flew countless hours of 

actual operations with great effectiveness. 

in World War I at least. The 

prototypes of both the US and British 

production AS blimps were cobbled up 

overnight by marr5ring a gas bag to an 

airplane fuselage. In fact, the technically 

crudest gas bags could operate safely for 

many hours over the ocean; but by the 

end of the war British and French nonrigids 

(the North Sea and AT-18 

Escorteur classes) had been developed 

which exceeded many early rigids in 

capability. However, it should be noted 

that the blimp was crucial solely as a 

convoy escort. Although useful forrescue, 

minesweeping support, and utility 

services, attempts to use them for army 

obsewation and as bombers were not, as 

should have been foreseen. successful. 

During World War I the British 

operated about 250 airships. Accordingto 

Robin Higham in The British Bigid 

Airship, between'June 1917 and October 

1918, inclusive, blimps averaged 56 ships 

escorted per month on patrol, carried out 

9,059 sorties, flew 59,703 hours and 32 

minutes equalling 1,496,000 miles, made 

2,210 escorts, sighted 134 mines and 

destroyed 73, spotted 49 U.Boats and 

attacked 27 (21 ach,ons being in conofficers,.and 

34 men killed. It must be 

remembered, of course, that no weapon 

was very effective at sinking submarines 

then. Five thousand four hundred and 

eight merchant ships were lost at a price 

of only 203 U-boats. The true goal of 

escort forces was to limit losses and this 

was achieved only after the initiation of 

the convoy system. If patrolling warships 

or aircraft spotted a U-boat, they seldom 

had time to attack before it dived and 

without sonar they had no means of 

pinpointing the location of a submerged 

sub. They did, however, rob it of most of 

its own mobility and vision. Until all 

merchant ships sailed under escort, this 

made little difference as World War I U- 

boats sank numerous merchant ships 

with gunfire on the surface. Before the 

introduction ofthe convoy systern in 1917 

they en-countered little interference, 

However, an escorted convoy would only 

be attacked by a submerged U-boat 

wl-richg had been able to position itself 

ahead of the convoy's. track, usually 

through the use of its surface speed. An 

airship escort made it possible to sight 

surfaced U-boats far beyond the range of 

vision of the escorts, to attack them or call 

in the surface escorts to force them under. 

BELow: A ZPG-2 about io refuel from USS 

Leyte CY A-32, 5 April 1955. One left 

South Weymouth, Mass 4 March 1967 for 

an 11-day double Atlantic crossing, still 

the world's record for unrefuelled airborne 

endurance. These ships, operated 

from 1951 to 1963, were dramatically 

larger than any previous non-rigids, yet 

possessed the inlierent structural 

simplicity, cheapness, and resilience of 

thiq type. Advances in chernical 

technology provided the strong, light, 

irnpermeable fabrics and other naterials 

- Kevlar, graphite, epoxy resins - which 

made possible this and even more 

advanced designs. USI\I 

199

A ZPG-2W, the USN's fi rst AEW airship. 

Five ofthese and four larger ZPG-3Ws 

were built. Note the search radar 

beneath the car and height-finder 

mirunted above the envelope. They 

carried 21-mancrews and two SOOhp 

Wright Cyclone radials, or two 525hp 

Wrights in the ZPG-3 Ws. These ships 

were part ofthe anti-strategic bomber 

defense system, and extended the 

coverage of the radar chain out into the 

Atlantic. They maintained patrols during 

winter gales when all other aircraft were 

gtounded. These craft established the 

pattern for the present day conception of 

the naval airships, Goodyea.r Aerospace 

and prevent them from ever reaching an 

attacking position or approaching the 

convoy at all. 

The airship was less effective at 

attacking surfaced U-boats than HTA 

craft due to its lower speed and greater 

visibility. This is not to say airships were 

ineffective; the British rigid R-29 engaged 

three U-boats and sank two successfully, 

bombing one and driving another onto a 

mine. However, the airship had several 

advantages over the airplane which 

made it morc effective as a convoy escort. 

The most important were its greater 

endurance, weather worthiness and reliability. 

Slower than the airplane, it could 

not patrol as great an area, but could 

provide continuous coverage to convoys 

under all conditions. 

In addition, the airship provided a 

supedor platform for detecting and 

attacking a submerged sub. Airship 

crews could see submarines (and mines) 

at depths as great as 100 feet in the 

Mediterranean, and 40 feet in the North 

Sea.rWorld War I airships also tracked 

subs by their periscope wakes, oil slicks, 

even by the seabirds they disturbed. 

200 

Airships sometimes tracked and bombed 

submarines by following trails of leaking 

oil and air bubbles after forcing the sub 

down, sometimes without ever seeingitat 

all. The airship's ability to slow to a hover 

and minutely examine the sea surface 

and then painstakingly stalk the submerged 

sub like a surface ship and 

position itself to bomb accurately was a 

significant advantage. Numerous such 

attacks were made with apparent effect: 

their bombs producing oil slicks, wreckage 

and massive secondary explosions. 

Their ability to reduce speed to zero 

made it possible for the British to 

increase blimp range and endurance by 

refuelling, resupplying, and taking on 

crew by winch from warships. Furthermore, 

they could be towed by warships, or 

based aboard aircraft carriers. The 

British had equipped all blimps with 

dipping hydrophones by the end of the 

war, and experimented with torpedoes set 

to run in a spiral course, as weapons for 

blimps to use against submerged U- 

boats. Thus, airships were experimenting 

tn World War I with sound location of 

Submerged submarines, and an antisubmarine 

torpedo, both devices 

essential to present-day airborne ASW. 

Both,'howeve-r, required considerable 

development in electronics before they 

became effective. late in World War II. 

On the other hand, blimps could not 

always force U-boats under. Some fought 

back. Unless surface escorts were available, 

the blimp required some kind of a 

standoff weapon to attack the surfaced 

submarine. The larger Flench blimps 

were equipped with cannon up to 75mm. 

(The US Navy-manned AT 13, operating 

out of NAS Paimboeuf in France. missed 

a chance to test this weapon against a U- 

boat when her gun's firing mechanism 

failed on 1 October 1918.) The Germans 

also experimented with a glider-carried 

torpedo which would have required 

electronic guidance to be effective. However, 

the one potentially effective standoff 

weapon, within the of the 

'state 

art' was the airship carried airplane, 

tested by the Germans, British, and 

Americans. 

Despite the frequently repeated boast 

that no airshipescorted vessel was sunk 

by a submarine during the course of 

World War I, the entire British non-rigid 

programme was ended after the war, in 

contrast to the FYench who maintained a 

small anti-submarine airship force and 

continued to produce innovative designs 

through the 1930s. Britain's anti-submarine 

airship non-rigids disappeared 

with the transference of British naval 

aviation to the RAF afber the war. 

The US Navy's ASW blimp force, 

created over-night in 1917 under the 

leadership of Lt Louis H Maxfield, was 

operating about 20 units by the end ofthe 

war and had made several submarine 

contacts flying Bclass ships off the US 

Coast, or French airships out of 

Paimboeuf. However, the Navy's blimp 

force disappeared after 1922 with the 

completion of the rigid Shenandoah.illtis 

was as a result of the Army-Navy Joint- 

Board agteement which gave the Navy 

full responsibility for the development of 

the rigid and gave the non-rigids to the 

Army Air Corps. The Army programme 

was tiny, although not without foresight, 

and in 1937, when it was terminated, it 

bequeathed to the Navy the TC-13 and - 

14, the fleet's prototype modern anti-sub-

zPg-3w 

GENERAT 

"$i'd 

6,{tj!E 

","ge 

I. t[q 

3. Fmrq 

t. atcomq@tqrc.z 

r. [@mdurorc.r 

to, [com6^urc.3 

Plan of the ZPG-SWAEWship. Note the 

dorsal platform supported by envelope 

carrying height-finder radar; also the 4O 

foot-antenna of search radar. 

Contemporary proposals envisage 

similar craft as an extension ofthe Aegis 

AAW system, with its capacityto track 

rnultiple targets and control numerous 

missiles simultaneously. The airship's 

phbsed array radar would feed into Aegis 

ships' computers by automated highfrequency 

data-links, lending the 

extended horizon ofthe airborne radar to 

the Aegis system, giving gYeatly 

advanced warrring and tracking of seaskimming 

anti-ship missiles. Such craft 

would possess these advantages oyer 

HTA craft: greater endurance (60 days 

with at-sea refuelling has been 

suggested), much larger sensors (possibly 

ASWtowedarrays as well as AEW 

radgrs), and the ability to support and 

resrlpply from surface groups lacking a 

carrfur deck. Good,year Aerospoce 

marine airships. They were followed by 

the K-2, prototype of the class of 134ASW 

airships of World War II. 

The K-ships were the largest, fastest, 

most capable anti-submarine airships to 

date, with speeds of up to 75mph, 12-man 

crews, the ability to cross the Atlantic via 

the Azores, and, by the end of the war, 

radar, depth charges, sonor buoys, and 

MAD. These ships operated from Newfoundland 

to Brazil, as well as over the 

Straits of Gibraltar and in support of 

British Mediterranean minesweeping 

operations. They flew 550,000 hours over 

55,900 operational flights, and escorted 

89,000 ships without loss. 

However, the question of the blimp's 

effectiveness against the sub remains 

unanswered from the limited experience 

of World War IL The blimp lost no ships 

to subs; but on the other hand scored few 

victories over them. T'he reason is that 

few U-boats ever operated in the areas 

patrolled by blimps, mainly offthe North 

and South American coasts. The exception 

was operation Paukenschlag, 

the assault on the nearly unprotected 

East Coast shipping during the first half 

of 1942. But just as there were practically 

no effective escorts or patrol planes available, 

so the US had only the four airships 

of Squadron ZP-12 (commissioned 2 

January 1942) on the East Coast. Like the 

World War I Eagle boats (see Warship 4L) 

and Army B-18s, they were thrown into 

the breach without doctrine, haining, 

weapons, or even a convoy system. Later, 

when East Coast defenses took shape, the 

20L

U-boats withdrew to other areas. Thus, 

coastal blimps were not available when 

they were most needed. And, of course, 

the large airships which could have 

provided air cover to convoys in the mid 

Atlantic gap had ceased to exist by World 

War II. 

It is instructive to compare the record of 

the airplane as a sub-killer to that of the 

airship. For the airplane proceeded from 

a role in World War I similar to the 

airship's, as a deterrent to submarine 

attack, to that of an active and tremendously 

effective U-boat killer. British 

aircraft made 40 attacks on U-boats in 

World War II before, in January 1940, a 

RAF Sunderland participated in a 

sinking, and it was two more months 

before an aircraft sank a sub alone, with 

bombs. As Alfred Price wrote in Airuaft 

Versus Submarine:'...in the summer of 

1939 Coastal Command of the RAF was 

equipped with anti-submarine bombs of 

doubtful quality, no proper antisubmarine 

bomb sight, and most of its 

aircraft fitted with unsatisfactory bomb 

release gear.' American planes, and 

blimps laboured under similar difflculties 

dlring Paukenschlag. 

However, when airplanes began to kill 

subs they became deadly effective, 

sinking hundreds in all parts of the 

world. The airplane had experienced a 

quantum leap in performance: in range, 

reliability, weaponry, and speed. Unlike 

the BE2C of World War I, attacking at @ 

mph with 100-pound bombs, the 

Liberators and Sunderlands of World 

War II could dive upon a surfaced U-boat 

with very little warning straddling them 

with depth charges as they began to dive. 

The point is that the airplane suddenly 

emerged as a potent killer of surfaced 

submarines, with its speed as a potent 

and powerful weapon. However, until tbe 

appearance of the acoustic homing 

torpedo, sonobuoys, and MAD (tested 

initially on blimps) late in the war, it had 

practically no attack capacity against 

submerged submarines, which is, of 

course, the whole objective of today's 

Orion P-3s, Viking S-3s, and all modern 

ASW. 

Conversely, the blimp was hopeless 

against surfaced subs without a standoff 

weapon, as the loss of K-74 to the U-134's 

automatic gunfire showed in July 1943. 

(Such a weapon existed by the end ofthe 

war in the form of the Bat radiocontrolled 

glide bomb, the ancestor of the 

Harpoons carried by today's P-3s.) But 

the development of the Snorkl.e and the 

Type XXI U-boat brought ASW back to 

square one. 

The U-boat was defeated when radarequipped 

escorts denied it its ability to 

attack on the surface at night, and 

modern patrol planes robbed it of the 

ability to move on the surface by day. But 

the submarine which could operate continuously 

submerged posed an entirelSi 

new challenge for postwar ASW, and 

gave the blimp a new lease of life. For the 

first time in peace, ASW was taken 

seriously and the US Navy was willing to 

experiment with any ASW weapon or 

vehicle that looked promising, from the 

anti-submarine cruiser Norfolh to SSKs, 

hydrofoils, and drone helicopters. 

Suddenly, the airplane lost its 

tremendous advantage as a sub-killer 

over the blimp. Both were reduced to 

using the same weapons and sensors 

against the same target, the submerged 

sub, (and the same target the British 

blimps of World WarI weredealingwith). 

The difference was, again, simply thatof 

speed versus endurance. The P2V or S2F 

could patrol greater areas at a greater 

rate of speed: ZSGs and ZPG-2s could 

provide continuous escort for days. In 

addition, they had the potential forusing 

dipping or towed sonar along with 

sonobuoys and MAD. They refuelled and 

resupplied from carrier decks or by winch 

as the K-ships of World War II had done. 

In addition, the Navy developed a new 

role for blimps during the 1950s, AEW, in 

response to the threat of Bears. They 

supplemented the Constellation Warning 

Stars and Texas Towers, extending our 

anti-bomber radar defenses beyond the 

DEW line down our coasts. These ships 

displayed remarkable all-weather capability, 

performing continuous pafuols for 

days during heavy storm conditions. The 

final development of this type, the ZPG 

3W, carried the non-rigid airship to its 

ultimate development, being larger than 

many rigids, using the envelope as a 

radome for the largest airborne antennae 

ever carried. However, the replacement of 

the bomber threat by the ICBM rendered 

these ships superfluous. On the other 

hand; the Battle Surveillance Airship 

recently proposed would have essentially 

the same configuration with a different 

role: AEW for naval forces. 

Today, the anti-submarine blimp has 

disappeared, along with the fleets of 

cheap escorts and patrol planes, the 

CVEs of World War II and the CVSs of 

the 1950s. Yet, today's patrol planes and 

surface escorts face a greater threat than 

ever from the nuclear sub, requiring the 

most advanced sensors and computers. 

The numbers of ASW ships and planes 

we can field has dwindled with their 

growing cost, while the Russian sub- 

Tanr,n 1 NoN-RrcrD PRESSURE ArRSHrps 

British 

Sea Scout-Zero 

SSZ-1 

British 

Coastal C-2 

British 

North Sea NS-1 

USN K14 

USN ZPG-2 

USN ZPG-3W 

Built 

1916 

1916 

r9r7 

1943 

1955 

1958 

Volume Length 

(cubic feet) (feet) 

70,000 r43 

170,000 195 

360,000 262 

425,000 25i.7 

1,011,00 343 

1,516,300 403 

Engines 

(number and 

horse power) 

lx75 

2x150 

2x260 

2x 425 

2x800 

2 x 1,525 

Speed 

(mph) 

48.4 

47 

57.6 

77 

80 

90 

Remarks 

Crew: three. Bombs: 130 

pounds. Gross Lift: 4500 

irounds. Deadweight: 3156 

pourlos. 

Gross lift: 5 tons. Deadweight: 

3.4 tons. 

Max endurance: 101 hours, 50 

minutes. Range: 4000 miles. 

Crew: 10. Gross lift: 10.85 tons. 

Deadweight: 7 tons. 

Crew 10-12. First non-rigid to 

cross Atlantic. 

Non-stop double Atlantic 

crossing remains world's record 

for unrefueled airbome 

endurance. 

Largest non-rigid built. Crew: 

21. Carried internal 40-foot 

radar antenna. 

202

1984..This Skyship 600 has operated 

with MEL MAREC II Sea Searcher 

radar mounted within the envelope; 

Aerospatiale Atal high resolution 

camera pod, and infra-red sensors. It 

was capable of detecting ships at 5O 

miles from an altitude of 2OOO feet. It 

has demonstrated the ability to pick up 

survivors by winch and deploy a 

Zodiae Futura five-meter boat for 

boarding and inspection purposes (a 

feat beyond the capacity of rnost 

helicopters or fixed wing planes). A 

larger twin-deck version powered by a 

CODOG diesel.or-gas turbine system 

and the Fertanti-Seaspray radar was 

proposed for the recent Offshore 

Patrol Vessel design competition. An 

even more advanced version with a 35- 

foot Westinghouse phased array radar 

was proposed for the USN's Battle 

Surveillance Airship design study 

competition. (Note Zodiac boat at left 

of photo.) Airehip Ind.ustriee 

marine force is not only far more capable, 

but more numerous than the German one. 

How can we begin to provide significant 

protection to cargo shipping in a contemporary 

or future conflict? 

If there is a role for the ASW airship 

today it is as a result of economic limitations 

on our naval forces, because it can 

redress our shortage of surface escorts. 

The ASW airship could provide continuous 

coverage for convoys or 

individual high-value ships more cheaply 

than surface warships or fixed wing 

craft. Surface warships will be scarce and 

in demand for carrier defense and surface 

warfare. One airship could remain on 

station withits convoy, for periods which 

would require a succession of P-3s, and 

could operate at distances beyond their 

reach, or in areas where we have no 

bases. 

Likewise, the conception of the AEW 

airship has been revived due to the same 

scarcity of carrier decks which has 

initiated the concept of the Surface 

Action Group (SAG). Such a ship could 

provide the SAG with much needed early 

warning against long-range bombers 

and cruise missile attacks. Likethe SAG, 

it would be intended to operate beyond, or 

at least at the limits of. the reach of 

enemy tactical air, either in mid ocean, or 

in regions where this threat is limited. 

Such a craft wouldhavebeen of tremendous 

value to the British at the Falklands. 

Their V,zSTOL carriers lacked an AEW 

aircraft which would have detected the 

Argentine Super Etendards which sank 

the Sheffield, and Atlantic Conueyor vuith 

Exocets. An AEW airship might have 

been vulnerable but so was the Atlantic 

Conueyor and the P2Y that provided 

targeting for the Etendards, as well as 

Canberra and Sir Galahad. Indeed, such 

a ctaft might well have led to the interception 

of many successful Argentine air 

attacks. 

Has the naval airship been a success or 

failure? Perhaps the definitive answer 

lies in the future. 

Taslo 

German L-10 

German L-70 

Zeppelin Type'x' 

British R-29 

USS Akron 

ZPrS-4 

USB ZRCV 

2 RIGIDAIRSHIPS 

Built -Volume Length 

(cubic feet) (feet) 

1915 

1918 

1918 

1931 

t,t26,700 536 

2,196,900 694 

990,600 539 

6,850,000 785 

Engines 

(numbers and 

horse power) 

4x210 

7 x245 

4x250 

8x560 

9,550,000 897 8x750 

Speed 

61mph ^ 

8lmph 

55.3mph - 

Remarks 

Participated at Jutland. Gross 

lift: 81,500 pounds. Deadweight: 

46,500 pounds. 

4ighq.-t 

performance WWI airship. 

Various zeppelins 

achieved 118 houis endurance. 

4040-mile range. 23,000-foot 

altitude. Gross lift: 159,400 

pounds. Deadweight: 62,300 

pounqs. 

Crew: 17. 8.6 tons disposable 

lifr. 

75.6 KnotsCarried 5 planes. Crew:91. 

Max. range: 7268 miles at 40 

knots. Gross lift: 403.000 

pounds. Deadweight: 242,356 

DOUII(!S. 

?5 knots To."r., nine BT-1 scout 

bombers. Range: 8,750 miles at 

50 knots. Gross lift 592.000 

pounds. Deadweight 295,000 

pounos. 

203

US SUBMARINE 

LOSSES DURING 

\ryORLD WAR II 

Vernon J Miller continues his analysis of US submarine 

losses in the Pacifrc. 

Golet (55-361), November 

Museum 

GOLET (S5-361) 

LCDR James S Clark. All 82 crew lost. 

1943 on trials. Manitowoc 

Last Transntission Date: Never heard from after 

departing Midway 28 May tg44 fot second patrol. 

Loss Cause: hobably depth charged and sunk 14 June 

1944 off northem Honshu, at 41o, 04'N, 141', 3OE, by 

Japanese naval aircraft and guardboat Miya Maru and 

auxiliary submarine chaser Bunzan Maru. 

Supporting Euidercce: Japanese cargo vessel Sagamikawa 

Maru was unsuccessfully attacked by submarine, believed 

tn be Golet,14 June 1944, north of Hachinoe, Aomori 

hefecture, NE Honshu. Japanese claim air and surface 

units pursued submarine into field of 200 Type 93 mines 

laid in late 1942 northeast of Hakuoto Lighthouse by 

armed merchant cruiser Bangkok Mora. Surface ships 

reported:'on the spot offighting we later discovered cork 

chippings, etc and a heavy oil pool of 50 x 5200 meters'. 

Analysis: On 18 June, Miya Maru discovered oil slick two 

kilometers long and 100 meters wide 10 kilometers 

southwest of Monomisaki. Between 0830hrs and 1550hrs 

five separate attacks were made by aircraft, Miya Maru 

and Bunzan Maru, with total of 2l depth charges being 

dropped. Arr oil slick 100 meters wide was further detected 

at 2010hrs. Japanese believe that they attacked and sunk 

a submarine previously damaged by a mine. There is no 

conclusive evidence that this was either Golet or anv 

other submarine. 

204

Grampta (SS-207).23lrllay 1941 at Groton, CT. Only wartime 

change prior to loss was painting out of white ID numbers and 

name on stern. 

Natianal Archiue s N egative 19-N-23818 

GRAMPUS (SS-207) 

LCDR John R Craig. All 71 crew lost. 

Last Transmission Date: Never heard from after 

departing Brisbane 12 February 1943 for sixth patrol. 

Loss Cause: Two loss possibilities exist, neither with 

sufficient evidence to permit any definite conclusions: 

(1) Probably sunk by gunfire during night of 5-6 March 

1943 in Blackett Strait, Solomon Islands, while surfaced, 

by Japanese destroyer Minegumo. 

(2) Possibly bombed and sunk 19 February 1943 at about 

1540hrs southeast of New Britain, at 05o, 4A5,I52" ,18'E, by 

Japanese naval aircraft of958th Air Group. 

Supporting Euidence: (1) Japanese destroyers Minegurno 

and Murasame were both sunk after conducting supply 

mission to Kolombanagara. Murasame reported no antisubmarine 

activity. Minegumo sank with entire 

complement. In as much as there were no survivors to 

report any anti-submarine activity, it becomes feasible to 

assume that Minegurno alone was responsible for any 

sinking. Grayback (SS-208) was within 15 miles of the 

location and heard no depth charging. Thus it is more 

feasible to assume lhat Grampus was caught on the 

surface and sunk by gunfire. A large oil slick was 

reported in Blackett Strait 6 March. Grarnpus could not be 

contacted by radio on 7 March. 

(2) Japanese claim one direct hit on conning tower and 

reported large amount of oil surfaced after attack. 

Analysis: Japanese also reported, sighting a submarine 

on 24 February 1943 at 06", 15'S, 156",3yE. This could 

only have been Grampus, which indicates either that 

Grarnpus escaped serious damage on 19 February or that 

Amberiack was victim of that attack. 

GBAYBACK (SS-208) 

CDR John A Moore. All 80 crew lost. 

Last Transrnission Date: On 25 February t944 aft.er 

departing Midway 3 February 1944 for tenth patrol. 

Loss Cause: Probably bombed and sunk 26 February 1944 

in East China Sea, at 25a, 47'N, I28', 4UE, by Japanese 

naval aircrafb. 

Supporting Euidence : Aircraft detected surfaced 

submarine and dropped 250-kilo type bombs. Japanese 

claim one direct hit, causing the submarine to explode 

and sink immediately. Air bubbles surfaced, and there 

was an oil slick covering an area 100 meters wide and 250 

meters long. 

Analysis: Accounts of this sinking often mention carrierbased 

aircraft. This is an incorrect translation for carriertype 

aircraft. The aircraft involved were based on 

Okinawa and were Nakaiima B5N2 Kate attack bombers. 

205

Grayling (SS-2O9). March 1941. Only wartime change prior 

to loss was painting out of white ID numbers and name on 

stetn. National Arehiues Negatiue 79-N-28891. 

GRAYLING (SS.2O9) 

LCDR Roberi M Brinker. All 76 crew lost. 

Last Tlansmission Date: On 19 August Ig43 aftet 

departing FYemantle 30 July 1943 for eighth patrol. 

Successful completion 23 August 1943 delivering supplies 

at Pandan Bay, Panay, reported by guerilla forces. 

Loss Cause: Possibly rammed and sunk 9 September 

1943 west of Luzon, South China Sea, at unrecorded 

position, by Japanese transport Hokuan Maru. 

Supporting Euidence: Japanese claim Hokuan Maru 

detected submarine in shallow water and ran over spot of 

detection after increasing speed. A light shock was noted 

at the point ofimpact. Could not be contacted by radio on 

12 September 1943 and was probably lost by that time. 

Analysis: Reports that Grayling was torpedoed and sunk 

by Japanese submarine I-182 arc erroneous. I-182 was off 

the New Hebrides w}rrlle Grayling was operating off the 

Philippines. 

GRENADIEB (SS.21O) 

LCDR John A Fitzgerald. No casualties. 

Last Transrnission Date: Last transmission attempted 22 

April 1943 without success after departing Flemantle 20 

March 1943 for sixth patrol. 

Loss Cause: Scuttled 22 Apnl 1943 west of Lem Voalan 

Strait, in Puket Sea area, off Penang, Malaya, at about 

06', 3ryN, 97', 4AE, after being irreparably damaged 21 

April 1943 at about 0830hrs by one bomb from Japanese 

naval Nakajima attack bomber of 936th Air Group. 

Following initial attack, a further unsuccessful search 

was conducted by naval aircraft of936th Air Group and 

Army aircraft. Auxiliary gunboat Kosho Maru claims 

surfaced submarine was detected and pursued. Further 

attacked on morning of 22 Apil 1943 by single engine 

plane, probably Aichi DBA. The one bomb dropped, fell 

about 200 feet off starboard bow and caused no damage. 

Plane was hit by gunfire, oashed on landing, and killed 

the pilot. Japanese also claim auxiliary Choko Maru 

detected submarine immediately prior to scuttling and 

fired upon it. 

Analysis: Some published sources indicate that Japanese 

bomber dropped two 1000-pound bombs. Commanding 

Officer stated that Japanese captors told him that only 

one bomb of 500kg was dropped. The US War Damage 

Report no 58 dated 1 January 1949 stated that 'the 

severity and extent of the damage indicates that the 

weapon was probably a 250kg MK 2 anti-submarine depth 

bomb containing 317 pounds of type 98 explosive'. 

Grenndier (SS-21O). 27 December 1:94l at Portsmouth Navy 

Yard. As built, No further configuration changes prior to 

loss. National Archiuea Negatiue 19-N-26573 

206

Growler (SS-215) 21 February 1942 atGroton, CT. Original 

configuration as built..Alafional Archiues Negaliue 79-N- 

28445. 

GROWLEB (SS-215) 

CDR Thomas B Oakley Jr. All 85 crew lost. 

Last Transmission Date: On 7 November 1944 after 

departing Fremantle 20 October t944for eleventh patrol. 

Loss Cause: TWo loss possibilities exist, neither with 

sufficient evidence to permit any definitive conclusions. 

(1) Probably sunk 8 November t944 off Mindoro, at about 

13o, 53'N, llgo,2gE, by Japanese destroyer Shigure and. 

patrolescort vessels Chiburi and No 19. 

(2) Possible torpedo explosion heard by Hardhead codd 

have been from malfunctioning torpedo: either premature 

explosion or circular run. 

Supporting Euid.ence: (1) Japanese escorts conducted antisubmarine 

sweeps, dropping a few depth charges. Attacks 

were without visible results and no claims of a sinking 

were made. 

(2) Hake (5S-256) and Hardhead. (55-365) heard what 

expected to be three depth charges and one torpetio 

explosion. 

207

Grunion(35-216). March 1942. As built. No further 

configuration changes prior to loss. NotionalArchiues 

Negatiue 19-N-28742 

G,RtlN/ON (55-216) 

LCDR Mannert L Abele. All 70 crew lost. 

Last Transrnission Date: On 30 July 1942 afler departing 

Pearl Harbor 30 June 1942for first patrol. 

Lost Cause: Probably sunk shortly after 0610hrs 31 July 

1942 about 10 nautical miles north of Segula Island, just 

east of Kiska, Aleutian Islands, by gunfire from Japanese 

transport Kashima Maru, ex-Kano Ma.ru. 

Supporting Euidence: Japanese observed hit on 

submarine, followed by a dull underwater explosion. 

Minelayer Ishizaki and subchaser Ch 26 observed oil and 

pieces of life preservers at scene of attack. Oil continued 

to surface in three different places for several days. 

Japanese reporbed Grunion had made a report, not 

confirmed in any US records, prior to attack on Kashirna 

Maru and did not make any report afterwards. 

Analysis: Reports thal Grunion was torpedoed 30 July 

l942by Japanese submdrine I-25 are erroneous. I-25 was 

back at Yokosuka on 10 July and did not sail again until 

15 August. Only mines in area were field of 120 laid on 20 

June 1942 off north coast of Kiska by gunboat-minelayer 

Magane Maru. 

Gudgeon (SS-211). August 1943. Final configroration. National 

Archiues Negatiue 19-N-5OZ 88 

GUDGEON (SS-21r) 

LCDR Robert A. Bonin. AII 70 crew lost. 

Last Transmission Date: Never heard from after 

departing Johnston Island 7 April 1944 for twelfth patrol. 

Loss Cause: Probably bombed and sunk 18 April 1944 

about 166 miles southwest of Iwo Jima, at abott 22", 

40'N, 143o, 25E,by Japanese naval aircrafb of 901st Air 

Group. 

Supporting Euidence: Japanese claim aircraft sighted 

surfaced submarine, and, in a hurried attack, dropped two 

bombs scoring direct hits on the bow and on the bridge, 

leaving gaping hole in centre section. Japanese claim 

column of oil was thrown into the air. Submarine is 

reported to have sunk quickly followed by a great 

underwater explosion. 

Analysis: Another attack listed in Japanese records as a 

possible loss cause was a depth charge and bomb attack 

on 12 May 1944 off Saipan, Mariana Islands, at about 

15o, lyN, 145o, 3gE, by unidentified Japanese antisubmarine 

surface vessels and possibly aircraft. Names 

and units are not listed in Japanese records. Sandlance 

(SS-381), Siluersides (5S-236), ar.d Tunny (SS-282) all 

heard and noted heavy anti-submarine activity just 

slightly south ofarea assigned to Gudgeon. This could 

have been a false contact. Numerous US submarines were 

in the area off Marianas. Japanese were aware of their 

presence and were alert and aggressive. Loss to an 

unreported enemy attack is a definite possibility. 

208

". .'" ,,, 

Harder (SS-25?). 19 February 1944 at Mare Island' CA. 

Final configuration. Nationnl Archiues Negatiue 79-N- 

82476. 

HARDER (SS-257) 

CDR Samuel D Dealey. All 79 crew lost. 

Last Transmission Date: Last heard from 23 August 1944 

during rendezvous with Haddo (SS-255) and Ila&e (SS- 

256) after departing Port Darwin 13 August 1944 for sixth 

patrol. 

Loss Cause: Depth charged and sunk at0728hrs 24 

August 1944in Dasol Bay, off Point Caiman, Luzon, at 

15', 5ryN, 119o, 43 E, by Japanese patrolescort vessel No 

22. 

Supporting Euidence: Japanese destroyer Asakaze was 

torpedoed and heavily damaged 23 August !944by Haddo 

(SS-255) while acting as escort for tanker Niyo Maru. 

Attempts were made to tow Asahaze into Dasol Bay, but 

the destroyer sank 20 miles southwest of Cape Bolinao' 

Niyo Maru, seeking refuge from submarine attack, 

proceeded alone and arrived safely at Dasol Bay the same 

day. Japanese patrol boat No 102 (ex-USS Stewart - DD' 

224) and patrol escort vessel No 22 were undergoing 

repairs at Cavite and both received orders to proceed to 

assist the tanker. Both vessels arrived at Dasol Bay early 

in the morning of 24 August. Patrol boat No 102 entered 

the bay to assist Niyo Maru and. CD-22 patrolled outside. 

While conducting sweeps in the area, sound gear detected 

a submarine and a periscope was sighted off the 

starboard bow. As the range was closed, three torpedo 

tracks were observed. One passed to starboard and the 

other two missed on the port side, and CD-22 conducted a 

swift depth charge counter-attack. Although in the 

vicinity, patrol boat No 102 did not take any part in the 

attack. Hake (33-256) last sighted the periscope of Harder 

at 15o, 43'N, 119', 43 E, and shortly thereafter heard 15 

rapid depth charge explosions. Japanese reported that 

'much oil, wood chips, and cork floated in the 

neighborhood'. 

Herring (SS-233). Novernber 1943. Final configuration. 

National Archiuee Negatiue 79-N-54692 

HERBING (SS-233) 

LCDR David Zabriskie Jr. AII 84 crew lost. 

Last Transmission Date: Last heard from 31 May 1944 

during rendezvous with Barb (SS'220) after departing 

Midway 21 May 1944 fot eighth patrol. 

Loss Cause: Sunk 1 June 1944, two kilometres south of 

Point Taganon, Matsuwa To Island, Kurile Islands, by 

gunfire from naval shore batteries. 

Supporting Euidence: Japanese cargo vessels Hiburi Maru 

and Iwaki Maru were torpedoed and sunk at 0742h.rs 

while anchored close to shore at Matsuwa To Island. 

Japanese claim sighting surfaced submarine which they 

state was damaged by touching the shore at Cape Tagen, 

after which it was seen.to advance close to an island in 

the Asase direction. Japanese shore batteries opened fire 

at 0756hrs, claiming two direct hits on the conning tower, 

resulting in a sinking with bubbles and foam covering an 

area five metres wide and with heavy oil covering an area 

of approximately 15 miles long. 

209

Argonaut at sea, demonstrating the 

gleat freeboard of the desigru CPtr 

fter the Orlando class of 1884, 

the Royal Navy ceased to build 

true armoured cruisers (those 

with vertical side armow) for a number of 

years, turning instead to protected 

cruisers (with armowed protective decks 

but no side armour) or in the smaller 

sizes, to unprotected cruisers with no hull 

protection other than, in some ships, 

appropriately placed coal bunkers. All 

three types might have had their 

armament protected by shields, turrets or 

casemates. 

Sir William White, who had returned 

to the Admiralty as Director of Naval 

Construction (DNC) in 1886, after a 

period at Elswick, was a very strong 

advocate of the protected system. His 

arguments were that with the annour 

then available, it was impossible to cover 

more than a small and inadequate area of 

a cruiser's side with armour thick enough 

to be effective unless the ship was very 

big, and that under many conditions of 

weather and trim, enemy fire could get 

under or over the armour and let water in. 

2I0 

A protected ship, on the other hand, 

would have the lower part of her huil 

almost sealed off by the deck (which was 

at or at about waterline level). which 

would never in those days of flat 

trajectories, be struck squareon. The 

slopes would deflect any waterline hits 

upward, and ammunition supply and 

communications would be protected by 

armoured tubes. The deck would also 

keep out splinters from shells exploding 

in the 'tween decks. Water might get in 

from hits on the waterline but could not 

accumulate to any dangerous extent, and 

it seems to have been assumed that there 

would be hardly anyone in the 'tween 

decks during action. Damage control and 

fire parties were things ofthe future. 

The only large cruisers built between 

the Northbrook Programme of 1884 and 

the 1889 Naval Defence Act were the 

Blake and Blenheim of 9070 tons, 

carrying two 9.2in and ten 6in guns at a 

speed intended to be 20 knots natural 

draft and 22 knots forced draft. This came 

down to 19 knots natural draft in 

practice. Endurance at 10 knots was 

planned as 15,000 miles, but came out at 

10,000 miles, still a remarkable figure for 

a coal burner. The pair were highly 

regarded but suffered from having their 

armament increased at a late stage. For 

example, their 6in guns were supplied 

from ready-use magazines worked in 

among the bunkers. 

The Naval Defence Act provided for 

nine first-class cruisers; the seven -Edgars 

and the two related Royal Arthurs. "fhe 

Edgars carried the same armament as 

the Blakes but were two knots slower, 

with 10,000/12,00Oihp against 

13,000/20,000; 1250 tons of coal against 

1800; Sin,z3in deck against 6 in,zSin and 

less gun protection. These changes 

brought them down to 7350 tons. The 

Royal Arthur pair differed in having long 

forecastles, gtving 27.5 feet freeboard at 

the bow against 20 feet, the forward 9.2 

inches being replaced by two extra 6 

inches in side-by-side shields. Tonnage 

went up tn 7700, but the higher bow and 

extra living space were thought well

ot Diadetn. CPL 

worth the loss of the big gun. 

The next big programme was the 

Spencer one of 1893 and it included the 

mighty super-cruisers Powerful and, 

Terrible, designed to catch and defeat the 

Russian Rurik, whic}r had been announced 

as the ultimate in commerce 

raiders, capable oftravelling from Kronstadt 

to Vladivostock without refuelling; 

destroying the British mercantile 

marine (then 75 per cent of the 

world's shipping) single-handed; and 

eating a British cruiser for breakfast each 

moming. In fact, she was developed from 

a long line of armoured frigates, with her 

guns disposed almost in sailing-ship 

fashion, without shield or other protection. 

Her waterline was protected by a low 

but thick belt, with a flat deck on top of it, 

and her speed was about 19 knots. Sir 

William White, who had been appointed 

Director of Naval Construction in 1886. 

estimated that her endurance at 10 knots 

would be about 8500 nautical miles, about 

half that planned. 

The Admiralty decided that two ships 

would have to be built, both capable of 

catching and fi ghtrng Rurih, which posed 

much the same threat - on paper at least - 

as the pocket battleship Deutschlnnd in 

the 1920s. For this, a speed of 22linots on 

the four-hour trial and an endurance of 

11,000 "knots" was needed. This, with an 

armament about equal to Edgar, meanl 

a very large ship. Powerful came out at 

14,200 tons legend, nearly as big as the 

contemporary Majestic class battleships, 

which were regarded as gigantic. 

Armament was the subject of much 

debate. White proposed twenty 6in guns 

as a basis of discussion, arguing that 

they could qweep away lhe Burik's 

unprotected guns and their crews, even 

though they could not penetrate her belt. 

This is what the Japanese did atUlsan 11 

years later, but they had 6in and 8in guns 

and only succeeded after a very hard 

fight. Other proposals were for twentyone 

6in guns, four 8in in breastworks and 

fourteen 6in and finally, on 8 June 1893, 

Sir Frederick Richards, the First Naval 

Lord, put forward two 9.2in in single 

armoured turrets and twelve 6in, 

virtually the Edgar armament. It should 

be noted that the then Director of Naval 

Ordnance (DNO), R-Adm Compton Domville, 

suppoited the 8in armament, and 

that the proposed twenty-one 6in would 

have been sixteen in casemates, four in 

shields fore and aft, as in the Boyal 

Arthur and one in a casemate right 

forward, as in the Rurik and some other 

Russian ships. 

Powerful and Terrible werc the Daily 

S&efch ships oftheirday, always dashing 

about the world, landing naval brigades 

and guns (the oriein of the Field Gun 

Competition at the Royal Toumament); 

being the subjects of rumours about their 

Belleville water-tube boilers and the 

scenes of some of Sir Percy Scott's 

gunnery feats. The sailor suits ofchildren 

at the time usually had. Powerful or 

Temible on the capbands, Nevertheless, 

much service opinion was unconvinced, 

regarding them as undergunned (despite 

four 6in added later) and too vulnerable. 

In World War I they were employed as 

transports or depot ships. 

Apart from them, the Spencer Pro 

gramme also provided for eightfirst-class 

cnuisers intermediate between them and 

the nine second

Sretrurtn on'Wprcsrs Apnrr, 1894 

Length Between 

Perpendiculars 

External Breadth 

Draught M 

Disp (LD) 

TPI immersion 

at load draught 

Freeboard 

amid at LD 

fwd guns 

IHP at 

natural draught 

Speed at LD 

LD coal 

Bunker capacity 

Complement 

Armament: 

10 days water 

Provisions & 

casks 

Offrcers' 

Stores, Slops, 

Tare of Boxes 

& casks 

Officers, nien 

& effects 

Masts, yards, 

rigging, sails 

Cables & anchors 

Armament (inc shields, 

Ammo, torpedoes, 

elec..gear & 

turning mach.) 

Machinery (inc 

water in, & 

spares) 

Coal at LD 

Armour & Backing, 

less CT 

and armament prot.) 

CT & casemates 

Hull inc barb 

framing 

Sheathing 

Margin 

Total 

Gen. eqpt. 

Armament 

Mach & stores 

Coal at LD 

Protection 

Hull 

Sheathing 

Blake 

371', 

oo 

26'g' 

9070 tons 

40 tons 

_tD 

40,9, 

13,000 

20 knots 

1500 

1500 

600 

2x9.2'BL 

10x6" BL 

lSxBpdr 

2 sub tubes 

2 A.W. 

52 

80 

35 

84 

50 

86 

539 

1608 

1100 

1100 

276 

3502 

noto 

D.J"/0 

6To 

t8.4Vo 

t6.\Vo 

15.2Vo 

38.670 

0Vo 

New Blake 

430', 

68', 

26'g' 

10500 tons 

48 tons 

l5'g' 

? 40,9, 

11,000 cont 

15500,24hrs 

19 cont 

2012/4hts 

1100 

2000 

650 est. 

lx9.Z'BL 

12x 6.QF 

l4x2pdr 

various smaller 

4 sub tubes 

60 

118 

.JO 

82 

70 

t25 

700 

1400 

1100 

1100 

490 

4325 

500 

200 

I0520 

6Vo 

.6.8%o 

14.4Vo 

I0.7Vo 

15.4%o 

4l.8Vo 

4.9V0 

Powerful 

500 

7L',6', 

27' 

14200 tons 

59 tons 

t7'9" 

44'6" 

18,000 cont 

25,000/4hrs 

20 cont 

22/4hrs 

1500 

3000 

930 

b

The freeboard of tbe Diadem class was 

inherited from the preceding class of 

large protected cruisers, the 

Pouerfuls. These two views show 

Tetible. Note the characteristic closer 

spacing of the two centre funnels. CPL 

provided' and an enqufuy as to their 

troop-carrying capacity, made at the time 

of the Boer War, producedfigures of 200to 

300 for short distances and only 90 to 140 

for long voyages. It is clear that no one 

had much idea how many men would be 

needed to operate the ships under 

wartime conditions, or how many troops 

would have to be carried in cases of 

emergency. With regard to troop-carrying 

capacity, these and many other warships 

had what the Americans would call a 

secondary attack transport role. The 

formidable collection of small arms could 

also be used for the landing of naval 

brigades and two ofthe 12-pounders were 

213

B l a k e A B C l C z D E F D i a d e m 

L e n g t h 3 7 l ' = = = 4 0 0 ' 4 3 5 ' = = = 

Beam 65' = 67' 68' 68' 68'8" = = 69' 

Disp 9150 9150 9625 10100 10355 10400 10715 10895 11000 

(As comp) 

Arm. 2x9.2'BL Ix9.2" 15 = 1,4/L5 = 15x6" IU6" 

1O(6"8L l%6" 14x6" x g' (12 in = 

(4 in cas.) (10 in ? 12 cas) 

cas) in cas ? = 

18x3pdr 

14x12 pdr 

4 tubes 

(10x 3,/9 x Spdr = 3xSpdr 

8'in Stubes = 2tubes 

Cas, 

OR OR 

>8" 2x8" 

tA6" 10x6" 

(8in = 

Cas) 

A Blenheim with Military Tops & Belleuille Boilers. 

B A = 8 x 6in in casemates; ready-use magazines for each casemate. 

C Forecastle and fore & aft bridges. Royal Arthur armament. 

C All 6in armament, different hull proportions. 

D C2 sheathed: less coal. 

E Dshallowed&lengthened. 

F 16,500 i.h.p. Ammunition passes and lobbies added below armoured 

deck. Upper bunkers sub-divided. 

8cwt models which could be landed if 

necessary and a lot of the training was 

directed to this end. 

The vital protective deck was 4in on the 

slopes and 2.5in on the flat; it weighed 

1226 tons. The casemates, which had 6 in 

Harvey on their outer sides, weighed 432 

tons and the conning towers, 12 in with 

2in roofs. 89 tons with their tubes. The 

The other influence on the Diad.eme 

came from the Bloke and. Edgar 

designs. Blahe, seen here as completed, 

was more powerfully armed 

than the Diadems but lacked 

fteeboard,. CPL 

2t4

sx: '..; 

::t!::l 

\* 

,',4n 

T}oe Edgars, as reduced Blakes, also 

lacked freeboard. Here Grafton or 

Thesetn can be seen fitting out at 

Thames Ironworks. still without her 

armament. CPZ 

ammunition tubes weighed 62 tons. A 

final set of changes involved the 

elimination of the after above-water tube 

and iLs rnantlet, as in the Highflyers 

thereby doing away with a serious action 

risk; the addition of a sixteenth 6in aft; 

the fitting of torpedo nets and the deletion 

of the fighting tops, each with their three 

3-pounders. A long argument raged over 

this. The fire from top guns was regarded 

as valuable, but it was argued that they 

would disclose the ships' characters at 

long range, thereby losing the chance 

of creeping up on an unsusPecting 

opponent. 

To suit them for their long-range role, 

the Diadems carried 13 weeks provisions 

and their copper sheathing reduced the 

need for dry-docking. Ammunition sup 

ply was the usual 200 rpg for the 6in, 

made up of 128 common and,24 shrapnel 

shells, and ten armour piercing (AP) and 

38 Palliser shot per gun. The twelve 12 

cwt l2-pounders had 162 common, 30 

iron, 36 shrapnel and, interestingly, T2 

AP apiece. The outfit for the two 8cwt 

landing guns was 120 common, 30 iron, 

75 shrapnel and 75 case rounds per gun. 

In view of the criticism of British ships 

after Jutland, it is interesting that a lot of 

care was taken over lhe Diadems' am' 

munition supply arrangements. The 

main magazines were fore and aft with 

ammunition passages along each side, 

below the armoured deck and inboard of 

the bunkers. Overhead rails were provided 

for ammunition transport. Each 

6in gun had its own hoist and there were 

six for the l2-pounders. Originally, there 

was to have been one inside each mast for 

the 3-pounders in the fighting tops. 

The second batch had an additional 

1,000iph for an extra quarter-knot, which 

hardly seems worth it. They could be 

recognized by an additional bulwark 

abreast of the after 6 in guns. Tenders for 

the building of the originai batch were 

called for by 1 November 1895 and most 

were completed by the end of 1900, 

though Spartiate was delayed till 1902. 

The class had a uniformly bad press, 

being regarded as much too big and too 

2t5

ffi 

@ 

liw 

Two of the Ed.gars exchanged the forward 

9.2in gun for another deck and 

two 6in guns. This improved freeboard 

and ensured that the weapons could be 

fought in a seaway. Similar thinking 

clearly influenced lhe Diad.ems. This 

view shows Roy'al Arthur, still 

wearing the victorian livery of black, 

white and buff. CPL 

weakly armed. Oscar Parkes described 

them as the most useless ships ever built 

for the Royal Navy. They never 

encountered an enemy ship, unlike the 

later Counties, so their value was never 

put to the test. No other navy built 

anything like them, though none had the 

RN's commerce protection problems. It is 

a pity that R Adm Kane did not persist 

with the idea of an 8in gun. Sketch 

designs were considered but the gun 

never seemed to be available when 

wanted. Even the original 9.2in aft might 

have helped, though bringing it to bearin 

a chase would have been an interesting 

problem. As the ships were desigrred, the 

idea was evidently to overwhelm the 

enemy with a stream of 6in and 12- 

pounder fire; at the time all sea fighting 

was expected to be essentially closerange. 

It seems likely that the Diadems could. 

have disposed of small and medium 

cruisers without diffrculty, but their 

chances against Rurik would have been 

doubtful; their broadside of eight 6in 

would have faced two 8in and seven 6in. 

Their casemates would have helped, and 

the protective deck might have been 

better than the Russian ship's belt in 

heavy weather. Only having half their 

guns available on each broadside was 

unfortunate, but by no means unique. 

Other examples are the Variag and the 

German 4.1in light cruisers. 

All eight saw extensive peacetime 

service, partly at home and partly on the 

distant stations for which they were 

designed. Niobe, as one might expect 

with a name like that, gave a lot of trouble 

and was passed to the Canadians. By 

l9I4 Andromedo was up for disposal and 

the rest in reserve. They were recommissioned 

in 1914 and saw extensive 

service, fortunately meeting no enemy 

cruisers, but by 1918 were mostly in use as 

depot ships or troopships. Only one, 

Ariadne was lost, by U-boat attack. 

Technically, they came out lighter and 

a little faster than designed, and most of 

them gave little trouble. From thepointof 

view of cost-effectiveness, which was 

certainly considered at the time, it is 

hard to see that they gave much more 

commerce protection than the Talbots 

which were half the size, nearly as good 

in their armament and protection, nearly 

as fast and with much the same radius of 

action. 

Finally, in 1902, at about the time the 

Cressy and Drake classes were completing, 

Vickers proposed to fit side 

armour to the whole class for a lump sum 

of f780,000. This would have involved 

fitting a 310-foot belt of 4in Krupp armour 

with a 110-feet belt of 2in nickel steel 

above it and a bulkhead aft, increasing 

the draft by 16 /, in and the displacement 

by 900 tons. This was rejected on the 

grounds that the Diaderns were still 

effective for their original purpose, and 

that the money could be better used. A 

separate proposal to fit 7.5in guns fore 

and aft was also rejected. 

2t6

Hambledon, a Type I with the 2- 

pounder quad mount superfiring over 

the after 4in twin. Author's colleetion 

gi!: 

:r6: 

n September 1938, the Royal Navy 

possessed some 180 destroyers in service 

or under construction for fleet or 

escort duties. Seventy-seven of these 

vessels dated from World War I. The 

latest vessels to enter service were the 16 

Tribals and another 16 vessels of the J 

and K classes were building. The latter 

vessels mounted six 4.7in guns and ten 

torpedoes but cost f610,000 to construct. 

The projected L class were larger and still 

more expensive. All these destroyers had 

limited anti-submarine capacity and 

could not be produced quickly because of 

limitations in the gun and turbine 

manufacturing resources of the country. 

Starting in t929,limited funds had also 

been made available to replace the fleets' 

ageing escort and minesweeping sloops. 

By 1938, the Royal Navy had developed 

a first-rate convoy escort in the Egret/ 

Black Swan classes then under construction. 

The Blach Sruans had the 

excellent anti-aircraft armament of six 

4in high angle guns, with machine guns 

for close defence. These vessels were 

cheaper, but still cost f,470,000 each to 

build. Their speed was limited to 19 knots 

and their fire control was almost nonexistent. 

It was clear that war with Germany 

was inevitable and that the Royal Navy 

was suffering an acute shortage ofescort 

vessels. Clearly, there was a requirement 

for a vessel with a speed suitable for fleet 

duties combined with the armament of 

the Blach Swans. Mr AP Cole, Assistant 

Director of Naval Construction. in a 

memo submitted in September 1938 to Sir 

Stanley Goodall the Director of Naval 

Construction (DNC) outlined the constraints 

on building fleet destroyers: 

o 

r 

T'he cost of building fleet destroyers, 

that were not wholly suited for 

anti-submarine warfare. 

The problem of the delivery of guns 

and mountings for fleet destroyers. 

'I\e Dido and Fiji class cruisers of 

the 1936 and 1937 programmes had 

been delayed because of such 

problems. 

r 

The delivery time of a fleet destroyer 

would be 39 months compared 

with the 30 months requirement 

to build an escort vessel. 

The genesis of the Hunt class is to be 

found in this memo. Of necessity, off the 

shelf equipment was selected and the 

classwas designed around the Mark XVI 

4in guns with Mark XIX mounting, that 

had been successfully used in the Egret 

class. However, the projected vessel 

would require steam turbines in order to 

achieve the minimum speed of 25 knots 

required for fleet operation. 

The need to have the vessels in service 

quickly, meant that the design period was 

of necessity far shorter than normal. TWo 

sketch designs were immediately drawn 

up: 

A 810 tons (standard); 265ft (waterline) x 

27ft (depth); four 4in (%2),two machine 

guns, four torpedo tubes; 30 knots. 

B. 650 tons (standard); 240ft (waterline) x 

25ft x 8ft 10in (aft); fow 4in (D2), two 

2L7

Middleton, a Type 2, in August 1943. 

Note the positions of the two aft twin 

4in mounts, and the quad 2-pounder. 

Author's eollection 

machine guns, four torpedo tubes; 25 

knots. 

Both vessels were to be equipped with 

depth charges. Endurance was estimated 

at 3500 miles at 15 knots. However, the 

primary consideration was cost. Design 

A was estimated to cost f376,800, whilst 

design B was cheaper at f,309,300. On 28 

September 1938, the designs were 

discussed by Goodall, Admiral RGH 

Henderson (The Controller and Third Sea 

Lord) and Admiral Cunningham, and a 

design, closely following design A, was 

accepted. Speed was to be 28,/32 knots 

according to loading and the armament 

to consist of six 4in HA,/LA guns in twin 

mountings. No torpedo or minesweeping 

equipment was to be fitted, but allowance 

was made for asdic equipment, depth 

charges and stabilisers. However, an 

alternative design mounting four 4in 

(%2) and. a triple set of torpedo tubes was 

to be considered and costed. Itwas agreed 

on 18 October 1938 to lengthen the vessels 

by seven feet to impirove stability and 

trim and to provide a marg:in for contingencies. 

Even so, the Hunts were to 

become notorious for being overcrowded. 

A better vessel could have been constructed 

with longer endurance, but at 

gxeater cost. The roison d'etre ofthe class 

was that the vessels should be constructed 

quickly and cheaply. 

On 22 October, the First Sea Lord (Sir 

Roger Backhouse) approved the characteristics 

of the vessels. Endurance was 

now stated to be 2500 miles at 20 

knots. A novel feature was that the 

officers were accommodated forward 

under the bridge. The Hunts were the first 

destroyer type to have such an 

arrangement. In November, the GM was 

calculated at 2.42 feet standard and. 2.55 

feet deep. This compared well with other 

destroyers. An indication of the weight 

problems that were later to arise occurred 

at this time when a discrepancy was 

revealed in the weight of the hull 

calculated by the Constructors as 457 

tons, whilst the draughtsmen had calculated 

the weight as 495 tons. The latter 

results were not accepted as the draughtsmen, 

it was believed, had allowed for 

heavier scantlings than required. 

The legend of particulars, dated 29 

November 1938 ofthe fast escort vessels 

(termed as such to overcome Tleasury 

reluctance to build an extra 20 destroyers) 

was as follows: 

Dimensions: kngth 278 foot (oa), 272 feet (waterline) 264 

feet (PP). Breadth 28r/nfeet. 

Draught 7 feet 11 inches 

Dsplacement: 890 tons (standard) 1185 tons (deep load) 

Armament: Six 6in (3x2) Mk XIX, two machine guns, two 

depth charge throwers. 

Complement: Between t42 and, 144 officers and men. 

Endurance: 2500 miles at 15 knots. 

The estimated weights at this time were: 

Hull: 

450 tons 

Machinery: 

270 tons 

General equipment: 

58 tons 

Armament and ammunition: 

87 tons 

Stabiliser: : 25 tons 

Standard displacement: 

890 tons 

Oil fuel and reserve feed water: 295 tons 

Deep displacement: 

1185 tons 

2r8

i 

iculars on 1 December 1938 at an estimat€d 

cost of f400,000 per vessel. On 

the 3fth, approval was given to orderten 

vessels. However, the order for the second 

group of ten vessels was to be delayed 

pending the evaluation ofthe alternative 

design armed with torpedoes. 

The functions of the vessels were listed 

under the staff requirement for the 1939 

fast escort vessel (ADM I/9440): 

o 

r 

o 

e 

To supplement existing vessels on 

A/S and A,/A escort duties. 

To provide A/S and A,zA escort for 

fast transports and detached units 

of the fleet. 

For use at home and abroad. 

The vessels could be used fortraining 

in peacefime. 

The Initial Building 

Programme and Problems 

Tenders, to be received by 20 January 

1939, were invited on 20 December 1938. 

However, all the firms asked to tender 

said that the Engineer-inchiefs estimate 

of 270 tons for machinery was 30 tons too 

low. It was agteed to use 285 tons. Second, 

the legend hull weight was stated as 450 

tons (despite the detailed calculation of 

495 tons). The shipbuilders suggested 475 

tons and finally a figure of 460 tons with a 

margin of ten tons was agteed. By using 

D quality steel, the shipbuilders saved 13 

tons ofhull weight, leaving the design 14 

tons overweight compared with the 

revised estimate of 460 tons. 

A second problem arose when the 

stability of the vessels was checked and 

found to be 0.8 feet lower than originally 

calculated. After discussions with the 

builders, the beam of the vessels was 

increased by 9in to 29 feet on 14 February 

1939. The extra beam increased the hull 

weight by five tons and the full load by 7 

tons as the tanks got bigger. The speed of 

the vessels was reduced by 0.1 hrots. 

On 14 March 1939. the First Sea Lord 

{irected that in order to speed production, 

the second batch of ten vessels were to be 

repeats ofthe first ten. A week later, the 

first ten were ordered, to be followed 

quickly by the ordering of the second 

batch of ten vessels on 11 April 1939. the 

first units of the class were laid down on 8 

June 1939 on the expiry of TYeaty 

obligations. Progress was rapid with 18 

vessels being laid down before the 

declaration of war and, Atherstone, 

Hambledon and Eglintonbeing launched 

before 1939 had closed. 

Athe r s to ne's St ab ility 

Problems 

Atherstone was nearing completion and 

as usual an inclining experiment was 

undertaken to check the weight and the 

It would seem that the detailed calculations 

of her stability had been repeated 

and a serious error found. Goodall noted 

in his diary: "Cole came in with 

Atherstone's inclining results. GM 1 foot 

'tion, less than calculated. bad errorin calculashall 

have to do something drastic." 

After an investigation, the reasons for 

this error were discussed. First there was 

an original error in the preliminary calculation 

for the KG ofthe hull structure and 

fittings (it appears that the upper deck 

was taken as 7 feet above the keel instead 

of 17 feet). This was responsible for twothirds 

of the loss of stability. Second, the 

vessels turned out to be 60 to 70 tons 

heavier than estimated. This should have 

been expected, especially in light of the 

problems raised by the builders the 

previous year. This increase in weight 

was responsible for the other third of the 

loss of stability. 

The vessels were altered in the following 

ways to restore stability: 

o No 2 4in twin mounting was 

landed. 

o The funnel and bridge were cut 

down to reduce top weight. 

e 52 tons of permanent ballast was 

fitted. 

In fact, 23 vessels had to be altered this 

way, as three vessels of the second group 

(ordered in September and December 

1939), Blencathra, Brochlesby and Liddesdale, 

were already too far advanced 

to be widened and received modifications 

similar to those affected to the first 

group. 

It would seem that the stability 

problems that arose in Atherstone werc a 

result of the pressure being placed on 

naval constructors during 1938 and 1939. 

Supervision was inadequate and the 

head of section must be to blame for not 

checking the design of the new class 

against the Blqck Swan cfass, also armed 

with-three twin 4in guns on a beam of 37 

feet. Second, there were inadequate 

checks on the weights to be used in the 

design. 

The Deuelopment of the 

Type 2 Vessels 

To speed up production, these 36 vessels 

had originally been ordered as repeats of 

the original group. These vessels, except 

for those mentioned earlier, incorporated 

the following alterations to improve 

stability: 

r 

The beam of the vessels was 

increased by 2 feet 6in to 31 feet 6in. 

It is believed that some vessels 

were 

'kippered' 

on the slip to 

incorporate the required beam, by 

widening shell strakes. 

o 

further aft. 

The funnel was lowered' 

As a result of these modifications no 

permanent ballast was shipped. Further 

changes were made to these vessels to 

enhance their anti-aircraft provision, by 

fitting a quadruple 2-pounder and two 

single 20mm Oerlikon. The specifications 

of the Tlpe 2s were as follows: 

kngth: 280 feet (oa) 264 feet &etween pp) 

Beam: 31[ feet 

Displacement: 1050 tons (standard), 1430 

tons (deep) 

Armament: Six 4in (3x2), One 2-pounder 

quadruple pom pom, two 20mm and 50 

depth charges with one rail and two 

throwers. 

Max Speed: 25 knots (deep load) with 

19,000sHP 

Endurance: 2560 miles at 20 knots 

Complement: Nine officers, 155 ratings 

Ttre revised gxoup weights were: 

Hull: 

595 tons 

Machinery: 295 tons 

Armament: 136 tons 

Equipment: 111tons 

Oil Fuel: 

277 tons 

RFW: 

16 tons 

Deep displacement: 1430 tons 

The Type 3 Vessels 

By the spring of 1940, it had become clear 

that the Hunts would be undertaking 

fleet duties and would require a torpedo 

armamerit, albeit at the expense of 

suppressing part of the gun armament. 

This proposal was, in effect, a revival of 

the idea to arm the second batch of ten 

vessels of the 1939 Programme with 

torpedoes. 

At a meeting held on 26 March l.940the 

following parameters of the design were 

accepted: 

The ships were to have a beam of 

3lL/2 feet and it was hoped that a 

speed of 27 knots in deep condition 

could be achieved. 

The quarter deck 4in mounting 

was suppressed. 

It.was hoped to ship 100 depth 

charges, with four depth charge 

chutes'and four depth charge 

throwers being provided, butitwas 

accepted that two throwers only 

might have to be tolerated. 

Better protection ofthe bridge and 

wheelhouse, as well as depth 

charge personnel was to be 

provided. 

TWo designs were produced in April 1940: 

A: Four 4in guns, one set of twin tubes on 

2t9

Asovnt Bleasedale, a T54re 3. From this 

angle recogDition is less easy than in 

the preceeding viewe. The angle of the 

funnel cap is one distinguishing 

feature. Authar' a collection 

R,rctlrz Brecon, at Malta. The two 

Type 4 ships were more spacious and 

the distance between the major 

weapons aft of the funnel makes this 

clear. The torpedo tubes are obscured 

by the deck party. However, the cost 

of the larger ships raised doubts about 

the value of such intermediate types, 

Author's collection. 

a hull of 272feet. 

B: Six 4in guns, one set of twin tubes on a 

hull of 282 feet. 

On 3 May 1940 Type A was'gpproved, 

with the hull, general arrangements and 

machinety ofthe previous Type 2 vessels, 

except where modified by the torpedo 

requirements. The weight of the \pe 3 

vessels was within ten tons of the Type 2 

vessels, but 40 tons of permanent ballast 

had to be shipped. The vessels were 

ordered during July and August 1940, 

under the 1940 War Programme and 

incorporated some variations from the 

TVpe 2 specification: deep displacement 

was 1545 tons; average speed on trials 

26lrknots; and the armament consisted 

of four 4in, 2-pounder, three single 20mm 

guns and one twin 21in torpedo tube. 

Upon completion, these vessels carried 

the Type 291 warning radar, the \pe 285 

fire control radar as well as the TVpe 128 

asdic (sonar). Radar had been fitted to 

earlier Type 1 vessels when refitted and 

220

Asovn:. Talybonf, another Type 3, seen 

here leaving Malta 25 March 1946. 

From this. perspective the. torpedo 

tubes. the lack of a'Fecond twin 4in 

aft, the upright funnel and the position 

of the quad 2-porinder are all clear. 

The addition of single 40mm guns fore 

and aft is noteworthy. Author'a 

collection 

Type 2 vessels had it fitted either on 

completion if available or during later 

refits. 

The Type 4 Vessels 

These two vessels ordered on 27 J'aly 

1940 frorp Thornycrofts under the 1940 

programme were considerably different 

from the other Hunts and had originated 

from a proposed 1000-ton destroyer 

design of October 1938, which had not 

been accepted by the Admiralty. The 

proposal was revived in March 1940 after 

a meeting between Sir John Thomycroft 

and the Controller. Admiral Bruce 

Fraser. Four sketch designs of vessels of 

between 920 and 1115 tons and between 

260 feet and 280 feet, with a speed of 

.between 2T and 32[: knots and armed 

with either two.or three twin 4in guns, 

were proposed. These designs were again 

rejected.by the DNC on the following 

grounds: 

. No 2 mounting could not fire forward 

of 70". 

o The wireless office was too small. 

' . Magazine and depth charges store 

was too small. 

227

o 

It was anticipated that the vessels 

would roll heavily, 

In order to meet these criticisms, three 

more designs (T/1306, T,21307 and 

T/1308) werc submitted. These vessels 

were again between 260 and 280 feet in 

length, \If, to 32 feet beam and 1250 to 

1475 tons full load, with two twin or three 

twin 4in guns. These were again rejected 

on the following grounds. 

o T'he discontinuity of strength due 

to the presence ofthe torpedo openings. 

o Restricted fuel tankage. 

o A propensity to roll quickly. 

After an interim design (T/1309P) 

had again been rejected, Thornycroft 

found favour with their design 

T/1310 which had the following characteristics: 

o The adoption of the continuous 

shelter deck. 

a A partially enclosed bridge. 

a Additional protective plating 

around the bridge. 

Revised stem and keel line, which 

improved Asdic efficiency. 

An increase in the distance to 70 

feet between the 2-pounder mounting 

and No 2 gun. 

A larger wireless office. 

kngth: 

Breadth: 

Standard displacement: 

Shaft horsepower: 

Speed (standard): 

Speed (deep): 

Complement: 

Endurance at 20 knots: 

Armament: 

Torpedo tubes: 

Depth charges: 

Fuel oil: 

Revised T/1310 

(October 1940) 

283 feet 

331/a feet 

1170 tons 

19500 

28 knots 

26 knots 

2350 miles 

fr4in 

4 2-pdt 

2 Oerlikon 

2 Lewis 

L triple 

50 

285 tons 

*Brissenden 352 tons as stabiliser omitted. 

to their relatively early disposal. The 

importance of the class is that they filled 

the gap during 1941 and t942 before the 

larger fleet destroyers entered service in 

quantity. After that they formed an 

As completed 

283 feet 

33fa feet 

1175 tons 

19000 

n/a 

25 knots 

t67 

2350 miles 

6x4in 

4 2-pdr 

4 Oerlikon 

2 Lewis 

1 triple 

50 

286 tons* 

important element in the local escort 

flotillas and for that role their low 

endurance and limited speed were not so 

critical. 

The group weights were as follows: 

Hull: 

655 tons 

Machinery: 

305 tons 

Armament: 

154 tons 

Equipment: 

95 tons 

Oil Fuel: 

286 tons 

RFW: 

20 tons 

Full load displacement: 1515 tons 

'.:i 

€:!" 

t" 

tf1;, 

,& 

I 

:t* 

,lar: 

i* 

These vessels cost an additional f12,000 

pounds per hull over the earlier Hunts. 

Brecon and Brissenden were considerably 

superior to the earlier Hunts, as 

they were longer and more seaworthy 

because of the shelter deck. They had a 

superior armament of six 4in guns as well 

as torpedo armament. Both vessels were 

highly successful in service, but it must 

be doubted if such a design should have 

been continued, when shipyard capacity 

was stretched to the limit. 

Reuiew of the Class 

The design was evolved very quickly and 

was of necessity rushed and the mistakes 

made in the design gave the class initial 

stability problems. Although these problems 

were overcome, they meant that 

the ships were weight sensitive throughout 

their careers. This restriction led to 

their earlv retirement from the fleet and 

'a, 

.- 

't=-" 

,"+ 

,h 

:if 

.ni::j 

,] 

222

TONE 

Modifications and War Service 

In this final piece about Japan's last heavy cruiser class, 

the authors provide a detailed synopsis of their war 

service, which includes every important battle of the 

Pacifrc War, and look at the modifications which were 

made to them 

by Hans Lengerer, Sumie Kobler-Edamatsu and Tomoko Rehm-Takahara 

Jn 

the battle of Santa Cruz Islands, 

I 

Chikuma was heavily damaged by 

Ifour bomb hits near the bridge tower 

and three near misses. After emergency 

repairs by the repair ship Akashi atTluk 

between 29 October and 1 November 1942 

the cruiser made for Kure to be completely 

repaired. During the repairs, which 

lasted between 7 November 1942 and 27 

February 1943, Chikuma received a type 

21 air search radar. The large mattress 

aerial was installed atop the fore tripod 

mast. Besides this, it is said the ship 

received two twin 25mm MG mounts on 

each side ofthe reserve fire director. 

With regard ra Tone, these modifications 

were carried out while the ship 

was docked at the Naval Arsenal. 

Maizuru, between 3 and 13 March 1943. 

Between December 1943 and February 

1944 the 25mm twin mounts before the 

bridge tower and abreast the after mast 

were replaced by triples. It is also claimed 

that on Tone, fo:ur 13mm MG in single 

mounts were installed. For ?oze this was 

a regular overhaul in Kure Naval Arsenal 

from 6 November to 14 December 1943, 

while Chikuma, drydocked from 20 

December 1943 to 20 January 1944, also 

in Kure, had to be overhauled and also repaired 

from the damage received during 

the American air raid on Rabaul on 5 

November 1943. Following the Battle for 

the Marianas in June 1944the AA armament 

of IJN warships was increased 

generally and the Tone class received 12 

25mm MG in four triple mounts, installed 

on a level of the bridge tower and on the 

quarterdeck, as well as numbers of the 

newly introduced (1943) 25mm MG on 

naval pedestal mountings: 25 in Tone 

and 23 in Chikurna. Their positions are 

not exactly shown in official sources but 

the accompanying drawings are believed 

to be accurate. 

On the main mast, the Yag:i aerial of 

the radar type 13 was fitted and on both 

sides ofthe upper part ofthe bridge tower 

and the horn aerials ofthe surface search 

radar type 22 were installed. The new 

radar room was built below the main 

mast. 

Tone resting on the bottom of Kure Harbour, 

shortly after being sunk by American 

carrier aircraft on 29 July 1945. 

The structure around the bow is part 

of the camouflage netting. Author'e 

collection. 

223

During the Battle for Leyte Gulf, 

Chikurna was sunk and Tone was damaged 

by one bomb and several near 

misses from the attacking American 

carrier-based aircraft. During repafus in 

Naval Arsenal, Maizuru, from 17 November 

1944 until 17 February 1945 

the cruiser received four triple 25mm MG 

mounts, installed on the quarterdeck and 

the 25mm single MG on naval pedestals 

was reduced to 18. The type 21 radar was 

replaced by a type 22 and the mattress 

aerial changed to the horn aerial. It is 

said that the horn aerials on both sides of 

the bridge tower were also removed. 

Careers of Tone and 

L:72:34 Tone laid down 

2l:ll:37 ?one launched 

20:11:38 Tone completed, 

registered as a ship ofthe Naval 

Station Yokusuka. 

Reserve ship (Yijbikan) First 

classt Captain Kenzb Hara in 

commano. 

20:5:39 Joins krd trleet, CruDiv. 

Chikum.a 

Chikuma 7:10:'35 

Chikuma 19:3:38 

C hikurna registered 20:5:39 

Joined 2nd Fleet, 6th CruDiv; 

Captain Hidehiko Nishio in 

command. 

Captain Kenzd Hara takes 

command; remains Captain 

Tone,75:10:39 

15:11:39 Formed the 8th CruDiv, 

2ndFleetCaptainShinzoOnishi Captain Shintoro Hashimoto 

1:12:39 Registered as warships of the Naval Station, Maizuru 

27:3:40 Sortied from the Bay of Nakashiro to south China, 

participated in several operations. 

17:9:40 Sortied from Kure to south China, returned on 6:10140 to 

Yokusuka. 

10:10:40 Participated in the special Naval Review on the occasion of 

the 26fth anniversary of the Government constitution, departed frorn 

Yokohama on following day 

14:10:40 Both ships arrived Maizuru 

15:10:40 Captain Masao Nishida 

takes command 

30:10:40 Departed from Maizuru; 

cruised in western Sea of Japan 

and Bay of Ariake. 

17-27:17:40 Drydocked at 

Maizuru 

Drvdocked at Maizuru 

4:2:41 Arrived Bay of Ariake, 

departed on 13:2, arrived Sasebo 

on 15:2 

19:2:4 Departed Sasebo via 

South China for operations on 

11:3 in Bav of Ariake. Departed Sasebo; arrived Bay of 

Nakashiro on 21st; left on 26th; 

arrived Takao on 3:3; anchored 

Bay of Ariake 11:3. 

28:3:41 Departed from Bay of Ariake; arrived at Maizuru on 30:3 

10-21.4.41Docked at Maizuru Docked at Maizuru 2-10.4.4L. 

24:4:47 Depafied Maizuru; arrived 

Bay of Mikawa on 27th; left 

3:6; cruised to Bdy of Sukumo. Departed Maizuru; arrived Bay of 

Mikawa on 27th; left 3:5; arrived 

off Ise shrine on same day; left 

next day; arrived at Kure on 6th. 

20:5:41 left Kure; arrived Bay of 

Mikawa on 22nd.; departed on 3:6; 

arrived Bay of Beppu on 6th; left 

on 10th; arrived Bay ofSukumo on 

same day. 

22:6 :47 lefl B ay of Sukumo ; arrived 

at Bay ofAriake on 23rd; departed 

on 27lh; arrived at Yokusuka on 

30th; left and arrived at Kisarm on 

same day; arrived atBay of Ariake 

on 11:7; departed 16th; arrived 

Komakushima next day; left 20th; 

anchored Saeki on 22nd. 

1:8:41 left Saeki; arrived Bay of 

Beppu on same day; left 5th; 

anchored Bay of Sukima next day; 

left, 24th and arrived Bay of Saeki 

on same day. 

11:8:41 Captain Keiz6 Komura 

takes over. 

of 

Captain Gunji Kogure took cornmand 

1:11:40 

Departed to cruise in western Sea 

of Japan 25:12:40 

27:8:41 Arrived Maizuru 

1-8:9;41 Docked Maizuru 

10:9:41 Captain Tameji (or 

Kamchugu) Okada took com- 

26:8:47 l-eft, Bay of Saeki; arrived 

Maizuru next day. 

Docked at Maizuru &16:9:41 

mand. 

10:9:41 Left Maizuru; arrived off Murozumi next day; departed on 

14:10; arrived Bay of Saeki on same day left on 19th; arrived Bay of 

Sukumo on 22nd; left 1:11; arrived Bay of Ariake next day; departed 

on 4th; anchored at Kagoshima on 7th ; left and arrived at Kure on 9th ; 

prepared for scu and fuelled until 13th. 

13:11:41 departedKure;anchored departed Kure, arrived Saeki Bay 

off Saeki on 14th; deparied on on 14th; fuelled between 15th and 

15th (1000hrs); retumed 1735hrs;18th; departed 18th and arrived 

engagedin gunnerypractice. Tomkon(Hitokappu)Bayon22nd; 

carried out training 18th - 22nd. 

18:11:41 left Saeki; arrived Tomkon Bay on 22nd; Practised fuelling 

in tandem from lfth to 25th. 

26:ll:41 participated in surprise attack on Hawaii. Departed 

Tomkon Bay on 26th at 0758hrs (?oze), 0800hrs (Chikuma); 

proceeded under alert in fog until 7.12; declared war on 8th; 

between 0100hrs and 0700hrs planes nos 1 and 2 of Tone caried 

out pre-attack search and co-operated with air attack force. Flom 

0210hrs no 1 shipboard alert maintained. Both ships participated 

as part of the combined fleet, first mobile force, support unit. 

&16:72:41headed for invasion of Wake Island. 

76-2I:12:47 separated from the first mobile force and operated 

nntrl 24:12 under the tactical command of CinC Fourth Fleet. On 

21st plane no 7 of Chikumo reconnoitered Wake, while planes nos 

4 and 5 of Tone co-operated with CarDiv 2 (Hiryu & Soryu) for 

recce. 

22:1241 plane no 3 of Tone co-operated with CarDiv 2 in attack. 

23:12:410905hrs landed and occupied Wake. 

24:12:41 planes nos 2 and 4 of Tone, and nos 3 and 4 of Chikuma 

carried out anti-submarine patrols and screening. 

24-29:72:41 returned to Kure; planes canied out patrols and A/S 

screening. Arrived Kure 29th; carried out maintenance until 

8:l:42. 

975:7:42 departed Kure; anchored in Hiroshima Bay; departed 

10th; proceeded under alert to T!uk, arriving on 15th. 

16:1:42 planes carried out A,/S patrols and screening. 

l7-27:l:42 participated in R-Operation, supporting invasion of 

Rabaul. Departed Truk 17th; attacked Rabaul in concert with CV 

air strike on 20th; attacked Lae and Salamoa on 2lst; Tone's 

floatplanes left to attack Bicha on ?3td; Chihurna's floatplanes 

attacked the Admiralties on 24th: ?oze's planes canied out a 

reconnaissance attack on the Admiralties inflicting some damage 

on 25th: arrived Tluk on 27lh at 0744hrs. 

27:37:7:42 loaded fuel and fresh provisions; carried out drills 

including gunnery practice on 31st. 

7-14:2:42 departed Tluk on lst; formed pahol disposition; arrived 

Palau on 8th. Ship's aircraft carried out A/S screening. ?one's 

aircraft sighted and bombed a surfaced submarine. Results of 

attack not known. 

75-21:2:42 participated in the first nobile force surface operation, 

Port Darwin, attack. Departed Palau on 15th. Both ships'aircraft 

involved in attack; beginning 0616hrs, Tone's aftcraft scored a 

near miss on a large merchant ship. At 0815hrs Tone's floal,plane 

engaged an enemyflying boat; at 1200hrs bombed a large 

merchant ship, later sunk by CV aircraft. Arrived Starring Bay 

on 21st. 

2l-24:2:42 prepared for second mobile surface operation, refueling, 

maintenance, and gunnery drill. Floatplanes carried out A,/S 

screening. 

25:2-1"1:3:42 participated in second mobile surface operation (East 

Indian Ocean); departed Starring Bay on 25th; on 1:3, at 1125hrs 

Chihurna sighted enemy merchant ship on 13'S/106'E; at 

1143hrs opened fire; 1155hrs ship sank after firing 49 rounds of 

20.3crn. Later at 1715hrs, sighted enemy ships; 1737h.rs, enemy 

ship made smoke and fled; 1752hrs, all forces attacked; 1814hrs, 

opened fire; 1836hrs, shells hit enemy ship (Tone);1845hts, enemy 

ship heavily on fire; 1858hrs, ceased fire; 1859hrs, US Destroyer 

Edsall sunk. 

Ammunition expended: ?oze, 500 rounds; Chikuma,347 rounds. 

224

n; 

t'it-, 

',',. 

1".,-r-',,- . -., 

l*, 

iq* 

ti1,,!!i 

:,t r, 

Japanese personnel aboard ?one removing equipment. Note the close spacing ofA' B and C turrets. Author's colleetion 

Tone, viewed from the starboard bow. Author's collection 

225

Chikuma,54 rounds HA. During.this,action CruDiv 8 cooperated 

with BatDv 3. 

2:3:42htelled,. 

4:3:42 sank one armed merchant ship with DD (Jrahaze. 

5:3:42 seaplanes from both ships attacked Tjilatjap; Tone,s plane 

rescued survivors, and took one British seaman POW on 6th-. On 

8th recce of Sunda; arrived Starring Bay on 11th at 1620hrs. 

1l-25:3:42 prepared for next operation, Ioading ammunition, fuel 

etc, and carried out maintenance and training. Aircraft carried 

out A,zS screening. 

26:3-23:4:42 participate in third mobile surface operation (Ceylon); 

departed Starring Bay on 26th; sighted large enemy flying boat, 

shot down by CV fighters on 4th; participated in attack on 

Colombo on Sth; Tone's aircraft sighted and tracked two cruisers; 

guided CV planes in to sink Cornwall and Dorsetshire. On 8th a 

large enemy flying boat sighted; on 9th co-operated in attack on 

Tlincomalee; attacked by nine enemy planes; opened AA fire (five 

shot down by CV fighters); arrived Maizuru on 23rd. 

23:4-16:5:42 both ships underwent maintenance. 

25:4-3:5 Tone drydocked. Chikuma drydocked 3-12:5. 

lG24:.5:42 training, refuelling, maintenance. Departed Maizuru on 

16th; arrived Hashirajima on 17th at 1848hrs; practice sortie on 

20th; departed on 22nd; arrived Kure on 23rd; departed Kure on 

24th at 1600hrs; arrived Hashirajima at 1800hrs. 

27:5-6:6:42 participates in Midway Operation, as part of mobile 

support force. Departed Hashirajima at 0600hrs on 27th; attacked 

by enemy planes on 4:6; repulsed with AA fire; several attacks bv 

planes on 5th. At 0130hrs Midway air attack unit took off. Plane 

no 2 A,/S screening, nos 1 and 4 carried out search. 

0136hrs, planes no 1 and 4 

launched. 0151hrs plane no 2 

on ASW patrol. 

0253hrs enemy aircraft sighted; opened fire with main battery. 

0405hrs sighted enemy planes; 0458hrs; sighted 20 enemy planes, 

opened fire with main battery; opened fire. 

0627hrs sighted and fired on 15 

enemy planes. 

14:30-15-30 bombed-by enemy Four horizontal and dive bombing 

aircraft; I I near misses, but no attacks, but no damage. 

damage due to evasivenanoeuwe22S0hrs joined main force. 

ArnmunitionExpend.edTone Chikuma 

Main battery: 138 

74 

HA guns: 539 

576 

Machine guns: 4075 4b40 

7:6-12:7:42 operated as part of northern force, support force, {irst 

support unit (until 7.7). hoceeded under alert through fog; arrived 

Omonato on 26:6; received briefing aboard, Nachi on 2bth: 

departed on 28th; proceeded through fog; arrived Hashirajima on 

12th at 1803hrs. 

14:7:42 Tone becomes flagship of Assigned to third fleet, 

third fleet, CruDiv 8, Captain Yuji CruDv 8. 

Anibe (or- Keibu) took over 

commano. 

l5:7 -15:8:42 maintenance and training. 

On 6th departed Maizuru; arrived Hashirajima 7th; departed on 

llth; anchored for a short period of Kitsuki at 2248hrs: departed 

on 12th at 0530hrs; anchored briefly off Hagunshima at lT21hrs 

left on 13th at 0730hrs: arrived Kure at 1921hrs. 

16:8-5:9:42 participated in the Solomon area operation. Departed 

Kure on 16th at 0630hrs; arrived Hashirajima 0829hrs (Tone) and. 

0835hrs (Chikuma). Departed at 1800hrs (Tone\ and 1805hrs 

(Chihutna). Carried out ASW and other training; supported 

Second Battle ofthe Solomon Islands on 26th. 

1205hrs, plane no 2 sighted large 

enemy force; (later shot down by 

enemy aircraft.) 1307hrs, first 

. attack took off. 1318hrs, plane 

no 5 launched, tracked enemy; 

1400hrs, second attack unit took 

off; 1555hrs, sighted and fired on 

four B-17s; 1607 hrs, cedsed fire; 

2270hrs, unable to locate enemy; 

gave up plan for night action, 

proceeded north. 

Ammunition expended 

Main battery: 50 

HA battery: 40 

Machine guns: 600 

5:9 arrived Ttuk at 1430hrs; while 

underway seaplanes carried out 

ASW searches. 

6-23:9:42 maintained AS alert while lying at T!uk. Departed on 

9th; ordered to Guadalcanal area; on 14th own planes concluded 

search; enemy aircraft attacked. On 13:25, three B-17s driven off 

by gunfire; at 1425hrs more B-17s driven off and later a larEe 

enemy flying boat was also engaged. Fuelled; arrived at Tluk on 

23rd at 1118hrs (Tone) and.1127hrs (Chikuma\. 

23:9-10:42 training, maintenance and refuelling. 

1l-26:10:42 departed from Tluk for the Guadalcanal Operation 

Advance Force. Between 14th and 25th sighted enemy aircraft, 

and drove offwith gunflre. On 17th Tonerefiielled.from AO T6ho 

Maru. On 26th participated irr the Battle of Santa Cruz. 

0209hrs, sighted enemy 

aircraft; 0426hrs, more enemy 

aircraft sighted; believed to 

have shot down two; 0540hrs, 

carrier attack units take off; 

0508-0600hrs, two planes from 

Tone sent to shadow enemy 

task force; 0657-0800hrs, 

attacked by about 50 planes. 

Drove them off. 0751-0755hrs. 

attacked by 10 torpedo 

bombers; five torpedoes 

launched, all avoided: two 

bombers shot down. 

1125hrs, recovered aircraft. 

Casualties 

2 wounded 

0459hrs, sighted large enemy 

force; 0507hrs, three enemy 

aircraft sighted, opened fire. 

0656hrs, engaged six enemy 

aircraft; 0702hrs, six enemy 

torpedo bombers attacked, 

0715hrs, attacked by 21 

aircraft; 0726hrs. direct hit on 

port side of bridge on main 

battery control, 0731hrs, direct 

hit on starboard side of bridge; 

0739hrs, three near misses on 

starboard beam; 0759hrs, 

sighted 10 enemy planes, 

opened fire. 0917hrs, retired to 

Truk. 

Casualties 

190 killed. 154 wounded. 

including the Captain 

Arnmunition expended Tone Ch,ikuma 

Main battery L72 77 

HA battery 

220 353 

Machine guns 4075 1869 

27:10-8:11:42 between 27th and 27:10-7:11:42 arrived at Tluck on 

301h, Tone refuelled and carried 291h, a! 0938hrs. Emergency 

out air searches. Arrived Tluk onrepairs by Akashi begun at once. 

30th at 14l2hrs. Prepared for 

further action. Loaded 

ammunition on 1st and 2nd, 

fuelled on 4th. 

Tone: 9:11:42-17:9:43 

9-18:ll:42 participated in the KA Operation (Solomon Islands). On 

12th plane no 5 failed to return. On 13th, planes 1, 2 and 4 carried 

out searches, spotted several large flying boats. Involved in Third 

Solomons Naval Battle. On 15th and 16th, planes 1, 2 and 4 on 

search missions; B-17s sighted on 15th. Arrived Tluk on 18th at 

0846hrs. 

18:11:42-19:1:43 fuelled and anchored in combat-readv state until 

end of November; afterwards engaged in training and planes used 

for ASW patrols. 

19:1-?:2:43 involved in KA and KE Operations Support Force, 

Advance Force Eastem Diversionary Force. Departed Tluk on 

1fth at 1500hrs; arrived Yaruto on 22nd at 0835hrs; left next day 

at 1300hrs; returned on 27th at 1021hrs. Departed on %nd, at 

0400hrs and reached Tluk on 7th at 0838hrs. 

8:2-13.3:43 repairs and maintenance; departed on 15th; arrived 

Maizuru op 21st. Drydocked between &d and 13th. 

16-26:3:43 departed Maizuru at 1217hrs; arrived at Kure on lgth at 

0930hrs; departed Kure on 21st at 1500hrs; arrived Saeki on 2hrd 

at 0952hrs; left at 1200hrs; arrived Tluk on 26th at 1354hrs. 

26:3-.16:5:43 training, maintenance, and anchorage screening. 

Sortied through reef five times. 

17-29:5:43 assigned to main force, screening force; departed Truk 

226

for Yokusuka; arrived on 22nd; assigned to mobile force and 

anchored in readiness at Yokusuka; on standby for the northern 

operation; went to Kisarazu on 25th; moved to Sagami Bay on 

26th; practised fuelling in tandem on 27th and anchored on alert 

off Kisarazu. 

29:5-8:7:43 operated in western Inland Sea (Saeki, Hashirajima, 

Kure, Muzorumi, Tokuyarna). 

&26-7-43 transported troops between Japan and South Seas; 

departed Kure on 8th; arrived at Urajima on same day. Sortied 

Tluk on 1fth to Rabaul. 

26:7-17:9:43 anchored on alert at T!uk. carried out exercises and 

sorties through the reef. 

Chih,uma: 2: I 1 :42- 17 :9:43 

2:17:42-26:2;43 departed Tluk on 2:11; Arrived Kure on 7:11; 

investigated damage and carried out repairs between 7th and 

29:11; drydocked on 2fth; further repairs until 28:12; while under 

repair, Captain Tadashi Aoki (also Captain ofthe cruiser Aobo) 

took command; repairs continued until %:2:43. On 20:1, Captain 

Chikara Shigenga took command. 

27:2-27:3;43 carried out maintenance and training; operated until 

18:3 in Western Inland Sea (Kure, Tokuyama, Hashirajima, 

Yashima); arrived Kure on 18th; prepared for sortie; departed on 

21st; arrived off Kitsuki at 2145hrs; departed at 0700hrs; arrived 

Saeki at 0910hrs: left at 1200hrs; arrived Tluk on 27lh al 1356hrs. 

27:3-17:5:43 anchored on alert, practised sorties; carried out ASW 

patrols, 

17-29:5:43 departed Tluk for Yokusuka as part of main force, 

patrol unit (Shurykubutai - KeiKaitai); arrived Yokusuka on 22nd; 

assigned to mobile force; departed on 25th; arrived Kisarazu and 

anchored there under alert for northem operation. 

D:5-8:7:43 departed Kisarazu on 2fth; arrived Yokusuka next day; 

departed for Halshirajima on 30th; arrived Saeki on 1.7; departed 

for Hashirajima and anchored there on alert. F\rther exercises in 

western Inland Sea. 

8-26:7:43 transported army forces; departed Kure on 8th; arrived 

Urajima same day; loaded army stores on 9th; Arrived Yashima 

anchorage on 9th; left for Tluk on 10th; arrived on 15th; departed 

for Rabaul on lfth; arrived on 21st; unloaded troops and stores. 

On 22nd, assigned to eastern force, mobile force, main body; 

departed Rabaul on 24th; arrived Tluk on 26th. 

26:7-L7:9:43 carried out pre-arranged exercises and acted as 

emergency stand-by at Tluk. On 15:8 assigned to mobile force, 

main body. 

Tone a,nd ChikurrLa: 18:9:43-26:10 :43 

18-25:9:43 assigned to Mobile Force, Vanguard; took part in Z 

Operation. Patrolled Marshalls and Gilberis area. Sortied Tluk for 

Eniwetok; arrived on 20th (Tone) and 21st (Chikuma). Anchored 

on stand-by; departed on 23rd, arriving Ttuk on 25th. 

25:9-26:10:43 assigned to mobile force, main body, the object being 

to destroy the enemy fleet and air strength. At Tluk until 16:10, 

then sortied for Eniwetok on 17th; arrived on 19th; departed for 

Truk on 23rd; arrived on 25lh (Tone) and 26th (Chikuma). 

Tone: 26:10:43-1:2:44 

26:10-21:12:43 anchored on alert at T!uk; carried out exercises until 

3fth; departed Tluk for Kure on 31st; arrived on 6:11; carried out 

repairs and maintenance until 3:12; departed on 18th for 

Hashirajima; sortied for Kure on 20th; arrived on 21st. Captain 

Haruo Mayuzumi took over on 1:12. 

27:I2:43-BI:I:44 loaded army stores and troops at Kure; departed 

on 23rd; arrived Tluk on 29th; assigned to 3rd fleet, 7 CruDv on 

1:1:44; sortied from TYuk for Kaeving on 2nd; arrived on 4th; 

unloaded army material and reached Tluk on 5th. Anchored at 

T!uk; practised sorties. 

7-28:2:44 departed from Tluk on 1st; arrived at Palau on 4th; left 

there for Lingga on 16th; arrived on 21st; departed on 27th and 

anchored at Bangka on the next day. 

Chih,uma: 26 : 10 :43-5:2:44 

26:1-0-7;11:43 anchored on alert at Tluk; sortied from Tluk for 

Rabaul on Srd in an attempt to deshoy the enemy fleet. Sighted a 

B-24 shadowing on 4th; twice bombed during the night; arrived 

Rabaul on 5th; attacked by about 80 fighters and bombers; 

followed by 35 large aircraft. Part ofthe hull and machinery 

damaged by near misses; three wounded. Departed Rabaul for 

Truk, attacked by seven enemy planes on 6th; drove them offwith 

AA fire. Reached Truk on 7th. 

7-20:7I:43 anchored on alert at T!uk; carried out exercises. 

20-23:1,1:43 transported aviation fuel, personnel and material from 

Tluk to Eniwetok, between 20th and 21st. and from Eniwetok to 

Kwajalein between 2nd and21td. 

24:ll-7:12:43 moved to Ruotto anchorage to paf,rol the Gilberts, 

Nauru and Ocean area. Arrived Ruotto same day. Sortied on27th; 

arrived Eniwetok on 28th, departed on 29th; arrival at Ruotto on 

3fth. Anchored there as support for a transport operation. 

Departed on 3:12; arrived at Tluk on 5th; fuelled and departed for 

Kure on ?th. 

7:12:43-5:2:44 arrived Kure on 12th; drydocked in No 4 dock on 

20th; left dock on 20:1:44; completed overhaul by 4:2. Assigned to 

3rd Fleet, 7 CruDv on 1:1; Captain K6ji Norimitsu took command. 

Left Kure on 5th; transported material to Singapore; left for 

Lingga (as for Tonzl. 

Tone and Chikurna: 1:3:44-20:4:45 

l:3-17l.5:44 assigned to }rd Fleet, 7 CruDiv on 1:3; departed 

Bangka next day to attack merchant shipping in the Indian 

Ocean; arrived at Jakarta on 15:3; left on 18th; arived at 

Singapore on 20th; departed on 1:4; transported material for 601st 

Flight Squadron; retumed to Singapore on 4:4; departed next day 

for Lingga to take part in A G6 Sakusen (Mariands); left Lingga 

on 11:5; arrived at Tawi-Tawi on 14:5; Ieft next day and arrived at 

Tarakan on 16th; left anchorage, returning to ilbwi-Tawi on 17th. 

17;5-20:6:44 anchored at Tawi-Tawi on alert until 9:6; left on 10th; 

arrival at Guimaras on 12th; sortied next day for Marianas area; 

took part in Marianas air-sea battle between 19th and 20th. 

20;6-22:70:44 departed from battle area, arriving at Nakshino Bay 

on 22:6; left there next day, arriving at Hashirajima on 24th; 

drydocked at Kure on 26th; completed overhaul on 7.?; departed 

Kure on 8th carrying army personnel; arrived Lingga on 16th; 

remained in Singapore-Lingga area on stand-by until 18:10; 

departed Lingga on 18th; arrived Brunei on 20th; departed on 

22nd and operated as part of the Kurita fleet in Shd i Gd Sakusen 

(Leyte Gul0. 

22-28:10:44 advanced to I-eyte 

Gulfon 25th; flagship of 

TCruDv w}ren Suzuya was sunk. 

Slightly damaged by one bomb 

hit and several near misses. 

Arrived at Brunei on Zlth. 

Advanced to kyte; while firing 

on US CVEs and Des was 

subject to several air and ship 

attacks. Torpedoes hit in 

machinery spaces; ship sank. 

Part of crew rescued by DD 

Nowake, which was then also 

sunk 20:4:45. 

Tone : 28 : 10 :44-30 :9:4 

I 

28:10:44-17:2:45 carried out maintenance at Brunei until 7:11; 

departed on 8th arriving Maizuru on 17th. While en route was 

assigned to 2nd Fleet, 5 Cru-Div on 15th. Docked at Maizuru on 

17th and repaired until 17:2:45. Captain Yusaka Okada took 

command on 1:l:45. 

l8t2-23t7t45 departed Maizuru on 18th, arrived Kure on 20th; 

engaged in training and maintenance in the Kure-Edauchi area. 

Attacked by US carrier planes on 18:3 while moored at Edauchi 

and slightly damaged by splinters from near misses. Classified as 

special guard ship (Tokushu Kibokan) on 6:7. 

24:7-4:8:45 about 100 carrier planes attacked Tone on 24th. The 

ship was o

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Aircraft 

handling equipment 

KEY TO DRAWINGS (SHOWING 

ALTERATIONS 1941-45) 

1. Single 25mm MGs on pedestal mountings 

added 

2. Tliple 25mm MGs added 

3. Twin 25mm MGs repositioned 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

72. 

13. 

14. 

ID. 

lo. 

t7. 

search 

radar added 

Hom aerial oftype22 radar added 

Yagi aerial of type 13 radar added 

Topmast stepped on bracket 

Drection finder moved from fore too 

Binocular sights added 

Main topmast altered 

Wind deflectors fitted upper bridge 

decks 

Aichi E13A1 (Navy type 0 reconnaissance 

seaplane Model 1) 

Boats removed 

Ready-use ammunition stowage 

Funnel bands removed during war 

Kawanishi E7K2 (Navy tlpe 94 reconnaissance 


Nakajma E8N1 (Navy type 95 reconnaissance 


Tone ftom the port quarter. Author's collection 

237

PRIDE OF POLAND 

The Orzel Class Submarines: 

Technical Specifications 

Przernyslaw Bud,zbon concludes his study of these oceangoing 

submarines 

ABovE: Tlre petty officers' quarters of Orzel.lookingforward 

on the spherical bulkhead at frame 118. On the right are 

doors to the senior petty officers' quarters; tables in the 

middle and three-level bunks on the left. Poksh Institute 

and. Sihorshi Museurn 

RrcHr: Bow en d of Orzel wit}l the forward battery of TTs. 

Above the tubes No I and No 4, the rails with sliding blocks 

for loading torpedoes are visible as well as the valve wheels 

of the pneumatic folding system of the forward diving 

planes. Polieh Institute and. Sikorshi Museum. 

Partial 

Hull 

double type of mixed riveted,zwelded joints, 

constructed from mild steel with a maximum tensile strength 

of 50kg,/mm2. Factor of safety against collapse at the 

designed maximum diving depth was 1.65 for shell plating 

and2.40 for the framing. 

Pnpssunp Hul,L 

Built from 14mm plates which between frame 38 and 118 

232

type (160 x 65 x 7.5 x 10.5mm) spaced 550mm apart. The 

forward and aft tapered parts of the pressure hull were 

stiffened internally with steel sections of the T-bar type, 

spaced 500mm apart. To facilitate repairs, removable plates 

were provided in the pressure hull above diesel engines, main 

electric motors,/generators and battery tanks. 

The hull was subdivided by four spherical bulkheads 

designed to a load of 8kg/cm2 and three flat bulkheads 

designed to a pressure of lkg/cm2. The double bottom was 

carried in the tapered parts of the hull only, while the 

cylindrical section was fitted with watertight floors, except 

the engine room and main electric motors,/generators 

compartment. 

A cylindrical conning tower of 2500mm diameter and 

10mm plating was mounted atop the pressure hull amidships 

with 2100mm diameter gun tower placed abaft. 

Fnpn rlooDrNc HULL 

Built fro:n 5-7mm plates with 14mm horizontal and llmm 

vertical keel. The watertight channel keelson was carried 

underneath to sewe as a drain tank and stowage room for pig 

iron. Both ends of the pressure hull were streamlined by a 

light hull structure with 1000mm deep ice belt at the bow. 

In the space between inner and outer hulls, six MBT and 

two regulating tanks were provided. Most of the main ballast 

tanks, hull casing and bridge superstructure were built from 

3mm plating with deck structures fitted with wooden 

gratings. 

Teak wood clad officers' quarters ofOrzeJ (view taken from 

the ward room looking aft on the spherical bulkhead at 

frame 85). On the right the entrance door to the first officer's 

quarters. I{oninklijke Moatschappij de *helde. 

View on the bulkhead at ftame 85 from another side than on 

the previous photograph - central station of Orzel. Onleft of 

the hatch Ore cruising periscope with hydraulic ram. On the 

right the hydraulic ram operating ballast valve as well ae the 

steering wheel with a gyr.o repeater and rudder indicators 

are visible. At the extreme right is the master gyrocompass. 

Koninklijkn Maatschappij de &h.elde. 

Deck fittings and equiprnent 

SrppnrNc cpAR 

Semi balanced rudder of 8.41m2 and a pair of diving planes 

totalling 2 x 7.8m2 were mounted aft, the latter in a single 

plane with the shaft axis. The forward pair of diving planes 

totalling 2x 4.2m2 could be folded horizontally into the hull 

casing. They were faired to clear mine cables and protected 

by guard rods when folded. 

ANCHOR AND TowING ARRANGEMENT 

T'he bow on anchor of the Hall type was carried in a recess en 

the port side with 100m of 30mm chain cable stowed in the 

locker placed between the bow torpedotubes. lfre anchorwas 

operated by a windlass powered by pneumatic motor situated 

in the forward torpedo compartment. A bow capstan 

was driven via the gearbox by the windlass motor, while a 

stern capstan was powered by a 5hp pneumatic motor. The 

capstans and three sets of double bollards could be lowered 

into the hull casing. 

Mesm AND RIGGING 

The 6.5m hydraulically raised mast for wireless aerials was 

.mounted in the port side of the conning tower. It allowed the 

use ofwireless at periscope depth. A pair ofcopperwire-ropes 

were fitted forward of the bridge superstructure and a single 

steel cable provided abaft to serve as mine buffers. They 

could also be used as reserve radio aerials. Two net cutters 

with blades of hardened stainless steel were secured to the 

stem. 

Lrrp sevluc EeuTPMENT 

The motor boat and small folding boat were stowed abaftthe 

gun tower and protected by an extension of the bridge casing 

which could be elevated for launching operations. The 200- 

litre petrol tank was placed nearby. 

TVo lifebuoys were fitted inside the bridge superstructure. 

The telephone buoy was sited in the hull casing aft and the 

salvage buoy with 120m flexible air hose was fitted forward. 

The air hose was connected by the check valves with a high 

pressure air main. 

Machinery 

Pnopur.sroN MACHTNERY 

There was a two-shaft powerplant with two supercharged 

diesel engines mounted in the engine room and connected by 

hydraulic K 138 type Vulkan couplings with two main 

233

Central station of Orzel, port side. On the extrerne left the 

master gJrrocompass; in the centre the diving planes 

operating wheels - left one for the forward, right one for 

the after planes. Between them is the rudder position 

indicator and above the diving planes indicatorc. Polish 

Institute and. Sikorski Museum 

electric motors/generators placed in a lower part of the next 

compartment. The main motor switchboards were mounted 

there above and connected with the main battery switchboard 

housed above the battery tanks in the after part ofthe 

officers' quarters. The two battery tanks were provided below 

the floor between frames 85 and 117. 

Six oil fuel tanks with a total net capacity of 75.2m3 held 

the normal fuel stowage while the main ballast tanks Nos 2 

and 3 could be used as reserve fuel tanks. 

Auxnnnv sYsrEMs 

The draining installation was served by three centrifugal 

bilge pumps with maximum capacity of 35m3 per hour at 

80m and two rotary bilge pumps of 7m3/h at 80m each. 

The trimming main provided an independent connection 

between both the trimming tanks and was operated by a 

rotary pump of 30m3,/h at 40m. 

The main ballast tanks were served byhydraulic Kingston 

valves, mechanically coupled to provide simultaneous 

operation and hydraulic main vents mounted in the top 

plates of each tank. At depths below 20m the main ballast 

tanks could be blown by a 225 atmospheres air system 

supplied by 40 high pressure vessels oftotal capacity of8000 

litres. The system could be filled by the Junkers type diesel 

powered compressor and the electric driven one, each with a 

capacity of 9 litres per minute at full pressure. The 225 

atmospheres installation operated both the fast diving tanks 

and supplied air for starting the diesels. TWo electric driven 

turbo-blowers with a capacity of 60ma per minute each were 

provided to blow the main ballasttanks when the ship was in 

the awash position. 

The 12 atmosphere air system was provided for operating 

the other tanks and for general ship service. The ver*ilating 

installation was servd by four fans with intakes off the 

diesels coupled to the ventilation suction mainfold to assist 

the process. The 800-litre oxygen supply installation was 

carried with 44 potash regenerators to absorb carbon-dioxide 

for 72 hours. 

Fresh water was supplied by a 6m3 tank and two waste 

heat evaporators run by diesel exhaust gases and capable of 

50 litres per hour each when the vessel was travelling at a 

speed of about 13 Lnots. 

Conning tower of Orzel, etarboard side. On the foreground on 

the right the steering wheel with two voice pipes and airpurifying 

container behind. Above right is the rudder position 

indicator and electric heater; on the extreme right the attack 

periscope, Poliah Institute and. Sikoraki Museurn 

Armament 

GuNs 

The Bofors 105mm,241 model 1925 gun was mounted on a 

light rotating platform secured to a ring directly welded to 

the pressure hull. The gun was housed in a light streamlined 

structure to reduce resistance when the ship was submerged 

and to protect the crew against waves and splinters. The 

casing could rotate with the platform when the gun was 

trained and was fitted with sighting port. The ready-use 

ammunition was stowed in 20 watertight bins mounted in 

the bridge superstructure while 105 rounds were carried in 

the magazine, which was fitted with a hoist. 

The 40mm,243 Model 1937 Bofors twin automatic gun with 

folding base was housed in the gun tower. The mounting 

could be quickly raised to afiring position by a hydraulic ram 

and secured above the bridge. A total of 1200 rounds was 

canied in ready-use boxes and in the magazine. 

TWo forks were fitted on the bridge for attaching 

machine guns. 

Tonpnoo rUBES 

A total of 12 torpedo tubes was carried. Four bow and four 

stern 550mm tubes with reducers for 21in twin central pivot 

mountings were sited on the pressure hull forward and aft of 

the conning tower. They were trained hydraulically and 

AA 

234

21in Mk x the bow, French 550mm 24Y type aft. Both the 

fixed groups oftorpedo tubes could befired atmaximum of15 

knots while the central pivot mountings at a maximum of 5 

knots when submerged and trained athwartship. 

CoNrnor, AND coMMUNrcATroN 

Three sets of the Barr and Stroud type periscopes of 6in 

diameter and 8000mm optical length were fitted: 

- Cruising periscope in the central station, with the 

tilting top lens which could be raised up to 70o for sky 

obsewation, angular field 40o. 

- Attack periscope in the conning tower, with range 

estimator, direct reading scale coupled to the 

Anschiitz type giro-compass, angular field 40'. 

- Night periscope in the conning tower, angular fields 

40o and 10o. 

The Sall Selsyn bottom log was fitted and echo-sounding 

equipment comprised: 

- Submarine sigrralling installation with three transmitters 

mounted on each side of the hull. 

- Submarine listening installation with direction finder 

of a multiplot type with nine receivers mounted on 

Auxiliary central etation of Orzel, etarboard side looking 

forward. On the extreme left is the door to the central 

station; then the night periscope and hydraulic ram. On 

1!" lqtt_t in the foreground is the ventilating station. 

Koninhlijhe Maatsclwppii de Schel.de 

The four reserve bunks were provided in the wardroom, Four 

senior pett5r officers were berthed in two double quarters, the 

remaining officers in the general quarters in the petty 

officers' mess. Eighteen men were housed in each of the 

torpedo compartments. 

The following specialists comprised the complement of 54 

non-commissioned men: four sigaalmen, four gunners, seven 

torpedo-miners, ten electricians, 20 mechanicians, four radio 

operators, three stewards, one cook and one stretcher.beaier. 

The food stores provided capacity suffrcient for 12 weeks. 

Table 1 BurLDn{cDATA 

Auxiliary central station of Orzel looking aft at the bulkhead 

at frame 66. The hatchno the engine room is in the 

@ntre, and on the right the door to the galley. On the left 

are the turboblowers and the ventilation operating etation. 

I{oninkliike Maatechappij ile Schelde 

PL+ Name Builder Yard No 

O OF"ZEL K M de Schelde, Vlissingen 205 

S SEP RDM, Rotterdam 196 

Commis- 

Lai.d down Launched Sea trials Deliuered sbned 

14:8:1935 15:1:38 23:8:39 2:2:39 10:2:39 

15:7:1936 17:10:38 23:l:39 16:4:39 ,2:4:39. 

+Pendant Letter, planned but did not actually carry 

following cessation of the scheme in November 1937. 

each side of the bow; 

- Bottom Atlas type echo-sounder with two transmitters. 

- ICAM ultrasonar type ultrasonic detection and 

signalling system. 

The AVIA type wireless and radio D,zF of Polish 

manufacture was fitted. The internal communication was 

provided by a telephone, doubled by voice pipes from the 

bridge and conning tower to 105mm gun position and the 

central station. 

T\vo portable signal lamps could be mounted on both sides 

of the open bridge. 

Cnow 

The complement comprised six officers, 18 petty officers and 

36 seamen. The commander and first offrcer were berthed in 

private quarters, the other officers in two double quarters. 

Table 2 Meru DrunNsrous 

Displacement: 992.5 tons (standard), 1110.3ms 

(moulded), 1473.5m3 (moulded) 

Length: 

83:0m (wl), 84.0m (oa) 

Bearn: 

6.57m (wl), 6.7m (moulded) 

Depth: 

6.35m (moulded) 

Draught: 

4.17m (moulded) 

Reserue bznyancy: 32.7Vo 

Diuing depth: 80m (operational) 

Metarentric height: 0.6m/0.225m 

Ballasttankstotal: 437.1m9 

235

Table 3 PnopursronMacHrupny 

Cnanecrpn 

Arrangement: 

No of shaftsl 

propellers/ d.ia: 

MAIN ENGINES 

No/type: 

Model: 

Manufacturer/ 

prod.uction nos: 

No/dia of cylinders: 

Piston stroke: 

MC&/short time time 

rating: 

Oil fuel type/caloric 

ualue: 

OiI fuel consutnption: 

Lubricating oil 

consumption: 

Motors MCR: 

Motors short time 

rating: 

Generators MCB: 

Direct diesel 

2/2/7880mm 

2/ diesel, 2-stroke reversible 

Sulzer 6QD42 

Orzel - Sulzer, Winterthur / 480, 481 

Sep - RDM, Rottntdam/2L\,216 

6/420mm 

50Omm 

2370bhp at 455rpm/2500bhp at 

465rpm 

Gasoil,z10.15 kCal/kG 

175 g/bhp/h at mcr 

3 g/bhp/h atmcr 

MAIN ELECTRIC MOTORS/GENERATORS 

No/Type: 

2/DC, compound wound, double 

armature 

Manufacturer: Orzel - Brown-Boveri, Switzerland 

Sep - Rohn-Zielinski, Poland 

520hp at 260rpm, 180V 

550hp at 265rpm, 170V 

14004 at 360rpm, 240V 

PERFORMANCE 

Contracted speed.: 2Okts/gkts 

Trial results of Orzel: l9.42kts on N:ll:38/9.03kts on 

18:11:38 

Radius Surfaced. 

norrnal/max: 3850nm at 10kts,z7000nm at 10kts 

Raditn submerged: 100nm at Skts 

PROPELT,ANTS 

OiI fuel normal/max: 67.5/123.5 tons 

Lubricating oil: 11.9 tons 

Battery 

Model/ manufacturer: PM 25/Ttdor, Poland 

No of cells/ 

ditnensions/weight: %100/I127x500x396mm/0.63 tons' 

Nominal capacity per 

cell: 

7.4kwh at 1.1hl17.1kWh at 25h 

Table 5 WprcHrs DrsrnBUTroN 

Weight group 

Hull: 

Diesel engines and 

equipment: 

Main elecfuic motors/ 

generators, etc: 

Batteries: 

Electric cables, 

heating: 

Steering gear: 

Anchor,/towing equipment: 

Weapon systems: 

Pipelines and pumps: 

hessure air systems: 

Oil fuel, lubr. oil and 

pipelines: 

Ventilation: 

Special equipment: 

Inventory: 

Provisions, fresh water, 

Painting, concrete, etc: 

Pig iron: 

Other: 

Weight margin: 

design 

441,100kg 

85,800kg 

24,400ke 

130,000kg 

17,50Oke 

13,300kg 

6,700ke 

93,150kg 

24,400k9 

26,900kg 

77,200kg 

5,200kg 

24,100ke 

3,500kg 

17,600kg 

15,500k9 

53,500ke 

18,90Oks 

r5,2.50ke 

TOTAL: 1,094,000kg 

as built 

458,698kg 

99,634ke 

28,029ke 

r28,829ke 

30,294ke 

11,679ke 

6,413kg 

99,672kg 

24,747ks 

27,365kg 

77,556ke 

6,972kg 

27,7rTke, 

8,005kg 

23,500kg 

t7,444k9 

57,6r2ks 

2r,582ks 

L,155,766k9 

For calculating the standard displacement as built, the 

following weights had to be subtracted: 

- Lubricating oil 11,900kg 

- Oil fuel 67,500ke 

- Fresh water 6,000ke 

TOTAL: 

85,400kg 

Standard displacemeni: 1,155,766kg - 85,400kg = 

1,070,366kg - 1,070,366kg : 

t0l6kg/t =1053.3 tons 

Table 4 575LC DosrcN; CnanacrnRrsrrcs 

Type: 

Double hull 

Displacement: 1181.3m3,21763.5m3'(moulded) 

Dimensions: 84.63 (wl), 86.87 (oa) x 5.9& (wl), 8.00 

(max) x 5'18m (moulded) 

Machinery: 

2 shaft, 2 diesel engines/2 Brown- 

Boveri EM/G, 5400bhp/1260hp = 

20kts/gkts 

Radius: 

3850nm at 9kts,/100nm at 5kts 

Diuing d,epth: 80m (operational) 

Armament: 4-40mm/43 (2x2), 12-550mm TT 

(4 bow, 4 stern, 2x2),20 torpedoes 

ToPRTGHT: Engine room of Orzellooking aft. In the 

foreground are the diesel compressors. Note three rows of 

nickel steel bolts fixing portable plate. Polish Institute and. 

Sihorshi Mtneum 

RrcHT: Engine room of Orzel looking aft. On both sides in 

the foreground are the diesel engines with large diameter 

exhaust pipes. In the centre is the pillar supporting after 

central pivot TT mounting with control apparatus on. 

Polish Institute and Sihorski Mu.seum 

236

Top: Main electric motors/generators compartment of Orzel 

looking forward to the door of the engine room. On both 

sides are the main motors' switchboards. Koninhlijke 

Maa.techappij d.e Schelde 

Anow: After e nd of Orzelwith after battery of TTs. 

Konh*liihe Maa.teclnppij d.e *held.e, 

238

Bofors 40mm/43M37 

-B".olab-*q\st- 

Soviet loomm/56834 

Bofors 1o5mn/4lUl25 

239

,0 ,5 ,10 meters ,ZO 

C 1985, Przemystow Budzbon 

1q 

,ZS 

t7 IE t9 

i 

I 

IHffi 

a-t 

i 

I 

I 

I 

ii 

2l 

20- 

ti 

28.4. 

4 t I 

/plt I 

t t l 

2 4 l l t t I 

f IiI l 

lllw, 

I I e l10l-11 

Table 7 MTB DsstcN - CHARACTERISTICS ( seewarship 42) 

Displacement: 

8 tons 

Dimensions: 10.0 (oa) x 2.8 x 1.8m 

Machinery: 

2-shaft,2 petrol engines, gOObhp = 40kts. Radius 80nm 

Annament: 

1-18in torpedo 

Com,plemcnt: 2 

240

li-[ I 

- 

NT 

t40/14243 

) ) ) 

i- 

I 

I 

g 

I]\ 

i.\ 

I 

45 

l 

I 

46 

l-- 

I 

47 

t- 

I 

llr 

48 

I 

49 

t- 

Il 

I 

rl 

5t 52 

l l 

rl 

54 55 56 

J/ 

T_ 

i 

58 59 

t- 

i 

6l 

i- 

l 

I 

I 

I 

I 

r 

Table 8 

Az FlyrNc BoAT - CHARACTERISTTCS (seewarship 42) 

Type: high wing monoplane, wooden Machinery: 3-blade pusher propeller, 1 petrol 

construction engine D H Gipsy Major, 130bhp = 

Weight: 630kg base, 950kg full load 100 kts. Radius B50nm 

Dimensinns: 12.6 x 7.7 x 3,1m Complement: 2 

241

GpNnnal ARRANGEMENT - Knys 

I Compartments Key 

A Aft torpedo compartment 

B Main electric motors/generators compartments 

C Engine room 

D Auxiliary central station 

E Central station 

F Officers'quarters 

G Petty officers' quarters 

H Forward torpedo compartment 

J Gun tower 

K Conning tower 

L Bridge 

2 TanksKey 

No Specification 

I Aft bilge tank 

2 Aft trinming tank 

3 Aft torpedo cornpensating tank 

4 Oil fuel tank No I 

5 Oil fuel tank No 2 


TMBTNoI 

8 Lubricating oil drain tank 

9 Lubricating oil tank No 2 

1O Lubricating oil tank No I 

11 MBT No II 

12 MET No III 

13 Regulating tanks 

14 FYesh water tank 

15 Distilled fresh water tank 

16 Midship quick diving tank 

17 MBT No IV 

18 Oil tuel tank No 6 


2O MBT No V 

2l Oil fuel tank No 4 


23 MBT No VI 

24 Cofferdam 

25 Forward torpedo compensatingtank 

26 Forward trimmingtank 

27 Foiwardbilgetank 

28 Forward quick divingtank 

3 General Key 

Volum.e (artic 

neterq) 

1.10 

10.70 

7.lo 

34.60 

6.80 

4,ffi 

63.60 

2.90 

5.10 

5.20 

66.60 

63.40 

24.N 

4.85 

1.15 

10.00 

62.40 

7.60 

6.10 

54.50 

7.70 

7.80 

50.00 

7.70 

13.20 

1.50 

3.60 

Thial pressure 

(KG/sqcm) 

2.O 

8.5 

3.O 

2.O 

8.5 

2,O 

2.O 

8.5 

2.O 

8.5 

2.O 

2.O 

8.5 

2.O 

2.O 

8.5 

2,O 

2.O 

8.5 

2.O 

8.5 

2.O 

2.O 

36 Cruising periscope 

37 Magtretic compass, gtrrrorepeater, steering wheel, engine 

telegraphs 

38 MBT No fV main vent 

39 Battery Tanks exhsust 

4O Torpedo predictors with chart table below 

41 l05mmgun 

42 Rotational gun casing 

43 MBT No V main vent 

44 Escape trunk 

45 Fan 

46 2lrlr twin torpedo tubes mounting 

47 2lin torpedo tubes control position 

48 Forward copper bunping wires 

49 MBT No VI rnain vent 

50 Torpedo loading derrick 

51 Forward torpedo loading hatch 

52 Fan 

53 Lifesaving buoy 

54 Forward eEcape trunk 

55 Bow divingplanes gear 

56 Bow diving planes 

57 Forward capstan 

58 Windlass 

59 Anchor port side 

60 Forward towing hook 

61 Net cutters 

62 Rudder 

6il Rudder guard 

64 Steering gear 

65 Shaft 

66 Four spare torpedoes 

67 Shaft coupling 

68 Thrust bearing 

69 Main electric motor/generator 

7O Air pipe 

71 Oil filters and oil cooler 

72 Arnmunition magazine 

73 Ballast operating valves panel 

74 Cold stores 

75 After battery tank 

76 Forward battery tank 

77 Nlagazine 

78 Four spare torpedoes 

79 Chain locker and hawse pipe 

8O Forward 55omm torpedo tubes 

8l ForVard 

82 Stern diving planes 

83 Propeller guards 

84 Lockers 

86 Tables 

86 Main bilge pump 

87 Tlimming pump 

88 Galley 

89 Wireless 

90 Mast well 

91 Cruising periscope well 

92 Steering wheel 

93 Main battery switchboard 

94 Captain's quarters 

95 Captain's table 

96 Two officers' quarters 

97 Battery switchboard 

98 Tables 

99 Lockers 

100 Lockers 

1O1 Tables 

l. Aft torpedo tubes doors 

2. Aft 550mm torpedo tubes 

3 Sternlight 

4 Aft towing hook 

5 Telephone buoy 

6 Aft escape trunk 

7 Silencer 

8 Aft capstan 

9 Aft torpedo loading hatch 

1O Torpedo loading derrick 

11 MBT No I main vent 

12 Main electric motors/generators switchboard 

13 Portable plate 

14 zlrn twin torpedo tubes mounting 

l5 Hydraulic coupling 

16 21in torpedo tubes control position 

1O2 Propellers 

17 Muffler valve 

1O3 Auxiliary 

18 Diesel engine 

19 Aft steel bumping wire with radio aerial 

104 Fan 

105 Main bilge pump 

2O Boat housing casing 

21 MBT No II main vent 

106 Turboblowers 

1O7 Ventilating 

22 Diesel compressor 

23 Portableplate 

24 Boat 

25 MBT No II main vent 

26 Wireless aerial tube 

27 Galley stack 

28 4ornm AA twin mounting 

29 Gun hatch hydraulic cover 

3O Access hatch 

31 DF antennae 

32 Mast with main wireless aerials spreaded 

33 Attack periscope 

34 Access hatch 

35 Machine gun fork ' 121 Bilge pump 

3.O 

8.5 

2.O 

8.5 

torpedo tubes doors 

bilge pump 

stations 

1O8 Night periscope 

1O9 Ballast operating manifolds 

110 Stexn diving planes operating wheel 

111 Bow diving planes operating wheel 

112 Master gJrrocompass 

113 Pantry 

114 First officer's qumters 

115 Officer's mess 

116 Two officers' quarters 

117 Ventilating station 

118 Locker 

119 Two senior petty officer's quarters 

120 Two senior petty officer's quarters 

, A.)

{ 

,{ 

Bridgewater after the explosion of a 500-pound bomb. 

Author's collection 

he first trials, in May 1946, were to test the effectiveness 

of 20mm cannon fire against surfaced midget 

submarines. Two X-class boats were used in trials in 

Aberlady Bay to the south of the Firth of Forth. They were 

moored in shallow water so that they would dry out at low 

tide. 

Cannon Fire 

The first trial was on 2 May when one craft was attacked 

by two Seafires using SAP I ammunition. The first aircraft 

attacked in a shallow dive and scored no hits. The second 

came in from 2000 feet in a 25-degree dive. One cannon was 

defective and the other only fired 69 rounds before it too 

jammed. Two hits were scored both making 1/n-inch holes in 

the pressure hull. The second X craft was then attacked by a 

Mosquito which came in at a steep angle and fired 290 rounds 

of SAP I. Four shells penetrated the pressure hull and there 

were several more hits on the casing. During the second trial, 

on 7 May, both aircraft fired HE I ammunition. A Seafire 

attacked the first submarine scoring 22 lnits of which 17 

penetrated the pressure hull. A Mosquito attacked the second 

craft in a shallow dive, opening fire at about 800 yards and 

breaking off at 100 yards. Eighteen hits penetrated the 

pressure hull and 15 more hit the casing. It was concluded 

that a surfaced X craft was a difficult target but one which 

could be hit by aircraft cannon fire and which would receive 

lethal damage. HE ammunition was thought to be slightly 

the more effective round against such targets. 

Bombs 

Despite the number of ships hit by bombs during the war 

there was a lack of knowledge both of the effect of bombs on 

the ship and on the functioning of the bomb. In many 

wartime incidents it was not possible to locate the point at 

which the bomb detonated and frequently the size of the 

bomb was not known. For future designs of both ships and 

243

Westan after thd explosion of a 5oo-pound bomb in the 

engine room. Author'a collection 

bombs more basic knowledge was requfued. The first series of 

trials involved detonating 500- or 1000-pound bombs fixed to 

sloops and corvettes. The first tests were held in Angle Bay, 

Milford Haven, starting with the sloop Bridgewater on lL 

March 1947. A 500-pound Mk XIV was exploded in the gland 

space. Folhstone, another sloop, was moored alongside to 

starboard and the cowette Balsam to port to limit the extent 

to which debris was thrown. In fact, the debris waslimitedto 

bits of the wooden deck flying about 100 yards and the steel 

deck about 30 yards. The bomb made a hole in the starboard 

side about 36 x 20 feet and another in the port side about 20 x 

20 feet, The forecastle deck was wrecked overa length of30 

feet while the upper and lower decks were destroyed for 50 

feet. The after end ofthe ship was only loosely attached to the 

forward part with 10 degrees difference in heel between the 

ends. Both propeller shafts were severed and had the ship 

been at sea the after end would have fallen offthough the 

forward part could have floated. In action, therewouldhave 

been about 10 casualties. 

Three days later a similar test was conducted,inFolkstone. 

A 500-pound Mk XIV was arranged in the forward boiler 

room with its nose 7 feet below the deck and 6 feet 6 inches 

abaft the forward bulkhead. The wing oil fuel tanks were 

filled with seawater and no screening ship was thought 

necessary on the starboard side though the'wreck of 

Bri.d,gewater was moored to port. When the bomb went off 

there was a puff of black smoke, followed by an orange flash 

and then a cloud of grey smoke. There was very little debris. 

A hole 20 x 70 feet was blown in the side between the upper 

and lower decks and both boiler room bulkheads and the 

decks over were destroyed. The funnel collapsed. In action, 

the ship would have been immobilised due to lack of steam, 

and about 30 casualties would have been suffered. 

The third test in Angle Bay was on 23 April against the 

sloop Weston (Fig.z) Another 500-pound Mk XIV was 

exploded in the engine room. All the serious damage was 

above the waterline though the ship slowly settled due to 

minor leaks. The main machinery, including the after boiler 

room, was out of action but the ship would have been able to 

float. About 25 casualties would have been expected. 

Then on 26 April the fourth and last of the Angle Bay series 

was carried out with a 500-pound bomb in the forward mess 

deck of the cowette La Malauine. The sides and decks were 

destroyed forward of the gun but the ship could have got 

home in good weather. The gun was out of action and some 

20 casualties would have occurred at action stations. 

Another series of bomb explosions was held on theT\ubot 

bank near Pembroke Dock. Balsam was the first target and a 

500-pound Mk VII was attached to the mast, 40 feet above the 

deck, and exploded on 25 March 1947. The damage was 

mainly confined to the wooden compass platform though 

splinters travelled 80 feet and two penetrated the 20-pound 

protective plate of the compass platform. There would have 

been about 15 casualties and the W,zT gear would have been 

out of action but the ship would not have been in any danger. 

La Malouine was also used on Turbot Bank, prior to the 

Angle Bay trial. A 1000-pound MC Mk III bomb was 

attached to the mast and detonated on 31 March 1947. 

Damage was minor but the bridge and Oerlikon crews would 

have been lost. 

Balsam was used again for trials on the North Middle 

Ground, in the Bristol Channel, on 15 April. A 500-pound Mk 

VII bomb exploded just above the forecastle deck, 

immediately forward of the bridge. The bridge was badly 

damaged and all exposed personnel would have been lost but 

the ship could have proceeded under her own power. 

The last of these trials was also held on North Middle 

Ground. A 1000-pound Mk III was exploded just above the 

forecastle deck of the corvette Campbn. The whole bridge 

was blown overboard and many splinters would have 

penetrated the forecastle deck. Casualties would have been 

very heavy but the ship would have remained seaworthy. 

A much more elaborate series of trials was carried out at 

Spithead in May 1947 against the cruiser Hawkins. "Ihese 

trials were intended to study the performance of 500- and 

1000-pound medium case bombs. There were to be three 

phases but phase 3 was abandoned since the ship was 

244

functioning of the fuse. 

Phase II: Bombs were dropped with inert filling but with a 

small burster to determine where detonation occurred. 

Phase III: Bombs would have been exploded in selected 

places. 

The trawler Gorreganwasthe original control ship buther 

communications fit was inadequate and Cygnet replaced 

her. The orig:inal intention was to attack on Monday and 

T\resday of each week and tepait Hawkins before the next 

attacks. This was found too time consuming and attacks 

were continued until repair was essential. Bombing was 

from Lincolns flying at 18,000 feet and, altogether, 616 

bombs were dropped over 27 days with 29 hits. Draught 

marks were painted on the side forward, amidships and at 

the stern with big lines every three feet so that observers 

could see if she was sinking. 

In the first series of trials seven hits were scored with 500- 

pound Mk VIIs and Mk XIVs and of these five broke up. Of 

the next series of 15 hits nine functioned (two more partially 

detonated). The 1000-pound Mk III bomb was used in the last 

sequence and five of the seven bombs which hit were able to 

detonate. The trials party learnt a good deal about damage 

control and there were many reports on the need for better 

and smaller portable salvage pumps, better torches, and on 

the problem offinding doors in a dark ship. 

Nelson Bombing Trials 

The longest and most spectacular trials by Sub Committee 

2 were carried out against the battleship Nelson. This series 

of trials was intended to test the effectiveness of the 1000- 

pound medium case and 2000-pound Mk IV armourpiercing 

bombs against armoured targets. More specifically, the 

trials were intended to investigate the conditions under 

Hauskins as prepared for trials. Author's collection 

of the 2000-pound armour piercing bomb carried out at Shoeburyness. 

The trials were canied out on 4 June and 23 

September 1948 in the Firth of Forth. The aircraft were 

Barracuda III from an experienced squadron diving at 55 

degrees to the horizontal at 280 knots. Bombs were inert 

filled. 

The naval trials party under Cdr Peter Dickens was 

housed on the island of Inchkeith using the old coastal 

defence battery. Batteries of cameras were mounted on the 

old fire control base to measure the trajectory ofthe bombs by 

using timed exposures against a superimposed grid. Another 

set of cameras on the mainland was at right angles to the 

first so that the bombs'paths could be obtained in three 

dirnensions. 

In plan I, the first 1000-pound bombs were released from 

about 3000 feet to give the pilots some practice and one hit 

was scored with a striking velocity of about 600 feet per 

second, hitting at 25 degrees to the vertical. The release 

height was then increased to between 4000 and 5000 feet and 

three more hits were scored. Impact velocity was about 700 

feet per second and the first two bombs broke up on hitting 

thick armour. The third bomb hit the superstructure and 

passed through six decks before hitting annour and its 

velocity was so reduced that the bomb remained intact. 

The release height was then increased to 8000 feet for 

phase III and one hit was scored. The 2000-pound bomb 

pierced 33lin deck armour at an angle and hit the back of the 

side armour which caused it to break up. For phase IV, 

bombs with a small explosive charge were used with a 0.074- 

secrind delay. With a release height of 8000 feet, the first 39 

bombs missed and it was decided to reduce to 6000 feet. The 

first bomb hit B barbette and exploded on impact causing 

extensive damage. It was decided that the charge used was 

too large and this phase was discontinued. 

Phase III was then extended with a release height of5500 

feet with the intention that the bomb should remain in the 

245

,Albuera showing the supporting arrangements. The failure 

can be seen between the two main girdere. Author's 

colleetion 

ship after penetrating 6/4in armour. Two hits were scored; 

the first hit the bridge and after piercing nine decks hit 33/nin 

arnour and though the armour was severely distorted, the 

bomb did not.penetrate. The second hit went through 4/ain 

deck plating and out through the bottom. Perhaps the most 

interesting point which 6ame out from the trial was the inaccuracy 

of the bombing. Altogether 104 bombs were re- 

Ieased for 12 hits against a stationary and undefended 

target. The pilots were given the local wind strength and 

direction from a nearby weather station and were able to get 

their eye in using small smoke bombs on practice runs before 

each of the real bomb releases. On the other hand, the 

damage from the inert filled bombs was extensive and had 

live bombs been used, the ship would have been out of action 

very quickly and would probably have sunk. 

Though the 1000 MC bombs were likely to break up against 

heavy armour when dropped from over 3000 feet, their 

explosion would have wrecked fire control gear and communications 

in the superstructure. One can still wonder 

if dive bombers would have reached 3000 feet'over a 

manoeuwing and protected battleship in 1945. 

The 2000-pound AP bomb was a very effective weapon 

against armoured ships and far superior to earlier bombs. 

The nose was a thick forging of very special steel which 

would pierce thick armour and then continue outthrough the 

bottom to cause flooding. The sides ofthe bomb, round the 

charge, were of a tough steel which would not break up on 

oblique impact. When the charge detonated, heavy splinters 

from the thick sides of the bomb would be thrown out, 

rupturing bulkheads and allowing flooding and destroying 

all equipment over a wide radius. To function properly, the 

fuse should activate half way between the armoured deck 

and the ship's bottom. Since the striking velocity on the 

armoured deck and the ship's bottom. would be affected by 

lesser impacts on structure above the armour, the fuse setting 

was almost impossible to judge and this was the 

weapon's only weakness. T'he penetration of arrnour was 

consistent with the earlier tests and when the bomb did not 

penetrate, it rebounded in a fit condition to explode. 

The details of the armour arrangements in Nelson were 

considered satisfactory. The individual plates of the deck 

annour were as large as possible, supported along the edges. 

The joints were inevitably weak spots and the thicker plates 

were fitted with tongue and gtoove joints. The thinner 

armour plates (ess than 4in) were rabbetted. The 2000-pound 

AP IVIk IV bomb was designed about 20 years later than the 

Nelson and there can be little surprise that her arrnour was 

easily penetrated. 

Structural Strength 

There were two series oftrials, very different in character. 

In the first, five submarines were lowered until they collapsed 

under the pressure of water. In the second, a destroyer 

was loaded to simulate an extreme - impossible - 

loading which might occur in a sea-way with a wave crest 

amidship and the ends unsupported. 

Submarine Trials 

The first trial used a midget of the XT 1-4 class. She was 

lowered from Barfoot on 26 November 1946 until she 

collapsed. There were 49 strain gauges fitted to the boat and 

five deflection gauges in the control room. Readings from 

these gauges at different depths were read in Barfoot and 

later compared with calculations. It was also possible to 

246

extreme depth. Finally the boat collapsed in the battery 

compaftment. 

Three trials were then carried out as follows: 

Ship 

Varne 

Stoic 

Supreme 

Type of construction 

Partially welded 

Riveted shell. welded frames 

All welded 

The two S class both collapsed at the torpedo loading hatch 

at a depth close to that predicted for failure of the main hull. 

Very large deflections were measured before collapse. 

The final trial in this series used the hull bf the uncompleted 

A class submarine Achates. She was of all welded 

construction with S quality plates nearly an inch thick. Just 

before Whitsun 1950, Achates was lowered to a fairly shallow 

depth to check the instrument-ation and a few minor leaks 

were found and repaired on the Saturday. On the Sunday she 

was afloat but held by slings across the bows of the lifting 

craft when a heavy swell began to build up. The submarine 

began to bump against the lifting craft and some damage to 

Table I Pnesn rr PENETRATToN oF 2000-PouND 

Anuoun PrpncrNc Borus 

Height Thickness of Result 

ft (approx) armour (ins) 

2000 3"/n Armour holed, bomb 

rebounded 

1700 6fn Bomb deflected, gouged 

armour but did not penetrate 

4000 6% Armour holed, bomb 

rebounded 

5000 6fn Armour penetrated, bomb 

went out through bottom of 

ship 

the pressure hull was caused. The chief salvage officer, 

Captain 

'Tiny' Fell RN was on holiday but sensed that 

something was wrong even before the wind got up and 

dashed back, arriving on the scene in a fast motor boat. He 

summoned tugs and the complete trials rig was soon in 

sheltered water. 

The damaged area was heavily stiffened to ensure that 

failure, when it occurred, was remote from this anomalous 

section. Deflection gauges were also fitted to this area to 

check that it was not the final source ofweakness. Extensive 

instrumentation was fitted, based on that used intheVame 

trial. T!im, heel and pressure gauges were fitted together 

with some 32 gauges to measure strains and deflections at 

critical areas such as the torpedo loading hatch, the forward 

dome bulkhead and the damaged area. 

The trials were carried out in Gibraltar Bay. Achates was 

first lowered to 100 feet to check that the instrumentation 

was satisfactory. She was then lowered to 600 feet, the 

gauges being read at 100 feet intervals both on the way down 

and on the way up. Ttre graphs showed linear results with 

depth and both the instrumentation and the lifting 

arrangements worked well. On 19 June 1950, Achates was 

lowered to 600 feet. Depth was then increased in steps of50 

feet with readings taken at each level. As the estimated collapse 

depth was approached the interval between readings 

was reduced to 25 feet. At the final depth, the readings 

became non linear and deflections increased continuously 

until after five minutes at that depth she collapsed. The 

remains were brought up until nearly awash and examined 

down. In this condition it was not possible t o dock Achates or 

even to beach her. Collapse was initiated by failure of the 

plating between frames. Water then rushed in at very high 

speed to fill the interior space and the trapped air bubble 

would have oscillated violently, tearing the submarine 

apart. One piece of the internal T-bar frame was pulled out of 

the boat and found wrapped round the instrumentation 

cab]e. 

The results of these submarine trials were very comforting 

to the designers since the science of pressure hull collapse 

under extemal load was not as well understood then as it is 

now. That five submarines of different design and 

construction had all collapsed at depths close to but a little 

greater than those calculated was very reassuring. Since 

then great strides have been made in the design of submarine 

structure, mainly by Kendrick at NCRE (now part of ARE) 

and these calculations have been confirmed by large-scale 

tests. 

* * * 

Strength calculations for surface ships in 1950 envisaged 

the ship on a wave of length equal to that of the ship either 

with the crest amidships and the ends relatively 

unsupported or with crests at either end and the trough amidships. 

Though considerably refined, this idealised loading is 

still part of today's strength calculation. Some configuration 

of the basic assumption had been obtained by Professor Biles 

in 1903 when the destroyer Wolf was loaded in dock at 

Portsmouth and the strains measured. These were later compared 

with measurements of strains while in a rough sea. 

Ttre uncompleted, Battle class destroyer Albuera was 

allocated in 1950 for a more severe trial since she could be 

tested to destruction. In the first sequence she was loaded 

with water ballast while afloat and strains were measured 

around the break offorecastle, always a critical area in the 

traditional destroyer. She was then taken into dock and 

connected to support towers 70 feet apart, either side of 

amidships. The water in the dock was gradually pumped out 

until the unsupported ends imposed a load which the 

structure could not accept. Final failure was initiated by 

shear buckling in the side plating. 

Reports on the extensive work carried out by the other sub 

committees has not come to light. It is known that there was 

a lengthy series of trials with 6in, 4.5in and 4in shells against 

corvettes, LCTs and E boats. Coastal force guns, 20mm, 

60mm, 6-pounder and 4.5in were tried against targets 

representing E and R boats, flak lighters and easternjunks. 

Only the 4.5in was effective. 

Tlials on the stowage ofrockets and other weapons were 

conducted in Loch Striven using the old carrier Furious. 

Almost certainly there were other trials such as that against 

an unknown MMS shown on page 248 and the assistance of 

readers is sought in filling the gaps. 

Lessons Learnt 

T'he lessons were well learnt and speedily incorporated in 

the design of structure of the Leopard and. Whitby classes, 

notably by E W Gardner RCNC who had been trials officer 

for many of the tests. Full-scale trials of weapons against 

ships remain an essential part of the development of new 

ships and there have been many such trials since 1950. Some, 

Tike Undaunted (see Warship 22) and Deuonshire (see 

Warship 33), have been reported while others have not been 

discussed. Among these are postwar frigates incorporating 

the lessons of the original ship target trials and these trials 

have confirmed the value of the lessons from the earlier 

trials. One ship of each new class is exposed to big 

247

An unrecorded tiial against an MMS. Autltor's collection 

underwater explosions at a distance which will not rupture 

the hull or injure the crew but impose a nasty jolt on 

equipments. These, too, show thatthe \947-50 trials taught 

many useful lessons. 

Overall structural design has advanced and control of 

details has improved. Modern steels are better able to resist 

explosive loads at low temperature as well as in warmer 

waters. Equipment is more robust and better mounted. 

My thanks are due to the Chief Superintendent and his 

staff at ARE Dunfermline (formerly NCRE), to Mr J. C. 

Lawrence, Lt Cdr J Maber and to Lt Cdr MR Wilson (Naval 

Historical Branch), for assistance in preparation of this 

article. 

Postscript 

Ttris series of articles has covered the trials of weapons 

against RN ships from 1830 to 1950, with afewgaps. Sofar, 

the period 1860 to 1880 has not been dealt with and, one day, 

work in that era will be discussed. One day, too, details of 

trials since 1950 will become available and a postscript to the 

series may be written. 

There can, however, be no end to the struggle between 

attack and defence, atleast as far as conventional weapons 

are concerned. Weapon desiglers as well as ship designers 

are highly skilled and imaginative and a temporary success 

by one team will soon be matched by a development fromthe 

other. 

248

Hood Guns 

Brian Head recently visited 

Ascension Island, and sends 

these photographs of the 

guns still in place in the 

island. The two 5.5in guns 

were landed there in March 

1941, and mounted on Cross 

Hill, 300 feet up overlooking 

Georgetown. They were in 

action on 9 December 1941 

when U124 was sighted on 

the surface on her way back 

to Germany after a patrol in 

the South Atlantic, during 

which she sank the cruiser 

Duned.in. Kapitan-kutnant 

Mohr submerged after the 

guns opened up at 11,000 

yards. lhe guns are 

apparently some of those 

removed from Hood. and the 

small dents in the face plate 

would appear to be from 

small calibre ammunition. 

The Victorian muzzle 

loading rifles on Scott's 

carriages are mounted close 

to the later weapons, 

although no one is aware of 

when they were installed. 

One explanation might be 

linked with the 1879 

Carnaervon Commission-on 

colonial defence, which 

called for tJre protection of 

strategic bases. By that date 

these guns, which appear to 

be 6 or 7in types, were 

almost obsolete and could 

have been spared. Does 

anyone have any ideas? 

249

New Works on the Period Before 1900 

THE ATHENIAN 

TRIREME 

J S Morrison and J F 

Coates 

Cambridge University 

Press. 

210 x 145mm,266pp,72 

illustrations 

ISBN 0 521311004 

(hardbach) f22.50, 

(paperback) f7.95 

Ttrere can be no better place 

to start any history of 

warships than with the first 

well documented, purposebuilt 

ship configured for 

battle. This work combines 

the research efforts of a 

classical scholar and a naval 

architect in an effort to 

explain the real nature of the 

three banked, oared galley, 

its purposes and use. 

Essentially an oar driven 

ram, the trireme has fascinated 

historians and oarsmen 

for centuries. 

250 

Napoleon III even built a 

conjectural example. Now 

the authors work has been 

translated into wood by the 

Greek Navy, and the 

resulting ship should soon be 

tried at sea. Recommended. 

THE SEVENTY- 

FOUR GUN SHIP 

VOLUMES I AND II 

Jean Boudriot, 

translated by David 

Roberts 

Jean Boudriot 

Publications. 

310 x 240mm. 166 & 213 

pp, heavily illustrated. 

ISBN2903178143&15 

1,939 each 

The publishing event of the 

year for enthusiasts 

concerned with the age of 

sail has to be the first two 

volumes of Jean Boudriot's 

four-volume study of the 

French 74 of the period of 

the American War of 

Independence, detailing every 

aspect of design and 

construction, along with a 

host of detail on the naval 

service ofthe age. The 

translation, by David 

Roberts, provides valuable 

guidance for areas where 

British and French practice 

and nomenclature differ. 

Otherwise, it is true to the 

original. This remains lhe 

book on wooden warship 

construction and everyone 

interested will await the 

final two volumes with 

anticipation. Volume III 

should be available by the 

time this review appears. 

THE WOODEN 

WORLD: AN 

ANATOMY OF THE 

GEORGIAN NAVY 

N A M Rodger 

Collins, 235 x 160mm, 

445pp, illustrated. 

ISBN 0 002165481 

917.50 

In this thoughtful and 

provoking study, Nicholas 

Rodger dismantles many of 

the myths and 

misconceptions about the 

Royal Navy in the 

eighteenth century that have 

long garlanded our 

understanding on the 

human element of seapower. 

Recent work by the author 

and other scholars has 

overturned the image of a 

brutalised, divided society in 

favour of a complex but just 

and tolerant organisation, 

concerned to cany out its 

duties with the consent of 

the men. With numerous 

examples we are introduced 

to an open society, far less 

obsessed with class and 

rank than that of the 

nineteenth and twentieth 

centuries, and one in which 

no police force was needed, 

The image of seamen with

eakfast in a Portsmouth 

coffee house is one that must 

be taken to heart. The 

foundation of loyalty was 

not violence but trust and 

reward. Men followed good 

officers, and ran away from 

bad ones. No Navy in any 

age can afford to ignore this 

message. 

The central theme of the 

work is simple: the Royal 

Navy in the Seven Years 

War was a good service, 

because it was almost 

invariably successful. It is 

worth asking how far the 

weakness ofthe Flench cast 

the navy in an unjustly 

favourable light. The War of 

American Independence 

demonstrated that the 

superiority survived, but not 

in so great a deglee. Without 

the powerful leadership of 

Ansoir the service suffered. 

and there are examples 

enough in this book to reemphasise 

the importance of 

his contribution. Highly 

recommended. 

THE WAR OF 1812: A 

DOCUMENTARY 

HISTORY, VOLUME 

I 

Edited by William S 

Dudley 

US Naval Historical 

Centre, 250 x 170mm; 

774pp, illustrated. 

In this magnificent volume 

the US Naval Historical 

Centre demonstrates some of 

the advantages to 

scholarship of Government 

funding. Where the British 

Navy Records Society has to 

rely on the unpaid labours of 

its editors for a series of 

excellent but often 

unconnected studies, the 

historical centre can begin to 

consider the War of t812, 

one of the formative 

experiences of the service, in 

three volumes, of which this 

is the first. While by no 

means as exhaustive as the 

series on the Quasi War with 

Flance, and the conflict with 

the Barbary Pirates, this will 

be a major work and more 

accessible because of its 

relative brevity. In this 

to l8l2 and the first year of 

the War, the subjects include 

the three famous frigate 

actions in which the 

Americans captured the 

Macedonian, Jaua and. 

Guetiere, along with minor 

engagements and the details 

of naval administration. 

Recommended.' 

FREE TRADE AND 

SAILORS'RIGHTS: A 

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 

THE WAR OF 1812 

Compiled by John C 

Freriksen 

Greenwood Press, 235 x 

169mm,399pp. 

ISBN 0 313243131 f0.00 

This work will be of 

tremendous benefit to all 

students of the War of 18t2, 

providing a comprehensive 

listing of all printed source 

materials relating to the 

war. The heavy 

American,/Canadian bias is 

to be expected. The war was 

a major event in North 

American history: a mere 

sideshow for Britain. 

Perhaps this work might 

encourage more studies of 

the British war effort. 

Excellent. 

WHY THE CRIMEAN 

WAR? A 

CAUTIONARY TALE 

Norman 

Rich 

University Press of New 

England, 220x 745mm, 

257pp 

ISBN 0 87451 328 6 

tr7.25 

A handy resume of the latest 

work on the so-called 

Crimean War. However, this 

book, like almost every other 

work on the subject reduces 

the role of the Navy to 

insignificance, accepts the 

standard view that naval 

commanders wete 

incompetent and commits 

several mistakes offact. The 

Russian fortress in the 

not even a village! The 

importance of this theatre to 

the author can be gauged 

from its receiving little more 

than one page in the whole 

book. The navy is similarly 

ignored. On the diplomacy of 

the war this work is well 

informed, but the conflict is 

little understood. 

THE 

UNFORTUNATE 

DUKE: HENRY 

PELHAM, FIFTH 

DUKE OF 

NEWCASTLE: 

1811-64 

F Darrell Munsell 

University of Missouri 

Press, 230 x 155mm, 

334pp 

ISBN 0 826204562 

930.00 

This usefuI biography of the 

Secretary of State for War 

during the Crimean conflict 

provides a remarkable 

example of political 

interference with senior 

commanders on active 

service. Newcastle blamed 

Admiral Dundas for the 

failure of the invasion of the 

Crimea, considering him a 

cautious and irresolute 

incompetent. Despite the fact 

that he had no authority 

over the naval officers, he 

advised General Lord 

Raglan to ignore any orders 

Dundas might give that 

would endanger the army, 

and hoped that thd naval 

second in command. Rear 

Admiral Lyons, would do the 

same. The reason for 

Newcastle's concern was the 

alarmist stories of the 

newspaper reporters on the 

spot, who Iistened to any 

rumours critical of Admiral 

Dundas and did not check 

their sources. A more 

rounded treatment, using 

Dundas's extant papers, 

would have suggested that 

Newcastle was unjustified in 

his fears. He was driven 

from office two months later 

when the newspapers he had 

tried to placate turned on 

him. A case of poetic justice? 

ARAB PIRACY IN 

THE GULF 

Sultan Muhammad Al- 

Qasimi 

Croom Helm,240 x 

160mm, 244pp,20 

coloured illustrations 

ISBN 0 709921063 

s25.00 

In this stimulating book the 

author attempts to 

demonstrate that the British 

East India Company 

deliberately accused the 

Arab traders of the Persian 

Gulf of piracy in order to 

destroy their ability to 

compete in economic terms. 

Previous. British studies 

have always accepted the 

contemporary accounts of 

piracy and brutality atface 

value. Using archives in 

Britain and India this book 

sets out to expose the 

dishonesty of the original 

claims, and the poor 

scholarship of later works. 

In accepting his revision we 

must begin to reconsider the 

cosy view of Britain in the 

nineteenth century acting as 

the disinterested world 

policeman. This study points 

to the cynical manipulation 

of the truth by apparently 

disinterested men, seeking to 

safeguard their economic 

expansion by crushing the 

opposition. How much more 

of the naval history of the 

eighteenth and nineteenth 

centuries might not be open 

to the same critique? 

Recommended. 

HMS 

COLLINGWOOD 

7844-7848 PACIFIC 

STATION 

Edited by Allison Kay 

The Pentland kess, 220 x 

150mm, 279pp 

ISBN 0 9462703\ 7 

f 10.00 

This book consists of the 

edited journal of a lieutenant 

aboard the flagship of the 

Pacific Station, the 80-gun 

sailing ship Collingwood. It 

promises much, by the way 

25r

of insight into the 

nineteenth century navy, 

and yet ends up by 

disappointing. The period 

covered is dominated by the 

Tahiti crisis, and the 

journals are crammed with 

references to local politics, 

which might be of interest to 

students of the islands, and 

the diplomacy of the crisis, 

but they add nothing to our 

understanding of the Navy. 

The ship is almost invisible, 

apart from the tables. 

LIBERALISM AND 

NAVAL STRATEGY: 

IDEOLOGY. 

INTEREST AND SEA 

POWER DURING 

THE PAX 

BRITANNICA 

Bernard Semmel 

George Allen & Unwin, 

160 x 230mm, 239pp 

ISBN 0 049422006 

(hardback),942201 4 

(puperbach) f25.00 or 

f8.95 

The author has a wide 

knowledge of political 

attitudes during the late 

nineteenth century, and their 

relationship to policy. 

However, in this book he 

puts forward an argument, 

based on a later debate 

rather than contemporary 

sources, which cannot be 

justified. He presents the 

1856 Declaration of Paris as 

a complete surrender of the 

British position on rnaritime 

warfare, which had always 

jusfified stopping neutral 

ships on the high seas. This 

was not the case. The 

private correspondence of 

the responsible ministers 

revealS that the Declaration 

was used to win.the 

propaganda war on this 

issue with the USA, by 

linking it to the abolition of 

privateering. America 

refused to accept this and, 

alone of the major powers, 

refused to sign the 

declaration. British 

statesmen were delighted; 

they knew that the terms of 

the Declaration could always 

be abrogated, on the excuse 

that the enemy, by using 

privateers, had broken it 

first. This is exactly what 

happened in 1914-18. 

Essentially, no statesman 

colld, publicly admit to such 

intentions, so speeches in 

Parliament are a very poor 

guide to the real policy of the 

Government. The later 

history of this debate, and 

the role of the naval 

intellectuals and more 

practical men like Lord 

Fisher, is well handled, but 

the whole issue was always 

academic. In the age of 

realpolitik no nation would 

forego a major weapon. 

Britain, for all the hopes of 

Cobden and others, was no 

better or worse than any 

other state. In 1856, Britain 

was seriously thinking about 

war either against FYance, or 

America. Ilr both cases the 

Declaration of Paris would 

have been abrogated. It 

would have been broken at 

any time up to 1914 if it had 

been necessary. Only in the 

Crimean War was it 

unnecessary, because of the 

absence of Russian shipping, 

or serious seaborne trade. 

Misguided. 

THE RED EARL: 

THE PAPERS OF 

THE FIFTH EARL 

SPENCER: 1835-1910. 

TWo Volumes. 

Edited by Peter Gordon 

Northants Record 

Society, 250 x 150mm, 328 

and 374pp, illustrated. 

ISBN 0 90727545X&52 

2 S30.00 

Earl Spencer was the Liberal 

First Lord of the Admiraltv 

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252

during the last Gladstone 

Mnistry, and Iod 

Roseberry's brief 

Government" As the 

highlight of a long political 

career this period is wel, 

represented among Spencer's 

papers, which have only 

recently been sent to the 

British Library, where they 

are still closed. This edition. 

superbly edited, is rather 

more general than naval 

historians might require, but 

as a study of late nineteenth 

century politics it is 

unrivalled. Coverage of the 

naval administration, the 

loss of the Victoria, 

increases in construction 

and the struggle for 

estimates all feature. Fisher 

also makes an appearance 

as a forceful junior. 

One area of naval interest 

that is not mentioned is 

Spencer's election as the 

First President of the Navy 

Records Society in 1893. The 

support of leading political 

figures gave the Society the 

support it needed in the 

early days. Spencer 

demonstrated an 

appreciation of history as 

the record of experience that 

contrasts favourably with 

contemporary politicians. To 

set an example Spencer 

made the papers of the 

Second Earl available to the 

Society. These covered the 

period 1794-1801 and were 

edited in four volumes by Sir 

Julian Corbett and Admiral 

Herbert Richmond. Required 

reading for the early stages 

of the modern Royal Navy. 

MAKERS OF 

MODERN 

STRATEGY: FROM 

MACHIAVELLI TO 

THE NUCLEAR AGE 

Edited by Peter Paret 

Oxford University Press, 

235 x 155mm, 941pp 

ISBN 0 19820097 

8 

(paperback) 972.95 

This new collection uses the 

title of E M Earle's epoch 

making work of 1943. It is a 

powerful demonstration of 

the advances made in 

scholarship in the past 25 

years. Every essay now 

deals with an existing 

literature. raises a discussion 

and attempts to improve our 

level of understanding. For 

those who wish to 

understand the business of 

war, from the intellectual 

perspective, this is the finest 

guide yet devised. As a 

paperback it cannot be too 

highly recommended. 

THE 

CONSTRUCTION 

AND FITTING OF 

THE SAILING MAN 

oF wAR 1650-1850 

Peter Goodwin 

Conway Maritime kess, 

295x 284mm, 288pp, 100 

photographs, 300 line 

drawings. 

ISBN 0 851773265 

f30.00 

Where Boudriot provides an 

exhaustive coverage of one 

ship, Goodwin attempts the 

more complex task of 

dealing with 200 years of 

development in the 

construction, fitting and 

machinery of the hull of the 

British sailing warship. The 

masts and rigging have 

already been examined in 

James Lees' book, Masting 

and. Rigging. Ttre process of 

evolution is well illustrated 

by excellent drawings, and 

explained in a manner that 

emphasises the reasons for 

change, rather than merely 

noting that change had 

taken place. There is a 

tremendous amount of 

information, much of it of 

value to for the model maker 

and tbchnical historian. 

In one area, the same one 

that all other authors on this 

subject tend to neglect, the 

coverage is not up to the 

general standard. It has 

always been assumed that 

after Seppings completed his 

work, in 1832, nothing 

happened. This is not the 

case. Much of the postwar 

work of the Surveyor's 

Department was taken up 

with attempts to preserve 

timber from dry rot. 

'ncMainmast 

I nloolg 4 

Saxmundham, Suffolk, 

lP17 1HZ, England 

Apart from stocking 

thousands of U.K. titleg 

we import nautical 

books from:- 

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Nonruay 

Oman 

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Portugal 

South Africa 

Singapore 

Spain 

Sweden 

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U.S.A. 

New, Secondhand and 

Antiquarian Marine Books 

253

An example of Sepping's iron tiller and a double sheave tiller 

block fi tted to_the deckhead. One of the many excellent photographs 

from Th.e Conetruction and Fitting of the Saitiig Man 

of War. 

Seppings' own preference 

waS fcir two yeafs immeision 

of all green.timber in salt 

water (he had a sl.oop sunk 

in Poitsmduth harbour in 

1E16 to prove his point). 

Once constrtcied, ships were 

injected with a variety of 

evil mixtures, including coal 

tar, mineral oil, white lead 

and slaked lime in various 

proportrons. I[ rs worln 

noting'that Sbveral of 

SeppingS', slips lasted well 

into' the twentieth century; 

lhe NiIe being over 110 years 

old when accidentally 

destroyed in April 1953. The 

ffigatp Unicorz, still afloat 

at Dundee, provides an 

invaluable demonstration of 

the post 1815 methods. Her 

survival reflects the advantages 

of slow construction 

with seasoned timber, and 

the benefits of having no sea 

service. Even well built shios 

were pulled apart by the 

weights they had to carry 

254 

and the strain of the 

sea, 

Seppings' successor, Sir 

William Symonds, protnptly 

abandoned all Seppings' 

methods of avoiding dry rot, 

believing they did not justify 

the cost and inconvenience. 

Even so, his ships, the 

largest wooden sailing ships 

ever built, lasted well. His 

modifi cations were intended 

to make ships cheaper to 

build, including the use of 

more iron, and less heavy, 

curved timber. In a period of 

reduced naval estimates this 

was important. 

This aside, Goodwin has 

added to the literature ofBritish 

wooden shipbuilding, 

a literature that is better 

rounded than that for any 

other country, with the possible 

exception of the United 

States. What we need nowis a 

French equivalent for this 

book, and Brian Lavery's 

Ship of the Line. 

AT RNEE, SeNtember 

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First five volumes; 

* Modern Sea Power 

* Ships, Submarines and the 

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* Naval Electronic Warfare 

For further information on 

individualtitles olease write to: 

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The Gruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni 

Franco Gay 

The latest volume in the series covers the fastest 

cruiser of all time, one of the Condottieri type built 

by ltaly between the wars as a counter to the large 

French super-destroyers. 

240 x 254mm landscape, 120pp,26 photos, 

300 line drawings. ISBN 0 851774539. e14.00 

Published 24 September 1987 

The Frigate Diana 

David White 

Built in 1793, Diana is typical of hundreds of 

frigates built by all the combatants in the 

Napoleonic Wars. 


300 line drawings. ISBN 0 851773567. 

Cl4.00 19 November 1987 

SEND FOR OUR 

The 20-Gun Ship Blandford 

Peter Goodwin 

The first in a long line of small Sixth Rates built 

for the Navy from 1719 onwards. 


300 line drawings. ISBN 0 851774695. Cl4.00 

21 January 

1988 

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Warship will begin 1988 terests will make War- Motorboats of the Rus 

under the new editor- ship a lively and stimu- sian Army 1915-20, The USN solution for a specialised 

ship of Ian Grant. This lating a magazine ap- Career of Vasilevs tender, converted from a 

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is another step in the pealling both to the gen- Georgios 1, and some supplied rigids with helium, 

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Warship and ensuring cialist reader. Warship losses. 

its success for a second 45 will set the tone with This is another exciting 

decade. It is our inten- articles on USS Vesu- step for Warship and we 

tion to include a greater vilis and the Dynamite look forward to the connumber 

of articles in Gun, The Loss of the tinued support of our 

each issue while at the IJN Musashi, Landing regular read.exs and an 

same time retaining the CraftThrough the Ages, influx of new ones to enhigh 

degree of detail by TheSalvageofHMS/M sure that Warship reimproved 

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Conway Maritime Press - Warship 44

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